ML20058D426

Insp Rept 70-1257/93-11 on 930908 & 0927-1001.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Criticality Safety,Operations & Followup on Open Items

ML20058D426
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	10/17/1993
From:	Hooker C, David Proulx, Reese J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058D417	List: ML20058D414 ML20058D426
References
70-1257-93-11, NUDOCS 9312030152
Download: ML20058D426 (2)

Text

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F U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V l

l Report No. 70-1257/93-11 1

Docket No. 70-1257 License No. SNM-1227 Licensee:

Siemens Power Corporation 2101 Horn Rapids Road l

Richland, Washington 99352-0130 Facility Name: Siemens Power Corporation Inspection at: Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:

September 8 and September 27 through October 1, 1993 Inspectors:

AM

/8 /T C. A. Hooker, Fuel Facilities Inspector Date Signed

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l D. Problx, Re.

nspector, WNP-2 Date Signed j

Approved by:

A)M lo 17 !? 3 i

QamffL H. Ree'se, Ch6ef Dat'e Si6iid Fat?ities Radiological Protection Branch Summary:

Areas Inspected: This was an unannounced routine inspection of criticality safety, operations and followup on open items.

Inspection procedures 30703, 88015, 88020, 92701, 92702, and 92703 were addressed.

l Results: Within the scope of this inspection, no violations or deviations were identified. The licensee's immediate response to assure that NRC identified program weaknesses were remedied was representative of management's commitment to improve program performance (Section 2.1.1).

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i DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) i

• B. N. Femreite, Plant Manager,

• R. E. Vaughan, Manager, Safety, Security and Licensing

• M. K. Valentine, Manager, Manufacturing Engineering

• L. J. Maas, Manager, Regulatory Compliance l

• J. B. Edgar, Staff Engineer, Licensing l

J. W. Helton, Manager, Plant Engineering

• B. F. Bently, Manager, Plant Operations J. H. Phillips', General Supervisor, Chemical Operations

• E. L. Foster, Supervisor, Radiological Safety

• C. D. Manning, Criticality Safety Specialist

• R. K. Burklin. Health Physicist i

W. G. Keith, Manager, Mechanical / Chemical Engineering

• Denotes those attending the open exit interview on July 30, 1993.

In addition to the individuals noted above, the inspectors met and held discussions with other members of the licensee's staff.

In the following sections of this report, the singular use of the word l

" inspector" indicates that only one inspector was involved in the j

specific area and the plural use " inspectors" indicates that more that one inspector shared involvement in the specific area.

l 2.0 Criticality Safety / Operations Review (88015 and 88020)

Inspection Report No. 70-1257/92-08, 93-02 and 05' describe previous l

t inspection activities in this area. This inspection of these areas was l

primarily focused on observations made during facility tours, discussions with cognizant personnel, and review of facility changes.

f 2.1 Facility Chanaes i

2.1.1 Dry wnversion By letter dated April 28, 1993, the licensee requested the NRC's author 'ation to begin construction of a new facility to house an expanded dry conversion process for converting uranium hexafluoride (UF,) to uranium dioxide (U0,) powder. The licensee has been testing and qualifying its dry conversion process and product in a full scale,'

one-line, in the U0, Building.

The new facility will contain three standard dry conversion lines with a nominal capacity of 400 metric tons per year per line. Two lines will be installed % mediately and the third line will be added later. The dry conversion process will consist of electrically heated chests to f

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2 vaporiz'e the UF. in 30B cylinders. UF. gas will be reacted with steaa and hydrogen in a high-temperature fluidized bed (called reactor),' which J

produces defluorinated U0, and an HF-bering gaseous effluent. The U0, powder will be fed to a rotary calciner for final defluorination.

From the calciner, the powder will be transferred to a powder preparation system similar to those currently used for the licensee's chemical conversion process. The HF-bearing off-gas-from the reactors and calciners will be condensed to form a hydrofluoric acid liquid coproduct which the licensee intends to market it as a commercial chemical.

The licensee will be constructing its new facility between the existing U0, Building and storage lagoons. This location will require the

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removal of several chemical storage tanks, the current UF cylinder

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l handling and storage area, and underground liquid waste lines and a l

sewer discharge li'ne. The licensee will be removing all under ground l

lines where the new facilities will be located.

l The main process portion of the building will be approximately 75 ft. x 80 ft. x 50 ft. high. Also a 30 ft. x 60 ft. x 25 ft. high attached l

l building will be constructed to house an HF (coproduct) recovery operation.

