ML20235X155

Insp Rept 70-1257/87-05 on 870606-12 & 0701.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Organization & Controls, Criticality Safety,Operations Review,Transportation/Radwaste Mgt & Emergency Preparedness & Environ Protection

ML20235X155
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	07/20/1987
From:	Brock R, Thomas R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235X150	List: ML20235X149 ML20235X155
References
70-1257-87-05, 70-1257-87-5, NUDOCS 8707240067
Download: ML20235X155 (10)

Text

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O.S..NUC'LEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION'

' REGION V.

Report No.- 70-1257/87-05 Docket No. 70-1257 License No. SNM-1227 Safeguards Group: I.

Licensee: Advanced Nuclear Fuels, Inc.

2101 Horn Rapids' Road Richland, Washington 99352

~ Facility Name: -Richland Facility Inspection at: Richland, Washington l- Inspection Conducted: ' June 6-12 and July 1, 1987 .

Inspectors: ,

B. L. Brock, Fuel: Facilit es Inspector.-

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Date igned M

l Approved by: g/ [d [7 R. D. Thomas, Chief f)dte/Sig6ed Nuclear Materials Safety Section Summary:

I Inspection on June 6-12 and July 1,1987 (Report No. 70-1257/87-05)-,

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection was conducted of management' organization and controls, criticality safety, operations review, transportation / radioactive waste management, emergency preparedness and'-

environmental protection.

During this inspection, Inspection Procedures'88005, 88015, 88020,  ;

86740/88035,.88050, and 84850 were covered. j 1

Results: No violations were identified in the six areas inspected. ,

1 8707240067 870717 PDR ADOCK 07001257 C PDR

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted A. Advanced Nuclear Fuels

-R. A. Schneider, Staff Specialist, Safeguards T. C. Probasco, Supervisor, Radiological and Industrial Safety

• L. D. Gerrald, Criticality Safety Specialist

• J. E. Pieper, Specialist, Health Physics L *R. H. Purcell, Manager, Safety and Security l

• E. L. Foster, Radiological Safety Assistant i

• M. K. Valentine, Manager, Plant Operations M. Kirkman, Chemical . Engineer

• C. W. Malody, Manager, Corporate Licensing

• D. C. Lehfeldt, Manager, Operations Planning and Scheduling S. R. Lockhaven, Specialist, Industrial Hygiene L. Weaver, Supervisor, Chemical Operations C. H. Gibson, Assistant Engineer J. Lusty, Traffic Technician S. Strickland, Technician J. Phillips, Shift Supervisor, Conversion M. A. Moberg, Technician Specialist B. Tadlock, Technician Specialist G. York, Health Physics Technician E. Allen, Maintenance Technician M. J. Hill, General Supervisor, Chemical Operations J. Cudmore, Senior Health Physics Technician D. Belt, Health Physics Technician B. Other Organizations G. Luer, Fire Protection Consultant R. Carlson, Operations Foreman, City of Richland Sewage Treatment Plant C. Other NRC Participants J. A. Shaffner, NRC-HQ/NMSS/LLWMD ,

A. M. Huffert, NRC-HQ/NMSS/LLWMD l Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Management Organization and Controls Section 9 of License SNM-1227 incorporated Part I and the Appendixes to Part I of the licensee's application as license conditions.

A. Organizational Structure l

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. 2 Section 2.4 of the license application requires certain organizational divisions of responsibility to provide a check and balanu system in the important areas of plant safety.

(1) The licensee's management organization division of responsibilities remains unchanged; therefore, the checks and balances remain viable.

(2) The Safety Committees activities included the review of two fires in different areas; however, both fires involved zirconium chips. Appropriate corrective action was expeditiously taken (see Section.6). Additionally, an investigation was conducted of a possible violation of the blender moisture control limit. The results of the investigation indicated procedures were followed properly and the moisture control limit had not been violated (see 5ection 3). Evaluation of changes to improve moisture-control are continuing and will be reviewed in the next inspection (87-05-01).

No violations were identified.

3. Criticality Safety Section 3.2 of the license application requires assurance of criticality safety through both administrative and technical practices.

A. An incident occurred in which a question arose regarding the possibility that a criticality safety moderation control limit may have been violated. The licensee's response included stopping i operations, taking and analyzing additional samples of the lot of

material, forming an investigation ' team, and conducting an i appropriate investigation. The investigation found that procedures

! had been properly followed but that a steam lance had sustained a fracture and contributed to elevated but acceptable moisture levels (less than the moisture control limit). The Criticality Safety l

Specialist's conservative analysis indicated the k-effective of the system remained well below 0.95. The corrective action taken by the licensee appeared to be appropriate. Additional changes are beir,g evaluated for further system improvements. The licensee responded immediately on encountering evidence of a possible. problem. It was noted however that the licensee needs a procedure describing the actions to be taken when the loss of a criticality safety contingency is suspected. This open item will be reviewed in the next inspection (87-05-O'2).

