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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217N8911999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for Period of 970422-990621,IAW 10CFR50.59(b).List of Changes Effecting Fsar,Encl ML20217D3951999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990806 Submittal on USI A-46, Implementation Methodology Used at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Per GL 87-02 ML20217E1581999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-05 on 990726-0905.Three Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.Violations Include Failure to Assure That Design Bases Correctly Translated Into Specifications ML20217C3151999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Scenario Package for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Scheduled for 991207.Without Encl ML20217D5591999-10-0505 October 1999 Documents Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Five Yr Survey of Main Breakwater.Survey Has Determined That Pilgrim Main Breakwater Is Intact & Remains Adequately Constructed to Perform Designed Safety Function ML20217C8051999-10-0505 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Results of Audiologic Evaluations for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Attachment Clearly Shows Requirements for Operator Hearing Ability Are Met. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20212J8301999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.Staff Conducts Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months ML20216J9961999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Resume of Person Identified as Acting RPM in Licensee to NRC Re Notification That Person Named in License Condition 11 of 20-07626-02,is No Longer Employed at Pilgrim Station.Resume Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20212F7871999-09-24024 September 1999 Advises That Util 990121 Application for Amend Being Treated as Withdrawn.Proposed Changes Would Have Modified Facility UFSAR Pertaining to Values for post-accident Containment Pressure Credited in Pilgrim Net Positive Head Analyses ML20212H1381999-09-23023 September 1999 Submits Info in Support of Request Filed on 990730 to Grant one-time Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Authorizing Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise to Be Conducted in 2002 Instead of 2001 ML20212H1441999-09-23023 September 1999 Withdraws 990121 Request for License Change Re Emergency Core Cooling Sys Net Positive Suction Head,Due to Incorrect Datum Preparation ML20212C2861999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards SER Accepting Licensee 981123 Request for Relief RR-E1,RR-E5,RR-E6 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & Request for Relief RR-E2,RR-E3 & RR-E4 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20216F3451999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Summary Rept Providing Results of ISI Conducted at PNPS on-line & Refueling Outage (RFO 12) ML20216E7111999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards License Renewal Application Including Form NRC-398 & Form NRC-396 for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Without Encls ML20216E5891999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Copy of Pilgrim Station Organization Structure. Encl Refelcts Changes in Upper Mgt Level Structure.Changes Were Effective 990901 ML20211M4501999-09-0303 September 1999 Informs That Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Plans to Conduct Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise with Commonwealth of Ma on 991207,IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.2 ML20211M9161999-08-31031 August 1999 Submits Review & Correction of Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid),Version 2,re Pilgrim Station ML20211J8391999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Provisional Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Plant,Changing Portions of Agreement to Permit Up to Two Distributions & Clarify Formula for Distribution ML20211H5701999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-04 on 990610-0725.Two Violations Identified Being Treated as non-cited Violations ML20211C3381999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides semi-annual LTP Update,Including Schedule, Commitment Descriptions,Progress Since Last Update & Summary of Changes.Rev Bars Indicate Changes in Status Since Last Submittal ML20210U7521999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opossing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems ML20210U6691999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opposing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems ML20210U5761999-08-18018 August 1999 Responds to Opposing Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Informs That for Sale,Nrc Responsible for Only Ensuring That Entergy Technically & Financially Qualified to Operate NPP ML20210U5151999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Approval