ML20198S518

Insp Rept 70-1257/97-07 on 971215-19 & 971222-24.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ep,Operations & Followup on Open Items from Previous Insps

ML20198S518
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	01/16/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198S480	List: ML20198S477 ML20198S496 ML20198S518
References
70-1257-97-07, 70-1257-97-7, NUDOCS 9801260207
Download: ML20198S518 (16)

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ENCLOSURE 2

- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket No.: 70 1257 License No.: . SNM-1227 Report No.: 70-1257/97-07 Licensee: Siemens Power Corporation Facility: Siemens Power Corporation Location: Richland, Washington Dates: December 15-19 and 22-24,1997 Inspector: C. A. Hooker, Senior Fuel Facility ine,pector Approved By: Frank A. Wenslawski, Chief Materials Branch

Attachment:

Supplemental Inspection Information i

9901260207 990116

PDR- ADOCK 07001257

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2-EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Siemens Power Corporation .

NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/97-07 This routine', announced inspection included a review of emergency preparedness, selected

- aspects of operations, and followup on open items from previous inspections.

Emergency Precaredness

• The licensee's Emer,,ency Plan (EP) and implementing emergency procedures provided

. sufficie.7t guidance for responding to plant emergencies, and the emergency organization appeared adequate for responding to emergencies (Section 1.1).

- Emergency response personnel were adequately trained and appeared knowledgeable of emergency response procedures and equipment (Section 1.2).

. The licensee maintained adequate support from offsite agencies for responding and assisting during an emergency event (Section 1.3).

. Emergency exercises and drills appeared to adequately exercise the licensee's emergency response organization (Section 1.4).

• The licensee's emergency response facilities and equipment were maintained in a state of operational readiness (Lection 1.5).

Ooerations

. The licensee appropriately responded to a hydrofluoric (HF) acid spill and licensee management apprnpriately instituted an incident investigation team to review the event (Section 2.1).

. No discrapancies were identified between the criticality safety specification (CSS) and installed equipment or configuration of the lagoon uranium recovery (LUR) process.

Operators were adequately trained and knowledgeable of the system (Section 2.2).

The licensee identifie i a violation involving unauthorized storage of uranium powder in

- temporary storage facilities; the matter is being cited because the cause of not recognizing and adhering to the applicable license condition has not yet been-determined and corrective ' actions rehtive to the cause have not yet been defined (Section 2.3)._

- 41 - Although overall housekeeping practices were generally adequate, some areas warranted attention (Section 2.4).

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~3-Pecort Details Summary of Plant Status The plant was operating both of its wet chemical conversion lines and Line 1 in the new Dry Conversion Facility (D. F). Fuel pellet production, fuel rod, and fuel bundle assembly operations were also in progress.

1 Emergency Preparedness 1.1 Emeroency Plan and imolementino Procedutes

a. Insoection Scoce (88050)

The inspector reviewed and discussed revisions to the licensec's EP and impiamenting procedures, and organization and staffing with licensee oersonr,el to determine if the licensee's emergency program was current with site conditions and being maintaine<1 in a state of operational readiness. Specific 1997 revisions reviewed included Part I (EP) and Part 11, Quick Reference Section," and Part 111 (EP implementing procedures) submitted to NRC by letter dated May 2,1997 (Revisions dated April 28,1997).

b. ' Observations and Findinos Although the licensee's quick reference (Part II), implementing procedures (Part lil), and letters of agreement (Part IV) are not considered as part of the EP specified in Section 8, Part I of the license, the licensee provides these Parts and revisions to the NRC as part of the EP manual. Revisions to the EP involved inclusion of the new DCF and the Lagoon Uranium Recovery / Solids Processing Facility. The revisions to Part 11 included the addition of two new nearby facilities arid names of onsite personnel due to organizational r.hanges, Implementing procedure changes included improved decision making guidance for the Plant Emergency Director (PED) and a r.otification worksheet for the new nearby facilities. The licensee's emergency renonse organization, emergency response personnel responsibilities, and staffing were consistent with that described in the licensee's EP. The EP and implementing procedures provided adequate guidance on classification and mitigation of the consequences of emergencies, assessment for any potential releases of radioactive materials and hazardous chemicals, personnel accountability, sito evacuation, and internal and off-site notification of emergencies.

