ML20129F113
| ML20129F113 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1994 |
| From: | Colapinto D NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129F106 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-94-208 NUDOCS 9610040055 | |
| Download: ML20129F113 (400) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. _ _ _ . _ , _ . _ - . _. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ [ g.- NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER 517 Florida Avenue.NW Washington, DC 20001-1850 (202) 667-7515 Fax (202) 462-4145 ; i t April 28, 1994 6 t 1 Chief, FOIA/LPDR Branch FREED 0W OF INFORMATION ! Division of Freedom of Information ACT REQUEST r and Publications Services Office of Administration d _/_N O hgg i I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ci l
' Washington, D.C. 20555 [ 'f -
i h Ret FOIA Reauest j
Dear Chief:
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") , 5 U.S.C. t 5 552, et sea., the National Whistleblower Center.("NWC") hereby l requests a copy of any and all records and information pertaining l directly or indirectly to the following: NRC Office- of Investigations ("OI") case , number 2-90-020R, regarding allegations of l wrongdoing by licensee Georgia Power Company. 1 This request includes the OI report and its ! exhibits and attachments in case number 2 j 020R. This request also includes but is not limited to notes, letters, memoranda, drafts, minutes, diaries, logs,files, - procedures, [ instructions, engineering analyses, drawings, graphs, charts, maps, photographs, agreements, handwritten notes, studies, data, notebooks, books, telephone messages, computations, interim and/or final reports, status reports, and any and all other records relevant to and/or generated in connection with the above-listed categories of information. As you.are aware, the FOIA requires you to release docume.;ts in segregable portions in the event they contain exempt material. For any-documents or' portions that you deny due to a specific FOIA exemption, please provide an index itemizing and describing the documents or portions ~of documents withheld. We also ask that all fees be waived because the information requested will contribute significantly to the public's understand- z 9610040055 960827 i PDR FOIA A COLAPIN94-208 PDR [ _ _ _ _.- . _ - . _ _ _ _ ~. .-
i FOIA Request April 28, 1994 i Page 2 ing of the operations or activities of the government and/or is t primarily in the public interest and is not in the commercial interest of the requester. The National Whistleblower Center is a r tax-exempt, non-profit organization. The purpose-of the NWC is to assist whistleblowers to bring allegations of corporate wrongdoing and/or government corruption to the attention of the public. Egg, FOIA-91-114. In addition, a similar request for a fee waiver by the NWC was granted by the NRC on January 25, 1993 in response to ' a FOIA request for infomation about whistleblower allegations against Houston Lighting & Power Co. Egg, FOIA-93-44. ; The specific allegations of NRC OI Case No. 2-90-020R and l other whistleblowing allegations concerning the Georgia Power ' Company and its operation of the Plant Vogtle nuclear plant have already received widespread attention in the national and Georgia , media. In addition, there is great public interest in the NRC's investigation of OI Case No. 2-90-020R. As you also may be aware, last year, in June, 1993, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear . Regulation held public hearings regarding allegations related to ! the substance of OI Case No. 2-90-020R. There is also a licensing proceeding pending regarding allegations related to OI Case No. 2-90-020R. Egg, In the Matter of Georaia Power Company, et.al., (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), Dockets Nos. 50-424-OLA-3 & 50-425-OLA-3, ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OLA-3. The NWC l intends to disseminate to the public the information received from ! i the NRC pursuant to this request. We look forward to hearing from you within ten (10) working l j days as the law stipulates, l Sincerely,
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;*, y Colapihtc.
David K. for the National Whistleblower Center Encl. d:\301\olfola
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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323 v...../ [ a6 - - i t w 1 Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 ' 50-424 and 50-425 (10 CFR Section 2.206) l l 1 Michael D. Kohn, Esquire Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, P.C. l 517 Florida Avenue, NW. !
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Washington, DC 20001
Dear Mr. Kohn:
l This is-in response to the September 11, 1990 " Request for Proceedings and l Imposition of Civil Penalties for Improperly Transferring Control of Georgia l Power Company's Licenses to the SONOPC0 Project and for the Unsafe and Improper Operation of Georgia Power Company Licensed Facilities," (Petition) that you filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on behalf of Messrs. Marvin Hobby and Allen Mosbaugh (Petitioners), pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). You supplemented the Petition with submittals made on September 21 and October 1, 1990, and July 8, 1991. The Petition contained allegations regarding: the management of the Georgia Power Company (GPC) nuclear facilities; illegal transfer of GPC operating licenses to Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SONOPCO); intentional false statements to the NRC regarding GPC's organizational chain of coinnand and the reliability of a diesel generator; perjured testimony submitted by a GPC i executive during a U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) proceeding under Section 210 < of the Energy Reorganization Act; repeated abuse at the Vogtle facility of Technical Specification 3.0.3; repeated willful technical specification i violations at the Vogtle facility; repeated concealment of safeguards problems l from the NRC; operation of radioactive waste systems and facilities at Vogtle ' in gross nonconservative and questionable management practices; and retaliation by GPC against managers who make their regulatory concerns known to GPC or SONOPCO management. The supplements to the Petition of September 21 and October 1,1990, forwarded exhibits and provided additional information regarding the alleged illegal +;ansfer of operating licenses. Based on these allegationa, Petitioners requesced that the NRC institute proceedings and take swift and immediate action. ' i The Julv 8,1991 supplerant to the Petition repeated several of the earlier i allegations, and also alleged that GPC's Executive Vice President made ! material false statements in GPC's April 1,1991, submittal to the NRC responding to allegations in the original Petition. The supplement tiso alleged false statements made by the same individual to the NRC during a ! transcribed meeting on January ll, 1991, to discuss the formation and operation of SON 0PCO. Based on these allegations, Petitioners requested the NRC to take immediate steps to determine if GPC's current anagement has the j requisite character, competence, fundamental trustworthiness, and commitment to safety to continue operating a nuclear facility. ; , o n Y
- t
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1 Michael D. Kohn, Esquire ! Upon review of the Petitioners' allegations, I have determined that certain issues are capable of resolution now and that issuance of a Partial Director's Decision is appropriate. I have not made a final determination for those issues involving matters currently before the DOL; such issues are being deferred until DOL has completed its deliberation. Nor have I made a final determination for certain issues regarding wrongdoing raised by the Petitioners. These issues will require further investigation before I can determine what action, if any, is appropriate. However, I have made a decision on those issues for which the facts are sufficiently understood as a result of NRC inspections or other reviews to reach a final determination. As discussed in this partial decision, I find that certain concerns raised by the Petitioners are partially substantiated. Violations of regulatory requirements have occurred in the operations of the Vogtle and Hatch facilities. A number of civil penalties have been issued to GPC for certain of these violations. To this extent, the Petitioners' request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is granted. l However, I have also determined that no unauthorized transfer of the Vogtle operating licenses has occurred, and that the GPC nuclear facilities are now being operated in accordance with NRC regulations and do not endanger the health and safety of the public. Additionally, I conclude that none of the issues addressed in this Partial Director's Decision call into question the Licensee's character, competence, fundamental trustworthiness, and commitment to safely operate its nuclear facilities. Therefore, I decline to take any further action with respect to the issues addressed in this Partial Director's Decision. To this extent. the Petitioners' request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is denied. A copy of the Partial Director's Decision will be referred to the Secretary for the Commission's Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the regulations. For your information, I also have enclosed a copy of the notice regarding this Partial Director's Decision, which has been filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
- 1. Partial Director's Decision (00 )
- 2. Federal Reaister Notice cc w/ enclosures:
See next page
Licensee i Michael D. Kohn, Esquire < Upon review of the Petitioners' allegations, I-have determined that certain issues are capable of resolution now and that issuance of a Partial Director's. Decision is appropriate. I have not made a final determination for those ; issues involving matters currently before the DOL; such issues are being- i deferred until DOL has completed its deliberation. Nor have I made a final : determination for certain issues regarding wrongdoing raised by the Petitioners. These issues will require further investigation before I can determine what action, if any, is appropriate. However, I have made a ; decision on those issues for which the facts are sufficiently understood as a result of NRC inspections or other reviews to reach a final determination. As discussed in this partial decision, I find that certain concerns raised by the Petitioners are partially substantiated. Violations of regulatory requirements have occurred in the operations of the Vogtle and Hatch facilities. A number of civil penalties have been issued to GPC for certain - of these violations. To this extent, the Petitioners' request for action , pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is granted. ! However, I have also determined that no unauthorized transfer of the Vogtle operating licenses has occurred, and that the GPC nuclear facilities are now , being operated in accordance with NRC regulations and do not endanger the health and safety of the public. Additionally, I conclude that none of the issues addressed in this Partial Director's Decision call into question the Licensee's character, competence, fundamental trustworthiness, and commitment to safely operate its nuclear facilities. Therefore, I decline to take any further action with respect to the issues addressed in this Partial Director's Decision. To this extent, the Petitioners' request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is denied. A copy of the Partial Director's Decision will be referred to the Secretary for the Commission's Commission's regulations. review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the For your information, I also have enclosed a copy of the notice regarding this Partial Director's Decision, which has been filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Director
Enclosures:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- 1. Partial Director's Decision (DD )
- 2. Fgderal Reaister Notice DISTRIBUTION SEE NEXT PAGE cc w/ enclosures: Licensee & Service List 0FFICE: PDII-3/LA PDII-3/PM PDII-3/PM PDII-3/D D:01 NAME: L. BERRY D. HOOD K.JABB00R D.MATTHEWS B. HAYES DATE: 10/ /92 10/ /92 10/ /92 10/ /92 10/ /92
0FFICE: D:0E OGC APR2 D:DRPE 5 9 b 2 b /9 b/ 92 0FFICE: ADP NRR/D TECH ED RII (BY PHONE) NAME: J.PARTLOW T.MURLEY J. MAIN A.HERDT DATE: 10/ /92 10/ /92 10/21/92 10/ /92 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY FILE NAME: V0G206.LTR DIRECTOR'S DECISION (DD ) QAT[Q: l DISTRIBUTION: Docket File i NRC/ Local PDRs . EDO#5836 l EDO Reading l T.Murley/F.Miraglia 1 J.Partlow l S.Varga i G.Lainas i D.Matthews i D. Hood ' K.Jabbour L. Berry OPA OCA NRR Mail Room (EDO #5836) 12 G18 PDII-3 Reading i Vogtle Reading l Hatch Reading i J. Taylor V.Yanez(2) P-223 , C. Carter, SECY M.Malsch, 0GC J.Goldberg, OGC ASLBP S. Burns, OCAA ACRS (10) E.Merschoff, RII
00 l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director , In the Matter of )
)
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET AL. ) Docket Nos. 50-321,
) 50-366, (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, ) 50-424, Units 1 and 2) ) and 50-425
)
(Hatch Nuclear Plant, ) (10 CFR 2.206) Units 1 and 2) ) PARTIAL DIRECTOR'S DECISION PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.206 i I. INTRODUCT QN l On September 11, 1990, Michael D. Kohn, Esquire, filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a " Request For Proceedings and Imposition of Civil Penalties for Improperly Transferring Control of Georgia Power Company's Licenses to the SON 0PC0 project and For the Unsafe and Improper Operation of Georgia Power Company Licensed Facilities" (Petition) on behalf of Messrs. Marvin B. Hobby and Allen L. Mosbaugh (Petitioners). The Petitioners are former employees of the Georgia Power Company (GPC or Licensee), which operates and is part owner of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and the Hatch Nuclear Plant. The Petition was referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for the Director of NRR to prepare a Director's Decision in accordance with Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). The NRC received exhibits to support the Petition on September 21, 1990, and a supplement to the Petition on October 1, 1990.
The Petitioners made a number of allegations about the management of the GPC nuclear facilities. Specifically, the Petitioners alleged that GPC (1) illegally transferred its operating licenses to Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SON 0PCO)'; (2) knowingly included misrepresentations in its response to concerns of a Commissioner about the chain of comand for the Vogtle facility; (3) made intentional false statements to the NRC about the reliability of a diesel generator whose failure had resulted in a Site Area Emergency at Vogtle; (4) submitted perjured testimony by a GPC executive i during a U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) proceeding under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act; (5) repeatedly abused Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 at the Vogtle facility; (6) repeatedly and willfully violated Technical Specifications (TSs) at the Vogtle facility; (7) repeatedly concealed safeguards problems from the NRC; (8) operated radioactive waste systems and facilities at Vogtle in gross violation of NRC requirements; (9) routinely I used nonconservative and questionable management practices at its nuclear facilities, and (10) retaliated against managers who make their regulatory l concerns known to GPC or SONOPC0 management. The Petitioners requested that l HRC institute proceedings and take swift and immediate action on these ! l allegations. l On October 23, 1990, I acknowledged receiving the Petition and concluded that no immediate action was necessary regarding these matters. I made that l determination based on completed and continuing NRC inspections and , investigations of the Licensee and particularly of the operation of the Vogtle l Southern Nuclear Operating Company is more conunonly known today as " Southern Nuclear." However, to be consistent with the i Petition, "SONOPCO" will be used throughout this Partial l Director's Decision, i
3_ facility. I further informed the Petitioners that I would issue a Directcr's Decision regarding these matters within a reasonable time. ! On February 28, 1991, the NRC requested that the Licensee respond to the Petition. The Licensee responded on April 1, 199I (Response). On July 8, 1991, Petitioners submitted " Amendments to Petitioners Marvin Hobby's and Allen Mosbaugh's September 11, 1990, Petition; and Response to Georgia Power Company's April 1, 1991, Submission by its Executive Vice President, Mr. R. P. Mcdonald" (Supplement). The Supplement alleged that GPC's Executive Vice President made material false statements in GPC's April 1, 1991, submittal to the NRC. The Supplement also alleged that this same individual made false statements to the NRC at a transcribed meeting held on i January 11, 1991, to discuss the formation and operation of SONOPCO. The Supplement provided additional information about certain allegations made in , t the earlier Petition. The Supplement requested a variety of relief, including a request that the NRC take immediate steps to determine if GPC's current management has the requisite character and competence to continue operating a nuclear facility. On August 26, 1991, I acknowledged receiving the Supplement and informed the Petitioners that I had determined that no immediate action was appropriate and that the specific issues raised in the Supplement would be considered in my Director's Decision. On August 22, 1991, the NRC requested ( that the Licensee respond to the Supplement. The Licensee submitted its , l response on October 3, 1991 (Supplemental Pesponse). The Petitioners raised a large number of issues in their submittals, i Either the DOL or the NRC Staff is considering some of these issues and will require addnional time before reaching final conclusions. I do not, at this time, address allegations of discrimination raised by the Petitioners that are ! I
I 1
; before the 00L.2 With regard to the matters involving Messrs. Hobby and i Mosbaugh which are currently pending before DOL, the NRC has determined that i
j immediate action is not warranted. At this time, I an, not prepared to make a final determination about certain issues regarding wrongdoing raised by the Petitioners. These issues l will require further investigation by the NRC's Office of Investigations (01) i before I can determine what action, if any, is appropriate. I do address in (
, this Partial Director's Decision certain issues of alleged wrongdoing for i
i 4 which the facts are sufficiently well understood as a result of NRC ! i inspections or other reviews to reach a final determination. l 'I have determined to issue a Partial Director's Decision on those issues - l
, for which the NRC Staff has completed its review and has reached final i j conclusions. I intend to issue a supplement to this Decision for all issues
- not addressed herein, when the NRC staff's and the DOL's considerations are
- complete. My discussion and decision for the issues for which we have reached 1
j final conclusions follow. b l II. DISCUSSION ! A. A11eaed illeaal Transfer of Licenses t ) 1 (Petition Section 111.1 with supplemental filing of October 1,1990; l July 8, 1991, Supplement, Section IV) i i I 1 2 The NRC Staff is aware of the decision by a DOL j Administrative Law Judge recommending to the Secretary of Labor that the complaint of Mr. Hobby be dismissed with prejudice. { (Marvin ]L, Hobby ya Georcia Power Company, Case No. 90-ERA-30.) ' 1 i 1
The Petitioners allege an illegal transfer to SONOPC0 of the NRC licenses currently held by GPC that authorize operation of GPC nuclear facilities. Specifically, the Petitioners allege that GPC improperly transferred control of its nuclear licenses to SONOPC0 and that Mr. Farley was, in fact, responsible for operating the GPC and Alabama Power Company (APC) nuclear facilities, beginning with the first of three phases in the planned transition to SON 0PCO. The Petitioners also allege that Mr. Mcdonald made false statements during a transcribed meeting with the NRC staff on January 11, 1991, when he discussed the SONOPC0 organization. A review of the history and background of the formation of SON 0PC0 is necessary to understand this issue. The Southern Company is the parent firm of five electric utilities: APC, GPC, Gulf Power, Mississippi Power, and Savannah Electric. Two of these utilities are associated with nuclear facilities at three different sites. GPC is the principal owner and currently holds licenses from the NRC for operating the Vogtle nuclear facility near Augusta, Georgia, and the Hatch l nuclear facility near Baxley, Georgia. APC owns the Farley nuclear facility near Dothan, Alabama. The Southern Company also includes Southern Company j Services, Incorporated, a wholly-owned service organization. In 1988, Southern Company established the SON 0PC0 project for the long-term purpose of establishing an operating company to eventually operate the I nuclear oower generating plants that were then operated by GPC and APC. 1 Establishing a single operating company was to be accomplished in three major phases, with the SON 0PC0 project first providing support services to the l operating companies (GPC and APC) and, ultimately, accairing the NRC licenses ! to operate the GPC and APC nuclear facilities. Because of delays, the l
i transition ocurred more slowly than anticipated, and the initial project phase lasted for about 2 years (1989 and 1990). During this phase, Mr. Joseph M. Farley was responsible for the administrative aspects of forming the new : operating company. On February 24, 1989, Mr. Farley was elected Executive Vice President-Nuclear, of the Southern Company and Executive V1.ce President of the Southern Company Services, Incorporated. Before this appointment, he had been President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of APC for almost 20 years. Until SONOPC0 acquired the NRC licenses, the GPC nuclear facilities were l to remain under the direction of the GPC President, Mr. A. W. Dahlberg, with a reporting chain downwards of Executive Vice President (Mr. R. P. Mcdonald), : Senior Vice President (Mr. W. G. Hairston, III), and the vice presidents for the Hatch and Vogtle facilities. The APC plants were to remain under the l direction of the APC President, with a similar chain downward of Mr. Mcdonald, Mr. Hairston, and the vice president for the Farley facility. Mr. Mcdonald and Mr. Hairston were officers of both APC and GPC. In Phase 1, which began about November 1,1988, technical support was provided to all three nuclear facilities by a common Technical Services group under a Vice President of Southern Company Services, Incorporated, who reported to the Executive Vice President, Mr. Mcdonald. Administrative support to all three facilities was provided by a common Administrative Services Group under another Vice President of Southern Company Services, , Incorporated, who also reported to Mr. Mcdonald. This phase was to be ! effective until the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved the creation of SONOPCO. Mr. Farley was not designated as having any l responsibility for operating the GPC nuclear facilities during this phase. He
was responsible for providing technical and administrative services through the Southern Company Services, Incorporated, and for establishing the legal entity of SON 0PCO. He was also responsible for administrative matters relating to the formation of SONOPCO. Although not effective during Phase 1, Mr. Farley had been designated to become the President and CEO of SONOPC0 when it was established. Phase 2 began near the end of 1990 with the approval of SONOPC0 as a legal entity by the SEC. Specifically, on December 14, 1990, the SEC approved the Southern Company's request of June 22, 1988, to form SON 0PCO. SON 0PC0 was incorporated on December 17, 1990, and its officers were elected December 18, 1990. rs part of Phase 2, GPC's Executive Vice President and Senior Vice President, Auclear Operations (Messrs. Mcdonald and Hairston) became officers of SON 0PC0 and reported administratively to the President and CEO of SON 0PCO, Mr. Farley. The Vice Presidents of each nuclear facility also became officers of SONOPCO. The Vice President of Technical Services and the Vice President of Administrative Services, respectively, for the Southern Services Company became officers of SON 0PCO, rather than officers of the Southern Services Company. During this phase, GPC and APC retained their NRC licenses and the responsibility for operating their respective nuclear facilities. I
~
Phase 3, when SON 0PC0 was to have operating responsibility, was planned to begin for GPC nuclear facilities when the NRC licentes had been transferred to SON 0PCO. The NRC issued license amendments on November 22, 1991, authorizing the transfer of licenses for the APC facility from APC to SON 0PCO. The license transfer for the APC facility was implemented within 90 days thereafter. GPC filed applications for similar amendments to transfer the 1
licenses for operation of the Vogtle and Hatch facilities on September 18, 1992, and the NRC is currently reviewing these applications. The Petitioners claim that, during Phases 1 and 2 of the transition to SONOPCO, GPC, in effect, transferred control of its NRC licenses to the 50N0PC0 project. They base their claim, in part, on their witnessing the daily operation of GPC's nuclear facilities at the site and at GPC's corporate ~ offices. The Petitioners state that the actual chain of command was General Plant Manager George Bockhold (Vogtle) to SON 0PC0 Vice President McCoy; McCoy to SON 0PCO's Senior Vice President, George Hairston, Hairston to SON 0PCO's Executive Vice President and Chief Operations Officer, R. Patrick Mcdonald; Mcdonald to SONOPC0's Chief Executive officer, Mr. Farley. 4 In the supplementary filing of October 1,1990, the Petitioners further i claim that Mr. Farley, " chose the GPC Corporate Officers which would be i staffing the SONOPC0 project even though he is not an officer or employee of GPC." In the July 8, 1991, Supplement (page 20), the Petitioners assert that l
- Mr. Mcdonald has reported to Mr. Farley on administrative matters since the formation of the SON 0PC0 project. l In March 1988, GPC and APC met with NRC to discuss their plans to form a separate operating company, SONOPCO. On July 25, 1988, NRC met with GPC to 1
- discuss the corporate organization of SONOPC0 and GPC, including the generic ;
activities and initiatives involving the Vogtle and Hatch facilities. Enclosure 3 to the meeting summary prepared by NRC Region II, August 11, 1988, a Nuclear Operations-Transitian Organization chart, shows the Vice President- l . Nuclear (Hatch), and the Vice President-Nuclear (Vogtle) reporting to Mr. W. , G. Hairston, the Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations and Mr. W. G. Hairston reporting to Mr. R. P. Mcdonald, the Executive Vice President-Nuclear ! Operations. On March ~1,1988, Mr. Mcdonald was elected a senior officer of
GPC and named Executive Vice President-Nuclear, effective April 25, 1988. On May 4, 1988, Mr. W. G. Hairston was elected Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations of GPC and Mr. C. K. McCoy was elected Vice President of GPC (GPC submittal, April 1,1991, Attachment 1, Exhibit 4). During December 19 through 21, 1988, with Phase 1 of the SON 0PC0 transition in effect, the NRC conducted an inspection of the corporate organization, responsibilities, and functions at Birmingham, Alabama (Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-41, 50-366/88-41, 50-424/88-60, 50-425/88-77, 50-348/88-33, and 50-364/88-33). Part 3 of thf r, report states:
- In preparation for combining the management of Vogtle, Hatch, and Farley into one organization, GPC has reorganized and moved the corporate nuclear operations to Birmingham.... Currently, the Executive Vice President and Senior Vice President for Nuclear Operations are officers of both GPC and APC.... The Vice Presidents for each of the three projects (Vogtle, Hatch, and Farley) report to the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations.
The transcript for the D0L proceeding *, considering the discrimination complaints of Mr. Hobby, indicates that GPC President, Mr. Dahlberg, stated that the operation of GPC's nuclear facilities is his direct responsiblity; i that Mr. Mcdonald takes his management direction from Mr. Dahlberg regarding the operation of GPC's nuclear plants; and that Mr. Mcdonald reports to Mr. Dalhberg for management operations dealing with GPC plants, (Proceeding Transcript at pages 305, 307, and 309). Mr. Farley stated that he does not have any responsibility for operating GPC's nuclear facilities and that Mr. Mcdonald does not report to him with respect to the operation of Hatch and Vogtle. (Proceeding Transcript at pages 567 and 568). Mr. Mcdonald stated 3 Marvin JL. Hobby y2 Georcia Power Comoany, Case No. 90-ERA-30.
that he reports to Mr. Dahlberg regarding the operation of GPC's nuclear facilities (Proceeding Transcript at pages 613 and 614). In a deposition of May 5,1990, taken in the same Hobby DOL proceeding, at pages 13 and 14, Mr. Mcdonald stated that he has no reporting responsibilities to Mr. Farley. In a Memorandum to Mr. H. B. Hobby of May 15, 1989, Mr. F. D. ; Williams stated: Mr. R. P. Mcdonald reports to A. W. Dahlberg for operation and support activities of Plants Vogtle and Hatch. I have attached a copy of the most recent published organization chart showing the reporting. Mr. George Hairston reports to Mr. Mcdonald. The Petition (pages 5 and 6) states that Mrm Hobby's claims regarding control of operating the nuclear facilities are based upon his witnessing the day-to-day operation at GPC's corporate offices. Other than Mr. Hobby's observations of day-to-day operation, no direct evidence supports the claim that Mr. Mcdonald reported to Mr. Farley regarding the operation of the Hatch or Vogtle nuclear facilities. Mr. Hobby acknowledged that he had no personal knowledge that Mr. Mcdonald received his direction from Mr. Farley (Hobby DOL Proceeding Transcript at page 239). He does, however, relate observations or assertions that he believes strongly suggest that SON 0PC0 was in control: 1 (1) In his Memorandum of April 27, 1989 (Exhibit A of the ' September 21, 1990, Supplement to the Petition), Mr. Hobby refers to a specific concern with regard to control expressed by one of the joint owners of the Vogtle facility, the Oglethorpe Power Corporation. (2) Page 4 of Mr. Hobby's letter of June 8, 1989, to Mr. D. Wilkinson (Attachment 4 to the July 8, 1991, Supplement to the Petition) refers to coaching of the GPC corporate staff regarding the organizational reporting and control issue. 1
(3) Mr. Hobby states that on October 25, 1989, GPC's counsel advised him that statements in certain contractual documents should be reworded to avoid any accusation that SON 0PCO was in control (October 1, 1990, Supplement to Petition. page 3). ; (4) In the October 1, 1990 Supplement (pages I and 2), the Petitioners state that Mr. Farley was responsible for selecting GPC vice presidents associated with SONOPC0 project and would also decide whether to transfer GPC employees from SON 0PC0 project located in Birmingham, Alabama, to GPC l Headquarters, in Atlanta, Georgia, even though he was not a GPC employee. (5) Mr. Hobby was advised that "[I]t was Mr. Farley who would be making l the call about the staffing of all GPC nuclear positions...." (October 1, i 1990, Supplement to Petition, page 4), (6) The Petitioners state that Vogtle project management assumed that Mr. Farley, and not Mr. Dahlberg, controls Vogtle's operation, citing two reasons for this assertion: a statement by Mr. McCoy during a meeting on Vogtle Unit l's Cycle 4 refueling outage that the outage philosophy was created by Mr. Farley and others; and a taped comment by a former SON 0PC0 manager stating his belief that, in case of a significant event at a GPC facility, the corporate duty manager would call Mr. Farley rather than Mr. Dahlberg (October 1,1990, Supplement to Petition, pages 4 and 5). (7) The Petitioners assert (July 8, 1991, Supplement to Petition, page
- 20) that Mr. Mcdonald made false statements during a transcribed meeting with the NRC Staff on January 11, 1991, when Mr. Mcdonald discussed the formation of SONOPC0 and stated that the management of SON 0PC0 underwent a change in December 1990 (i.e., that Mr. Mcdonald began to report to Mr. Farley with respect to administrative matters). The Petitioners contend that Mr.
Mcdonald's statements were false because, the Petitioners claim, Mr. Mcdonald has reported to Mr. Farley on administrative matters since the SON 0PC0 project I was formed in November 1988 . The Petitioners assert that deposition i testimony of Mr. Farley on May 7,1990, verifies that Mr. Mcdonald's statement ' was false because Mr. Farley's description of a " joint office for the Administrative side" of the SONOPC0 project conflicts with Mr. Mcdonald's assertion that Mr. Farley had no responsibilities in the area of administrative support before December 1990. The admini',trative responsibilities to support the GPC staff during Phase I were descr'. bed in a letter of agreement with Southern Company Services, Incorporated, dated April 24, 1989. Item 1 of the letter of agreement provides for administrative services under the direction of Mr. C. D. McCrary, Vice President, Administrative Services-Nuclear. These administrative services were to support GPC's nuclear staff. During this period, Mr. McCrary reported to Mr. Mcdonald with respect to these functions. Item 4 of this agreement provides for services under Mr. J. M. Farley, Executive Vice l President-Nuclear, relating to the anticipated transfer of nuclear operating l and support activities from GPC to SON 0PCO. When Phase 2 began and Mr. Farley l l became CEO of SON 0PCO, he acquired line responsibility for executive oversight of SONOPCO's Administrative Support Group and the Technical Services Group. Therefore, when Phase 2 began, Mr. Farley's responsibilities for the Administrative Services Group and the Technical Services Group did indeed : change. The NRC Staff has reviewed the materials submitted by the Petitioners to support their claims. With regard to Items (1), (2), and (3) previously described, the Petition contains evidence of concerns both within and outside m
of GPC that SON 0PC0 might be perceived as being in control of GPC nuclear operations. These concerns would not necessarily be unusual during a. transitional phase when, of necessity, the responsibilities of GPC and SON 0PC0 could closely coincide. -As is discussed in the following paragraphs, the NRC Staff has concluded that GPC retained control of its nuclear facilities during this transitional phase. With regard to Items (4) and (5), the DOL depositions and testimony do provide some support for the contention that Mr. Farley participated to some degree in personnel decisions affecting both SON 0PC0 and GPC employees, including some who were elected as GPC corporate officers. Mr. Farley was Executive Vice President-Nuclear of the Southern Company (parent company of APC, GPC, and Southern Company Services) and was expected to become President and CEO of the SONOPC0 project upon its formation. Therefore, his involvement in personnel decisions for employees transferring into or out of the SON 0PCO project is not unusual. Further, Mr. Farley's consultation with GPC on other GPC employees does not conflict with NRC requirements. Both Mr. Farley and GPC have provided sworn statements or depositions that the ultimate responsibility for decisions on assignment of GPC employees rested with the authorized GPC management structure (i.e. Dahlberg, Mcdonald, et al.) In fact, GPC vice presidents, as officers of GPC, were approved by the GPC Board of Directors. On the basis of this information, the NRC Staff concludes that the Petitioner's assertions about Mr. Farley's decisionmaking with respect to GPC employees are an insufficient basis for further NRC action in this matter. With regard to Items (6) and (7) above, the Petitioners express specific concern that the Executive Vice President-Nuclear Operations was taking guidance and direction from the SONOPC0 organization, as opposed to taking
I l this guidance and direction from the GPC CEO, and that this began in November 1988 rather than in December 1990 as indicated by Mr. Mcdonald during the January ll,1991, meeting. As such, the Petitioners claim that GPC's statement that the management of SONOPCO underwent a change in December of ! l 1990 was not accurate. The January 11, 1991, meeting occurred after SONOPC0 was formally established, at which time Phase I had been completed and Phase 2 was beginning. During Phase 1, the administrative services support for GPC's nuclear staff had been provided by the Vice President-Administrative Services group, Mr. McClary. Mr. McClary had reported to Mr. Mcdonald with respect to these activities. Mr. McClary had also provided administrative support to the SON 0PC0 project office on administrative matters. Mr. Farley was the officer in charge of the SONOPC0 project office. Mr. Mcdonald also worked with Mr. l Farley on the administrative aspects of the formation of SONOPC0 (Transcript for Deposition of Joseph M. Farley, May 7, 1990, 90-ERA-30, pp 37 and 38). l These responsibilities were described in Items 1 and 4, respectively, of a l letter of agreement between Mr. Mcdonald and Mr. H. A. Franklin, President and CEO of Southern Company Services, Incorporated, dated April 24, 1989. When l Phase 2 began and Mr. Farley became CEO of SON 0PCO, he acquired line 1 responsibility for executive oversight of SON 0PC0's Administrative Support : Group and the Technical Services Group. Therefore, when Phase 2 began, Mr. Farley's responsibilities for the Administrative Services group and the Technical Services group changed. l The NRC Staff has reviewed the Vogtle Final Safety Analysis Report, the Vogtle licenses, records of an NRC Special Inspection conducted to review the l SON 0PC0 management organization, and testimony of key officials taken under ; l 1
I r I oath. The NRC Staff concludes that this information indicates that the
- responsibility for decisions affecting the operation of the GPC plants rests I and has rested with the Senior Vice President-Nuclear. While certain observations and assertions of Messrs. Hobby and Mosbaugh indicate concern in this area, those concerns do not warrant a conclusion that SONOPC0 was in control. Rather, the NRC Staff finds that, throughout Phases I and 2 of the SON 0PC0 project, the chain of command was from the respective vice presidents for the Vogtle and Hatch facilities to Mr. Hairston. Mr. Hairston reported to ;
Mr. Mcdonald, who reported to Mr. Dahlberg, President of GPC. Each of these individuals is an elected officer of GPC, and the reporting chain is to the President of GPC. Therefore, the NRC Staff concludes that there has been no responsibility transferred from GPC for the Vogtle or Hatch facilities. l Also, by the end of 1990, Mr. Farley's responsibilities had changed, Mr. Mcdonald began to report to Mr. Farley with respect to administrative matters, and, therefore, Mr. Mcdonald's statements during the January 11, 1991, meeting with the NRC Staff were not false. 4
- 8. Alleaed False Statements About Chain of Command (Petition Section III.2; July 8, 1991, Supplement, Section III)
The Petitioners state that GPC misled the Commission about the chain of command from the Vogtle project's Plant Manager to its CEO before the NRC ! issued the operating license for the facility. l On March 30, 1989, the Commissioners met to discuss and possibly vote on j the full power operating license for Vogtle Unit 2. The Commissioners present ~ were Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr., Kenneth M. Carr, Thomas M. Roberts, i
Kenneth C. Rogers, and James R. Curtiss. The transcript reflects that then Comissioner Carr expressed concern about the hierarchy between the Vogtle Plant Manager (i.e., the General Manager) and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), noting that it " looked to me like he was a long way from the CEO." Mr. R. P. Mcdonald, GPC Executive Vice President-Nuclear Operations, responded that (1) he (Mr. Mcdonald) reported to Mr. A. William Dahlberg, the GPC CEO, (2) that Mr. Ken McCoy, Vice President of Vogtle, reported to Mr. Mcdonald, and (3) that Mr. George Bockhold, then Vogtle General Manager, reported directly to Mr. McCoy. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Comissioners voted unanimously in favor of the license, and the license was issued the following day. On May 1, 1989, Mr. W. G. Hairston, III, Senior Vice President for Nuclear Operation, sent the NRC a letter of correction of the transcript, noting that Mr. Mcdonald had inadvertently left out the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations. The organization is as described on figures 13.1.1-1 and 13.1.1-2 of the Vogtle Final Safety Analysis Report. The Petitioners claim that Mr. Mcdonald knowingly made false statements to the NRC Comissioners in the presence of Messrs. Dahlberg, McCoy, and Bockhold during his response to then Comissioner Carr in that he " eliminated one entire level of management between the plant manager and the CEO." Moreover, the Petition asserts that Messrs. Dahlberg, McCoy and Bockhold should have known that Mr. Mcdonald's statements were false and should have brought this to the imediate attention of the Cominion and otherwise corrected the record before the Comission acted on the Vogtle full power license request. In its Response to the Petition of April 1, 1991, GPC noted that the Comission had been apprised of the Company's organization before the meeting
on March 30, 1989, including the Senior Vice President position, by an amendment to the Vogtle Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) that was submitted November 23, 1988. The amendment described the reporting chain as being from Mr. McCoy to Mr. Hairston to Mr. Mcdonald. GPC's Response also stated that the NRC had reviewed the organizational structure in December 1988 and issued l an inspection report.' In the inspection report, the NRC stated that the vice presidents of the Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle facilities reported to the Senior Vice President, who reported to the Executive Vice President, and that l the organization for Vogtle was consistent with the Vogtle FSAR amendment submitted in November 1988. j i in its Response, GPC noted that, during the March 30 meeting, Commissioner i Rogers stated that he had reviewed the Company's organizational chart during a visit he made to the plant site. In the Response to the Petition, GPC also noted that GPC had submitted the letter of correction to the transcript approximately 2 weeks after receiving the NRC transcript. l The NRC Staff has reviewed this issue and has concluded that Mr. Mcdonald's reply to then Commissioner Carr was inaccurate in that the transcribed record clearly contradicted other documents of record, including the FSAR and NRC inspection reports. The failure was material in that the reply (1) responded directly to the Comissioner's stated concern for an organizational structure in which the plant manager appeared to be "a long way
' NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-41, 50-366/88-41, 50-424/88-60, 50-425/88-77, 50-348/88-33, and 50-364/88-33, February 7, 1989.
I l from the.CEO," (2) could influence the Commission, and (3) may have been considered by the Commission in its decision. The Licensee or its employees would probably not attempt to deliberately l mislead the Commissioners since the Licensee had previously provided correct ( information, and NRC Staff members were present who presumably knew the correct information. Therefore, the NRC Staff believes that Mr. Mcdonald's I false statement or omission was not intentional. j The NRC Staff also believes that, while the statement (and thus the omission) was material because it could have influenced the Commission, it was i not significant because the NRC Staff does not believe this one issue would ; have caused the Commission to reach a different decision. In summary, while inaccurate information was given to the Commissioners, the NRC Staff does not believe that it was deliberate or significant. Under the NRC's Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C), unsworn oral statements that are unintentionally inaccurate are not normally acted upon unless they involve significant information by a Licensee official. In this case, no enforcement action is warranted regarding the oral statement because the information was not significant. Although we cannot be certain whether the other GPC personnel knowingly made a material omission when they failed to correct the false statement, further action to pursue this omission is not warranted because the statement was insignificant. On November 7, 1991, the NRC Staff informed the Commission of the inaccurate information and the Staff's intent to reply to this issue on the basis that the statement omitting Mr. Hairston in the organizational structure was insignificant. The Commission has concurred in this approach (Staff Requirements Memorandum of December 2,1991, in response to SECY-91-358).
C. A11eaed Routine Enterino into " Motherhood" (Petition Section III.5) The Petitioners allege that GPC routinely threatens the safe operation of GPC's nuclear facilities by allowing them to enter TS 3.0.3, referred to in the Petition as " motherhood." Specifically, the Petitioners state that GPC repeatedly allowed the Vogtle facility to enter TS 3.0.3 by rendering both trains of safety-related load sequencers for the diesel generators inoperable. The Petitioners also allege that GPC did not make the required notifications to the NRC when TS 3.0.3 was entered. Vogtle TS 3.0.3 requires that, when a limiting condition for operation (LCO) is not met, except as provided in the associated action requirements, i action shall be taken within I hour to place the unit in a mode in which the l TSs do not apply by placing it in hot standby within the next 6 hours, in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours, and at least in cold shutdown within ! the subsequent 24 hours. The NRC established TS 3.0.3 to ensure that the reactor plant is shut down in a timely and orderly manner when the LCO in the TS for the specific ' component or system is exceeded or when a condition exists that is not 4 addressed by TS requirements. The Licensee has satisfied the TS if it l 1 performs the final action within the time specified in the TS. If the condition requiring entry into TS 3.0.3 is corrected before commencing or completing the shutdown, the Licensee need not initiate a shutdown, or if a shutdown is already initiated, may end the shutdown and return the plant to
)
the previous conditions, 1 l I l
t i r t i The Commission's regulations for notifying and reporting to the NRC do not ! contain'an explicit requirement that an entry into .TS 3.0.3, in and of itself, f i be. reported. Licensees are required by 10 CFR 50.72 to notify the NRC within i I hour of the initiation of any plant shutdown required'by the plant's TS. Thus, the NRC is promptly notified of entries into TS 3.0.3 if the plant l initiates a shutdown as a result of the problem that caused entry into the TS. However, there is no requirement to notify the NRC of entries into TS 3.0.3 if a shutdown is not initiated. l The NRC Staff has reviewed entry into TS 3.0.3 through various inspections ' conducted by regional-based inspectors and the observations of the permanently assigned resident inspectors' staff and concludes that GPC does not routinely enter TS 3.0.3. In Inspection Report 50-424,425/90-19, January 11, 1991, the NRC Staff documented that GPC management had indicated that actions for an orderly shutdown would not be initiated until at least 3 hours after entry into TS 3.0.3. GPC management also indicated that it could perform an orderly, controlled shutdown within I hour, if need be. GPC has interpreted the action statement of TS 3.0.3 to allow 7 hours to be in hot standby, and to accomplish this, the shift crew could wait for at least 3 hours after entering the LC0 ; i before commencing a shutdown. It was also GPC's position that no notifications to the NRC were required under these circumstances. GPC's actions in this area did not differ significantly from those of various other licensees, except that GPC does not i:nmediately notify the load dispatcher'
' The NRC confirmed that, while GPC did not follow the i actione recoesnanded in Generic Letter 87-09 (i.e., notification {
of the load dispatcher within the first hour and performance of a controlled shutdown throughout the next 6 hours), GPC has never exceeded the 7-hour time limit to be in hot standby. In NRC
and does not provide written guidance to the operations personnel. In the inspection report. the NRC Staff identified this lack of immediate notification and written guidance as a weakness. On February 28, 1991, GPC responded to this finding by providing written guidance for the operators to l use upon entering TS 3.0.3. The NRC Staff reviewed this guidance and found it acceptable. The specific example identified by the Petitioners regarding this issue concerned GPC's practice in the area of safety-related load sequencers for Vogtle's emergency diesel generators. The Petitioners claim that the Licensee failed to recognize that the loss of a load sequencer resulted in the entry l into TS 3.0.3 and, thus, required notification to the NRC. Each unit at Vogtle has two Engineering Safety Feature Actuation Systems (ESFASs) sequencers and both must be operable during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The NRC and GPC personnel determined that removing the load sequencers from service could result in entering the LCO for TS 3.0.3 or in entering TS Table 3.3-2, depending on what portion of the sequencer system was removed. Some of the circuits were included in Table 3.3-2, but the TS did not address the remainder of the system. The Operations Department had historically linked load sequencer outages to the emergency diesel generator LCO of TS 3.8.1.1.b (78 hours to hot standby). Although TS Table 3.3-2 and TS 3.0.3 have recently been found to apply to sequencer outages, GPC informed the NRC Staff that it had not reviewed past load sequencer outages. The NRC Staff has conducted a review of both the completed maintenance work orders that were performed on the sequencers on Units 1 and 2 and the Inspection Report 50-424,425/90-19, the NRC identified as a weakness the failure to notify the load dispatcher in any of the instances that a change in plant operation had been initiated.
_ 22 - ! i related surveillance tests by the Instrumentation and Control Engineering and l the Operations Departments. The NRC Staff found several instances in which the work performed would have required the load sequencers to be de-energized. However, the associated unit was found not to have been in Modes 1, 2, 3 or 4 l 1 at the time this work was performed and, thus, '1o TS LCO applied. l Similar to the maintenance work order review, a review of related Instrumentation and Control Engineering and the Operations Departments' surveillance tests did not reveal any examples of the load sec,uencers having been de-energized while in Modes 1 through 4 at the time the work was performed and, thus, no TS LC0's applied. Accordingly, the NRC Staff has concluded that GPC does not routinely : threaten the safe operation of the Vogtle facility by allowing entry into TS 3.0.3. The Petitioners' claim that NRC notification requirements were i violated upon entry into TS 3.0.3 was not substantiated. ! D. Alleaed Ionorina of TS (Petition Section III.6) i l The Petitioners claim that GPC routinely endangers the public's safety by ! ignoring TS and that this is illustrated by seven cited exampies: 1 J Example (1) Openina Dilution Valves When Recuired to ha locked Closed l (Petition Section III.6a) The Petitioners state that the Licensee willfully and knowingly violated i Vogtle Unit 1 TSs by opening dilution valves required to be locked closed by l l
TSs. The Petitioners claim that the valves were opened while the reactor coolant system (RCS) was at mid-loop, and that this placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition and created the risk of an uncontrolled boron dilution i accident and an inadvertent reactor criticality. The Petitioners allege that ; the valves were opened to expedite an outage so that the plant could be placed r back on line according to the outage schedule. The Petitioners also assert that violating TSs to stay on schedule was due, in part, to SONOPCO's philosophy (attributed by the Petitioners to Messrs. Farley, Mcdonald, Hairston, and three SONOPC0 Vice Preridents but not attributed to Mr. Dahlberg) that outages must be scheduled assuming that !
... everything goes right. Everything falls into place right. That you do not put any contingency or extra time in there ... (quotation verbatim from Vice President McCoy).
[ Petition, page 18].
~
1 01 has investigated this event, which occurred in October 1988 during Vogtle's first refueling outage. The results of that investigation are documented in 01 Report 2-90-001. The OI investigators concluded that TS i 3.4.1.4.2 was knowingly and intentionally violated by Vogtle Operations shift supervisors, with the express knowledge and concurrence of the Operations Manager. In its report, 01 also concluded that a violation of the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 occurred, but that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that this was a deliberate violation of reporting requirements. On June 3, 1991, after reviewing the 01 findings, the NRC Staff issued Demands for Information (Demands) to some Operations shift supervisors, the 1 1988 Operations Manager, and GPC. After receiving and reviewing the responses to the Demands, the NRC held an Enforcement Conference on September 19, 1991, with GPC and the 1988 Operations Manager. The NRC Staff sent letters to each
of the individuals following the Enforcement Conference stating that no additional actions would be taken regarding their individual NRC licenses. The NRC also stated that, although the actions of these individuals did not meet NRC expectations, the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that their actions in 1988 were a deliberate attempt to disregard and intentionally circumvent plant TSs. On December 31, 1991, the NRC Staff issued GPC a Notice of Violation And Proposed Imposition Of Civil Penalty of
$100,000 (Notice). The Notice set out several violations identified during the NRC investig'ation conducted between February 1, 1990, and March 19, 1991, including a violation that, contrary to the requirements of TS 3.4.1.4.2 (1988 edition), on October 12 and 13, 1988, with Unit 1 in Mode 5, loops not filled, reactor makeup water storage tank valves 1208-U4-176 and 1208-U4-177 were opened in order to add chemicals to the RCS. On January 30, 1992, the Licensee responded to the Notice, denied the violations, and protested the l imposition of the civil penalty. The NRC Staff reviewed the GPC response and, l on June 12, 1992, issued an Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty of $100,000 (Order). On July 9,1992, GPC responded to the Order, submitted payment of the penalty, and noted that it did not plan to continue an appeal of this action.
a On the basis of this investigation and subsequent followup, the NRC Staff agrees that a violation associated with the operatien of these dilution valves
- did, in fact, occur. To this extent, the Petitioner's claim is substantiated and the NRC has taken appropriate enforcement action. However, the evidence does not substantiate that this action was willful.
Rather, as indicated by the responses of the Operations Manager and GPC to the NRC's Demand, the action resulted from an incorrect interpretation of the TS requirement by the Operations Manager in 1988.
i ! l l 4 l l The Petitioners state that opening these valves while the RCS was at mid- l I , loop placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition and resulted in risking an. ! l
- uncontrolled dilution accident and inadvertent reactor criticality. The NRC l j Staff did find that this action placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition.
l For this reason, in part, the NRC Staff issued the Notice to GPC dated December 31, 1991, and the Order dated June 12, 1992. With respect to the placement of the plant in a condition that could have resulted in an uncontrolled dilution event and inadvertent reactor criticality, the NRC Staff reviewed analyses that Westinghouse later performed for GPC. GPC provided the analyses to the NRC Staff on November 21, 1989, to support proposed license amendments to change Vogtle TS 3.4.1.4.2. The change would allow the valves to be opened under administrative control to enable non-borated chemical additions to be made to the RCS during Mode 5b (cold shutdown with coolant inventory reduced to the extent that the reactor coolant loops are not filled) and Mode 6 (refueling), using a flow path via the reactor makeup water storage tank. The results of the Licensee's analyses indicated that the minimum acceptable operator action times of 15 minutes for Mode 5b and 30 minutes for Mode 6, as specified in the NRC's Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), would be met. On the basis of these analyses, the NRC i Staff concluded that the opening of these valves under administrative controls { with the RCS in a loops-not-filled condition, including the mid-loop condition, would not result in an unsafe condition. This conclusion was + included in NRC Staff correspondence to GPC dated February 20, 1990, which i approved License Amendment Number 28 for Vogtle Unit 1 and License Amendment , Number 9 for Vogtle Unit 2. The investigation by 01 and the responses by GPC , and specific individuals indicate that precautions were taken when the valves j P t
l were opened in 1988 to ensure that the valves would remain open for no more than 5 minutes. Therefore, the NRC Staff concludes that, although the TSs in effect at the time were violated, the actual event of opening the valves in 1988 did not endanger the health and safety of the public. With respect to the Petitioners' claim that the valves were opened to expedite the outage so that the plant could be placed back on line according to the outage schedule, the NRC Staff pursued this issue during the Enforcement Conference on September 19, 1991. The NRC Staff did not conclude that this evolution had been performed to meet the outage schedule. Similarly, the statements made by the Petitioners that SONOPCO's philosophy would necessarily result in managers intentionally violating TSs and "taking" LERs to remain on schedule, was not substantiated by the NRC Staff's review. Although chemical cleaning is a desirable process, which is advantageous in maintaining radiological exposures of plant personnel to levels as low as is reasonable achievable, it is performed at the option of the utility. The NRC did not require chemical cleaning before the utility restarted of the reactor in 1988. If the desire to remain on schedule had been the basis for the decision, then the more logical decision for this first refueling outage would have been to omit the chemical cleaning step and defer it for a subsequent outage. This supports the statements of the individuals involved that the decision to open the valves was not based on schedular concerns. Example (2) Failure to Secure Dilution Valves as Recuired by TS (Petition Section III.6b)
i On February 26, 1990, the NRC Staff found that dilution valves, identified ) in previous Example 1, were required to be locked closed, but were not locked i while at mid-loop in violation of TSs. The Petitioners assert that this is another example of willful violation of TSs by Vogtle senior management. On February 26, 1990, while Unit I was in Mode 5 with reactor coolant { loops not filled (mid-loop), the NRC Staff found that discharge valve 1-1208- ' V4-176 from the refueling makeup water storage tank was closed but was not secured in position as required by TS 3.4.1.4.2C. Instead of installing a mechanism to mechanically secure this valve, the Licensee had placed a ! l clearance " hold tag" on the valve, which provided only administrative control ' to preclude valve operation. When the NRC Staff described this condition to 1' the Licensee, Vogtle personnel contended that the administrative controls were acceptable to fulfill the requirements of the TS that the valve be secured in position. GPC later agreed that this method was not acceptable nd took action to install a mechanical, lockable device. On April 26, 1990, the NRC Staff issued Notice of Violation, 50-424,425/90-05, " Failure to Mechanically Secure Valve 1-1208-U4-176 During Mode 5 As Required By TS 3.4.1.4.2.C." During a subsequent NRC inspection (Inspection Report 50-424,425/91-14), the NRC Staff reviewed and closed this violation. The inspectors reviewed the locked valve procedure, 10019-C, which had been revised to eliminate using a
" hold tag" on valves that are required by TSs to be secured in position. To secure the valve involved in this violation the Licensee had routed a steel cable through drilled holes in the valve handle and then mechanically secured the cable to prevent personnel from operating the valve. GPC conducted a comprehensive review of all remaining valves that are required by TSs to be secured to ensure each had a locking mechanism in place. GPC committed to
l I i provide an appropriate locking mechanism for any valve that is secured by a hold tag and is required to be secured by TSs. However, GPC found no other valves that were in that category. The NRC Staff concludes that, although a violation occurred, it was an error based upon interpretation and was not an example of a willful violation of TSs by Vogtle senior management. l Example (3) Miscalculation of Shutdown Marain (Petition Section III.6c) l In January 1989, two shif ts of licensed operators miscalculated, through ) procedural errors, the shutdown margin for Vogtle Unit 1, which was shut down at the time. The Petition alleges that the RCS boron concentration thus became " dangerously low" and that the Licensee did not write a deficiency report, conduct a critique, review their actions for conformance to TSs, or submit a report to the NRC. Vogtle TS 3.1.1.2 requires that a specified minimum shutdown margin be maintained when the reactor is in Modes 3 (Hot Standby), 4 (Hot Shutdown), or 5 (Cold Shutdown). The required minimum value is specified by graphs of shutdown margin as a function of RCS boron concentration. The minimum shutdown margin specified in TS 3.1.1.7 is sufficient to ensure, as a most restrictive condition, that if a baron dilution accident were to occur during the beginning of core life, the operator would have at least 15 minutes to take corrective action after the initiation of an alarm caused by source range high flux to avoid total loss of shutdown margin. An operator reaction time of at least 15 minutes is consistent with the associated accident analyses of the boron dilution event in the FSAR. The corresponding surveillance requirement
in TS 4.1.1.2 requires that the shutdown margin be determined to be greater i than or equal to the required value at least once every 24 hours by f considering several factors, including RCS boron concentration, RCS average ' temperature, and xehon concentration. At 5:35 p.m. on January 19, 1989, control room oper. tors at Vogtle manually tripped the Unit I turbine and reactor to enter a planned outage to repair a leaking socket weld for the drain line in the loop seal downstream of the pressurizer safety relief valve. After the unit was shut down, an extra ! shift supervisor on shift completed Procedure 14005-1, " Shutdown Margin i Calculation," which must be compl"ted every 24 hours when the plant is in l Modes 3, 4, or 5. He signed the procedure at 7:13 p.m. on January 19, 1989.
)
However, the extra shift supervisor incorrectly completed Data Sheet 2, which applies to conditions when the average RCS temperature is equal to or greater than 557 degrees Fahrenheit. This action was incorrect because he should have completed Data Sheet 4, which applies to conditions related to entering Cold Shutdown (Mode 5). That shutdown margin calculation, using the wrong data sheet, resulted in a calculated shutdown margin of 6.6 percent reactivity ! (i.e., delta k/k)* and a required shutdown margin of 2.58 percent delta k/k. These results indicated to the operators that no boron addition to the RLS was required in order to enter Cold Shutdown.
