ML20198F602

Insp Rept 70-1257/98-05 on 981026-30.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Operational Event Review Feedback & Mgt Organization

ML20198F602
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	12/15/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198F576	List: ML20198F570 ML20198F602
References
70-1257-98-05, 70-1257-98-5, NUDOCS 9812280160
Download: ML20198F602 (10)

Text

,

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket No.:

70-1257 License No.:

SNM-1227 l

Report No.:

70-1257/98-05 Licensee:

Siemens Power Corporation Facility:

Siemens Power Corporation Location:

Richland, Washington Dates:

October 26-30,1998 Inspectors:

David A. Ayres, Fuel Facility inspector, Region ll Wayne L Britz, Fuel Facility inspector Douglas S. Simpkins, Fuel Facility inspector Approved By:

D. Blair Spitzberg, Chief Fuel Cycle / Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Attachment:

Supplemental Inspection Information 9812280160 981' 15 4

PDR ADOCK 07001257 C

PDR l

1

! l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Siemens Power Corporation l

NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/98-05 l

This routine, announced inspection included a review of selected aspects of operational safety, l

operational event review feedback, management / organization, and followup of open items from l

previous inspections.

Ooerations Operations involving the processing of special nuclear material were in accordance with established safety requirements (Section 1.1).

Operational Event Review Feedback The review of Event Report 34819 was vicered to headquarters for further investigation i

due to the criticality safety issues associated with the event. An unresolved item was identified relating to the event. This item will be reviewed and documented in NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/98-204 (Section 2.1).

Manaaement/Oraanization The licensee's management and organization met license requirements. The licensee's audit program was being conducted in accordance with the license conditions and appeared effective in identifying deficiencies (Section 3.1).

t l

l l

l

a l' l L

ReDort Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant was operating Unes 1 and 3 of the dry conversion facility (DCF). Uranium recovery activities were also in operation. Fuel pellet production, fuel rod loading and downloading, and fuel bundle assembly operations were also in progress.

i l

1 Operational Safety Review (Tl2600/003) l 1.1 Plant Ooerations I-a.

. Insoection Scope General facility operations were reviewed to verify adherence to safety requirements documented in license conditions, criticality safety specifications, operating procedures, l

and area postings.

u b.

Observatians and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the normal operating procedures for the Dry Conversion l

Facility (DCF), the Criticality Safety Specifications (CSS) for the DCF vaporization and powder production systems, and the CSS for plant-wide moderation control. The inspectors observed operations in the DCF and noted the safety-related process parameters used for monitoring moderation controls at various stages of the DCF 1

process. The inspectors interviewed several operators in various operational areas of the DCF and found them to be knowledgeable in their assigned duties. The inspectors found no safety-related parameters outside the approved operating ranges for ensuring moderation control. The inspectors also observed area safety postings throughout the facility for criticality and radiological controls. The inspectors found no discrepancies between safety postings and observed operating practices. The physical condition of l

the safety equipment and the housekeeping in the DCF was observed to be adequate.

Work involving respiratory protection equipment was observed in the scrap recovery l

areas of the ammonium diuranate (ADU) process area. The inspectors found no f.

discrepancies in the use of safety equipment or the special safety postings in use for the work in the contaminated areas.

l.

The inspectors observed operations in the pelletizing, rod loading, bundle assembly, and p

scrap recovery areas. The inspectors interviewed several operators in these areas and L

also found them to be knowledgeable in their operations. The inspectors compared the

' observed operations with license requirements, safety postings, and established criticality controls for moderation, mass, geometry, and ccntainer spacing. The inspectors found no significant discrepancies.

o

. c.

Conclusion Operations involving the processing of special nuclear material were in accordance with established safety requirements.

2 Operational Event Review Feedback (88002) 2.1 Insoection Scope l

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures for reviewing and reporting of off-normal operating conditions or events associated with licensed activities. Event Report 34819,

" Event Description for Bulletin 91-0124-br Report," was investigated for an incident involving a failure to follow a criticality safety requirement to remove visible solids from l

ductwork during disassembly and prior to placing the ductwork in an accumulation area.

2.2.

