ML20154K232

Insp Rept 70-1257/86-02 on 860203-07 & 20.Violations Noted: Procedure Specified That Valves Be Tested Between 70 & 90 Psig Instead of 100 Psig & Protective Valve Cover on Cylinder Not Used After Removal from Vaporization Chest

ML20154K232
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	02/26/1986
From:	Brock B, Thomas R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154K216	List: ML20154K213 ML20154K220 ML20154K232
References
70-1257-86-02, 70-1257-86-2, NUDOCS 8603110249
Download: ML20154K232 (6)

Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V Report No. ,

70-1257/86-02 Docket No. 70-1257 License No. SNM-1227 Licensee: '

/ Exxon Nuclear Company 2101 Horn Rapids Road

, , :Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: .

,'Richland, Facility Inspection at: ' '

Richland, Washington Inspection conducted: , Jebruary 3-7 and 20, 1986 Inspector: [p B. L. Brock, Fuel Facilities Inspector Date signed Approved By: //d/ NM R. D. Thomas, Chief D(te Rigned Nuclear Materials Safety Section Susuna ry:

Inspection on February 3-7 and 20, 1986 (Report No. 70-1257/86-02)

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection was conducted of operations review.

The inspection involved a total of 27 man-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

During this inspection, Inspection Procedure 88020 was covered.

Results: Two violations were identified (see Sections 2.A.(2)(a) and 2.A.(2)(b) and (c) for details).

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i' DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• R. G. Frain, Manager, Operations-Richland

• M. K. Valentine, Manager, Plant Operations

• C. W.' Malody,' Manager, Corporate Licensing

• R.~H..Purcell, Manager, Safety and Security

• D. C. Lehfeldt, Manager, Operation Planning and Scheduling

• T. C. Probasco, Supervisor, Radiological and Industrial Safety

• L. D. Gerrald, Criticality Safety Specialist

• J. E. Pieper, Specialist, Health Physics M. Kirkman, Process Engineer, Conversion R. A. Schneider, Staff Specialist, Safeguards E. L. Foster, Radiological Safety Assistant G. V. Mulligan, Supervisor, Shipping W. E. Stavig, Senior Operations Analyst L. Stephens, Shift Supervisor, Conversion-M. Moberg, Lead Technician D. L. Belt, Health Physics. Technician

• Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Operations Review Section 2.1 of the license application requires the licensee to conduct business in a manner so as to assure that licensee facilities are safe from radiation and other nuclear hazards, and the operations will not be detrimental to the environs and to assure that personnel radiation exposures, both in-plant and offsite, are maintained as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).

A. Conduct of UF, Operations The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken since the UF cylinder; rupture at the Sequoyah Facility in Gore, Oklahoma on 6 January 4,,1986~, and -the licensee's UF 6 cylinder use procedures and

. practices.

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$(1), Licensee Response

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,. a, The. inspector's review of the licensee's response found that on January 7, 1986, the licensee established a six member UF Study Group with the Senior Operations Analyst as Chairman.6 a In

, addition to the Chairman, the committee membership included a

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, Chemical Engineer anil an Electrical Specialist from Equipment and Maintenance Engineering, a chemical Engineering from Process and Support-Engineering (Conversion Section), a 1

, }'," Chemical Engineer from the Dry Conversion Project and the General Supervisor from Chemical Operations. Other expertise was availabic as needed. The Study Group was charged with evaluating the licensee's UF 6handling system because of the UF6 cylinder rupture in Gore, Oklahoma. They were also to l,

2 recommend upgrades 'or improvements and to assure the

, implementation of their recommendations.

"In;its firsi'eeting m on January 8, 1986, the Study Group reviewed reports of th'e accident. They acknowledged the basic

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3 difference between emptying UFg cylinders, the mode of operation. at their plant, and filling them, the mode of

- operation.at the Sequoyah plant. Ilowever, the Study Group also recognized that overheating a normally filled UF 6cylinder

. .could result in a' rupture and a UF 6release. The Study Group

' reviewed the ' electrical heating system on the five vaporization chests, the, temperature. controls, and the Primary and Secondary UF6 lieader Transfer Line interlocks. The in-progress projects of the Process and Equipment Engineering Department, related to UF6 cylinder measurements, were also reviewed. The Study Group made four general area recommendations and eight specific area reconsnendations .

Ia it's second meeting on January 30, 1986, the Study Group reviewed the status of the implementation of it's recommendations. Of the twelve recommendations nine had been implemented and only three remained to be completed. Several additional changes were made to improve the performance of the system thermocouples. Other changes discussed are receiving further consideration before designation as actior. items. The status of implementation of action items will be reviewed during the next inspection (86-02-01).

(2) Licensee Procedures and Practices

.(a) The inspector identified an inconsistency between two procedures addressing testing of valves on UF cylinders.