' Re:.ctivity is defined as the fractional change in neutron population from one neutron generation to the subsequent !
generation. Reactivity is expressed mathematically as (K effective ' 1)/K effective, or as delta k/k, where K effective is the multiplication factor in a nuclear system expressing generation. the change in the fission neutron population per
On January 20. 1989, at approximately 9 a.m., a reactor engineer questioned the apparently low RCS boron concentration of 1333 parts per million (ppm). His concern prompted the Licensee to stop the unit cooldown until the shutdown margin calculation was verified. At 10:22 a.m., the reactor engineer completed a shutdown margin calculation that assumed an RCS temperature of 68 degrees Fahrenheit and 0 percent reactivity for xenon worth. His calculation, without taking credit for xenon worth, showed that 1800 ppm boron concentration was necessary to obtain a shutdown margin of 4.015 percent delta k/k compared to a required shutdown margin of 3.47 percent delta k/k. j This calculation included no credit for xenon worth, which would have added approximately 3.8 percent delta k/k to the shutdown margin and provided more ; than an adequate margin above TS requirements without further boration. Since no TS limit was exceeded, GPC was not required to submit, and did not submit, a written report to the NRC. On January 20, 1989, at 1:38 p.m., the on-shift operations supervisor recalculated the shutdown margin that had been incorrectly determined at 7:13 p.m. on January 19, 1989. The new calculation used plant data in effect on January 19 and was based upon Data Sheet 4. The new calculation determined that the shutdown margin was 4.185 percent delta k/k while the required l shutdown margin is 1.92 percent delta k/k. The NRC resident inspectors reviewed Procedure 14005-1, Data Sheets 2 and 4, the calculations concerning the data sheets dated Januarv 19 and 20, 1989, and control room logs for that period. The NRC Staff discussed the inspection in Inspection Report 50-424/91-20 and 50-425/91-20, dated September 12, 1991. The inspector found that the shutdown margin calculation performed at , 7:13 p.m. on January 19, 1989, was incorrect in that the wrong Data Sheet of
l l l Procedure 14005-1 was used. However, the inspector found no evidence that the . TS limits on shutdown margin were ever exceeded or that an inadvertent ! criticality could have occurred because the wrong data sheet was used. The confusing instructions on Data Sheet 2 of Procedure 14005-1 contributed to this error. On March 26, 1989, the Licensee revised this procedure to l simplify, consolidate, and clarify the data sheets. Although the NRC Resident Inspectors determined that the extra shift supervisor had failed to follow l procedures in selecting the data sheet, the inspectors issued no violation or deviation because the Licensee had identified and corrected this apparent i weakness in a prompt and satisfactory manner. The inspectors also confirmed 9 that GPC failed to write a deficiency card for this event that would have ' prompted the Licensee to peform a followup review of the error. The NRC 1 inspectors determined that the Licensee's followup review of the error ! occurred relatively promptly, even though a deficiency card had not been written. The inspectors reviewed the Licensee's deficiency card program and found it to be adequate; they could find no other instances of a failure to write a deficiency card. Therefore, the inspectors chose not to issue a > notice of violation. t In summary, the NRC inspectors concluded that an individual made an error i and failed to write a deficiency card. Nevertheless, the Licensee identified and corrected this error, which did not result in the violation of a TS limit and did not require a written report to the NRC. Moreover, the corrected calculations of the shutdown margin do not support the allegation that the error resulted in " dangerously low" boron concentrations in the RCS or that it endangered the health and safety of the public.
a Example (4) "Takina" LERs (Petition Section III.6d) , 1 The Petitioners claim that GPC employees were told, on March 22, 1990, to keep planned shutdowns on schedule by "taking" LERs. The Petitioners also contend that pressure'to keep on schedule would necessarily result in intentional violation of TS and "taking" LERs in order to remain on schedule.
"Taking" LERs implies that personnel intentionally do not perform a required l TS and then subsequently acknowledge this action that would require a written report to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.73. The Petitioners allege that this would be done in order to not perform the activity at a time that we11d cause a schedule delay. l This issue was reviewed as part of Ol's investigation of an alleged intentional TS violation with regard to a mode change with an inoperable I
neutron source range monitor (see Example 6 hereinafter). OI's review and ; I findings in this area are documented in O! Report 2-90-012. The 01 i investigation did not substantiate the alleged "taking" of LERs. The personnel interviewed stated that they had never been instructed to do whatever it takes to stay on schedule. 1 On the basis of this investigation, the NRC Staff has concluded that i Vogtle personnel did not intentionally, and were not instructed to, "take" J LERs to stay on schedule. Similarly, the statements made by the Petitioners l l that SONOPCO's philosophy would necessarily result in managers intentionally ; violating TS and "taking" LERs to remain on schedule was not substantiated by the NRC Staff's review. I
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l 1 -;
Example (5) Surveillance Testino of containment Isolation Valves (Petition Section III.6.e.i) The Petitioners claim that the Licensee knowingly concealed a technical violation which, if recognized, would have resulted in a safety-related shut down of Vogtle's Unit 1. This technical violation allegedly concerned the failure to properly test approximately 39 containment isolation valves in violation of TS surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a. In February 1990, when operations pe.wonnal completed a monthly TS surveillance on containment isolation valves and turned in their paperwork, the Shift Supervisor recognized an error in that only 2 of 39 valves had been checked. From previous records, the Shift Supervisor found that the same error had also been made the previous month. After the surveillance had been re-performed, the Shift Supervisor informed the Work Planning Group of the error and this group prepared and delivered a Deficiency Card to the control room. Since the surveillance had already been completed, no action was initiated under the TS's LCO (shut down within I hour). The Petitioners state that the Deficiency Card should have been initiated earlier by the individual
- discovering the deficiency and that the event was mishandled to conceal the a
discovery time and avoid the shutdown requirement of the LCO. GPC reported this issue in LER 50-425/90-01 dated March 27, 1990, and NRC l resident inspectors reviewed it as discussed in Inspection Report 50-424,425/90-10. The report notes that the task sheet contained in the procedure for performing this task was inadequate. The format of the task sheet resulted in cognitive personnel errors because the task sheet was unclear as to the number of valves required to be tested. The NRC Staff
issued no notice of violation for this event because the criteria specified in Section V.G.1 of the then-effective General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C) was met. Under those criteria, the NRC need not issue a notice of violation if the violation was identified by the Licensee, is normally classified at a Severity Level IV or V, was reported if required, was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence) within a reasonable time, was not a willful violation, and was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the Licensee's corrective action for a previous violation. The application of these criteria is based upon the judgement of the NRC inspectors, with support as needed from their management. This process of not requiring issuance of a violation was adopted by the NRC to encourage a Licensee to
- Jentify and correct violations. The procass also avoids spending unnecessary effort on the associated administrative work for both the NRC and Licensee--
time that could be better spent improving safety. OI investigated the willful aspects of this issue and found that it was not substantiated. 0! reported the results of this investigation in 01 Report 2-90-012. In this report, 01 concluded that the missed surveillance had been reported in an LER and resulted from an inadequate Surveillance Task Sheet that had listed eouipment identification numbers of only two valves for the monthly containment integrity check. 01 noted that the NRC resident inspectors had reviewed the LER and documented the event without issuing a notice of violation. 01 also noted that the circumstances of this event were reviewed during the NRC's special team inspection at Vogtle in August 1990, which found that the Shift Supervisor did not conceal the true discovery time of the missed surveillance to avoid a unit shutdown and that the Shift
Supervisor's actions to initiate an investigation into the adequacy of the previous surveillance and to concurrently re-perform the surveillance procedure were appropriate. The special team inspection identified that the supervisor who identified this potential problem took action to determine if a l previous surveillance test had been conducted and, at the same time, initiated ) action to reperform the surveillance test. Since the surveillance test is of l short duration, it was completed before the determination was made that the previous test had not been completed correctly. Since the surveillance test had already been repeated once the inadequacy of the previous test became ' known, a shutdown of the unit at that point was not required. l On the basis of the NRC Staff's inspections and investigation, the ; Petitioners' claim that the Licensee knowingly concealed a technical violation 1 is not substantiated. Example (6) Chanoina Modes With Reauired Eauipment inoperable (Petition Section III.6.e.ii) The Petitioners claim that the Licensee knowingly concealed another technical violation on March 1,1990, when a change from Mode 5 to Mode 6 occurred even though required equipment was not operable. The failure to comply with the TS, the Petitioners claim, translated to a 12-hour schedule enhancement at a critical juncture. The PetitSners allege this is an example of a willful violation. The NRC resident inspectors, an NRC special inspection team, and 01 investigators reviewed this issue. Results of these efforts are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-424/90-10 dated June 14, 1990 and 01 Report 2-90-012.
GPC also documented this event in LER 424/90-004 dated May 11, 1990. This LER described the violation of TS 3.0.4 on March 1, 1990, when Unit 1 entered Mode 6 from Mode 5 with an LC0 in effect for a neutron source range channel. The LER attributed the root cause to cognitive personnel error by the Shift Superintendent who failed to review the back side of the relevant LCO Status Sheet that noted the mode change was prohibited while the source range monitor ! was inoperable. Moreover, the Shift Superintendent had not otherwise recognized the prohibition before authorizing the mode entry. The NRC Staff interviewed various personnel involved in the review of plant conditions and involved with documentation necessary to change modes. [ The interviews indicated that neither the Shift Superintendent nor the Unit Shift Supervisor recognized that a mode restraining LC0 was in effect at the time of the mode change. Moreover, both were aware of an active LCO, but neither had connected the LCO to a mode restriction. Both of these individuals indicated that there had been no unreasonable emphasis on the critical path schedule. Both denied that they had ever been given any i indication or instruction to do whatever it takes to stay on schedule. They also indicated that they did not feel undue pressure to stay on schedule and particularly not if it meant compromising plant safety. The mode change did result in a reduction of the critical path outage time. The NRC Staff did identify a concern associated with the format of the LCO l status sheet that contributed to this problem. The status sheet is a two- l sided form with the remarks section on the back side of the form. A cursory review of these forms would result in a possible omission of the review of any remarks that may be entered on the form. On the basis of the NRC resident ; inspectors' review, the NRC determined that a violation occurred as discussed
h 1 in Inspection Report 50-424/90-10. A notice of violation was not issued because the criteria specified in Section V.G.1 of the then-effective General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C) was satisfied. Under these criteria, the NRC need not issue a notice of violat ion if the violation was identified by the Licensee, is normally classified at a Severity Level IV or V, was reported if required, was < or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence) within a reasonable time, was not a willful violation, and was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the Licensee's corrective action for a previous violation. , On the basis of evidence developed during these NRC inspections and investigation, this allegation of an intentional violation was not substantiated. Example (7) Failure to Declare RHR Pump Inoperable And Enter LCO (Petition Section III.6.e.iii) The Petitioners allege that GPC knowingly concealed a TS violation when the "B" residual heat removal (RHR) pump was not declared inoperable after cracking of the nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) line. The "A" RHR pump was inoperable at the time because of outage work. The Petitioners allege that, during the second refueling outage at Unit 1, (IR2), with RHR train "A" out of service for maintenance, the RHR train "B" pump experienced excessive vibration and the NSCW motor cooler experienced a leak at its outlet. TS 3.9.8.1, "RHR and Coolant Circulation," was allegedly violated because the Operations Department 1
l f chose not to declare :HR pump "1B" inoperable in an effort to mitigate the effect on the critical work path. The NRC Staff included this item in the Special Team Inspection discussed in Supplement I to NRC Inspection Report 50-424/90-19 and 50-425/90-19, dated November 1, 1991. :n Section 2.2 of the Inspection Report, the NRC Staff concluded that the Vogtle Operations Department had , an adequate engineering basis for accepting the operability of the RHR i pump even with the pump's high vibration and the NSCW leak. 1 The inspection team slso concluded that declaring the pump inoperable would not have affected the critical work path: the LCO actions would not 1 I have been restrictive because the containment, except for ventilation, had l been isolated as required by TS 3.9.4. The LCO actions would not have i prevented the Licensee from continuing refueling activities because the actions to close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere would only have required closing the containment ventilation purge valve, which has an automatic closure signal. Thus, schedule could not have motivated the Licensee in this matter. E. Alleced Concealment of Safecuards Problems (Petition Sections III.7a and III.7b) The Petitioners allege that GPC personnel, including a Vice President and General Manager, and a Southern Company Services Manager, knowingly and repeatedly hid safeguards problems from the NRC and willfully refused to comply with mandatory reporting requirements. The Petitioners further allege
that the GPC Vice President made false statements to the NRC during an Enforcement Conference about the status of safeguards materials in Birmingham, Alabama, which probably influenced a subsequent civil penalty action taken by the NRC. The Petitioners claim that this false and misleading information presented at the enforcement conference and other information withheld from the NRC are highly significant to the regulatory process and were relied upon as a basis for NRC decisions. The Petitioners are of the opinion that if the NRC had had the benefit of complete, factual information, the NRC would have, most probably, increased the civil penalty from the minimum ($50,000) into the hundreds of thousands of dollars (i.e., 100% increase in the base penalty owing to past performance, 100% increase in the base penalty owing to multiple events, 50% increase owing to failure to report, a 50% increase owing to failure to take prompt corrective action, and an increase owing to will fulness) . The Petitioners also allege that on July 23, 1990, plant and SONOPC0 senior management prevented the Site Security Manager from making a 7 Red Phone notification within I hour as required by 10 CFR 73.71. The Petitioners also allege that the manager was so prevented in order to delay or defuse the NRC's knowledge of programatic problems within SON 0PC0 (and its design agencies, which include Southern Company Services, Incorporated) with safeguards documents. 01 has investigated the allegation that GPC knowingly and repeatedly hid safeguards problems from the NRC and willfully refused to comply with mandatory reporting requirements. 0! also investigated the allegation that I A Red Phone refers to & Licensee's Emergency Notification System and is used for immediate telephone notifications to the NRC's Operation Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 73.71.
the GPC Vice President made false statements to the NRC in an enforcement conference concerning the status of safeguards material in Birmingham, Alabama. The results of these investigations are documented in OI Report 2-91-003. The 01 investigations did not substantiate that GPC withheld pertinent information from the NRC at the time of the enforcement conference on May 22, 1990, or that GPC management impeded the reporting of safeguards events. On the basis of the 01 investigations, NRC concludes that the Notice of Violation and Imposition of Civil Penalty of $50,000 was appropriate. 01 also investigated the allegation tha' on July 23, 1990, plant and SONOPC0 senior management prevented the Site Security Manager from making a Red Phone notification within 1 hour as required by 10 CFR 73.71 . The results of the investigation are also documented in 01 Report 2-91-003. The O! investigation concluded that, although the reporting of safeguards events to the NRC was slow in some instances, neither Licensee's management nor SONOPCO's management actively impeded the reporting process. The concern of the Site Security Manager was that a safeguards container had been found open and uncontrolled for half an hour in Birmingham, Alabama, in November 1989, and that 14 safeguards documents had been found uncontrolled in the SONOPC0 offices on June 15, 1990. The Site Security Manager did report these events after some delay, but not within the 1 hour required by 10 CFR 73.71. The NRC did not cite the delay in reporting these events because the Licensee had discovered these problems during the completion of corrective actions for a previously cited violation and the problems had occurred during the same timeframe as those in the previously cited violation and before the commitment date for completing all corrective actions associated with the previous violation.
F. Alleaed Operation of R dioactive Waste Systems and intimidation of Plant Review Board Members (Petition Section III.8) The Petitioners assert that GPC has endangered the public's health and safety by operating radioactive waste systems and facilities known to be in gross violation of NRC requirements. The Petitioners also state that Vogtle's General Manager intimidated members of the Plant Review Board (PRB) when they attempted to consider if the use of the waste system should be resumed. The NRC's Special Inspection Team reviewed this item and discussed its findings in Sapplement I to Inspection Reports 50-424/90-19 and 50-425/90-19, dated November' 1,1991. The first assertion regarding improper installation and operation of the radioactive waste system is discu m d in Section 2.1 of the Inspection Report. The second part regarding intimidation of PRB members is discussed in Section 2.7 of the Inspection Report. The Petitioners allege that GPC installed and operated a radioactive waste micro-filtration system without performing an adequate engineering and safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.' This specific system is known as the FAVA system because it is supplied by FAVA Control Systems (FAVA). The Petitioners further allege that the material configuration, fabrication, and quality of the system did not meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.143, " Control of Stainless Steel Weld Cladding of Low-Allow Steel a Title 10 of The Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.59, allows licenees to make changes in the facility, procedures, or conduct tests or experiments as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval, unless the proposed changes involve a change in the Technical Specifications or an unreviewed safety question.
l l P Components," and the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code. In late 1987, GPC had temporarily installed and operated a system at Vogtle for removing Niobium-95. GPC planned to replace this temporary modification with a permanent, high-quality system in the future. In February 1988, GPC experienced difficulty with the temporary system in , removing colloidal Niobium-95 following a reactor shutdown for maintenance work. GPC contracted FAVA to help rectify this problem. The Licensee l corrected the situation by installing a 0.35-micron filter system downstream - of the existing pre-filters. However, a large volume of radioactive waste was ; generated because the 0.35-micron filters rapidly exhibited high differential pressure and had to be changed frequently. The need to change filters l frequently also resulted in radwaste department personnel receiving additional I radiation exposure. Upon evaluating the performance of the 0.35-micron filter system, the ' Radwaste Department determined that the best approach to the problem was to install a back-flush, pre-coat filter system. However, no operational data was available for a system of this type in this specific application. FAVA supplied a proprietary Ultra Filtration System (Model No. 5FD/E) for testing to evaluate whether this was a practical and effective solution to the problem. GPC installed the temporary FAVA system before the Unit I refueling outage and operated it under Test Procedure T-0PER-8801. The test system kept liquid effluent releases well below TS limits. The Radwaste, Chemistry, and Engineering Departments evaluated the test results, and GPC issued a general work order to purchase a permanent system.
In the early part of 1989, the Quality Assurance (QA) Department performed ! an audit and identified a significant audit finding involving a programmatic breakdown in the procurement of the temporary FAVA system and a failure to e meet commitments of the FSAR. That finding prompted the Licensee to remove the temporary FAVA system from service. In late 1989, the Licensee sought to reinstall the FAVA system under a temporary modification because colloidal Cobalt-59 and Cobalt-60 had to be removed. The PRB reviewed this temporary modification and several members expressed strong objections to it based on the previous QA audit finding. These objections prompted the Licensee to submit a Request for Engineering
)
l Assistance (REA) and perform a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR : 50.59 in November 1989. The Licensee's engineering staff subsequently reviewed the November 1989 safety evaluation and found it to be adequate, l except that it did not properly address the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.143 regarding the use of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) piping. GPC l performed another safety evaluation in February 1990 to address this issue and { the vulnerability of the PVC pipes to radiation degradation. In the February , i 1990 safety evaluation, the Licensee specifically stated that the FAVA system ' did not conform to the criteria of RG 1.143. However, this deviation was I found to be technically acceptable for several reasons: (1) The design of the FAVA system had been previously evaluated and found to be adequate in the REA response of November 1989, except for the PVC nipes; (2) The location of the FAVA system was inside a shielded watertight vault, which provided adequate assurance that any system failures would be contained and would not create the potential for offsite releases; and (3) The presence of PVC pipe in the FAVA system, although prohibited by RG 1.143, was acceptable based on subsequent
design reviews because the radiation exposure of the plastic was found to be within acceptable limits. Although the testimony of one of the PRB members indicated that the temperature effects on the use of PVC in the FAVA system were not adequately evaluated before the system was installed, the testimony of the corporate system engineer indicated that GPC had considered this before installing the system although not specifically doctraented in the safety evaluation. Vogtle management subsequently consulted the NRC resident inspector to seek an NRC position regarding placing the FAVA system back in service. This was supplemented with additional information provided by other Vogtle management personnel documenting reasons that it should not be placed in service. The Licensee forwarded this package to Region II and NRR for review. In March 1990, following Region II and NRR concurrence during a telephone conference, the Licensee placed the FAVA system in service with the following NRC stipulations: (1) That procedures for operating the FAVA system require that an operator be present any time the system is in operation; (2) That all hoses to and from the FAVA system be verified to conform to RG 1.143; (3) That the cover over the FAVA system be securely fastened when the system is in operation to ensure that, if a spraying leak developed, it would be contained in the concrete vault; and (4) That the design of the walls of the auxiliary radwaste building be evaluated to determine if a design change was needed to reduce the possibility of wall leakage if a hose develops a leak and sprays its contents on the walls.
The Licensee complied with these stipulations upon returning the system to ' operation. i This review indicated that the FAVA system was originally installed and operated by the Licensee without an adequate safety evaluation and did not meet the guidance in RG 1.143 in that PVC piping was used in'this system. However, this deficiency was of limited' duration, and the Licensee, upon , performing subsequent safety evaluations that were forwarded to and accepted by the NRC Staff, concluded that the system was acceptable for use. Given their extensive review, the facts of this matter do not support a conclusion that the Licensee willfully violated NRC requirements or willfully operated the facility in a manner to endanger public health or safety. The Petitioners also contend that Vogtle's General Manager intimidated and ; pressured PRB members during a PRB meeting. The meeting occurred in February i 1990 te determine the acceptability of the safety analysis for installing the l FAVA micro-filtration system. As previously discussed, the Licensee performed several safety evaluations for the temporary modification to install the FAVA micro-filtration system. The NRC Special Inspection Team found through its discussions with PRB members that, while reviewing these safety evaluations, various PRB members had l expressed reservations on several occasions concerning the acceptability of the FAVA system. Although various PRB members may have expressed reservations, the l inspection team, in reviewing the PRB meeting minutes regarding this temporary modification, identified few instances of the PRB members documenting their dissenting opinions. Specifically, the minutes of PRB meeting 90-15, on l February 8, 1990, documented one PRB member's negative vote and dissenting
opinions regarding the acceptability of exempting the temporary modification from regulatory requirements and the adequacy of the system's safety evaluation. The only other example of a dissenting opinion was in the minutes for PRB Meeting 90-32, on March 6,1990. This dissenting opinion related to the acceptability of voting on the FAVA system installation when the PRB member who raised im initial questions and concerns on the operation of the FAVA system was not present. During discussions with NRC inspectors, PRB members indicated that, during the various PRB meetings concerning installing the F.AVA system, they did feel intimidated and pressured by the presence of the General Manager at the PRB meeting. On one occasion, an alternate voting member felt intimidated and ; feared retribution or retaliation because the General Manager was present at the meeting and the PRB member knew the General Manager wanted to have the temporary modification approved. However, the PRB member stated that he did not alter his vote and felt comfortable with how he had voted. This PRB member also stated that he was not aware of any occasions on which he or any other PRB member had succumbed to intimidation or any other occasions where he or they feared retribution. l The PRB members informed the General Manager following the meeting : (PRB 90-15) that several of them viewed his presence as intimidating. On March 1, 1990, the General Manager addressed this concern by meeting with all PRB members to reiterate each member's duties and responsibilities. He specifically told the members that his presence at PRB meetings must not I influence them and that alternates should be selected who would feel l comfortable with this responsibility. He also addressed the difference i
a t I t ! i ! [ between professional differences of opinion and safety or quality concerns,
, and methods for resolving each. !
4 Thus, the NRC Staff has found that, in one case, a PRB voting member felt t j intimidated and feared retribution because the General Manager was present at ; i i the PRB meeting. However, this member stated that he did not change his vote l in response to this pressure. He stated that the General Manager was ; } informed of this issue and met with the PRB to allay fears. The information ) I j obtained by the NRC Staff indicated that retribution did not occur. The event ! - t of a member fearing retribution was confirmed, and the absence of dissenting j opinions in the PRB meeting minutes calls into question the openness of ! t l discussions at PRB meetings. However, further discussions with PRB members : 1 t ! indicated the reason for the lack of dissenting opinions was that items are ' 1 , - discussed and reviewed until all members were comfortable with their ! decisions. NRC resident inspectors at Vogtle frequently attend PRB meetings and have .I found that the subjects are candidly discussed and the issues resolved without 1 i intimidation or fear of retribution. j III. CONCLUSION n 1 j As discussed in this partial decision, certain concerns raised by the Petitioners were partially substantiated. Violations of regulatory 1 requirements have occurred in the operations of the Vogtle and Hatch l facilities. A number of civil penalties have been issued to the Licensee for certain of these violations. To this extent, the Petitioners' request for action persuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is granted. i 1- !
However, the NRC Staff has concluded that no unauthorized transfer of the Vogtle operating licenses has occurred, and that the GPC nuclear facilities are now being operated in accordance with NRC regulations and do not endanger the health and safety of the~public. Additionally, I conclude that none of the issues addressed in this Partial Director's Decision call into question the Licensee's character, competence, fundamental trustworthiness, and commitment to safely operate its nuclear facilities. The institution of proceedings in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206, as requested by the Petitioners, i.: appropriate only where substantial health and safety issues have been raised. See Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975), and Washinaton Public Power System (WPPS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7,19 NRC 899, 923 (1984). As previously discussed, there is reasonable assurance that the Vogtle and Hatch facilities now oper:te witn adequate protection of the public health and safety. Therefore, I decline to take any further action with respect to the issues addressed in this Partial Director's Decision. To this extent, the Petitioners' request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is denied. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Commission to review. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this day of
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l 7590-01 i UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION GEORGIA POWER CONPANY. ET AL. V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 i DOCKET N05. 50-424 AND 50-425 i i AND EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AM 2 l D0CKET N05. 50-321 AND 50-366 i ISSUANCE OF PARTIAL DIRECTOR'S DECISION UWER 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor ' Regulation, has issued a Partial Director's Decision concerning a request l dated September ll, 1990 (Petition), as supplemented September 21 and ; October 1,1990, and July 8,1991, filed pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 by Michael D. Kohn, Esquire, on behalf of Messrs. Marvin Hobby and Allen Mosbaugh. The Petition and supplements contain allegations regarding: the management of the Georgia Power Company (GPC) nuclear facilities; illegal transfer of GPC's operating licenses to Southern Nuclear Operating Company j (SON 0PCO); intentional false statements to the NRC regarding GPC's organizational chain of command and the reliability of a diesel generator; I perjured testimony submitted by a GPC executive during a U.S. Department of l Labor (DOL) proceeding under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act; l repeated abuse at the Vogtle facility of Technical Specification 3.0.3; ) repeated willful technical specification violations at the Vogtle facility; repeated concealment of safeguards problems from the NRC; operation of
- radioactive waste systems and facilities at Vogtle in gross violation of NRC requirements; routine use at GPC nuclear facilities of nonconservative and questionable management practices; and retaliation by FC against managers who make regulatory concerns known to GPC or SONOPC0 management.
f 4 i e
i The supplements to the Petition also alleged that GPC's Executive Vice ; President made material false statements in GPC's April 1,1991, submittal to I the NRC responding to the issues raised in the Petition, and during a i transcribed meeting on January 11, 1991, with the NRC staff, to discuss the I formation and operation of SONOPCO. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has determined that certain issues raised in the Petition are capable of resolution now as the facts are sufficiently well understood as a result of NRC inspections or other reviews. The Director of NRR has determineo that issuance of a Partial Director's Decision, with regard to these issues, is appropriate. The remaining issues will be considered within a reasonable time in the future. Based on his review of the issues, the Director has determined ; l that certain concerns raised by the Petitioners are partially substantiated, ' and that for these matters, the NRC staff has taken appropriate action in the 3 form of civil penalties. To this extent, Petitioners' request for action has j been granted and I decline to take further action. Several concerns raised by the Petitioners are not substantiated by this Partial Director's Decision and Petitioners' request for action with respect to these matters is denied. The reasons for this decision are explained in the Partial Director's Decision under 10 CFR 2.206, 0D , which is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, and at the Local Public Document Rooms at the Burke County Library, 412 Fourth I Street, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830, and the Appling County Public Library, 301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia 31513. I A copy of the Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As l
I pro.:ded in this regulation, the Partial Director's Decision will constitute the fhial action of the Commission, except for the remaining open issues, ! 25 days after issuance, unless the Commission, on-its own motion, institutes j review of the Partial Director's Decision within that time period. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this ! l FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPMISSION l Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i i i
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i l l l 1
Failure to perform Adequate Shutdown Margin Calculation Leads to Near Miss Inadevertent Critica111ty 1 On 1-20-88 Plant Vogtle Unit I was in a forced outage l having been shut down from full power due to a cracked weld ] on a pressurizer drain line. Licensed Operators had preformed a Shutdown Margin 4 Calculation required by Technical Specifications'and in accordance with operating procedures.Due to ambiguities l in the procedure and errors made by licensed personnel in I using procedure data sheets, a shutdown margin of i approximately 7% was calculated.In fact at that moment a : shutdown margin of only about 3.4% existed.At that point the i RCS boron concentration was approximately 1390 ppm. Xenon was still decaying away at that time and at zero Xenon the RCS ) boron concentration would have had to be approximately 1420 l ppm for 0% shutdown margin. 1 1 Operations had no plans to alter the boron concentration since they had calculated a 7% shotdown margin.Their 21culation was performed on the night shift and had , subsequently been performed again by the day shift.
.1 At that point a reactor engineer came to the control room on other business.In the course of his review of plant status in the control room he noticed that the boron concentration seemed to be low. Feeling uneasy he performed a shut down margin calculation which revealed the errors made by operations.He alerted operations personnel as to the j,,
mistake and immediate boration of the RCS was initiated averting a significant problem.Had the reactor engineer not ! by chance come to the control room and discovered this problem;the ongoing Xenon decay would have caused first the i Technical specification limit of 3% shutdown margin to be violated and then as the shutdown margin went less than 0% ] an inadvertent critica111ty would have occurred.This would < have happened fairly quickly (over a few hours) and before j the next check of shutdown margin. About 12:00 ,after the reactor engineer briefed me on what had happened.I went to the Operations Manager's office (the plant Manager was also present) to inform him of the ) event.The Operations Manager seemed to already be aware of l the event but the Plant Manager didn't. l I then proceeded to ask for a special meeting to brief my l supervisor, Tom Green and the General Manager, George Backhold on the event.They did not seem to be aware of the occurance. Tom Green noted the significance of the event and stated "It could have affected both units" (Unit 2 did not yet have an operating license).Neither Tom Green nor George , Bockhold ask me to take any action over the event.I briefed y y\ n :x
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- f. -
. 1
-Jim Swartzwelder the NSAC Manager on this event the same afternoon. ;
The next day in the 9:00 AM meeting there was no mention of the.near miss inadvertent criticallity.I ask the NSAC l manager if he had received a DC on the event and he said no.I had ask.the reactor engineer the previous day about a DC and he said operations personnel were going to write one. On a second occation I ask NSAC if a DC had been written and they indicated none had been received yet. With no action apparently being taken by anyone on this near miss inavertent criticallity I approached my supervisor Tom Green again and told him I thought this event was very significant and felt management should investigate.Because of the procedural errors and potential training issues being i at the root of the operator's miscalculations, there could l have been other occasions where Technical Specification l shutdown margin limits were violated and it would be l reportable to the NRC.I told him that one of the consultants in Operations believed that there had been previous. miscalculations.Adminestrative Procedure 057-C paragraph 1.F tasks the General Manager, plant Manager and Plant Support Manager with identifying events and initiating critiques
- on events deemed significant.When I pressed Tom Green further to investigate, he said that he didn't want" to split the organization" by making an issue of it.
Subsequent to returning the plant to power the Plant Manager announced in the General Managers staff meeting on two
.occations that he wanted to critique events from the forced outage. !
The near miss inadvertent critica111ty was not amoung the events critiqued even though it was by far more safety significant than other issues chosen. To my knowledge no DC was ever written .no critique ever conducted no review of previous shutdown margin calculations ever performed to assure Technical specifications were not ' violated and to assure that required reports to the NRC under 50.72 & 50.73 were made. j j l
r On the morning of 2-28-90 operations personnel at Plant Vogtle Unit 2 were performing a monthly Technical Spec 1fication surveillance (4.6.1.1.a) on containment isolation valves.Due to confusion over the task sheet and because the procedure was not followed, only 2 valves were surveilled.When the paperwork was returned to the control room the shift supervisor realized the error that had been made.He sent the crew out to re-perform the surveillance and checked the previous performance records of this surveillance which are located in the control room.He found, as suspected, the same error was made last month. Numerous containment isolation valves (approximately 39) had been mistakenly omitted in the previous performance of Technical Specification Surveillance 4.6.1.1.a.Thus these valves were inoperable since they did not have a valid surveillance on them.After about 2 hours, around 10:42, the surveillance had been re-performed.After this he called the Work Planning Group and informed them of the surveillance mistake and ask them to initiate a Deficiency Card.They did so at approximately 11:00 AM.The Deficiency Card was then delivered to the control room and since the surveillance had been completed, no LCO was initiated.This action may constitute another willful violation of Technical Specifications because at the time of discovery, the LCO must be initiated and the Action Statement entered.By procedure the individual discovering a deficiency should have initiated the DC.By handling the event as above,the discovery time was concealed, entry into the LCO was not made and actions to place the plant in the " safe" condition required by Technical Specifications not initiated. Since Unit I was in an outage much emphasis had been placed on the need to keep Unit 2 on line.The LCO appropriate to the above condition of 39 inoperable conta1nment isolation valves would have been a 1 hour shutdown LCO. Corrective actions could not have been completed within 1 hour (they routinely took 2 hours) so a forced shutdown would have had to be initiated.This condition would have also been a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) which would have been a further embarassment since Unit 1 had to report a NUE for the same reasons on 2-23-90.This event is documented in part on DC 2-90-0022. '/$
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<l Another violation of Technical Specifications (3.0.4) occurred on 3-1-90 at approximately 01:33 CST when a mode 1 change from Mode 5 to Mode 6 was made for Unit 1 without all /
reQu1 red equipment operable.NI-31,a source range neutron , 7 monitor, was still inoperable at the time the mode change ' was made.This is documented in part on DC 1-90-0050 which i indicates that an LCO was in effect for NI-31 at the time of , the mode change.It is normal routine to assure that no mode
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l i restraining LCO's are in effect prior to making a mode l change.The LCO ver1f1 cation is a simple task and the source range neutron monitor would be one of the most important instruments to have operable to assure sub-critically in a refueling condit1on.The DC indicates that the discovery of this mistake was at 06:35 CST (after the mode change was made).It is difficult to understand how this was missed at 01:33 CST, but the benefits to the schedule are so obvious that it too could appear to be a willful violation.According to the shift supervisor's entries at 09:53 CST (over 8 hours , later) they were " restoring NI-31 to service".The LCO was still not exited until that afternoon.A savings of about 12 l l hours of critical pach time occurred. l In the morning congratulations were offered to operations l for a " great night" and the schedule showed that we gained 2 j hours and were now 14 hours ahead of schedule. 1 - j On 3-5-90 another violation of Technical Specifications l occurred.The"B traln" RHR pump had been experiencing increasing v1bration (up to .55 in/sec and 9 mils). Due to this high vibration, one of the safety related NSCW cooling water lines at the motor cooler had cracked resulting in NSCW water spraying out at around 5 to 10 spm.With the pump v1brating severly and with a failed cooling line, the pump should have been declared inoperable."A train" of RHR was drained for outage work at the time.Thus under Technical Specification (3.9.8.1) both trains were now inoperable.The LCO and action statement for this condition should have been il entered which requires suspending "all actions or operations , involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a '! reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant l System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR train to operable status as soon as possible". In addition the action statement states Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours". Instead the pump was not declared inoperable, the LCO was not entered,some of the action statements were occurring by coincidence as scheduled actions to unload the core continued.However actions to secure containment integrity (particularly containment purge) and actions to place the undamaged A train RHR pump back in service immediately did not occurr.Because of the failure to comply with the action statement another violation of Technical Specifications occurred.Like the previous violations, complying with the above action statements would have affected schedule because of containment outage work that was in orogress. All three of these Tech. Spec. violations are the result of manipulations, interpretations.or cversights (intentional or unintentional) that would have stoppec or slowed schedule progress if the letter and intent of Technical
p , r a l Spec 1ficat1ons were followec.Instead the action taken avolded any schedule impact.The probability that all these i examples were only personell error LER's that occurred ! within a week and avoided scheoule impact seems remote ! indeed.t'3rious inconsistencles in the accounts of these ! events are an additional cause for concarn. ! In all three cases there were other courses of action that j could have been taken to comply with Technical ! Spec 1fications and avoid serious schedule impacts.Other i courses of action include asking for" waivers of compliance", i obtaining engineering evaluations for continued operation,and promptly performing corrective maintenance, i These alternate actions were not persued. , The above samples portray the operations approach to ! schedule versus compliance.The following is a quote made ! by an operations superintendent and a OSOS on 3-22-90 at 8:00 PM EST in the small conference room of the Vogtle Service Building at the end of the evening OSOS meeting. Approximately 20 personnel were in attendance. , Ops. Supt.-- "We've got a lot of work to do." i OSOS -- "It can be done - as long as you : can take the LER's." Plant Vogtle has one of the highest LER rates in the Region but also has one of the highest capacity factors in 1989 as well as some of the shortest outages.These statistics may be related.The cost of a LER is small.The value of at power , hours and critical path outage time is high.The above I examples and statements from such high level operations personnel suggest that this relationship is not only ! recogn1 zed but in practice at Vogtle. l r I Management rewards the non-conservative and questionable ! compliance practices with praise for meeting schedule and takes no action to critically investigate these , events, discipline the responsible personnel or reverse the dangerous course that Vogtle is on. . These occurrances are reminisant of 1987 when the drive ! for schedule overrode safety, conservatism, and regulation. i e i k e
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7cj,g,jg7 LISTING OF AUDIO TAPES , PROVIDED BY MOSBAUGH 130'5(t/'/" NRC 1. D. 9 DATA ON TAPE BRAND & TYPE COMMENTS 2 NHEN RECE!VED OF TAPE
..........MDLN? A0-10 80-0 1.............. ....... 3M 2..............A B ........CERTR0N..........MDLN? A0-10 80-3 ,
3.............. ....... 3M ..........N0 CASE MDLN? A0-8 32-10 4.............. ....... 3M ..........MDLN? A0-3 80-0 5.............. ........CERTR0N..........MDLN? A0-0 80-4 6............. 3-21-90 ....... 3M ..........MDLN? A0-6 80-0 ; 7............. 3-22 ....... 3M ..........MDLN? A0-7 B3-10 l 8............. 3-22 ....... 3M ..........MDLN? A0-7 B3-10 w --'9.............. ....... 3M ......... 3-23-90 ON PAPER IN CASE MDLN? A0-7 B3-3 1 BLIP Empr (E) 10. . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 3 / 2 4 BEAS RAND... 3M ......... 3-23-90 DN PAPER IN N16HT CNTIG--- CASE 4 l MDLN? A0-10 B0-0 4 l !!............ 3-24 ....... 3M ..........N0 CASE MDLN? A0-7 B3-10 l ; 12............. CONF CALL ARA-- ......CERTRON......... 3-24 DN PAPER IN CASE ' CALL IN ADVTEX 3-24 MDLN7 A0-6 B0-0 - END OF -- 13............ 3-25 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 B0-10 14............ 3-26 et ........TDK ..........MDLN7 A0-10 80-10 15............ 3-26 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 A0-10 80-10 16............ 3-27 . . . . .? . . . T D K ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 17............ 3-27 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 18............ 3-27 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 A0-7 8 NO BLIP 19............ 3-2B et ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-0 1 BP 20............ 3-2B 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 B0-10 21............ 3-2B 63 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 22............ 3-29 91 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 23............ 3-29 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-5 24............ 3-30 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-6 25............ 3-30 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-6 26............ 3-30 #3 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-7 B NO BLIP N 27............ 4-2-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-6 28............ 4-2-90 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-8 80-9 29.......... 4.4-3-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-9 BO-B 30...........,.4-3-90 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 A0-10 B0-10 31............ 4-3-90 83 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-7 B0-10 / 32.............! 4-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 B0-10 r' 4 33............ 4-4-90 82 34............ 4-4-90 d3
........TDK
........TDK
..........MDLN?
..........MDLN?
A NO BLP B NO BLE A0-10 80-8 f
/*
'f 35............ 4-5-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 B0-4 [.
36............ 4-5-90 62 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 - 37............ 4-9-90 91 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-7 B0-7 38............ 4-9-90 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-3
/ !
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=
4-10-90 el ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-7 80-7 39............ 4-10-90 #2 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 A0-10 80-7 40............
........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-7 B0-10
--- 41. . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 0 81 A0-6 B0-10
.-- , -42............ 4-11-90 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
4-12-90 81 4-12-90 52 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-7 80-10 43............ A0-10 80-5 44............ 4-13-90 61 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 4-16-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 45............ A0-10 80-10 46............ 4-16-90 92 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 4-16-90 53 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-3 47............ A0-10 80-10 48............ 4-17 01 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 4-17 62 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 49............ 4-17 43 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-8 80-9 50............ 51............ 4-17 54 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 52............ 4-18 41 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 53............ 4-18 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 5 4. . . . . . . . . . . . 4- 1 B 9 3 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 55............ 4-19 et ........TDK ..........MDLN? 56............ 4-19 62 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
..........MDLN? A0-10 B0-7 Emme (g>57,,,,,,,,,,,,,4.g9 90 93 ........TDK
........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 B NO BLIP
--- G-)58............ 4-19-90 94 59............ 4-20-90 53 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 60............ 4-21 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 4-22 61............ 4-23 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 62............ 4-23 42 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 63............ 4-24 51 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 64............ 4-24 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 65............ 4-25 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 66............ 4-25 42 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 67............ 4-25 53 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 68............ 4-26-90 91 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 69............ 4-26 52 ..... ..TDK ..........MDLN? 70............ 4-26 83 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 71............ 4-27-90 #1 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-7 80-6 TOM GREEN TO CALL FRI 68 DEMOTION CENTER DISC 72............ 4-27-90 52 ........TDK ..........MDLN7
--- -- 7 3. . . . . . . . . . . . 4 -3 0- 9 0 e l ........TDK ..........MDLN?
-- 7 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3 0 8 2 ........TDK ..........MDLN7
--- 7 5. . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3 0 - 9 0 e t ........TDK ..........MDLN?
---76............ 4-30-90 #2 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
77............ 5-5-90 91 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 5-7-90 78............ 5-7-90 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 79............ 5-7-90 93 ........TDK ..........MDLN? B0............ 5-7-90 84 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
....... 50NY ..........MDLN? A0-6 B NO BLIP .-- ---81.............
82............. ........SONY ..........MDLN? A NO BLIP B NO BLP
........SONY ..........MDLN7 A0-6 B NO BLIP
---83.............
........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-10 90-10 84.............
85............. ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-1 B NO BLIP
0 86............ 5-1-90 el ........TDK ..........MDLN? 87............ 5-1-90 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 88............ 5-2-90 el ........TDK ..........MDLN? 89............ 5-2-90 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 90............ 5-2-90 83 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 91............ 5-3-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 92............ 5-3-90 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 93............ 5-3-90 43 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 94............ 5-4-90 91 ........TDK ..........MDLN7
=== 63)95............. SNITCHES ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 5-4-90 62 96............ 5-4-90 43 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
97............ 5-4-90 84 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
--- 98............ 5-8-90 el ........TDK ..........MDLN?
--- 99.............MCC0Y ........TDK ..........MDLN? A0-10 90-10 5-8-90 #2
-- 10 0. . . . . . . . . . . 5 9 0 # 3 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 101. . . . . . . . . . . 5 - B -9 0 4 4 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
102........... 5-9-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 103........... 5-9-90 92 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 104........... 5-9-90 #3 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 105........... 5-10-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 106........... 5-10-90 #2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 107........... 5-10-90 93 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 108........... 5-11-90 41 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 109........... 5-11-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 110........... 5-11-90 #3 ........SONY ..........MDLN? j 111........... 5-11-90 #4 ........SONY ..........MDLN? l 112........... 5-14-90 41 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 113........... 5-14-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 114........... 5-15-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 115........... 5-15-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 116........... 5-15-90 #3 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 117........... 5-16-90 91 ........SONY ..........# ______ MDLN? A0-8 B0-10 118............LOOK ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-10 B0-3 , 5-16-90 #2 119........... 5-17-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 120........... 5-17-90 #2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 121........... 5-18-90 il ........SONY ..........MDLN? 122........... 5-19-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 123........... 5-21-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 124........... 5-2' ;0 92 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 125........... 5-2a A1 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 126........... 5-23-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 127........... 5-24-90 Il ........SONY ..........MDLN7 128........... 5-24-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 129........... 5-24-90 53 ........SDNY ..........MDLN? 130........... 5-25-90 61 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 131........... 5-2*-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 132........... 5-29-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 133........... 5-29-90 83 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 134........... 5-30-90 il ........SONY ..........MDLN? 135........... 5-30-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? (
C 8 136........... 5-30-90 63 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 137........... 5-31-90 81 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN? 138........... 5-31-90 92 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 139........... 5-31-90 53 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 140........... 6-1-90 61 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 141........... 6-1-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 142........... 6-1-90 63 ........$3NY ..........MDLN? 143........... 6-4-90 51 ........SONY ..........MDLM? 144........... 6-4-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 145........... 6-4-90 83 ........SONY .. .......MDLN? 146........... 6-5-90 61 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 147........... 6-5-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 148........... 6-6-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 149........... 6-6-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 150........... 6-6-90 93 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 151............ ........SONY ..........MDLN? 152........... 6-7-90 el ........SONY ..........MDLN? 153........... 6-7-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 154........... 6-7-90 63 ........SONY ..........MDLN7
--- GED 155. . . . . . . . . . . 6-8-9 0 51 ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-10 ---- --- 15 6 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 0 9 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
157........... 6-8-90 53 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 15 8. . . . . . . . . . . 6- 1 1 - 9 0 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
- 159. . . . . . . . . . . 6- 11 -9 0 # 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 1 6 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . ........SONY ......... 6-12-90 DN CASE MDLN?
161........... 6-13-90 61 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 162........... 6-13-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 163........... 6-14-90 61 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 164........... 6-14-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 165............ ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 16 6. . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 0 01 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- --- 16 7. . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 0 6 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
===
GED 16 8. . . . . . . . . . . 6- 18 = 90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 A0-10 80-7
--- <$2} 169. . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 0 0 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-10 B0-10 170........... 6-18-90 53 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
171........... 6-19-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 172........... 6-19-90 92 ........SONY ..........MDLN? h 173........... 6-19-90 63 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 174........... 6-20-90 01 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- --- 17 5. . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 2 0 - 9 0 9 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-6 B NO BLIP 176........... 6-21-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
177........... 6-21-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 178........... 6-22-90 81 ........SONY .... .....MDLN? 179........... 6-22-90 92 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 180........... 6-25-90 61 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 101........... 6-25-90 #2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
-182........... 6-28-90 ........SONY ..........MDLN7
-- 1 8 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . ........SONY ..........N0 CASE f MDLN? A0-10 B0-10 i
--- 1 8 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-7 B0-8 j
--- ---185............ ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-7 B0-4 1
-- 186. . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 9-9 0 61 ........SONY ..........MDLN? f I
]
i t
........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-10 90-6
-- 18 7. . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 2 9 - 9 0 8 2 188........... 7-2-90 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
189........... 7 2-90 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 190........... 7-3-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 191........... 7-3-90 52 ........SONY ..........MDLN? j 192........... 7-3-90 #3 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 193........... 7-5-90 ........SDNY ..........MDLN? j 194........... 7-5-90 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 195........... 7-9-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 196........... 7-9-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 197........... 7-10-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 198........... 7-10-90 92 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 7-11-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-7 B0-10 i -- 199...........
........SONY ..........MDLN7 A0-5 8 NO BLIP
-- 2 00. . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 1 1 - 9 0 0 2 A0-10 B NO BLIP
-- 2 01. . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 1 1 - 9 0 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 PM EVE NITH 202........... 7-12-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
203........... 7-12-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- --- 204........... 7-13-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7
--- 2 0 5. . . . . . . . . . . 7 9 0 0 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
2 0 6. . . . . . . . . . . 7 9 0 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 207........... 7-17-90 62 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN? l j 20 ......... 7-18-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 209. ........ 7-18-90 #2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 210. ...... 7-19-90 53 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
- 211.. ........ 7-19-90 Ca ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 212. . . . . . . . . . . 7 9 0 8 2 ........SONY . . . . . . . . . . M D !. N ?
=== -- 213. . . . . . . . . . . 7 9 0 6 3 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
=== GED 214. . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 3-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-10 B0-7
--- --- 215. . . . . . . . . . . 7 -2 3 -9 0 0 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- (E3)216........... 7-24-90 41 ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-6 B0-10
--- --- 217. . . . . . . . . . . 7 -2 4 - 9 0 # 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
218........... 7-25-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7
--- --- 219. . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 2 5 -9 0 0 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- - 22 0. . . . . . . . . . . 7 -2 6-9 0 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
221........... 7-26-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 2 2 2. . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 2 7 - 9 0 51 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 2 23. . . . . . . . . . . 7 -2 7 -9 0 9 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
224............ ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-10 B NO BLIP
--- 225. . . . . . . . . . . 7-30-9 0 e t ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 2 2 6. . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 3 0 - 9 0 # 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN7
--- --- 2 2 7 . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 3 0 - 9 0 9 3 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
228........... 7-31-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 229........... 7-31-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 2 3 0. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
231........... 8-2-90 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 232........... 8-2-90 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 233........... 8-3-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
- - 2 3 4. . . . . . . . . . . 8-3 -9 0 8 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 235........... 8-6-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 236............B-6-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 237............B-7-90 01 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
238............B-7-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 239........... 8-8-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
l 240........... 8-8-90 #2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 241........... 8-9-90 el ........SONY ..........MDLN7 242........... 8-9-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? l l 243........... 8-10-90 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 244........... 8-10-90 92 ........SONY ..........MDLN? l
--- 2 4 5. . . . . . . . . . . 8- 13 41 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN7
--- c52>246........... 8-13 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? A0-6 80-10
.-- --- 2 4 7 . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 13 0 3 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
=== GED2 4 8. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 01 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 A0-10 80-9
--- 2 4 9 . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 8 3 ........SONY ..........MDLN? I
-- 2 5 0. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 8 4 ........SONY ..........MDLN? l
=== --- 251. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 41 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN? !
--- 2 5 2. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 # 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
-- 2 5 3. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 8 3 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
-- 2 5 4. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 # 4 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- (E9 255........... 8-15/16 90 82 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN? A0-10 80-9 i
--- 2 5 6. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 1
--257........... 8-16-90 #3 ........SONY ..........MDLN? ,
-- 2 5 8. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7
-- 2 5 9 . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 0 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- 2 6 0. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 # 3 ........SONY ..........MDLN? ;
--- 2 61. . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 0 8 4 ........SONY ..........MDLN? l
< 262........... 8-27-90 01 ........SONY ..........MDLN? I 263........... 8-27-90 62 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--- d5P 264........... 8-28-90 #1 ........SDNY ..........MDLN7 A0-10 80-7 l 265........... 8-28-90 92 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
-- 2 6 6. . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 2 9 01 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
--2 67. . . . . . . . . . . 8-29 0 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? l 268........... 8-30-90 et ........SONY ..........MDLN? l I
--- 2 6 9 . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 3 0 - 9 0 ( 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
270............ ........SONY ......... 8-31 ON CASE MDLN? 271........... 8-31 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 272........... 9-4-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 273........... 9-4-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? i 274........... 9-5-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 275........... 9-5-90 #2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? , 276........... 9-7-90 FRI 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN? l . 2 7 7. . . . . . . . . . . 9-7-90 FRI 0 2 . . . . . . . . SONY ..........MDLN? ) l l
LISTINS OF AUDIO TAPES S7#R7~: PROVIDED BY MOSBAUGH / fg NRC !.D. 8 DATA ON TAPE BRAND tr TYPE COMMENTS /'+5 PM - WHEN RECEIVED OF TAPE f 80
/-8 1.............. ....... M' ..........MDLN? A WO) 2..............A 3..............
B .......
....... Q .......
'ERT Ns ........MDLN?
NO CASE A 8((f% MDLN? A YB SWlly%%N 4.............. . . . . . . .& . . . . . . . . . . MDLN? Af% Sg(D) 5..............
. . . . . . . GE R T R O D. . . . . . . . . M 3L N ? N*) ff. +)
b............. 3-21-90 .......
. . . . . . . . . . MDLN? A(.4) B(5 7............. 3-22 ....... . . . . . . . . . . hDLN ? A ( 7) o('") 'r'7"7 h 8............. 3-22 ......
. . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? A (.7) 9.............. ...... .......... 23-90 DN PAPER8(57.gr. IN US-EA&1 g[
MDLN?A 67) B(star.zr ,,g,
........... 3-23/24 uo f NISHT CNTIG---
BEAS RAN . .h ......... 3-23-90 ON PAPER IN CASE f"(
#M 11............ 3-24
~ MDLN? A(/.0) 8(o # sm) f Ipd ....... ...... M .N0 CASE CONF CALL ARA-- ....
MDLN? A&&s) 86mre.3-/.o) (( 12............. CALL IN ADVTEX 3-24 R h ........ 3-24 DN PAPER IN CASE END OF -- MDLN?A[0,4)g[0-o} h 13............ 3-25 ...... 6 . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? A /o-/c) 8 /O -/0) (b' 14............ 3-26 01 15............ 3-2b e2
.......(1h '
. . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? A -(4 -/0) 8(0-/0 ) ~
, ....... ,, . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? Afo -/0 ) 8(c-/0 ) l 16............ 3-27 ....... 17............ 3-27 .......
. . . . . . . . . . MDLN?ffe te) 8(6 - /c) 18............ 3-27
. . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? A(r -/c) B(c - to)
....... . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? A(D- 7 f s . ej sv o B is f.S
\ 19............ 3-28 91 ....... Du . . . . . . . . . . MDL N?,4(s g ,g) g((s oj i g sty s tst ;
' 2 0. . . . . . . . . . . . 3- 2 8 9 2 .......
. . . . . . . . . . M DLN ? Afo ,4) g(;. poy
, 21............ 3-28 83 ....... _', . . . . . . . . . . M DL N 7 4(c -[cf g[e jo; 22............ 3-29 *1 ....... 23............ 3-29 92 .......
' . . . . . . . . . . MDL N? A (c /o} f(e - f o
. . . . . . . . . . M DL N ?A(4 -M/ ,f 24............ 3-30 81 .......
..........MDLN?A/e'se) -4 4 25............ 3-30 82 ....... > . . . . . . . . . . M D L N 7 4[d - /4) 8 -4 I
, 26............ 3-30 83 ....... . . . . . . . . . . M DLN ? A(4 - 7) g ,w ge/p5 l 27............ 4- -90 el ...... . /, ..........MDLN? A /4-/c 8 d - 4 )
28............ 4-2-90 82 ....... D 29............ 30............ 4-3-90 81 4-3-90 82
. . . . . . . . . . MDLN
..........MDLN?A U - )#(0 ?A(0 d 8(O' - 9)
....... . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? e4 (o "/4) 8(.o - /4) 31............ 4-3-90 83 .......Gd I 32............