The inspector noted that one of two copies of the EP and implementing procedures maintained in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was considerably out-of-date.

This was also noted as a finding that was corrected in the licensee's recent annual independent audit described below. The licensee suspected that someone had brought an unrevised copy of the EP to the EOC during the October 1997 annual exercise and this was inadvertently exchanged with the EOC copy following the exercise. Copies of the EP are not assigned control numbers and/or location designations and approximately 42 onsite persons are provided copies of the EP and implementing procedures. The

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-4 licensee informed the inspector that a method would be developed to identify EPs maintained in the EOC. The inspector discussed with cognizant licensee personnel the benefits of including a review of onsite EPs in the licensee's monthly equipment inspection program, especially EPs maintained in the EOC. This matter was acknowledged by the licensee representatives.

c. Conclusions T'ie licensee's EP and implementing emergency procedures provided sufficient guidance for responding to plant emergencies, and the emergency organization appeared adequate for responding to emergencies.

1.2 Emeraency Preoaredness Trainina

a. Insoection Scoce (88050)

The inspector reviewed training records and interviewed selectri emergency response supervisory personnel and technicians to evaluate their awareness of emergency procedures.

b. Observations and Findinas The inspector noted that the licendee's training program was consistent with Section 7.2 of the EP. Training lessen plans for the Plant Emergency Response Management Team (PERMTi , PED, and the Plant Emergency Response Team (PERT) adequately covered subject matter relative to their respective assignments. As part of emergency response capabilities, the licensee also maintains & qualified confined space and rope rescue team. PERT team training covering the use of a self-contained breathing aoparatus consisted of practical exercises in a smoke trailer located at the Richland airport.

Training related to emergency response included the areas of industrial hygiene, radiological response procedures, hazardous materials decontamination and spill control procedures, first aid / mass casualties proceduies, and fire fighting. Regarding fire fighting capabilities, the licensee's training primarily involved the use of fire extinguishers that i included extinguishing a 160 ft! liquid fire. With exception of incipient fires, the licensee relies on the Richland Fire Department for fire fighting capabilities.

The licensee maintained a current roster of the qualified PERMT and PERT members in the incident Commander's office and the Emergency Operations Center. Personnel interviewed appeared knowledgeable of their responsibilities and procedures for their respective assignmer.t in the emSrgency organization.

c. Concludon Emergency response personnel were adequately trained and appeared knowledgcable of emergency response procedures and equipment.

5-1.3 Offsite Sucoort Aaencies a, Insoection Scooe (88050)

The inspector evaluated the licensee's involvement with offsite support agencies as described in the EP.

b. Observations and Findinas The licensee's emergency plan contained current agreement letters with offsite agencies for response or assistance during emergency events. The licensee had formally notified local, county, state, federal support agencies, and nearby facilities of its annual one day training and site familiarization tour that occurred on December 11,1997. The training covered Siemens emergency response organization, classification / notification of incidents, emergency response planning zones, the offsite coordination process, and the layout of the EOC. The inspector noted that the attendance included personnel from 12 different suppurt agencies and one nearby facility. Quarterly communication exercises with offsite support agencies were conducted in accordance with procedures outlined in the EP.

c. Conclusions The licensee maintained adequate support from offsite agencies for responding and assisting during an emergency event.

1.4 Drills. Exercises. and Audits

a. insoection Scooe (88050)

Records of licensee drills, exercises, and audits were revi%ed and discussed with cognizant licensee personn .l.

b. Observations and Findinas in accordance with the licensee's EP, one major exercise or table-top exercise is conducted by the site emergency response organization 6ach year. Every 2 years a r.1ajor Deld exercise consisting of an accident scenario, activation of the emergency response organization, and activation of emergency response facilities is conducted.

The biennial field exercise " Lobo" involving a nitric acid tank explosion and injured personnel was held on October 29,1997. Participants included the state and other

' support agencie .. The purpose of the exercise was to test the actions of the PERMT,-

. especially in their ability to make proper notifications and how they handled a mass casualty event involving employees and outside contractor workers. The exercise was also to test the PERMT's decision making process regarding the need for an offsite evacuation. The exercise was also designed to test the PERT's capability for responding to such an event and interfacing with the local fire and police departments. The exercise was evaluated by contractor workers and a Siemens employee.