Other attached structures _will include.a clean _ equipment i

room, change rooms, an office area, and a hot maintenance shop.

1 When the new dry conversion facility becomes operational, the licensee l

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will eliminate its chemical conversion processes. The licensee expects l

that approximately 90% of liquid wastes currently generated with the chemical conversion processes will be eliminated. The. licensee is considering decommissioning of their storage lagoons following the shutdown of its chemical conversion systems.

i During the inspection the inspector noted that licensee had initiated several activities in preparation for the. % #acility.

The licensee had relocated two 10,000 gallor smmonium hyois Sie tanks, was breaking ground for a new UF handing and storage facility, and.had rerouted one of the liquid waste lines. The inspector reviewed activities involved the waste line relocation that was performed under the licensee's Engineering Change Notice (ECN) procedure EMF-858, No. 1.13.- Based on the review of ECN, "1993 Encased Lines," dated June 8,1993, a walk-down of the system, discussions with the cognizant engineer, operations personnel and the criticality safety specialist,_ the inspector made the following observations:

(1)

The ECN involved the re-location of existing liquid waste (low level uranium nominally at about 1.0 parts per million U and chemical wastes) lines from the Solid Waste Uranium Recovery (SWUR) facility's incinerator off-gas scrubber. and the U0, Building's fuel rod etching facility, laboratory, change rooms, and radiation safety's decon sink. The ECN also covered the fabrication of a new waste holdup / lift station with a 500 gallon _.

chemically resistant tank. The tank is housed in a concrete sump on the west side of the U0, Building. This modification was being performed to replace a similar system that was located on the east

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side of the U0, building. The liquid waste from the new holdup / lift station is pumped from one of two installed pumps over the roof of the U0, Building to the lagoon storage system..One pump starts automatically at a specific tank level and the other is a manually started standby pump. Both pumps were also connected to the licensee's emergency power system. The-collection tank was equipped with a visible and audible high level alarm both locally and in the SWUR control panel. The discharge from the tank is sampled via an automatic composite sampler when liquid is pumped to the lagoon system.

(2)

The licensee's ECN process requires that modifications remain -

under engineering control until all the work has been completed l

before fully assigned to and accepted by the operational I

organization. Before fully assigned and accepted, by signature, l

the supervisor of the operational organization. specifies that l

procedure revision and operator training have been completed.

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l Occasionally it is necessary for the operational organization to l

temporarily operate the equipment or systems under engineering-control before all work for the modification has been fully completed. However, the ECN procedure does not specify l

requirements for operator training and revision of procedures for a syste::: under engineering control. Since.some systems or-equipment must be operated during off-shift hours, adequate i

procedures and operating training are necessary details to mitigate process upsets.

(3)

The inspector noted that the new lift station was placed in service on September 13, 1993. The ECN was still under engineering control because insulating of the above ground lines and some equipment labeling had not been completed. The inspector noted that the new holdup / lift station was being operated by the Plant Support group under Plant Operations. The inspector also noted that the acting Plant Support supervisor and operations supervisory personnel were not fully cognizant of the status of the new facility.

Additiona'.ly, the operating procedure, EMF-22 No. P66,755, "High and Low kaste Monitors and Proportional Samplers," dated June 17, 1992, had not been revised to reflect the new system. However, during discussions with the Plant Support operators, the inspector determined that these individuals had received adequate training from the engineer on the operation of the facility.

Following discussions with the operations personnel, the responsible engineer initiated actions to revise'the operating procedure.

Based on the above observation, the lack of an undefined process for i

operating equipment and systems while under engineering control was identified as a weakness in the licensee's ECN process. This matter was discussed with cognizant licensee management and engineering personnel.

The licensee acknowledged, the inspector's observation and discussed 1

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4 proposed chang'es to the ECN procedure to improve the turnover process from engineering control to the operational organization. The inspector will examined the licensee's final action regarding this matter in a future inspection. This is an inspector followup item (70-1257/93 '

01).

1 2.1.2 Other Chanaes The inspector noted ground preparation for a new 10,000 square ft. non-radioactive pre-engineered steel frame warehouse. This new warehouse is being located on the south side of the licensee's protected area.