33............ 4-4-90 el 4-4-90 02
....... TDK T
.. . .. . .. ... ... ..M.D.L.N.? M Ald -DL /0 8(ON ? /l [4- 7)) 8
" 'Of
. . . . . . . . . . MDL N ? 4(* du/S) 8(N* 04/PS) 34............ 4-4-90 63 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? A [0 - /0 / #I4 * - 8 35............ 4-5-90 01 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? fl(e ,v) 8(o --4))
36............ 4-5-90 62 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? A(4 /4/ g[# -/# 37............ 4-9-90 81 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? A (4 - 7 ) g ("O - 7 38............ 4-9-90 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN? yp fo) p(p - y
! i f
l l 39............ 4-10-90 al ........TDK ..........MDLN? A h '~7 8 ~~~7) 40............ 4-10-90 #2 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? /f (4 -/d g [p 7; 41............ 4-11-90 #1 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N?A[e - 7 gg -fg i 42............ 4-11-90 92 ........TDK ..........MDLN?/.}[0 (f p g fg I 1 4-12-90 81 43............ 4-12-90 82 l
........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M DLN ? AVO - 7 ) 8 4-/4) 44............ 4-13-90 el ........TDK ..........MDLN?/f(o - /0/ B $ .9) l 45............ 4-16-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 4(,0 - p) B p - /o 46............ 4-16-90 92 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . MDLN? /t/c - /cf d 4 -f o ,
47............ 4-16-90 83 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . MDL N? M /t'- /c) 6 (0- 5) l 49............ 4-17 #1 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . MDLN? 4[0-/t/ 8/> -/4) 49............ 4-17 82 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . MDLN 7 /7 -(4 yc) 8[4-/o ) . 50............ 4-17 03 ........TDK ..........MDLN?A[0-B) 4 (o-f) '//re 51............ 4-17 84 ....... 1DK . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ?Afo -4) B(o - 7) <!/s.t 52............ 4-18 91 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . MDLN? A(0 -/c) #fo - sc ) j 53............ 4-18 82 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ?A(4 -/0) 8(o -( 54............ 4-10 63 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M DL N?A(0 -8/ 8(# ' S' 55............ 4-19 01 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? A[# -h 8[O '/0) l
............ 4-19 92 ........TDK ..........MDLN?A((- # 8 N '~ l
} ........... 4-19-90 #3 ........TDK ..........MDLN?A[O".&)8[4-7) l j 'W- ........... 4-19-90 #4 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? A (6 - /0/ 8ha ## )
., ............ 4-20-90 83 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? A(6 .S* ) S& syt/.f) 60............ 4-21 ........TDK ..........MDLN? g p ..,-} g p g7} '
4-22 61............ 4-23 81 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? A (.0 - b _ NO - ' b 62............ 4-23 52 ........TDK ..........MDLN? S (t ' 1 C @ ~ .) 63............ 4-24 #1 ........TDK ..........MDLN? 4(0.*/}b(0-'C) 64............ 4-24 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN1 g p- y)gqo.3 65............ 4-25 #1 ........TDK ..........MDLN? h gO. re) n ( o ~7 66............ 4-25 62 ........TDK '
..........MDLN? A(c-ic) f5 k'-io 67............ 4-25 83 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . MDLN7 6 ( O - 4 i -f ' C ~ Ol 68............ 4-26-90 81 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N 7 6 ( C ~ 0 ) #3 0 0 ' D) 69............ 4-26 82 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? ,, (o . < ) d Us - ' O )
7 .......... 4-26 83 ........TDK ..........MDLN? AM") f ' l 1 ........... 4-27-90 #1 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A [4 - 7 [6 -(h p TOM GREEN T.D. CALL p[ FR1 6B DEMOTION CENTER DISC '(() ! l 72............ 4-27-90 #2 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? A (0 - 8 (> ) 0 73............ 4-30-90 81 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? . \ (0 -8 0 ) S6(0-7 (0 - 'O,)) 74............ 4-30 82 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? A Q* c) 75............ 4-30-90 #1 ........TDK ..........MDLN?g g., Q /3(p. Q 76............ 4-30-90 #2 ........TDK ..........MDLN? A g. g f3 (o .o } 77...... ..... 5-5-90 el ........TDK ..........MDLN? g(3. 3 ) 6(9-d 5-7-90 78............ 5-7-90 82 ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . M D L N ? A(C - @ )
' 79............ 5-7-90 83 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
v80............ 5-7-90 84 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
........................................................... g .j...........
............ ........SONY . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ? A(0- f ) g [AW 84/b
............ ....... 50NY . . . . . . . . . . M DL N ?Adq>
............ ....... 50NY . . . . . . . . . . M D L t') k ?.8h(c gg)g s,00 BuP(Ao ft/Q
'............ ........SONY . . . . . . . . . . M DL N? AfD .g.,>) f(0 - /0) 8 ............ ........SONY ..........MDLN?A (p - ,; g g gy,,c)
86............ 5-1-90 et ........TDK ..........MDLN? 87............ 5-1-90 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN7 88............ 5-2-90 01 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
'89............ 5-2-90 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
.90............ 5-2-90 93 ........TDK ..........MDLN? l
'91............ 5-3-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
'92............ 5-3-90 02 ........TDK ..........MDLN? I
/ 3............ 5-3-90 83 ........TDK ..........MDLN? l
........... 5-4-90 el ........TDK ..........MDLN?
........... SWITCHES ........TDK ..........MDLN? A _~ ~ /O 5-4-90 42 l I 196............ 5-4-90 83 ........TDK ..........MDLN? '
s/ 7............ 5-4-90 #4 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
........... 5-8-90 91 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
9 ............MCC0Y ........TDK . . . . . . . . . . MDLN?ka - /0 ) 8[o - /4) {q 5-B-90 #2 00........... 5-8-90 83 ....... 50NY ,.........MDLN? 141........... 5-B-90 84 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
'402........... 5-9-90 81 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
/103........... 5-9-90 82 ........TDK ..........MDLN?
V104........... 5-9-90 83 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
/105. . . . . . . . . . . 5 9 0 e l ........SONY ..........MDLN? i v(06........... 5-10-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? -
i r(07........... 5-10-90 83 ........SONY ..........MDLN? e408........... 5-11-90 #1 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
~409........... 5-11-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
rd10........... 5-11-90 #3 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN? 6411........... 5-11-90 84 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
/'112........... 5-14-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN7 113........... 5-14-90 82 ........SONY *
..........MDLN?
'114........... 5-15-90 #1 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
........SONY ..........MDLN?
f15...........5-15-9092 1 ........... 5-15-90 83 ........SONY ..........MDLN7
.......... 5-16-90 81 ....... 50NY
~
. . . . . . . . . . MDLN? A(e- 8)S(d- /O /g _'
11 ...........L00K ........SONY . . . . . . . . . .' M DL N ? AT ~/cj g[o -y}
~
5-16-90 #2
/119........... 5-17-90 el ....... 50NY ..........MDLN7
-120........... 5-17-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
/121. . . . . . . . . . . 5 9 0 81 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN?
;)22...........5-18-9092 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
23........... 5-21-90 81 ..........MDLN?
........SONY 24........... 5-21-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
25........... 5-23 II ........SONY ..........MDLN? 26........... 5-23-90 82 ... ....SONY ..........MDLN? j g27...........5-24-9081 ........SONY ..........MDLN? 128........... 5-24-90 92 ........SONY ..........MDLN? d)29........... 5-24-90 e3 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
/130........... 5-25-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
-431........... 5-29-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
-} 3 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2 9 - 9 0 9 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
133........... 5-29-90 #3 ........SONY ..........MDLN? v'134........... 5-30-90 81 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
'135........... 5-30-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
w/13 6. . . . . . . . . . . 5- 3 0- 9 0 9 3 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
l l i t 0 Y137............ 5-31-90 N1 ........SDNY ..........MDLN? 38........... 5-31-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN? - 139........... 5-31-90 #3 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
/140........... 6-1-90 #1 ........SONY ..........MDLN? i
/141........... 6-1-90 #2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? ;
..........MDLN?
/J 4 2. . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 0 9 3 ........SONY
/143........... 6-4-90 41 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
144........... 6-4-90 02 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN? l
. 145........... 6-4-90 83 ....... 80NY ..........MDLN?
"146........... 6-5-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN? I s'147........... 6-5-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
/148........... 6-6-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
LA 4 9 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 0 0 2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? I
/150........... 6-6-90 63 ....... 50NY ..........MDLN?
*1 5 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . ........SONY ..........MDLN?
52........... 6-7-90 el ........SONY ..........MDLN? 153........... 6-7-90 e2 ........SONY ..........MDLN7
.......... 6-7-90 93 ........SONY ..........MDLM7
{f k .......... 6-8-90 el ........SONY . . . . . . . . . . MDLN? A [o- /@ M6 '"Yd) 4 6........... 6-B-90 82 ........SONY ..........MDLN? k , 7........... 6-B-90 #3 ........SONY ..........MDLN? I 58........... 6-11-90 et ........SONY ..........MDLN? 159........... 6-11-90 m2 ........SONY ..........MDLN? J d60............ ........SONY ......... 6-12-90 ON CASE MDLN?
*/161........... 6-13-90 91 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
s 62........... 6-13-90 02 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
~)63........... 6-14-90 el ........SONY ..........MDLN?
- / 4........... 6-14-90 #2 ........SONY ..........MDLN?
g) k65............ ........SONY ~
..........MDLN?
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STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO RUSHTON 95 19900504 EDG SHIPMAN 20 4 "SO YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN WAS THAT WE HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE SWITCH..." [TO RUSHTON, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, RE CALCON SWITCHES). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE THE JULY STH-INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) [ INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). I l 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 20 "THE 11TH [7/11/90) INCIDENT'S { WHEN IT [EDG) FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT.WE ' FINALLY GOT INTO." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF EDG FAILURES TO NRC). l 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 42 16 "DOES THE RECOGNITION.. 0F THE JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE] START A [ REPORTING) CIDCK AT A DIFFERENT TIME?" [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 1 234 19900803 EDG GREENE 42 22 "
...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS A [EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTHER IliCIDENT WAS REPORTED AS A 10 CFR 21 ITEM." [TO SHIPMAN, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH).
234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD) JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON 1 THAT" [EDG FAILUREJ [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). l l i b l d k 4
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l l M i IAG ' STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO BAILEY ' [ .p f ;F '" j 155 199dO608/ EDG AUFDENKAMPE 43 8 EXPLAINED TO BAILEY LANGUAGE Il & BASES FOR CHANGE IN EDG STARTS IN LER REV 1. TOLD BAILEY I l BIRMINGHAM HAD THE APPROVED LER REV FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. TOLD l BAILEY HE WANTS TO CORRECT THE COAR IN THE COVER LTR. TO LER REV. [ BAILEY ON PHONE, MOSBAUGH]. ; 167 19900615 EDG MOSELY 71 4 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT BAILEY CALLED, LOOKING FOR BOCKHOLD, AND HAD ASKED HIM [MOSLEY] ABOUT VALID FAILURES. , 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR SURE." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.] 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 CO ] I WOP R D WTTH YOU [ BAILEY] ON THE
. PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO Y DON'T WE SAY3 HAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER 9 COAR] WHICH WAS SIGNED
[' BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND g/l[/ , OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] ht / /rIl' 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I i 3 BELIEVE IT [THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST l
/ '
PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER] HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE
, i // AND ME." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.]
1 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER] IN GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO , REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, 1 FREDERICKS]. l l l
STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO MCDONALD i 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER]
" ...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON] WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." (SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD] JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" [EDG FAILUP.E] [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH]. l l l
STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO MAJORS 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 39 21 "AND APPARENTLY JUST WHEN HARRY MAJORS AND THE STAFF UP THERE IN CORPORATE, THE WORD
' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST' GOT PUT IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER).
186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 45 4 " ...I THINK THAT'S [THE
' SUBSEQUENT TO EVENT' TERMINO!AGY) WHAT HARRY'S [ MAJORS) GOING TO !
USE...I MAY HAVE TO PUT SOME WORDS IN THE AUDIT REPORT BASED ON , THAT." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV). 186'19900629 EDG ODOM 47 21 "I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT [' SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT' TERMINOLOGY) CAMEFROM . I JUST CALLED HARRY l (MAJORS) AND TOLD HARRY, 'STOP THE PRESS. IT'S NOT RIGHT.'" (TO i MOSBAUGH, TYNAN). 187 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE HIMSELF." (TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV). i 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, (nEC:'ONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL 1 RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCLAIMER AT A LATER POINT." (TO I GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW THAT'S A KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT ZAS BEEN BLESSED BY GEORGE (HAIRSTON), SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8. "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE [HAIRSTON) AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE..." (TO GREENE RE STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 56 8 GREENE SUGGESTED TO MAJORS TO USE j THE WORD " DIFFERENCE" V. " DISCREPANCY" IN LER REV COVER LETTER BECAUSE " DISCREPANCY" MEANT ADMITTING A MISTAKE. MAJORS LIKED THE IDEA. l 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 58 20 AGREED WITH MOSBAUGH THAT THIS l NEW LER JUST CHANGED "TO APPLES AND ORANGES." [TO GREENE, ! MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON) PERSONALLY ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." (THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES) (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 62
- TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT HAIRSTON CONSCIOUSLY THINKING THAT THE NRC MIGHT INTERPRET THE i " CORRECTION" COVER LETTER AS NOT ADDRESSING THE 4/9 COAR.
k
- _ . .. . . . _ . . = _ . . . _ . _ . . . .. . -. _ . .
187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 63 15 PUT MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 j LETTER IS FALSE. GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS MAJORS FROM HAVING l TO RESPOND. [TO MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS). -
+
i L i 4 i i ll 4 3 I t i i
I i i STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO GREENE i
- 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE
, PLANT DOES THINGS. AND FROM WHAT...MCCOY SAID THE NRC SAID, I l DON'T DISAGREE [WITH NRC)." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM GREENE). 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE HE'D TELL
. MCCOY HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU KNOW, NY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED HERE." [TO GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH).
99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 53 4 " ...YOUR DEPARTMENT [ OPS) IS PART OF THIS CLIQUE. [ MEANING THE CLIQUE HE IS AFRAID TO TELL ABOUT VEGP'S ATTITUDE ABOUT KEEPING THE PLANT RUNNING.) [TO GREENE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME EXPLANATION DOWN BEIDW." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPLANNED TRIPS." [RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 26 19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST MAINTENANCE STARTS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WITH THE NRC." [TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, GREENE). 184 19900830 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID TEST FAILURES. THAT'S THE ONLY KIND WE HAVE TO REPORT. DOES IT AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAILURE TO REPORT 7" [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S] CALL TO THE NRC, WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.) 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE PAPER...IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S IDST. [TO HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPIANATORY PHRASE IN COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, IF IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE,
l i WHY FLAG IT IN THE PORTION OF THE LETTER 7" [TO GREENE, HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH USING i THE WORDS " APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE i ERRORS IN THE 4/9 LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE THE RESULT OF." [TO BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ; AUFDENKAMPE). ; 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' [TO BE THE RESULT OF)." [RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER & 4/19 LER) [TO - GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF !
' ERRORS' IN THE APRIL 9TH..." [BOCKHOLD TOTALLY OBFUSCATES THE LETTER THAT IS TO CORRECT THE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER) [TO ;
GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE INDIVIDUAL [ CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). lo* 19903830 EDG BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION) JIMMY [ CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE MAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, , AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA i TAKE.6.THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, l FREDEP.ICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). t l 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 21 ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS l LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." [RE LETTER , 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, l MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 1 ! 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE
- OUT WITHOUT YOU [PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30 LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, i COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
i 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT l WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL j SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." [TO BOCKHOLD,
- HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
186 19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "OKAY, THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH) WENT AND COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS HAIRSTON, I'D SAY ' WHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE LER REV). 187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 42 9 PUTS GREENE ON NOTICE THAT ATTRIBUTING THE ERROR IN EDG STARTS TO POOR RECORD PRACTICES /END j OF TEST PROGRAM IS NOT TRUE. f
, n - - , - - ,.n , , - , . , , , , - . .- - - - , , , - , , , - , - - , - .
- - _ - . ~ ~ - . . . _ . . - - - - .. _ - - _. _ - . . - _ . - - ._ _ _ . - _. - ~ -
l l l 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, l [ RESPONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCLAIMER AT A LATER POINT." (TO j GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). 1 1 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER i (REV) TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOING TO LET THE COVER ' LETTER TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEOUENT TO THE TEST l PROGRAM?" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODON, FREDERICKS, WEBB). j i 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT l THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW THAT'S A KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN BLESSED BY GEORGE [HAIRSTON), SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." i 4 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE [HAIRSTON) AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE..." [TO GREENE RE STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). I 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 56 8 GREENE SUGGESTED TO MAJORS TO USE 1 THE WORD " DIFFERENCE" V. " DISCREPANCY" IN LER REV COVER LETTER BECAUSE " DISCREPANCY" MEANT ADMITTING A MISTAKE. MAJORS LIKED THE IDEA. 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 58 20 AGREED WITH MOSBAUGH THAT THIS NEW LER JUST CHANGED "TO APPLES AND ORANGES." (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON) PERSONALLY ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." [THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES) (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 63 15 PUT MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 LETTER IS FALSE. GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS MAJORS FROM HAVING TO RESPOND. [TO MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 66 15 TRIED TO TALK MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG AIR RECEIVER VALVES STICKING. 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE l THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC l RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) ! (INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 20 "THE _1TH [7/11/90) INCIDENT'S WHEN IT [EDG) FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WE FINALLY GOT INTO." (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF EDG FAILURES TO NRC). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 42 16 "DChr T!3 RECOGNITION. . 0F THE i JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE] START A [ REPORTING) CLOCK AT A DIFFERENT TIME 7" (TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSLAUGH). I i ~ .. _ -- . - . .
234 19900803 EDG GREENE 42 22 " ...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS A [EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTHER INCIDENT WAS REPORTED AS A 10 CFR 21 ITEM." [TO SHIPMAN, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). I 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD) JUST WANTED ) TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON l THAT" [EDG FAILURE] [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH]. 246 19900813 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 266 19900829 EDG BOCKHOLD 21 4 " ... SUCCESSFUL START MEANT [TO BOCKHOLD) THE ENGINE STARTED AND RAN SUFFICIENT TIME THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE MARCH 20TH EVENT. AND...AFTER RUNNING A SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ENGINE COULD HAVE SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF A PROBLEM..." [TO A.M., GREENE,HORTON) l i l I I i
, g- u . . , - , . . , g ,v.+ -e
STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO FREDERICKS 9 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 4 17 COMMENTED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE DIESEL WAS AN AIRPLANE, GEORGE WOULD NOT GO UP IN IT. 10 19900323 EDG 12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT: FREDERICKS, HOIJ(ES, KOCHERY, COURSIE, CASH, AND BRINEY. 10 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD TIME, AND DURING THAT THIRD RUN, IT TRIPPED AFTER A COUPLE OF HOURS." [ TALKING ABOUT 1B DIESEL TRIP ON 003-23-90 TO HOIJtES, KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINE (CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING)J. I 10 19900323 EDG CC'TRSIE 14 13 "BUT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' l TRIPPED." [ SPEAKING TO FREDERICKS,BRINEY, CASH, AND OTHERS ON CRITIQUE TEAM). 10 19900323 EDG CASH 16 9 "I LEFT THE HIGH TEMPERATURE OUT, AND 1 THE TRIP FOR TWO DIFFERENT PRESSURES (IN AUDIBLE) IT'S A ONE OUT OF ONE ON TRIP, CORRECT." [TO FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, RE: 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP). 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 19 2 COURSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION PROBLEMS WITH CALCON SWITCHES. [WITH CASH, FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, HOIJ(ES, MOSBAUGH) . 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNING AND THE DAMN THINGS JUST DECIDED TO STOP7" (CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, CASH, HOIJtES, BRINEY). 10 19900323 EDG CASH 20 2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP SIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE , OUT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 ' DEGREES." [TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HOIJtES, COURSEY.] 10 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 21 15 QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR QUALITY, CLEANLINESS OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN MATERIAL. [TO: BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HOIJtES , COURSEY, CASH.] 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE WORST TEMPERATURE [ SWITCHES YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNK." [TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, COURSEY, HOIJtES. ) ! 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER IDOKED AT THE CALIBRATION PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, HOW IN THE HELL ; CAN WE PUT THIS ON ... A DIESEL?"[FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, COURSEY, HOIJtES. ) 1 t 10 19900323 EDG KOCHERY 23 13 "THE CALCON SWITCHES HAVE A I4T l
. - _ . - . . - - . . . . ._.- - _. . - - ~ - - - _ _ . . - - - - -
OF PART 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW?" [TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, BRINEY, COURSEY, HOIJtES . ) 10 19900323 EDG CASH 23 13 " ...YOU GOT TWO. ALARMS. ONE IS HIGH LUBE OIL OUT, HIGH LUBE OIL TEMP. OUT, IT'S 190 DEGREES." (TO BRINEY, KOCHERY, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH] 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE... IT'S RIDICUIhUS . " (REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOIJEES. ) 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 10 " GEORGE [FREDERICKS) POINTED OUT THERE WAS A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE B DIESELS RIGHT AFTER THE MAINTENANCE WORKED ON IT." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 16 "IT WASN'T OPERABLE [B DIESEL) SO WE DON'T WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT WITH NO FAILURES AND NO PROBLEMS." (TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 98 19900508 EDG SWARTZWELDER 60 5 TALKED ABOUT REV 1 TO 4/19/90 l LER IN PRB. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS). 103 13300611 EDG FREDERICKS 7 11 "SHOULDN'T TAKE MORE THAN A COUPLE OF DAYS. I WAS GIVEN THE GUIDELINES THAT IT HAD TO BE l DONE BEFORE THE LER WOULD BE SIGNED." (TO MOSBAUGH). I 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 3 "HAIRSTON SAYS HE'S GOING TO WRITE HIS OWN [LER REV). MY GUY HASN'T FINISHED YET." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON RE HIS QA " GUY" NOT DONE WITH AUDIT OF EDG STARTS). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 10 "I'M SUPPOSED TO NOT ONLY
- COME UP WITH A NUMBER; I'M SUPPOSED TO COME UP WITH WHY THE DISCREPANCY EXISTS." [TO MOSBAUGH RE EDG START COUNT). 1 f
i 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 25 "HOW COULD THEY [ CORPORATE] HAVE REVVED THE NUMBERS? THEY DON'T HAVE THE NUMBERS." (TO I MOSBAUGH). i
- 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 25 4 "SOMEBODY CHANGED IT TO SAY
' VALID' STARTS." (TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REV).
160 19900612 EDG HORTON 30 1 "WELL, THE CONSISTENCY IS DOWN THE TUBE BECAUSE THE FIRST LER THAT WENT OUT IS INCORRECT." [TO AJLUNI, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH , 160 19900612 EDG AJLUNI 33 6 TALKED TO HORTON AND FREDERICKS ABOUT THE CHANGES IN EDG START INFO FROM COAR TO LER TO REV1 OF LER. l ! 167 19900615 EDG MOSELY 67 14 "I'VE TABULATED THE DATA,
- BUT... HAVEN'T...DONE ANY COUNTING IN TERMS OF VALID FAILURES,
! VALID STARTS..." (TO MOSBAUGH) (MOSELY IS QA WHO OBTAINED EDG i
1
]
START DATA FOR FREDERICKS IN AUDIT FOR REV TO LER). 184 19900830 EDG 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, ) FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPEJ. 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 21 " ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS , LETTER WRITTEN THIJ WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." [RE LETTER l 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE]. f 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE i OUT WITHOUT YOU [PRB] RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30 LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTERJ [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE]. ] j 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT i WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL 4 SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." [TO BOCKHOLD,
- HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
1 i 186 19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "OKAY, THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH] WENT AND 3 COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS na usAON, I'D SAY ' WHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE LER REV). I 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 39 21 "AND APPARENTLY JUST WHEN
, HARRY MAJORS AND THE STAFF UP THERE IN CORPORATE, THE WORD
, ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST' GOT PUT IN THERE. [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM l RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER). ; 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 40 25 " ...AND WHEN IT [COAR] SAYS 4
'NO PROBLEMS OR FAILURES DURING ANY OF THESE STARTS' THAT BURNS YOU UP." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER]. ;
186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 42 22 " ...WHAT THEN THEY'RE I [ CORPORATE] GOING TO DO IS SAY A MORE ACCURATE MEASURE OF THE l RELIABILITY WAS THE VALID..." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV]. l 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 45 4 " ...I THINK THAT'S [THE
' SUBSEQUENT TO EVENT' TERMINOIDGY) WHAT HARRY'S [ MAJORS) GOING TO USE...I MAY HAVE TO PUT SOME WORDS IN THE AUDIT REPORT BASED ON THAT." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV).
i 187 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE l HIMSELF." [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV). i 187 19900629 EDG HORTON 20 12 "WELL, WHAT WAS WRONG WITH OUR i DIESEL START RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES?" [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, RE WHETHER PRACTICES WERE CAUSE OF FALSE DATA GIVEN TO
- NRC 4/9).
! 187 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 26 23 "THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S IDG IS NOT AN ACCURATE RECORD OF WHAT HAPPENED." [TO MOSBAUGH, 1 m . , - .
l HORTON]. 187 19900629 -EDG MAJORS 52 19- "I WILL ACCEPT IT, i (RESPONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER] BUT I'LL , RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCIAIMER AT A LATER POINT." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB]. ) 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER [REV) TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOING TO LET THE COVER l LETTER TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST I PROGRAM?" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB]. 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 58 20 AGREED WITH MOSBAUGH THAT THIS j NEW LER JUST CHANGED "TO APPLES AND ORANGES." [TO GREENE, ' i MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS).
'187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON] PERSONALLY l ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." [THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG j RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES] [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS]. I 187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 63 15 PUT MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 LETTER IS FALSE. GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS MAJORS FROM HAVING TO RESPOND. [TO MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS).
204 19900713 EDG HORTON 16 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT THEY CLEANED i THE AIR START SOLENOID VALVES AND USED EMERY CIOTH TO " WIDEN THE i CLEARANCES" SO THAT THE VALVES WOULDN'T STICK. [MOSBAUGH, ! FREDERICKS]. 205 19900713 EDG KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. 205 19900713 EDG MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT HARGIS RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE UNIT 1 EDG ALSO. [TO FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC j RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON] j [ INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). 246 19900813 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION . TRANS.<AENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZ'iELDER, A.M. , AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS. ] 1 i 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU (BAILEY) ON THE l PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM ! BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED i BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND l OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] a
+ - , . , - - , , --n-, ,, ----,7-- ,y-- r - ~ ~ , y ,
4 253 19900815 EDC BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I BELIEVE IT (THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST
- PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE AND ME." (TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.)
253 19900815 EDG McCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAN' IN 4/19 LER) IN GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO i REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." (TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, ~l FREDERICKS). l 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 24 17 " ... ALLEN CAME TO ME AND SAID, I I
' HEY, THE INFORMATION [4/9 EDG START INFO)IS WRONG' AND I TOLD ALLEN TO GET THE STAFF TO FIX IT." [TO FREDERICKS, WHO QUESTIONED IF ANYONE HAD ANY CONTENTION ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF THE 4/9 l DATA.) i 258 19900817 EDG MCCOY 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19) WAS BASED ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9) PRESENTATION...THE ]
CORRECTION TO THE LER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME OR NUMBER..." [TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENXAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.) j 156 19900817 EDG FREDERICKS 27 17 " ...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP,...THE REASON WAS IhW JACKET WATER PRESSURE." [TO MCCOY,BOCKHOLD,J.G.A.,A.M.] 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 11 "...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE [EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYIDR BELIEVES, ) BUT...(HE) BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONAINISTAKE..." (TO MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) (EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYIDR BELIEVES VS. ACTUAL SITUATION.) 267 19900829 EDG STRINGFELIhW 47 6 " ...I'M TICKLED TO DEATH l THAT...Y'ALL ARE TAKING THIS THING [ CORRECTION OF EDG START DATA) l SERIOUSLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T CONFORTABLE WITH IT AT ALL." (TO ODOM, FREDERICKS, A.M.) ; I l i i I t i i I l r
- ,,.~...__,_- - - -
9 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 4 17 COMMENTED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE DIESEL WAS AN AIRPLANE, GEORGE WOULD NOT GO UP IN IT. 10 19900323 EDG WEBB 11 5 "BUT IT TRIPPED." [ DISCUSSING EDG WITH KOCHERY & MOSBAUGH). 10 19900323 EDG -12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT: FREDERICKS, klu b M E S , KOCHERY, COURSIE, CASH, AND BRINEY. 10 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD TIME, AND DURING THAT THIRD RUN, IT TRIPPED AFTER A COUPLE OF HOURS." [ TALKING ABOUT 18 DIESEL TRIP ON 003-23-90 TO HOIMES, KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINE (CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING)). 10 19900323 EDG COURSIE 14 13 "BUT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' TRIPPED." [ SPEAKING TO FREDERICKS,BRINEY, CASH, AND OTHERS ON CRITIQUE TEAM). 10 19900323 EDG CASH 14 20 "THEY DIDN'T RESET ANYTHING ON THE LOCAL CONTROL PANEL. BOTH OF THE ALARMS CAME IN." [ CASH PERSONALLY FAMILIAR WITH 03-23-90 TRIP). - 10 19900323 EDG CASH 15 1 COMMENT SHOWS CASH'S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. 10 19900323 EDG CASH 16 9 "I LEFT THE HIGH TEMPERATURE OUT, AND THE TRIP FOR TWO DIFFERENT PRESSURES (IN AUDIBLE) IT'S A ONE OUT OF ONE ON TRIP, CORRECT." [TO FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, RE: 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP). 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 19 2 COURSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION PROBLEMS WITH CALCON SWITCHES. [WITH CASH, FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, HOLMES, MOSBAUGH). 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNING AND THE DAMN THINGS JUST DECIDED TO STOP?" (CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, CASH, HOIMES, BRINEY). 10 19900323 EDG CASH 20 2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP SIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE OUT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 j i DEGREES." [TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HOLMES, i COURSEY.] l 10 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 21 15 QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR i QUALITY, CLEANLINESS OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN I' MATERIAL. [TO: BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HOIMES, COURSEY, CASH.] 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE WORST TEMPERATURE
- SWITCHES YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNK." [TO
[ FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, COURSEY, HOLMES.) i 1
10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER IDOKED AT THE CALIBRATION PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, HOW IN THE HELL CAN WE PUT THIS ON ... A DIESEL?"[FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, COURSEY, HOLMES.) 10 19900323 EDG KOCHERY 23 13 "THE CALCON SWITCHES HAVE A IhT OF PART 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW?" [TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, BRINEY, COURSEY, HOLMES.) 10 19900323 EDG CASH 23 13 " ...YOU GOT TWO ALARMS. ONE IS HIGH LUBE OIL OUT, HIGH LUBE OIL TEMP. OUI, IT'S 190 DEGREES." [TO BRINEY, KOCHERY, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH] 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE... IT'S RIDICULOUS." [ REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOLMES.] 10 19900323 EDG HOLMES 28 19 SAID THE JACKET WATER TEMP. SENSORS (CALCON SWITCHES) HAD TO BE RECALIBRATED EVERY TIME. [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) [ REITERATES ON P.31, LN 12) 10 lii00323 EDG HOLMES 33 11 SAID NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE TO CORRECT CALCON CALIBRATION PROBLEM. "JUST BEEN LIVING WITH IT." ; , [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) ! 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 41 11 " ...WHAT HE'S GOT TO CALIBRATE IS A PIECE OF GARBAGE [CALCON SWITCHES), AND HE KNOWS THEY'RE ALI i GOING TO BLOW." ["HE" COULD BE BRINEY OR VENDOR REP, SHELDON) l [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 46 15 "TOO MANY PEOPLE IN THE BOAT..." l [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECTION FROM ' CRITIQUE TEAM AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT. 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 4 DISCUSSES NRC GIVING OK TO GO TO , MODE 3. [TO LACKEY, MOSBAUGH) 41 19900411 EDG LACKEY 8 22 TALKS ABOUT GOING TO MODE 3 24 ! HOURS AFTER MODE 4. [TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH) 41 19900411 EDG BURWINKLE 21 13 TALKS ABOUT LACK OF SET PROCEDURE FOR MEASURING DEWPOINT (AIR QUALITY) [TO STEELI, MOSBAUGH). 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 40 4 TALES ABOUT NOT LOSING ANY TIME GETTING BACK TO MODE 1, PER PROJECTION. [TO PARTON, HORTON, MOSBAUGH). 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 43 5 COMMENTS ABOUT NOT DOING GOOD PM'S ON CHECKING AIR DRYER QUALITY FROM 5/88 TO 5/89. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH). WOULD THAT FACT AFFECT "THE STATEMENT WE MADE IN OUR LETTER?"
--. . . . - - - . .~.. - . - . - . . - - .. - - . - . . - . - . - _ - - -. - - - - . - 4
)
)
41 19900411 .EDG BOCKHOLD 44 7 TALKS ABOUT PM PROGRAM PEING
" SUSPECT" IN '89. SAID WE DON'T KNOW IF WE HAD GOOD AIR OR BAD AIR. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH).
41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 46 9 TALKED ABOUT FSAR REQUIREMENTS AND SOMETIMES NOT BEING ABLE TO MEET THtM. CONCERNED ABOUT HAIRSTON LETTER [COAR RESPONSE 4/9). STATEMEHTS ABOUT AIR QUALITY STILL BEING " VALID." [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH). j l 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 50 16 " ...ON THE 29TH [ MAR 90) OR SO, WE GOT A CRUMMY READING AND NOBODY KNEW ABOUT IT UNTIL MILT HUNT PICKED IT UP." [TO BURMEISTER, MOSBAUGH, STOKES). 41 19900411 EDG MOSBAUGH 50 21 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD), WE HAD A BAD READING [ DEWPOINT / AIR QUALITY) TODAY [4/11/90) 70 DEGREES ON THE 2A DIESEL." - 41 19900411 EDG HORTON 51 4 " HAVEN'T WE GOT ANY GOOD READINGS?" [RE: EDG DEWPOINT / TO BOCKHOLD). 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 51 6 "NOT ON 2A, 2B." [ RESPONDING TO HORTON WHO ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY GOOD DEWPOINT READINGS). 11 10000411 EDG BOCKHOLD 51 11 "ACTUALLY, I HEARD ABOUT IT JUST BEFORE THE MEETING WITH THE NRC." [TO HORTON, KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH, BURMEISTER RE: BAD DEWPOINT READING). 41 19900411 EDG KOCHERY 52 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT "THEY" STILL RUN THE DIESEL COMPRESSOR EVEN WITH THE AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE. 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 52 6 "I'LL WRITE A NOTE TO SKIP KITCHENS ON THIS THING." [ ACKNOWLEDGES KOCHERY'S NOTIFICATION ABOUT RUNNING COMPRESSORS WITH AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE). 41 19900411 EDG MOSBAUGH 54 1 SUMMARIZED HIS AIR QUALITY CONCERNS. 41 19900411 EDG BEACHER 74 11 COMMENTED TO MOSBAUGH AND AUFDENKAMPE ABOUT TELECOPYING AN APPARENTLY INCOMPLETE DEWPOINT MEASUREMENT HISTORY FOR PAST YEAR TO CHAFFEE (NRC), BROCKMAN (NRC), IDUIS WARD, & KEN BURR. 42 19900411 EDG MOSBAUGH 2 16 TO BURWINKLE ABOUT BOCKHOLD CONCLUDING NO AIR QUALITY PROBLEM BECAUSE OF NO CORROSION IN TANK AND NOTHING ON THE FILTER. NOT A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION. 42 19900411 EDG BURWINKLE 5 7 " YUP, WHEN YOU GET WATER IN THE PNEUMATIC RELAY, THEY DO GO TO SHIT." " ...THERE WERE A COUPLE THAT SHOT WATER AND WE REPLACED AND REPLACED..." "...THEM REGULATORS GOT THAT SMALL ORIFICE." [TO MOSBAUGH).
-42 19900411 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 13 1 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT IT'S NOT GPC'S OBLIGATION TO TELL NRC THAT "WE" (GPC/VEGP) FEEL WE HAVE i
1 l l AIR PROBLEMS OR THAT WE FOUND AN AIR PROBLEM. 1 42 19900411 EDG KOCHERY 28 7 TOLD MOSBAUGH THE A DIESEL HAD NO i PROBLEMS, BUT B DIESEL TRIPPED TWICE SINCE 3/20/90 - A HIGH LUBE l OIL TRIP ON 3/22/90. 1 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 10 " GEORGE [FREDERICKS) POINTED OUT ! THERE WAS A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE B DIESELS RIGHT AFTER THE ) MAINTENANCE WORKED ON IT." (TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 16 "IT WASN'T OPERABLE [B DIESEL) SO WE DON'T WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT WITH NO FAILURES AND NO PROBLEMS." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 21 " ... STARTED MORE THAN 20 TIMES EACH...WHATEVER NUMBER...MAKE SUTE IT'S NOT A FALSE STATEMENT." [TO PRB RE:LER) 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELLOW 88 12 RELAYED HAIRSTON'S QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT EVALUATIONS THE EQUIP. OPERATOR MADE BEFORE HE TRIED TO RESTART THE DIESEL AFTER IT TRIPPED IN THE SITE AREA l EMERGENCY. JGA SAID HE JUST WENT IN AND STARTED PUSHING BUTTONS. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 91 4 "WE THINK THAT'S BASICALLY A ' MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT." (TO STRINGFELLOW, MOSBAUGH, REFERRING TO 20 STARTS WITHOUT FAILURES OR PROBLEMS SINCE MAR 20). , 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 91 7 "
...WE KNOW FOR A FACT THAT THE B DIESEL TRIPPED AT LEAST ONCE AFTER MARCH 20TH." [TO STRINGFELLOW).
57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 91 8 "ACTUALLY, IT (B DIESEL) TRIPPED TWICE AFTER MARCH 20TH, OR IT HAD AT LEAST TWO SEPARATE PROBLEMS. "[TO STRINGFELI4W) . 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELLOW 91 21 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE WAS OFF THE PHONE, HE WOULD RUN IN AND TELL SHIPMAN WHAT AUFDENKAMPE AND MOSBAUGH TOLD HIM. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELI4W 94 11 RECOGNIZED THEY "WERE DOWN TO " THE "20 TIMES EACH" QUESTION IN THE WORDING OF THE LER. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELIDW 96 8 "IT JUST DAWNED ON ME WHAT AL WAS SAYING A MINUTE AGO. IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE SAY NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN ANY STARTS, YOU'RE SAYING THAT'S NOT TRUE." "OH, WONDERFUL, O.K." (TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 96 15 "BECAUSE, YOU KNOW, WE...THIS HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO THE NRC ONCE ALREADY." (STRINGFELIDW RESPONDS BY BY SAYING THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS THINKING). 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 97 4 ASKED AUFDENKAMPE IF HE HAD
HAIRSTON'S COAR LETTER, "BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONE..." - AUFDENKAMPE INTERRUPTED SAYING "WHERE THEY LIED...I MEAN THEY..." MOSBAUGH FINISHED THE THOUGHT BY SAYING, " ...MADE THAT STATEMENT'[NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) PREVIOUSLY." 57 19900439 EDG SHIPMAN 100 23 [TO MOSBAUGH) TRYING TO GET "ALL THE HAIRSTON QUESTIONS ANSWERED." WHAT OPERATORS DID BEFORE TRYING TO RESTART THE DIESEL. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 103 25 TOLD MOSBAUGH HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THE OPERATOR ACTION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE PROPOSED LER [IMMEDIATELY RESET ANNUNCIATORS), BUT THAT HAIRSTON HAD A PROBLEM WITH IT. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 8 "OTHER QUESTION WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO GET AN ANSWER TO IS TO REASSURE GEORGE [HAIRSTON) THAT WE HAD MORE THAN 20 VALID STARTS SINCE MARCH THE 20TH, LIKE WE SAY IN THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH) MOSBAUGH TOLD SHIPMAN THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THAT'S STATED. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS THE DATA THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE [HAIRSTON) WROTE AND [BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE ...EBNETER LAST MONDAY IN
.'.TL'.NTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T ANY. FAILURES IT JUST WASN'T TRUE.
57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 105 5 " ... THE B MACHINE, ON 3-22 AT 12:43 THE MACHINE TRIPPED ON HIGH LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE." [TO SHIPMAN). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 105 18 "WE COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM THAT'S CREATED BY THAT INFORMATION [THE 3-22 TRIP) BY SAYING NO VALID FAILURES." [TO MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 105 21 "I THINK WE GOT ANOTHER ONE [ FAILURE). IT IS ON 3-23 ATG 17:31. THE B MACHINE ... TRIPPED ON LOW JACKET WATER PRESSURE / LUBE OIL PRESSURE LOW." [TO SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 106 4 " ...THIS THING'S ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THE PRB A COUPLE OF TIMES. HOW IN THE WORLD DID IT GET THROUGH THE PRB?" [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 107 20 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THIS WHOLE STATEMENT [ DIESEL STARTS WITH NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) NEEDS TO BE STRICKEN." [TO MOSBAUGH, "TRINGFELIDW) . 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 8 "CERTAINLY, IF IT'S NOT A VALID STATEMENT, WE WOULD NEED TO GET IT THE HECK OUT OF HERE REGARDLESS OF WHAT GEORGE TOLD EBNETER." [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). i 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND STRINGFELLOW GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS COMMENTS. [TO I 1 __.._______.-__-_.~-.-.---------J
MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 EDG SWARTZWELDER 115 25 TALKED ABOUT HAIRSTON NEEDING TO TALK TO OPERATORS WHO RESET ANNUNCIATORS ON DIESEL IN SITE AREA EMERGENCY. IS CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFICALLY LETTING THESE OPERATORS KNOW THAT HAIRSTON WILL NOT YELL AT THEM. [TO l CASH, MOSBAUGH).. ; i 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 118 25 "WHAT BIRM7NGHAM IS THINKING ! NOW IS THEY MADE A MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT IN THE APRIL 9TH ! LETTER. [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM). 57 19900419 EDG WEBB 123 19 "WE NEED TO GET RID OF THE . STATEMENT IN THE LER ABOUT HOW MANY FAILURES OR HOW MANY TESTS i YOU'VE GOT ALTOGETHER, OR ELSE CORRECT.THE MISCONCEPTION THAT WE GENERATED ON 4-9. I DON'T KNOW IF WE SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE THE l MISCONCEPTION..."(AM,ODON, AUFDEN) ; 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 2 4 PUT WORDS IN EQUIPMENT OPERATOR'S l MOUTH ABOUT CHECKING GAGES ON DIESEL BEFORE PUSHING RE-START BUTTON. [DEIDACH, MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER). 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 5 16 DISCUSSED WORDING OF LER. l (iwosAUGH, SWARTZWELDER, DELOACH). i l 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. (AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN) . 1 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" (NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) (AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG BOCKHOLD 9 6 TOLD MCCOY THAT EDG START COUNT NUMBERS IN 4/9 PRESENTATION BEGAN AFTER COMP. TEST PROGRAM. (EITHER DOESN'T KNOW OR IS B.S. ING MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION' 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 10 8 STATED HIS AWARENESS OF HAIRSTON PERSONALLY INTERVIEWING EQUIP. OPERATORS THAT RE-STARTED EDG AT l SITE AREA EMERGENCY. 58 15.,00419 EDG SHIPMAN 11 2 SUSPECTED HAIRSTON OF " LEADING" THE EDG EQUIP. OPERATOR INTO SAYING WHAT HAIRSTON WANTED HIM TO I SAY. j 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" (SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, l MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." (MEANING NO , i 1
)
i
TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELI4W, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." [PROBABLY MEANING FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, STRINGFELI4W, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG BURWINKLE 19 19 "HAVE YOU GUYS FIGURED OUT HOW COME THE DIESEL STARTS WHEN IT AIN'T SUPPOSED TO7" , 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 20 20 "...AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED BECAUSE THAY WERE PART OF THE RETURNING TO SERVICE OF THE DIESEL..." [RE: 3/22 AND 3/23 TRIPS) [MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 23 7 "THE PROBLEM WITH THAT IS THAT THAT NUMBER [EDG STARTS) IS GOING TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN WHAT GEORGE TOLD MR. EBNETER, AND, YOU KNOW, IT'S GOING TO CREATE A SELLING JOB FOR ME, I THINK, BUT EVENTUALLY THAT'S THE ONLY WAY WE CAN TELL A VALID STORY.. 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 23 8 " ...[ CONT. OF PG. 23, LINE 7) THAT YOU KNOW, WE CAN DEFEND. IF SOMEBODY CALLS ALLEN MOSBAUGH, BILL SHIPMAN, AND JOHN AUFDENKAMPE AGAIN TO TESTIFY, THAT'S THE STORY I W;GT TO TELL." [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE RE COUNTING STARTS AFTER DIESEL DEC. OPERABLE) 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS ; OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE) 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER)
...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." [SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
1 l 58 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 34 12 STATED THAT IT REALLY DOESN'T j MATTER WHAT START COUNT IS PUT IN THE LER, BECAUSE IF NRC DISAGREES, GPC WILL JUST ISSUE A REVISION [TO MOSBAUGH) .
- 58 19900419 EDG CASH 35 19 STATED NOT SURE IF HE TOLD BOCKHOLD i
ABOUT FAILURES IN EDG COUNT FOR NRC PRESENTATION. SAID BOCKHOLD KNEW ABOUT FAILURES. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 19900419 EDG CASH 36 3 STATED HE STARTED EDG START COUNT ON 3/20, THE THREE MAINTENANCE STARTS ON NIGHT OF 3/20. [TO: MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). .' 58 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 36 23 "WE DIDN'T COUNT THE FAILURE, THOUGH." [RE MOSBAUGH'S QUESTION TO CASH ABOUT START FAILURES SINCE 3/20) [AUFDENKAMPE IS REMINDING MOSBAUGH THAT THEY'RE ] STARTING THE COUNTS IN THE LER AS OF THE END OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
I l TESTING). l 75 19900430 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 31 10 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THE MATERIAL I FALSE STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE LER." (TO MOSBAUGH) , (MOSBAUGH HAS A MORE COK/REHENSIVE LIST OF EDG START DATA). i 75 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 35 2 "I COMPLETED MY REVIEW. I FINALLY SORTED OUT ALL THE STARTS, I THINK." [TO TYNAN) i (MOSBAUGH GIVING THIS DATA TO BOCKHOLD). 75 19900430 EDG TYNAN 35 21 " THIRTEEN, FIFTEEN,.AND SEVENTEEN ARE RIGHT SM.LCK IN THE MIDDLE." [TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG PROBLEMS J IN THE SERIEJ OF STARTS). : 75 19900430 EDG BEACHER 43 9 STATED THAT CHAFEE WANTS A LIST OF A SEQUENCE OF EDG STARTS FROM THE POINTS BOTH EDG'S WERE DECLARED , OPERABLE (To MOSBAUGH). ! 75 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 47 17 SHOWED KITCHENS THE COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS AND POINTED OUT FAILURES. [TO ; KITCHENS). : 1 75 19900430 EDG SWARTZWELDER 53 12 A CONVERSATION WITH MOSBAUGH ABOUI " PROBLEMS" IN MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE EDG START LIST. [TO MOSBAUGH, KITCHENS). 75 19900430 EDG CASH 56 10 INVOLVED WITH VERIFICATION OF MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS. (MOSBAUGH). 76 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. LIST CF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. (MOYE, HORTON). 76 19900430 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 9 2 " JIMMY PAUL CASH SAID HE HAD RESEARCHED THE OPERATOR IDGS TO DETERMINE HOW MANY STARTS THERE WERE WITHOUT PROBLEMS..." (MOSBAUGH). 76 19900430 EDG BOCKHOLD 30 18 "THEN WE HAVE TO OBVIOUSLY REVISE THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH POINTED OUT START PROBLEMS ON HIS COMP. LIST). 76 19900430 EDG BOCKHOLD 30 25 TALKED ABOUT MAKING NRC PRESENTATION FROM CASH'S INFO, WITH KEN BURR'S APPROVAL. SAID HE DIDN'T GET TO THE EDG START SLIDE. SAID MAYBE CASH WAS " THINKING OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT" (MISCOMMUNICATION) FROM WHAT BOCKHOLD WANTED OUT OF SLIDE. [TO MOSBAUGH). 83 EDG PARTON 7 5 "WHAT SHOULD THE LER SAY?" [TO MOSBAUGH RE REV 1 TO THE LER). 95 19900504 EDG SHIPMAN 20 4 "SO YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN WAS THAT WE HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE SWITCH..." (TO RUSHTON, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, RE CALCON SWITCHES). 1
)
95 19900504 EDG CHAFEE 28 22 TALKS ABOUT FOREIGN MATERIAL PROBLEMS IN SWITCHES. VEGP PEOPLE STILL NOT SURE OF CAUSE OF SWITCH PROBLEMS. [MOSBAUGH, LOUIS WARD, ,5UFDENKAMPE, BROCKMAN AND OTHER UNIDENT. VEGP PEOPLE). 95 19900504 EDG MOSPAUGH 43 19 "WELL, BASED ON THE WYLIE TESTING AND THE DEBRIS FOUND IN THE SWITCH, THEY [NRC) STARTED USING THE WORD OPERABILITY." [TO BOCKHOLD ABOUT NRC [BROCKMAN, CHAFEE) AWARENESS OF DEBRIS IN CALCON SWITCH). 95 19900504 EDG BOCKHOLD 46 7 TALKED ABOUT LETTER TO NRC RE S.A.E. AND SAID SOME MINOR ITEMS ARE "NOT THE NRC'S BUSINESS." [TO MOSBAUGH AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS). 95 19900504 EDG BOCKHOLD 55 21 "NOW I HEARD JOHN GIVE ME SOME SONG AND DANCE THAT WE'D LIKE TO KEEP'WILL BE REVISED BY' SO WE DON'T MAKE MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENTS AND CHANGE THE WORDS AFTER THE FACT." [MOSBAUGH & VEGP MGRS ABOUT DRAFTING 5/14/90 LTR TO NRC RE COR. ACTIONS ON S.A.E.]. 98 19900508 EDG SWARTZWELDER 60 5 TALKED ABOUT REV 1 TO 4/19/90 LER IN PRB. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS). ww 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 44 2 "AND WE CONTINUED TO FIGHT WITH THE NRC THROUGH THE ITT." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON). 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 44 19 " ...THE ATTITUDE IS WE'RE NOT GOING TO GET OUR LICENSE IF WE DON'T DO WHAT THEY [NRC) WANT. NOW WE'VE GOT OUR LICENSE AND WE'RE FIGHTING." [TO MOSBAUGH). 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 48 7 "THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT YOU DON'T OPERATE IT SAFELY AND YOU INJURE PEOPLE." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). i' 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 48 13 " ...WE GO TO EXTREMES WITH TECH SPEC INTERPRETATIONS TO KEEP THIS PLANT RUNNING AND WE'VE DONE IT l FOR YEARS." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 48 24 "WE [GPC/VEGP) HAVE AN ATTITUDE
- THAT BRINGING THIS PLANT DOWN IS THE WORST THING THAT COULD l HAPPEN. AND IT'S NOT THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN." [TO 1
MOSBAUGH, PARTON). 4 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE 1 PLANT DOES THINGS. AND FROM WHAT...MCCOY SAID THE NRC SAID, I
- DON'T DISAGREE [WITH NRC)." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM GREENE).
99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE HE'D TELL MCCOY HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU KNOW, MY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED l HERE." [TO GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH). ! 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 53 4 " ...YOUR DEPARTMENT [ OPS) IS i PART OF THIS CLIQUE. [ MEANING THE CLIQUE HE IS AFRAID TO TELL i
l ABOUT VEGP'f ATTITUDE ABOUT, KEEPING THE PIANT RUNNING.) (TO GREENE). 101 199t05'8 EDG BOCKHO.D 1 15 "IS THERE SOMETHING BESIDES I'M-SCREWING 1? A. 1 STARTINi THE WRONG DIESEL...*/" [TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSI. UGH .'OTIFIE',HIM AVOUT THE MISTAKEN START OF THE A DIESEL). : 101 1990.508 . ;X; E(. CKHOLD 2 24 "I WOULD DO NOTHING WITH IT EXCEPT F8R YOUR "A'IYNG THE PEOPLE LOOK AT THE LER CORRECTION." ' (TO MOSB$ UGH RE h GT\ KEN START OF A DIESEL). 55.199f0608 E'G ALDkNKAMPE 43 8 EXPIAINED TO BAILEY LANGUAGE
}& BASES FOR CH1. AGE IN EDG STARTS IN LER REV 1. TOLD Bi BIRMING IAM F'.J THE APPD"ED LER REV FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. TOLD BAILEY 3' WANTS TO CORRE'? THE COAR IN THE COVER LTR. TO LER REV.
(BAIUu ON PHONE, MOSBAUG4 8 i 158 19900611 **DG MOSBAUGH 8 3 SAID NRC ITT TEAM AWARE OF DIESEL PROBLEM h.."' TORY AT VEG. CITED-100 PLUS WORK ORDERS ON i SWITCHES. [HORTON). 159 19000611 EDG AUFDENKAMM S 1 "HAIRSTON WON'T SIGNOUT THE
""..d [WEBB, MOSBAUGH) (RE REV 1, ER THAT WAS PRB APPROVED AND SENT TO BIRMINGHAM IN MID-MAY).
159 19900611 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 6 6 "Th RE GOING TO HAVE QA AUDITS." (BIRMINGHAM GOING TO HAVE VEGI- 'ITE QA DO AN AUDIT ON THE DIESEL START COUNTS) (TO MOSBAUGH, W.'B). 159 19900611 EDG FREDERICKS 7 11 "SHOULDa T TAKE MORE THAN A COUPLE OF DAYS. I WAS GIVEN THE GUIDELINES '1AT IT HAD TO BE DONE BEFORE THE LER WOULD BE SIGNED." (TO mot..\ UGH), 159 19900611 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 11 3 TALKED ABOL HOW THE CORPORATE PEOPLE IN BIRMINGHAM WERE GOING TO TEL NRC THAT THE i INACCURATE IDGS CAUSED EDG COUNT PROBLEIM. [TO MOSBAUGH). l 159 19900611 EDG SHEBANI 36 17 " GEORGE (BOCKHOLD) APPARENTLY HAD A DISCUSSION WITH McCOY, AND GEORGE DID DIRECT TO TOM (WEBB] WHAT HE WANTS PUT IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH RE REV TO LER). 159 19900611 EDG MOSBAUGH 38 9 TALKED ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO USE " VALID" IN LER REV TO REFER TO EDG TESTS. [TO ODOM). 160 19900612 EDG WEBB 5 18 " GEORGE [B' OKHOLD) DID. HE SAID HE WANTED NEW -- NEW INFO." (BOCKHOLD INSTRUCTED WEBB TO USE THE VALID START TERMINOIDGY IN THE LER REV) (To MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 EDG MOSBAUGH 8 13 "THERE'S A LOT WRONG WITH IT [LER REV), AND I WOULD JUST BE REAL CAUTIOUS IF I WERE YOU." (TO ! AUFDENKAMPE).. l 160 19900612 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 9 11 "I THINK WE OUGHT TO JUST GO
t TELL THE RESIDENTS WE LIED IN THE FIRST LER... AND THE LETTER." [TO MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 10 4 "NOBODY IS GOING TO WP.r., A 1 LETTER AND SAY WE LIED TO YOU THE FIRST TIME, NRC." r'"' MOSBAUGH, . JUSTIFYING HIS IDEA TO GO TELL THE RESIDENTS). I 160 19900619 " 7 ~! L vn 4.s 14 "I ASSUM5' idOM CORPORATE MEETING. ar.,x'RE' CHANGING THE RESPONSE. 3 THE r h." [TO MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS
- 3 "HAIRSTON SYAS HE'S GOING TO WRITE HIS OWN [LER REV). ;d GUY HASN'T FINISHED YET. " [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON RE NT', QA " GUY" NOT DONE WITH AUDIT OF EDG
] STARTS). 160 19900%4 EDG FREDERICKS 24 10 "I'M SUPPOSED TO NOT ONLY COME % WITH A NUMBER; I'M SUPPOSED TO COME UP WITH WHY THE D'sCREPANCY EXISTS." [TO MOSBAUGH RE EDG START COUNT). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 25 "HOW COULD THEY [ CORPORATE] HAVE REVVED THE NUMBERS? THEY DON'T HAVE THE NUMBERS." [TO MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 25 4 "SOMEBODY CHANGED IT TO SAY
- ' VALID' STARTS." [TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REV).