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The evaluation noted positive findings including: (1) the PERMT, through good team

- workmanship, provided excellent suggestive guidance to the PED; (2) the PED made timely and appropriate classification and protective action decisions; and (3) the PERMT worked well together as a team to determine the cause of the event and the initiating mechanism.

Negative findings inv61ved: (1) the lack of audibility of the public address (PA) system during the initial activation of the event, (2) a weakness in communication related to if and who had called for offsite medical assistance, and (3) downgrading the classification of the even* under conditions at the time may have been too soon with a potential for allowing workers to return to normal duty too soon. Items 2 and 3 were discussed and closed at the debriefing following the exercise Regarding problems with the PA system, the licensee's investigation determined that the failure was due to the signal f om the security station emergency PA override microphone being over powered by excessive amplifichtion of the regular PA system, which resulted in a very weak emergency PA .

During the inspection, the licensee was taking steps to remove several interfering amplifiers to increase the power of the emergency override microphone.

Semiannual enticality evacuation drills and the annual fire evacuation drills from all site buildings were consistent with Section 7.3 of the EP. Critiques of fire and criticality evacuation drills were utilized to identify and correct deficiencies. Actions taken to correct deficiencies appeared appropriate.

Monthly audits of emergency equipment and supplies were timely. The licensee's annualindependent audit of the EP was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Section 7.5 of the EP. The audit was conducted by an outside consultant with emergency management expertise on October 21-23,1997. The auc'it primarily focused on Section 7.0,' Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Capability." The audit report indicated that tne emergency program, facilities and equipment, and trair.ing were "exceptionall/ well maintained except for a negative finding involving maintenance of up-to date EPs and implementing procedures. Some individua!3 who maintained copies of the EP and implementing procedures had not inserted applicable revisions ar.d one of 1

two copies of the EP in the EOC was not up to date. These matters were corrected during the audit.

c. Conclusions Emergency exercise and drill audits were consistent with the commitments in the licensee's EP and appeared to have adequately exercised the licensee's emergency response organization.

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n 1.5 Emeroency Eauioment and Facilities L

a. Insoection Scone (88050)

The inspector toured the licensee's facilities to examine selected emargency response equipment maintained in emergency repoaitories.

b. Observations ar d Findinas The inspector noted that emergency equipment =positories contained the quantities and equipment identified in the licensee's EP and imph:menting procedures. Cabinets containing emercency equipment were clearly identifiable, c intents were orderly, and appeared to be well maintained. Survey meters examinod we e currently calibrated and operational, and self-contained breathing apparatus air tanks were full. During facility tours, the inspector noted that emergency exit doors were adequately posted and evacuation routes were clearly posted on appropriately located site bulletin boards.

c. Conclusinns The licensee maintained a good inventory of well maintained emergency response equipment and supplies that was in a state of operational readiness.

2 Plant Operations 2.1 Oggrational Event - HF Acid Soil' A primary byproduct of the licensee's new DCF io HF acid that is collected in two 12,000 gallon storage tanks (Nos. 500 and 501) and ultimately released for unrestricted commercial use under the provisions of Section 1.6.11, Part I of the license. The tanks are located inside a special, coated,. secondary containment sump designed to hold more than the capacity of one taak. On December 10,1997, the licensee experienced a spill of apprcximately 250 gallons of HF acid from Tank 501.

a. Insoection Scoce (88020 and 88050)

The inspection of this event included discussions with cognizant licensee personnel, a review of celected associated records, and observations during a visit to the HF acid storage tank area. The inspection also included a review of the emergeacy response aspects relateo to the spill.

b. Observations

- At 7:30 a.m. on December 10,1997, the lead operator in the DCF control room observed a high sump alarm for the HF acid tank storage system, and flow to the storage system was secured. . Tank 501 had been filled to approximately 8,720 gallons (~73% full) and was considered full,= and tank 500 had been placed in the filling mode by the -

computerized control system. The level indicator on tank 501 had failed the previous a- -_ ,

8 Week and there were no spares in stock. A new level indicator was to be insta"ed on the day of the spill. The level indicators provide a high level alarm when the tank is at the normal full level and a high-high level alarm (approximately 9,500 gallons) automatically diverts the HF flow from the filling tank to the other tank. Subsequent to the spill, the licensee found that a three way automatically controlled tank fill ball valve had been installed 90 d3grees out of position. The improperly installed ball valve resulted in continued acid flow to tank 501. Relative to the event, the licensee initiated an incident investigation to determine the cause(s) and necessary corrective actions.