No violations were identified.

4. Operations Revig Section 2.1 of the license application requires the licensee to conduct I business in a manner so as to assure that the licensee facilities are safe from radiation and other nuclear hazards, and the operations will not be detrimental to the environs and to assure that personnel radiation

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exposures, both in plant and offsite, are maintained as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).

A. Conduct of Operations (1) The licensee's lagoon system was in a modified operation mode designed to by pass lagoon 2 which had developed a leck. The leak was reported to Region V office as required by the  !

license. The lagoon contents had been pumped to another lagoon. Inspection and repair of the dry lagoon was being undertaken. The licensee plans to hold the repaired lagoon on stand by. It may be used in conjurection with the solids leaching pit.

(2) The Liquid Uranium Recovery (LUR) process appeared to be in routine operation. A significant number of product (uranyl nitrate hexahydrate) barrels were noted on the storage pad.

The barrel storage array met the requirements of the criticality limit cards which were clearly posted in the area.

(3) The Gadolinium Scrap Recovery (GSR) process was in routine operation. Practices appeared to follow procedures and no poor health physics practices were observed. The affect of the  !

ventilation system improvements was not reviewed therefore item (86-08-05) remains open.

(4) The Neutron Absorber Facility (NAF) in the Specialty Fuels (SF) l Building had undergone some modifications of its production J line. The line was not running during the visit. A new doorway had been cut through the West wall of the NAF to facilitate fuel movement over a revised route. The modifications were appropriately reviewed and approved.

(5) The incinerator installation status in the SF Building was observed. Installation is still taking place; however, startup is projected to be in the August to September 1987 time frame.

The licensee has received a permit to construct and operate the  ;

incinerator from the Air Pollution Control Authority of Benton, '

Franklin and Walla Walla Counties. This Solid Waste Uranium Recovery (SWUR) operation is expected to yield a high level ash from selected feed. The uranium will be separated from the ash l

by leaching followed by purification in scrap recovery. Some i feed will yield low uranium content ash which will be solidified and packaged for burial. A licensee waste task team j is evaluating the licensee's waste handling options including i various methods of compacting nonburnable materials (including i those recovered during separation of waste barrel contents). 1 (6) U0, Building fuel production operations were observed during  !

thB inspection. Particular attention was given to the generation of wastes (for the benefit of the visiting NRC low level uranium waste management staff). Waste measurement by a nondestructive assay (NDA) system (a barrel scanner) was reviewed. The calibration of the NDA system and the standards I

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i used was also discussed. Additionally, the. monitoring of irregularly shaped objects and the conservative approach to quantifying them was reviewed. The values from't,uch j irregularly shaped objects are summed on the inventory sheet as )

the objects are accumulated in a large metal waste container. i A plywood sheet, one inch thick, is placed on the floor of the box to preclude fracturing the floor should a slip occur when putting heavy items in the metal waste container.- Further j waste shipment preparation is included in Section 5. No poor )

health physics practices were noted. _l (7) The recommendation that the licensee cycle manual valves, that back up. critical automatic UFg valves, at a frequency that will assure their operability was clarified. The valve in questien was not'that which the licensee's response addressed. The valve in fact is not common to both conversion lines. The valve addressed in the licensee's response is cycled each time a cylinder is changed out or a UF6 pigtail is connected or j disconnected. However, the valve in. question is. downstream 1 from the automatic valve, not upstream as is the valve the j licensee addressed in his response. The downstream valve is '

within the vaporization chest in Line 2 and its operation handle extends through the north wall of the vaporization - ,

chest. According to the control room operators, the cycling I l frequency of this valve is only a small fraction of that of the l l

cylinder valve. The licensee needs to reevaluate the response I (labeled 3.C.(1)) because the original response addressed the l wrong valves.

(8) The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the NRC -l letter concerning introduction of_ hydrocarbons into UF  !

cylinders and process systems. The licensee's UF cylinder handlingsystemexcludestheuseofoilfilledvahuumpumpsor cold traps. On March 31, 1987 the licensee responded to the NRC letter with the requested licen'se amendment including  ;

proposed controls as license conditions. _The licensee's i submittal was made as amended pages to the license. The.

J renewal application had been submitted in a timely manner.