160 19900612 EDG HORTON 30 1 "WELL, THE CONSISTENCY IS DOWN THE l TUBE BECAUSE THE FIRST LER THAT WENT OUT IS INCORRECT." [TO AJLUNI, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 EDG AJLUNI 33 6 TALKED TO HORTON AND FREDERICKS ABOUT LER. THE CHANGES IN EDG START INFO PROM COAR TO LER TO REV1 OF i 167 19900615 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 23 21 "I BRIEFED THE RESIDENTS, i AND THEY TALKED TO BROCKMAN, AND THEY SAID THAT WAS FINE." [TO MOSBAUGH RE TELLING NRC OF INCORRECT STATEMENT IN LER). 167 19900615 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 23 23 "I TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD AN INCORRECT STATEMENT IN THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT TELLING NRC RESIDENTS). 167 19900615 EDG MOSELY 67 14 "I'VE TABULATED THE DATA, j BUT... HAVEN'T...DONE ANY COUNTING IN TERMS OF VALID FAILURES, VALID STARTS..." [TO MOSBAUGH] [MOSELY IS QA WHO OBTAINED EDG 8 START DATA FOR FREDERICKS IN AUDIT FOR REV TO LER). 167 19900615 EDG MOSELY 71 4 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT BAILEY CALLED, LOOKING FOR BOCKHOLD, AND HAD ASKED HIM [MOSLEY) ABOUT VALID FAILURES. 168 19900618 EDG ODOM 51 13 i TALKED TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT STALLING ON A WAIVER, AND ABOUT A TOTAL RE-WRITE OF THE LER REVISION.
i 4
- 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 7 2 "WELL, THERE'S TWO QUESTIONABLE THINGS WE GOTTA RESOLVE, WHETHER WE'RE GOING TO DECIARE THEN
[ STARTS) SUCCESSFUL OR NOT. ONE ON EACH [ DIESEL) RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STRING [OF STARTS)." [TO MOSBAUGH). i* 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 7 23 "WE CAUSED THAT TRIP. IT WOULDN'T i
; HAVE TRIPPED ON BLACK TUESDAY. I'LL LET GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) CALL 1 j THAT ONE."
3 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 8 2 "THE B TRAIN IS THE ONE THAT YOU j IDENTIFIED. WHERE IT DIDN'T TRIP, IT SHOULD HAVE." [TO MOSBAUGH l ABOUT A DIFFERENT KIND OF EDG PROBLEM). 4 184 19900830 EDG PARTON 9 7 "DID WE COME UP WITH AS MANY [ SUCCESSFUL STARTS) AS WE THOLD THEM [NRC)?" [TO MOSBAUGH, i j: HORTON). I i
! - 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 9 8 "NO, WE UNDERSTAND THAT." [TO ! ! PARTON, MOSBAUGH, IN RESPONSE TO PARTON'S QUESTION RE COMING UP i WITH AS MANY SUCCESSFUL STARTS AS GPC TOLD NRC).
4
- 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 15 22 "IT WAS AN UNPLANNED TRIP. I {
WOULD LIKE TO CALL IT AN UNPLANNED TRIP, HOWEVER, DECIARE IT A
]
SUCCESS." [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD). J 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR 1 SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME j EXPLANATION DOWN BEIhW." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, j j MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPIANNED TRIPS." [RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED i l AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) [TO HORTON, ! GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). . ! i ! 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 26 19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST [ MAINTENANCE STARTS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WITH THE NRC." [TO l j BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, GREENE). l l 184 19900830 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID
- TEST FAILURES. THAT'S THE ONLY KIND WE HAVE TO REPORT. DOES IT I 8
AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAILURE TO REPORT 7" [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, i l MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). l I ! j 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE 1 i IAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S] CALL TO THE NRC, ; j WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN ! j ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT J j OUT. (CONT.) l l 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE t STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A
- PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." [TO i HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR i
l l l l HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE PAPER...IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S IDST. [TO HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPLANATORY PHRASE IN COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED). 1R4 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, IF IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE, WHY FLAG IT IN THE PORTION OF THE LETTER?" [TO GREENE, HORTON, i AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). I 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH USING THE WORDS " APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE , ERRORS IN THE 4/9 LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE THE RESULT OF." [TO BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' [TO BE THE RESULT OF)." [RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER & 4/19 LER) [TO ] GhEENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF
' ERRORS' IN THE APRIL 9TH..." [BOCKHOLD TOTALLY OBFUSCATES THE LETTER THAT IS TO CORRECT THE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE INDIVIDUAL [ CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF l FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION) JIMMY [ CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS. " [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 21 ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." [RE LETTER 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 45 A8 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE OUT WITHOUT YOU [PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30 LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." [TO BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
186 19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "OKAY, THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH] WENT AND COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS HAIRSTON, I'D SAY ' WHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE LER REV). 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 39 21 "AND APPARENTLY JUST WHEN HARRY MAJORS AND THE STAFF UP THERE IN CORPORATE, THE WORD-
' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST' GOT PUT IN THERE."- [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER).
186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 40 25 " ...AND WHEN IT [COAR) SAYS
'NO PROBLEMS OR FAILURES DURING ANY OF THESE STARTS' THAT BURNS YOU UP." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER).
186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 42 22 " ...WHAT THEN THEY'RE [ CORPORATE] GOING TO DO IS SAY A MORE ACCURATE MEASURE OF THE-RELIABILITY WAS THE VALID..." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV). 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 45 4 " ...I THINK THAT'S [THE
' SUBSEQUENT TO EVENT' TERMINOIDGY) WHAT HARRY'S [ MAJORS) GOING TO USE...I MAY HAVE TO PUT SOME WORDS IN THE AUDIT REPORT BASED ON THAT." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV).
186 19900629 EDG ODOM 47 21 "I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT [' SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT' TERMINOLOGY) CAMEFROM . I JUST CALLED HARRY [ MAJORS) AND TOLD HARRY, 'STOP THE PRESS. IT'S NOT RIGHT.'" [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN). 186 19900629 EDG TYNAN 47 24 "WHY CAN'T WE GET THROUGH WHAT WE [PRB) KEEP APPROVING AND SENDING OFF SITE?" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE DRAFTS OF LER REV'S). 186 19900629 EDG ODOM 48 13 "YOU WRITE THE NRC AND TELL THEN THE FALSE STATEMENT IN THE REVISION. . .YOU DON'T TRY A MINOR TYPORGRAPHIC ERROR. YOU TELL WHY YOU KNOW." [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN RE LER REV). 187 19900629 EDG WEBB 3 15 " ...IT GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL THE TESTS AFTER THAT MAY HAVE BEEN SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES TOO, AND THEY WEREN'T. ...THERE WERE INVALID TESTS IN THERE ALSO." [TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REVS). 187 19900629 EDG WEBB 6 9 "HAIRSTON CHANGED AT LEAST 3 OF THEM [LER' REVS)...AT LEAST 3, BUT SHIPMAN CHANGED ONE OF THEM, I KNOW." [TO MOSBAUGH). 187 19:00629 EDG MOSBAUGH 14 16 "I'M JUST SAYING THAT THE REV PROPOSED'ON 5/8 IS NO DIFFERENT THAN THIS [6/29). NOW WHY WASN'T THAT SUBMITTED?" [TO WEBB, TYNAN). 187'19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE HIMSELF." [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV). 187 19900629 EDG HORTON 20 12 "WELL, WHAT WAS WRONG WITH OUR
I i DIESEL START RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES?" [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, RE WHETHER PRACTICES WERE CAUSE OF FALSE DATA GIVEN TO NRC 4/9]. ) 187 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 26 23 "THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S IOG IS NOT AN ACCURATE RECORD OF WHAT HAPPENED." [TO MOSBAUGH, l HORTON). 187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 42 9 PUTS GREEME ON NOTICE THAT ATTRIBUTING THE ERROR IN EDG STARTS TO POOR RECORD PRACTICES /END OF TEST PROGRAM IS NOT TRUE. ; 1 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, ) [ RESPONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER] BUT I'LL l RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCLAIMER AT A LATER POINT." [TO , GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB]. i 1 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER [REV) TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOING TO LET THE COVER LETTER TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM 7" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB]. 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW THAT'S A KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN BLESSED BY GEORGE [HAIRSTON], SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE [HAIRSTON] AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE..." [TO GREENE RE STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 56 8 GREENE SUGGESTED TO MAJORS TO USE THE WORD " DIFFERENCE" V. " DISCREPANCY" IN LER REV COVER LETTER BECAUSE " DISCREPANCY" MEANT ADMITTING A MISTAKE. MAJORS LIKED THE IDEA. 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 58 20 AGREED WITH MOSBAUGH THAT THIS NEW LER JUST CHANGED "TO APPLES AND ORANGES." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON] PERSONALLY ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." [THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES] [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). I 1 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 62 4 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT HAIRSTON CONSCIOUSLY THINKING THAT THE NRC MIGHT INTERPRET THE
" CORRECTION" COVER LETTER AS NOT ADDRESSING THE 4/9 COAR.
187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 63 15 PUT MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 LETTER IS FALSE. GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS MAJORS FROM HAVING TO RESPOND. [TO MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 66 15 TRIED TO TALK MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG
( AIR RECEIVER VALVES STICKING. 199 19900711 EDG KOCHERY 8 1 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG AIR RECEIVER VALVES STICKING. 199 19900711 EDG MOYE 11 1 TALKED TO MOSBAUGH, MANSFIELD, ; BURWINKLE, ABOUT THE 4TH TIME THE SAME PROBLEM HAS HAPPENED TO THE 2A EDG. 199 19900711 EDG MANSFIELD 11 6 TO MOSBAUGH, BURWINKLE, MOYE ABOUT CHAFFEE TELLING THEM THEY COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE 3/20 EVENT BY BEING MORE PERSISTENT IN RESOLVING REPEAT PROBLEMS WITH THE DIESELS. 199 19900711 EDG MANSFIELD 14 3 TOLD MOSBAUGH, MOYE ABOUT AN ; INSUFFICIENT " AIR ROLL" BEING A DIESEL PROBLEM. ' 199 19900711 EDG HORTON 27 15 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT 2A EDG BEING IN A 72 HOUR LCO DUE TO AN INSUFFICIENT AIR ROLL. IT WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE. ' 200 19900711 EDG MOSBAUGH 8 1 TO MANSFIELD, KOCHERY, STOKES ' ABOUT EDG AIR ROLL PROBLEMS. I 204 19900713 EDG 7/11 OSOS 2 23 TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT 2A EDG ' STILL BEING INOP. PROBLEIR IS CLEARANCES ON AIR START PIIDT VALVES AND OIL IN AIR START PIIDT VALVE LINES. 204 19900713 EDG HORTON 16 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT THEY CLEANED THE AIR START SOLENOID VALVES AND USED EMERY CIDTH TO " WIDEN THE CLEARANCES" SO THAT THE VALVES WOULDN'T STICK. (MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 205 19900713 EDG KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. 205 19900713 EDG MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT HARGIS i RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE UNIT 1 EDG ALSO. [TO l FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD). 216 19900724 EDG MANSFIELD 4 14 "DID YOU HEAR WE HAD A DIESEL FAIL TO START 7" (TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 217 19900724 EDG HORTON 25 11 "BUT WE GOT ANYWHERE BETWEEN A QUART AND TWO GALLONS...[OF JACKET WATER OUT OF THE COMBUSTION l AIR DRAIN VALVES) (TO MOSBAUGH). ' 220 19900726 EDG MOSBAUGH 9 21 "THERE WAS A FAILURE TO START THAT WAS UNDOCUMENTED ON UNIT 1. THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR ON UNIT 2..." (TO AUFDENKAMPE). 220 19900726 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 10 15 "IT WAS IN THE -- IN THE DIESEL, THE TAPE ON THE DIESEL...THEY PUSHED THE BUTTON, AND IT
' I i ! l DIDN'T START." [TO MOSBAUGH RE PAINTED-OVER TAPE ON DIESEL). '
j 222 19900727 EDG MANSFIELD 37 4 " ...THE CONTAINMENT COOLING FUNCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN DEGRADED. I MEAN, THAT'S A LIE...IT l WOULD HAVE BEEN NON-EXISTANT." [TO MOSBAUGH RE LER ON EDG 1 TAPING). l 222 19900727 EDG MANSFIELD 38 6 " ...A BLATANT LIE." [ FINISHED l l MOSBAUGH'S STATEMENT ABOUT TAPED DIESEL LER. j i 222 19900727 EDG MANSFIELD 38 17 "SO AL, IDSS OF A SAFETY
! FUNCTION FROM A SINGLE EVENT IS A 4 HOUR REPORT. HOW DO YOU DEAL i j WITH THAT WHEN YOU FIND OUT ABOUT IT MONTHS LATER7" [TO MOSBAUGH RE EDG TAPING). i 2
222 19900727 EDG MOSBAUGH 39 3 "APPARENTLY, STRINGFELIDW j THOUGHT IT [ TAPED EDG) WAS A 4 HOUR." [ REPORT REQUIREMENT) [TO ] MOSBAUGH). 222 19900727 EDG HINES 39 17 " DIESEL GENERATOR 1A CONTROL AIR LEAK AND THERE IS NOT AN LCO WRITTEN AGAINST IT." [TO MOSBAUGH, MANSFIELD). I i j 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE l THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC j RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) 1 [ INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 20 "THE 11TH [7/11/90) INCIDENT'S .' WHEN IT [EDG] FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WE l i FINALLY GOT INTO." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF l EDG FAILURES TO NRC). l j 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 40 8 "IT'S IMPORTANT FOR ME TO KNOW
- THAT WE IDENTIFIED..." [THE CONNECTION BETNEEN THE 7/5 AND 7/11 EDG FAILURES, AS OPPOSED TO THE NRC ID'ING IT).
7 4 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 42 16 "DOES THE RECOGNITION.. 0F THE JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE) START A [ REPORTING) CIDCK AT A DIFFERENT TIME 7" [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). }l " i 234 19900803 EDG GREENE 42 22 ...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS ] A [EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTHER i INCIDENT WAS REPORTED AS A 10 CFR 21 ITEM." [TO SHIPMAN, j RUCHTON, MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD) JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" [EDG FAILURE) [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). . 246 19900813 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.]
l l l 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR i SURE." (To MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP -{ MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.] 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE; WOULD SAY THAT I { PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED '4ITH YOU (BAILEY) ON THE i PREPARATIONS, RIGHT7...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM ' MTLEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED l BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, ---- l 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 9 (CONT'D) ---SHIPMAN, BAILEY, i FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I BELIEVE IT (THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE AND ME." (TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER] IN GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." [To BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, , FREDERICKS). 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 15 2 DESCRIBES HIS RECOLLECTION OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS RE EDG PRESENTATION TO NRC ON 4/9, AND HOW i 4/9 COAR RESPONSE WAS CREATED. [ FULL DISCUSSION ABOUT 4/19 LER l CONFERENCE CALL INCLUDED THROUGH PAGE 19). 258 19900817 EDG WILLIAMS 8 15 "AND THEN LAST NIGHT [8/16/90) i THE 1B DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO-STARTED FOR NO APPARENT REASON." (TO ; BOCKHOLD,.A.M., AT MORNING STATUS MEETING ON LAST DAY OF NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION.] 258 19900817 EDG HORTON 20 24 "
...THERE MAY BE A RELATIONSHIP (TO THE IB DIESEL AUTO-STARTING) TO ANOTHER SLAVE RELAY TEST." !
[TO A.H., MANSFIELD, IN ENGINEERING MEETING.] 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 24 17 " ... ALLEN CAME TO ME AND SAID, ' HEY, THE INFORMATION [4/9 EDG START INFO)IS WRONG' AND I TOLD ALLEN TO GET THE STAFF TO FIX IT." [To FREDERICKS, WHO QUESTIONED IF ANYONE HAD ANY CONTENTION ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF THE 4/9 DATA.] 258 19900817 EDG MCCOY 25 11 4HE ORIGINAL LER [,/19) WAS BASED ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9] PRESENTATION...THE , CORRECTION TO THE LER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME ' OR NUMBER..." [TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.] 258 19900817 EDG FREDERICKS 27 17 " ...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP,...THE REASON WAS LOW JACKET WATER PRESSURE." [TO MCCOY,BOCKHOLD,J.G.A.,A.M.)
-- . . _ . . - . . - . - - . - -.. -- .- .- - - - - . . . - - - - - -. - .~ - -
L ; i i 258 19900817 .EDG BOCKHOLD 32 11 " ...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE (EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYIOR BELIEVES, , BUT...[HE) BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONAIRISTAKE..." (TO ' MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) (EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYIDR BELIEVES VS. ACTUAL SITUATION.) ! 260 19900817 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 8 3 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD HAVING ; SIGNED OFF ON THE COVER LETTER TO REV 1 OF THE LER [6/29] IN MID l M5Y. [TO MOSBAUGH, CHESTNUT) (CHESTNUT IS TAKING J.G. A. 'S PIACE ! AS TECHNICAL MANAGER.) j 264 19900828 EDG ODOM 39 18 "IT'S GOT A MIND OF ITS OWN." (REFERS TO AN INADVERTENT, UNEXPIAINED UNIT 1 DIESEL START ON { 8/16-17/90.] [TO A.M., COPEIAND.) i i 266 19900829 EDG BOCKHOLD 21 4 " ... SUCCESSFUL START MEANT [TO BOCKHOLD) THE ENGINE STARTED AND RAN SUFFICIENT TIME THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE MARCH 20TH EVENT. AND...AFTER RUNNING A i SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ENGINE COULD HAVE SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF A l PROBLEM..." [TO A.M., GREENE,HORTON) l 267 19900829 EDG KOCHERY 32 8 DISCUSSES ANOTHER CURR$NT PROBLEM WITH THE 1A EDG. A VOLTACE REGULATOR PROBLEM. THE 1A EDG HAS BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE. [TO MOSBAUGH) (MOSBAUGH SAYS THIS PROBLEMS HAS EXHIBITED ITSELF BEFORE.] 267 19900829 EDG HORTON 41 22 " ...WE JUST NEED TO MAKE IT AS REASONABLY ACCURATE AS WE CAN, BECAUSE THE LIABILITY I SEE IS SUBSTANTIAL." (TO A.M., RE EDG START DATA STILL BEING COMPILED JUST PRIOR TO ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ON SITE AREA EMERGENCY.) 267 19900829 EDG STRINGFELLOW 47 6 " ...I'M TICKLED TO DEATH THAT...Y'ALL ARE TAKING THIS THING (CORRECTION OF EDG START DATA) ; SERIOUSLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T CONFORTABLE WITH IT AT ALL." (TO ! ODOM, FREDERICKS, A.M.] ll 269 19900830 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 1 25 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD l
" GUIDING" THE PRB ABOUT THE WORDING AND CONTENT OF THE LETTER i THAT SUPPOSEDLY CORRECTED THE " INCORRECT" EDG START DATA GIVEN TO NRC IN APRIL. [TO MOSBAUGH.]
STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO KITCHENS 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 52 6 "I'LL WRITE A NOTE TO SKIP KITCHENS ON THIS THING." [ ACKNOWLEDGES KOCHERY'S NOTIFICATION ABOUT RUNNING COMPRESSORS WITH AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE). 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 10 " GEORGE [FREDERICKS] POINTED OUT THERE WAS A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE B DIESELS RIGHT AFTER THE MAINTENANCE WORKED ON IT." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 16 "IT WASN'T OPERABLE [B DIESEL) SO WE DON'T WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT WITH NO FAILURES AND NO PROBLEMS." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 21 " ... STARTED MORE THAN 20 TIMES i EACH...WHATEVER NUMBER...MAKE SUTE IT'S NOT A FALSE STATEMENT." [TO PRB RE:LER] , 75 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 47 17 SHOWED KITCHENS THE COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS AND POINTED OUT FAILURES. [TO KITCHENS).
/d 19900430 EDG SWARTZWELDER 53 12 A CONVERSATION WITH MOSBAUGH ABOUT " PROBLEMS" IN MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE EDG START LIST. [TO MOSBAUGH, KITCHENS].
76 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. LIST OF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. [MOYE, HORTON). 205 19900713 EDG KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. 205 19900713 EDG MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT HARGIS : RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE UNIT 1 EDG ALSO. [TO FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD]. '
STATEMENTS PERTAINING TO CASH 10 19900323 EDG 12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT: FREDERICKS, HOLMES, KOCHERY, COURSIE, CASH, AND BRINEY. 10 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD TIME, AND DURING THAT T53IRD RUN, IT TRIPPED AFTER A COUPLE OF HOURS." [ TALKING ABOUT 1B DIESEL TRIP ON 003-23-90 TO HOIJtES, KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINE (CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING)). 10 19900323 EDG COURSIE 14 13 "BUT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' TRIPPED." [ SPEAKING TO FREDERICKS,BRINEY, CASH, AND OTHERS ON s CRITIQUE TEAM). ; 10 19900323 EDG CASH 14 20 "THEY DIDN'T RESET ANYTHING ON THE IDCAL CONTROL PANEL. BOTH OF THE ALARMS CAME IN." [ CASH PERSONALLY FAMILIAR WITH 03-23-90 TRIP). 10 19900323 EDG CASH 15 1 COMMENT SHOWS CASH'S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. 10 10000323 EDG CASH 16 9 "I LEFT THE HIGH TEMPERATURE OUT, AND THE TRIP FOR TWO DIFFERENT PRESSORES (IN AUDIBLE) IT'S A ONE OUT OF ONE ON TRIP, CORRECT." [TO FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, RE: 03-23-90 IB DIESEL TRIP). 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 19 2 COURSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION PROBLEMS WITH CALCON SWITCHES. [WITH CASH, 1 FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, HOLMES, MOSBAUGH). 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNING AND THE DAMN THINGS JUST DECIDED TO STOP?" [CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, CASH, HOLMES, BRINEY). 10 19900323 EDG CASH 20 2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP SIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE OUT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 DEGREES." [TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HOLMES, COURSEY.] 10 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 21 15 QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR QUALITY, CLEANLINESS OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN MATERIAL. [TO: BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HOLMES, COURSEY, CASH.) 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE WORST TEMPERATURE SWITCHES YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNK." [TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, COURSEY, HOLMES.] 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T NNOW WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER LOOKED AT THE CALIBRATION ; PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, HOW IN THE HELL i
. 1 CAN WE PUT THIS ON ... A DIESEL?"[FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, COURSEY, HO MES.)
10 19900323 EDG KOCHERY 23 13 "THE CAICON SWITCHES HAVE A LOT OF PART 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW?" [TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, BRINEY, COURSEY, HOIJfES. ) 10 19900323 EDG CASH 23 13 " ...YOU GOT TWO ALARMS. ONE IS HIGH LUBE OIL OUT, HIGH LUBE OIL TEMP. OUT, IT'S 190 DEGREES." [TO BRINEY, KOCHERY, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH) 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE... IT'S RIDICUIDUS." [ REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOIJfES. ) 10 19900323 EDG HOLMES 28 19 SAID THE JACKET WATER TEMP. SENSORS (CALCON SWITCHES) HAD TO BE RECALIBRATED EVERY TIME. [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) [ REITERATES ON P.31, LN 12) 10 19900323 EDG HOIJ(ES 33 11 SAID NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE TO CORRECT CALCON CALIBRATION PROBLEM. "JUST BEEN LIVING 'WITH IT. " [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 41 11 " ...WHAT HE'S GOT TO CALIBRATE IS A PIECE OF GARBAGE [CALCON SWITCHES), AND HE KNOWS THEY'RE ALL GOING TO BLOW." ("HE" COULD BE BRINEY OR VENDOR REP, SHELDON) [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) t i 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 46 15 "TOO MANY PEOPLE IN THE BOAT..." [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECTION FROM CRITIQUE TEAM AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT. 57 19900419 EDG SWARTZWELDER 115 25 TALKED ABOUT HAIRSTON NEEDING TO TALK TO OPERATORS WHO RESET ANNUNCIATORS ON DIESEL IN SITE AREA EMERGENCY. IS CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFICALLY LETTING THESE OPERATORS KNOW THAT HAIRSTON WILL NOT YELL AT THEM. [TO CASH, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG CASH 35 19 STATED NOT SURE IF HE TOLD BUCKHOLD ABOUT FAILURES IN EDG COUNT FOR NRC PRESENTATION. SAID BOCKHOLD KNEW ABOUT FAILURES. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 19900419 EDG CASH 36 3 STATED HE STARTED EDG START COUNT ON 3/20, THE THREE MAINTENANCE STARTS ON NIGHT OF 3/20. [TO: MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 36 23 "WE DIDN'T COUNT THE FAILURE, THOUGH." [RE MOSBAUGH'S QUESTION TO CASH ABOUT START FAILURES SINCE 3/20) [AUFDENKAMPE IS REMINDING MOSBAUGH THAT THEY'RE STARTING THE COUNTS IN THE LER AS OF THE END OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TESTING). I 1
O 75 19900430 EDG CASH 56 10 INVOLVED WITH VERIFICATION OF MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS. [MOSBAUGH). 76 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. LIST OF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. [MOYE, HORTON). 76 19900430 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 9 2 " JIMMY PAUL CASH SAID HE HAD l RESEARCHED THE OPERATOR IDGS TO DETERMINE HOW MANY STARTS THERE l WERE WITHOUT PROBLEMS..." [MOSBAUGH). j 76 19900430 EDG BOCKHOLD 30 25 TALKED ABOUT MAKING NRC ) PRESENTATION FROM CASH'S INFO, WITH KEN BURR'S APPROVAL. SAID HE l DIDN'T GET TO THE EDG START SLIDE. SAID MAYBE CASH WAS " THINKING ' OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT" [MISCOMMUNICATION) FROM WHAT BOCKHOLD WANTED OUT OF SLIDE. [TO MOSBAUGH). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE l INDIVIDUAL [ CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." [TO j GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC]. 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO l NRC FRESENTATION) JIMMY [ CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 246 19900813 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.)
r STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO SHIPMAN 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELI4W 91 21 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE WAS OFF THE PHONE, HE WOULD RUN IN AND TELL SHIPMAN WHAT AUFDENKAMPE AND MOSBAUGH TOLD HIM. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 100 23 [TO MOSBAUGH) TRYING TO GET "ALL THE HAIRSTON QUESTIONS ANSWERED." WHAT OPERATORS DID BEFORE TRYING TO RESTART THE DIESEL. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 103 25 TOLD MOSBAUGH HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THE OPERATOR ACTION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE PROPOSED LER [IMMEDIATELY RESET ANNUNCIATORS), BUT THAT HAIRSTON HAD A PROBLEM WITH IT. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 8 "OTHER QUESTION WE'VE BEEN TRYING [ ,3 i.'TO GET AN ANSWER TO IS TO REASSURE GEORGE [HAIRSTON) THAT WE HAD igf.;g/MORETHAN20VALIDSTARTSSINCEMARCHTHE20TH,LIKEWESAYIN g THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH) MOSBAUGH TOLD SHIPMAN THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THAT'S STATED. t f( ,1 f',;'57 19900419
, EDG SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS T::" DATA THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE [HAIRSTON) WROTE AND 1 < '. ' _[BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE ...EBNETER LAST MONDAY IN t 4 .,
4]f d, t ATLANTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T ANY FAILURES IT JUST WASN'T TRUE. 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 105 5 " ... THE B MACHINE, ON 3-22 AT 12:43 THE MACHINE TRIPPED ON HIGH LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE." [TO SHIPMAN). I
' p!! ' .' 'D 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 105 18 "WE COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM
,,f'
# THAT'S CREATED BY THAT INFORMATION [THE 3-22 TRIP) BY SAYING NO i'
', VALID FAILURES." [TO MOSBAUGH).
57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 105 21 "I THINK WE GOT ANOTHER ONE [ FAILURE). IT IS ON 3-23 ATG 17:31. THE B MACHINE ... TRIPPED ON LOW JACKET WATER PRESSURE / LUBE OIL PRESSURE LOW." [TO SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 106 4 " ...THIS THING'S ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THE PRB A COUPLE OF TIMES. HOW IN THE WORLD DID IT GET , THROUGH THE PRB?" [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 107 20 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THIS WHOLE
.i jd[1,'fBESTRICKEN." STATEMENT
,f
[ DIESEL STARTS WITH NO FAILURES OR PROB [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). If b, 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 8 "CERTAINLY, IF IT'S NOT A VALID l t' 4 STATEMENT, WE WOULD NEED TO GET IT THE HECK OUT OF HERE REGARDLESS OF WHAT GEORGE TOLD EBNETER." [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 1
I 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND STRINGFELLOW l GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS COMMENTS. [TO i MOSBAUGH]. 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START !
... DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. ;
Y : .'* {&UFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN).
> / ,- Q d 7'ja pf..
6 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" ; t i,7, ,TNUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION)
- , (AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, SHIPMAN].
t- . p F / 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE l' i l'; USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, I, , - MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, MCCOY).
/
58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 10 8 STATED HIS AWARENESS OF HAIRSTON I PERSONALLY INTERVIEWING EQUIP. OPERATORS THAT RE-STARTED EDG AT SITE AREA EMERGENCY. I 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 11 2 SUSPECTED HAIRSTON OF " LEADING" ; 7 THE EDG EQUIP. OPERATOR INTO SAYING WHAT HAIRSTON WANTED HIM TO
.' i i I
yt \ ', t , - SAY.
*/ 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T !
. d 9' HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" [ SHIPMAN, STRINGFELI4W,
', MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY).
58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." [ MEANING NO i c/t" TRIPS ) [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, l f MCCOY). g e .1 .7 [af // 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW. "d PROBA%Y MEANING gM 7 f FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS] [HAIRSTON, Q[7 g t /'
' [STRINGFELI.OW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH).
r -
. erf,/g
, l
//' f 58' 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 20 20 " ...AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE
' d//I' INCLUDED BECAUSE THAY WERE PART OF THE RETURNING TO SERVICE OF t f.i i DIESEL..." [RE: 3/22 AND 3/23 TRIPS] [MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
', / 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 23 7 "THE PROBLEM WITH THAT IS THAT
/
THAT NUMBER [EDG STARTS] IS GOING TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN WHAT GEORGE TOLD MR. EBNETER, AND, YOU KNOW, IT'S GOING TO CREATE A SELLING JOB FOR ME, I THINK, BUT EVENTUALLY THAT'S THE ONLY WAY WE CAN TELL A VALID STORY.. 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 23 8 " ...[ CONT. OF PG. 23, LINE 7) THAT YOU KNOW, WE CAN DEFEND. IF SOMEBODY CALLS ALLEN MOSBAUGH, BILL SHIPMAN, AND JOHN AUFDENKAMPE AGAIN TO TESTIFY, THAT'S THE STORY I WANT TO TELL." [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE RE COUNTING STARTS AFTER DIESEL DEC. OPERABLE) 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER
THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE) 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER)
" . . .THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT IGN, PAT, AND i,t>),{l' 7
,.l*
GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR
' TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." [SWARTZWELDER, P', ,( MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
r-ir i',p
\ 4- 95 1990.0E M EDG SHIPMAN 20 4 "So YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN
/ [TO RUSHTON,
' [WAS THAMEMOSBAUGH, BOCKHCLD, HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE SWITCH. . . "
RE CALCON SWITCHES). j 187 19900629 EDG WEBB 6 9 "HAIRSTON CHANGED AT LEAST 3 OF THEM [LER REVS)...AT LEAST 3, BUT SHIPMAN CHANGED ONE OF THEM, I KNOW." [TO MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) , [ INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). l IM 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 20 "THE 11TH [7/11/90) INCIDENT'S WHEN IT [EDG) FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WE FINALLY GOT INTO." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF EDG FAILURES TO NRC). ; 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 40 8 "IT'S IMPORTANT FOR ME TO KNOW l THAT WE IDENTIFIED..." [THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 7/5 AND 7/11 l EDG FAILURES, AS OPPOSED TO THE NRC ID'ING IT). j i 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 42 16 "DOES THE RECOGNITION.. 0F THE JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE] START A [ REPORTING) CI4CK AT A DIFFERENT TIME?" [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG GREENE 42 22 " ...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS i A [EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTHER l INCIDENT WAS REPORTED AS A 10 CFR 21 ITEM." [TO SHIPMAN, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD) JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" [EDG FAILURE) [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH]. 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATIr" NUMBER 1 FOR SURE." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.) 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU [ BAILEY) ON THE PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...S0 WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND
OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I BELIEVE IT [THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER] HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE AND ME." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] l 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER] IN ' GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, ' FREDERICKS). ___m__-______-_-.---__ _ _ _ _ - _ _
I e{ - STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO STRINGFELIDW 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELIDW 88 12 RELAYED HAIRSTON'S QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT EVALUATIONS THE EQUIP. OPERATOR MADE BEFORE HE TRIED TO RESTART THE DIESEL AFTER IT TRIPPED IN THE SITE AREA EMERGENCY. JGA SAID HE JUST WENT IN AND STARTED PUSHING BUTTONS. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 91 4 "WE THINX THAT'S BASICALLY A MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT." [TO STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, REFERRING TO 20 STARTS WITHOUT FAILURES OR PROBLEMS SINCE MAR 20). 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 91 7 " ...WE KNOW FOR A FACT THAT THE B DIESEL TRIPPED AT LEAST ONCE AFTER MARCH 20TH." [TO STRINGFELIDW) . 37 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 91 8 "ACTUALLY, IT [B DIESEL) TRIPPED TWICE AFTER MARCH 20TH, OR IT HAD AT LEAST TWO SEPARATE PROBLEMS. "[TO STRINGFELIDW) . 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELLOW 91 21 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE WAS OFF THE PHONE, HE WOULD RUN IN AND TELL SHIPMAN WHAT AUFDENKAMPE
?.PD MOSBAUGH TOLD HIM. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH).
57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELIDW 94 11 RECOGNIZED THEY "WERE DOWN TO " THE "20 TIMES EACH" QUESTION IN THE WORDING OF THE LER. [To AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELLOW 96 8 "IT JUST DAWNED ON ME WHAT AL WAS SAYING A MINUTE AGO. IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE SAY NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN ANY STARTS, YOU'RE SAYING THAT'S NOT TRUE." "OH, WONDERFUL, O.K." [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 96 15 "BECAUSE, YOU KNOW, WE...THIS HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO THE NRC ONCE ALREADY." [STRINGFELLOW RESPONDS BY BY SAYING THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS THINKING). 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 105 21 "I THINK WE GOT ANOTHER ONE [ FAILURE]. IT IS ON 3-23 ATG 17:31. THE B MACHINE ... TRIPPED ON LOW JACKET WATER PRESSURE / LUBE OIL PRESSURE IDW. " [TO SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW) . 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 106 4 " ...THIS THING'S ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THE PRB A COUPLE OF TIMES. HOW IN THE WORLD DID IT GET THROUGH THE PRB7" [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELI4W) . 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 107 20 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THIS WHOLE STATEMENT [ DIESEL STARTS WITH NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) NEEDS TO BE STRICKEN." [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 8 "CERTAINLY, IF IT'S NOT A VALID STATEMENT, WE WOULD NEED TO GET IT THE HECK OUT OF HERE REGARDLESS OF WHAT GEORGE TOLD EBNETER." [TO MOSBAUGH,
, )
STRINGFELIDW) . 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND STRINGFELIDW GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS COMMENTS. [TO MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DTESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" (NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) (AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 181-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" (SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." (MEANING NO 1xuS J [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." (PROBABLY MEANING FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) (HAIRSTON, STRINGFELIDW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 222 19900727 EDG MOSBAUGH 39 3 "APPARENTLY, STRINGFELIDW THOUGHT IT [ TAPED EDG) WAS A 4 HOUR." (REPORT REQUIREMENT) (TO MOSBAUGH). 267 19900829 EDG STRINGFELLOW 47 6 " ...I'M TICKLED TO DEATH
- THAT...Y'ALL ARE TAKING THIS THING [ CORRECTION OF EDG START DATA)
SERIOUSLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T COMFORTABLE WITH IT AT ALL." [TO ODOM, FREDERICKS, A.M.]
s p STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO MCCOY (Tape Date EDG Speaker Page Line Comment) 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" [ NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRING 7ELLOW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG BOCKHOLD 9 6 TOLD MCCOY THAT EDG START COUNT NUMBERG IN 4/9 PRESENTATION BEGAN AFTER COMP. TEST PROGRAM. [EITHER DOESN'T KNOW OR IS B.S. ING MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, HOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" [ SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW, MCCOAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." [ MEANING NO TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." [PROBABLY MEANING FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, STRINGFELLOW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE) 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER]
. . .THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." [SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE PLANT DOES THINGS. AND FROM WHAT...MCCOY SAID THE NRC SAID, I DON'T DISAGREE [WITH NRC)." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM GREENE). 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE HE'D TELL MCCOY HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU KNOW, MY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED HERE." [TO GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH).
i I
, I I
159 19900611 EDG SHEBANI 36 17 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) APPARENTLY f MAD A DISCUSSION WITH MCCOY, AND GEORGE DID DIRECT TO TOM [WEBB) l WHAT HE WANTS PUT IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH RE REV TO LER). ; 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 54 24- "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW l THAT'S A KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN BLESSED BY ) GEORGE [HAIRSTON), SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD ) WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." ! 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE [HAIRSTON) AND KEN MCOY DESIGNED SEN~'ENCE. . . " [TO GREENE RE e STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). I 1 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR l SURE." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP l MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.] j 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I PREPARED THAT.'[THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU [ BAILEY) ON THE PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED i BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, ---- 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 9 (CONT'D) ---SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I BELIEVE IT [THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE AND ME." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER) IN GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS). 258 19900817 EDG MCCOY 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19) WAS BASED ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9] PRESENTATION...THE CORRECTION TO THE LER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME OR NUMBER..." [TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.] 258 19900817 EDG FREDERICKS 27 17 " ...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP, . . .THE REASON WAS IDW JACKET WATER PRESSURE." [TO MCCOY,BOCKHOLD,J.G.A.,A.M.) 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 11 " ...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE [EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYLOR BELIEVES, BUT...[HE] BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONAIMISTAKE..." [TO MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) [ EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYI4R BELIEVES VS. ACTUAL SITUATION.)
.-o .
l STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO HAIRSTON 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 46 9 TALKED ABOUT FSAR REQUIREMENTS i pAND SOMETIMES NOT BEING ABLE TO MEET THEM. CONCERNED ABOUT ff HAIRSTON LETTER [COAR RESPONSE 4/9). STATEMENTS ABOUT AIR QUALITY STILL BEING " VALID." [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH). i M +f pO'57.19900419
/
31 EDG STRINGFELIDW 88 12 RELAYED HAIRSTON'S QUESTIONS g f / ABOUT WHAT EVALUATIONS THE EQUIP. OPERATOR MADE BEFORE HE TRIED , g (- TO RESTART THE DIESEL AFTER IT TRIPPED IN THE SITE AREA i
;} 4 EMERGENCY. JGA SAID HE JUST WENT IN AND STARTED PUSHING BUTTONS. I
[TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 97 4 ASKED AUFDENKAMPE IF HE HAD i HAIRSTON'S COAR LETTER, "BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONE..." - AUFDENKAMPE [ INTERRUPTED SAYING "WHERE THEY LIED...I MEAN THEY..." MOSBAUGH ; FINISHED THE THOUGHT BY SAYING, " ...MADE THAT STATEMENT [NO ! FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) PREVIOUSLY." l 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 100 23 [TO MOSBAUGH) TRYING TO GET "ALL THE HAIRSTON QUESTIONS ANSWERED." WHAT OPERATORS DID BEFORE TRYING TO RESTART THE DIESEL.
- f
'37 13300419 EDG SHIPMAN 103 25 TOLD MOSBAUGH HE HAD NO PROBLEM !
, WITH THE WAY THE OPERATOR ACTION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE PROPOSED I LER [IMMEDIATELY RESET ANNUNCIATORS), BUT THAT HAIRSTON HAD A ! PROBLEM WITH IT.
- 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 8 "OTHER QUESTION WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO GET AN ANSWER TO IS TO REASSURE GEORGE [HAIRSTON) THAT WE HAD l MORE THAN 20 VALID STARTS SINCE MARCH THE 20TH, LIKE WE SAY IN i THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH) MOSBAUGH TOLD SHIPMAN THERE'S A PROBLEM j WITH THE WAY THAT'S STATED.
1 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS ' THE DATA THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE [HAIRSTON) WROTE AND [BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE ...EBNETER LAST MONDAY IN ATLANTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T ANY FAILURES IT JUST WASN'T TRUE. ! 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND STRINGFELIDW } GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS COMMENTS. [TO ! j MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 EDG SWARTZWELDER 115 25 TALKED ABOUT HAIRSTON ! j NEEDING TO TALK TO OPERATORS WHO RESET ANNUNCIATORS ON DIESEL IN t p SITE AREA EMERGENCY. IS CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFICALLY LETTING i %g Ai ['I THESE-OPERATORS KNOW THAT HAIRSTON WILL NOT YELL AT THEM. [TO CASH, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 2 4 PUT WORDS IN EQUIPMENT OPERATOR'S y' 7 M MOUTH ABOUT CHECKING GAGES ON DIESEL BEFORE PUSHING RE-START ! BUTTON. [DELOACH, MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER). t l
l I 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 5 16 DISCUSSED WORDING OF LER. [MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER, DEI 4ACH). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 10 8 STATED HIS AWARENESS OF HAIRSTON PERSONALLY INTERVIEWING EQUIP. OPERATORS THAT RE-STARTED EDG AT SITE AREA EMERGENCY. J g 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 11 2 SUSPECTED HAIRSTON OF " LEADING" THE EDG EQUIP. OPERATOR INTO SAYING WHAT HAIRSTON WANTED HIM TO 4 SAY. 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" [ SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, j MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." [ MEANING NO l TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, i MCCOY). h 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." [PROBABLY MEANING FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, STRINGFELLOW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 5" 10000419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER] f " ...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND l GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON] WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." [SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 159 19900611 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 5 17 "HAIRSTON WON'T SIGNOUT THE LER." [WEBB, MOSBAUGH] [RE REV 1, LER THAT WAS PRB APPROVED AND SENT TO BIRMINGHAM IN MID-MAY). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 3 "HAIRSTON SAYS HE'S GOING TO WRITE HIS OWN [LER REV). MY GUY HASN'T FINISHED YET." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON RE HIS QA " GUY" NOT DONE WITH AUDIT OF EDG STARTS). 4 9[184 1 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME
,p p EXPLANATION DOWN BEI4W." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, ' #[ MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON).
Pkt 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND (' YES FOR UNPLANNED TRIPS." [RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASS 1FIED
] AS SUCCFSSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTO GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE).
[TO HORTON, 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE p LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S] CALL TO THE NRC, g WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN f ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.) I
. - . i l
l p 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE f s STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A ; 6 4 PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON AND EXPIAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." [TO
.f HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR l
i HAIRSTON). j p 186'19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "OKAY, THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH) WENT AND ! 3 COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS l 5 HAIRSTON, I'D SAY ' WHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE LER REV). J (O i 187 19900629 EDG WEBB 6 9 "HAIRSTON CHANGED AT LEAST 3 OF THEM l [LER REVS)...AT LEAST 3, BUT SHIPMAN CHANGED ONE OF THEM, I l KNOW." [TO MOSBAUGH). l 187 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE - HIMSELF." [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW THAT'S A KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEW BLESSED BY GEORGE [HAIRSTON), SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." l 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE l [HAIRSTON) AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE..." [TO GREENE RE l STATFMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON) PERSONALLY ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." [THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES) [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 62 4 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT HAIRSTON CONSCIOUSLY THINKING THAT THE NRC MIGHT INTERPRET THE
" CORRECTION" COVER LETTER AS NOT ADDRESSING THE 4/9 COAR.
i 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I ; PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU [ BAILEY) ON THE l PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM j BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED l BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND l OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] I l
i 4 I STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO BOCKHOLD l 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 4 DISCUSSES NRC GIVING OK TO GO TO MODE 3. [TO LACKEY, MOSBAUGH) 41 19900411 EDG LACKEY 8 22 TALKS ABOUT GOING TO MODE 3 24 HOURS AFTER MODE 4. [TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGHJ 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 40 4 TALKS ABOUT NOT IOSING ANY TIME GETTING BACK TO MODE 1, PER PROJECTION. [TO PARTON, HORTON, MOSBAUGH). 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 43 5 COMMENTS ABOUT NOT DOING GOOD PM'S ON CHECKING AIR DRYER QUALITY FROM 5/88 TO 5/89. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH]. WOULD THAT FACT AFFECT "THE STATEMENT WE MADE IN OUR LETTER?" 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 7 TALKS ABOUT PM PROGRAM BEING
" SUSPECT" IN '89. SAID WE DON'T KNOW IF WE HAD GOOD AIR OR BAD I AIR. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH).
41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 46 9 TALKED ABOUT FSAR REQUIREMENTS I AND SOMETIMES NOT BEING ABLE TO MEET THEM. CONCERNED ABOUT iiAIA5 ION LETTER [COAR RESPONSE 4/9] . STATEMENTS ABOUT AIR QUALITY STILL BEING " VALID." [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH). 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 50 16 "...ON THE 29TH [ MAR 90] OR So, WE GOT A CRUMMY READING AND NOBODY KNEW ABOUT IT UNTIL HILT HUNT PICKED IT UP." [TO BURMEISTER, MOSBAUGH, STOKES). 41 19900411 EDG MOSBAUGH 50 21 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD), WE HAD A BAD READING [ DEWPOINT / AIR QUALITY) TODAY [4/11/90] 60 DEGREES ON THE 2A DIESEL." 41 19900411 EDG HORTON 51 4 " HAVEN'T WE GOT ANY GOOD READINGS?" [RE: EDG DEWPOINT / TO BOCKHOLD]. 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 51 6 "NOT ON 2A, 2B." [ RESPONDING TO HORTON WHO ASKED IF THERE HAD_BEEN ANY GOOD DEWPOINT READINGS).
'41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 51 11 "ACTUALLY, I HEARD ABOUT IT JUST s
/[g,BEFORETHEMEETINGWITHTHENRC." [TO HORTON, KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH,
,/ t},i f BURMEISTER RE: BAD DEWPOINT READING). /,
<I a ;. l.
41 19900411 EDG KOCHERY 52 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT "THEY" STILL
,< ,I ' RUN THr DIESEL COMPRESSOR EVEN WITH THE AIR DRYERS OUT OF l' 5 'd. SERVICE.
3-
,4 {/1 i' 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 52 6 "I'LL WRITE A NOTE TO SKIP AL i
KITCHENS ON THIS THING." [ ACKNOWLEDGES KOCHERY'S NOTIFICATION ABOUT RUNNING COMPRESSORS WITH AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE). 42 19900411 EDG MOSBAUGH 2 16 TO BURWINKLE ADOUT BOCKHOLD CONCLUDING NO AIR QUALITY PROBLEM BECAUSE OF NO CORROSION IN TANK l
- l l
AND NOTHING ON THE FILTER. NOT A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION. [ t 4 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS ;
^
THE DATA THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE [HAIRSTON) WROTE AND ' [BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE ...EBNETER LAST MONDAY IN ATLANTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T l
~ ANY FAILURES IT JUST WASN'T TRUE. '
58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START
\ DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM.
k< i (AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS"
) (NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) ,
(AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). ! 58 19900419 EDG BOCKHOLD 9 6 TOLD MCCOY THAT EDG START COUNT N , 4 [ UMBERS IN 4/9 EITHER DOESN'T PRESENTATION KNOW BEGAN AFTER COMP. TEST PRO OR IS B.S. ING MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCRHOLD, - MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE) 58 19900419 EDG CASH 35 19 STATED NOT SURE IF HE TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT FAILURES IN EDG COUNT FOR NRC PRESENTATION. SAID BOCKHOLD KNEW ABOUT FAILURES. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 75 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 35 2 "I COMPLETED MY REVIEW. I FINALLY SORTED OUT ALL THE STARTS, I THINK." (TO TYNAN) (MOSBAUGH GIVING THIS DATA TO BOCKHOLD). 76 19900430 EDG BOCKHOLD 30 18 "THEN WE HAVE TO OBVIOUSLY REVISE THE LER." (TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH POINTED OUT START PROBLEMS ON HIS COMP. LIST). 76 19900430 EDG BOCKHOLD 30 25 TALKED ABOUT MAKING NRC PRESENTATION FROM CASH'S INFO, WITH KEN BURR'S APPROVAL. SAID HE DIDN'T GET TO THE EDG START SLIDE. SAID MAYBE CASH WAS " THINKING OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT" (MICCOMMUNICATION) FROM WHAT BOCKHOLD WANTED OUT OF SLIDE. (TO MOSBAUGH). 95 19900504 EDG SHIPMAN 20 4 "So YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN WAS THAT WE HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE SWITCH..." (TO RUSHTON, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, RE CALCON SWITCHES). 95 19900504 EDG MOSBAUGH 43 19 "WELL, BASED ON THE WYLIE TESTING AND THE DEBRIS FOUND IN THE SWITCH, THEY [NRC) STARTED
o USING THE WORD OPERABILITY." [TO BOCKHOLD ABOUT NRC [BROCKMAN, CHAFEE) AWARENESS OF DEBRIS IN CAIrON SWITCH). 95 19900504 EDG BOCKHOLD 46 7 TALKED ABOUT LETTER TO NRC RE S.A.E. AND SAID SOME MINOR ITEMS ARE "NOT THE NRC'S BUSINESS." [TO MOSBAUGH AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS). 95 19900504 EDG BOCKHOLD 55 21 "NOW I HEARD JOHN GIVE ME SOME SONG AND DANCE THAT WE'D LIKE TO KE2P'WILL BE REVISED BY' SO WE DON'T MAKE MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENTS AND CHANGE THE WORDS AFTER THE FACT." [MOSBAUGH & VEGP MGRS ABOUT DRAFTING 5/14/90 LTR TO NRC RE COR. ACTIONS ON S.A.E.J. 101 19900508 EDG BOCKHOLD 1 15 "IS THERE SOMETHING BESIDES I'M SCREWING UP AND STARTING THE WRONG DIESEL...?" [TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH NOTIFIED HIM AVOUT THE MISTAKEN START OF THE A DIESEL). 101 19900508 EDG BOCKHOLD 2 24 "I WOULD DO NOTHING WITH IT EXCEPT FOR YOUR HAVING THE PEOPLE I40K AT THE LER CORRECTION." [TO MOSBAUGH RE MISTAKEN START OF A DIESEL). 159 19900611 EDG SHEBANI 36 17 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) APPARENTLY nAU A DISCUSSION WITH McCOY, AND GEORGE DID DIRECT TO TOM [WEBB) WHAT HE WANTS PUT IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH RE REV TO LER). 160 19900612 EDG WEBB 5 18 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) DID. HE SAID HE WANTED NEW -- NEW INFO." [BOCKHOLD INSTRUCTED WEBB TO USE THE VALID START TERMINOLOGY IN THE LER REV) [TO MOSBAUGH). 167 19900615 EDG MOSELY 71 4 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT BAILEY CALLED, I40 KING FOR BOCKHOLD, AND HAD ASKED HIM [MOSLEY) ABOUT VALID FAILURES. 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 7 23 "WE CAUSED THAT TRIP. IT WOULDN'T I HAVE TRIPPED ON BLACK TUESDAY. I'LL LET GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) CALL l THAT ONE." ! 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 15 22 "IT WAS AN UNPLANNED TRIP. I ! WOULD LIKE TO CALL IT AN UNPLANNED TRIP, HOWEVER, DECLARE IT A SUCCESS." [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD).
. 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME
. EXPLANATION DOWN BELOW." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPLANNED TRIPS." [RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) [TO HORTON,
- GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE).
- 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 26 19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST MAINTENANCE STARTS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WITH THE NRC." [TO
BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, GREENE). 184 19900830 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID TEST FAILURES. THAT'S THE ONLY KIND WE HAVE TO REPORT. DOES IT AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAILURE TO REPORT 7" (TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON).
- 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S] CALL TO THE NRC, WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.)
I 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE ' STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." (TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR i HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE PAPER. . .IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S IDST. (TO HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPLANATORY PHRASE IN COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, IF IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE, , WHY FLAO IT IN THE PORTION OF THE LETTER?" (TO GREENE, HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH USING THE WORDS " APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE ERRORS IN THE 4/9 LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE THE RESULT OF." (TO BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, 1 AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' (TO BE THE RESULT OF)." (RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER & 4/19 LER) (TO q GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF
' ERRORS' IN THE APRIL 9TH..." (BOCKHOLD TOTALLY OBFUSCATES THE LETTER THAT IS TO CORRECT THE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER] (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
1 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE INDIVIDUAL (CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." (TO l GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION] JIMMY (CASH] WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA
l i i f TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 4 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 21 " ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS ; LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." [RE LETTER ) j 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, l
- MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). -
j ! ] 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE j OUT WITHOUT YOU [PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30 i j LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, i
~
COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
- l i 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL
- SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." [TO BOCKHOLD, j HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). j
- 204 19900713 EDG 7/11 OSOS 2 23 TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT 2A EDG STILL BEING INOP. PROBLEIR IS CLEARANCES ON AIR START PIIDT
{ ' VALVES AND OIL IN AIR START PILOT VALVE LINES. { 204 19900713 EDG HORTON 16 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT THEY CLEANED
- T ::: AIR START SOLENOID VALVES AND USED EMERY CIDTH TO " WIDEN THE j CLEARANCES" SO THAT THE VALVES WOULDN'T STICK. [MOSBAUGH,
- FREDERICKS).
i ! 205 19900713 EDG KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS,
- HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR 1 SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE.
205 19900713 EDG MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT HARGIS J RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE UNIT 1 EDG ALSO. [TO i FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD). 246 19900813 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION l TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKE, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR , SURE." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.) i 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I
- PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU [ BAILEY) ON THE i PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE 3AY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED l BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FRECERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.)
253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I i BELIEVE IT [THE' ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST ! PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER] HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE AND ME." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP l 1
\
t
- l l
l I MANAGERS.] ! 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE i ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER) IN GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." (TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS). l 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 15 2 DESCRIBES HIS RECOLLECTION OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS RE EDG PRESENTATION TO NRC ON 4/9, AND HOW
- 4/9 COAR RESPONSE WAS CREATED. [ FULL DISCUSSION ABOUT 4/19 LER CONFERENCE CALL INCLUDED THROUGH PAGE 19).