of Indirect Transfer of FOL for Pilgrim in Response to .Approval No Longer Needed Since Beco Sold Interest in Pilgrim to EOI on 990713 ML20211B3841999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR power-operated Gate Valves ML20210U4831999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data Sheets for Period of 990101-0630,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML20210S0891999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Amend 11 to Indemnity Agreement B-48 Signed by Boston Edison Co & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20210R6251999-08-0606 August 1999 Provides Supplementary Info on USI A-46 Implementation Methodology at Pilgrim Station,To Enable NRC to Perform Evaluation & Issuance of Plant Specific SER for Plant ML20210M9411999-08-0202 August 1999 Requests That NRC Treat Pending Actions Requested by Beco Prior to 990713,as Requests Made by Entergy.Ltr Requests That Minor Administrative Changes to License Amend 182 & Associated Ser, ,reflect 990713 Transfer ML20210H8761999-07-30030 July 1999 Requests That NRC Grant Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section IV F,Which Would Authorize Rescheduling of 2001 Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Pilgrim Station to 2002 ML20210H8661999-07-29029 July 1999 Provides Revised Response to GL 96-06 & Addresses NRC Insp Concern for Containment Penetration X-12.Info Submitted to Facilitate NRC Review & Closeout of Subject GL for Plant ML20216E2321999-07-26026 July 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. NRC Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing as Rvid Version 2 ML20216D4131999-07-22022 July 1999 Informs That J Conlon,License OP-11040-1,terminated Employment with Beco on 990703,per 10CFR50.74.Individual Will Not Participate in Util Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program ML20210E2231999-07-20020 July 1999 Discusses Arrangements Made by Dennis & M Santiago During 990615 Telephone Conversation for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Pilgrim During Wk of 991004 ML20210C4151999-07-19019 July 1999 Informs That Util Intends to Submit Approx Eight Licensing Actions in FY00 & Eight in FY01,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02.Actions Are Not Expected to Generate Complex Reviews ML20210A9441999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to Re Changes to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Physical Security Plan Identified as Issue 2,rev 14, Addendum 1,respectively.No NRC Approval Is Required IAW 10CFR54(p) ML20210F3711999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs NRC That Effective 990713,listed Pilgrim Station Security Plans Have Been Transferred from Boston Edison to Entergy & Are Still in Effect ML20209G2251999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-03 on 990419-0609.Five Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C. Several Individual Tagging Errors Occurred ML20209C4661999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Addendum on Proposed Change in Corporate Ownership Structure Involving Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20209C3851999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Redacted Draft of Decommissioning Trust Agreement Re Transfer of PNPS & NRC Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generating Co ML20209C7761999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Annual Summary Rept of Changes Made to QAP Description as Described in QA Manual,Vol Ii.Rept Covers Period of Jul 1998 Through June 1999.No Changes Made During Period ML20196J7251999-07-0101 July 1999 Informs of Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20209B9411999-06-30030 June 1999 Discusses Deferral of IGSCC Welds to RFO 13.Deferral of Welds to Refueling Outage 13 Does Not Impact Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) Since Plant in Compliance W/Exam Percentage Requirements ML20209B9431999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Formal Notification That Closing Date for Sale & Transfer of Pilgrim Station Scheduled to Occur on 990713. a Wang Will Be Verbally Notified of Time of Sale Closing ML20196H2381999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards SER Denying Licensee 980820 Request for Alternative Under PRR-13,rev 2 for Use of Code Case N-522 During Pressure Testing of Containment Penetration Piping ML20209B9791999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 13A to Pilgrims COLR for Cycle 13,IAW TS 5.6.5 Requirements.Rev 13A Provides cycle-specific Limits for Operating Pilgrim During Remainder of Cycle 13 ML20209A8761999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards SER Authorizing Licensee 990317 Relief Request to Use ASME Code Case N-573 as Alternative to ASME Code Section XI Article IWA-4000 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20209A8701999-06-25025 June 1999 Responds to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant,Reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Encl ML20210U5901999-06-25025 June 1999 Opposes Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts.Expresses Skepticism Re Claim by Companies That Consumers Will Benefit from Proposed Consolidation & four-year Freeze in Base Rates ML20209C3431999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Addendum 1,Rev 14 to Pilgrim Station Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Changes Proposed Have Been Implemented & Constitute Increase in Plant Defense Plan Commitments.