Observations and Findinos On September 22,1998, the licensee issued " Event Description for Bulletin 91-0124-hr Report," for an event that occurred on September 21,1998. The report described the disassembly of the plant's ADU Conversion Line 1. During the disassembly, the criticality safety specialist noticed that a stacked section of ductwork had visible accumulations of solids in portions of the ductwork. This was contrary to the plant's CSS UO50 i B.2. which requires that the disassembly crew have a process operator remove the visible solids from the ductwork prior to placing it in an accumulation area.

The inspectors reviewed the Shift Supervisor's Abnormal Event Log dated September 21,1998, the incident Investigation Board (118) review of the criticality safety incident dated September 23,1998, and Siemens' 30-day followup report dated October 20,1998.

A review of the event determined that mass and geometry were controlled for this operation. The moderator was not designed to be a controlling criticality parameter for this particular plant operation. During disassembly, the geometry was no longer being controlled when the vidble solids were not removed as specified in the applicable CSS.

This left mass as the only criticality parameter being controlled. The inspectors reviewed Standard Operating Procedure P66,917,"Line 1 and 2 Process Offgas l

Ventilation System," which describes a boroscopic inspection through ports in the ductwork. It was not clear in the review of this procedure or in discussion with plant personnel just how effective this process was in determining material accumulations to control mass.

l l

The 118 short term corrective actions for ADU Line 1 and 2 included:

(1) training / retraining appropriate Manufacturing Engineering staff and contractors in the applicable criticality safety specifications for the work, (2) retraining Plant Support Operators who perform the inspection / cleaning, (3) conducting pre-job briefings of Plant Support supervisors, operators, and contractors by Manufacturing Engineering personnel and (4) inspecting ADU Line 2 ductwork inspection ports for accumulations of uranium before startup of Line 2. The long term corrective actions included:

(1) evaluation of relocating Line 2 HEPA filters closer to the scrubbers and replacing the l

5 ductwork using favorable geometry, (2) evaluation of a better method for conducting ductwork inspections and (3) a quarterly training program for Manufacturing Engineering personnel working on processes covered by CSS.

The inspectors noted that the llB's corrective actions for the event did not address the mid to senior level management role and responsibilities in this event. The llB's review of the incident and its causes did not include any responsibilities above the project engineer level; i.e., no higher level supervisory responsibilities for the operation. The inspectors noted that management's role should be evaluated during incident investigations.

After further discussion, it was decided that a continuation of NRC's review of this incident would be performed by headquarters with input from the regional inspectors due to the specialized technical nature of the remainder of the investigation. It was also decided that the NRC's conclusions related to this event would be reported in NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/98-204. The determination of whether a violation occurred and, if so, its related significance is considered an unresolved item (URl 70-1257/9805-01).

2.3.

Conclusions The review of Event Report 34819 was referred to headquarters for further evaluation due to the criticality safety issues associated with the event. An unresolved item was identified relating to this event. This item will be reviewed and documented in NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/98-204.

3 Management Organization and Controls (88005) 3.1 Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed and discussed current organization and staffing with licenseo personnel. Records of the (1) Health and Safety Council monthly meetings, (2) Criticality Safety Management System Appraisals, (3) Al. ARA Committee meetings and (4) internal audits and inspections were reviewed.

3.2.

Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the licensee's organization, defined responsibilities and staffing. There were no significant changes in management personnel or in the I

organization and their responsibilities.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Health and Safety Council (H&SC) monthly meeting reports for the past 3 months. The inspectors' review included monthly H&SC t

committee safety inspections of housekeeping and industrial safety, monthly criticality safety audits by the Criticality Safety Component, monthly radiological safety audits, and quarterly inspections of the environmental program. The inspectors found these reports 1

to be adequate in depth. The membership of the H&SC and the scope of review were consistent with Section 2.3.1 of the license conditions.

l l

i L l The inspectors reviewed the Criticality Safety Management System Appraisals required L

by the licensee's Safety Manual. The inspectors found these reports to be adequate in depth.

'..The inspectors reviewed the ALARA Committee's semi-annual report and the annual l

report. The inspectors found these reports to be adequate in depth. The membership of the ALARA Committee and the scope of review were consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the license conditions.