258 19900817 EDG WILLIAMS 8 15 "AND THEN LAST NIGHT [8/16/90] j THE 1B DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO-STARTED FOR NO APPARENT REASON." (TO i BOCKHOLD, A.M., AT MORNING STATUS MEETING ON LAST DAY OF NRC ] SPECIAL INSPECTION.] 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 24 17 " ... ALLEN CAME TO ME AND SAID,
' HEY, THE INFORMATION [4/9 EDG START INFO]IS WRONG' AND I TOLD s ALLEN TO GET THE STAFF TO FIX IT." (TO FREDERICKS, WHO QUESTIONED 1
IF ANYONE HAD ANY CONTENTION ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF THE 4/9
- DATA.)
l l 258 19900817 EDG MCCOY 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19) WAS BASED ; ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9) PRESENTATION...THE ! ! CORRECTION TO THE LER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME l l OR NUMBER..." (TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.] l 258 19900817 EDG FREDERICKS 27 17 "...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE l MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP,...THE REASON WAS LOW JACKET 4 i WATER PRESSURE." [TO MCCOY,BOCKHOLD,J.G.A.,A.M.) 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 11 " ...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE ! (EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYIDR BELIEVES, BUT...[HE) BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONALMISTAKE..." (TO MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) (EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYIOR BELIEVES l VS. ACTUAL SITUATION.) 260 19900817 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 8 3 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD HAVING SIGNED OFF ON THE COVER LETTER TO REV 1 OF THE LER [6/29] IN MID MAY. [TO MOSBAUGH, CHESTNUT] (CHESTNUT IS TAKING J.G.A.'S PLACE AS TECHNICAL MANAGER.) 266 19900829 EDG BOCKHOLD 21 4 " ... SUCCESSFUL START MEANT (TO BOCKHOLD) THE ENGINE STARTED AND RAN SUFFICIENT TIME THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE MARCH 20TH EVENT. AND...AFTER RUNNING A SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ENGINE COULD HAVE SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF A PROBLEM..." (TO A.M., GREENE,HORTON) 269 19900830 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 1 25 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD
" GUIDING" THE PRB ABOUT THE WORDING AND CONTENT OF THE LETTER THAT SUPPOSEDLY CORRECTED THE " INCORRECT" EDG START DATA GIVEN TO NRC IN APRIL. [TO MOSBAUGH.]
e
- t MOSBAUGH TAPE EXCERPTS IN RE: ALLEGED CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD THE NRC REGARDING VOGTLE DIESEL GENERATOR TESTING APRIL - AUGUST 1990 3
l 4 l t
. :.(,/
CONTENTS complete list of tape excerpts 1 Statements pertinent to Ajluni 24 I Statements pertinent to Aufdenkampe 25 I l Statements pertinent to Bailey 31 Statements pertinent to Bockhold 32 Statements pertinent to Briney 39 ' Statements pertinent to Burr 41 Statements pertinent to Cash 42 Statements pertinent to coursey 45 Statements pertinent to Fredericks 47 l Statements pertinent to Greene 52 ] Statements pertinent to Hairston 56 Statements pertinent to Horton 59 i Statements pertinent to Kitchens 63 i Statements pertinent to Majors 64 Statements pertinent to Mansfield 66 Statements pertinent to McCoy 68 Statements pertinent to Mcdonald 71 Statements pertinent to odom 72 Statements pertinent to Parton 74 Statements pertinent to Rushton 75 l Statements pertinent to Shipman 76 Statements pertinent to Stringfellow 80 Statements pertinent to Swartzwelder 82 Statements pertinent to Tynan 83 Statements pertinent to Webb 84
)
l l _ _ - - _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _l
l l I l 1 COMPLETE LIST OF EDG STATEMENTS 9 19900323 FREDERICKS 4 17 COMMENTED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE DIESEL WAS AN AIRPLANE, GEORGE WOULD NOT GO UP IN IT. 10 19900323 WEBB 11 5 "BUT IT TRIPPED." (DISCUSSING EDG WITH KOCHERY & MOSBAUGH). 10 19900323 12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION. OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT: FREDERICKS, HOLMES, KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINEY. 10 19900323 FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD TIME, AND DURING THAT THIRD RUN, IT TRIPPED AFTER A COUPLE OF HOURS." [ TALKING ABOUT 1B DIESEL TRIP ON 003-23-90 TO HOLMES, KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINEY (CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING)). 10 19900323 COURSEY 14 13 "BUT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' TRIPPED." [ SPEAKING TO FREDERICKS, BRINEY, CASH, AND OTHERS ON CRITIQUE TEAM). 10 19900323 CASH 14 20 "THEY DIDN'T RESET ANYTHING ON THE LOCAL , CONTROL PANEL. BOTH OF THE ALARMS CAME IN." (CASH PERSONALLY i FAMILIAR WITH 03-23-90 TRIP). 10 19900323 CASH 15 1 COMMENT SHOWS CASH'S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. 10 19900323 CASH 16 9 "I LEFT THE HIGH TEMPERATURE OUT, AND THE TRIP FOR TWO DIFFERENT PRESSURES (IN AUDIBLE) IT'S A ONE OUT OF ONE ON TRIP, CORRECT." [TO FREDERICKS, KOCHERY, BRINEY, RE: 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP). 10 19900323 COURSEY 19 2 COURSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION , PROBLEMS WITH CALCON SWITCHES. [WITH CASH, FREDERICKS, KOCHERY, .! BRINEY, HOLMES, MOSBAUGH). 10 19900323 COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNING AND THE DAMN THINGS i JUST DECIDED TO STOP?" (CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, CASH, HOLMES, BRINEY). 10 19900323 CASH 20 2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP SIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE i OUT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 DEGREES." (TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, HOLMES, l 'COURSEY.) i i
l e 2 i 10 19900323 FREDERICKS 21 15 QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR QUALITY, CLEANLINESS OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN MATERIAL. [TO. l BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, HOLMES, COURSEY, CASH.) l 2 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE WORST TEMPERATURE SWITCHES.YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNK." [TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOLMES.] 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER LOOKED AT THE CALIBRATION PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, HOW IN THE HELL l CAN WE PUT THIS ON ... A DIESEL 7"[FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH,
- KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOLMES.)
; 10 19900323 KOCHERY 23 13 "THE CALCON SWITCHES HAVE A LOT OF
- PART 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW?" [TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, 3
BRINEY, COURSEY, HOLMES.]
- 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY I SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE... IT'S I
RIDICULOUS." (REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO i FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOLMES.) 10 19900323 CASH 24 13 " ...YOU GOT TWO ALARMS. ONE IS HIGli LUBE OIL OUT, HIGH LUBE OIL TEMP. OUT, IT'S 190 DEGRiES." (TO BRINEY, KOCHERY, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH) i 10 19900323 HOLMES 28 19 SAID THE JACKET WATER TEMP. SENSORS i (CALCON SWITCHES) HAD TO BE RECALIBRATED EVERY TIME. (TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) (REITERATES ON P.31, LN 12) 10 19900323 HOLMES 33 11 SAID NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE TO CORRECT CALCON CALIBRATION PROBLEM. "JUST BEEN LIVING WITH IT." (TO } CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) 1_ 10 19900323 COURSEY 41 11 " ...WHAT HE'S GOT TO CALIBRATE IS A PIECE OF GARBAGE (CALCON SWITCHES), AND HE KNOWS THEY'RE ALL GOING TO BLOW." ("HE" COULD BE BRINEY OR VENDOR REP, SHELDON) [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) j 10 19900323 BRINEY 46 15 "TOO MANY PEOPLE IN THE BOAT..." (TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECTION FROM CRITIQUE TEAM AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT. 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 8 4 DISCUSSES NRC GIVING OK TO GO TO MODE
- 3. [TO LACKEY, MOSBAUGH) 41 19900411 LACKEY 8 22 TALKS ABOUT GOING TO MODE 3 24 HOURS
, AFTER MODE 4. [TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH) 1
- - - - _ . - -- - - . . - . . . -- . .-- - - -- . - ~ . - - - - . - . - - .
l I i 3 41 19900411 BURWINKLE 21 13 TALKS ABOUT IACK OF SET PROCEDURE I FOR MEASURING DEWPOINT (AIR QUALITY) (TO STEELE, MOSBAUGH). l l 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 40 4 TALKS ABOUT NOT IDSING ANY TIME i GETTING BACK TO MODE 1, PER PROJECTION. [TO PARTON, HORTON, ; MOSBAUGH). 3 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 43 5 COMMENTS ABOUT NOT DOING GOOD PM'S ON CHECKING AIR DRYER QUALITY FROM 5/88 TO 5/89. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH). WOULD THAT FACT AFFECT "THE STATEMENT WE MADE IN OUR LETTFR?" 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 44 7 TALKS ABOUT PM PROGRAM BEING
" SUSPECT" IN '89. SAID WE DON'T KNOW IF WE HAD GOOD AIR OR BAD AIR. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH).
41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 46 9 TALKED ABOUT FSAR REQUIREMENTS AND SOMETIMES NOT BEING ABLE TO MEET THEM. CONCERNED ABOUT HAIRSTON LETTER (COAR RESPONSE 4/9]. STATEMENTS ABOUT AIR QUALITY STILL BEING " VALID." (TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH). 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 50 16 " ...ON THE 29TH (MAR 90] OR SO, WE GOT A CRUMMY READING AND NOBODY KNEW ABOUT IT UNTIL MILT HUNT PICKED IT UP." (TO BURMEISTER, MOSBAUGH, STOKES). 41 19900411 MOSBAUGH 50 21 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD), WE HAD A BAD READING [ DEWPOINT / AIR QUALITY) TODAY (4/11/90) 60 DEGREES ON THE 2A DIESEL." 41 19900411 HORTON 51 4 " HAVEN'T WE GOT ANY GOOD READINGS?" [RE: EDG DEWPOINT / TO BOCKHOLD). 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 51 6 "NOT ON 2A, 2B." (RESPONDING TO HORTON-WHO ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY GOOD DEWPOINT READINGS). 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 51 11 "ACTUALLY I HEARD ABOUT IT JUST , BEFORE THE MEETING WITH THE NRC." (TO HORTON, KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH, BURMEISTER RE: BAD DEWPOINT READING). 41 19900411 KOCHERY 52 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT "THEY" STILL RUN THE DIESEL COMPRESSOR EVEN WITH THE AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE. 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 52 6 "I'LL WRITE A NOTE TO SKIP KITCHENS ON THIS THING." (ACKNOWLEDGES KOCHERY'S NOTIFICATION ABOUT RUNNING COMPRESSORS WITH AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE). 41 19900411 MOSBAUGH 54 1 SUMMARIZED HIS AIR QUALITY CONCERNS.
, . . - - ,w r-,, e .- , , . .
4 41 19900411 BEACHER 74 11 COMMENTED TO MOSBAUGH AND AUFDENKAMPE ABOUT TELECOPYING AN APPARENTLY INCOMPLETE DEWPOINT MEASUREMENT HISTORY FOR PAST YEAR TO CHAFFEE (NRC), BROCKMAN (NRC), IDUIS WARD, & KEN BURR. 42 19900411 MOSBAUGH 2 16 TO BURWINKLE ABOUT BOCKHOLD CONCLUDING'NO AIR QUALITY PROBLEM BECAUSE OF NO CORROSION IN TANK AND NOTHING ON THE FILTER. NOT A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION. 1 42 19900411 BURWINKLE 5 7 " YUP, WHEN YOU GET WATER IN THE PNEUMATIC RELAY, THEY Do GO TO SHIT." " ...THERE WERE A COUPLE l THAT SHOT WATER AND WE REPLACED AND REPLACED..." "...THEM ! REGULATORS GOT THAT SMALL ORIFICE." [TO MOSBAUGH]. l 42 19900411 AUFDENKAMPE 13 1 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT IT'S NOT GPC'S OBLIGATION TO TELL NRC THAT "WE" (GPC/VEGP) FEEL WE HAVE AIR PROBLEMS OR THAT WE FOUND AN AIR PROBLEM. 42 19900411 KOCHERY 28 7 TOLD MOSBAUGH THE A DIESEL HAD NO
/ PROBLEMS, BUT B DIESEL TRIPPED TWICE SINCE 3/20/90 - A HIGH LUBE OIL TRIP ON 3/22/90.
57 19900419 KITCHENS 63 10 " GEORGE [FREDERICKS] POINTED OUT THERE WAS A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE B DIESELS RIGHT AFTER THE MAINTENANCE WORKED ON IT." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 57 19900419 KITCHENS 63 16 "IT WASN'T OPERABLE [B DIESEL] SO WE DON'T WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT WITH NO FAILURES AND NO PROBLEMS." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 57 19900419 KITCHENS 63 21 " ... STARTED MORE THAN 20 TIMES EACH...WHATEVER NUMBER...MAKE SUTE IT'S NOT A FALSE STATEMENT." [TO PRB RE:LER) 57 19900419 STRINGFELI4W 88 12 RELAYED HAIRSTON'S QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT EVALUATIONS THE EQUIP. OPERATOR MADE BEFORE HE TRIED ; TO RESTART THE DIESEL AFTER IT TRIPPED IN THE SITE AREA EMERGENCY. JGA SAID HE JUST WENT IN AND STARTED PUSHING BUTTONS. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). i l i
i 5 4 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 91 4 "WE THINK THAT'S BASICALLY A MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT." [TO STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, REFERRING TO 20 STARTS WITHOUT FAILURES OR PROBLEMS SINCE MAR 20) . 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 91 7 " ...WE KNOW FOR A FACT THAT THE B DIESEL TRIPPED AT LEAST ONCE AFTER MARCH 20TH." [TO STRINGFELI4W) . 57 19900419 MOSBAUGH 91 8 "ACTUALLY, IT [B DIESEL) TRIPPED TWICE AFTER MARCH 20TH, OR IT HAD AT LEAST TWO SEPARATE PROBLEMS. "[TO STRINGFELI4W] . 57 19900419 STRINGFELLOW 91 21 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE WAS OFF THE PHONE, HE WOULD RUN IN AND TELL SHIPMAN WHAT AUFDENKAMPE AND
'MOSBAUGH TOLD HIM. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH).
57 19900419 STRINGFELLOW 94 11 RECOGNIZED THEY "WERE DOWN TO " THE "20 TIMES EACH" QUESTION IN THE WORDING OF THE LER. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH] 57 19900419 STRINGFELLOW 96 8 "IT JUST DAWNED ON ME WHAT AL WAS SAYING A MINUTE AGO. IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE SAY NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN ANY STARTS, YOU'RE SAYING THAT'S NOT TRUE."
"OH, WONDERFUL, O.F." [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 96 15 "BECAUSE, YOU KNOW, WE...THIS HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO THE NRC ONCE ALREADY." [STRINGFELLOW RESPONDS BY BY SAYINC THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS THINKING) .
57 19900419 MOSBAUGH 97 4 ASKED AUFDENKAMPE IF HE HAD HAIRSTON'S COAR LETTER, "BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONE..." - AUFDENKAMPE INTERRUPTED SAYING "WHERE THEY LIED...I MEAN THEY..." MOSBAUGH FINISHED THE THOUGHT BY SAYING, " ...MADE THAT STATEMENT [NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) PREVIOUSLY." 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 100 23 [TO MOSBAUGH) TRYING TO GET "ALL THE HAIRSTON QUESTIONS ANSWERED." WHAT OPERATORS DID BEFORE TRYING TO RESTART THE DIESEL. 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 103 25 TOLD MOSBAUGH HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THE OPERATOR ACTION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE PROPOSED LER [IMMEDIATELY RESET ANNUNCIATORS), BUT THAT HAIRSTON HAD A PROBLEM WITH IT. 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 104 8 "OTHER QUESTION WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO GET AN ANSWER TO IS TO REASSURE GEORGE [HAIRSTON) THAT WE HAD MORE THAN 20 VALID STARTS SINCE MARCH THE 20TH, LIKE WE SAY IN THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH) MOSBAUGH TOLD SHIPMAN THERE'S A PROBLEM i WITH THE WAY THAT'S STATED. I 1 l l
l 6 i I 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS THE l DATA THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE [HAIRSTON) WROTE AND ! (BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE ...EBNETER LAST MONDAY IN l ATLANTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T l ANY FAILURES IT JUST WASN'T TRUE. 57 19900419 MOSBAUGH 105 5 " ... THE B MACHINE, ON 3-22 AT 12:43 THE MACHINE TRIPPED ON HIGH LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE." (TO SHIPMAN). i 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 105 18 "WE COL *LD SOLVE THE PROBLEM THAT'S CREATED BY THAT INFORMATION [THE 3-22 TRIP) BY SAYING NO VALID FAILURES." (TO MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 MOSBAUGH 105 21 "I THINK WE GOT ANOTHER ONE ' (FAILURE). IT IS ON 3-23 ATG 17:31. THE B MACHINE ... TRIPPED ON LOW JACKET WATER PRESSURE / LUBE OIL PRESSURE LOW. " (TO SHIPMAN, i STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 106 4 " ...THIS THING'S ALREADY BEEN THROUGH j THE PRB A COUPLI OF TIMES. HOW IN THE WORLD DID IT GET THROUGH THE PRB?" (To MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 107 20 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THIS WHOLE STATEMENT [ DIESEL STARTS WITH NO FAILURES OR PROBLIMS) NEEDS TO BE STRICKEN." [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 108 8 "CERTAINLY, IF IT'S NOT A VALID STATEMENT, WE WOULD NEED TO GET IT THE HECK OUT OF HERE REGARDLESS OF WHAT GEORGE TOLD EBNETER." (TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND STRINGFELLOW GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS COMMENTS. [TO MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 SWARTZWELDER 115 25 TALKED ABOUT HAIRSTON NEEDING TO TALK TO OPERATORS WHO RESET ANNUNCIATORS ON DIESEL IN SITE AREA EMERGENCY. IS CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFICALLY LETTING THESE OPERATORS KNOW THAT HAIRSTON WILL NOT YELL AT THEM. [TO CASH, MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 118 25 "WHAT BIRMINGHAM IS THINKING NOW IS THEY MADE A MATERIAL FALSE MtATEMENT IN THE APRIL 9TH LETTER. [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM). I 4
i 7 1 l 57 19900419 WEBB 123 19 "WE NEED TO GET RID OF THE STATEMENT IN ' THE LER ABOUT HOW MANY FAILURES OR HOW MANY TESTS YOU'VE GOT ALTOGETHER, OR ELSE CORRECT THE MISCONCEPTION THAT WE GENERATED ON 4-9. I DON'T KNOW IF WE SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE THE MISCONCEPTION..."(AM,ODOM, AUFDEN) 58 19900419 HAIRSTON 2 4 PUT WORDS IN EQUIPMENT OPERATOR'S ! MOUTH ABOUT CHECKING GAGES ON DIESEL BEFORE PUSHING RE-START BUTTON. (DELOACH, MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER). 58 19900419 HAIRSTON 5 16 DISCUSSED WORDING OF LER. [MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER, DELOACH).
)
58 19900419 MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL i START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" (NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) (AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 BOCKHOLD 9 6 TOLD MCCOY THAT EDG START COUNT NUMBERS IN 4/9 PRESENTATION BEGAN AFTER COMP. TEST PROGRAM. [EITHER DOESN'T KNOW OR IS B.S. ING MCCOY). 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, MCCOY). 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 10 8 STATED HIS AWARENESS OF HAIRSTON PERSONALLY INTERVIEWING EQUIP. OPERATORS THAT RE-STARTED EDG AT SITE AREA EMERGENCY. 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 11 2 SUSPECTED HAIRSTON OF " LEADING" THE EDG EQUIP. OPERATOR INTO SAYING WHAT HAIRSTON WANTED HIM TO SAY. 58 19900419 HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRI""?" (SHIPMAN, STRI"'; FELLOW, i MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." [ MEANING NO TRIPS) (HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." (PROBABLY MEANING FOR
)
t 8 MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, l STRINGFELIDW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH]- i 58 19900419 BURWINKLE 19 19 "HAVE YOU GUYS FIGURED OUT HOW COME THE DIESEL STARTS WHEN IT AIN'T SUPPOSED TO?" 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 20 20 " ...AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED BECAUSE THAY WERE PART OF THE RETURNING TO SERVICE OF THE DIESEL..." (RE: 3/22 AND 3/23 TRIPS) [MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 23 7 "THE PROBLEM WITH THAT IS THAT THAT NUMBER (EDG STARTS) IS GOING TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN WHAT GEORGE TOLD MR. EBNETER, AND, YOU KNOW, IT'S GOING TO CREATE A SELLING JOB FOR ME, I THINK, BUT EVENTUALLY THAT'S THE ONLY WAY WE CAN TELL A VALID STORY.. 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 23 8 " ...[ CONT. OF PG. 23, LINE 7) THAT YOU KNOW, WE CAN DEFEND. IF SOMEBODY CALLS ALLEN MOSBAUGH, BILL SHIPMAN, AND ?OHN AUFDENKAMPE AGAIN TO TESTIFY, THAT'S THE STORY I WANT TO TELL." [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE RE COUNTING STARTS AFTER DIESEL DEC. OPERABLE] 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER i THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE) 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SIT,E HELP ON 4/19 LER]
...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE (MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." (SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
58 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 34 12 STATED THAT IT REALLY DOESN'T MATTER WHAT START COUNT IS PUT IN THE LER, BECAUSE IF NRC DISAGREES, GPC WILL JUST ISSUE A REVISION [TO MOSBAUGH). 58 199v0419 CASH 35 19 STATED NOT SURE IF HE TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT FAILURES IN EDG COUNT FOR NRC PRESENTATION. SAID BOCKHOLD KNEW ABOUT FAILURES. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 19900419 CASH 36 3 STATED HE STARTED EDG START COUNT ON 3/20, THE THREE MAINTENANCE STARTS ON NIGHT OF 3/20. [TO: MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
1 l l 9 l 1 58 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 36 23 "WE DIDN'T COUNT THE FAILURE, ) THOUGH." (RE MOSBAUGH'S QUESTION TO CASH ABOUT START FAILURES l SINCE 3/20) [AUFDENKAMPE IS REMINDING MOSBAUGH THAT THEY'RE j STARTING THE COUNTS IN THE LER AS OF THE END OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TESTING). , i
***** )
J 75 19900430 AUFDENKAMPE 31 10 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THE MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH) ; [MOSBAUGH HAS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG START DATA).
***** )
75 19900430 MOSBAUGH 35 2 "I COMPLETED MY REVIEW. I FINALLY i SORTED OUT ALL THE STARTS, I THINK." (TO TYNAN) [MOSBAUGH GIVING , THIS DATA TO BOCKHOLD). ] 75 19900430 TYNAN 35 21 " THIRTEEN, FIFTEEN, AND SEVENTEEN ARE : RIGHT SMACK IN THE MIDDLE." (TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG PROBLEMS IN l THE SERIES OF STARTS). ) i 75 19900430 BEACHER 43 9 STATED THAT CHAFEE WANTS A LIST OF A SEQUENCE OF EDG STARTS FROM THE POINTS BOTH EDG'S WERE DECLARED OPERABLE [TO MOSBAUGH). 75 19900430 MOSBAUGH 47 17 SHOWED KITCHENS THE COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS AND POINTED OUT FAILURES. [TO KITCHENS).
?????
75 19900430 SWARTZWELDER 53 12 A CONVERSATION WITH MOSBAUGH ABOUT "PROBLIMS" IN MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE EDG START LIST. [TO MOSBAUGH, KITCHENS).
?????
75 19900430 CASH 56 10 INVOLVED WITH VERIFICATION OF MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS. (MOSBAUGH). 76 19900430 MOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. LIST OF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. (MOYE, HORTON]. i l l
l l 10 76 19900430 AUFDENKAMPE 9 2 " JIMMY PAUL CASH SAID HE HAD ' RESEARCHED THE OPERATOR LOGS TO DETERMINE HOW MAliY STARTS THERE WERE WITHOUT PROBLEMS..." (MOSBAUGH). 76 19900430 BOCKHOLD 30 18 "THEN WE HAVE TO OBVIOUSLY REVISE ' j THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH POINTED OUT START PROBLEMS i ON HIS COMP. LIST). 76 19900430 BOCKHOLD 30 25 TALKED ABOUT MAKING NRC PRESENTATION
; FROM CASH'S INFO, WITH KEN BURR'S APPROVAL. SAID HE DIDN'T GET TO THE EDG START SLIDE. SAID MAYBE CASH WAS " THINKING OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT" (MISCOMMUNICATION) FROM WHAT BOCKHOLD WANTED OUT OF SLIDE. (TO MOSBAUGH).
83 PARTON 7 5 "WHAT SHOULD THE LER SAY?" [TO MOSBAUGH RE REV 1 TO THE LER).
***** i d
95 19900504 SHIPMAN 20 4 "SO YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN WAS THAT WE HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE SWITCH..." [TO RUSHTON, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, RE CALCON SWITCHES). i 95 19900504 CHAFEE 28 22 TALKS ABOUT FOREIGN MATERIAL PROBLEMS l IN SWITCHES. VEGP PEOPLE STILL NOT SURE OF CAUSE OF SWITCH l PROBLEMS. (MOSBAUGH, LOUIS WARD, AUFDENKAMPE, BROCKMAN AND OTHER UNIDENT. VEGP PEOPLE). l l f 2 95 19900504 MOSBAUGH 43 19 "WELL, BASED ON THE WYLIE TESTING : AND THE DEBRIS FOUND IN THE SWITCH, THEY (NRC) STARTED USING THE WORD OPERABILITY." (TO BOCKHOLD 3 BOUT NRC (BROCKMAN, CHAFEE) l ! AWARENESS OF DEBRIS IN CALCON SW1TCH). ! 95 19900504 BOCKHOLD 46 7 TALKED A3OUT LETTER TO NRC RE S.A.E. l AND SAID SOME MINOR ITEMS ARE "NOT THE NRC'S BUSINESS." (T,0
~"
MOSBAUGH AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS).
"NOW I HEARD JOHN GIVE ME SOME SONG 95 19900504 BOCKHOLD 55 21 AND DANCE THAT WE'D LIKE TO KEEP'WILL BE REVISED BY' SO WE DON'T
= MAKE MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENTS AND CHANGE THE WORDS AFTER THE FACT." (MOSBAUGH & VEGP MGRS ABOUT DRAFTING 5/14/90 LTR TO NRC RE COR. ACTIONS ON S.A.E.).
11
***** i
.98 19900508 SWARTZWELDER 60 5 TALKED ABOUT REV 1 TO 4/19/90 LER j IN PRB. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS). ;
***** t 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 44 2 "AND WE CONTINUED TO FIGHT WITH THE NRC THROUGH THE ITT." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON). l 1
99 19900508 MANSFIELD 44 19 " ...THE ATTITUDE IS WE'RE NOT GOING f TO GET OUR LICENSE IF WE DON'T DO WHAT THEY [NRC) WANT. NOW WE'VE GOT CUR LICENSE AND WE'RE FIGHTING." [TO MOSBAUGH). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 7 "THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT YOU DON'T OPERATE IT SAFELY AND YOU INJURE PEOPLE." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 13 " ...WE GO TO EXTREMES WITH TECH ' SPEC INTERPRETATIONS TO KEEP THIS PLANT RUNNING AND WE'VE DONE IT FOR YEARS." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 24 "WE [GPC/VEGP) HAVE AN ATTITUDE THAT BRINGING THIS PLANT DOWN IS THE WORST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN. AND IT'S NOT THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE PLANT DOES THINGS. AND FROM WHAT...MCCOY SAID THE NRC SAID, I DON'T DISAGREE [WITH NRC)." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM GREENE). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE HE'D TELL MCCOY HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU KNOW, MY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED HERE." [TO GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 53 4 " ...YOUR DEPARTMENT [ OPS) IS PART OF THIS CLIQUE. [ MEANING THE CLIQUE HE IS AFRAID TO TELL ABOUT VEGP'S ATTITUDE ABOUT KEEPING THE PLANT RUNNING.) [TO GREENE). 101 19900508 BOCKHOLD 1 15 "IS THERE SOMETHING BESIDES I'M SCREWING UP AND STARTING THE WRONG DIESEL...?" [TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH NOTIFIED HIM AVOUT THE MISTAKEN STt,RT OF THE A DIESEL). 101 19900508 BOCKHOLD 2 24 "I WOULD DO NOTHING WITH IT EXCEPT FOR YOUR HAVING THE PEOPLE LOOH AT THE LER CORRECTION " [TO MOSBAUGH RE MISTAKEN START OF A DIESEL). l i
f i 12 . 155 19900608 AUFDENKAMPE 43 8 EXPLAINED TO BAILEY LANGUAGE & BASES FOR CHANGE IN EDG STARTS IN LER REV 1. TOLD BAILEY BIRMINGHAM HAD THE APPROVED LER REV FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. TOLD . BAILEY HE WANTS TO CORRECT THE COAR IN THE COVER LTR. TO LER REV. (BAILEY ON PHONE, MOSBAUGH). . r 158 19900611 MOSBAUGH 8 23 SAID NRC ITT TEAM AWARE OF DIESEL PROBLEM HISTORY AT VEGP. CITED 100 PLUS WORK ORDERS ON SWITCHES. [HORTON). ! i 159 19900611 AUFDENKAMPE 5 17 "HAIRSTON WON'T SIGNOUT THE LER." l (WEBB, MOSBAUGH) (RE REV 1, LER THAT WAS PRB APPROVED AND SENT TO BIRMINGHAM IN MID-MAY). , 159 19900611 AUFDENKAMPE 6 6 "THEY'RE GOING TO HAVE QA AUDITS." : [ BIRMINGHAM GOING TO HAVE VEGP SITE QA DO AN AUDIT ON THE DIESEL START COUNTS) [TO MOSBAUGH, WEBB]. 159 19900611 FREDERICKS 7 11 "SHOULDN'T TAKE MORE THAN A COUPLE l OF DAYS. I WAS GIVEN THE GUIDELINES THAT IT HAD TO BE DONE BEFORE THE LER WOULD BE SIGNED." (TO MOSBAUGH]. i 159 19900611 AUFDENKAMPE 11 3 TALKED ABOUT HOW THE CORPORATE PEOPLE IN BIRMINGHAM WERE GOING TO TELL NRC THAT THE INACCURATE LOGS CAUSED EDG COUNT PROBLELM. [TO MOSBAUGH). 159 19900611 SHEBANI 36 17 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD] APPARENTLY HAD A DISCUSSION WITH MCCOY, AND GEORGE DID DIRECT TO TOM (WEBB) WHAT HE WANTS PUT IN THERE." (TO MOSBAUGH RE REV TO LER]. 159 19900611 MOSBAUGH 38 9 TALKED ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO USE
" VALID" IN LER REV TO REFER TO EDG TESTS. [TO ODOM).
160 19900612 WEBB 5 18 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) DID. HE SAID HE WANTED NEW -- NEW INFO." (BOCKHOLD INSTRUCTED WEBB TO USE THE VALID START TERMINOLOGY IN THE LER REV) (TO MOSBAUGH]. 160 19900612 MOSBAUGH 8 13 "THERE'S A IDT WRONG WITH IT [LER l I i
. .- - . - , - ._ _.- . . _ . , -_ - _ __ _ . . _ . _ . . - I
13 7- REV), AND I WOULD JUST BE REAL CAUTIOUS IF I WERE YOU." (TO AUFDENKAMPE). 160 19900612 AUFDENKAMPE 9 11 "I THINK WE OUGHT TO JUST GO TELL THE RESIDENTS WE LIED IN THE FIRST LER... AND THE LETTER." (TO MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 AUFDENKAMPE 10 4 "NOBODY IS GOING TO WRITE A LETTER AND SAY WE LIED TO YOU THE FIRST TIME, NRC." [TO MOSBAUGH, JUSTIFYING HIS IDEA TO GO TELL THE RESIDENTS). 160 19900612 HORTON 23 14 "I ASSUME FROM CORPORATE MEETING. THEY'RE CPJllGING THE RESPONSE...THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS]. 160 19900612 FREDERICKS 24 3 "HAIRSTON SAYS HE'S GOING TO WRITE HIS OWN [LER REV). MY GUY HASN'T FINISHED YET." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON RE HIS QA " GUY" NOT DONE WITH AUDIT OF EDG STARTS). 160 19900612 FREDERICKS 24 10 "I'M SUPPOSED TO NOT ONLY COME UP WITH A NUMBER; I'M SUPPOSED TO COME UP WITH WHY THE DISCREPANCY EXISTS." (TO MOSBAUGH RE EDG START COUNT). 160 19900612 FREDERICKS 24 25 "HOW COULD THEY [ CORPORATE] HAVE REVVED THE NUMBERS? THEY DON'T HAVE THE NUMBERS." (TO MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 FREDERICKS 25 4 "SOMEBODY CHANGED IT TO SAY
' VALID' STARTS." [TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REV).
?????
160 19900612 HORTON 30 1 "WELL, THE CONSISTENCY IS DOWN THE TUBE BECAUSE THE FIRST LER THAT WENT OUT IS INCORRECT." (TO AJLUNI, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 AJLUNI 33 6 TALKED TO HORTON AND FREDERICKS ABOUT THE CHANGES IN EDG START INFO FROM COAR TO LER TO REV1 OF LER. 167 19900615 AUFDENKAMPE 23 21 "I BRIEFED THE RESIDENTS, AND THEY TALKED TO BROCKt'AN, AND THEY SAID THAT WAS FINE." (TO MOSBAUGH RE TELLING NRC OF INCORRECT STATEMENT IN LER). 167 19900615 AUFDENKAMPE 23 23 "I TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD AN INCORRECT STATEMENT IN THE LER." (TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT TELLING NRC RESIDENTS).
, i i
i ! 14 l 167 19900615 MOSELY 67 14 "I'VE TABUIATED THE DATA, , BUT... HAVEN'T.s.DONE ANY COUNTING IN TERMS OF VALID FAILURES,
; VALID STARTS..." [TO MOSBAUGH) [MOSELY IS QA WHO OBTAINED EDG l 4
START DATA FOR FREDERICKS IN AUDIT FOR REV TO LER). l l < 1 1
! 167 19900615 MOSELY 71 4 TOLD MOSBAUG9 THAT BAILEY CALLED, LOOKING FOR BOCKHOLD, AND HAD ASKED HIM [MOSLEY) ABOUT VALID FAILURES.
I 168 19900618 ODOM 51 13 TALKED TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT STALLING ON A ! WAIVER, AND ABOUT A TOTAL RE-WRITE OF THE LER REVISION. 184 19900830 HORTON 7 2 "WELL, THERE'S TWO QUESTIONABLE THINGS [WEGOTTARESOLVE, WHETHER WE'RE GOING TO DECLARE THEM [ STARTS) SUCCESSFUL OR NOT. ONE ON EACH [ DIESEL) RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STRING [OF STARTS) . " [TO MOSBAUGH). I t/ 184 19900830 HORTON 7 23 "WE CAUSED THAT TRIP. IT WOULDN'T ! HAVE TRIPPED ON BLACK T'CSDAY. I'LL LET GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) CALL i THAT ONE." 5
- ,/ 184 19900S30 HORTON 8 2 "THE B TRAIN IS THE ONE THAT YOU
- IDENTIFIED. WHERE IT DIDN'T TRIP, IT SHOULD HAVE." [TO MOSBAUGH j j ABOUT A DIFFERENT KIND OF EDG PROBLEM).
1 v 184 19900830 PARTON 9 7 "DID WE COME UP WITH AS MANY
- [ SUCCESSFUL STARTS) AS WE THOLD THEM [WRC)?" [TO MOSBAUGH, j HORTON).
j 184 19900830 HORTON 9 8 "NO, WE UNDERSTAND THAT." [To PARTON, I j MOSBAUGH, IN RESPONSE TO PARTON'S QUESTION RE COMING UP WITH AS
- MANY SUCCESSFUL STARTS AS GPC TOLD NRC) .
l l i
. 184 19900830 HORTON 15 22 "IT WAS AN UNPIANNED TRIP. I WOULD LIKE TO CALL IT AN UNPIANNED TRIP, HOWEVER, DECLARE IT A
' SUCCESS." (TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD). j l
i v 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, j UNPIANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME EXPIANATION DOWN i BELOW." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON).
/ 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPLANNED TRIPS." [RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS l
l ~)- i
I 15 SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). HORTON 26.19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST
/ 184 19900830STARTS.
MAINTENANCE THIS IS AN ISSUE WITH THE NRC." (TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, GREENE). 184 19900830 AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID TEST ) FAILURES. THAT'S THE ONLY KIND WE HAVE TO REPORT. DOES IT AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAILURE TO REPORT 7" (TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, M7SBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE,.HORTON). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S) CALL TO THE NRC, WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.) 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE l PAPER...IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S IDST. [TO 4 HORTON,-AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPLANATORY I PHRASE IN COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, IF IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE, WHY I FLAG IT IN THE PORTION OF THE LETTER?" (TO GREENE, HORTON, ! AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). } x' 184 19900830 HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH USING THE i WORDS "APIEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE ERRORS i IN THE 4/9 LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE 1 THE RESULT OF." (To BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l ) 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' (TO BE THE , ! RESULT OF)." [RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER & 4/19 LER) (TO l l GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). l 4 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF
- ' ERRORS' IN THE APRIL 9TH..." (BOCKHOLD TOTALLY sdFUSCATES THE l j
LETTER THAT IS TO CORRECT THE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER) [TO j GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
- 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE INDIVIDUAL [ CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." [TO
- GREENE, HORTON, Mc BAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF
- FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). l I
t 16 l a , 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC V PRESENTATION) JIMMY [ CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l 184 19900830 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, i'REDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l 184.19900830 BOCKHOLD 44 21 " ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." [RE LETTER 8/30 ! CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
\ 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE OUT l WITHOUT YOU [PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30 i \ LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, i COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
184 19900830 GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT WE l USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL ' SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." [TO BOCKHOLD, f l/7 HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 186 19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "O aY, THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH) WENT AND COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS HAIRSTON, I'D SAY ' WHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE LER REV]. l 186 19900629 FREDERICKS 39 21 "AND APPARENTLY JUST WHEN HARRY MAJORS AND THE STAFF UP THERE IN CORPORATE, THE WORD ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST' GOT PUT IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER). 186 19900629 FREDERICKS 40 25 " ...AND WHEN IT [COAR) SAYS 'NO PROBLEMS OR FAILURES DURING ANY OF THESE STARTS' THAT BURNS YOU UP." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER). 186 19900629 FREDERICKS 42 22 " ...WHAT THEN THEY'RE [ CORPORATE) GOING TO DO IS SAY A MORE ACCURATE MEASURE OF THE RELIABILITY WAS THE VALID..." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV). 186 19900629 FREDERICKS 45 4 " ...I THINK THAT'S [THE
'SUBSEWENT TO EVENT' TERMINOLOGY) WHAT HARRY'S [ MAJORS) GOING TO USE...I MAY HAVE TO PUT SOME WORDS IN THE AUDIT REPORT BASED ON THAT." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV).
186 19900629 ODOM 47 21 "I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT [' SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT' TERMINOIDGY) CAMEFROM . I JUST CALLED HARRY [ MAJORS)
n _ ._ - 17 AND TOLD HARRY, 'STOP THE PRESS. IT'S NOT RIGHT.'" [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN). 186 19900629 TYNAN 47 24 "WHY CAN'T WE GET THROUGH WHAT WE [PRB) KEEP APPROVING AND SENDING OFF SITE?" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE DRAFTS OF LER REV'S). i 186 19900629 ODOM 48 13 "YOU WRITE THE NRC AND TELL THEM THE FALSE STATEMENT IN THE REVI.cION...YOU DON'T TRY A MINOR TYPORGRAPHIC ERROR. YOU TELL WHY YOU KNOW." [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN RE LER REV). 187 19900629 WEBB 3 15 " ...IT GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL THE TESTS AFTER THAT MAY HAVE BEEN SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES TOO, AND THEY WEREN'T. ...THERE WERE INVALID TESTS IN THERE ALSO." [TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REVS). 187 19900629 WEBB 6 9 "HAIRSTON CHANGED AT LEAST 3 OF THEM [LER REVS]...AT LEAST 3, BUT SHIPMAN CHANGED ONE OF THEM, I KNOW." [TO MOSBAUGH).
?????
187 19900629 MOSBAUGH 14 16 "I'M JUST SAYING THAT THE REV PROPOSED ON 5/8 IS NO DIFFERENT THAN THIS [6/29). NOW WHY WASN'T THAT SUBMITTED?" [TO WEBB, TYNAN).
****w / 187 19900629 FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE HIMSELF." [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV). / 187 19900629 HORTON 20 12 "WELL, WHAT WAS WRONG WITH OUR DIESEL START RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES?" [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, RE WHETHER PRACTICES WERE CAUSE OF FALSE DATA GIVEN TO NRC 4/9).
187 19900629 FREDERICKS 26 23 "THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S LOG IS
/ NOT AN ACCURATE RECORD OF WHAT HAPPENED." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON). / 187 19900629 MOSBAUGH 42 9 PUTS GREENE Oli NOTICE THAT ATTRIBUTING THE ERROR IN EDG STARTS TO POOR RECORD PRACTICES /END OF TEST PROGRAM IS NOT TRUE.
. . . - .-. . .. . .-. . . .. - _ _ - _ ~ . . -
1 1 l
; 18 c 187 19900629 MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, [ RESPONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCLAIMER AT A LATER POINT." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBBj.
187 19900629 GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER [REV) TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOING TO LET THE COVER LETTER TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM?" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). p- 187 19900629 MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW THAT'S A i KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN BLESSED BY GEORGE [HAIRSTON), SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." v 187 19900629 MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE [HAIRSTON] AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE..." [TO GREENE RE STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). g 187 19900629 GREENE 56 8 GREENE SUGGESTED TO MAJORS TO USE THE l WORD " DIFFERENCE" V. " DISCREPANCY" IN LER REV COVER LETTER i BECAUSE " DISCREPANCY" MEANT ADMITTING A MISTAKE. MAJORS LIKED THE IDEA. i y 187 19900629 MAJORS 58 20 AGREED WITH MOSBAUGH THAT THIS NEW LER JUST CHANGED "TO APPLES AND ORANGES." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH,
- - FREDERICKS).
187 19900629 MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON) PERSONALLY ZEROED l IN ON THOSE WORDS." [THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES) [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS).
/ 187 19900629 MAJORS 62 4 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT HAIRSTON CONSCIOUSLY THINKING THAT THE NRC MIGHT INTERPRET THE " CORRECTION" COVER
- LETTER AS NOT ADDRESSING THE 4/9 COAR.
,/
/ 187 19900629 MOSBAUGH 63 15 PUT MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 LETTER IS FALSE. GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS MAJORS FROM HAVING j TO RESPOND. [TO MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS).
i
, 187 19900629 GREENE 66 15 TRIED TO TALK MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG AIR RECEIVER VALVES STICKING.
q 199 19900711 KOCHERY 8 1 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG AIR RECEIVER VALVES STICKING. 4
19 199 19900711 MOYE 11 1 TALKED TO MOSBAUGH, MANSFIELD, BURWINKLE, ABOUT THE 4TH TIME THE SAME PROBLEM HAS HAPPENED TO THE 2A EDG. 199 19900711 MANSFIELD 11 6 TO MOSBAUGH, BURWINKLE, MOYE ABOUT CHAFFEE TELLING THEM THEY COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE 3/20 EVENT BY BEING MORE PERSISTENT IN RESOLVING REPEAT PROBLEMS WITH THE DIESELS. 199 19900711 MANSFIELD 14 3 TOLD MOSBAUGH, MOYE ABOUT AN INSUFFICIENT " AIR ROLL" BEING A DIESEL PROBLEM. 199 19900711 HORTON 27 15 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT 2A EDG BEING IN A 72 HOUR LCO DUE TO AN INSUFFICIENT AIR ROLL. IT WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE. 200 19900711 MOSBAUGH 8 1 TO MANSFIELD, KOCHERY, STOKES ABOUT EDG AIR ROLL PROBLEMS. 204 19900713 7/11 OSOS 2 23 TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT 2A EDG STILL j BEING INOP. PROBLELM IS CLEARANCES ON AIR START PILOT VALVES AND OIL IN AIR START PILOT VALVE LINES. 204 19900713 HORTON 16 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT THEY CLEANED THE AIR START SOLENOID VALVES AND USED EMERY CLOT 3 TO " WIDEN THE CLEARANCES" SO THAT THE VALVES WOULDN'T STICK. [MOSBAUGH, 1 FREDERICKS). 205 19900713 KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. 205 19900713 MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT HARGIS RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE UNIT 1 EDG ALSO. [TO FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD). 216 19900724 MANSFIELD 4 14 "CID YOU HEAR WE HAD A DIESEL FAIL TO START?" [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
20 217 19900724 HORTON 25 11 "BUT WE GOT ANYWHERE BETWEEN A QUART AND TWO GALIDNS. . . [OF JACKET WATER OUT OF THE COMBUSTION AIR DRAIN VALVES) [TO MOSBAUGH). 220 19900726 MOSBAUGH 9 21 "THERE WAS A FAILURE TO START THAT WAS UNDOCUMENTED ON UNIT 1. THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR ON UNIT 2..." [TO AUFDENKAMPE). 220 19900726 AUFDENKAMPE 10 15 "IT WAS IN THE -- IN THE DIESEL, THE TAPE ON THE DIESEL...THEY PUSHED THE BUTTON, AND IT DIDN'T START." [TO MOSBAUGH RE PAINTED-OVER TAPE ON DIESEL). 222 19900727 MANSFIELD 37 4 " ...THE CONTAINMENT COOLING FUNCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN DEGRADED. I MEAN, THAT'S A LIE...IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NON-EXISTANT." [TO MOSBAUGH RE LER ON EDG TAPING). 222 19900727 MANSFIELD 38 6 " ...A BLATANT LIE." [ FINISHED MOSBAUGri'S STATEMENT ABOUT TAPED DIESEL LER. 222 19900727 MANSFIELD 38 17 "SO AL, LOSS OF A SAFETY FUNCTION FROM A SINGLE EVENT IS A 4 HOUR REPORT. HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH THAT WHEN YOU FIND OUT ABOUT I'I HONTHS LATER?" [TO MOSBAUGH RE EDG TAPING). 222 19900727 MOSBAUGH 39 3 "APPARENTLY, STRINGFELLOW THOUGHT IT [ TAPED EDG) WAS A 4 HOUR." [ REPORT REQUIREMENT) [TO MOSBAUGH). 222 19900727 HINES 39 17 " DIESEL GENERATOR 1A CONTROL AIR LEAK AND THERE IS NOT AN LCO WRITTEN AGAINST IT." [TO MOSBAUGH, MANSFIELD]. 234 19900803 SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) [ INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). 234 19900803 SHIPMAN 38 20 "THE 11TH [V/11/90) INCIDENT'S WHEN IT [EDG) FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WE FINALLY GOT INTO." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF EDG FAILURES TO NRC). 234 19900803 SHIPMAN 40 8 "IT'S IMPORTANT FOR ME TO KNOW THAT WE IDENTIFIED..." [THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 7/5 AND 7/11 EDG FAILURES , AS OPPOSED TO THE NRC ID'ING IT).
l l 21 234 19900803 SHIPMAN 42 16 "DOES THE RECOGNITION.. 0F THE JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE] START A [ REPORTING) CLOCK AT A DIFFERENT TIME?" [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). . I 234 19900803 GREENE 42 22 ...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS A [EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTHER ! INCIDENT WAS REPORTED AS A 10 CFR 21 ITEM." [TO SHIPMAN, l RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). I i 234 19900803 SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD) JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" [EDG FAILURE) [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 246 19900813 BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] l l I i k 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR SURE." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.) 253 19900815 MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU [ BAILEY) ON THE , PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY LON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM l BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED i BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND ! OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) { i h 253 19900815 BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I l BELIEVE IT [THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST ! PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER] HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE AND ME." [TO McCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 253 19900815 MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER) IN GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS). 253 19900815 BOCKHOLD 15 2 DESCRIBES HIS RECOLLECTION OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS RE EDG PRESENTATION TO NRC ON 4/9, AND HOW 4/9 COAR RESPONSE WAS CREATED. [ FULL DISCUSSION ABOUT 4/19 LER
1 22 CONFERENCE CALL INCLUDED THROUGH PAGE 19) . 258 19900817 WILLIAMS 8 15 "AND THEN LAST NIGHT [8/16/90) THE IB DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO-STARTED FOR NO APPARENT REASON." [TO BOCKHOLD, A.M., AT MORNING STATUS MEETING ON LAST DAY OF NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION.] HORTON 20 24 " 258 19900817 ...THERE MAY BE A RELATIONSHIP [TO THE 1B DIESEL AUTO-STARTING) TO ANOTHER SLAVE RELAY TEST." [TO A.M., MANSFIELD, IN ENGINEERING MEETING.] 258 19900817 BOCKHOLD 24 17 " ... ALLEN CAME TO ME AND SAID,
' HEY, THE INFORMATION [4/9 EDG START INFO]IS WRONG' AND I TOLD ALLEN TO GET THE STAFF TO FIX IT." [TO FREDERICKS, WHO QUESTIONED IF ANYONE HAD ANY CONTENTION ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF THE 4/9 DATA.]
k258 19900817 MCCOY 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19] WAS BASED ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9] PRESENTATION...THE CORRECTION TO THE LER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME OR NUMBER..." [TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.) 258 19900817 FREDERICKS 27 17 " ...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP,...THE REASON WAS LOW JACKET WATER PRESSURE." [TO MCCOY,BOCKHOLD, J.G.A.,A.M.]
- 258 19900817 BOCKHOLD 32 11 " ...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE [EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYLOR BELIEVES, BUT...[HE) BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONALMISTAKE..." [TO MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) [ EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYLOR BELIEVES VS. ACTUAL SITUATION.] / -
60 19900817 AUFDENKAMPE 8 3 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD HAVING SIGNED
' OFF ON THE COVER LETTER TO REV 1 OF THE LER [6/29) IN MID MAY.
[TO MOSBAUGH, CHESTNUT) [ CHESTNUT IS TAKING J.G.A.'S PLACE AS TECHNICAL MANAGER.) 264 19900828 ODOM 39 18 "IT'S GOT A MIND OF ITS OWN." [ REFERS TO AN INADVERTENT, UNEXPLAINED UNIT 1 DIESEL START ON 8/16-17/90.) [TO A.M., COPELAND.) l
23 if ***** b 266 19900829 BOCKHOLD 21 4 ... SUCCESSFUL START MEANT [TO [BOCKHOLD)THEENGINESTARTEDANDRANSUFFICIENTTIMETHAT WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE MARCH 20TH EVENT. AND...AFTER RUNNING A SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ENGINE COULD HAVE SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF A PROBLEM..." [TO A.M., GREENE,HORTON) 267 19900829 KOCHERY 32 8 DISCUSSES ANOTHER CURRENT PROBLEM WITH THE 1A EDG. A VOLTAGE REGULATOR PROBLEM. THE 1A EDG HAS BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE. [TO MOSBAUGH) [MOSBAUGH SAYS THIS PROBLEMS HAS EXHIBITED ITSELF BEFORE.) 267 19900829 HORTON 41 22 " ...WE JUST NEED TO MAKE IT AS , REASONABLY ACCURATE AS WE CAN, BECAUSE THE LIABILITY I SEE IS l SUBSTANTIAL." [TO A.M., RE EDG START DATA STILL BEING COMPILED i JUST PRIOR TO ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ON SITE AREA EMERGENCY.] 19900829ARESTRINGFELIDW f 267THAT...Y'ALL 47 6 " ...I'M TICKLED TO DEATH TAKING THIS THING [ CORRECTION OF EDG START DATA] ; SERIOUSLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T COMFORTABLE WITH IT AT ALL." [TO ! ODOM, FREDERICKS, A.M., DANNEMILLER.] [f26919900830 AUFDENKAMPE 1 25 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD " GUIDING" THE PRB ABOUT THE WORDING AND CONTENT OF THE LETTER THAT SUPPOSEDLY CORRECTED THE " INCORRECT" EDG START DATA GIVEN TO NRC IN APRIL. [TO MOSBAUGH.) l J 1 i l l l
( 24 -
+
STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO AJLUNI 160 19900612 HORTON 30 1 "WELL, THE CONSISTENCY IS DOWN THE TUBE BECAUSE THE FIRST LER THAT WENT OUT IS INCORRECT." (TO AJLUNI, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH). : 160 19900612 AJLUNI 33 6 TALKED TO HORTON AND FREDERICKS ABOUT THE CHANGES IN EDG START INFO FROH COAR TO LER TO REV1 OF LER. 1 i l
+
1 1
25 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO AUFDENKAMPE 41 19900411 BEACHER 74 11 COMMENTED TO MOSBAUGH AND AUFDENKAMPE ABOUT TELECOPYING AN APPARENTLY INCOMPLETE DEWPOINT MEASUREMENT l HISTORY FOR PAST YEAR TO CHAFFEE (NRC), BROCKMAN (NRC), LOUIS l WARD, & KEN BURR. I 42 19900411 AUFDENKAMPE 13 1 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT IT'S NOT GPC'S j OBLIGATION TO TELL NRC THAT "WE" (GPC/VEGP) FEEL WE HAVE AIR PROBLEMS OR THAT WE FOUND AN AIR PROBLEM. 57 19900419 STRINGFELLOW 88 12 RELAYED HAIRSTON'S QUESTIONS l ABOUT WHAT EVALUATIONS THE EQUIP. OPERATOR MADE BEFORE HE TRIED TO RESTART THE DIESEL AFTER IT TRIPPED IN THE SITE AREA I EMERGENCY. JGA SAID HE JUST WENT IN AND STARTED PUSHING BUTTONS. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). I 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 91 4 "WE THINK THAT'S BASICALLY A l MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT." [TO STRINGFELLOW, MOSBAUGH, REFERRING TO 20 STARTS WITHOUT FAILURES OR PROBLIMS SINCE MAR 20).
" ...WE KNOW FOR A FACT THAT THE B 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 91 7 !
1 DIESEL TRIPPED AT LEAST ONCE AFTER MARCH 20TH." [TO STRINGFE LOW). 57 19900419 STRINGFELLOW 91 21 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE WAS OFF THE PHONE, HE WOULD RUN IN AND TELL SHIPMAN WHAT AUFDENKAMPE AND MOSBAUGH TOLD HIM. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 STRINGFELLOW 94 11 RECOGNIZED THEY "WERE DOWN TO " THE "20 TIMES EACH" QUESTION IN THE WORDING OF THE LER. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 19900419 STRINGFELLOW 96 8 "IT JUST DAWNED ON ME WHAT AL WAS SAYING A MINUTE AGO. IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE SAY No FAILURES OR PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN ANY STARTS, YOU'RE SAYING THAT'S NOT TRUE."
"OH, WONDERFUL, O.K." [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 96 15 "BECAUSE, YOU KNOW, WE...THIS HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO THE NRC ONCE ALREADY." [STRINGFELLOW RESPONDS BY BY SAYING THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS THINKING).
57 19900419 MOSBAUGH 97 4 ASKED AUFDENKAMPE IF HE HAD HAIRSTON'S COAR LETTER, "BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONE..." - AUFDENKAMPE INTERRUPTED SAYING "WHERE THEY LIED...I MEAN THEY..." MOSBAUGH FINISHED THE THOUGHT BY SAYING, " ...MADE THAT STATEMENT [NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) PREVIOUSLY." 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 118 25 "WHAT BIRMIHGHAM IS THINKING NOW IS THEY MADE A MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT IN THE APRIL 9TH LETTER. [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM).
._ . . _ ~ . _ _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ _ . . ._. -- . . .
l I l l 26 a
- 58 19900419 MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL
- START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. [AUFDENKAMPE, 4 BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELloW, SHIPMAN). j l 1 58 19900419 MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" l (NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) l
- (AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN).
l 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKLOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, . STRINGFELI4W, MCCOY). ; i 58 19900419 HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T
- HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" (SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW,
; MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY).
58 19900419 MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." (MEANING No
- TRIPS) (HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, j MCCOY).