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217N8911999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for Period of 970422-990621,IAW 10CFR50.59(b).List of Changes Effecting Fsar,Encl ML20217C3151999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Scenario Package for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Scheduled for 991207.Without Encl ML20217C8051999-10-0505 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Results of Audiologic Evaluations for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Attachment Clearly Shows Requirements for Operator Hearing Ability Are Met. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20217D5591999-10-0505 October 1999 Documents Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Five Yr Survey of Main Breakwater.Survey Has Determined That Pilgrim Main Breakwater Is Intact & Remains Adequately Constructed to Perform Designed Safety Function ML20216J9961999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Resume of Person Identified as Acting RPM in Licensee to NRC Re Notification That Person Named in License Condition 11 of 20-07626-02,is No Longer Employed at Pilgrim Station.Resume Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20212H1441999-09-23023 September 1999 Withdraws 990121 Request for License Change Re Emergency Core Cooling Sys Net Positive Suction Head,Due to Incorrect Datum Preparation ML20212H1381999-09-23023 September 1999 Submits Info in Support of Request Filed on 990730 to Grant one-time Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Authorizing Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise to Be Conducted in 2002 Instead of 2001 ML20216F3451999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Summary Rept Providing Results of ISI Conducted at PNPS on-line & Refueling Outage (RFO 12) ML20216E7111999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards License Renewal Application Including Form NRC-398 & Form NRC-396 for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Without Encls ML20216E5891999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Copy of Pilgrim Station Organization Structure. Encl Refelcts Changes in Upper Mgt Level Structure.Changes Were Effective 990901 ML20211M4501999-09-0303 September 1999 Informs That Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Plans to Conduct Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise with Commonwealth of Ma on 991207,IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.2 ML20211M9161999-08-31031 August 1999 Submits Review & Correction of Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid),Version 2,re Pilgrim Station ML20211J8391999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Provisional Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Plant,Changing Portions of Agreement to Permit Up to Two Distributions & Clarify Formula for Distribution ML20211C3381999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides semi-annual LTP Update,Including Schedule, Commitment Descriptions,Progress Since Last Update & Summary of Changes.Rev Bars Indicate Changes in Status Since Last Submittal ML20211B3841999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR power-operated Gate Valves ML20210U4831999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data Sheets for Period of 990101-0630,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML20210S0891999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Amend 11 to Indemnity Agreement B-48 Signed by Boston Edison Co & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20210R6251999-08-0606 August 1999 Provides Supplementary Info on USI A-46 Implementation Methodology at Pilgrim Station,To Enable NRC to Perform Evaluation & Issuance of Plant Specific SER for Plant ML20210M9411999-08-0202 August 1999 Requests That NRC Treat Pending Actions Requested by Beco Prior to 990713,as Requests Made by Entergy.Ltr Requests That Minor Administrative Changes to License Amend 182 & Associated Ser, ,reflect 990713 Transfer ML20210H8761999-07-30030 July 1999 Requests That NRC Grant Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section IV F,Which Would Authorize Rescheduling of 2001 Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Pilgrim Station to 2002 ML20210H8661999-07-29029 July 1999 Provides Revised Response to GL 96-06 & Addresses NRC Insp Concern for Containment Penetration X-12.Info Submitted to Facilitate NRC Review & Closeout of Subject GL for Plant