Regarding emergency actions related to the HF acid spill, barricading cones were immediately set up arouad the tank system and contractors working on nearby projects ,

were removed from the area. At 7:40 a.m., sampling measurements around and over the sump indicated that the HF (as hydrogen fluoride) airboma concentration around the sump ranged from 0.0 to 2.5 ppm. The indutarial permissible level (time weighted average) for workers, assuming an 8-hour work day and 50-weeks per year, is 3.0 ppm.

The licensee estimated that approximately 250 gallons (approximately 2,000 lbs.) of HF acid (-43 wt.% HF) overflowed to the sump. Workers using respiratory protection equipment and full acid suits entered the area, pumped the spilled acid into portable storage containers, and washed the sump down with about 150 gallons of water which was also pumped to a portable storage container. Sampling measurements during the cleanup indicated that the HF airbome concentration did not exceed 2.5 ppm and there were no measurable concentrations by 10 a.m.

Regarding vaporization of HF acid, at a concentration of 50 wt % HF, the vapsrization pressure is very low below 80'F. At the time of the acid spill, the ambient temperature was 35 'F and 41 'F following cleanup.

The licensee's emergency action level for an onsite potential emergency condition (Lovel 1 response for hazardous chemicals) is 5.0 ppm; a level at which a worker may be exposed up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects. The licensee's EP also requires that the Environmental Protection Agency and the Washington Department of Ecology be promptly notified if a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance is released ir'to the environment within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. The EP listed 100 lbs. as the reportable quantity for HF. Since the HF acid spill was confined to the secondary containment (sump) and licensee's sample measurements indicated that there was no threat to human health or the environment, the event did not provide cause for the licensee to activate its EP.

Since the licensee had not completed its investigotion, the inspector informed the licensee that the results of the investigation would be reviewed during a subsequent inspection to independently assess the licensee's decision making in determining the cause and corrective actions. The inspection would also include a review to determine if the licensee's engineering change notice process was adequately imolemented for the installation of the system. The results of NRC's review will be documented in a subsequera inspection report and is considered an inspection followup item (IFl 70-1257/9707-01).

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c. CDDelusions The licensee appeared to have appropriately responded to the HF acid spill, and licensee management appropriately instituted an incident investigation team to review the event, identify the causes, and define corrective actions to prevent similar recurrences.

2,2 Plant Modifications - LUR Facility The LUR facility was designed to recover uranium from liquid chemical wastes stored in the licensee's lagoon system. The basic process involves pumping approximately 4,000 gallons of high uranium content liquid waste from La0oon 3 into one of two 6,000 gallon plastic precipitation tanks (twin systems). The uranium is precipitated from the solution by audition of sodium hydrosulfite and several hours of settling. At the end ,

of the settling period, the low uranium content liquM. is decanted and pumped to another lagoon. The uranium precipitate is pumped into the precipitate wash tank and the washed slurry is either collected in 4 gallon carboys or centrifuged and collected in 4 gallon buckets. The product is transferred to another facility and processed in a solvent extraction system for the recovery of usable uranium.

The licensee shut down the LUR facility in 1992, folloung NRC inspection findings involving the failure to provide a high-efficiency particulate air filtering system and effluent samp ing for an off-gas system used for a temporary dissolution process for processing mop water waste products. The LUR facility was not enclosed and only operated during the warm weather season.

The licensee recently completed construction of a new pre-engineered 110 ft. by 65 ft.

metal building to enclose the existing LUR process equipment and the new solids waste processing addition. The new facility provides a heating and ventilation system, a HEPA futered exhaus; system, and a room air and effluent sampling system. The purpose of this new additic:i is for the licensee to effectively nmmss the liquids and solids in the lagovn system, consistent with an enforceable cc. scree between Siemens and the state of Washington to have this facility in operation in 1998 for ultimate lagoon closur6. Although operation of the LUR facility is authorized by the license, an amendment for operating the solids processing facility is still under NRC revien.