58 19900419 SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." (PROBABLY MEANING FOR } MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) (HAIRSTON,
- STRINGFELLOW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). ~
l 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 20 20 " ...AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED BECAUSE THAY WERE PART OF THE RETURNING TO SERVICE OF THE , DIESEL..." [RE: 3/22 AND 3/23 TRIPS) (MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). I 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 23 8 " ...[ CONT. OF PG. 23, LINE 7) THAT YOU j KNOW, WE CAN DEFEND. IF SOMEBODY CALLS ALLEN MOSBAUGH, BILL 4 SHIPMAN, AND JOHN AUFDENKAMPE AGAIN TO TESTIFY, THAT'S THE STORY j I WANT TO TELL." [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE RE COUNTING STARTS l AFTER DIESEL DEC. OPERABLE] 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER
- THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE) j 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 31 7 (RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER)
, "...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE (McCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANT:.D TO FINE TUNE IT FOR
- TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." (SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
, 58 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 34 12 STATED THAT IT REALLY DOESN'T MATTER WHAT START COUNT IS PUT IN THE LER, BECAUSE IF NRC DISAGREES, GPC WILL JUST ISSUE A REVISION [TO MOSBAUGH).
a I
1 27 58 19900419 CASH 35 19 STATED NOT SURE IF HE TOLD BOCKHOLD i ABOUT FAILURES IN EDG COUNT FOR NRC PRESENTATION. SAID BOCKHOLD KNEW ABOUT FAILURES. (TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 19900419 CASH 36 3 STATED HE STARTED EDG START COUNT ON 3/20, THE THREE MAINTENANCE STARTS ON NIGHT OF 3/20. [TO: 1 MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l 58 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 36 23 "WE DIDN'T COUNT THE FAILURE, THOUGH." (RE MOSBAUGH'S QUESTION TO CASH ABOUT START FAILURES SINCE 3/20) [AUFDENKAMPE IS REMINDING MOSBAUGH THAT THEY'RE STARTING THE COUNTS IN THE LER AS OF THE END OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TESTING). 75 19900430 AUFDENKAMPE 31 10 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THE MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE LER." (TO MOSBAUGH) (MOSBAUGH HAS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG START DATA). 76 19900430 AUFDENKAMPE 9 2 " JIMMY PAUL CASH SAID HE HAD RESEARCHED THE OPERATOR LOGS TO DETERMINE HOW MANY STARTS THERE WERE WITHOUT PROBLEMS..." (MOSBAUGH]. j 95 19900504 CHAFEE 28 22 TALKS ABOUT FOREIGN MATERIAL PROBLEMS l IN SWITCHES. VEGP PEOPLE STILL NOT SURE OF CAUSE OF SWITCH ) PROBLEMS. [MOSBAUGH, LOUIS WARD, AUFDENKAMPE, BROCKMAN AND OTHER UNIDENT. VEGP PEOPLE). 98 19900508 SWARTZWELDER 60 5 TALKED ABOUT REV 1 TO 4/19/90 LER IN PRB. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS). 155 19900608 AUFDENKAMPE 43 8 i::XPLAINED TO BAILEY LANGUAGE & BASES FOR CHANGE IN EDG STARTS IN LER REV 1. TOLD BAILEY BIRMINGHAM HAD THE APPROVED LER REV FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. TOLD BAILEY HE WANTS TO CORRECT THE COAR IN THE COVER LTR. TO LER REV. [ BAILEY ON PHONE, MOSBAUGH). 159 19900611 AUFDENKAMPE 5 17 "HAIRSTON WON'T SIGNOUT THE LER." (WEBB, MOSBAUGH] [RE REV 1, LER THAT WAS PRB APPROVED AND SENT TO BIRMINGHAM IN MID-MAY). 159 19900611 AUFDENKAMPE 6 6 "THEY'RE GOING TO HAVE QA AUDITS." [ BIRMINGHAM GOING TO HAVE VEGP SITE QA DO AN AUDIT ON THE DIESEL START COUNTS) [TO MOSBAUGH, WEBB). 159 19900611 AUFDENKAMPE 11 3 TALKED ABOUT HOW THE CORPORATE PEOPLE IN BIRMINGHAM WERE GOING TO TELL NRC THAT THE INACCURATE IDGS CAUSED EDG COUNT PROBLELM. [TO MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 MOSBAUGH 8 13 "THERE'S A LOT WRONG WITH IT [LER REV), AND I WOULD JUST BE REAL CAUTIOUS IF I WERE YOU." (TO AUFDENKAMPE).
I 28 ; i 160 19900612 AUFDENKAMPE 9 11 "I THINK WE OUGHT TO JUST GO TELL ! THE RESIDENTS WE LIED IN THE FIRST LER... AND THE LETTER." [TO ! MOSBAUGH).
.160 19900612 AUFDENKAMPE 10 4 "NOBODY IS GOING TO WRITE A LETTER AND SAY WE LIED TO YOU THE FIRST TIME, NRC." [TO MOSBAUGH, JUSTIFYING HIS IDEA TO GO TELL THE RESIDENTS).
167 19900615 AUFDENKAMPE 23 21 "I BRIEFED THE RESIDENTS, AND THEY TALKED TO BROCKMAN, AND THEY SAID THAT WAS FINE." [TO MOSBAUGH RE TELLING NRC OF INCORRECT STATEMENT IN LER). 167 19900615 AUFDENKAMPE 23 23 "I TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD AN INCORRECT STATEMENT IN THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT TELLING NRC RESIDENTS). 184 19900830 HORTON 15 22 "IT WAS AN UNPLANNED TRIP. I WOULD l LIKE TO CALL IT AN UNPLANNED TRIP, HOWEVER, DECLARE IT A ; SUCCESS." [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD). ' 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, ; UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME EXPIRIATION DOWN I BELOW." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND YES l FOR UNPLANNED TRIPS." [RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) [TO HORTON, ' GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). l 184 19900830 HORTON 26 19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST MAINTENANCE STARTS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WITH THE NRC." [TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, CREENE). 184 19900830 AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID TEST FAILURES. THAT'S THE ONLY KIND WE HAVE TO REPORT. DOES IT AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAILURE TO REPORT?" [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S) CALL TO THE NRC, WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.) 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE PAPER...IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S LOST. [TO
f l 29 HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPLANATORY PHRASE IN COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, IF IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE, WHY l FLAG IT IN THE PORTION OF THE LETTER 7" (TO GREENE, HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). ! l 184 19900830 HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH USING THE ' WORDS " APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE ERRORS IN THE 4/9 LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE , THE RESULT OF." (To BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' (To BE THE RESULT OF)." [RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER & 4/19 LER) (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON]. 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF
' ERRORS' IN THE APRIL 9TH..." (BOCKHOLD TOTALLY OBFUSCATES THE LETTER THAT IS TO CORRECT THE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER) (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE INDIVIDUAL [ CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 41'12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION) JIMMY [ CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, , AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 44 21 "...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." (RE LETTER 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 45 18 "T AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE OUT WITHOUT YOU (PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." (RE DRAFT 8/30 i LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) (TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). i 184 19900830 GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL i SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." (TO BOCKHOLD, ! .HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). ! l 1 1 v
l l 30 l 216 19900724 MANSFIELD 4 14 "DID YOU HEAR WE HAD A DIESEL FAIL TO START?" [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). . I 220 19900726 MOSBAUGH 9 21 "THERE WAS A FAILURE TO START THAT WAS UNDOCUMENTED ON UNIT 1. THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR ON UNIT 2..." ) (TO AUFDENKAMPE]. ! l 220 19900726 AUFDENKAMPE 10 15 "IT WAS IN THE -- IN THE DIESEL, j THE TAPE ON THE DIESEL...THEY PUSHED THE BUTTON, AND IT DIDN'T START." (TO MOSBAUGH RE PAINTED-OVER TAPE ON DIESEL). 258 19900817 MCCOY 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19] WAS BASED ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9] PRESENTATION...THE CORRECTION TO THE LER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME OR NUMBER..." (TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.] 258 19900817 FREDERICKS 27 17 " ...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP,...THE REASON WAS LOW JACKET WATER PRESSURE." (TO MCCOY,BOCKHOLD, J.G.A.,A.M.] 258 19900817 BOCKHOLD 32 11 " ...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE [EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYLOR BELIEVES, i , BUT...[HE) BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONALMISTAKE..." [TO 1 MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) [ EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYLOR BELIEVES VS. ACTUAL SITUATION.] l < 260 19900'.,17 AUFDENKAMPE 8 3 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD HAVING SIGNED OFF ON Tite COVER LETTER TO REV 1 OF THE LER [6/29] IN MID MAY. [TO MOSBAUGH, CHESTNUT] (CHESTNUT IS TAKING J.G.A.'S PLACE AS TECHNICAL MANAGER.) 269 19900830 AUFDENKAMPE 1 25 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD "GUIDIPG" i THE PRB ABOUT THE WORDING AND CONTENT QF THE LETTER THAT SUPPOSEDLY CORRECTED THE " INCORRECT" EDG START DATA GIVEN TO NRC IN APRIL. (TO MOSBAUGH.] 1 1
I i i 31 i STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO BAILEY I
- 155 19900608 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 43 8 EXPLAINED TO BAILEY LANGUAGE i i . & BASES FOR CHANGE IN EDG STARTS IN LER REV 1. TOLD BAILEY !
p BIRMINGHAM HAD THE APPROVED LER REV FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. TOLD
. BAILEY-HE WANTS TO CORRECT THE~COAR IN THE COVER LTR. TO LER REV. t j (BAILEY ON PHONE, MOSBAUGH). _i i
167 19900615 EDG MOSELY 71 4 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT BAILEY CALLED, j' Ih0 KING FOR BOCKHOLD, AND HAD ASKED HIM [MOSLEY) ABOUT VALID , 4 FAILURES. i } 253'19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR i i SURE." (To MCCOY, FiiIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP
- MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.]
- 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I 2
PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU [ BAILEY) ON THE 3 PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED , BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND , OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] ! 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I
- j. BELIEVE IT (THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE i AND ME." (TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.)
- . 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE )
j ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER) IN ] GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT 1 DO l REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." (TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, 1 i FREDERICKS). ! 4 i ( ! ! i i i , 4 4 i i i J v- r- y- + --d -y,- --e w i,ee
32 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO BOCKHOLD 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 4 DISCUSSES NRC GIVING OK TO GO TO
, MODE 3, [TO LACKEY, MOSBAUGH) 41 19900411 EDG LACKEY 8 22 TALKS ABOUT GOING TO MODE 3 24 HOURS AFTER MODE 4. [TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH) 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 40 4 TALKS ABOUT NOT I4 SING ANY TIME GETTING BACK TO MODE 1, PER PROJECTIch. [TO PARTON, HORTON, MOSBAUGH).
41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 43 5 COMMENTS ABOUT NOT DOING GOOD PM'S ON CHECKING AIR DRYER QUALITY FROM 5/88 TO 5/89. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH). WOULD THAT FACT AFFECT "THE STATEMENT WE MADE IN OUR LETTER?" 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 7 TALKS ABOUT PM PROGRAM BEING
" SUSPECT" IN '89. SAID WE DON'T KNOW IF WE HAD GOOD AIR OR BAD AIR. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH).
41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 46 9 TALKED ABOUT FSAR REQUIREMENTS AND SOMETIMES NOT BEING ABLE TO MEET THEM. CONCERNED ABOUT HAIRSTON LETTER [COAR RESPONSE 4/9). STATEMENTS ABOUT AIR QUALITY STILL BEING " VALID." [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH). . 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 50 16 " ...ON THE 29TH [ MAR 90) OR SO, WE GOT A CRUMMY READING AND NOBODY KNEW ABOUT IT UNTIL MILT HUNT PICKED IT UP." [TO BURMEISTER, MOSBAUGH, STOKES). 41 19900411 EDG MOSBAUGH 50 21 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD), WE HAD A BAD READING [ DEWPOINT / AIR QUALITY) TODAY [4/11/90) 60 DEGREES ON THE 2A DIESEL." 41 19900411 EDG HORTON 51 4 " HAVEN'T WE GOT ANY GOOD READINGS?" [RE: EDG DEWPOINT / TO BOCKHOLD). 1 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 51 6 "NOT ON 2A, 2B." [ RESPONDING TO 2 HORTON WHO ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY GOOD DEWPOINT READINGS). 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 51 11 "ACTUALLY, I HEARD ABOUT IT JUST BEFORE THE MEETING WITH THE NRC." [TO HORTON, KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH, BURMEISTER RE: BAD DEWPOINT READING). i 41 19900411 EDG KOCHERY 52 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT "THEY" STILL RUN THE DIESEL COMPRESSOR EVEN WITH THE AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE. 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 52 6 "I'LL WRITE A NOTE TO SKIP KITCHENS ON THIS THING." [ ACKNOWLEDGES KOCHERY'S NOTIFICATION ABOUT RUNNING COMPRESSORS WITH AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE).
33 42 19900411 EDG MOSBAUGH 2 16 TO BURWINKLE ABOUT BOCKHOLD l CONCLUDING NO AIR QUALITY PROBLEM BECAUSE OF NO CORROSION IN TANK , AND NOTHING ON THE FILTER. NOT A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION. ; 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS THE DATA THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE [HAIRSTON) WROTE AND ; [BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE ...EBNETER LAST MONDAY IN i ATLANTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T ANY FAILURES IT JUST WASN'7.' TRUE. l 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. i (AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" (NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG BOCKHOLD 9 6 TOLD MCCOY THAT EDG START COUNT NUMBERS IN 4/9 PRESENTATION BEGAN AFTER COMP. TEST PROGRAM. [EITHER DOESN'T KNOW OR IS B.S. ING MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.(AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS 1 OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. (To MOSBAUGH, ! AUFENDKAMPE) 58 19900419 EDG CASH 35 19 STATED NOT SURE IF HE TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT FAILURES IN EDG COUNT FOR NRC PRESENTATION. SAID BOCKHOLD KNEW ABOUT FAILURES. (TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 75 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 35 2 "I COMPLETED MY REVIEW. I FINALLY SORTED OUT ALL THE STARTS, I THINK." (TO TYNAN) (MOSBAUGH GIVING THIS DATA TO BOCKHOLD). ! l 76 19900430 EDu BOCKHOLD 30 18 "THEN WE HAVE TO OBVIOUSLY REVISE THE LER." (TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH POINTED OUT START PROBLEMS ON HIS COMP. LIST). 76 19900430 EDG BOCKHOLD 30 25 TALKED ABOUT MAKING NRC PRESENTATION FROM CASH'S INFO, WITH KEN BURR'S APPROVAL. SAID HE DIDN'T GET TO THE EDG START SLIDE. SAID MAYBE CASH WAS " THINKING OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT" [MISCOMMUNICATION) FROM WHAT BOCKHOLD . WANTED OUT OF SLIDE. [TO MOSBAUGH). l 95 19900504 EDG SHIPMAN 20 4 "SO YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN i a
34 WAS THAT WE HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE SWITCH..." [TO RUSHTON, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, RE CALCON SWITCHES). 95 19900504 EDG MOSBAUGH 43 19 "WELL, BASED ON THE WYLIE TESTING AND THE DEBRIS FOUND IN THE SWITCH, THEY [NRC) STARTED
*d.,ING THE WORD OPERABILITY." [TO BOCKHOLD ABOUT NRC [BROCKMAN, CHAFEE) AWARENESS OF DEBRIS IN CALCON SWITCH).
95 19900504 EDG BOCKHOLD 46 7 TALKED ABOUT LETTER TO NRC RE S.A.E. AND SAID SOME MINOR ITEMS ARE "NOT THE NRC'S BUSINESS." [TO MOSBAUGH AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS). 95 19900504 EDG BOCKHOLD 55 21 "NOW I HEARD JOHN GIVE ME SOME SONG AND DANCE THAT WE'D LIKE TO KEEP'WILL BE REVISED BY' SO WE DON'T MAKE MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENTS AND CHANGE THE WORDS AFTER THE FACT." [MOSBAUGH & VEGP MGRS ABOUT DRAFTING 5/14/90 LTR TO NRC RE COR. ACTIONS ON S.A.E.]. 101 19900508 EDG BOCKHOLD 1 15 "IS THERE SOMETHING BESIDES IM SCREWING UP AND STARTING THE WRONG DIESEL...?" [TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH NOTIFIED HIM AVOUT THE MISTAKEN START OF THE A DIESEL). 101 19900508 EDG BOCKHOLD 2 24 "I WOULD DO NOTHING WITH IT 1 EXCEPT FOR YOUR HAVING THE PEOPLE LOOK AT THE LER CORRECTION." l [TO MOSBAUGH RE MISTAKEN START OF A DIESEL). 159 19900611 EDG SHEBANI 36 17 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) APPARENTLY HAD A DISCUSSION WITH MCCOY, AND GEORGE DID DIRECT TO TOM [WEBB) WHAT HE WANTS PUT IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH RE REV TO LER). 160 19900612 EDG WEBB 5 18 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) DID. HE SAID HE , WANTED NEW -- NEW INFO." [BOCKHOLD INETRUCTED WEBB TO USE THE l VALID START TERMINOLOGY IN THE LER REV) [TO MOSBAUGH). 167 19900615 EDG MOSELY 71 4 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT BAILEY CALLED, LOOKING FOR BOCKHOLD, AND HAD ASKED HIM (MOSLEY) ABOUT VALID FAILURES. 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 7 23 "WE CAUSED THAT '; RIP. IT WOULDN'T HAVE TRIPPED ON BLACK TUESDAY. I'LL LET GEORG': [BOCKHOLD) CALL THAT ONE." 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 15 22 "IT WAS AN UNPLANNED TRIP. I WOULD L1XE TO CALL IT AN UNPLANNED TRIP, HOWEVER, DECLARE IT A SUCCESS." [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME EXPLANATION DOWN BELOW." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON).
35 184.19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPIANNED TRIPS. " (RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) (TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 26 19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST MAINTENANCE STARTS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WITH THE NRC." [TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, GREENE). ; 184 19900830 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID l TEST FAILURES. THAT'S THE ONLY KIND WE HAVE TO REPORT. DOES IT ! AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAILURE TO REPORT 7" (TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, ! MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). l t 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE l LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S] CALL TO THE NRC, i i WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS] WAS IN ERROR.'-PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.) 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." (TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE PAPER. . .IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S LOST. [TO HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPLANATORY PHRASE IN COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, IF IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE, WHY FLAG IT'IN THE PORTION OF THE LETTER?" (TO GREENE, HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH USING THE WORDS " APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE ERRORS IN THE 4/9 LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE THE RESULT OF." [TO BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' (TO BE THE RESULT OF)." (RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER & 4/19 LER) (TO ' GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). j 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF 1
' ERRORS' IN THE APRIL 9TH..."
(BOCKHOLD TOTALLY OBFUSCATES THE LETTER THAT IS TO CORRECT THE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER) (To GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). j 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE . INDIVIDUAL (CASH]'WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." [TO
36 GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC) . 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION) JIMMY (CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." (TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 21 " ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." [RE LETTER 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER] (TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE 4 OUT WITHOUT YOU [PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." (RE DRAFT 8/30
; LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER] (TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, i COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
j 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." [To BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). i 204 19900713 EDG 7/11 OSOS 2 23 TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT 2A EDG i STILL BEING INOP. PROBLELM IS CLEARANCES ON AIR START PILOT j VALVES AND OIL IN AIR START PILOT VALVE LINES. j 204 19900713 EDG HORTON 16 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT THEY CLEANED THE AIR START SOLENOID VALVES AND USED EMERY CIDTH TO " WIDEN THE I CLEARANCES" SO THAT THE VALVES WOULDN'T STICK. (MOSBAUGH, ) i FREDERICKS). 205 19900713 EDG KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR l SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. 205 19900713 EDG MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT HARGIS RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE UNIT 1 EDG ALSO. (TO l FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD). ~ 246 15,00813 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO i GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR SURE." (TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.)
t i i l 37 ; i l- 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I I l PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU [ BAILEY) ON THE j PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WEY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM , l BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED
- BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND j OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.)
] 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I r i BELIEVE IT [THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST ; j PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETNEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE : AND ME." (TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP l MANAGERS.]
- 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE l
! ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER] IN ! i GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO j REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." (To BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, ! l , FREDERICKS). 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 15 2 DESCRIBES HIS RECOLLECTION OF I l THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS RE EDG PRESENTATION TO NRC ON 4/9, AND HOW ; 4/9 COAR RESPONSE WAS CREATED.-[ FULL DISCUSSION ABOUT 4/19 LER : i j CONFERENCE CALL INCLUDED THROUGH PAGE 19). ! .l 258 19900817 EDG WILLIAMS 8 15 "AND THEN LAST NIGHT [8/16/90) i i THE 1B DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO-STARTED FOR NO APPARENT REASON." [TO i BOCKHOLD, A.M., AT MORNING STATUS MEETING ON IAST DAY OF NRC j l SPECIAL INSPECTION.) l 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 24 17 " ... ALLEN CAME TO ME AND SAID,
- ' HEY, THE INFORMATION (4/9 EDG START INFO]IS WRONG 8 AND I TOLD ,
! ALLEN TO GET THE STAFF TO FIX IT." [TO FREDERICKS, WHO QUESTIONED l IF ANYONE HAD ANY CONTENTION ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF THE 4/9
- DATA.)
l ! 258.19900817 EDG MCCOY 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19) WAS BASED l ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9) PRESENTATION...THE i i CORRECTION TO THE LER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME l OR NUMBER..." (TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.] l i j 258 19900817 EDG FREDERICKS 27 17 " ...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE ;
- MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP, . . .THE REASON WAS IDW JACKET !
! WATER PRESSURE." [TO MCCOY,80CKHOLD,J.G.A.,A.M.] l 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 11 " ...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE [EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYIDR BELIEVES, , BUT. . . (HE) BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONAIJtISTAKE. . . " (TO : MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) (EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYIDR BELIEVES i i VS. ACTUAL SITUATION.) ! i ! 1 i I. _ _ _ _ _ _._- _ __ _ _ - . -
i 38 260 19900817 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 8 3 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD HAVING 4 SIGNED OFF ON THE COVER LETTER TO REV 1 OF THE LER [6/29) IN MID MAY. [TO MOSBAUGH, CHESTNUT) [ CHESTNUT IS TAKING J.G.A.'S PLACE AS TECHNICAL MANAGER.] 266 19900829 EDG BOCKHOLD 21 4 " . . . SUCCESSFUL START MEANT [TO BOCKHOLD) THE ENGINE STARTED AND RAN SUFFICIENT TIME THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE MARCH 20TH EVENT. AND...AFTER RUNNING A SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ENGINE COULD HAVE SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF A PROBLEM..." [TO A.M., GREENE,HORTON)
. 269 19900830 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 1 25 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD
" GUIDING" THE PRB ABOUT THE WORDING AND CONTENT OF THE LETTER THAT SUPPOSEDLY CORRECTED THE " INCORRECT" EDG START DATA GIVEN TO NRC IN APRIL. [TO MOSBAUGH.)
I i I d i 1 e 9 4
39 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO BRINEY
< 10 19900323 12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT: FREDERICKS, HOLMES, KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINEY.
10 19900323 FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD TIME, AND DURING THAT THIRD RUN, IT TRIPPED AFTER A COUPLE OF HOURS." (TALKING ABOUT 1B DIESEL TRIP ON 003-23-90 TO HOLMES, KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINEY (CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING)). 10 19900323 COURSEY 14 13 "BUT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' TRIPPED." (SPEAKING TO FREDERICKS, BRINEY, CASH, AND OTHERS ON CRITIQUE TEAM). 10 19900323 CASH 16 9 "I LEFT THE HIGH TEMPERATURE OUT, AND THE TRIP FOR TWO DIFFERENT PRESSURES (IN AUDIBLE) IT'S A ONE OUT OF ONE ON TRIP, CORRECT." (TO FREDERICKS, KOCHERY, BRINEY, RE: 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP). 10 19900323 COURSEY 19 2 COURSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION PROBLEMS WITH CALCON SWITCHES. (WITH CASH, FREDERICKS, KOCHERY, j BRINEY, HOLMES, MOSDAUGH). 10 19900323 COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNING AND THE DAMN THINGS JUST DECIDED TO STOP?" (CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, CASH, HOLMES, BRINEY). 10 19900323 CASH 20 2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP SIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE 4 OUT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER LT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 4 DEGREES." (TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, HOLMES, COURSEY.) 10 19900323 FREDERICKS 21 15 QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR QUALITY, ' CLEANLINESS OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN MATERIAL. [TO: BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, HOLNIS, COURSEY, CASH.) 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE WORST TEMPERATURE SWITCHES YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNK." (TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOLMES.] 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T KN0d WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER Ih0KED AT THE CALIBRATION PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, HOW IN THE HELL CAN WE PUT THIS ON ... A DIESEL 7"[FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOLMES.) 10 19900323 KOCHERY 23 13 "THE CALCON SWITCHES HAVE A LOT OF PART 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW?" (TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH,
40 BRINEY, COURSEY, HOLMES.) L 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE... IT'S RIDICULOUS." (REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOIRES.) 10 19900323 CASH 24 13 " ...YOU GOT TWO ALARMS. ONE IS HIGH LUBE OIL OUT, HIGH LUBE OIL TEMP. OffT, IT'S 190 DEGREES." (TO BRINEY, XOCHERY, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH) 10 19900323 COURSEY 41 11 " ...WHAT HE'S GOT TO CALIBRATE IS A PIECE OF GARBAGE [CALCON SWITCHES), AND HE KNOWS THEY'RE ALL GOING TO BLOW." ("HE" COULD BE BRINEY OR VENDOR REP, SHELDON) (TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) 10 19900323 BRINEY 46 15 "TOO MANY PEOPLE IN THE BOAT..." [TO ) CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECTION FROM CRITIQUE TEAM AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT. l l j l l l
41 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO BURR 41 19900411 BEACHER 74 11 COMMENTED TO MOSBAUGH AND AUFDENKAMPE ABOUT TELECOPYING AN APPARENTLY INCOMPLETZ DEWPOINT MEASUREMENT HISTORY FOR PAST YEAR TO CHAFFEE (NRC), BROCKMAN (NRC), ICUIS WARD, & KEN BURR. 76 19900430 BOCKHOLO 30 25 TALKED ABOUT MAKING NRC PRESENTATION FROM CASH'S INFO, WITH KEN BURR'S APPROVAL. SAID HE DIDN'T GET TO THE EDG START SLIDE. SAID MAYBE CASH WAS " THINKING OF SOMETHING DIFFERZNT" (MISCOMMUNICATION) FROM WHAT BOCKHOLD WANTED OUT OF SLIDE. [TO MOSBAUGH). 1 I 1
, i I s 42 j l- ' S'.ifEMENTS PERTINENT TO CASH j i l l 10'19900323 12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION l
- OF.03 23-90 IB DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT
- FREDERICKS, HOIJtES, KOCHERY, 1 1 COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINEY. :
l l 10 19900323 FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD ; i TIME, AND DURING THAT THIRD RUN, IT TRIPPED AFTER A COUPLE OF ! i HOURS." (TALKING ABOUT 1B DIESEL TRIP ON 003-23-90 TO HOIJtES, j
- KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINE (CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING)J. 1 l
3 10 19900323 COURSEY 14 13 "BUT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' ) ] TRIPPED." (SPEAKING TO FREDERICKS,BRINEY, CASH, AND OTHERE ON l CRITIQUE TEAM). ] } 10 1s9 % 323 CASH 14 20 "THEY DIDN'T RESET ANYTHING ON THE I4 CAL
. CONTi" ~ PANEL. BOTH OF THE ALARMS CAME IN." (CASH PERSONALLY FAMIL.lv WITH 03-23-90 TRIP).
{ 10 19.5 % 23 CASH 15 1 COMMENT SHOWS CASH'S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 1 OF 03-2s-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. . s l 10 19900323 CASH 16 9 "I LEFT THE HIGH TEMPERATURE OUT, AND THE i TRIP FOE TWO DIFFERENT PRESSURES (IN AUDIBLE) IT'S A ONE OUT OF j ONE ON TRIP, CORRECT." (TO FREDERICKS, KOCHERY, BRINEY, RE: 03-23-90 1B-DIESEL TRIP).
- 10 19900323 COURSEY 19 2 COURSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION
- PROBLEMS WITH CALCON SWITCHES. [WITH CASH, FREDERICKS, KOCHERY, l BRINEY, HOLMES, MOSBAUGH).
I 10 19900323 COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE l WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNIiiG AND THE DAMN THINGS l JUST DECIDED TO STOP7" (CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, ! MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, CASH, HOIJfES, BRINEY). i ~ 10 19900323 CASH 20 2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP EIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE OUT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 DEGREES." (TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, HOLMES, COURSEY.)
- i. 10 19900323 FREDERICKS 21 l'i QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR QUALITY,
- j. CLEANLINESS-OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN MATERIAL. (TO:
1 BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, HOIJtES, COURSEY, CASH.) 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE WORST TEMPERATURE I
-SWITCHES YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNM." (TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOIJtES. )
! l J
,.+-,e- ----+-r o - --v - , e --.-,,-.---a,
- , r-
I t t l i- 43 ! 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER IDOKED AT THE CALIBRATION j PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, HOW IN THE HELL ! l CAN WE PUT THIS ON ...-A DIESEL 7"[FREDERICKS, CASH, NOSBAUGH, l l KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOIJtES. ] l 10 19900323 KOCHERY 23 13 "THE CALCON SWITCHES HAVE A LOT OF PART 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW?" [TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, l BRINEY, COURSEY, HOIJtES.) 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY , SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE... IT'S l RIDICUICUS." [ REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO-FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOIJtES. ] 10 19900323 CASH 24 13 " ...YOU GOT TWO AIARMS. ONE IS HIGH LUBE OIL OUT, HIGH LUBE OIL TEMP. OUT, IT'S 190 DEGREES." [TO BRINEY, KOCHERY, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH] 10 19900323 HOLMES 28 19 SAID THE JACKET WATER TEMP. SENSORS (CALCON SWITCHES) HAD TO BE RECALIBRATED EVERY TIME. [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) [ REITERATES ON P.31, LN 12) 10 19900323 HOLMES 33 11 SAID NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE TO CORRECT CALCON CALIBRATION PROBLEM. "JUST BEEN LIVING WITH IT." [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM] 10 19900323 COURSEY 41 11 " ...WHAT HE'S GOT TO CALIBRATE IS A PIECE OF GARBAGE [CALCON SWITCHES), AND HE KNOWS THEY'RE ALL GOING TO BI4W." ("HE" COULD BE BRINEY OR VENDOR REP, SHELDON) [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM] = 10 19900323 BRINEY 46 15 "TOO MANY PEOPLE IN THE BOAT..." [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM] CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECTION FROM CRITIQUE TEAM AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT. 57 19900419 SWARTZWELDER 115 25 TALKED ABOUT HAIRSTON NEEDING TO TALK TO OPERATORS WHO RESE7 ANNUNCIATORS ON DIESEL IN SITE AREA EMERGENCY. IS CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFICALLY LETTING THESE OPERATORS KNOW THAT HAIRSTON WILL NOT YELL AT THEM. [TO CASH, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 CASH 35 19 STATED NOT SURE IF HE TOLD BOCKHOLD I ABOUT FAILURES IN EDG COUNT.FOR NRC PRESENTATION. SAID BOCKHOLD KNEW ABOUT FAILURES. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 19900419 CASH 36 3 STATED HE STARTED EDG START COUNT ON 3/20, THE THREE MAINTENANCE STARTS ON HIGHT OF 3/20. [TO: MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 1
44 58 199004?,9 AUFDENKAMPE 36 23 "WE DIDN'T COUNT THE FAILURE, THOUGH." [RE MOSBAUGH'S QUESTION TO CASH ABOUT START FAILURES SINCE 3/20) [AUFDENKAMPE IS REMINDING MOSBAUGH THAT THEY'RE STARTING THE COUNTS IN THE LER AS OF THE END OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
, TESTING).
75 19900430 CASH 56 10 INVOLVED WITH VERIFICATION OF MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS. [MOSBAUGH). 76 19900430 NOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. LIST OF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. (MOYE, HORTON). 76 19900430 AUFDENKAMPE 9 2 " JIMMY PAUL CASH SAID HE HAD RESEARCHED THE OPERATOR LOGS TO. DETERMINE HOW MANY STARTS THERE WERE WITHOUT PROBLEMS..." (MOSBAUGH). 76 19900430 BOCKHOLD 30 25 TALKED ABOUT MAKING NRC PRESENTATION FROM CASH'S INFO, WITH KEN BURR'S APPROVAL. SAID HE DIDN'T GET TO THE EDG START SLIDE. SAID MAYBE CASH WAS " THINKING OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT" (MISCOMMUNICATION) FROM WHAT BOCKHOLD WANTED OUT OF SLIDE. (TO MOSBAUGH). 184 10900830 BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE INDIVIDUAL [ CASH).WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION) JIMMY (CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 246 19900813 BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.)
t I e t 45 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO COURSEY [ 10 19900323 12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION l OF 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT: FREDERICKS, HOIJEES , KOCHERY, l COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINEY. I 10 19900323 FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD t TIME, AND DURING THAT THIRD RUN, IT TRIPPED AITER A COUPLE. OF l HOURS." (TALKING ABOUT 1B DIEGEL TRIP ON 003-73-90 TO HOIMES, .I KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRINE (CRITIQUE T7.AM MEETING)). ] 10 19900323 COURSEY 14 13 "BUT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' l TRIPPED." (SPEAKING TO FREDERICKS,BRINEY, CASH, AND OTHERS ON I CRITIQUE TEAM). I 10 19900323 COURSEY 19 2 COURSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION
- PROBLEMS WITH CALCON SWITCHES. [WITH CASH, FREDERICKS, KOCHERY, BRINEY, HOIMES, MOSBAUGH).
10 19900323 COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNING AND THE DAMN THINGS JUST DECIDED TO STOP7" (CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, CASH, HOLMES, BRINEY). 10 19900323 CASH 20 2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP SIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE OUT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 DEGREES." (TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, HOIRES, COURSEY.) 10 19900323 FREDERICKS 21 15 QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR QUALITY, CLEANLINESS OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN MATERIAL. (TO: BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, HOLMES, COURSEY, CASH.) 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE WORST TEMPERATURE SWITCHES YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNK." (TO , FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH,_KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOIMES.) 1 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER IDOKED AT THE CALIBRATION PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, HOW IN THE HELL CAN WE PUT THIS ON ... A DIESEL 7"[FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOIMES.) 10 19900323 KOCHERY 23 13 "THE CALCON SWITCHES HAVE A IDT OF PART 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW?" (TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, I BRINEY, COURSEY, HOIMES.) 10 19900323 BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE... IT'S RIDICULOUS." (REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO
.i 1
( I 46 l FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOI.MES.) l l 10 19900323 COURSEY 41 11 " ...WHAT HE'S GOT TO CALIBRATE IS A PIECE OF GARBAGE (CALCON SWITCHES), AND HE KNOWS THEY'RE ALL , GOING TO BIDW." ("HE" COULD BE BRINEY OR VENDOR REP, SHELDON) (TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE OUT . WITHOUT YOU [PRB) PECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30 l LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER] (TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, l COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l l l l 1 4
47 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO FREDERICKS 9 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 4 17 COMMENTED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE DIESEL WAS AN AIRPLANE, GEORGE WOULD NOT GO UP IN IT. 10 19900323 EDG 12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION OF. 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT: FREDERICKS, HOLMES, KOCHERY, COURSIE, CASH, AND ERINEY. 10 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD TIME, AND DURING THAT THIRD RUN, IT TRIPPED AFTER A COUPLE OF HOURS." [ TALKING ABOUT 1B DIESEL TRIP ON 003-23-90 TO HOIMES, KOCHERY, COURSEY, CASH, AND BRIME (CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING)). 10 3 t900323 EDG COURSIE 14 13 "BUT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' TRIl'dD." (SPEAKING TO FREDERICKS,BRINEY, CASH, AND OTHERS ON CRIT.QUE TEAM). 10 19900323 EDG CASH 16 9 "I LEFT THE HIGH TEMPERATURE OUT, AND THE TRIP FOR TWO DIFFERENT PRESSURES (IN AUDIBLE) IT'S A ONE OUT OF ONE ON TRIP, CORRECT." [TO FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, RE: 03-23-90 1B DIESEL TRIP). 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 19 2 COURSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION PROBLEMS WITH CALCON SWITCHES. (WITH CASH, FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, HOIMES, MOSBAUGHj. 10 19900323 EDG COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNING AND THE DAMN THINGS JUST DECIDED TO STOP?" (CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, CASH, HOINES, BRINEY).
=
10 19900323 EDG CASH 20 2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP SIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE OUT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 DEGREES." (TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HOLMES, COURSEY.) 10 19900323 EDG FREDERICKS 21 15 QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR QUALITY, CLEANLINESS OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN MATERIAL. (TO: BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HOIMES, COURSEY, CASH.) 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE WORST TEMPERATURE SWITCHES YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNK." (TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, COURSEY, HOIMES.) 10 19900323 ~ EDG BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER Ih0KED AT THE CALIBRATION PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, HOW IN THE HELL CAN WE PUT THIS ON ... A DIESEL 7"[FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH,
- KOCHERI, COURSEY, HOLMES.]
48 10 19900323 EDG KOCHERY 23 13 "THE CALCON SWITCHES HAVE A LOT OF PART 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW?" [TO FRIDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, BRINEY, COURSEY, HOLMES.) 10 19900323 EDG CASH 23 13 a...YOU GOT TWO ALARMS. ONE IS HIGH LUBE OIL OUT, HIGH LUBE OIL TEMP. OUT, IT'S 190 DEGREES." [TO BRINEY, KOCHERY, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH) 10 19900323 EDG BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE... IT'S RIDICULOUS." [ REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERY, COURSEY, HOLMES.) 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 10 " GEORGE [FREDERICKS) POINTED OUT THERE WAS A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE B DIESELS RIGHT AFTER THE MAINTENANCE WORKED ON IT." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 16 "IT WASN'T OPERABLE [B DIESEL) SO WE DON'T WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT WITH NO FAILURES AND NO PROBLEMS." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 98 19900508 EDG SWARTZWELDER 60 5 TALKED ABOUT REV 1 TO 4/19/90 ) LER IN PRB. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS). ! 159 19900611 EDG FREDERICKS 7 11 "SHOULDN'T TAKE MORE THAN A COUPLE OF DAYS. I WAS GIVEN THE GUIDELINES THAT IT HAD TO BE DONE BEFORE THE LER WOULD BE SIGNED." [TO MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 3 "HAIRSTON SAYS HE'S GOING TO WRITE HIS OWN [LER REV). MY GUY HASN'T FINISHED YET." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON RE HIS QA " GUY" NOT DONE WITH AUDIT OF EDG STARTS). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 10 "I'M SUPPOSED TO NOT ONLY COME UP WITH A NUMBER; I'M SUPPOSED TO COME UP WITH WHY THE DISCREPANCY EXISTS." [TO MOSBAUGH RE EDG START COUNT). I 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 25 "HOW COULD THEY [ CORPORATE) HAVE REVVED THE NUMBERS? THEY DON'T HAVE THE NUMBERS." [TO MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 25 4 "SOMEBODY CHANGED IT TO SAY
' VALID' STARTS." [TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REV).
160 19900612 EDG HORTON 30 1 "WELL, THE CONSISTENCY IS DOWN THE TUBE BECAUSE THE FIRST LER THAT WENT OUT IS. INCORRECT." (TO AJLUNI, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 EDG AJLUNI 33 6 TALKED TO HORTON AND FREDERICKS ABOUT THE CHANGES IN EDG START INFO FROM COAR TO LER TO REV1 OF LER.
49 167 19900615 EDG MOSELY 67 14 "I'VE TABULATED THE DATA, BUT... HAVEN'T...DONE ANY COUNTING IN TERMS OF VALID FAILURES, VALID STARTS..." [TO MOSBAUGH) [MOSELY IS QA WHO OBTAINED EDG START DATA FOR FREDERICKS-IN AUDIT FOR REV TO LER). 184 19900830 EDG 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184.19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 21 " ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." [RE LETTER 8/30 CofutECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, . 'MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). J j 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE
- OUT WITHOUT YOU [PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30
;- LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, j COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
184 19900830 EDG GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT ! WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL j SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." [TO BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). ! 186 19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "OKAY, THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH) WENT AND , COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS j i ' HAIRSTON, I'D SAY ' WHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE LER REV). 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 39 21 "AND APPARENTLY JUST WHEN ! HARRY MAJORS AND THE STAFF UP THERE IN CORPORATE, THE WORD l ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST' GOT PUT IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM , RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER). , l l.
- 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 40 25 ...AND WHEN IT [COAR) SAYS l
! 'NO PROBLEMS OR FAILURES DURING ANY OF THESE STARTS' THAT BURNS
- YOU UP." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER).
186-19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 42 22 " ...WHAT THEN THEY'RE
~
j [ CORPORATE] GOING TO DO IS SAY A MORE ACCURATE MEASURE OF THE RELIABILITY WAS THE VALID..." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV). t
- . 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 45 4 " ...I THINK THAT'S [THE i ' SUBSEQUENT TO EVENT' TERMINOLOGY) WHAT HARRY'S [ MAJORS) GOING TO j USE...I MAY HAVE TO PUT SOME WORDS IN THE AUDIT REPORT BASED ON i THAT." [To MOSBAUGH,.ODOM RE LER REV).
4
-187'19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY
! MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE l I i- HIMSELF." [TO MOSBAUGH,-.TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV).- 1 h- l
, , , _ ,_ . . . . . .-, . , . _ . _ .._ .._. -... .._.-. ....- -- .- - ___._.- ,-,.. m.._,,
50 187 19900629 EDG HORTON 20 12 "WELL, WHAT WAS WRONG WITH OUR DIESEL START RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES?" [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, RE WHETHER PRACTICES WERE CAUSE OF FALSE DATA GIVEN TO NRC 4/9). 187 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 26 23 "THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S LOG IS NOT AN ACCURATE RECORD OF WHAT HAPPENED." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, [ RESPONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCLAIMER AT A LATER POINT." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER- [REV) TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOING TO LET THE COVER LETTER TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST
-PROGRAM 7" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB).
5 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 58 20 AGREED WITH MOSBAUGH THAT THIS l 'NEW LER JUST CHANGED "TO APPLES AND ORANGES." [TO GREENE, i MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). i' I j 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON) PERSONALLY j ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." [THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG , 4 RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES) [TC GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). j i j 187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 53 13 PUT MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 i LETTER IS FALSE. GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS MAJORS FROM HAVING , j TO RESPOND. [To MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS). l , 204 19900713 EDG HORTON 16 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT THEY CLEANED j THE AIR START SOLENOID VALVES AND USED EMERY CLOTH TO " WIDEN THE j CLEARANCES" SO THAT THE VALVES WOULDN'T STICK. [MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). I 1 l 205 19900713 EDG KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR l SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. i 205 19900713 EDG MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT HARGIS l [ RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE' UNIT 1 EDG ALSO. [TO
- FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD).
t i 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE ! THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC i RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) l [ INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). ! 246 19900813 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION ] TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO i l
51 GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) [ ) 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I ] PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU (BAILEY) ON THE 3 PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM l BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED 4 BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND , l OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) l 1 1
- 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I a BELIEVE IT (THE ADDITION OF THE PHR3SE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST i PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE .
j AND ME." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, RAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE i ~ ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER) IN : GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO
- REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." (TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, 3 FREDERICKS).
258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 24 17 " ... ALLEN CAME TO ME AND SAID,
- ' HEY, THE INFORMATION (4/9 EDG START INFO]IS WRONG' AND I TOLD j ALLEN TO GET THE STAFF TO FIX IT." (TO FREDERICKS, WHO QUESTIONED j IF ANYONE HAD ANY CONTENTION ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF THE 4/9 j DATA.)
l 258 19900817 EDG MCCOY 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19) WAS BASED l ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9) PRESENTATION...THE i CORRECTION TO THE LER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME OR NUMBER..." [TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.) ! 258 19900817 EDG FREDERICKS 27 17 " ...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE ! MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP,...THE REASON WAS LOW JACKET l WATER PRESSURE." [TO MCCOY,BOCKHOLD,J.G.A.,A.M.) 4 258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 11 " ...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE (EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYLOR BELIEVES, e BUT...(HE) BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONAIMISTAKE..." (TO
- MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) (EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYLOR BELIEVES VS. ACTUAL SITUATION.]
i 267 19900829 EDG STRINGFELLOW 47 6 " ...I'M TICKLED TO DEATH THAT...Y'ALL ARE TAKING THIS THING [ CORRECTION OF EDG START DATA) SERIOUSLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T COMFCRTAB*.E WITH IT AT ALL." [TO l, ODOM, FREDERICKS, A.M.) 4 0 4 2. i
. -- - - - - . = - - . . - -- _ . . - - - - . . .- . - . - . . - . .
i 52 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO GREENE 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE PLANT DOES THINGS. AND FROM WHAT...MCCOY SAID THE NRC SAID, I DON'T DISAGREE (WITH NRC)." (TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM GREENE). 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE HE'D TELL MCCOY HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU KNOW, MY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED HERE." [TO GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH). l 99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 53 4 " ...YOUR DEPARTMENT [ OPS) IS 1 PART OF'THIS. CLIQUE. [ MEANING THE CLIQUE HE IS AFRAID TO TELL l ABOUT VEGP'S ATTITUDE ABOUT KEEPING THE PLANT RUNNING.) [TO GREENE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME EXPLANATION DOWN BEI4W." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPLANNED TRIPS." (RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED l AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) (TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 26 19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST MAINTENANCE STARTS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WITH THE NRC." (TO ! BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, GREENE). 184 19900830 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID TEST FAILURES. THAT'S THE ONLY K1ND WE HAVE TO REPORT. DOES IT j AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAILURE TO REPORT?" (TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, i MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S) CALL TO THE NRC, WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.)
'184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN AND NOT Go ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." (TO 'HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR HAIRSTON).
184 19900830 EDG GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE PAPER...IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S LOST. [TO HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPLANATORY PHRASE IN COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED). ! j
l l 53 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, IF IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE, WHY FLAG IT IN THE PORTION OF THE LETTER?" [TO GREENE, HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 184 19900830 EDG HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH UuING THE WORDS " APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE ERRORS IN THE 4/9 LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE THE RESULT OF." [TO BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' [TO BE THE RESULT OF)." [RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER & 4/19 LER) [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF
' ERRORS' IN THE APRIL STH..." [BOCKHOLD TOTALLY OBFUSCATES THE LETTER THAT IS TO COPICCT TFE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOS:stid5I, ALFDENKAMPE).
184 19900830 EDG ICCKMLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE INDIVIDUAL [ CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION) JIMMY [ CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." [TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 44 21 " ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS l LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." [RE LETTER 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGL, AUFDENKAMPE). ; 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE l OUT WITHOUT YOU [PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30 LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON,,FREDERICKS, COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l l 184 19900830 EDG GREENE 5; o "LET THE PRB M1.UTES REFLECT THAT WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN.", [TO BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 186 19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "OKAY, THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH) WENT AND , COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS l HAIRSTON, I'D SAY tviHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, NCSBAUGH RE LER REV).
54 187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 42 9 PUTS GREENE ON NOTICE THAT ATTRIBUTING THE ERROR IN EDG STARTS TO POOR RECORD PRACTICES /END OF TEST PROGRAM IS NOT TRUE. 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, [ RESPONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCIAIMER AT A IATER POINT." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER [REV) TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOING TO LET THE COVER LETTER TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM?" (TO MOSBAUGH,' ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW. THAT'S A KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN BLESSED BY GEORGE (HAIRSTON], SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE (HAIRSTON) AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE..." [TO GREENE RE STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 56 8 GREENE SUGGESTED TO MAJORS TO USE THE WORD " DIFFERENCE" V. " DISCREPANCY" IN LER REV COVER LETTER BECAUSE " DISCREPANCY" MEANT ADMITTING A MISTAKE. MAJORS LIKED THE IDEA. 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 58 20 AGREED WITH MOSBAUGH THAT THIS NEW LER JUST CHANGED "TO APPLES AND ORANGES." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE (HAIRSTON) PERSONALLY ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." (THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES) (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 63 15 PUT MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 LETTER IS FALSE. GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS MAJORS FROM HAVING g TO RESPOND. [TO MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG GREENE 66 15 TRIED TO TALK MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG AIR RECEIVER VALVES STICKING.
- 234 4900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON)
(INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 20 "THE 11TH [7/11/90) INCIDENT'S i-WHEN IT (EDG) FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WE
- FINALLY GOT INTO." (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF i
t !
55 l EDG FAILURES TO NRC). l 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 42 16 "DOES THE RECOGNITION.. 0F THE JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE) START A [ REPORTING) CLOCK AT A DIFFERENT TIME?" [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG GREENE 42 22 " ...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS A [EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTHER l INCIDENT WAS REPORTED AS A 10 CFR 21 ITEM." [TO SHIPMAN, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD] JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" [EDG FAILURE] [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 246 19900813 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 266 19900829 EDG BOCKHOLD 21 4 " ... SUCCESSFUL START MEANT [TO l BOCKHOLD) THE ENGINE STARTED AND RAN SUFFICIENT TIME THAT WE ' WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE MARCH 20TH EVENT. AND...AFTER RUNNING A SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ENGINE COULD HAVE SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF A PROBLEH..." [TO A.M., GREENE,HORTON) l l i
- -- . - - - . - _ . ~ _ . _ _ - - . - --- . - . . _ . - _ _ . - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ 56 STATEMENTS PETTINENT TO HAIRSTON 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 46 9 TALKED ABOUT FSAR REQUIREMENTS AND SOMETIMES NOT BEING ABLE TO MEET THEM. CONCERNED'ABOUT HAIRSTON LETTER [COAR RESPONSE 4/9). STATEMENTS ABOUT AIR QUALITY
-STILL BEING " VALID." [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH).
57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELIDW 88 12 REIAYED HAIRSTON'S QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT EVALUATIONS.THE EQUIP. OPERATOR MADE BEFORE HE TRIED TO RESTART THE DIESEL AFTER IT TRIPPED IN THE SITE AREA EMERGENCY. JGA SAID HE JUST WENT IN AND STARTED PUSHING BUTTONS. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). ; 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 97 4 ASKED'AUFDENKAMPE IF HE HAD
.HAIRSTON'S COAR LETTER, "BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONE..." - AUFDENKAMPE :
INTERRUPTED SAYING "WHERE THEY LIED...I MEAN THEY..." MOSBAUGH FINISHED THE THOUGHT BY SAYING, " ...MADE THAT STATEMENT [NO l FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) PREVIOUSLY." ; 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 100 23 [TO MOSBAUGH) TRYING TO GET "ALL THE HAIRSTON QUESTIONS ANSWERED." WHAT OPERATORS DID BEFORE TRYING TO RESTART THE DIESEL. i 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 103 25 TOLD MOSBAUGH HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THE OPERATOR ACTION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE PROPOSED LER [IMMEDIATELY RESET ANNUNCIATORS), BUT THAT HAIRSTON HAD A PROBLEM WITH IT. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 8 "OTHER QUESTION WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO GET AN ANSWER TO IS TO REASSURE GEORGE [HAIRSTON) THAT WE HAD MORE THAN 20 VALID STARTS SINCE MARCH THE 20TH, LIKE WE SAY IN THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH) MOSBAUGH TOLD SHIPMAN THERE'S A PRCBLEM WITH THE WAY THAT'S STATED. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS THE DATA THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE [HAIRSTON) WROTE AND [BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE . . .EBNETER IAST MONDAY IN ATLANTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T ANY FAILURES IT JUST WASN'T TRUE. 57'19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND S;.'RINGFELLOW GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS COMMENTS. [TO MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 EDG SWARTZWELDER 115 25 TALKED ABOUT HAIRSTON NEEDING TO TALK TO OPERATORS WHO RESET ANNUNCIATORS ON DIESEL IN SITE AREA EMERGENCY. IS CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFICALLY LETTING THESE OPERATORS KNOW THAT Hl.IRSTON WILL NOT YELL AT THEM. [TO CASH,-MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 2 4 PUT WORDS IN EQUIPMENT OPERATOR'S
57 MOUTH ABOUT CHECKING GAGES ON DIESEL BEFORE PUSHING RE-START BUTTON. [ DEI 4ACH, MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER). 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 5 16 DISCUSSED WORDING OF LER. [MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER, DEI 4ACH) . 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 10 8 STATED HIS AWARENESS OF HAIRSTON PERSONALLY INTERVIEWING EQUIP. OPERATORS THAT RE-STARTED EDG AT SITE AREA EMERGENCY. 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 11 2 SUSPECTED HAIRSTON OF " LEADING" THE EDG EQUIP. OPERATOR INTO SAYING WHAT HAIRSTON WANTED HIM TO SAY. 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" [ SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." [ MEANING NO TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELI4W, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 JUST DISAVOW. " [PROBABLY MEANING FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, STRINGFELLOW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER) l " ...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR l TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." [SWARTZWELDER, ! MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l 159 19900611 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 5 17 "H&IRSTON WON'T SIGNOUT THE l LER." [WEBB, MOSBAUGH) [RE REV 1, LER THAT WAS PRB APPROVED AND SENT TO BIRMINGHAM IN MID-MAY). 160 19900612 EDG FREDERICKS 24 3 "HAIRSTON SAYS HE'S GOING TO WRITE HIS OWN [LER REV). MY GUY HASN'T FINISHED YET." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON RE HIS QA " GUY" NOT DONE WITH AUDIT OF EDG STARTS). l 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME ) EXPTMIATION DOWN BELOW." [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, l MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOSE IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPLANNED-TRIPS." [RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) [TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE
-_ .--- . .. . . . - . . - . . - . . - - _ . . - . - ~_-... -- ...-_- .
58 LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN'MY (HAIRSTON'S] CALL TO THE NRC, WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED-THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS] WAS IN ; ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GQ'ING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.) ! 184 19900830 EDG BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I WOULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." (TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 186 19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "OKAY,-THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH] WENT AND COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS l HAIRSTON, I'D SAY ' WHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE LER REV). l i 187 19900629 EDG WEBB 6 9 "HAIRSTON CHANGED AT LEAST 3 OF THEM ; [LER REVS)...AT LEAST 3, BUT SHIPMAN CHANGED ONE OF THEM, I J KNOW." (TO MOSBAUGH]. 187 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE HIMSELF." [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV]. 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. (ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT l THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM] NOW i THAT'S A KEN McCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN BLESSED BY GEORGE [HAIRSTON], SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT."
- 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE I [HAIRSTON] AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE..." [TO GREENE RE i
STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES]. 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON] PERSONALLY j ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." (THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG l RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES] [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). i 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 62 4 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT HAIRSTON CONSCIOUSLY THINKING THAT THE NRC MIGHT INTERPRET THE l " CORRECTION" COVER LETTER AS NOT ADDRESSING THE 4/9 COAR. ! 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I l l PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR] I WORKED WITH YOU [ BAILEY] ON THE i PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR] WHICH WAS SIGNED ' BY...(HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.] l 4 5 8 I i
i i- , b j STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO HORTON l 4 < i 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 40 4- TALKS ABOUT NOT IDSING ANY. TIME GETTING BACK TO MODE 1, PER PROJECTION. (To PARTON, HORTON, 4 MOSBAUGH]. 41 19900411 HORTON 51 4 " HAVEN'T WE GOT ANY GOOD READINGS?" (RE: EDG DEWPOINT / TO BOCKHOLD). . 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 51 6 "NOT ON 2A, 2B." [ RESPONDING TO ! HORTON WHO ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY GOOD DEWPOINT READINGS). 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 51 11 "ACTUALLY, I HEARD ABOUT IT JUST i BEFORE THE MEETING WITH THE NRC." (TO HORTON, KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH, BURMEISTER RE: BAD DEWPOINT READING). 4 76 19900430 MOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. LIST . i OF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. [MOYE, HORTON). l J l j 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 44 2 "AND WE CONTINUED TO FIGHT WITH THE l l NRC THROUGH THE ITT." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON). l 158 19900611 MOSBAUGH 8 23 SAID NRC ITT TEAM AWARE OF DIESEL PROBLEM HISTORY AT VEGP. CITED 100 PLUS WORK ORDERS ON SWITCHES.
- [HORTON).