(9) The NRC inspector reviewed the ammonium diurinate (ADU) dryer oil bath which uses dimethyl silicone' oil and found it to be as described by the licensee. The system design and method of operation appear to. effectively preclude exposure of the hot oil to oxygen. Further, the licensee has self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) available so emergency response personnel will not be subjected to the toxic by products of oil oxidation resulting from an accidental exposure of the hot oil to oxygen. This closes item (86-08-02).

No violations were identified.

5. Transportation / Radioactive Waste Management l

, 5 The licensee's program for packaging and shipment.of licensed material must be'in accordance with 10 CFR 20.311 and 10 CFR 71. All low-level radioactive waste prepared by the licensee for disposal must also be classified and labeled to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 61.

A. Shipping and Receiving was' visited to complete the review of the uranium waste-generation ar.d handling cycle. .The shipping operation

- was previously discussed with the Manager, Operations Planning and Scheduling who provided copies of the applicabie current'and properly reviewed and approved procedure. The practices of the shipping office were discussed in detail with the Traffic' Technician. This discussion and a review of the records indicated appropriate attention was given to waste shipments. A check list was used to assure that the many steps needed to. prepare a shipment' a were completed. The check list also required recording the receipt of the shipment. The. Traffic Technicians' practice was to keep the shipment file'on her desk until she received notification'of the shipments receipt. However, the procedure did not require the followup acticns of 10 CFR 20.311 for late or missing shipments. '

Close proximity of the burial site, less than 35 miles-, facilitated

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very short in-transit times and quick telephonic notification with:

followup notification by mail. The licensee agreed that the next procedure revision would include guidance that would assure responding to the requirements of 10 CFR 20.311 if the need arose'

.(open item 87-05-03).

No violations were identified.

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6. Emergency Preparedness hetion 3.9 of the license' application addressed the licensee's Emergency.

Plan (XN-NF-32) which includes a listing of procedures that have'been i prepared to implement the plan. l A. The licensee experienced two fires in the second quarter of 1987, both involved zirconium. The first fire occurred in April in the cold machine shop. The fire involved oily zirconium chips generated during the machining of zirconium end caps for fuel rods. Damage was confined to the hydraulic servo hoses to the pickup attachment at the rear.of the Star screw machine. The licensee subsequently installed a manually dumped Halon fire extinguishing system with several penetrations into the machine enclosure. The second fire

. occurred at the fuel bundle inspection station beneath the west' inspection elevator. The fire started during a cleanup. operation.

Hair-like zirconium fines, generated during the sliding of rods into '

the spacers that hold them in fixed positions in the fuel element, were being vacuumed from a small pit beneath the elevator where they accumulate. The exposed electrical connectors in the pit apparently.

were shorted by the zirconium hair-like fines as they were moving towards the vacuum hose. The ignited fines vacuumed into the vacuum cleaner burned the hose and ignited the' fines already retained by-the vacuum cleaner filter. The fire, extinguished with a Class D extinguisher, damaged only the vacuum cleaner hose and filter. .The licensee subsequently covered the electrical connectors with an

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approved cover, cleaned the residual zirconium fines out of the fixed vacuum piping, and scheduled more frequent vacuuming with a new wet vacuum system. The fines will be removed while still wet and taken to the zirconium burning area.  ;

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B. The licensee's new owner, Siemens, had requested an evaluation of )

the ANF facility by a Fire Protection Consultant to assure that the type and amount of insurance was appropriate. A portion of the consultants evaluation included fir- hydrant flow testing. This test, conducted after hours, was observed by the NRC inspector. The i licensee pointed out that the time of the test coincided with a  !

heavy offsite demand. The initial low test resuit was because of an understated residual pressure that was traced to entrapped air in i the water pressure gauge. The test was repeated after bleeding out  !

the air. A factor of two increase in residual pressure was obtained. The system test was acceptable. It was noted by the consultant that the fire hydrants needed servicing. This was evident through the considerable effort needed to operate the fire  !

hydrant valves. The consultant recommended that the licensee "

lubricate the fire suppression system valves. The licensee's response to this recommendation will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (87-05-04).

C. The licensee indicated the City of Richland plans to install 800 feet of 12 inch pipe between the City's 16 inch main and the ANF fire protection system southern feed. This bypassing of the 6 inch line will improve the water volume and pressure available for fire j suppression. J D. The licensee plans a multi phased drill involving several off-site responders. The participants met in April and are scheduled to meet  !

again in July. The drill will be announced in an effort to preclude j recurrence of injuries as recently experienced during an alarm. j i

No violations were identified.