ML20216D4131999-07-22022 July 1999 Informs That J Conlon,License OP-11040-1,terminated Employment with Beco on 990703,per 10CFR50.74.Individual Will Not Participate in Util Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program ML20210C4151999-07-19019 July 1999 Informs That Util Intends to Submit Approx Eight Licensing Actions in FY00 & Eight in FY01,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02.Actions Are Not Expected to Generate Complex Reviews ML20210F3711999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs NRC That Effective 990713,listed Pilgrim Station Security Plans Have Been Transferred from Boston Edison to Entergy & Are Still in Effect ML20209C7761999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Annual Summary Rept of Changes Made to QAP Description as Described in QA Manual,Vol Ii.Rept Covers Period of Jul 1998 Through June 1999.No Changes Made During Period ML20209C3851999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Redacted Draft of Decommissioning Trust Agreement Re Transfer of PNPS & NRC Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generating Co ML20209B9431999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Formal Notification That Closing Date for Sale & Transfer of Pilgrim Station Scheduled to Occur on 990713. a Wang Will Be Verbally Notified of Time of Sale Closing ML20209B9411999-06-30030 June 1999 Discusses Deferral of IGSCC Welds to RFO 13.Deferral of Welds to Refueling Outage 13 Does Not Impact Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) Since Plant in Compliance W/Exam Percentage Requirements ML20209B9791999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 13A to Pilgrims COLR for Cycle 13,IAW TS 5.6.5 Requirements.Rev 13A Provides cycle-specific Limits for Operating Pilgrim During Remainder of Cycle 13 ML20209A8701999-06-25025 June 1999 Responds to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant,Reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Encl ML20210U5901999-06-25025 June 1999 Opposes Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts.Expresses Skepticism Re Claim by Companies That Consumers Will Benefit from Proposed Consolidation & four-year Freeze in Base Rates ML20209C3431999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Addendum 1,Rev 14 to Pilgrim Station Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Changes Proposed Have Been Implemented & Constitute Increase in Plant Defense Plan Commitments.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20195G3721999-06-0707 June 1999 Informs That Proposed Indicators Failed QA Assessments for Digital Verification,Validation & Control of Software. Proposed Mod Can Be Completed on-line ML20195B5021999-05-27027 May 1999 Provides Suppl Info to 990203 Request of Beco That NRC Consent to Indirect Transfer of Control of Util Interest in License DPR-35.Request Described Proposed Merger of Bec Energy with Commonwealth Energy Sys ML20207D4681999-05-24024 May 1999 Provides Addl Info to That Included in Beco Ltr 98-123 Dtd 981001,addressing NRC Concerns Described in GL 96-06, Concerning Waterhammer in Reactor Bldg Closed Cooling Water Sys ML20195B9051999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Completed Renewal Applications for Listed Operators.Without Encls ML20206J4901999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards Completed License Renewal Application,Including Forms NRC-398 & 396 for Sc Power,License OP-6328-3 ML20206P0711999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee, for K Walz,License SOP-10886-1.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20206D3621999-04-27027 April 1999 Informs NRC That Final Five Sys self-assessments Required to Fulfill Commitment Made in 980828 Response to Insp Rept 50-293/98-04 Were Completed on 990422.Completion Was Delayed by High Priority Refueling Outage 12 Preparatory Work ML20205R9871999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Affidavit of JW Yelverton of Entergy Nuclear Generation Co Supporting Request for Withholding Info from Rept on Audit of Financial Statements for Year Ended 971231. Pages 16 & 18 of Subj Rept Also Encl ML20207B0891999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards e-mail Message from Constituent,J Riell Re Y2K Compliance of Nuclear Power Plant in Plymouth,Massachusetts. Copy of Article Entitled Nuke Plants May Not Be Y2K Ready Also Encl ML20206A2741999-04-16016 April 1999 Dockets Encl Ltr Which Was Sent to AL Vietti-Cook Re Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition for DPR-35.Encl Resolves Issues Between Attorney General of Commonwealth of Massachusetts & Applicants ML20205P9131999-04-16016 April 1999 Submits Applicant Consent to Listed Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition for License DPR-35 & Affirmatively Request That NRC Adopt Listed Language in Order ML20205P9271999-04-16016 April 1999 Withdraws Motion for Leave to Intervene & Petition for Summary Or,In Alternative,For Hearing.Requests That NRC