160 19900612 HORTON 23 14 "I ASSUME FROM CORPORATE MEETING. l THEY'RE CHANGING THE RESPONSE...THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). i j .160 19900612 FREDERICKS 24 3 "HAIRSTON SAYS HE'S GOING TO WRITE HIS OWN [LER REV). MY GUY HASN'T FINISHED YET." (TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON RE HIS QA " GUY" NOT DONE WITH AUDIT OF EDG STARTS). 160 19900612 HORTON 30 1 "WELL, THE CONSISTENCY IS DOWN THE TUBE BECAUSE THE FIRST LER THAT WENT OUT IS INCORRECT." [TO i AJLUNI, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH). 160 19900612 AJLUNI 33 6 TALKED TO HORTON AND FREDERICKS ABOUT l . THE CHANGES IN EDG START INFO FROM COAR TO LER TO REV1 OF LER. 184 19900830 HORTON 7 2 "WELL, THERE'S TWO QUESTIONABLE THINGS
. WE GOTTA RESOLVE, WHETHER WE'RE GOING TO DECLARE THEM [ STARTS]
. SUCCESSFUL OR NOT. ONE ON EACH [ DIESEL) RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF i THE STRING [OF STARTS)." (TO MOSBAUGH). ! l 184 19900830 HORTON 7 23 "WE CAUSED THAT TRIP. IT WOULDN'T i HAVE TRIPPED ON BLACK TUESDAY. I'LL LET' GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) CALL THAT ONE." 4 1
~ - r- , , - , - , - .. --w,, ,e- -v.,- - - - , . r-, .
l i 60 i 184 19900830 HORTON 8 2 "THE B TRAIN IS THE ONE THAT YOU , IDENTIFIED. WHERE IT DIDN'T TRIP, IT SHOULD HAVE." (TO MOSBAUGH l ABOUT A DIFFERENT KIND OF EDG PROBLEM). , 184 19900830 PARTON 9 7 "DID WE COME UP WITH AS MANY
,(SUCCESSFUL STARTS) AS WE THOLD THEM (NRC)?" (TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON).
184 19900830 HORTON 9 8 "NO, WE UNDERSTAND THAT." (TO PARTON, i MOSBAUGH, IN RESPONSE TO PARTON'S QUESTION RE COMING UP WITH AS ' MANY SUCCESSFUL STARTS AS GPC TOLD NRC). 184 19900830 HORTON 15 22 "IT WAS AN UNPLANNED TRIP. I WOULD ! LIKE TO CALL IT AN UNPIANNED TRIP, HOWEVER, DECLARE IT A SUCCESS." [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME EXPLANATION DOWN BELOW." (TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING A ] LETTER FOR MAIRSTON]. ; 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROPOEs IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPLANNED TRIPS." (RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) (TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 HORTOM 26 19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST MAINTENANCE STARTS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WITH THE NRC." (TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, GREENE). 184 19900830 AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID TEST FAILURES. THAT'S THE ONLY KIND WE HAVE TO REPORT. DOES IT AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAILURE TO REPORT?" [TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD,
- MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON).
! 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE LAST SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY [HAIRSTON'S] CALL TO THE NRC, WE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF IT OUT. (CONT.) 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I ifoULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN j AND NOT GO ON AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." (TO HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). i 184 19900830 GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE PAPER...IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S IDST. (TO l HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPLANATORY , PHRASE IN. COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED).. 6 d
l 61 , 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, IF IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE, WHY FLAG IT IN THE PORTION OF THE LETTER?" [TO GREENE, HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). { I 184 19900830 HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH USING THE : l WORDS " APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE ERRORS IN THE 4/9 LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE THE RESULT OF." [To BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' (TO BE THE RESULT OF)." (RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER & 4/19 LER) (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). l 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF I
' ERRORS' IN THE APRIL 9TH..." (BOCKHOLD TOTALLY OBFUSCATES THE LET'ER THAT IS TO CORRECT THE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER) (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 1 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE
-INDIVIDUAL (CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION) JIMMY (CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." (TO GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." (TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 44 21 ...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS LETTER WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD DO." (RE LETTER 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) (TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 BOCKHOLD 45 18 "I AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE OUT WITHOUT YOU (PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." (RE DRAFT 8/30 LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) (TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 19900830 GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT WE USE THE CRITERIA OF TWO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL SHUTDOWN TO BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL RUN." (To BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 187 19900629 FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE HIMSELF." (To MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV). 187 19900629 HORTON 20 12 "WELL, WHAT WAS WRONG WITH OUR DIESEL
r N 62 START RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES?" (TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, RE WHETHER PRACTICES WERE CAUSE OF FALSE DATA GIVEN TO NRC 4/9). 187 19900629 FREDERICKS 26 23 "THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S LOG IS NOT AN ACCURATE RECORD OF WHAT HAPPENED." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON). ; 199 19900711 HORTON 27 15 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT 2A EDG BEING IN A l 72 HOUR LCO DUE TO AN INSUFFICIENT AIR ROLL. IT WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE. 204 19900713 HORTON 16 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT THEY CLEANED THE l AIR START SOLENOID VALVES AND USED EMERY CIDTH To " WIDEN THE CLEARANCES" SO THAT THE VALVES WOULDN'T STICK. [MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 205 19900713 KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. 217 19900724 HORTON 25 11 "BUT WE GOT ANYWHERE BETWEEN A QUART j AND TWO GALIANS. . . (OF JACKET WATER OUT OF THE COMBUSTION AIR DRAIN VALVES) (TO MOSBAUGH). 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR , SURE." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.] 258 19900817 HORTON 20 24 " ...THERE MAY BE A RELATIONSHIP (TO l THE 1B DIESEL AUTO-STARTING] TO ANOTHER SLAVE RELAY TEST." (TO A.M., MANSFIELD, IN ENGINEERING MEETING.) 266 19900829 BOCKHOLD 21 4 " ...SUCf.;ESSFUL START MEANT (TO BOCKHOLD) THE ENGINE STARTED AND RAN SUFFICIENT TIME THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE MARCH 20TH LVENT. AND...AFTER RUNNING A SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ENGINE COULD HAVE SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF A PROBLEM..." (TO A.M., GREENE,HORTON) 267 19900829 HORTON 41 22 " ...WE JUST NEED TO MAKE IT AS i REASONABLY ACCURATE AS WE CAN, BECAUSE THE LIABILITY I SEE IS SUBSTANTIAL." [TO A.M., RE EDG START DATA STILL BEING COMPILED JUST PRIOR TO ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ON SITE AREA EMERGENCY.]
I 1 63 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO KITCHENS 41 19900411 EDG BOCKHOLD 52 6 "I'LL WRITE A NOTE TO SKIP , KITCHENS ON THIS THING." [ ACKNOWLEDGES KOCHERY'S NOTIFICATION ! ABOUT RUNNING COMPRESSORS WITH AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE). j 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 10 " GEORGE [FREDERICKS) POINTED OUT i THERE WAS A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE B DIESELS RIGHT AFTER THE 1 MAINTENANCE WORKED ON IT." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). i 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 16 "IT WASN'T OPERABLE [B DIESEL) , j SO WE DON'T WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT WITH NO FAILURES AND NO i PROBLEMS." [TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 4 57 19900419 EDG KITCHENS 63 21 " ... STARTED MORE THAN 20 TIMES 7 EACH...WHATEVER NUMBER...MAKE SUTE IT'S NOT A FALSE STATEMENT." [TO PRB RE:LER) 75 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 47 17 SHOWED KITCHENS THE j COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS AND POINTED OUT FAILURES. [TO i 1 KITCHENS). s j 75 19900430 EDG-SWARTZWELDER 53 12 A CONVERSATION WITH MOSBAUGH ABOUT " PROBLEMS" IN MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE EDG START LIST. [TO l MOSBAUGH, KITCHENS). { 76 19900430 EDG MOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. i LIST OF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. [MOYE, HORTON). { 205 19900713 EDG KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. 205 19900713 EDG MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT MARGIS ! RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE UNIT 1 EDG ALSO. [TO l FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD). j I l l 1 i
, , _ . _ . . . . _ - . , . - . . . . _ _ . , _ . . _ . . . . _ _ . . .~, , ,_--,.v . _ .
- 64 4 l
STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO MAJORS 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 39 21 "AND APPARENTLY JUST WHEN l HARRY MAJORS AND THE STAFF UP THERE IN CORPORATE, THE WORD ;
- ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST' GOT PUT IN THERE." (TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER).
i' 186 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 45 4 " ...I THINK THAT'S (THE l j ' SUBSEQUENT TO EVENT' TERMINOIDGY) WHAT HARRY'S [ MAJORS) GOING TO USE...I MAY HAVE TO PUT SOME WORDS IN THE AUDIT REPORT BASED ON THAT." (TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV). l 1 i l 186 19900629 EDG ODOM 47 21 "I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT [' SUBSEQUENT
- TO THE EVENT' TERMINOLOGY) CAMEFROM . I JUST CALLED HARRY 1
(MAJORS) AND TOLD HARRY, 'STOP THE PRESS. IT'S NOT RIGHT.'" (TO j MOSBAUGH, TYNAN). i'
-187 19900629 EDG FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY )
- MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE IAST SENTENCE HIMSELF." (To MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV).
- 187 19900629 EDG' MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, (RESPONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL ,
j RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCIAIMER AT A IATER POINT." (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB]. ! 187 19900629' EDG MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT l THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW i THAT'S A KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN BLESSED BY i GEORGE (HAIRSTON), SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD j WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE 8 4 (HAIRSTON) AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE..." (TO GREENE RE STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). i 167 19900629 EDG GREENE 56 8 GREENE SUGGESTED TO MAJORS TO USE i THE WORD " DIFFERENCE" V. " DISCREPANCY" IN LER REV COVER-LETTER BECAUSE " DISCREPANCY" MEANT ADMITTING A MISTAKE. MAJORS LIKED 4 THE IDEA.
, 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 58 20 AGREED WITH MOSBAUGH THAT THIS NEW LER JUST CHANGED."TO APPLES AND ORANGES." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS).
4 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 59 23 " GEORGE (HAIRSTON) PERSONALLY ZEROED IN ON THOSE WORDS." (THE DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO EDG RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES) [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 62 4 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT HAIRSTON 4 CONSCIOUSLY THINKING THAT THE NRC MIGHT INTERPRET THE l
i l l 65 I
" CORRECTION" COVER LETTER AS NOT ADDRESSING THE 4/9 COAR. l 187 19900629 EDG MOSBAUGH 63 15 PUT MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 LETTER IS FALSE. GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS MAJORS FROM HAVING TO RESPOND. [TO MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS). ,
l 1 1
l 4 66 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO MANSFIELD 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 44 2 "AND WE CONTINUED TO FIGHT WITH THE i NRC THROUGH THE ITT." [TO MOSBAUGH,'HORTON).
^
. 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 44 19 " ...THE ATTITUDE IS WE'RE NOT GOING j TO GET OUR LICENSE IF WE DON'T DO WHAT THEY [NRC) WANT. NOW l WE'VE GOT OUR LICENSE AND WE'RE FIGHTING." [TO MOSBAUGH).
! 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 7 "THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN IS I
THAT YOU DON'T OPERATE IT SAFELY AND YOU INJURE PEOPLE." [TO i MOSBAUGH, PARTON).
- 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 13 " ...WE GO TO EXTREMES WITH TECH f SPEC INTERPRETATIONS TO KEEP THIS PLANT RUNNING AND WE'VE DONE IT 2 FOR YEARS." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON).
1 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 24 "WE [GPC/VEGP) HAVE AN ATTITUDE _THAT BRINGING THIS PLANT DOWN IS THE WORST THING THAT COULD : i HAPPEN. AND IT'S NOT THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN." [TO
- MOSBAUGH, PARTON). ,
i l 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE j PLANT DOES THINGS. AND FROM WHAT...MCCOY SAID THE NRC SAID, I i DON'T DISAGREE [WITH NRC)." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM GREENE). } 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE HE'D TELL MCCOY ! HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN i FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU KNOW, MY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED HERE." [TO f GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 53 4 ' , ...YOUR DEPARTMENT [ OPS) IS PART OF , THIS CLIQUE. [ MEANING THE CLIQUE HE IS AFRAID TO TELL ABOUT VEGP'S ATTITUDE ABOUT KEEPING THE PLANT RUNNING.) [TO GREENE). , 199 19900711 MOYE 11 1 TALKED TO MOSBAUGH, MANSFIELD, l BURWINKLE, ABOUT THE 4TH TIME THE SAME PROBLEM HAS HAPPENED TO ! THE 2A EDG. 199 19900711 MANSFIELD 11 6 TO MOSBAUGH, BURWINKLE, MOYE ABOUT' i CHAFFEE TELLING THEM THEY COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE 3/20 EVENT BY ' BEING MORE PERSISTENT IN RESOLVING REPEAT PROBLEMS WITH THE DIESELS . 4 i 199 19900711 MANSFIELD 14 3 TOLD MOSBAUGH, MOYE ABOUT AN INSUFFICIENT " AIR ROLL" BEING A DIESEL PROBLEM. 200 19900711 MOSBAUGH 8 1 TO MANSFIELD, KOCHERY, STOKES ABOUT ) EDG AIR ROLL PROBLEMS. 1 I ) + 216 19900724 MANSFIELD 4 14 "DID YOU HEAR WE HAD A DIESEL FAIL 4 i i
67 TO START 7" (TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDr.NKAMPE).
" ...THE CONTAINMENT COOLING 222 19900727 MANSFIELD 37 4 '
FUNCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN DEGRADED. I MEAN, THAT'S A LIE...IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NON-EXISTANT." (To MOSBAUGH RE LER ON EDG TAPING). 222 199C0727 MANSFIELD 38 6 " ...A BLATANT LIE." [ FINISHED MOSBAUGH'S STATEMENT ABOUT TAPED DIESEL LER. 222 19900727 MANSFIELD 38 17 "So AL, I4SS OF A SAFETY FUNCTION FROM A SINGLE EVENT IS A 4 HOUR REPORT. HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH THAT WHEN YOU FIND OUT ABOUT IT MONTHS LATER?" (TO MOSBAUGH RE EDG TAPING). 222 19900727 HINES 39 17 " DIESEL GENERATOR 1A CONTROL AIR LEAK AND THERE IS NOT AN LCO WRITTEN AGAINST IT." [TO MOSBAUGH, MANSFIELD). 258 19900817 HORTON 20 24 ...THERE MAY BE A RELATIONSHIP [TO THE IB DIESEL AUTO-STARTING] TO ANOTHER SLAVE RELAY TEST." [TO A.M., MANSFIELD, IN ENGINEERING MEETING.] l l i l l l a 'I
I 6
.j 68 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO MCCOY ,.
58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. i [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). ; i 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" l [ NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) { [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). ! 58 19900419 EDG BOCKHOLD 9 6 TOLD MCCOY THAT EDG START COUNT NUMBERS IN 4/9 PRESENTATION BEGAN AFTER COMP. TEST PROGRAM. , [EITHER DOESN'T KNOW OR IS B.S. ING MCCOY). f 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE ! USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, MCCOY). r 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T ; HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" [ SHIPMAN, STRINGFELI4W, l MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). ! 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." [ MEANING NO TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELI4W, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, l MCCOY). ) 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." [PROBABLY MEANING I FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, STRINGFELLOW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE) 58.19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER)
...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." [SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
99 19900508 EDG MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE PLANT "OES THINGS. AND FP.ON WHAT...MCCOY SAID THE NRC SAID,-I DON'T DISAGREE [WITH NRC)." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM GREENE]. 99 19900508' EDG MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE.HE'D TELL MCCOY HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU KNOW, MY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED HERE." [TO GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH). o i
+ ~ , . . , . . -
- j. i 69
! )
i 159 19900611 EDG SHEBANI 36 17 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) APPARENTLY HAD A DISCUSSION WITH MCCOY, AND GEORGE DID DIRECT TO TOM [WEBB) , j WHAT HE WANTS PUT IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH RE REV.TO LER). l i 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 54 24 "RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT THAT ORIGINAL LER INCLUDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) NOW : 1 THAT'S A KEN MCCOY ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN BLESSED BY ! GEORGE (HAIRSTON), SO IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD I WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." j p 187 19900629 EDG MAJORS 55 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE ; {'rin e r_ _- p ([HAIRSTON]
'riENTAND ABOUT KEN MCCOY poult mrw-DESIGNED nyconn reepn: SENTENCE..."
,- m yc;;g, ,
i 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR 3 SURE." (TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.) 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU'[ BAILEY) ON THE ] PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM l i ~ BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER (4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED i BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, ---- i l ! 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 11 9 [ CONT'D) ---SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 56 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I
/ BELIEVE IT [THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST
/ PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE AND ME." [TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.]
l 1 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO (RE ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER] IN 4
/ GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO
- REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." (TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, l FREDERICKS).
l 258 19900817 EDG MCCOY 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19] WAS BASED ON THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9) PRESENTATION...THE CORRECTION TO THE TER IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF TIME OR NUMBER..." (TO BOCKHOLD, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.) 258 19900817- EDG FREDERICKS 27 17 " ..THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE . . MIDDLE OF THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP,...THE REASON WAS LOW JACKET WATER. PRESSURE." (TO MCCOY,BOCKHOLD,J.G.A.,A.M.)
~
258 19900817 EDG BOCKHOLD 32 11 " . . . WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE (EDG START) COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYLOR BELIEVES, BUT...[HE) BELIEVES IT WASN'T AN INTENTIONALMISTAKE..." (TO 4
,rw- - - - - - - - - - - -
i 4 4
- 1. ~
l 70 l t l . , i MCCOY, J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) [ EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYIDR BELIEVES VS.' ACTUAL SITUATION.J ' 1 i i i l i
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71 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO MCDONALD 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER]
" ...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." [SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
j 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD) JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" [EDG FAILURE] [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). Y f ] I l I i 1 9 1
1 l: 72 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO ODOM 57 19900419 AUFDENKAMPE 118 25 "WHAT BIRMINGHAM IS THINKING NOW IS THEY MADE A MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT IN THE APRIL 9TH LETTER. [To MOSBAUGH, ODOM). 57 19900419 WEBB 123 19 "WE NEED TO GET RID OF THE STATEMENT IN THE LER ABOUT HOW MANY FAILURES OR HOW MANY TESTS YOU'VE GOT ALTOGETHER, OR ELSE CORRECT THE MISCONCEPTION THAT WE GENERATED ON 4-9. I DON'T KNOW IF WE SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE THE MISCONCEPTION..."[AM,GDOM, AUFDEN) 159 19900611 MOSBAUGH 38 9 TALKED ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO UTE
" VALID" IN LER REV TO REFER TO EDG TESTS. [TO ODOM).
168 19900618 ODOM 51 13 TALKED TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT STALLING ON A WAIVER, AND ABOUT A TOTAL RE-WRITE OF THE LER REVISION. 186 19900629 EDG ODOM 38 20 "OKAY, THEN YOU [MOSBAUGH) WENT AND COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT NUMBERS. IF I WAS HAIRSTON, I'D SAY ' WHOA'." [TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE LER REV). 186 19900629 FREDERICKS 39 21 "AND APPARENTLY JUST WHEN HARRY MAJORS AND THE. STAFF UP THER11 IN CORPORATE, THE WORD ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST' GOT PUT IN THERL" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER). 186 19900629 FREDERICKS 40 25 " ...AND WHEN IT [COAR) SAYS 'NO PROBLEMS OR FAILURES DURING ANY OF THESE STARTS' THAT BURNS YOU UP." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER). 186 19900629 FREDERICKS 42 22 " ...WHAT THEN THEY'RE [ CORPORATE) GOING TO DO IS SAY A MORE ACCURATE MEASURE OF THE RELIABILITY WAS THE VALID..." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV). 186 19900629 FREDERICKS 45 4 " ...I THINK THAT'S [THE
' SUBSEQUENT TO EVENT' TERMINOIDGY) WHAT HARRY'S [ MAJORS) GOING TO USE...I MAY HAVE TO PUT SOME WORDS IN THE AUDIT REPORT BASED ON THAT." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV).
186 19900629 ODOM 47 21 "I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT [' SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT' TERMINOLOGY) CAMEFROM . I JUST CALLED HARRY [ MAJORS) AND TOLD 'iARRY, 'STOP THE PRESS. IT'S NOT RIGHT.'" [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN). 186 19900629 TYNAN 47 24 "WHY CAN'T WE GET THROUGH WHAT WE [PRB) KEEP APPROVING AND SENDING OFF SITE 7" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE DRAFTS OF LER REV'S). 186 19900629 ODOM 48 13 "YOU WRITE THE NRC AND TELL THEM THE ! FALSE STATEMENT IN THE REVISION. . .YOU DON'T TRY A MINOR
73 TYPORGRAPHIC ERROR. YOU TELL WHY YOU KNOW." (To MO9BAUGH, TYNAN RE LER REV). r 187 19900629 MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, (RESPONSIBILITY OF ' AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DISCLAIMER AT A LATER POINT." (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, , ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). ! 187 19900629 GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER (REV) ! TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOING TO LET THE COVER LETTER i TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM 7" (TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). , 264 19900828 ODOM 39 18 "IT'S GOT A MIND OF ITS OWN." (REFERS ! TO AN INADVERTENT, UNEXPLAINED UNIT 1 DIESEL START ON 8/16-17/90.) (TO A.M., COPELAND.) 267 19900829 STRINGFELIDW 47 6 " ...I'M TICKLED TO DEATH l THAT...Y'ALL ARE TAKING THIS THING (CORRECTION OF EDG START DATA) SERIOUSLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T COMFORTABLE WITH IT AT ALL." (TO ODOM, FREDERICKS, A.M., DANNEMILLER.] 1 4 s
, -- n , ,
.I l
l 1 74 , 1 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO PARTON 1 41 19900411 BOCKHOLD 40 4 TALKS ABOUT NOT I4 SING ANY TIME GETTING BACK TO MODE 1, PER PROJECTION. [TO PARTON, HORTON, MOSBAUGH). 83 PARTON 7 5 "WHAT SHOULD THE LER SAY?" (TO MOSBAUGH RE REV 1 TC THE LER). 1 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 7 "THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT YOU DON'T OPERATE IT SAFELY AND YOU INJURE PEOPLE." (TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 13 " ...WE GO TO EXTREMES WITH TECH SPEC INTERPRETATIONS TO KEEP THIS PLANT RUNNING AND WE'VE DONE IT FOR YEARS." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 48 24 "WE [GPC/VEGP) HAVE AN ATTITUDE THAT BRINGING THIS PLANT DOWN IS THE WORST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN. AND IT'S NOT THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE PLANT DOES THINGS. AND FROM WHAT...MCCOY SAID THE NRC SAID, I ; DON'T DISAGREE [WITH NRC)." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM GREENE). i 99 19900508 MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE HE'D TELL MCCOY ; HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN l FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU KNOW, MY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED HERE." (TO GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH). 184 19900830 PARTON 9 7 "DID WE COME UP WITH AS MANY (SUCCESSFUL STARTS) AS WE THOLD THEM (NRC)?" (TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON). 184 19900830 HORTON 9 8 "NO, WE UNDERSTAND THAT." [TO PARTON, MOSBAUGH, IN RESPONSE TO PARTON'S QUESTION RE COMING UP WITH AS MANY SUCCESSFUL STARTS AS GPC TOLD NRC). J 4 9 i
- --r -
I 75 r , STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO RUSHTON , i 95 19900504 EDG SHIPMAN 20 4 "SO YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN WAS THAT WE HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE SWITCH..." [To RUSHTON, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, RE CALCON SWITCHES). , 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC i RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) , (INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). , 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 20 "THE 11TH [7/11/90) INCIDENT'S WHEN IT (EDG) FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WE FINALLY GOT INTO." (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF > EDG FAILURES TO NRC). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 42 16 "DOES THE RECOGNITION.. 0F THE JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE) START A (REPORTING) CIDCK AT A , DIFFERENT TIME 7" (TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). '
" ...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS 234 19900803 EDG GREENE 42 22 A (EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTN.ER INCIDENT WAS REPORTED AS A 10 CFR 21 ITEM." (TO SHIPMAN, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH).
234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD) JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" (EDG FAILURE) (TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 4 I
l l 76 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO SHIPMAN 1 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELI4W 91 21 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE WAS OFF THE PHONE, HE WOULD RUN IN AND TELL SHIPMAN WHAT AUFDENKAMPE AND MOSBAUGH TOLD HIM. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 100 23 (To MOSBAUGH) TRYING TO GET "ALL THE HAIRSTON QUESTIONS ANSWERED." WHAT OPERATORS DID BEFORE TRYING TO RESTART THE DIESEL. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 103 25 TOLD MOSBAUGH HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THE OPERATOR ACTION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE PROPOSED LER [IMMEDIATELY RESET ANNUNCIATORS), BUT THAT HAIRSTON HAD A PROBLEM WITH IT. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 8 "OTHER QUESTION WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO GET AN ANSWER TO IS TO REASSURE GEORGE [HAIRSTON) THAT WE HAD MORE THAN 20 VALID STARTS SINCE MARCH THE 20TH, LIKE WE SAY IN THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH) MOSBAUGH TOLD SHIPMAN THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THAT'S STATED. 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS l THE DATA THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE [HAIRSTON) WROTE AND (BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE ...EBNETER LAST MONDAY IN ATLANTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T ANY FAILURES IT JUST WASN'T TRUE.
" ... THE B MACHINE, ON 3-22 AT 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 105 5 12:43 THE MACHINE TRIPPED ON HIGH LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE." (TO i SHIPMAN).
57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 105 18 "WE COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM l THAT'S CREATED BY THAT INFORMATION [THE 3-22 TRIP) BY SAYING NO VALID FAILURES." (TO MOSBAUGH). 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 105 21 "I THINK WE GOT ANOTHER ONE (FAILURE). IT IS ON 3-23 ATG 17:31. THE B MACHINE ... TRIPPED ON LOW JACKET WATER PRESSURE / LUBE OIL PRESSURE LOW." (TO SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 106 4 " ...THIS THING'S ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THE PRB A COUPLE OF TIMES. HOW IN THE WORLD DID IT GET THROUGH THE PRB?" (TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 107 20 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THIS WHOLE STATEMENT [ DIESEL STARTS WITH NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) NEEDS TO BE STRICKEN." [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 8 "CERTAINLY, IF IT'S NOT A VALID STATEMENT, WE WOULD NEED TO GET IT THE HECK OUT OF HERE REGARDLESS OF WHAT GEORGE TOLD EBNETER." [TO MOSBAUGH,
77 STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND STRINGFELLOW GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS COMMENTS. [TO MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST' PROGRAM. [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" [ NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). i 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE ' USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, I MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, MCCOY). I 1 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 10 8 STATED HIS AWARENESS OF HAIRSTON PERSONALLY INTERVIEWING EQUIP. OPERATORS THAT RE-STARTED EDG AT SITE AREA EMERGENCY. 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 11 2 SUSPECTED HAIRSTON OF " LEADING" THE EDG EQUIP. OPERATOR INTO SAYING WHAT HAIRSTON WANTED HIM TO SAY. 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" [ SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." [ MEANING NO TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY). . 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." [PROBABLY MEANING FOR McCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, STRINGFELI4W, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 20 20 " ...AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED BECAUSE THAY WERE PART OF THE RETURNING TO SERVICE OF j THE DIESEL..." [RE: 3/22 AND 3/23 TRIPS) [MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l l 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 23 7 "THE PROBLEM WITH THAT IS THAT i THAT NUMBER [EDG STARTS) IS GOING To BE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN WHAT GEORGE TOLD MR. EBNETER, AND, YOU KNOW, IT'S GOING TO CREATE A SELLING JOB FOR ME, I THINK, BUT EVENTUALLY THAT'S THE ONLY WAY WE CAN TELL A VALID STORY.. 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 23 8 " ...[ CONT. OF PG. 23, LINE 7) THAT YOU KNOW, WE CAN DEFEND. IF SOMEBODY CALLS ALLEN MOSBAUGH, BILL SHIPMAN, AND JOHN AUFDENKAMPE AGAIN TO TESTIFY, THAT'S THE STORY I WANT TO TELL." [TO MOSBAUGH, AUTENDKAMPE RE COUNTING STARTS
i 78 l l AFTER DIESEL DEC. OPERABLE) 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKMAN AND EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF THE NUMBERS IN BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, l AUFENDKAMPE) 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER) l
" ...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND i l
GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." [SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 95 19900504 EDG SHIPMAN 20 4 "SO YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN WAS THAT WE HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE SWITCH..." [TO RUSHTON, i BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, RE CALCON SWITCHES). l 187 19900629 EDG WEBB 6 9 "HAIRSTON CHANGED AT LEAST 3 OF THEM [LER REVS)...AT LEAST 3, BUT SHIPMAN CHANGED ONE OF THEM, I KNOW." [TO MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIZE l THE JULY STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT, PRIOR TO THE NRC RESIDENTS RAISING THE QUESTION?" [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) [ INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 38 20 "THE 11TH [7/11/90) INCIDENT'S I WHEN IT [EDG) FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WE FINALLY GOT INTO." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF EDG FAILURES TO NRC). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 40 8 "IT'S IMPORTANT FOR ME TO KNOW THAT WE IDENTIFIED..." [THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 7/5 AND 7/11 EDG FAILURES, AS OPPOSED TO THE NRC ID'ING IT). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 42 16 "DOES THE RECOGNITION...OF THE JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE] START A [ REPORTING) CLOCK AT A DIFFERENT TIME 7" [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG GREENE 42 22 " ...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS A [EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTHER INCIDENT WAS REPORTED AS A 10 trR 21 ITEM." [TO SrfIPMAN, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 234 19900803 EDG SHIPMAN 43 15 " YEA, PAT [ MCDONALD) JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" (EDG FAILURE] [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR
79 SURE." (TO MCCOY, SHIPMAF, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.) l 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU (BAILEY) ON THE i PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T WE SAY THAT KEN MCCOY AND JIM i BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND ) OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) j 253 19900815 EDG BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCCOY, IF YOU REMEMBER, I BELIEVE IT (THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST
' PROGRAM' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YOUR OFFICE ,
AND ME." (TO MCCOY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP 1 I MANAGERS.] 253 19900815 EDG MCCOY 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO [RE ! ORIGIN OF TERM ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER] IN GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." (To BOCKHOLD, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS). i
I 80 l 5 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO STRINGFELLOW i 57 19900419- EDG STRINGFELIDW 88 12 RELAYED HAIRSTON'S QUESTIONS f ABOUT WHAT EVALUATIONS THE EQUIP. OPERATOR MADE BEFORE HE TRIED t TO RESTART THE DIESEL AFTER IT TRIPPED IN THE SITE AREA EMERGENCY. JGA SAID HE JUS"' WTNT IN AND STARTED PUSHING BUTTONS. ) (TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). l l 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 91 4 "WE THINK THAT'S BASICALLY A j MATERIAL FAIEE STATEMENT." (TO STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, REFERRING ! TO 20 STARTS WITHOUT FAILURES OR PROBLEMS SINCE MAR 20). 1
)
57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 91 7 " ...WE KNOW FOR A FACT THAT THE B DIESEL TRIPPED AT LEAST ONCE AFTER MARCH 20TH." (TO STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 91 8 "ACTUALLY, IT [B DIESEL) TRIPPED TWICE AFTER MARCH 20TH, OR IT HAD AT LEAST TWO SEPARATE PROBLEMS. "(TO STRINGFELI4W) . 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELLOW 91 21 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE WAS OFF THE PHONE, HE WOULD RUN IN AND TELL SHIPMAN WHAT AUFDENKAMPE AND MOSBAUGH TOLD HIM. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). l 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELI4W 94 11 RECOGNIZED THEY "WERE DOWN TO " THE "20 TIMES EACH" QUESTION IN THE WORDING OF THE LER. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 19900419 EDG STRINGFELIDW 96 8 "IT JUST DAWNED ON ME WHAT AL WAS SAYING A MINUTE AGO. IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE SAY NO FAILURES ; OR PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN ANY STARTS, YOU'RE SAYING THAT'S NOT TRUE." "OH, WONDERFUL, O.K." (TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 1 57 19900419 EDG AUFDENKAMPE 96 15 "BECAUSE, YOU KNOW, WE...THIS HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO THE NRC ONCE ALREADY." (STRINGFELIDW RESPONDS BY BY SAYING THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS THINKING). _- m_ . -- _ 57 19900419 EDG MOSBAUGH 105 21 "I THINK WE GOT ANOTHER ONE [ FAILURE). IT IS ON 3-23 ATG 17:31. THE B MACHINE ... TRIPPED ON I I4W JACKET WATER PRESSURE / LUBE OIL PRESSURE IhW." (TO SHIPMAN, STRINGFELLOW). 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 106 4 " ...THIS THING'S ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THE PRB A COUPLE OF TIMES. HOW IN THE WORLD DID IT GET THROUGH THE PRB7" [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIhW) . 57'19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 107 20 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THIS WHOLE STATEMENT (DIESEL STARTS WITH NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) NEEDS TO BE STRICKEN." (TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIhW) .
81 l 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 8 "CERTAINLY, IF IT'S NOT A VALID ! STATEMENT, WE WOULD NEED TO GET IT THE HECK OUT GF HERE l REGARDLESS OF WHAT GEORGE TOLD EBNETER." (TO MOSBAUGH, i 1 STRINGFELIhW) . i 57 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND STRINGFELIhW ; GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS COMMENTS. [TO MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 8 25 "YOU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" (NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELLOW, SHIPMAN). 58 19900419 EDG SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, MCCOY). j i 58 19900419 EDG HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO,- WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" (SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY]. 58 19900419 EDG MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." (MEANING NO l TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, i MCCOY). W .,9900419 EDG SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." (PROBABLY MEANING l FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) (HAIRSTON, STRINGFELLOW, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 222 19900727 EDG MOSBAUGH 39 3 "APPARENTLY, STRINGFELI4W THOUGHT IT [ TAPED EDG) WAS A 4 HOUR." (REPORT REQUIREMENT) [TO MOSBAUGH). i 267 19900829 EDG STRINGFELIDW 47 6 " ...I'M TICKLED TO DEATH THAT...Y'ALL ARE TAKING THIS THING (CORRECTION OF EDG START DATA] SERIOUSLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T COMFORTABLE WITH IT AT ALL." [TO ODOM, FREDERICKS, A.M.) I
82 STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO SWARTZWELDER 57 19900419 SWARTZWELDER 115 23 TALKED ABOUT HAIRSTON NEEDING TO TALK TO OPERATORS WHO RESET ANNUNCIATORS ON DIESEL IN SITE ' AREA EMERGENCY. IS CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFICALLY LETTING THESE OPERATORS KNOW THAT HAIRSTON WILL NOT YELL AT THEM. [To CASH, MOSBAUGH). 58 19900419 HAIRSTON 2 4 PUT WORDS IN EQUIPMENT OPERATOR'S MOUTH ABOUT CHECKING GAGES ON DIESEL BEFORE PUSHING RE-START BUTTON. [ DEI 4ACH, MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER). 58 19900419 HAIRSTON 5 16 DISCUSSED WORDING OF LER. (MOSBAUGH, SWARTZWELDER, DEI 4ACH). 58 19900419 SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER]
'"...THE THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE [MCCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." (SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE).
75 19900430 SWARTZWELDER 53 12 A CONVERSATION WITH MOSBAUGH ABOUT " PROBLEMS" IN MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE EDG START LIST. [TO MOSBAUGH, KITCHENS). 76 19900430 MOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. LIST OF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. [MOYE, HORTON). 98 19900508 SWARTZWELDER 60 5 TALKED ABOUT REV 1 TO 4/19/90 LER IN PRB. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS). !' 246 19900813 BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SPEC. INSPEC. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTZWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) i l l i k s
I 1 1 83 l l STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO TYNAN 75 19900430 MOSBAUGH 35 2 "I COMPLETED MY REVIEW. I FINALLY SORTED OUT ALL THE STARTS, I THINK." [TO TYNAN) (MOSBAUGH GIVING THIS DATA TO BOCKHOLD). 75 19900430 TYNAN 35 21 " THIRTEEN, FIFTEEN, AND SEVENTEEN ARE RIGHT SMACK IN THE MIDDLE." [TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG PROBLEMS IN l THE SERIES OF STARTS). ] 186 19900629 ODOM 47 21 "I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT [' SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT' TERMINOLOGY) CAMEFROM . I JUST CALLED HARRY (MAJORS) AND TOLD HARRY, 'STOP THE PRESS. IT'S NOT RIGHT.'" [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN). l 186 19900629 TYNAN 47 24 "WHY CAN'T WE GET THROUGH WHAT WE ; [PRb] KEEP APPROVING AND SENDING OFF SITE?" [To MOSBAUGH, ODOM l RE DRAFTS OF LER REV'S). ] 186 19900629 ODOM 48 13 "YOU WRITE THE NRC AND TELL THEM THE FALSE STATEMENT IN THE REVISION...YOU DON'T TRY A MINOR TYPORGRAPHIC ERROR. YOU TELL WHY YOU KNOW." [To MOSBAUGH, TYNAN RE LER REV). 187 19900629 MOSBAUGH 14 16 "I'M JUST SAYING THAT THE REV PROPOSED ON 5/8 IS NO DIFFERENT THAN THIS (6/29). NOW WHY WASN'T THAT SUBMITTED?" (TO WEBB, TYNAN). 187 19900629 FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE HIMSELF." (TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV). I
i 1 4 84 i i STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO WEBB > f 10 19900323 WEBB 11 5 "BUT IT TRIPPED." (DISCUSSING EDG WITH KOCHERY & MOSBAUGH). j' 57 19900419- WEBB 123 19 "WE NEED TO GET RID OF THE STATEMENT IN THE LER ABOUT HOW MANY FAILURES OR HOW MANY TESTS YOU'VE GOT ) ALTOGETHER, OR EIEE CORRECT THE MISCONCEPTION THAT WE GENERATED ,
- ON 4-9. I DON'T KNOW IF WE SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE THE i MISCONCEPTION..."[AM,ODON, AUFDEN) ,
j . j 159'19900611 AUFDENKAMPE 5 17 "HAIRSTON WON'T f,IGNOUT THE'LER." j (WEBB, MOSBAUGH) (RE REV 1, LER THAT WAS PRB APPROVED AND SENT TO BIRMINGHAM IN MID-MAY). . 159 19900611 AUFDENKAMPE 6 6 "THEY'RE GOING TO HAVE QA AUDITS." j l [ BIRMINGHAM GOING TO HAVE VEGP SITE QA DO AN AUDIT ON THE DIESEL .
- START COUNTS) (TO MOSBAUGH, WEBB).
! 159 19900611 SHEBANI 36 17 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) APPARENTLY HAD A l DISCUSSION WITH MCCOY, AND GEORGE DID DIRECT TO TOM [WEBB) WHAT i HE WANTS PUT IN THERE." (TO MOSBAUGH RE REV TO LER).
- 160 19900612 WEBB 5 18 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) DID. HE SAID HE 1 WANTED NEW -- NEW INFO." (BOCKHOLD INSTRUCTED WEBB TO USE THE l VALID START TERMINOLOGY IN THE LER REV) (TO MOSBAUCI) .
187 19900629 WEBB 3 15 " ...IT GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL THE < TESTS AFTER THAT MAY HAVE BEEN SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES TOO, AND
- THEY WEREN'T. ...THERE WERE INVALID TESTS IN THERE ALSO." (TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REVS).
l 187 19900629 WEBB 6 9 "HAIRSTON CHANGED AT LEAST 3 OF THEM [LER REVS)...AT LEAST 3, BUT SHIPMAN CHANGED ONE OF THEM, I KNOW." (TO MOSBAUGH). 187 19900629 MOSBAUGH 14 16 "I'M JUST SAYING THAT THE REV i PROPOSED ON 5/8 IS NO DIFFERENT THAN THIS (6/29). NOW WHY WASN'T THAT SUBMT.TTED7" (TO WEBB, TYNAN). 187 19900629 MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, (RESPONSIBILITY OF-l AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL RESERVE THE RIGHT ! TO MAKE A DISCLAIMER AT A LATER POINT." (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). l 4 187 19900629 GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER [REV) TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOING TO LET THE COVER LETTER TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM?" , (TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). t- ) a
STATEMENTS PERTINENT TO VEGP EDG PROBLEMS ) SORTED CHRONOIDGICALLY TAPE DATE SPEAKER PG IE COMMENT 0 02/23/90 0 0 VOGTLE UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN FOR SCHEDULED 45 DAY REFUELING OUTAGE. 0 03/20/90 0 0 VOGTLE SITE AREA EMERGENCY. (APPROX 25 DAYS INTO OUTAGE). 0 03/21/90 0 0 EDG "B" U.ASSEM8 LED. 2 START FAILURES ON "B." ' I O 03/22/90
~
0 0 EDG "B" TRIP. 'HIGH IDBB--OIL TEMPERATURE. *
... o~ , , . . . , .. .. _;.
9 03/23/90 FREDERICKS 4 17' COMMENTED ~THAT HE BELIEVED _THAT IF THE DIESEL WAS AN AIRPIANE, GEORGE WOUID NOT GO UP IN IT. 10 03/23/90 WEBB 11 5 "BUT IT TR'IPPED." (DISCUSSING EDG WITH KOCHERY & MOSBAUGH). 10 03/23/90 ~~ 12 10 VOGTLE CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING WITH DISCUSSION OF 03-23-90 IB DIESEL TRIP. PRESENT: FREDERICKS, HOIJEES, KOCHERY,
- COURSIE, CASH, AND BRINEY.
10 03/23/90 FREDERICKS 12 20 "AND THEN WE STARTED IT A THIRD TIME, AND DURING THAT THIRD RUN, IT. TRIPPED AFTER A COUPLE OF HOURS." [ TALKING ABOUT 18 DIESEL TRIP ON 003-23-90 TO BOIJEES, KOCHERY, COURSEY,' CASH, AND BRINE (CRITIQUE TEAM MEETING).). 10 03/23/90 COURSEY 14 13 "BUT WE REALTX DON'T KNOW WHY 'B' TRIPPED." (SPEAKING TO , FREDERICKS,BRINEY,. CASH, AND OTHERS ON CRITIQUE TEAM). , 10 03/23/90 CASH 14 20 "THEY DIDN.T RESET ANYTHING ON THE.IOCAL CONTROL PANEL. BOTH OF THE AIARMS CAME IN." (CASH PERSONALLY FAMILIAR WITH I 03-23-90 TRIP). I 10 03/23/90 CASH' 15 1 COMMENT SHOWS CASH'S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF 03-23-90 IB DIESEL TRIP. . l 10 03/23/90 CASH 16 9 "I LEFT THE HIGH TEMPERATURE OUT, AND THE TRIP FOR TWO DIFFERENT PRESSURES (IN AUDIBLE) IT'S A ONE OUT OF ONE ON TRIP, CORRECT." (TO FREDERICKS, KOCHERI, BRINEY, RE: 03'23-90 IB DIESEL TRIP . . 1 s
..,1
- /
[ / ' / /L4b t l-j
. ~ _ . . . ~ . - . . - - - i
- . - - . - - . . . . - . . _ . ~ . - - . - . - _ . . _ . - . . _ _ ____ _ . --_.-____
10 03/23/90 COURSEY 19 2 LXKTRSEY DISCUSSED PAST CALIBRATIION PROBLEMS WITH CAICON SWITCHES. [WITH CASH, FREDERICKS, K0CHERI, BRINEY, HOIJtES, MOSBAUGH). 10 03/23/90 COURSEY 19 11 "IN THE PAST, HOW MANY FAILURES HAVE WE HAD WHEN THE DIESELS WERE UP AND RUNNING AND THE DANN THINGS JUST DECIDED TO STOP7" [CALCON SWITCH PROBLEMS TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, CASH, HOIJEES , BRINEY). 10 03/23/90 CASH 20 -2 "IT'S MORE THAN THE TRIP SIGNAL. THE TRIP SIGNAL CAME'IN BY ITSELF WITHOUT (INAUDIBLE) TEMPERATURE QDT... THAT CLEARED IMMEDIATELY'AFTER IT CAME IN. THAT'S AT 190 DEGREES." [TO: FREDERICKS, BRINEY, MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, HODEES, 00URSEY.) , ) 10 03/23/90 FREDERICKS 21 15 QUESTIONED THE DIESEL AIR QUALITY, j j CLEANLINESS OF PNEUMATIC LINES, POSSIBLE FOREIGN MATERIAL. (TO: BRINEY, MO,SBAUGH, j KOCHERI, HOIJtES, COURSEY, CASH. ) 10 03/23/90 BRINEY 23 7 "THESE ARE THE NORST TEMPERATURE 1 j SWITCHES YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN YOUR LIFE. IT'S JUNK." (TO FREDERICKS, CASH, j MOSBAUGH, KOCHERI, COURSEY, HOLMES.] l l 10 03/23/90 BRINEY 23 9 "I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE NEED TO ADVERTISE THAT OR NOT, BUT IF YOU EVER l LOOKED AT THE CALIBRATION PROCESS OF THESE TEMPERATURE SWITCHES, YOU'D SAY, l HOW IN THE HELL CAN WE PUT THIS ON . . . A l DIESEL 7"[FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, ROCHERI, COURSEY, HOIJtES. ) ! 10 03/23/90 K0CHERY 23 13 "THE CAICON SWITCHES HAVE A LOT OF PART i 21'S ON THEM, YOU KNOW7" [To FREDERICKS, 2 CASH, MOSBAUGH, BRINEY, COURSEY, HOIJEES. ) I
- 10 03/23/90 CASH 23 13 "...YOU GOT TNO ALARMS. ONE IS HIGH l
ISBE OIL OUT, HIGH ISBE OIL TEMP. OUT, IT'S 190 DEGREES." [To BRINEY, KOCHERY,
- FREDERIcKS, MOSBhUGH)
^ 10 03/23/90 BRINEY 23 15 "THEN THEY'RE ASKING US TO ACTUALLY SIT THERE AND TAP ON THE SWITCH AS WE CALIBRATE. . . IT'S RIDICUIhUS. " (REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM VENDOR /TO FREDERICKS, CASH, MOSBAUGH, ) EDCHERY, COURSEY, HOIJtES. ] 1 l l
10 03/23/90 HOIJtES 28 19 SAID THE JACKET NATER TEMP. SENSORS ! (CAIrON SWITCHES) HAD TO BE RECALIBRATED EVERY TIME. [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) [ REITERATES ON P.31, IX 12) 10 03/23/90 HOIJEES 33 11 SAID NOTHING HAS.BEEN DONE TO CORRECT CALCON CALIBRATION PROBLEM. "JUST BEEN LIVING WITH IT." [TO CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) ; 10 03/23/90 COURSEY 41 11 ". . .WHAT HE'S GOT M CALIBRATE IS A PIECE OF GARBAGE [CAI40N SWITCHES), AND HE KNOWS THEY'RE ALL GOING TO BIAW." ["HE" COULD BE BRINEY OR VENDOR REP, l SHELDON) [2O CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE l
- TEAM) ;
10 03/23/90 BRINEY 46 15 "MO MANY PEOPLE IN THE BOAT. . ." [TO
~
CASH AND VEGP CRITIQUE TEAM) CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECTION FROM CRITIQUE TEAM AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT.
, 0 03/23/90 0 0 NRC ISSUED CONFIRMATION OF ACTION LETTER i TO GPC.
l 1 0 03/23/90 0 0 EDG "B" TRIP. LOW JACKET WATER ! PRESSURE. 0-03/26/90 0 0 NRC ITT (INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM) ARRIVES AT VOGTLE SITE. f 0 03/27/90 0 0 EDG "B" SUCCESSFUL UNDERVOLTAGE (UV) ! TEST. END OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST PERIOD. f 0 03/28/90 0 0 EDG "B" DECLARED OPERABLE. I O 04/02/90 0 0
- DIESEL GENERATOR MEETING BETNEEN NRC &
L "c-( % ne r m ' m g % 0 04/07/90 0 0 BOCKHOLD, CASH, & BURR ANIEED EDG l 4 START DATA FOR PRESENTATION TO THE NRC j (WEEKEND) . 0 04/09/90 0 0 GPC/VOGTLE VERBAL PRESENTATION TO NRC l RII RE: SITE AREA EMERGENCY. l 0 04/09/90 0 0 COAR (CONFIRMATION OF ACTION RESPONSE) SENT FROM GPC TO NRC. i 41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD 8 4 DISCUSSES NRC GIVING OK TO GO TO MODE 3. ' ! [TO IACKEY, ' 3BAUGH) j j 41 04/11/90 LACKEY 8 22 TALKS ABOUT GOING TO MODE 3 24 HOURS ! AFTER MODE 4. [TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH)
f 41 04/11/90 BURWINKLE 21 13 TALKS ABOUT LACK OF SET PROCEDURE FOR MEASURING DEWPOINT (AIR QUALITY) (TO ,
. STEELE, MOSBAUGH).
I 41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD 40 4 TALKS ABOUT NOT IDSING ANY TIME GETTING 4 BACK TO MODE 1, PER PROJECTION. [TO PARTON, HORTON, MOSBAUGH). ] 41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD 43 5 COMMENTS ABOUT NOT DOING GOOD PM'S ON CHECKING AIR DRYER QUALITY FROM 5/88 TO 5/89. [TO KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH) . WOULD THAT FACT AFFECT "THE STATEMENT WE MADE IN , OUR LETTER 7"
! 41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD G 7 TALKS ABOUT PM P2G' RAM BEING " SUSPECT"
- IN '89. SAID WE DON'T ENOW IF WE HAD GOOD AIR OR BAD AIR. (TO KOCHERY, ,
10SBAUGH) . 41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD 46 9 TALKED ABOUT FSAR REQUIREMENTS AND j SOMETIMES NOT BEING ABLE TO MEET THEM. CONCERNED ABOUT HAIRSTON LETTER (COAR i RESPONSE 4/9). STATEMENTS ABOUT AIR j QUALITY STILL BEING " VALID." (TO i j KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH).
~
41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD 50 16 ". . .ON THE 29TH (MAR 90) OR SO, WE GOT A CRUMMY READING AND NOBODY KNEW ABOUT IT 4 UNTIL MILT HUNT PICKED IT UP." (TO l BURMEISTER, MOSBAUGH, STOKES). 41 04/11/90 MOSBAUGH 50 21 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD), WE HAD A BAD READING [ DEWPOINT / AIR QUALITY) TODAY [4/11/90) 60 DEGREES ON THE 2A DIESEL." ] 41 04/11/90 HORTON 51 4 " HAVEN'T WE GOT ANY GOOD READINGS?" (RE:
- EDG DEWPOINT / TO BOCKHOLD).
41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD 51 6 "NOT ON 2A, 2B." (RESPONDING TO HORTON WHO ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY GOOD , DEWPOINT READINGS). l 41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD 51 11 "ACTUALLY, I HEARD ABOUT IT JUST BEFORE THE MEETING WITH THE NRC." (TO HORTON, KOCHERY, MOSBAUGH, BURMEISTER RE: BAD DEWPOINT READING). ! 41 04/11/90 KOCHERY 52 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT "THEY" STILL RUN THE DIESEL COMPRESSOR EVEN WITH THE AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE. 41 04/11/90 BOCKHOLD 52 6 "I'LL WRITE A NOTE TO SKIP IGTCHENS ON THIS THING." (ACKNOWLEDGES KOCHERY'S NOTIFICATION ABOUT RUNNING COMPRESSORS WITH AIR DRYERS OUT OF SERVICE).
?
I 41 04/11/90 MOSBAUGH 54 1 SUMMARIZED HIS AIR QUALITY CONCERNS. I 41 04/11/90 BEACHER 74 11 COMMENTED TO MOSBAUGH AND AUFDENKAMPE ABOUT TELECOPYING AN APPARENTLY 4 INCOMPLETE DEWPOINT MEASUREMENT HISTORY FOR PAST YEAR TO CHAFFEE (NRC), BROCKMAN (NRC), IDUIS WARD, & KEN BURR. 42 04/11/90 MOSBAUGH 2 16 TO BURWINKLE ABOUT BOCKHOLD CONCIDDING I NO AIR QUALITY PROBLEM BECAUSE OF NO CORROSION IN TANK AND NOTHING ON THE I FILTER. NOT A COMPREHENSIVE EVAIDATION. , 42 04/11/90 BURWINKLE 5 7 " YUP, WHEN YOU GET WATER IN THE J _ PNEUMATIC REIAY, THEY DO GO TO SMIT." ,
...THERE WERE A 00UPLE THAT SHOT WATER AND WE REPIACED AND REPLACED. . . " ,
. . .THEN REGUIA' TORS GOT THAT SMALL ORIFICE." (TO MOSBAUGH). I
\
42 04/11/90 AUFDENKAM?E 13 1 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT IT'S NOT GPC'S i OBLIGATION TO TELL NRC THAT "WE" j (GPC/VEGP) FEEL WE HAVE AIR PROBLEMS OR l THAT WE FOUND AN AIR PROBLEM. ' 42 04/11/90 KOCHERY 28 7 TOLD MOSBAUGH THE A DIESEL HAD NO PROBLEMS, BUT B DIESEL TRIPPED TWICE SINCE 3/20/90 - A HIGH IDBE OIL TRIP ON 3/22/90. - 0 04/12/90 0 0 LETTER FROM NRC TO GPC AUTHORIZING _ RETURN TO POWER OPERATION. 0 04/17/90 0 0 IAST ON-SITE INTERVIEW OF VOGTLE/GPC PERSONNEL BY IIT. 57 04/19/90 KITCHENS 63 10 " GEORGE (FREDERICKS) POINTED OUT THERE j WAS A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE B DIESELS RIGHT AFTER THE MAINTENANCE WORKED ON IT." (TO PRB, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). i 57 04/19/90 KITCHENS 63 16 "IT WASN'T OPERABLE (B DIESEL) SO WE ! DON'T WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT WITH NO . FAILURES AND NO PROBLEMS." [TO PRB, i MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). l
- 57 04/19/90 KITCHENS 63 21 ". . . STARTED MORE 'rHAN 20 TIMES EACH. . .WHATEVER NUMBER. . .MAKE SUTE IT'S l NOT A FALSE STATEMENT." [TO PRB RE:LER) i l 57 04/19/90 STRINGFELIDW 88 12 REIAYED HAIRSTON'S QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT EVAIDATIONS THE EQUIP. OPERATOR MADE BEFORE HE TRIED TO RESTART THE DIESEL AFTER IT TRIPPED IN THE SITE AREA
) ^ EMERGENCY. JGA SAID HE JUST WENT IN AND STARTED PUSHING M7TTONS. [TO MOSBAUGH, t - AUFDENKAMPE). 9 A __ _ -.___ a_r __ ___rrrr _ _ . ___.___ . _ _ _ _1 --
- ~
- .- . - - - -. - -. _ - ~---.- -- - - .-. - - _ -
57 04/19/90 AUFDENKAMPE 91 4 "WE THINK THAT'S BASICALLY A MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT." (TO STRINGFELUMf, [ MOSBAUGH, REFERRING TO 20 STARTS WITHOUT ; FAILURES OR PROBLEMS SINCE MAR 20). ! 57 04/19/90 AUFDENKAMPE 91 7 ". . .WE KNOW FOR A FACT THAT THE B DIESEL l' TRIPPED AT LEAST ONCE AFTER MARCH 20TH." ;. [TO STRINGFELIAMf) . ] 57 04/19/90 MOSBAUGH 91 8 "ACTUALLY, IT (B DIESEL) TRIPPED TWICE AFTER MARCH 20TH, OR IT HAD AT LEAST TNO SEPARATE PROBLEMS. "(TO STRINGFELUNf) . _ 57 04/19/90 STRINGFELIDW 91 21 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE WAS OFF THE PHONE, NE WOULD RUN IN AND TELL SHIPMAN WHAT AUFDENKAMPE AND MOSBAUGH TOLD HIN. [TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 57 04/19/90 STRINGFELI4W 94 11 RECOGNIZED THEY "WERE DOWN TO " THE "20 TIMES EACH" QUESTION IN THE WORDING OF THE LER. (TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) i 57 04/19/90 STRINGFELI4W 96 8 "IT JUST DAWNED ON ME WHAT AL NAS SAYING ; A MINUTE AGO. IN OTHER WORDS, IF NE SAY i NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN ANY STARTS, YOU'RE SAYING THAT'S NOT TRUE."