The licensee expects to complete the construction of this new facility by December 31, 1993. The warehouse will be used for maintenance and repair of empty fuel shipping containers and records storage. The facility will be equipped with a water sprinkler fire protection system.

Following completion of the new warehouse, the licensee will consolidate its receiving of scrap fuel pellets and new fuel pellet shipping (currently located at several site locations) in the space occupied in the existing warehouse. The licensee stated that the consolidation of fuel pellet receiving and shipping operation handling will eliminate the need for the licensee's extensive use of sea / land containers used to store fuel pellets.

2.2 Other Observations The inspector toured selected facilities to observe current operations and criticality controls. The inspector observed several partially obscured criticality control limits signs in the Specialty Fuels fabrication area that were immediately corrected.

In the areas toured, the inspector did not identify any peor criticality safety practices by l

operators or maintenance personnel.

Except for the Hot Shop in the U0, Building, housekeeping was good in the areas toured.

Since housekeeping has been a continual problem in the Hot Shop,. the licensee recently formulated a Hot Shop Quality Improvement Program (QlP) Team to evaluate housekeeping in this area.

Based on discussions with cognizant licensee personnel and the review of l

Hot Shop QIP Team meeting minutes, the inspector determined that the licensee was providing adequate attention to the matter.

The inspector noted that the licensee had added a new criticality safety 1

analyst to their staff. Based on a review of the new individuals resum6, the inspector determined that this individual met the qualifications specified in Section 2.2.4, Part I of the license application.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3.0 Followuo - Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findina 3.1 Cited Violations (92702)

5 Based on the review of selected licensee procedures, CSAs, training records; and system walk-downs and discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector verified the corrective actions taken to correct the violation and those to prevent recurrence of the following violations as stated in the licensee's timely response:

(1) 70-1257/93-04-01 (Closed) - Failure to Follow Criticality Controls.

(2) 70-1257/93-05-01 (Closed) - Failure to Follow Procedures for Modifications Involving Fissile Material.

(3) 70-1257/93-05-02 (Closed) - Failure to follow Operating Procedures.

(4) 70-1257/93-05-03 (Closed) - Failure to Evaluate the Potential for Moderator Intrusion.

(5) 70-1257/93-05-04 (Closed) - Failure to Incorporate Safety Controls In CSAs.

5.2 Non-Cited Violations (92702) 70-1257/93-09-01 (Closed) - Failure to Perform Monthly Tests of Safety Interlocks on the UF. Off-Gas System.

The inspector verified that the licensee had placed the subject tests, performed by Operations, on its computerized preventative maintenance system to ensure that they were formally scheduled and would not be overlooked in the future. The inspector also verified that all subsequent tests had been performed at the required frequency and had no further questions regarding this matter.

5.3 Confirmatory Action letter (CAL) No. 5-93-001 (Closed) - (92703)

This CAL dated February 12, 1993, detailed the agreement between the SPC and the NRC resulting from the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) review of an event which occurred at your facility during the week of February 8, 1993. The CAL confirmed SPC's commitments (1) to perform an engineering evaluation of the potential intrusion of moderating liquids into the uranium oxide blending and powder preparation systems, (2) to define the specific controls necessary to prevent criticality, and (3) to use either an alternative method to manually vacuum transfer blended powder to the powder preparation system and tag the " accurate" feeder system out of service, or if SPC decided to use the feeder, SPC would dedicate, on a continuous basis, a qualified operator at the feeder station to observe operation of the feeder and to be watchful for the intrusion of moderating liquids. Use of the alternate method or the dedicated operator was to remain in effect until completion of the engineering review and satisfactory resolution of NRC concerns.

SPC submitted the engineering evaluation to the NRC on April 22, 1993.

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The licensee's evaluation identified several additional controls to be implemented prior to removing the interim control utilizing a qualified l

operator to monitor for moderator intrusion.

On September 8,1993, based a physical inspection of the systems of concern, the inspector verified that the licensee had effectively l

implemented these additional controls which involved the:

(1) installation of vac-u-max shutdown switches in the control rooms, (2) installation of deadman switches for manual operations with the powder transfer system, (3) installation of moisture detectors in the powder j

preparation hoods with automatic vacuum system shutdown,-(4) upgrading i

of " accurate" feeder hopper covers with spring-activated closures and installing lights inside the feed hoppers, and (5) installation of covers on vacuum system air inlets. The inspector also verified that the licensee's operating procedures adequately incorporated the '

modifications and that operators were cognizant of the new controls.