Adopt Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition Agreed to Beco & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20205Q9231999-04-15015 April 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Addl Info in Support of Request to Transfer of Plant FOL & Matls License to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20205P9631999-04-15015 April 1999 Provides Attachments a & B in Support of Request for Transfer of Plant Operating License & NRC Matl License from Beco to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co as Submitted in Ref 1. Info Provided in Response to Request at 990413 Meeting ML20205H9281999-04-0707 April 1999 Requests Withdrawal of Uwua Locals 369 & 387 Unions Joint Intervention in Listed Matter ML20205F3731999-04-0202 April 1999 Submits Addl Info Provided in Support of Request for Transfer of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Operating License & Matls License.State of Ma Order Authorizing Divestiture & Copy of Financial Arrangement Encl ML20204H3771999-03-26026 March 1999 Informs That Local 387,Utility Workers Union of America,AFL- Cio Voted to Approve New Contract with Entergy Nuclear Generation Co & Voted to Accept Boston Edison Divestiture Agreement ML20205D4231999-03-24024 March 1999 Forwards Decommissioning Funding Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,In Accordance with 10CFR50.75(f)(1) 1999-09-09
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h Boston Edison Pilgrim Nuclear Power station Rocky Hdt Road Plymouth. Massachusetts 02360 L J. Olivier Vice President Nuclear Operations and Station Director January 28, 1997 BECo Ltr. 2.97-006 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 120 Day Response to Generic Letter 96-06 Assurance of Eauipment Operability and Intearity Durina Desian-Basis Accident Conditions Generic Letter (GL) 96-06 requested addressees to determine:
- 1) if containment air cooler cooling water systems are susceptible to either waterhammer or two phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions; and
- 2) if piping systems that penetrate the containment are susceptible to thermal expansion of ;
fluid so that overpressurization of piping could occur. )
Within 120 days of the GL date, a written summary report is required stating actions taken in response to the requested actions noted above, conclusions that were reached relative to susceptibility for waterhammer and two-phase flow in the containment air cooler cooling water system and overpressurization of piping that penetrates containment, the basis for cont;nued operability of affected systems and components as applicable, and corrective actions that were .
implemented or are planned to be implemented. If systems were found to be susceptible to the l conditions that are discussed in the generic letter, identify the systems affected and describe the !
specific circumstances involved.
1 Attached is Pilgrim Station's 120 day summary report in response to the above.
9702120200 970128 -
l PDR ADOCK 05000293 P PDR L. J. Olivier
Attachment:
GL 96-06 Summary Report JDK\dmc\radmisc\gl96-06A 120036
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i
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8,osfon Edison Company Page 2 BECo Ltr. 2.97-006 Commonwealth of Massachusetts)
County of Plymouth )
Then personally appeared before me, L. J. Olivier, who being duly swom, did state that he is Vice President Nuclear Operations and Station Director of Boston Edison Company and that he is duly l
authorized to execute and file the submittal contained herein in the name and on behalf of Boston Edison Company and that the statements in said submittal true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
My commission expires: d10 7$dA [ _ ss dATE '
NOTARY PUBLIC cc: Mr. Alan B. Wang, Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mail Stop: 14B2 1 White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I i 475 Allendale Road i King of Prussia, PA 19406 Senior Resident inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 1
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l Attachment to BECo Ltr. 2.97 006 l
GL 96-06 Summary Report 1 CONTAINMENT AIR COOLING WATER SYSTEM The reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system loop B provides the cooling water for the containment air coolers. The containment air coolers at Pilgrim Station do not perform any active safety-related function in response to any postulated design basis accidents. However, the portion of the RBCCW system (loop B non-essential piping) that cools the containment air coolers is required to maintain pressure boundary integrity (a passive safety function) to, e maintain a closed system configuration (i e., the piping does not communicate with the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the containment i atmosphere) and, e
prevent loss of RBCCW fluid that could jeopardize the ability of the RBCCW safety-related (essential) portion of the system to perform its safety function.