Inspgrtion Scoce (88020)

On December 18,1997, the inspector observed the licensee's initial phase of startup testing of the LUR process. The inspector discussed the startup process with cognizant licensee personnel, and reviewed applicable records and documents for startup approval and operating the system. The inspector also performed a walkdown of the system to verify system design features and configuration.

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b. Observations and Findinos The startup testing of the LUR facility was limited to processing one batch of liquid waste in each of the two process lines. The first phase of this operation consisted of pumping -

approximately 4,000 gallons of liquid wastes from Lagoon 3 into the precipitation tank for subsequent chemical addition and precipitation of the uranium slurry. Functional testing of the system with potable water did not reveal any problems w?,h the operation of the system. Startup a; emval to operate the system for processing lagoon wastes was consistent with the lico.isee's engineering change notice procedure. Criticality safety controls were consistent with CSS, No. P97,170, " Liquid Uranium Recovery and Solid -

Processing Facility," Revision 0. Applicable criticality safety controls were adequately incorporated in Operating Procedure No. P66,794, " Lagoon Uranium Recovery (LUR),"

Revision 13. The operators had been adequately trained on the process and operating procedure. Appropriate radiological controls were in place, including work area air sampling and exhaust stack effluent sampling. The inspector did not identify any discrepancies between the process system and components described in the criticality safety specification and facility drawings.

Sampling data indicated that the uranium concentration in Lagoon 3 was 0.222 gU/l with an enrichment of 2.96 wt.% U-235. The CSS limited the concentration to 1.0 gU/l with a maximum enrichment of 5.0 wt.% U 235.

Since the startup began late in tne day, the inspector did not observe complete filling of the precipitation tank from Lagoon 3. However, an obseivation of a considerable dimple on the side of the tank was discussed with cognizant licensee personnel. According to the process engineer, when the liquid in the tank reaches a certain height in the tank (during pre operational testing with water), the dimple rapidly expanded to the normal diameter of the tank. The licensee acknowledged a need to evaluate the reliability of the tank due to continued flexing at the dimpled area if the condition existed after several uses. The inspector will review the licensee's evaluation of this matter in a subsequent

- inspection and it is considered an inspection followup item (IFl 70-1257/9707-02).

c. Conclusions No discrepancies were identified between the CSS and installed equipment or

- configuration of the process. Operators were adequately trained and knowledgeable of the system.

2.3 Temocrary Storace of SNM At approximately_5:30 p.m. on December 18,1997, the Manager, Safety, Security and Licensing informed the inspector of the discovery of a violation of the requirements of the licence for onsite _SNM temporary storage facilities. The licensee maintains several permanent warehouses for storage of various uranium compounds. In addition, over the

. past 10 years the licenses has utilized sea-land containers for temporary storage of SNM, and currently approximately 40 sea-land containers are maintained at various -

locations on the site.- To eliminate the use of sea-land containers and increase storage 1

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I space, by letter dated July 14,1997, the licensee requested an amendment to its license ,

for the addition of a 7,000 ft? " Operations Scrap Warehouse

• for storage of scrap snd product containers.

Since the external structure of the new warehouse had been recently completed, but the license amendment had not yet been approved, by letter dated December 10,1997, the license notified the NRC licensing group of its intent to use the new warehouse as a temporary storage facility for scrap uranium dioxide as described in Table 1.1.1 of the license application. By letter dated Dece,1ber 18,1997, the NRC licensing group acknowledged that Siemens' use of the scrap warehouse for temporary storage in a p'.nar array was an activity authorized in the license.

From internal licensee discussions on December 18,1997, the licensee determined that uranium oxide powder was the material that needed to be placed in temporary storage.

During a closer examination of the license authorization for temporary stcrage the licensee noted that the authoiization was for storage of a planar array of closed containers of uranium oxide pellets with a maximum enrichment of 5.0 wt.% U-235.

During this examination, the licensee recognized that sea-land containers had been used for temporary storage of uranium oxide powders and that such storage was not an authorized activity. Of 31 sea-land containers being used as temporary storage facilities,12 contained some uranium oxide powder. The licensee subsequently informed the inspector of thic condition.

