ML20028A571
| ML20028A571 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Framatome ANP Richland |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1982 |
| From: | Book H, Brock B, Thomas R, Zurakowski P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028A569 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1257-82-09, 70-1257-82-9, NUDOCS 8211220297 | |
| Download: ML20028A571 (7) | |
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U. S. ZiUCLEAR RECUL\\ TORY COMMISSIO:t OFFICE OF INSPECTIO:I AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION V
( vcReport No. 70-1257/82-09 Docket No. 70-1257 License No. SNM-1227 Safeguards croup 1
Licensee: Exxon Nuclear Company 2101 Horn Rapids Road Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Nacte: Richland Facilty Inspection at: Richland, Washington Inspection conducted: September 20-22, 1982 Inspectors:
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[.2' B. L. Brock, Fuel Facilities Inspector---
' Date Signed f4bAA
/oAsh m P.R.Zprakowski,RadiationSpecialist Dat6 Signed
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,3 Date Signed Approved by:
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-tO-j 1-t o - 2.r _. N R. D. Thomas, Chief,OMaterial Radiation Date Signed
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Approved b :
4 H. E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch (fa te' Signed Summary:
Inspection on September 20-22, 1982 (Report No. 70-1257/82-09)
Areas Inspected: Organization, facility changes and modifications; internal review and audit; criticality safety; operations review; emergency planning; radiation protection; and required calibration.
The inspection involved 40 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified within the scope of this inspection.
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l Dr RV Form 219 (2) 8211220297 821026 PDR ADOCK 07001
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- D. L. Cornell, Manager, Plant Operations
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- T. L. Davis, Manager, Auxiliary Operations-T. C. Probasco, Engineer, Nuclear and Industrial Safety
- E. L. Foster, Radiation Safety Assistant, Radiological -Safety
- C. W. Malody, Manager, Licensing and Compliance,' Operating Facilities
- J. E. Pieper, Engineer, III-Licensing
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- D. E. Clark, Senior Engineering Assistant
- C. O. Brown, Senior Licensing Engineer
- M. G. Hill, Supervisor, Chemical Operations M. K. Valentine, Manager, Maintenance Engineering R. R. Sharp, Specialist, Nuclear Materials c
R. R. Brinkerhoff, General Supervisor, Ceramics L. Klug, Engineering Assistant R.~ R. Roper, Technical Specialist R. M. Rogers, Health Physics Technician
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Organization R. McAlees, has replaced K. P. Galbraith as Manager U0 Shop Operations.
p No changes in the organizational structure have been made.
3.
Facility Changes and Modifications The planned move of the laundry to a new location next to the maintenance building has been completed and the facility is fully operational.
The new quarters are larger and the ventilation has been improved, i
recov$rhroom.tionisbeingtemporarilysetupinthe2ndfloorscrap The U 0 opera The scrap recovery operation, currently shut down, will resume operations in the same area after the U,0g operation has been moved from this temporary location to its new Totation in the building l
addition currently under construction.
I Construction of the new lagoon was underway.
Excavation was in' process during the inspection. Although the lagoon will have a single liner initially, it will have a second liner and leak detection system installed next year.
A portion of the warehouse containing used HEPA filters, recoverable
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scrap and moderated scrap was insulated and heated to improve its habitability.
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Two office buildings, one a single story building of 8000 square feet and the other a two story building of 30,000 square feet, were about 50 percent complete.
The licensee indicated he plans to install a scrubber on conversion line 2.
The scrubber has been on-site for over two years but as of the previous inspection a decision to install it on line 2 had not been
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made.
4.
Internal Review and Audit The licensee maintains an effective internal review and audit program.
The criticality safety by-monthly audits reviewed (3 were conducted since our April 1982 inspection) were of appropriate scope and depth '
and identified items warranting corrective action. Appropriate corrective actions were taken or scheduled. Subsequent audits-reviewed items identified in the previous reports and the reports indicated no previously identified items remaining outstanding.
The monthly radiological safety audits conducted since the last inspection were also reviewed. As in past years, the most frequent item observed was visible contamination in the conversion and powder handling areas.
It was noted that the audits were performed in'a' timely manner and all recommendations on the cleanup of visible contamination were given prompt attention by operations and supervisory personnel. However, there was one exception.
Visible U07 powder was found by the auditor in a July 1982 audit on top of the line #I nauta mixer where a vac-u-mix line enters.
The flange connecting the line to the blender appeared to be leaking.
At the time of the inspection, this flange had not been fixed. It is suspected that the recent higher than normal air concentrations in the area may be attributed, at least in part, to this problem. Several audits in the scrap recovery area noted significant visible contamination and high smearable contamination. A special audit on 9/21/82 noted smearable contamination up to 20,000 dpm alpha and non-smearable contamination to 50,000 dpm alpha.