We performed an evaluation of the RBCCW system inside containment subject to heating during design basis loss-of-coolant accidents and concluded the system is not ;
susceptible to waterhammer or two-phase flow that would degrade pressure boundary integrity or RBCCW safety-related heat removal performance. Thus, the system is operable and corrective actions are not required. The details of our evaluation are described below.
jl During a postulated design basis loss-of-coolant accident (DBA-LOCA) with a concurrent loss of off-site power (LOOP), the component cooling water pumps temporarily lose power until the emergency AC power system is initiated and AC power is restored by the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). LOCA containment heat removal is accomplished via the residual heat removal (RHR) system together with the RBCCW and salt service water (SSW) systems. The RHR pumps are part of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and are started early in the EDG loading sequence. The first SSW and RBCCW pumps are restarted after a short, and intentional, time delay. The RBCCW system restarts with the same system lineup in which it shut down, which is assumed to be the normal system lineup. Loop B of RBCCW includes the drywell coolers, which provide drywell temperature control when the plant is operating at normal full power conditions. The drywell coolers are not needed for containment heat removal during emergency conditions and are not included as active components in the design basis accident analyses.
For the DBA-LOCA event, the drywell rapidly achieves saturated steam conditions with the peak temperature and pressure occurring within the first ten seconds. Main steam line break (MSLB) events create superheated steam conditions but at initially lower pressures than the DBA-LOCA. With a concurrent LOOP or degraded AC voltage, the drywell cooler fans and RBCCW cooling water flow will stop. With no forced circulation, 1
W the water within the drywell coolers and associated piping will heat up due to the steam condensation on the tube outside surface and free convection currents formed within the tubing. After the appropriate time delays, the cooling water pumps restart. The drywell cooler fans do not automatically restart without an intentional manual reset being performed.
BECo performed calculations to determine the time required for the water in the lowest pressure drywell cooler to reach saturation and begin boiling. Due to its elevation relative to the RBCCW head tank, the lowest pressure drywell cooler under static conditions has a saturation temperature of 261'F. Using the worst case saturated steam conditions in the drywell and zero fouling assumed for the cooler, a thermal calculation was done using conservative assumptions such that the results represent the bounding lower limit for the cooler heatup time. These bounding results show that the saturation temperature of 261 F is achieved within the cooler tubes approximately 72 seconds after the DBA LOCA/ LOOP event. Considering the subsequent heatup of the surrounding subcooled water in the connected piping to the same saturation temperature, it was determined that it will be approximately 94 seconds before a stable vapor bubble can be formed within the cooler.
Following a LOOP, the first RBCCW pump is restarted after 45 seconds. If necessary due to failure of the first pump to start, a second RBCCW pump starts after 75 seconds. If the pumps had been stopped due to a load shed with off-site power available, they would restart at approximately the same time as for the LOOP case. It was concluded that under design basis conditions, with either the first or second RBCCW pump starting per the automatic sequencing following a LOCA/ LOOP, there will not be a condensation-induced water hammer transient caused by steam vapor in the drywell coolers. These calculations are considered to be conservative and to bound other events and transients that create a less severe steam environment in the drywell.
The design t' asis accident analysis does not consider the use of the drywell coolers for post-accident containment heat removal, and the supply and retum lines may be isolated along with other non-essential heat loads in the RBCCW system. This isolation of the non-essential heat loads is assumed to be manually initiated after the system has restarted and is assumed to occur at 10 minutes into the event for the DBA-LOCA analysis. Although not a design basis situation, it is possible that operators may at some later time choose to open the isolation valves and restore RBCCW flow to the drywell coolers. At all times after the first ten minutes into a LOCA or MSLB event, the drywell saturation condition drops below 270cF. The isolated drywell coolers may, therefore, be pressurized at a saturated equilibrium condition of approximately 270 F.
When the isolation valves are opened with the RBCCW pumps operating, the system pressure will be greater than the isolated portion, and the water that was in the drywell coolers and piping will remain subcooled as it is flushed out. It is, therefore, concluded that condensation-induced water hammer will not occur if the drywell coolers are manually restarted after having been isolated.