6 One procedures, P43,078 Revision 0, " Inspection and Testing of UFg Cylinders" was consistent with the American National Standard for Packaging of Uranium llexafluoride for Transport (ANSI N14.1, 1982). This procedure, used by the logistics group, and the ANSI Standard require that valves on UFg cylinders be tested at 100 psig. The other procedure P65,371 "UF 6 Cylinder Valve Change-out - Lines 1 and 2," which is used by the operations personnel, requires that after replacing a faulty valve the cylinder be tested at greater than 70 psig. The UF cylinder 6

tested at this lower pressure is not subsequently tested at 100 psig before reuse. This procedure is not consistent with P43,078 or ANSI N14.1, 1982. The failure to test all UF cylinder valves at the required 100 psig 6

was identified as a violation.

(b) The inspector's observ.ations of the licensee's practices identified the licensee's failure to follow procedure P66,366 Revision 18 " Preparing and Removing UF g Cylinders

- Line 1". This procedure requires that a protective valve cover be put in place before installing the lifting device on a UF cylinder. The inspector determined that a 6

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protective valve cover had not been used during the removal of UF6 cylinder EX827 from a Line 1 vaporization chest on February 4, 1986. This failure to follow the

procedure and use the required protective valve cover was identified as a violation.

(c) The inspector's observations of the licensee's practices in the UF cylinder recertification area identified the licensee'6s. failure to follow the applicable procedure.

Procedure P43,078 Revision 0 " Inspection and Testing of UF6 Cylinders" requires that because the test equipment has not been designed for winter service, the licensee must af ter each cylinder inspection campaign remove the hose reels, crate and store them in the warehouse.

Furthermore, the procedure requires that the licensee also lock the piping cabinet. During the inspection the inspector found the hose reels inplace and the piping cabinet unlocked. The licensee's failure to follow the procedure was identified as another example of the violation identified in the preceding paragraph.

(3) UF gReceiving Practices The inspector's review of the licensee's practices relative to the receiving of UF cylinders indicated that the licensee 6

weighs the UF 6 cylinders within one or two days of receipt (well within the ten days suggested in their procedure -

currently undergoing revision). The licensee would therefore be able to identify an overloaded UF cylinder shortly after 6

its receipt. Of the last six months receipts the UF cylinder 6

with the highest net weight (4915 lb) was 105 lb less than the maximum net weight of 5020 lb of UF6 8Pecified in ANSI N14.1, 1982 for Model No. 30B UFg cylinders. Typical net weights in the group were about 300 Ib less than the maximum net weight permitted. However, the licensee is revising the receiving procedure to address actions that must be taken on receipt of an overfilled UF cylinder. The licensee's revised procedure 6

will be reviewed during the neu. inspection (86-02-02).

(4) UF Emergency Procedures 3

The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency procedures for control of UF6 gase us releases. The licensee's response to a

l**** 8'#ItY l "*l'* A UF 6 release is based on three UF6 level I UF release is one that is confined within the 6

vaporination chest and is handled by the normal process offgas scrubber. If the release escapes the vaporization chest and is confined in the vaporization room it is categorized as a level II release. A level II release which triggers the vaporization room smoke detectors starts the scrubber within the room which scrubs the UF fr m the air and isolates the 6

ventilation system such that the room air is recirculated through the scrubber. This system collects the hydrolyzed

, UOaF2 and HF in a favorable geometry slab tank and stores it

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temporarily in a favorable geometry cylindrical tank from which it can be fed to the normal process precipitation tank. A level III UF 6release is one not confined to the ventilation room but instead escapes into the conversion area. The level III release is postulated to occur when the scrubber water spray becomes saturated. The licensee is reviewing the affect of changes in several parameters on the variation of the scrubber system capacity. Additionally, the availability of the Liquid Uranium Recovery Process (LURP) will be considered because of its affect on selection of a feed and bleed rate which in turn also affects scrubber capacity. The licensee's scrubber capacity reevaluation will be reviewed during subsequent inspections (86-02-03).

The licensee's emergency procedures require use of self-contained breathing apparatus and coveralls and gloves under an acid suit when entering an area with other than light concentrations of UF - In n rmal Perations, a fresh air mask must be worn by the6operator removing or installing a pigtail header connection. Any other personnel present must wear a full face mask, protective clothing, plastic gloves and safety glasses.

3. Exit Meeting-The results of the inspection were discussed with members of the licensee's staff identified in Section 1. The topics included:

The areas inspected.

Licensee's response since the Sequoyah Facility UF 6 cylinder rupture in Gore Oklahoma: (Actions taken)

• Organized a Study Group with appropriate training and experience.

• Evaluated Exxon's procedures and practices.

• Provided prioritized recommendations.

• Assigned responsibility and target dates.

• Expeditiously impicmented the recommendations.

• Continuing followup on incomplete recommendations.

Potential violations related to protective valve covers, storing the UF6 cylinder test equipment, and testing valves at 100 psig. The inconsistency in the valve test procedurcs was also identified.

Performance in timely UF 6 cylinder weight verification of receipts, j The scrubbers capacity to contain a UF6 **I*""**

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The licensee agreed to review the affect the availability of the LURP may have on the scrubber capacity for containing a UF6 release.

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