Prior to the exit meeting on December 19,1997, the licensee commenced a physical verification of its inventory of uranium powder stored in sea-land containers. At this time, the inspector examined the contents of sea-land containers Nos. 2 and 5 which had been opened for inventory. The inspector observed a mix of stored uranium powder and pellets in 5-gallon safe batch containers. Each container was sealed, properly labeled with the contents, and stored in fixed metal grids with one foot edge-to-edge spacing and arranged in a single-tier planar array. Each of the sea-land containers were maintained locked while not in use, posted with the applicable criticality safety limits for uranium i compounds generically used throughout the site for such storage and posted as required by 10 CFR Part 20. At the exit meeting, the I;censee provided the inspector with copies of pertinent documents that provided the safety basis for the storage condition.

By letter dated December 22,1997, the licensee provided the NRC Headquarters Fuel Cycle Operations Branch and the inspector a summary of the applicable criticality safety analyses wh ch provided the safety basis for the storage of uranium powder in sea-land containers Also, during subsequent telephone conversations on December 22-24, 1997, the licensee provided the inspector with details related to inventory of uranium powder in temporary storage. As provided by the licensee, approximately 14,000 kg of low enriched uranium was stored in the se:-land containers. During a telephone conversation between the licensee, NRC Fuel Cycle Operations and Licensing Branches, and the RIV Walnut Creek Office on December 23,1997, there was a mutual  !

agreement that the unauthorized temporary storage matter was an analyzed condition i

but occurring at locations not specifically authorized by the license. By letter dated December 29,1997, the licensee also provided the NRC Region IV Office a letter which

4 12- l provided: (1) Siemens' recognition of being in violation of the license for temporary storage of uranium oxide, (2) an explanation of the safety consequences and the basis for the licensee's conclusion that the storage conditions were safe, and (3) a ,

description of the storage restraints to be employed until the material could be moved. i The licensee's letter stated that conditions associated with storage of uranium oxide in temporary locations were consistent with the conditions specified for urmJam oxide storage in criticality safety analyses for other areas of the plant. The letter also stated that Siemens would soon be submitting a license amendment request for authorization to store a wider range of uranium bearing compounds in temporary storage.

Safety Ccndition S-1 of t.icense SNM-1227 authorizes the use of licensed materials in accordance with the siatements, representations, and conditions contained in Part I of the licensee's application dated October 28,1996, and supplements and revisions thereto. Section 1.5, " Authorized Activities," Part I, of the license application states that specific locations of authorized activities involving wpecial nuclear materials are identified in Table 1-1.1. The authorized activity for temporary storage facilities in Table 1-1.1,

" Specific Locations of Authorized Activities,' specifies the storage of a planar array of closed containers of oxide pellets up to 5.0 wt.% U-235.

Although the licensee identified the matter as a violation of it , license ar d it was reported to the NRC, the failure to impleinent the requirements of Safety Conditic a S-1 of the license is considered a cited violation (701257/9707-03) because the cause of ' ot recognizing and adhering to the license condition has not been determined and the corrective actions to be taken relative to the cause have not been defined.

2.4 Other Oogrational items

a. Insnection Scoce (88020)

The inspector toured selected facilities during normal and back-shift hours to observe ongoing activities and conditions of the opera *:ag areas. The NRC Senior Resident inspector from the nearby Washington Public Power System nuclear power plant also accompanied the inspector during a facility tour on December 17,1997.

b. Observations and Findinas Overall housekeeping was generally adequate. However, early in the insp3ction, the inspector noted that housekeeping in some areas was not up to the standards observed during previous inspections. In the HF scrubber room of the new DCF, considerable combustible materials (cardboard boxes containing various maintenance remnants and plastic bags of cleaning rags) were stored on and next to a 480 voit transformer and nearby high voltage disconnect panels. Plastic bags containing used cleaning rags and rubber gloves were strewn about the floors in the North and South tank rooms, a broken water hose reel partially blocked the door into the North Tank Room in the chemical conversion area of the UO2 Building, and other similar housekeeping practices were observed in nearby locations. Empty labels had not been removed or obliterated on some waste drums used for the accumulation of low-level uranium dry waste materials in

13-the UO, Building. These matters were immediately corrected when brought to the licensee's attention.