2
1 Since the drywell coolers are not required for post-accident heat removal, the expected !
performance or efficiency of the operating units under post-accident conditions was not rigorously analyzed. The drywell coolers are intended for sensible and latent heat removal for dry or moist air (or nitrogen) under normal plant operating conditions. The ;
post-accident steam environment is not the intended service, and the actual heat transfer achieved is not included in any design basis accident analysis. If the plant were in the limiting case for the design basis accident in which only one loop of containment heat removal was operating, that loop would be operated in the most efficient containment cooling mode which maximizes the RBCCW flow to the RHR heat exchanger. The available containment cooling modes are LPCI with heat rejection and suppression pool cuaung with or without containment spray. ;
For potential accident cases where the drywell coolers may continue to be used, the proportion of flow passing through the parallel flow path of the RHR heat exchanger will still be several times greater than through the drywell coolers. The return flow from the RHR heat exchanger (cooling water outlet) will also be substantially subcooled with design temperatures under 142 F. Therefore, the smaller heated water retum flow from the drywell coolers will be joining with this subcooled water retuming to the RBCCW heat exchanger. It is concluded that there is no potential condition where any significant vapor from the operating drywell coolers would be carried by two-phase flow to any extent that restricts the essential cooling water flow, accumulates in the RBCCW system, or results in a waterhammer.
DRYWELL PENETRATION PIPING A review of drywell penetration piping was performed to determine the susceptibility of each line to thermal expansion of fluid such that thermal pressurization of the line could occur. The review revealed that the piping at the following six drywell penetrations is subject to thermal pressurization effects:
. RBCCW System Supply to Drywell (Penetration X-23)
. RBCCW aystem Return from Drywell (Penetration X-24)
. Core Spre/ Sample Line (Penetration X-28A)
. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Suction Line (Penetration X-12)
. Drywell Equipment Sump Pump Discharge Line (Penetration X-19)
. Drywell Floor Sump Pump Discharge Line (Penetration X-18)
Each of the lines is discussed in detailin the following sections.
3
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I i RBCCW System Suppiv to Drywell(Penetration X-23) and RBCCW System Retum from Drywell(Penetration X-24)
RBCCW system loop B supplies cooling water to various non-essential components within the drywell. The cooling water passes through the single isolation valve located outside containment, check valve 30-CK-432, and enters the drywell at penetration X-
- 23. After cool;ng the various non-essential loads within the drywell, the cooling water exits the drywell at penetration X-24 and passes through a single isolation valve, motor operated valve MO-4002, that is located outside containment. The RBCCW piping passing through penetrations X-23 and X-24 is six inch diameter piping.
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Valve 30-CK-432 is normally open due to the RBCCW flow and will automatically close upon a reversal of process fluid flow. Valve MO-4002 is a normally open valve that l does not receive any automatic isolation signals. Valve MO-4002 can be manually l closed by control room operators via the remote manual control switch located on l control room panel C-1. The only scenario where operators would be required to close ;
MO-4002 would be for a breach of the RBCCW piping inside containment. Operators l are not directed to close valve MO-4002 for any other reason.
The normal system lineup precludes overpressurization since the lines communicate with the RBCCW surge tank. In the event that operators isolate these lines from the
- RBCCW surge tank by closing the non-essentialloop block valves, MO-4009A and MO-4009B, with valve MO-4002 open, RBCCW relief valve PSV-4033, located on the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) non-regenerative heat exchanger, E-2168, protects the RBCCW piping at drywell penetrations X-23 and X-24 from overpressurization. In light of this protective function and GL96-06 concerns, PSV-4033 will be added to the IST Program and will be tested or replaced with a tested or new relief valve during Refuel Outage 11 (commencing in February 1997).
Core Spray Sample Line (Penetration X-28A)
The core spray system sample line penetrates the primary containment at penetration X-28A. This line is normally isolated between the inboard isolation valve, 1400-64A, and the outboard isolation valve,14-HO-5. The volume of liquid between valves 1400-64A and 14-HO-5 is trapped and could become pressurized such that the line could fait under postulated accident conditions. The line is uninsulated and is configured as follows, 3/4" Schedule 80S stainless steel piping from valve 1400-64A reduces to 3/8" stainless steel tubing (nominal wall thickness of 0.062") inside the containment, and the 3/8" tubing connects to 1" Schedule 80 stainless steel piping that penetrates the containment and connects to valve 14-HO-5.