Visible contamination was also noted. During the swing shift on 9/21/82 a clean up crew effectively cleaned the area. Smearable contamination was reduced to a maximum of 5000 dpm. Visible contamination was removed and all waste and scrap were placed in plastic bags and transported from the area. On 9/22/82 the scrap recovery area was revisited by the inspectors and it was found to meet license requirements in regard to visible and smearable contamination.
5.
Criticality Safety The ion exchange columns previously automatically controlled by measurement of the uranium concentration of the feed solution had been modified because of the high failure rate of the automatic system. The modification consisted of safing the 20 inch diameter columns by inserting 8 inch diameter right circular cylinders containing B C in the central bore of the columns.
4 A tube for moisture detection was added to the central axis of the cylinder I
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containing BaC. This tube will facilitate detectind fnleakage of moisture before significant loss of B C (about 1/8 inch granules) can occur by migration 4
through holes that might eventually develop in the safing cylinder. A transparent cover on the cylinder containing the 8 C facilitates checking 4
the B C level. Special locks with key control are in place for positive 3
contrdi of the B C contents of the ion exchange columns.
4 It was also disclosed by the licensee that they expect to use 45 gallon drums containing 17 fixed poison rods in the powder preparation process when they switch to larger batch processing methods. The criticality safety analysis of this container was not reviewed during this inspection.
6.
Operations Review i
During the plant tour, it was observed that two containers of fuel pellets,
in the same storage location may not have been within the criticality limit.
A check of the quantities and their enrichments resulted in the determination that the quantities in the two containers stored in the single location (32 Kg UO ) were well within the criticality limit (43 Kg U0 A review of the tr$1ning records of the employee who stored the mater $a)l confirmed that ne had been instructed in the use and importance of criticality limits.
The employee had passed the course examination and had appropriately handled other criticality safety storage problems in the same storage area.
. luring the plant tour it was also noted that the scrap recovery room which was shut down for modifications (the U 03 g process was being moved into it temporarily) reflected poor housekeepTng.
Although a review of the air monitoring data did not disclose excessive airborne contamination, its ' appearance was not acceptable from a visible c
contamination standpoint. The licensee immediately began removi99 tools and miscellaneous equipment from the room, conducted a survey, and had the following swing shift steam clean the room.
The licensee's swift and effective response resulted in a significant reduction in the visible contamination observable in the room. The licensee informed the inspectors that initially the room had been scheduled for cleanup at a later date, however, upon learning of the NRC concern the area was cleaned immediately. ~<
The observations during the tour also disclosed socre bowing (about 1/8 inch) of the licensee's slab tanks in the scrap recovery room. These slab tanks replaced some earlier ones that had bowed significantly (ayout 2 inches). The angle iron bracing on the current tanks is heav,ier arid the tanks have tie-bars joining the flat sidewalls. The engineer responsible for the current tank installation indicated the bowing observed currently,
is quite small and was observed when these more heavily braced tanks were-received.
The bowing was attributed to the stresses resulting from the welding associated with adding the tie bars and the heavier angle iron.
The tour included the Specialty Fuels Lab (neutron absorber fuels-NAF) which had been expanded to include a former storage area. The area was
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. very clean. Air samplers were in calibration and operating normally.
HEPA filtration units were operating within proper limits. While in this area, it was stated by the licensee that the Nautablender criticality safety analysis does not take credit for the added neutron absorbing element, and that additions to the Nautablender must, by measurement, contain less than 1% moisture. During the Specialty Fuels Laboratory tour, the presence of B C pellets that are loaded in special rods were noted. These 4
pellets were readily distinguishable from UO2 pellets by their grey color.
The expansion of the rod loading area into what formerly had been the cold machine shop was also of interest. The rod downloading station had been relocated w'. thin the rod loading area from an east wall location to a position along the north wall that separates the rod loading area from the pellet storage area. The area was clean and well kept.
The sump once used to adjust the pH of the liquid waste input to the lagoons was empty and clean. The south tank of the two 30,000 gallon tanks used to store alternately the liquid waste from the laundry was inspected for sludge accumulation. The residue in the south tank was apparently of low density since it was readily stirred with the depth stick and settled slowly.
A central recessed sump area of about 4 feet diameter and about 1.5 feet
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deep in which the pumpout pipe was located, appeared to have little if any sludge accumulation. To assure obtaining a representative sample of the sludge, the tank contents are recirculated for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> through the piping, the tank, ano pump before sampling.