1 L

The inspectors reviewed the internal audits and inspections requirement of Section 2.7 of the license conditions. The reviews include industrial hygiene / industrial safety, environmental compliance, safeguards, emergency preparednes 5, citicality safnty, health physics / radiation safety and radioactive material shipments ihe audits were found to be adequate and were consistent with Section 2.7 of the license conditions.

Audits defined in Section 2, Part I, of the license were performed in accordance with established procedures and checklists. The audits appeared effective in identifying deficiencies and corrective actions appeared appropriate.

3.3.

Conclusions The licensee's management and organization met license requirements. The licensee's l

audit program was being conducted in accordance with the license conditions und appeared effective in identifying deficiencies.

4 Followup (92701 and 92702) 4.1 (Closed) IFl 70-1257/9802-02: Review of licensee's final assessment, l

recommendations and corrective actions for the April 15,1998, waste bin fire. A l

followup inspection of the corrective actions taken by the licensee was made and closed out as part of the inspection of VIO 70-1257/9803-01 described in Section 5 below.

l 4.2 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 70-1257/9803-01: Failure to follow procedures for segregation l

of hazardous waste and fuel rod downloading. A reply to the Notice of Violation was received on August 17,1998. A followup inspection on the corrective actions taken was made during this inspection. Based on discussions with cognizant licensee representatives, a review of licensee procedural changes, and a physical examination of the hazardous waste and fuel rod downloading equipment and facilities, the inspectors verified that the licensee had completed the corrective actions described in the licensee's letter dated August 13,1998.

L 5

Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 30,1998. The facility staff acknowledged

(

the findings presented. The licensee did not identify any of the information discussed at the meeting as proprietary. A telephone re-exit was held on November 30,1998, to explain the transfer of the ductwork incident inspection from Region IV to headquarters.

l l

t 4

I I'

MTACHMENT p

SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i

_ld.pensee

• B. F. Bentley, Manager, Plant Operations R. K. Burklin, Health Physicist

• J. B. Edgar, Senior Engineer, Licensing

• B. N. Femreite, Vice President, Manufacturing l-E. L Foster, Supervisor, Radiological Safety l

B. G. Haugen, General Supervisor, Bundle / Cage Operations M. A. Hendrickson, Supervisor, Rod Fabrication Operations

• D. J. Hill, Manager, Quality Engineering '

• D. C. Kilian, Manager, Manufacturing Engineering L

- R. B. Logsdon, General Supervisor, Ceramic Operations

• L J. Maas, Manager, Regulatory Compliance

'G. A. McGehee, Criticality Safety "J. J. Payne, Shift Supervisor, Chemical Operations

• T. C. Probasco, Manager, Safety L G. Stephens, Supervisor, Plant Support Operations

• R. E. Vaughan, Manager, Safety, Security and Licensing l-

• Denotes present at exit meeting October 30,1998 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Tl 2600/003 Operational Safety Review 88002_

Operational Event Review Feedback 88005 Management / Organization 92701 Followup IFis -

. 92702 Followup Violations /Dev.

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED '

Opened 70-1257/9805 ;.

URI Review failure to remove uranium during dismantlement of l

ductwork as required by criticality safety requirements i

l Closed L

lt 70-1257/9803-01 VIO Failure to follow procedures for 1) segregation of L

hazardous waste, and 2) fuel rod downloading

.?

70-1257/9802-02 IFl Review of licensee's final assessment, recommendations j

and corrective actions of the April 15,1998, waste bin fire investigation l

. -~

l. ?

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED l

ALARA as low as reasonably achievable l

ADU-ammonium diuranate CSS criticality safety specification DCF.

dry conversion facility -

H&SC Health and Safety Council IFl inspection follow-up item IIB

. Incident investigation Board NRC

' Nuclear Regulatory Commission SPC Siemens Power Corporation URI

- unresolved item VIO violation k

i l

dW INSPECTION FOLLOW-UP SYSTEM (IFS)

DATA ENTRY FORM NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS 1

L 1

REGION: N

,B<% u d fh<Mv'bajo NANE:

EXPANDED DOCKETS (Y/H): Y INSTITUTION:

L.__

REPORT DOCKET LICENSE LAST NUMBER:

NUMBER:

NUMBER:

INSPECTION: CITY:

STATE:

4'filolo !E' o l'7!olo! I!2!SM S#h /2 3 7

/0 / ff h

/a4

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/.2 /.rf fg REPORT TRANSMITTAL:

f RESPONSIBLE ORG.:

4 !3! F1 d LEAD INSPECTOR:

tu!B! 6 i

(t:TT In tlets) kr 3 g 59I (Y/N):

//

LETTER (Y/N):

V//

CLEAR (Y/N):

/V UPDATE INFORMATION (Y/N):

j_

SEQUENCE NUMBER: o!f ITEM TYPE: # 18 !!

SEVERITY:

SUPPLEMENT:

UPDATE PROJECTED ACTUAL STATUS:

o INS. REPORT:

CLOSE0UT: C / 31/99 CLOSEOUT:

/ /

CFR:

LICENSE CONDITION:

TIE DOWN:

UPDATE PROJECTED ACTUAL STATUS:

INS. REPORT:

CLOSE0UT:

/ /

CLOSEOUT:

/

/

CFR:

LICENSE CONDITION:

TIE DOWN:

TITLE:

h&Yt>bAbmina & WaAbeltd & &

/

CLOSE00T ORG.: Y! 3 ! P! 6 l

CLOSE00T EMP.:

kA S ! /3 CONTACT EMP:

k>! 3! 6 l

INTEREST CODE:

CAUSE CODE:

EA NUMBER:

NOV ISSUED:

/ /

NOV ID:

ITEM TEXT:

MM /d12s /6 h M deaka dimwMe4 efa W 1l% rA w A hrs iAid 4 1 Cwra/1 &j'Jh Arra2A AA -

p a

e o

i

()

M) 70 - / 3 F7 / 92 6 C-ol

ADDIT!ONAL ITEMS UPDATE INFORMATION (Y/N): [

SEQUENCE NUMBER: p_L)_

ITEM TYPE: I/! ! ! d SEVERITY: j_

SUPPLEMENT:

UPDATE Y PROJECTED STATUS:

C ACTUAL 11$10!0 (CLOSE0UT: /il /ff' CLOSE0UT: /ffir, qy INS. REPORT:

CFR:

LICENSE CONDITION:

TIE DOWN:

UPDATE PROJECTED ACTUAL STATUS:

O INS. REPORT: f!7@ D!3 CLOSE00T: M/W / 47 CLOSE0 TIT:

//_

CFR:

LICENSE CONDITION:

TIE DOWN:

TITLE:

b%I/jabN U22n otbtf 14Ao A & 1 M ?d 21

$d Un &

Yk Y

CLOSE0UT ORG.: $ !3 !@ !D CLOSEOUT EMP.: W!3!B INTEREST CODE:

CONTACT EMP: 41!3!d CAUSE CODE:

s EA NUMBER:

NOV ISSUED:

/ /

ITEM TEXT:

M/d

~? O * /2 f ~7 !ff 4 3 - c l UPDATE INFORMATION (Y/N): (

SEQUENCE NUMBER: 01 3 ITEM TYPE: _ l ! F-! l SEVERITY:

SUPPLEMENT:

UPDATE PROJECTED ACTUAL STATUS:

O INS. REPORT: h!?!a Ol3 CLOSE00T:

'A/31/ff' CLOSE00T: /d 0712

/

CFR:

LICENSE CONDITION:

TIE DOWN:

UPDATE PROJECTED ACTUAL STATUS:

O INS. REPORT: ?!8!B(/E CLOSE00T:lA /W /ff CLOSE0UT:

CFR:

LICENSE CONDITION:

TIE DOWN:

b M//mz/ h M At 84/bdNP TITLE:

G dA/x If47,42126 & f '

f CLOSEOUT ORG.: //!3!P!o l

CLOSE00T EMP.: _lu! 3!/J INTEREST CODE:

CONTACT EMP:

IM 3 Id CAUSE CODE:

l EA NUMBER:

NOV ISSUED:

/ /

ITEM TEXT:

@/

~/O -/D f f 74) -o >

_.