Another observation included three reusable (plastic coated) used danger / lockout tags

!ying on panels in the Line 1 blend room in the UO2 Building. The tags had been used to tag the power supplies for the blender drive motors during enrichment clean-outs and were not returned to storage or discarded. Procedure EMF P65,513. " Lock and Tag Procedures," Revision 5, did not address disposal of lockout tags after use. The lockout tags were immediately removed from the area when the matter was brought to the licensee's attention.

c. Conclusions Although overall housekeeping practices were generally adequate, some areas warranted attention.

2.5 Miscellaneous Ooerational issues (92701)

(Closed) Unresolved item 70-1257/9704-01: This item involved a licensee identified matter concerning an individual s intentionalimproper transfer of uranium powder. On July 31,1997, the NRC completed its investigation and by letter dated September 12, 1997, the subject individual was issued a Notice of Violation (lA 97-071). By letter dated September 30,1997, the individual appropriately responded to the matter. By letter dated November 5,1997, the NRC notifi3d the licensee of the results of NRC's investigation and its exercise of discretion which resulted in the violations being treated as non-cited violations, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

This item is closed based On the referenced actions taken by the NRC.

(Closed) Insoection Followuo item 701257/9706-01: Review of the license 4 investigation of NRC Bulletin 91-01 reportable event (No. 32949). This event !nvolved wet UO, powder in licensee's Dry Conversion Pilot Plant. This matter was re'.iewed by the NRC Fuel Cycle Operations Branch and documented in Section lli of Inspection Report No. 70-1257/97-207 dated November 7,1997. This item is closed.

3 Miscellaneous Radiation Protection issues (92701)

(Closed) Insoection Followuo item 70-1257/9705-2: Timely review and documentation of re-survey results. The inspector identified that several survey forms did not provide information related actions taken by operations to clean areas or re-survey results for areas which exceeded the licensee's action levels for removable contamination. Also, the radiological supervisor's monthly reviews of survey data was considered not timely relative to identifying and correcting problems. During this inspection, the inspector noted that the appropriate information was being documented for re-surveys of areas cleaned 'oy operations and weekly reviews of survey data by the radiological supervisor appeared adequate for identifying and correcting problems. The radiation safety group was also computerizing the survey system which will incorporate methods to flag when re-surveys were due. The inspector had no further questions relative to this item.

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~ Exit Meeting Summary

. The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on December 19 and during telephone conversations on December 22-24,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

Although proprietary information was reviewed during this inspection, such information is not knowingly described in this report.

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATICN ,

PARTlAt LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED LicatData B. F. Bentley, Manager, Plarit Operations J. M. Deist, Criticality Safety Specialist

. J. B. Edgar, Senior Engineer, Licensing

8. N. Femreite, Vi:e President, Manufacturing D. C. Kilian, Manager, Process Engineerinc L. J. Maas, Manager, Regulatcry Compliance C. D. Manning, Lead Criticality Safety Specialist J. H. Phillips, General Supervisor, Chemical Operations

. T. C. Probas:o, Manager, Safety L 1. J. Urza, Manager, Manufacturing Technology R. E. Vaughan, Manager, Safety, Secarity and Licensing

' R.T. Kimura, Proce.ss Engineer -

NRC S. A.. Boynton, Senior Rasident inspector, Washington Public Power System INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88050: Emergency Preparedness

- Tl 2600/003: . Operational Safey Review IP 92701: Fol'.~ lup ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 70-1257/9707-01 -lFl- Review iicensee's investigation of hF acid spill 70-1257/9707-02 IFl Review licensee's evaluation of the LUR precipitation tank flexing.

70-1257/9707-03 VIO Unauthorized storage of uranium oxide powder in L temporary storage facilities' Closed

70-1257/9'r04 URI ~ Intentional improper transfer of urc.1ium powder 1257/9505-02, IFl Timely review and documentation of re-survey results [

L 70-1257/9706-01' ;IFl Review of licensee's investigation of moderated povcder in the dry conversion pilot plant (Event No,32949)

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.2- t LIST OF ACRONYMS .

CSS criticality safety specification  :

DCF Dry Conversion Facility _

-_EOC . Emergency Operations Center EP' - Emergency Plan

_HF hydrofluoric LUR lagoon uranium recovery PA public address PED Plant Emergency Director PERMT - Plant Eme.gency Response Management Team -

PERT Plant Emergency Response Team 5

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