If the piping were to fail inside the primary containment, primary containment integrity is maintained by the piping outboard of the penetration and outboard isolation valve 14-HO-5. Similarly, for piping failure outside primary containment, the piping inboard of 4
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the penetration and inboard isolation valve 1400-64A maintain primary containment j integrity. j To preclude failure of the line, the line will be unisolated by opening valves 1400-64A and 1400-63A during Refuel Outage 11. Opening the valves will connect the line to the l reactor pressure vessel and prevent the buildup of pressure in the line.
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Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Coolina (SDC) Line (Penetration X-12)
The RHR SDC line penetrates the primary containment at penetration X-12. This 20"
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diameter line is insulated and is normally isolated between the inboard isolation valve, i MO-1001-50, and the outboard isolation valve, MO-1001-47. This line has l approximately 5 feet of exposed piping within the containment to absorb the thermal energy from the containment atmosphere and approximately 40 feet of piping outside the containment to dissipate the pressure energy. Even assuming that the insulation inside containment is removed during the event, the pressure in the line remains below the maximum operating pressure of the line during postulated DBA-LOCA and MSLB 4 events. Thus, no corrective actions are required for this penetration. l l
Drvwell Floor Sump Pumps Discharoe Line (Penetration X-18) and Drvwell Eauipment Sumo Pumps Discharae Line (Penetration X-19)
The drywell floor sump pumps discharge line penetrates the primary containment at penetration X-18. This 2" diameter piping is uninsulated and is normally isolated between the pump discharge check valves,20-CK-213 and 20-CK-223, which close upon the cessation of flow, and the first outboard containment isolation valve, AO-7017A, which is normally closed.
The drywell equipment sump pumps discharge line penetrates the primary containment at penetration X-19. This 2" diameter piping is uninsulated and is normally isolated between the pump discharge check valves,20-CK-152 and 20-CK-154, which close upon the cessation of flow, and the first outboard containment isolation valve, AO-7011 A, which is normally closed.
These lines consist of piping spools, valves, and a pressure switch. There are both flanged joints and socket welded fittings in the system. The system is designed to operate at 50 psig and 210 F. The piping inside the containment does not perform any safety-related function. The piping outside the containment penetration is safety-related in order to maintain primary containment integrity and is designed to meet Seismic Class I criteria.
An initial engineering analysis of the effects of postulated DBA-LOCA and MSLB temperatures on these lines was performed. The analysis concluded that, during heat-up of the trapped volume, leakage will occur at the flanged joints inside the drywell that will preclude pressure build-up to any degree that could threaten failure of other components in the system. Except for the flanged joints and the 150# check and plug valves, all other system components involved are over-specified for the low operating conditions (i.e., Sch 80 piping,3000 psi socket-welded fittings, and a pressure switch that was proof tested to 1200 psi.). The low strength flange bolts (with red rubber 5
, a gaskets) are not likely to be installed with a preload that will maintain leak tightness during significant pressure increases. Additionally, only the piping inside the drywell will be expanding at accident temperatures. The safety-related Seismic Class I piping outside the primary containment will be at a much lower ambient temperature. Thermal moment loading on the flanged joints inside the drywell was shown to exceed the flange design criteria provided in current piping codes. Although this is not an indication of imminent component failure, it is an indication that the flange will be susceptible to leakage.
Thus, any thermally induced pressure increases developed in this piping will be littermittently relieved as leakage through the !!anged joints inside containment, and primary containment integrity is maintained by the containment outboard piping and isolation valves.
To ensure that pressure build-up due to fluid thermal expansion is limited, a pressure relieving device will be added to each sump pump discharge line within the containment during Refuel Outage 11.
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