5.3

_ inspector Followuo Items (92701)

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70-1257/92-02-01 (Closed) - Review of Licensee's Enaineerina Evaluation of Moderation Controls Inspection Report No. 70-1257/93-05 describes the review of the subject

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evaluation and Section 5.2 above describes the NRC's verification that the licensee had effectively implemented additional criticality safety.

controls identified in the evaluation. The inspector had no further.

questions regarding the licensee's evaluation and this matter is closed.

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i 70-1257/92-08-03 (Closed) - Review of Licensee's Final Investiaation of Slab Hooper Bulaina and 70-1257/93-08-04 (Closed) - Review of Lono Term i

Corrective Actions to Mitiaate Slab Hooper Bulaina 1

Section 4.0 of Inspection Report No. 70-1257/92-08 describes the initial l

review of the-licensee's actions related an NRC Bulletin 91-01

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reportable event (No. 24382) concerning slab hopper bulging.

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this inspection (70-1257/93-11), the inspector reviewed the licensee's final investigation and implementation of long term corrective actions to correct the problem.

The licensee's investigation.and engineering studies determined that the slab hopper bulging was most likely caused metal fatigue from heat generated from oxidation.of U0, to uranium oxide (U,0,) that is commonly.

known as "burnback", which is increased by leakage of air into the hopper.

Several of the actions taken by the licensee to mitigate f

bu.lging problems included:

(1)

Replacement of all slab hoppers with new hoppers built to new specific. design and reinforcement criteria.

(2)

Impose enrichment control of the U0, powder stored in the hoppers until they were replaced.

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i-7 Install a temperature monitoring system that can provide 5

(3) temperature warning alarms and automatic high level trips that l

shuts down the vacuum transfer system to stop air in-leakage to stop further oxidation.

4 (4)

Add pressure relief valves to all hoppers.

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(5)

Perform routine dimensional inspections of the hoppers.

f Perform routine ultrasonic tests (UT) of the wall thickness of all (6) 3 hoppers.

The inscector noted that as of October 1,1993, the licensee (1) had replaced the Line 1 slab hoppers, (2) was installing new hoppers in the Line 3 powder system, (3) was controlling the enrichment of the U0, -

stored in the Line 2 hoppers until their replacement, (4) had installed temperature monitoring devices with alarms and automatic trips of shut 4

off of the vacuum transfer' system, (5) had developed and were-implementing new operating procedures to reflect the modifications and 4

operators response to temperature alarms, (6) had trained the operators on the new procedures, (7) had developed specific design criteria for slab hoppers, and (8) had incorporated routine dimensional inspections and UT of the hoppers in their computerized preventative maintenance program.

Other NRC Bulletin 91-01 Reportable Events i

Based on a review of the applicable.CSAs, criticality safety specifications, and physical inspections of the effected systems, the inspector verified that the licensee had effectively implemented corrective actions to prevetit recurrence of the reportable events:

(1)

Event No. 92-24514 - Buildup of Uranium in th'e UNH Dissolver.

(2)

Event No. 93-24955 - Overfilling of Sintering' Boats 70-1257/93-03-06 (0 pen) - Review of the Licensee's Criticality Safety Analysis (CSA) Update Procram Regarding the licensee's verification of "as-built" configuration of l

plant systems, the licensee determined from its pilot task team efforts that additional resources were needed for timely completion of this portion of the program. The inspector noted the licensee had contracted

'j six individuals from an outside professiona.1 firm to complete this task, The which included re-verification of the licensee's pilot team work.

inspector noted that the licensee had assigned a' knowledgeable SPC.

engineer and an operator to oversee and coordinate the activities of the The inspector did not identify' any concerns related contract. personnel.

to the licensee's efforts for timely completion of the update-program.

The licensee's update program will be under NRC review until its completion.

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8 5.0 Inspection Exit Meetina (30703)

The scope and results of the inspection were summarized with the lir.ensee representatives denoted in Section 1.0 on October 1, 1993, at the conclusion of the onsite inspection.

The licensee was informed of that no violations or deviations from NRC requirements were identified.

Although proprietary information was reviewed during the inspection, such information is not described in this report. No dissenting comments were imparted by the licensee.

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