7. Environmental Programs Section 3.5 of the license application addresses the licensee's Environmental Surveillance Program wherein gaseous effluents, liquid j effluents and lagoon systems are monitored. Additionally, the licensee i collects vegetation soil and air samples at strategic locations for analysis of pertinent chemicals and uranium.

A. The licensee's gaseous and liquid effluent releases continue to be significantly below NRC release limits. However, in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2800/9 " Reconcentration of Radionuclides in Sanitary Sewerage Systems" the NRC inspector took sludge samples i from the new City of Richland Sewage Treatment Plant. Additionally, the inspector took dried sludge samples from the City's old sewage i treatment plant that was shut down in 1985. NRC and licensee  ;

samples were taken from the same area at the old plant and at about the same time off the conveyer belt at the new plant. Essentially, i the NRC and the licensee samples are from the same population. The l 2

. 7 results of the analyses will be provided under separate cover when l they become available. The licensee recently undertook quarterly sampling of the sludge at~the new plant. The results obtained by the licensee's laboratory indicated 8.1 PPM U to 13.0 PPM U.

Analyses by an independent laboratory yielded 7.7 PPM U to 12.9 PPM U. The independent laboratory also determined the uranium enrichment to be about 2 weight percent. The NRC samples were sent to the Department of Energy's Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory (RESL) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

No violations were identified. ,

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8. Exit Meeting i i

The results of the inspection were discussed with the licensee's staff )

identified in Section 1. j The topics included:

The areas inspected. j The participation of two NRC licensing personnel from the office responsible for low level uranium waste management.

Sludge sampling at the old and new sewage treatment plants.

Fire hydrant flow test.

Unusual incident review.

Review of Assessment Team recommendations to identify and correct misunderstandings.

Status of open items.

• Closure of open items:

(86-08-02) Review ADU dryer oil bath safety system.

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• Items remaining open:

(84-10-02) Pallet contamination control improvements.

(85-02-05) Criticality Safety Task Force recommendation implementation.

(85-06-01) Ventilation improvement around the drum tumbler.

(85-12-04) Disposal of 34 drums of TRU waste.

(86-02-01) (a) Pressure based UF 6 cylinder heating shutdown. .

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8 (b) Automatic inchest TC placement (currently considered not feasible).

(86-02-03) Emergency scrubber capacity reevaluation.

(86-03-02) (b) Retraining of Health Physics Technicians.

(c) Job checklist preparation.

-(86-03-03) Relocation of UF6 cylinder rinse storage drum.

(86-03-04) Documentation of corrective action needed for -

resolution of the boat roller contamination at the NAF press. l i

(86-03-06) Corporate licensing improvement in records tracking discrepancies.through their resolution.

(86-05-01) Check licensee's performance where mass control has been replaced by slab control.

(86-05-02) Check compliance with control limits on UNH )

barrel spacing. J (86-05-03) Review results of additional bioassays of a )

contaminated maintenance worker.  !

(86-05-04) Check licensee's plans with regard to interfacing with the hospital regarding lead time needed for preparation to receive a contaminated patient not requiring the shielded facility.

(86-08-01). Review completion of radiation protection lesson plans.

(86-08-03) Review the status of the Pre-Fire Plan upgrading.

(86-08-04) Review the upgrading of training, drills their frequency and related evaluations and documentation.

(86-08-05) Review the results of the ventilation system improvement in the Gadolinium Scrap Recovery Process.

(86-08-06) Review the implementation of the independent review of the licensee's Emergency and Radiological Contingency Plan.

(86-08-07) Review the improvement in the exercise scope and critique documentation.

(86-08-08) Review the licensee's independent audit of exercises.

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(86-08-09) Review the licensee s improvement in the i

inventory of emergency equipment, supplies and j documents.

(86-08-10) Review the licensee's evaluation of the need for a program for intercomparison of environmental samples taken before and after an incident and the setting of action levels.

I (86-08-11) Review the revisions to the Emergency Plan j reflecting responses to hazardous material releases. j (86-08-12) Review the status of Emergency Cadre special access badge issuance and road control agency recognition and position regarding the badges.

(86-08-13) Review the designation of onsite Plant I Emergency Directors for swing, holiday and weekend shifts. j

• l New open items: i (87-05-01) Review improvements in moisture control between the calciners and the blenders.

(87-05-02) Review licensee's procedure covering action to l be taken when loss of a criticality safety contingency is suspected.

(87-05-03) Review the shipping procedure incorporating j guidance regarding response to 10 CFR 20.311.

(87-05-04) Review the licensee's response to the consultants recommendation of lubricating fire suppression system valves.

NOTE: Some assessment team recommendations discussed during the inspection were not included here because licensee practices were not observed.

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