The north tank was partially full and the liquid content was not sufficiently clear to permit the inspectors to view the bottom of the tank even with the aid of a flashlight. The licensee indicated the same low density, readily stirred residue was all that had been encountered in their inspections of both tanks. The tanks are scheduled in the near future to receive inputs directly from other low uranium content effluent streams (etch solutions, passivation wastes, laboratory wastes and chemicals from the West Tank Farm). All process effluents will be pumped to the lagoons and sampled before being pumped to the retention tanks. Additional sampling will occur as needed to comply with the State of Washington's specifications for release to the sewer system.
Additional attention will be given to this area.in subsequent inspections because of the changes contemplated in the use of the tanks (82-09-01).
Approximately 8000 55 gallon barrels of recoverable waste are stored onsite.
Plans for the startup of a wet chemistry recovery system have changed.
The new plan includes an initial ashing step for significant volume reduction.
This plan will not be implemented until after October 1984 at which time the facility destined to house the operation will have been constructed.
7.
Emergency Planning The licensee was conducting fire protection training during two of the three days we were on site. The local fire department helped to train
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- i the licensee employees in metho'ds+0f effectively extinguishing fires.
The employees were able to use the extinguishers in the hands-on segment of the training program. Fires purposefully set by the local fire department were extinguished by the employees. The licensee indicated the local fire department has been very helpful in these training exercises. This training was scheduled to be followed by cardio-pulmonary resuscitation training.
8.
Radiation Protection Approximately one man day was expended reviewing the licensee's external radiation exposures and bioassay results. One high external exposure and one high bioassay result were reviewed in more detail.
a.
External Radiation Exposures A quarterly TLD program from U. S. Testing Company of Richland, Washington is utilized by the licensee.
Because of the nature of the work at the licensee's Horn Rapids Fuel Fabrication Plant, high external exposures are very unlikely. However, a group of engineers and technicians who do maintenance and refueling work on Exxon fueled reactors in the United States and several foreiga countries are at greater risk.
Their exposure records are maintained at the Horn Rapids Facility.
External exposures for employees at the Horn Rapids Facility were found to be in general quite low with many results near zero and an average yearly exposure of less than 150 mrem. A high quarcerly exposure of 1.48 rem was noted in the records for the 1st quarter.of 1982.
A follow up on this result indicated that the individual was in one of the groups mentioned above.
Complete NRC-4 & 5 information was in his file.
Therefore this is not considered an overexposure.
b.
Bioassay Results The bioassay program consists of lung counts and whole body counts by outside contractors and periodic urinalyses.
An outside contractor arrives on site two times a year with transportable equipment to do lung counts for U-235. The persons selected to take the count are divided into two groups thereby each person receives a yearly routine lung count.
In the event of a serious incident where internal exposure is suspected, the person (s) may be sent to a nearby Richland contractor and counted immediately.
During May 3-10, 1982 103 persons were given a lung count by the mobile laboratory. Of the persons counted 22 gave positive results. The high reading in this group was 86 + 46 micrograms U-235. This was calculated to be 34.4% MPLB.
Urine samples showing more than 25 ug/l uranium necessitate a reanalysis.
Workers with readings above 100 ug/l are removed from controlled area work.
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. A high urine sample of 430 ug/l for a conversion line wor'<er was noted in the records for the 2nd quarter. The inspectors were interested in determining whether or not the man was removed from controlled area work until his urine count reached an acceptable level. The appropriate monitor log book was checked in the U0 Building and it 7
was found that the person in question was removed from work in the restricted area until his urine count reached an acceptable level, c.
Solid Radioactive Waste Disposal As part of this inspection, the radioactive waste storage yard was toured. The radioactive waste storage area was roped off as a separate controlled area with appropriate radiation signs posted in several areas. Because of political and other problems at the three major low-level disposal sites, the licensee has been unable to ship any of the waste which has been collected. The inventory has grown to over 5000 drums and boxes. Although most druns appeared to be in good shape, a few of the older ones did show signs of corrosion and leakage. The licensee does have detailed written procedures for low-level solid waste compaction, packaging and shipment.
In addition,.
they have an internal audit system set up to insure that the procedures are followed.
Both the written procedures and audit system include check-off lists. However, because of the prolonged outside storage the inspectors stressed the importance of repackaging containers should they show signs of leakage.
9.
_Regnired Calibrations s
During the tour of all facilities and areas where licensed material is used or stored, particular emphasis was placed on checking both fixed and portable radiation detection equipment for timely calibration. All equipment observed during the tour carried current calibration stickers and appeared to be operating properly. The licensee's computerized tickler system for insuring proper calibration frequencies was not examined during this inspection.
- 10. Exit Interview The findings of the inspection were discussed in a meeting with the licensee's management staff on September 22, 1981. The licensee was informed that no items of noncompliance were identified during the inspection.
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