"OH, WONDERFUL, O.K." (TO AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH) 57 04/19/90 AUFDENKAMPE 96 15 "BECAUSE, YOU KNOW, WE. . .THIS HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO THE NRC ONCE ALREADY." '
(STRINGFELI4Mt RESPONDS BY BY SAYING THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS THINKING). 57 04/19/90 MOSBAUGH 97 4 ASKED AUFDENKAMPE IF HE HAD HAIRSTON'S COAR LETTER, "BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONE. . . " >
- AUFDENKAMPE INTERRUPTED SAYING "WHERE THEY LIED...I MEAN THEY..." MOSBAUGH i FINISHED THE THOUGHT BY SAYING, "...MADE THAT STATEMENT (NO FAILURES OR PROBLEMS) 4 PREVIOUSLY." l.
,j 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 100 23 (TO MOSBAUGH) TRYING TO GET "ALL THE
) HAIRSTON QUESTIONS ANSWERED." WHAT , OPERATORS DID BEFORE TRYING TO RESTART 2 THE DIESEL. - l 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 103 25 TOLD MOSBAUGH HE HAD.NO PROBLEM WITH THE WAY THE OPERATOR ACTION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE PROPOSED LER (IMMEDIATELY RESET ANNUNCIATORS), BUT THAT HAIRSTON HAD A ! PROBLEM WITH IT. i l i 1 .
^
'J-----. - ~ . ~ , -- - -
.~ _. _ ._.
i 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 104 8 "OTHER QUESTION WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO GET ;
- AN ANSWER TO IS TO REASSURE GEORGE '
i (HAIRSTON) THAT WE HAD MORE THAN 20 l VALID STARTS SINCE MARCH THE 20TH, LIKE WE SAY IN THE LER." (TO MOSBAUGH)
- MOSBAUGH TOLD SHIPMAN THERE'S A PROBLEM
! WITH THE WAY THAT'S STATED. 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 104 17 "THE PROBLEM WE GOT ALLEN, IS THE DATA j THAT'S IN THE LER IS WHAT GEORGE i (HAIRSTON) WROTE AND [BOCKHOLD) TOOK AND TOLD TO THE ...EBNETER LAST MONDAY IN ATIANTA." MOSBAUGH RESPONDED THAT IF ANYBODY SAID THERE WEREN'T ANY FAIWRES l IT JUST WASN'T TRUE. ^ 57 04/19/90 MOSBAUGH 105 5 "... THE B MACHINE, ON 3-22 AT 12:43 THE MACHINE TRIPPED ON HIGH WBE OIL
- TEMPERATURE." (TO SHIPMAN). _.
i
- 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 105 18 "WE COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM THAT'S i CREATED BY THAT INFORMATION (THE 3-22 TRIP) BY SAYING NO VALID FAILURES." (10
{ MOSBAUGH). l 57 04/19/90 MOSBAUGH 105_ 21 "I THINK WE GOT ANOTHER ONE [FAIIERE) . IT IS ON 3-23 ATG 17:31. THE B MACHINE
- . . . TRIPPED ON IDW JACKET WATER l PRESSURE /LUSE OIL PRESSURE IDW." (TO l SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW) .
i l 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 106 4 " ...THIS THING'S ALREADY BEEN THROUGH _ j THE PRB A COUPLE OF TIMES. HOW IN THE
- WORLD DID IT GET THROUGH THE PRB7" [TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW) .
l 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 107 20 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THIS WHOLE STATEMENT l' ! (DIESEL STARTS WITH NO FAIIERES OR ! PROBLEMS) NEEDS TO BE STRICKEN." (TO l MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW) . I j 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 108 8 "CERTAINLY, IF IT'S NOT A VALID } STATEMENT, WE WOULD NEED TO GET IT THE i HECK OUT OF HERE REGARDLESS OF WHAT . GEORGE TOLD EBNETER." (TO MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW) . y l 57 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 108 22 SAID THAT HE AND STRINGFELIDW GOING TO HAIRSTON'S OFFICE TO GO OVER HIS
-~ COMMENTS. [TO NOSBAUGH).
- _- ~ . . _ _ _
l 57 04/19/90 SWARTZWELDER 115 25 TALKED ABOUT HAIRSTON NEEDING TO TALK TO i OPERATORS WHO RESET ANNUNCIATORS ON DIESEL IN SITE AREA EMERGENCY. IS CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFICALLY LETTING THESE OPERATVRS KNOW THAT HAIRSTON WILL j NOT YELL AT THEM. [TO CASE, MOSBAUGH).
~
l
~ ~~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~
~.
+ r+M -i J - __ 4, . - J-- -ey- -. -mm4 , a,,m. _,~. uA .m.m.,a sr usgae.. --- , -r- - - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - -
57 04/19/90 AUFDENKAMPE 118 25 "WHAT BIRMINGHAM IS THINKING NOW IS THEY MADE A MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT IN THE APRIL 9TH LETTER. . [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM). 57 04/19/90 WEBB 123 19 "WE NEED TO GET RID OF THE STATEMENT IN THE LER ABOUT HOW MANY FAIIERES OR HOW MANY TESTS YOU'VE GOT ALTOGETHER, OR ELSE CORRECT THE MISCONCEPTION THAT WE GENERATED ON 4-9. I DON'T KNOW IF WE SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE THE MISCONCEPTION. . . "[ AM, ODON, AUFDEN) 58 04/19/90 HAIRSTON 2 4 PUT NORDS EN EQUIPMENT OPERATOR'S MOUTH ABOUT CHECKING GAGES ON DIESEL BEFORE PUSHING RE-START W TTON. [DEIDACH, _ MOSBAUGH, SWART 3 WELDER),
~
58 04/19/90 HAI'RSTON 5 16 DISCUSSED WORDING OF LER. [MOSBAUGH,.
~ -%
SWARTEWELDER, DEIDACH) . -
. . ~ . _ . .
58 04/19/90 NCCOY 8 17 DISCUSSED " MAKING SURE" TO START DIESEL START COUNTS AFTER COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM. [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN). 58 04/19/90 MCCOY 8 25 "YCU OUGHT TO USE THOSE NUMBERS" [ NUMBERS USED BY BOCKHOLD AT 4/9/90 RII PRESENTATION) [AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, SHIPMAN) .
' 58 04/19/90 BOCKHOLD 9 6 TOLD MCCOY THAT EDG START COUNT NUMBERS IN 4/9 PRESENTATION BEGAN AFTER COMP.
TEST PROGRAM. [EITHER DOESN'T KNOW OR IS B.S. ING MCCOY). 58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 9 23 ASKED BOCKHOLD WHAT NUMBERS HE USED IN PRESENTATION 17-18 OR 18-19.[AUFDENKAMPE, BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, STRINGFELIDW, MCCOY) . 58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 10 8 STATED HIS AWARENESS OF HAIRSTON PERSONALLY INTERVIEWING EQUIP. OPERATORS THAT RE-STARTED EDG AT SITE AREA EMERGENCY. 58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 11 2 SUSPECTED HAIRSTON OF " LEADING" THE EDG EQUIP. OPERATOR INTO SAYING WHAT HAIRSTON WANTED HIM TO SAY. 58 04/19/90 HAIRSTON 12 6 "WE GOT THE STARTS - SO WE DIDN'T HAVE NO, WE DIDN'T HAVE NO TRIPS?" [ SHIPMAN, STRINGFELIDW, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE,
- MCCOY).
{ i' i ] =. % , . e. .- * - --e.,+ . , . . .. -
r 58 04/19/90' MCCOY 12 7 "I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT." (MEANING NO TRIPS) (HAIRSTON, SHIPMAN, STRINGFELION, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY) . t %4 58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 12 8 "JUST DISAVOW." (PROBABLY MEANING FOR MCCOY TO DISAVOW ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EDG TRIPS) [HAIRSTON, STRINGFELIDW,
~ ._ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _
AUFDENKAMPE, MCCOY, MOSBAUGH). 58 04/19/90 BURWINKLE 19 19 "HAVE YOU GUYS FIGURED OUT HOW COME THE DIESEL STARTS WHEN IT AIN'T SUPPOSED TO7" _ u-58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 20 20 "...AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED BECAUSE THAY WERE PART OF THE RETURNING TO SERVICE OF THE DIESEL..." (RE: 3/22 AND 3/23 TRIPS) (NOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE) . 58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 23 7 "THE PROBLEM WITH THAT IS THAT THAT NUMBER [EDG STARTS) IS GOING TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN WHAT GEORGE TOLD MR. EBNETER, AND, YOU KNOW, IT'S GOING TO CREATE A SELLING JOB FOR ME, I THINK, BUT EVENTUALLY THAT'S THE ONLY WAY WE CAN TELL A VALID STORY. .
- 58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 23 8 " . . . ( CONT. OF PG. 2 3, LINE 7) THAT YOU KNOW, WE CAN DEFEND. IF SOMEBODY CALLS ALLEN MOSBAUGH, BILL SHIPMAN, AND JOHN j AUFDENKAMPE AGAIN TO TESTIFY, THAT'S THE i STORY I WANT TO TELL." [TO MOSBAUGH, I AUFENDKAMPR BR COUNTING STARTS AFTER I DIESEL DEC. OPERABLE) 58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 27 6 STATED THAT SINCE THEY HAD STARTED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THE EDG COUNTS IN THE LER THAT AFTERNOON, MCCOY HAD CALLED BROCKNAN AND EXPIAINED THE BASIS OF THE NUMBERS IN i l
BOCKHOLD'S NRC PRESENTATION. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFENDKAMPE) k 58 04/19/90 SHIPMAN 31 7 [RE VEGP SITE HELP ON 4/19 LER) ". . .THE ! THING HAS SUCH A POLITICAL IMPACT THAT kf KEN, PAT, AND GEORGE [McCOY, MCDONALD, HAIRSTON) WANTED TO FINE TUNE IT FOR TECHNICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS." (SWARTZWELDER, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 58 04/19/90 AUFDENKAMPE 34 12 STATED THAT IT REALLY DOESN'T MATTER WHAT START COUNT IS PUT IN THE LER, BECAUSE IF NRC DISAGREES, GPC WILL JUST j ISSUE A REVISION [TO MOSBAUGH) . ' l i
l 58 04/19/90 CASH 35 19 STATED NOT SURE IF HE TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT FAIWRES IN EDG COUNT FOR NRC )
; PRESENTATION. SAID BOCKHOLD KNEN ABOUT FAIWRES. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). ~ } 58 04/19/90 CASH 36 3 STATED HE STARTED EDG START COUNT ON i 3/20, THE THREE MAINTENANCE STARTS ON a
NIGHT OF 3/20. [TO: MOSBAUGH, j AUFDENKAMPE). 58 04/19/90 AUFDENKAMPE 36 23 "NE DIDN'T COUNT THE FAILURE, THOUGH." 4 [RE MOSBAUGN'S QUESTION TO CASH ABOUT } START FAILURES SINCE 3/20) [AUFDENKAMPE IS REMINDING MOSBAUGH THAT THEY'RE l STARTING __THE COUNTS IN THE LER AS OF THE 4 END OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TESTING). l 0 04/19/90 0 0 REV 0, LER StFBMITTED TO NRC (SITE AREA l - ENERGENCY). I 75 04/30/90 AUFDENKAMPE 31 10 "IT SOUNDS LIKE THE MATERIAL FALSE i STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE 12R." ! [To MOSBAUGH) [MOSBAUGH HAS A MORE { COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG START DATA), i j 75 04/30/90 NOSBAUGH 35 2 "I COMPLETED MY REVIEN. I FINALLY i SORTED OUT ALL THE STARTS, I THINK." j [To TYNAN) [MOSBAUGH GIVING THIS DATA TO 2 _ BoCKHOLD). i 75 04/30/90 TYNAN 35 21 " THIRTEEN, FIFTEEN, AND SEVENTEEN ARE i ' ~ RIGHT SMACK IN THE MIDDLE." [TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG PROBLEMS IN THE SERIES OF. STARTS). i l 75 04/30/90 BEACHER 43 9 STATED THAT CHAFEE WANTS A LIST OF A SEQUENCE OF EDG STARTS FROM THE POINTS l BOTH EDG'S NERE DECLARED OPERABLE [To
- MOSBAUGH).
- 75 04/30/90 MOSBAUGH 47 17 SHONED KITCHENS THE COMPREHENSIVE LIST 1
OF EDG STARTS AND POINTED OUT FAILURES. l [TO KITCHENS). ! 75 04/30/90 SNARTZNEIDER 53 12 A CONVERSATION NITH MOSBAUGH ABOUT , " PROBLEMS" IN MOSBAUGH'S COMPREHENSIVE j EDG STAPT LIST. [TO MOSBAUGH, j KITCHENS). 75 04/30/90 CASH 56 10 INVOLVED WITH VERIFICATION OF MOSBAUGH'S 3 COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EDG STARTS. [MOSBAUGH). t 4 9 e e v - ,- ---m< - w--
I 76 04/30/90 MOSBAUGH 2 8 TALKED ABOUT REVIEWING HIS COMP. LIST OF EDG STARTS WITH KITCHENS, CASH, SWARTZWELDER ON 4/30. [MOYE, NORTON). 76 04/30/90 AUFDENKAMPE 9 2 " JIMMY PAUL CASH SAID HE HAD RESEARCHED THE OPERATOR IDGS TO DETERMINE HOW MANY STARTS THERE WERE WITHOUT PROBLEMS..." ) [MOSBAUGH). l 76 04/30/90 BOCKHOLD 30 18 "THEN WE HAVE TO OBVIOUSLY REVISE THE I LER." [TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH POINTED OUT START PROBLEMS ON HIS COMP. ; LIST). j 76 04/30/90 BOCKHOLD _30 25 TALKED ABOUT MAKING NRC PRESENTATION FROM CASH'S INFO, WITH KEN BURR'S i APPROVAL. SAID HE DIDN'T GET TO THE EDG ' l START SLIDE. SAID MAYBE CASH WAS '
" THINKING OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT"
[MISCOIOFJNICATION) FROM WHAT BOCKHOLD I WANTED OUT OF SLIDE. [TO MOSBAUGH). 95 05/04/90 SHIPMAN 20 4 "SO YOU KNOW, OUT CONCERN GOING IN WAS l THAT WE HAD A COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE l SWITCH..." [TO RUSHTON, BOCKHOID, l MOSBAUGH, RE CALCON SWITCHES). 95 05/04/90 CHAFEE 28 22 TALKS ABOUT FOREIGN MATERIAL PROBLEMS IN SWITCHES. VEGP PEOPLE STILL NOT SURE OF CAUSE OF SWITCH PROBLEMS. [MOSBAUGH, IDUIS WARD, AUFDENKAMPE, BROCKMAN AND _ OTHER UNIDENT. VEGP PEOPLE). 95 05/04/90 MOSBAUGH 43 19 "WELL, BASED ON THE WYLIE TESTING AND THE DEBRIS FOUND IN THE SWITCH, THEY [NRC) STARTED USING THE WORD OPERABILITY." [TO BOCKHOLD ABOUT NRC
- [BROCKMAN, CHAFEE) AWARENESS OF DEBRIS
] IN CALCON SWITCH). 95 05/04/90 BOCKHOLD 46 7 TALKED ABOUT LETTER TO NRC RE S.A.E. AND
- SAID SOME MINOR ITEMS ARE "NOT THE NRC'S
! BUSINESS." [TO MOSBAUGH AND OTHER VEGP ! MANAGERS). 95 05/04/90 BOCKHOLD 55 21 "NOW I HEARD JOHN GIVE ME SOME SONG AND DANCE THAT WE'D LIKE TO KEEP'WILL BE REVISED BY' SO WE DON'T MAKE MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENTS AND CHANGE THE WORDS AFTER THE FACT." [MOSBAUGH & VEGP MGRS ABOUT DRAFTING 5/14/90 LTR TO NRC RE , COR. ACTIONS ON S.A.E.J. l I s . .
i 98 05/08/90 SWARTZWELDER 60 5 TALKED ABOUT REV 1 TO 4/19/90 LER IN !l PRB. [TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, j FREDERICKS). i
! 99 05/08/90 MANSFIELD 44 2 "AND WE CONTINUED TO FIGHT WITH THE NRC i THROUGH THE ITT." (TO MOSBAUGH, NORTON).
J
- 99 05/08/90 MANSFIELD 44 19 "...THE ATTITUDE IS WE'RE NOT GOING TO GET OUR LICENSE IF WE DON'T DO NHAT THEY l [NRC) WANT. NOW WE'VE GOT OUR LICENSE
! AND WE'RE FIGHTING." [TO MOSBAUGH).
j j 99 05/08/90 MANSFIELD 48 7 "THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT YOU DON'T OPERATE IT SAFELY AND YOU
=
__ INJURE PEOPLE." [TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). l j 99 05/08/90 MANSFIELD 48 13 " ...WE GO TO EXTREMES WITH TECH SPNC 1 INTERPRETATIONS TO KEEP THIS PIANT
~
RUNNING AND WE'VE DONE IT.FOR YEARS." (TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON). l 99 05/08/90 MANSFIELD 48 24 "WE [GPC/VEGP) HAVE AN ATTITUDE THAT j- BRINGING THIS PLANT DOWN IS THE WORST j THING THAT COULD HAPPEN. AND IT'S NOT l THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN." [TO j MOSBAUGH, PARTON). __. { 99 05/08/90 MANSFIELD 50 11 "WE'RE WELL SCHOOLED ON HOW THE PIANT l DOES THINGS. AND FROM WHAT...MCCOY SAID- ,
- THE NRC SAID, I DON'T DISAGREE [WITH i NRC)." (TO MOSBAUGH, PARTON, TOM i GREENE).
99 05/08/90 MANSFIELD 50 23 STATED THAT MAYBE HE'D TELL MCCOY HOW HE FELT ONE-ON-ONE, BUT, "IF I START SAYING THESE THINGS IN FRONT OF PEOPLE, YOU
- KNOW, NY FUTURE MAY BE LIMITED HERE." l l- [TO GREENE, PARTON, MOSBAUGH).
l! 99 05/08/90 MANSFIELD 53 4 ". . .YOUR DEPARTMENT (OPS) IS PART OF l THIS CLIQUE. (MEANING THE CLIQUE HE IS l
- AFRAID TO TELL ABOUT VEGP'S ATTITUDE i ABOUT KEEPING THE PIANT RUNNING. ) (TO
,' GREENE). 101 05/08/90 BOCKHOLD 1 15 "IS THERE SOMETHING BESIDES I'M SCRENING UP AND STARTING THE WRONG DIESEL. . .?" l (TO MOSBAUGH AFTER MOSBAUGH NOTIFIED HIM j AVOUT THE MISTAKEN START OF THE A DIESEL]. J 101 05/08/90 BOCKHOLD 2 24 "I WOULD DO NOTHING WITH IT EXCEPT FOR l YOUR HAVING THE PEOPLE IDOK AT THE LER CORRECTION." [TO MOSBAUGH RE MISTAKEN START OF A DIESEL). ] . h ,; p (,* *, k j i
155 06/08/90 AUFDENKAMPE 43 8 EXPLAINEDBAILEY T0' MLANGUAGE
, & BASES FOR CHANGE IN ELG 5TAnli IN LER REV 1. TOLD BAILEY BIRMINGHAN HAD THE APPROVED LER
[ REV FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. TOLD BAILEY HE WANTS TO CORRECT THE COAR IN THE COVER LTR. TO LER REV. [ BAILEY ON PHONE, MOSBAUGH). 0 06/08/90 0 0 ITT PRESENTATION TO COMMISSION. 158 06/11/90 MOSBAUGH 8 23 SAID NRC ITT TEAN AWARE OF DIESEL PRO 8LEM HISTORY AT VEGP. CITED 100 PIUS WORK ORDERS ON SWITCHES. [HORTON). - 159 06/11/90 AUFDENKAMPE 5 17 "HAIRSTON WON'T SIGNOUT THE LER." (WEBB, MOSBAUGH) (RE REV 1, LER THAT WAS PRB APPROVED AND GENT TO BIRMINGHAM IN _ MID-MAY).3 159 06/11/90 AUFDENKAMPE 6 6 "THEY'RE GOING TO HAVE QA AUDITS." (BIRMINGHAM GOING TO HAVE VEGP SITE QA DO AN AUDIT ON THE DIESEL START COUNTS) (TO MOSBAUGH, WEBB) . 159 06/11/90 FREDERICKS 7 11 "SHOULDN'T TAKE MORE THAN A COUPLE OF DAYS. I WAS GIVEN THE GUIDELINES THAT IT HAD TO BE DONE BEFORE THE LER WOULD BE SIGNED." (TO MOSBAUGH).
~
159 06/11/90 AUFDENKAMPE 11 3 TALKED ABOUT HOW THE CORPORATE PEOPLE IN B.':RMINGHAM WERE GOING TO TELL NRC THAT THY INACCURATE IDGS CAUSED EDG COUNT PROBLEIM. [TO MOSBAUGH). 159 06/11/90 SHEBANI 36 17 " GEORGE [DOCKHOID) APPARENTLY HAD A DISCUSSION WITH McCOY, AND GEORGE DID
- DIRECT TO TON [WEBB) WHAT HE WANTS PUT j IN THERE." [TO MOSBAUGH RE REV TO LER).
! 159 06/11/90 MOSBAUGH 38 9 TALKED ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO USE
- " VALID" IN LER REV TO REFER TO EDG
! TESTS. (TO ODOM). i
- 160 (,6/12/90 WEBB 5 18 " GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) DID. HE SAID HE WANTED NEW -- NEW INFO." (BOCKHOLD i- INSTRUCTED WEBB TO USE THE VALID START I
TERMINOIDGY IN THE LER REV) (TO MOSBAUGH). l 160 06/12/90 MOSBAUGH 8 13 "THERE'S A IDT WRONG WITH IT [LER REV), AND I WOULD JUST BE REAL CAUTIOUS IF I WERE YOU. " (TO AUFDENKAMPE). L t l t e
160 06/12/90 AUFDENKAMPE 9 11 "I THINK WE OUGHT TO JUST GO TELL THE RESIDENTS WE LIED IN THE FIRST LER... AND THE LETTER." (TO MOSBAUGH). 160 06/12/90 AUFDENKAMPE 10 4 "NOBODY IS GOING TO WRITE A LETTER AND SAY WE LIED TO YOU THE FIRST TIME, NRC." [TO NOSBAUGH, JUSTIFYING HIS IDEA TO GO TELL THE RESIDENTS). 160 06/12/90 HORTON 23 14 "I ASSUME FROM CORPORATE MEETING. THEY'RE CHANGING THE RESPONSE...THE LER." [TO MOSBAUGH). 160 06/12/90 FREDERICKS 24 3 "HAIRSTON SYAS HE'S GOING TO WRITE HIS OWN [LER REV). MY GUY HASM'T FINISHED YET." [To MOSBAUGH, HORTON RE HIS Oh-
' " GUY" NOT DONE WITH AUDIT OF EDG STARTS).
l 160 06/12/90 FREDERICKS 24 10 "I'M SUPPOSED TO NOT ONLY COME UP WITE E NUMBER I'M SUPPOSED TO COME UP WITH WHY THE DISCREPANCY EXISTS." (To MOSBAUGH RE EDG START COUNT). 160 06/12/90 FREDERICKS - 24 25 "HOW COULD THEY (CORPORATE] HAVE REVVED THE NUMBERS 7 THEY DON'T HAVE THE NUMBERS." [TO MOSBAUGH). 160 06/12/90 FREDERICKS 25 4 "SOMEBODY CHANGED IT TO SAY ' VALID' - STARTS." [TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REV). 160 06/12/90 HORTON 30 1 "WELL, THE CONSISTENCY IS DOWN THE TURE BECAUSE THE FIRST LER THAT WENT OUT IS INCORRECT." (TO AJLUNI, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH). 160 06/12/90 AJLUNI 33 6 TALKED TO HORTON AND FREDERICKS ABOUT THE CHANGES IN EDG START INFO FROM COA 2 TO LER TO REV1 OF LER. 0 06/14/90 0 0 MOSBAUGH EXECUTED CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT. 167 06/15/90 AUPDENKAMPE 23 21 "I BRIEFED THE RESIDENTS, AND THEY TALKED TO BROCKMAN, AND THEY SAID THAT WAS FINE." (To MOSBAUGH RE TELLING NRc OF INCORRECT STATEMENT IN LER). k 167 06/15/90 AUFDENKAMPE 23 23 "I TOLD THEN THAT WE HAD AN INCORRECT r STATEMENT IN THE LER." (TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT TELLING NRC RESIDENTS). i l
l l ' 167 06/15/90 MOSELY 67 14 "I'VE TABUIATED THE DATA, BUT... HAVEN'T...DONE ANY COUNTING IN TERMS OF VALID FAILURES, VALID l STARTS..." [TO MOSBAUGH) [MOSELY IS QA i WHO OBTAINED EDG START DATA FOR ! FREDERICKS IN AUDIT FOR REV TO LER). l 167 06/15/90 MOSELY 71 4 TOLD MOSBAUGH THAT BAILEY CALLED, j i IDOKING FOR BOCKHOID, AND HAD ASKED HIM i [MOSLEY) ABOUT VALID FAILURES. j 168 06/18/90 ODOM 51 13 TALKED TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT STALLING ON A WAIVER, AND ABOUT A TOTAL RE-WRITE OF THE LER REVISION. ) 186 06/29/90 ODOM 38 20 "OKAY, THEN YOU [MOSMUGE] WENT AND
~
COUNTED AGAIN, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENT ] NUMBERS. IF I WAS HAIRSTON, I'D SAY - j ' WHOA'." [To FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH RE j LER REV). 186 06/29/90 FREDERICKS 39 21 "AND APPARENTLY JUST WHEN HARRY MAJORS AND THE STAFF UP THERE IN CORPORATE, THE WORD ' SUBSEQUENT M THE TEST' GOT PUT IN THERE." [To MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING ' IN ORIGINAL LER). 186 06/29/90 FREDERICKS 40 25 ". . . AND WHEN IT [COAR) SAYS 'No PROBLENS
~ OR FAILURES DURING ANY OF THESE STARTS' THAT BURNS YOU UP." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE WORDING IN ORIGINAL LER).
186 06/29/90 FREDERICKS 42 22 ". . .WHAT THEN THEY'RE [CdRPORATE) GOING TO DO IS SAY A MORE ACCURATE MEASURE OF THE RELIABILITY WAS THE VALID..." [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM RE LER REV). 186 06/29/90 FREDERICKS 45 4 " ...I THINK THAT'S [THE ' SUBSEQUENT TO EVENT' TERMIN0IDGY) WHAT HARRY'S [ MAJORS) GOING TO USE...I MAY HAVE TO PUT SOME WORDS IN THE AUDIT REPORT BASED ON THAT." [To MOSBAUGH, ODON RE LER REV). 186 06/29/90 ODOM 47 21 "I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT [' SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT' TERMIN0!DGY) CAMEFROM . I JUST CALLED HARRY [ MAJORS) AND TOLD HARRY, 'STOP THE PRESS. IT'S NOT RIGHT.'" [TO MOSBAUGH, TYNAN). 186 06/29/90 TYNAN 47 24 "WHY CAN'T WE GET THROUGH WHAT WE [PRB) KEEP APPROVING AND SENDING OFF SITE 7" [M MOSBAUGH, ODON RE DRAFTS OF LER REV'S).
186 06/29/90 ODOM 48 13 CYOU WRITE THE NRC AND TELL THEM THE FALSE STATEMENT IN THE REVISION...YOU ! DON'T TRY A MINOR TYPORGRAPHIC ERROR. YCU TELL WHY YOU KNOW." (TO MOSBAUGH, : TYNAN RE LER REV). j 187 06/29/90 WEBB 3 15 "...IT GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL THE TESTS AFTER THAT MAY HAVE BEEN ' SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES TOO, AND THEY j WEREN'T. ...THERE WERE INVALID TESTS IN THERE ALSO." (TO MOSBAUGH RE LER REVS). 187 06/29/90 WEBB _.6 9 "HAIRSTON CHANGED AT LEAST 3 OF THEM (LER REVS)...AT LEAST 3, BUT SHIPMAN < CHANGED ONE OF THEM, I_. ENOW. " (TO l MOSBAUGJ). 187 06/29/90 MOSBAUGH 14 16 "I'M JUST SAYING THAT THE REV PROPOSED ON 5/8 IS NO DIFFERENT THAN THIS (6/29). NOW WHY WASN'T THAT SUBMITTED?" (TO WEBB, TYNAN). 187 06/29/90 FREDERICKS 19 23 "MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HARRY MAJORS IS THAT HAIRSTON MAY HAVE WROTE THE LAST SENTENCE HIMSELF." (To MOSBAUGH, TYNAN, HORTON RE LER REV). 187 06/29/90 HORTON 20 12 "WELL, WHAT WAS WRONG WITH OUR DIESEL
~ START RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES?" (TO FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, RE WHETHER PRACTICES WERE CAUSE OF FALSE DATA GIVEN TO NRC 4/9 h 187 06/29/90 FREDERICKS 26 23 "THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S I4G IS NOT AN ACCURATE RECORD OF WHAT HAPPENED." [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON).
187 05/29/90 MOSBAUGH 42 9 PUTS GREENE ON NOTICE THAT ATTRIBUTING THE ERROR IN EDG STARTS TO POOR RECORD PRACTICES /END OF TEST PROGRAM IS NOT TRUE.
. 187 06/29/90 MAJORS 52 19 "I WILL ACCEPT IT, [ RESPONSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP FOR LER REV COVER LETTER) BUT I'LL RESERVE THE RIGHT 'IV MAKE A DISCLAIMER AT A LATER POINT." (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBD).
187 06/29/90 GREENE 54 12 "OK, WE'RE GOING TO LET THE LER (REV) TALK ABOUT VALID STARTS, AND WE'RE GOINO TO LET THE COVER LETTER TALK ABOUT SUCCESSFUL STARTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM?" [TO MOSBAUGH, ODOM, FREDERICKS, WEBB). s'
l 187 06/29/90 MAJORS
; 54 24 #RIGHT. [ACK. GREENE'S STATEMENT THAT 2 )V ORIGINAL LER INCINDED STARTS IN THE TEST PROGRAM) i f NOW THAT'S A KEN MCCOY
} ADDITIONAL SENTENCE THAT HAS BEEN 4 BLESSED BY GEORGE [HAIRSTON), 80 IF THERE'S A PROBLEM WITH IT, GEORGE WOULD WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT." I g 187 06/29/90 MAJORS 55 ! g 8 "OK, THAT'S ANOTHER GEORGE [HAIRSTON) 4 AND KEN MCCOY DESIGNED SENTENCE. . . " [TO l GREENE RE STATEMENT ABOUT POOR EDG i ~ RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES). i 187 06/29/90 GREENE
;k 56 8 GREENE SUGGESTED TO MAJORS TO USE THE WORD " DIFFERENCE" V. " DISCREPANCY" IN jt 4 - LER REV COVER LETTER BECAUSE
" DISCREPANCY" MEANT ADMITTING A MISTAKE.
MAJORS LINED THE IDEA. i 187 06/29/90 MAJORS
-58 20 AGREED WITH NOSBAUGH THAT THIS NEW LER JUST CHANGED "TO APPLES AND ORANGES."
{ [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, FREDERICKS). 187 06/29/90 MAJORS l 59 23 " GEORGE [HAIRSTON) PERSONALLY ZEROED IN l ON THOSE WORDS." [THE DIFFERENCE IS l i ATTRIBUTED TO EDG RECORD-KEEPING t ) PRACTICES) [TO GREENE, NOSBAUGH, 2, FREDERICKS). ' 1G7 06/29/90 MAJORS 62 4 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT HAIRSTON CONSCIOUSLY 1 THINKING THAT THE NRC MIGHT INTERPRET j - THE " CORRECTION" COVER LETTER AS NOT I ADDRESSING THE 4/9 COAR. i 187 06/29/90 MOSBAUGH d 63 15 PUT FALSE. MAJORS ON NOTICE THAT 4/9 LETTER IS i GREENE TAKES OVER AND KEEPS { MAJORS FROM HAVING TO RESPOND. [TO MAJORS, GREENE, FREDERICKS). 4 1 187 06/29/90 GREENE j 66 15 TRIED TO TALK MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG AIR I
- RECEIVER VALVES STICKING.
l 0 06/29/90 0 0 REV 1, LER SUBMITTED TO NRC (SITE AREA ! ENER.) WITH COVER LETTER. j 0 07/05/90 0 0 2-90-012 OPENED l 199 07/11/90 KOCHERY 8 1 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT EDG AIR RECEIVER VALVES STICKING. , i 199 07/11/90 MOYE 11 1 1 TALKED TO MOSBAUGH, MANSFIELD, BURNINKLE, ABOUT THE 4TH TIME THE SAME ! l PROBLEM HAS HAPPENED TO THE 2A EDG. i ll
- - _ _ - - . - - - - - - - - _. - . _ _ = _ . . ._._ - . - - . - _ _ - - . . _ _ .
)
l l 199 07/11/90 MANSFIELD 11 6 TO MOSBAUGH, BURWINKLE, MOYE ABOUT l l CHAFFEE TELLING THEN THEY COULD HAVE l AVOIDED THE 3/20 EVENT BY BEING MORE l PERSISTENT IN RESOLVING REPEAT PROBLENS WITH THE DIESELS. 199 07/11/90 MANSFIELD 14 3 TOLD MOSBAUGH, MOYE ABOUT AN INSUFFICIENT " AIR ROLL" BEING A DIESEL R90BLEN. 199 07/11/90 HORTON 27 15 TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT 2A EDG BEING IN A 72 HOUR LCO DUE TO AN INSUFFICIENT AIR _ ROLL. IT WAS DECIARED INOPERABLE. t I 200 07/11/90 NOSBAUGH 8 1 TO MANSFIELD, KOCHERY, STOKES ABOUT EDG
~~
AIR ROLL PROBLEMS. '
)
204 07/13/90 7/11 OSOS 2.-23 TOLD BOCKHOLD ABOUT 2A EDG STILL BEING INOP. PROBLEIM IS CLEARANCES ON AIR. START PIIAT VALVES AND OIL IN AIR START i PIIAT VALVE LINES. 204 07/13/90 HORTON 16 5 TOLD BOCKHOLD THAT THEY CLEANED THE AIR START SOLENOID VALVES AND USED EMERY CLOTH TO " WIDEN THE CLEARANCES" SO THAT THE VALVES WGULDN'T STICK. [MOSBAUGH,-.- FREDERICKS). 205 07/13/90 KITCHENS 17 20 TO BOCKHOLD, FREDERICKS, HORTON, MOSBAUGH RE ROOT CAUSE OF AIR ROLL EDG PROBLEM IS AIR SOLENOID VALVE CLEARANCE. 205 07/13/90 MOSBAUGH 20 9 TALKED ABOUT SCOTT HARGIS RECALLING THE AIR ROLL PROBLEM ON THE UNIT 1 EDG AISO. [TO FREDERICKS, KITCHENS, BOCKHOLD). 0 07/18/90 0 0 MOSBAUGH INTERVIEWED RE: SPECIAL INSPECTION ISSUES (TRANSCRIPTED) . 0 07/19/90 0 0 MOSBAUGH INTERVIEWED RE: SPECIAL INSPECTION ISSUES (TRANSCRIPTED) . i 31$ 07/24/90 MANSFIELD 4 14 "DID YOU HEAR WE HAD A DIESEL FAIL TO 4 START 7" (TO MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). !' 217 07/24/90 HORTON ! 25 11 "BUT WE GOT ANYWHERE BETWEEN A. QUART AND
- TNO GALIANS. . . [OF JACKET WATER OUT OF THE COMBUoTION AIR DRAIN VALVES) (TO MOSBAUGH).
l22007/26/90 NOSBAUGH 9 21 "THERE WAS A FAILURE TO START THAT WAS UNDOCUMENTED ON UNIT 1. THERE HAVE BEEN i FOUR ON UNIT 2..." (TO AUFDENKAMPE). 3 1
l l 220 07/26/90 AUFDENKAMPE 10 15 "IT WAS IN THE -- IN THE DIESEL, THE TAPE ON THE DIESEL...THEY PUSHED THE BUTTON, AND IT DIDN'T START." [TO MOSBAUGH RE PAINTED-OVER TAPE ON DIESEL). 222 07/27/90 MANSFIELD 37 4 "
...THE CONTAINMENT COOLING FUNCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN DEGRADED. I MEAN, THAT'S A LIE. . .IT NOULD HAVE BEEN NON-EXISTANT." [TO MOSBA;GH RE LER ON EDG TAPING).
222 07/27/90 MANSFIELD 38 6 "...A BLATANT LIE " [ FINISHED MOSBAUGH85 STATENENT ABOUT TAPED DIESEL LER. 222 07/27/90 MANSFIELD 38 17 "SO AL, IDSS OF A SAFETY FUNCTION'FROM A SINGLE EVENT IS A 4 HOUR REPORT. HOW Do
, YOU DEAL WITH THAT WHEN YOU FIND OUT ABOUT IT MONTHS IATER7" [TO NOSBAUGH RE EDG TAPING).
222 07/27/90 NOSBAUGH 39 3 "APPARENTLY, STRINGFELIDW THOUGHT IT (TAPED EDG) WAS A 4 HOUR." [ REPORT REQUIREMENT) [TO NOSBAUGH). 222 07/27/90 HIIIES ~ 39 17 " DIESEL GENERATOR 1A CONTROL AIR LEAK AND IT." THERE IS NOT AN LCO WRITTEN AGAINST
- [TO MOSBAUGH, MANSFIELD). -
234 08/03/90 SHIPNAN i 38 16 "DID GEO. FREDERICKS RECOGNIM7 THE JULY
- _ STH INCIDENT TIED TO THE 11TH INCIDENT,
! PRIOR 'IC THE NRC RESIDENTS RAISING THE { QUESTION?" [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON) [ INCIDENTS ARE EDG FAILURES). 1 1 234 08/03/90 SHIPNAN
- 38 20 "THE 11TH [7/11/90) INCIDENT'S WHEN IT !
4 [EDG) FAILED TO START, AND THAT WAS THE ONE THAT NE FINALLY GOT INTO." [TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, RUSHTON RE REPORTING OF EDG FAILURES TO NRC). 234 08/03/90 SHIPMAN 40 8 "IT'S IMPORTANT FOR ME '1V KNOW THAT WE ! IDENTIFIED..." [THE CONNECTION BETNEEN
- THE 7/5 AND 7/11 EDG FAIIBRES, AS OPPOSED TO THE NRC ID'ING IT).
l 204 08/03/90 SHIPNAN 4 42 16 "DOES THE RECOGNITION.. 0F THE JULY THE STH [EDG FAILURE) START A [ REPORTING) CIDCK AT A DIFFERENT TIME?" [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). 234 OP/03/90 GREENE 42 22 " ...THE ONE WE REPORTED, THIS WAS A a [EDG) START FAILURE...THE LER WAS A START FAILURE. THE OTHER INCIDENT WAS j REPORTED AS A 10 CFR 21 ITEN." [TO SHIPMAN, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGE] . ,,
I 234 08/03/90 SHIPMAN 43 15 83 YEA, PAT (MCDONALD) JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE SQUEAKY CLEAN ABOUT OUR REPORTING DATE ON THAT" (EDG FAILURE) ! [TO GREENE, RUSHTON, MOSBAUGH). l 0 08/06/90 0 0 SPECIAL INSPECTIO;f BEGINS. 246 08/13/90 BOCKHOLD 11 2 ANTICIPATES NRC SL8EC. INSPEC.. QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGIN OF EDG START DATA ON 4/9 PRESENTATION TRANSPARENCIES. SAYS CASH 1 PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THAT ISSUE. [TO l GREENE, FREDERICKS, SWARTEWELDER, A.M., AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) = 0 08/14/90 0 0 SPECIAL INSPECTION INTERVIEW OF JIN SWARTEWELDER. _0 08/14/90 0 0SPECIALINSPECTIbNINTERVIEWOFCASE. 0 08/14/90 0 0 LETTER FROM GPC TO NRC RE: " CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY." 0 08/14/90 0 0 SPECIAL INSPECTION INTERVIEW OF BoCKHoLD. 253 08/15/90 BOCKHOLD 8 21 "THIS IS VIOLATION NUMBER 1 FOR SURE." [To MCCDY, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, HORTON, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS RE INCORRECT EDG START COUNT.) _ 253 08/15/90 MCCOY 11 8 "I GUESS WE WOULD SAY THAT I PREPARED THAT. [THE 4/9 COAR) I WORKED WITH YOU (BAILEY) ON THE PREPARATIONS, RIGHT?...SO WHY DON'T NE SAY THAT KEN MCC0Y AND JIM BAILEY PREPARED THE LETTER [4/9 COAR) WHICH WAS SIGNED BY...[HAIRSTON)." [TO BOCKHOLD, ---- 253 08/15/90 BOCKHOLD 11 9 (CONT'D) ---SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.) 253 08/15/90 BOCKHOLD 13 16 " KEN MCC0Y, IF YOU REMEMBER, I BELIEVE IT [THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE
' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAN' TO THE 4/19 LER) HAPPENED BETWEEN A GROUP IN YGUR OFFICE AND ME." [To McC0Y, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS, AND OTHER VEGP MANAGERS.]
253 08/15/90 MCC0Y 14 11 "THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION, TOO (RE ORIGIN OF TERN ' SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST PROGRAM' IN 4/19 LER) IN GENERAL TERMS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC WORDS, BUT I DO REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION." [TO BOCKHO!b, SHIPMAN, BAILEY, FREDERICKS).
4
; 253 08/15/90 BOCKHOLD 15 2 DESCRIBES HIS RECOLLECTION OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS RE EDG PRESENTATION
{ TO NRC ON 4/9, AND HOW 4/9 COAR RESPONSE j
- WAS CREATED. [ FULL DISCUSSICN ABOUT 4/19 LER CONFERENCE CALL INCLUDED TH,100GH 1
PAGE 19). '! 258 08/17/90 WILLIAMS 8 15 'AND THEN IAST NIGHT [8/16/90) THE 1B i DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO-STARTED FOR NO I APM RENT REASON." [TO BOCKHOLD, A.M., AT i MORNII:': STATUS MEETING ON LAST DAY OF s NRC SPECIAL IFSPECTION.] i 258 08/17/90 HORTON 20 24 ". . .THERE MAY BE A / HTIONSHIP [TO THE j IB DIESEL AUTO-STARTTJG) TO ANOTHER , SLAVE REIAY TEST." (10 A.M. , MANSFMLD, ! ,1 - IN' ENGINEERING MEETING.] l t 258 08/17/90 BOCKHOLD 24 17 "... ALLEN CAME TO ME AND SAID, 'IMY, THE - 4 INFORMATION [4/9 EDG START INFO)18 l WRONG' AND I TOLD ALLEN TO GET THE STAFF TO FIX IT." [To FREDERICKS, WHO QUESTIONED IF ANYONE HAD ANY CONTENTION l ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF THE 4/9 DATA.) 258 08/17/90 MCCOY ! ! - 25 11 "THE ORIGINAL LER [4/19) WAS BASED ON
- THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE [4/9)
PRESENTATION...THE CORRECTION TO THE LER i j IS NOT ADDRESSING THE SAME INTERVAL OF ! TIME OR NUNBER..." [TO BOCKHOLD, ' ! AUFDENKAMPE, FREDERICKS, A.M.) 258 08/17/90 FREDERICKS 27 17 "...THERE'S ONE TRIP IN THE MIDDLE OF
~
j THE SEQUENCE, DIESEL TRIP,...THE REASON ! WAS IAW JACKET WATER PRESSURE." [TO - MCCOY,BOCKHOLD,J.G.A.,A.M.) l 258 03/17/90 BOCKHOLD 32 11
"...WE MADE A MISTAKE IN THE [EDG START)
COUNT, OKAY? AND THAT'S WHAT PETE TAYIDR j BELIEVES, BUT...[HE) BELIEVES IT NASN'T ' 4 AN INTENTIONAINISTAKE..." [TO MCC0Y, i J.G.A., A.M., FREDERICKS) [ EMPHASIZES WHAT TAYIAR BELIEVES VS. ACTUAL 1 SITUATION.] 1 260 08/17/90 AUFDENKAMPE 8 4 3 TALKS ABOUT BOCKHOLD HAVING STGNED OFF i ON THE COVER LETTER TO REV 1 OF THE LER i [6/29) IN MID MAY. [To MOSBAUGH, j CHESTNUT) [ CHESTNUT IS TAKING J.G.A.'S PIACE AS TECHNICAL MANAGER. )
- O 08/17/90 0 0 SPECIAL INSPECTION END '
4 i i
-. . - . . , . - -_ - - - . . .__.x_ . - _ _ . . , - 7.--_,__, . - - . - _ -.-_._.-y.. ...r.
i l l 0 08/23/90 0 0 AJLUNI SENT " WHITE PAPER 3" FROM SPECIAL INSPECTION TO SHIPMAN, BOCKHOLD AND J OTHERS.
-264 08/28/90 ODOM 39 18 "IT'S GOT A MIND OF ITS OWN." [ REFERS.TO i AN INADVERTENT, UNEXPLAINED UNIT 1 l DIESEL START ON 8/16-17/90.] [TO A.M., l COPEIAND.]
O 08/28/90 0 0 BOCKHOLD SENT CORRECTION LETTER TO COAR SENT TO VOGTLE PRB FOR APPROVAL. 266 08/29/90 BOCKHOLD 21 4 "... SUCCESSFUL START MEANT [TO BOCKHOLD) THE ENGINE STARTED AND RAN SUFFICIENT
-. TIME THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE
- MARCH 20TH EVENT. AND...AFTER RUNNING.A SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ENGINE.COULD HAVE
-~~
SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF A. PROBLEM..." (TO A.M., GREENE,HORTON) 267 08/29/90 KOCHERY 32 8 DISCUSSES ANOTHER CURRENT PROBLEM WITH THE 1A EDG. A VOLTAGE REGUIATOR PROBI,EN. l THE 1A EDG HAS BEEN DECIARED INOPERABLE. (TO MOSBAUGH] (MOSBAUGH SAYS , THIS PROBLEMS HAS EXHIBITED ITSELF 1 BEFORE.) l 267 08/29/90 HORTON 41 22 "...WE JUST NEED TO MAKE IT AS , REASONABLY ACCURATE AS WE CAN, BECAUSE - ! THE LIABILITY I SEE IS SUBSTANTIAL." (TO A.M., RE EDG START DATA STILL BEING
~
COMPILED JUST PRIOR TO ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ON SITE AREA EMERGENCY.) 267 08/29/90 STRINGFELLOW 47 6 "...I'M TICKLED TO DEATH THAT...Y'ALL ARE TAKING THIS THING (CORRECTION OF EDG START DATA) SERIOUSLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T CONFORTABLE WITH IT AT ALL." (TO ODOM, FREDERICKS, A.M.) i l 0 08/29/90 0 0 GPC INTERNAL MEMO FROM L. WARD TO BOCKHOLD RE: CAIrON SWITCH PROBLEMS. l
- 184 08/30/90 HORTON 7 2 "WELL, THERE'S TWO QUESTIONABLE THINGS l
WE GOTTA RESOLVE, WHETHER WE'RE GOING TO j' DECIARE THEM (STARTS) SUCCESSFUL OR NOT. ONE ON EACH [ DIESEL) RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STRING [OF STARTS)." (TO . MOSBAUGH). 184 08/30/90 HORTON 7 23 "WE CAUSED THAT TRIP. IT WOULDN'T HAVE l TRIPPED ON BIACK TUESDAY. I'LL LET l GEORGE [BOCKHOLD) CALL THAT ONE." 4 1
i ~ 184 08/30/90 HORTON 8 2 "THE B TRAIN IS THE ONE THAT YOU IDENTIFIED. WHERE IT DIDN'T TRIP, IT 3 SHOULD HAVE." (TO MOSBAUGH ABOUT A ' DIFFERENT KINK OF EDG PROBLEM). I 184 08/30/90 PARTON 9 7 "DID WE COME UP WITH AS MANY [ SUCCESSFUL STARTS) AS WE THOLD THEM [NRC)?" [TO MOSBAUGH, HORTON). j 184 08/30/90 HORTON 9 8 "NO, WE UNDERSTAND THAT." [TO PARTON, 1 MOSBAUGH, IN RESPONSE TO PARTON'S j QUESTION RE COMING UP WITH AS MANY - j SUCCESSFUL STARTS As GPC TOLD NRC). j i l 18L 08/30/90 HORTON 15 22 "IT WAS AN UNPLANNED TRIP. I WOULD LIKE i TO CALL IT AN UNPLANNED TRIP, HOWEVER, j DECIARE IT A SUCCESS."' [TO AUFDENKAMPE, i ~ MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD). i 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 16 14 "OKAY, WE'LL PUT YES FOR SUCCESS, UNPLANNED TRIP, YES, WITH AN ASTERISK AND SOME EXPLANATION DOWN BEIDW." (TO ' HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE l PREPARING A LETTER FOR HAIRSTON). 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 17 10 "WHAT I PROP _QSE IS YES. AND YES FOR UNPLANNED TRIPS." (RE WHETHER A START IS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT IN ! DRAFT LETTER FOR HAIRSTON) (JP O H O R T O N , i GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE). I 184 08/30/90 HORTON 26 19 "THAT'S VOGTLE DEFINITION OF POST l MAINTENANCE STARTS. THIS IS AN ISSUE l WITH THE NRC." (TO BOCKHOLD, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, GREENE). j 4 184 08/30/90 AUFDENKAMPE 27 16 "THE ONLY COMMENT. VALID TEST FAILURES. ! THAT'S THE ONLY KIND WE HAVE TO REPORT. ! DOES IT AFFECT OUR ISSUE ON FAIIBRE TO REPORT?" (TO GREENE, BOCKHOLD,'MOSBAUGH,
- AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON).
i 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 29 15 "OKAY, I HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE LAST
- SENTENCES. 'AS REPORTED IN MY i
(HAIRSTON'S] CALL TO THE NRC, NE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THIS INFORMATION [EDG STARTS) WAS IN ERROR.' PUT A PERIOD THERE. I WAS GOING TO TAKE THE REST OF l, IT OUT. (CONT.)
- 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 29 16 "(CONT.) 'THERE WERE MORE STARTS CONDUCTED THAN THE NUMBER REPORTED...I NOULD JUST PUT A PERIOD IN AND NOT GO ON
- AND EXPLAIN ANY OF THAT STUFF." (TO
- HORTON, GREENE, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH RE PREPARING LETTER FOR HAIRSTON).
'. g e y,
184 08/30/90 GREENE 30 21 "IT'S EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN THE PAPER...IT ISN'T A CASE OF TAKE IT OUT OF HERE AND IT'S IDST. [TO HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH, BOCKHOLD RE TAKING OUT EXPLANATORY PHRASE IN COVER LETTER ABOUT MORE STARTS THAN REPORTED). 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 32 5 "WHY, It IT AIN'T IN THE TABLE, NHY FLAG IT !" THE PORTION OF THE LETTER 7" (TO GREENE, HORTON, AUFDENKAMPE, MOSBAUGH). 184 08/30/90 HORTON 33 9 HORTON HAS A PROBLEM WITH USING THE WORDS " APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF" WHEN REFERRING TO THE ERRORS IN THE 4/9 i LETTER & ORIGINAL LER. HE THINKS IT SHOULD BE "WERE THE RESULT OF." (TO - BOCKHOLD, GREENE, MOSBAUGH, 3 AUFDENKAMPE). l 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 33 14 "I PREFER ' APPEAR' (TO BE THE RESULT
! OF)." [RE ERRORS MADE IN 4/9 LETTER &
i 4/19 LER] (TO GREENE, MOSBAUGH, 1 AUFDENKAMPE, HORTON). l 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 35 10 "I CHANGED THE...INSTEAD OF ' ERRORS' IN j _ THE APRIL 9TH..." [BOCKHOLD TOTALLY j OBFUSCATES THE LETTER THAT I3 TO CORRECT THE WRONG INFO IN THE 4/9 LETTER) (TO { GREENE, HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). i
)
I 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 38 17 "OK...THE ERROR WAS MADE BY THE l i INDIVIDUAL [ CASH) WHO PERFORMED THE _j l COUNT OF DIESEL STARTS." (TO GREENE, l l HORTON, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE RE TAKING ) BLAME OFF HIMSELF FOR COUNTS IN 4/9 i LETTER & PRESENTATION TO NRC). 4 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 41 12 "ON THAT DATE [ WEEKEND PRIOR TO NRC PRESENTATION) JIMMY (CASH) WASN'T CONFUSED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD COUNTED SUCCESSFUL STARTS." (TO GREENE, HORTON, l MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 1 ) 184 08/30/90 42 22 " BILL'S GOT A GOOD POINT. WE'RE GONNA TAKE...THE LEGAL DEFENSE." [TO GREENE, 4 BOCKHOLD, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, ! AUFDENKAMPE). 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 44 21 "...IF BIRMINGHAM LIKES THIS LETTER l WRITTEN THIS WAY...THAT'S WHAT WE SHOULD I DO." (RE LETTER 8/30 CORRECTING 4/9 ' LETTER) (TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). a e e . _ , _ . - , , ,, _ . , . , . , _ _ . . _ . ,. .- m
l l l 184 08/30/90 BOCKHOLD 45 18 aI AIN'T GONNA SIGN THIS ONE OUT NITHOUT YOU [PRB) RECOMMENDING UNANIMOUSLY." [RE DRAFT 8/30 LETTER CORRECTING 4/9 LETTER) [TO GREENE, HORTON, FREDERICKS, COURSEY, MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE). 184 08/30/90 GREENE 52 6 "LET THE PRB MINUTES REFLECT THAT NE USE THE CRITERIA OF TNO MINUTES ON A RUN OR AN INTENTIONAL SHUTDONN TO BE CONSIDERED ' A SUCCESSFUL RUN." [TO BOCKHOLD, I HORTON, FREDERICKS, MOSBAUGH, ' AUFDENKAMPE). 269 08/30/90 AUFDENKAMPE 1 25 TALKS AbC"T BOCKHOLD " GUIDING" THE PRB ABOUT THE WORDING AND CONTENT OF THE _ LETTER THAT SUPPOSEDLY CORRECTED THE
" INCORRECT" EDG START DATA GIVEN '!O NRC IN APRIL. ['to MOSBAUGH. ]
O 08/30/90 0 0 CORRECTION TO COAR ISSUED 'f0 NRC BY GPC. 0 09/12/90 0 0 STEVEN KOHN ADVISED OI OF EXISTANCE OF TAPES. 0 09/13/90 0 0 TAPES TAKEN INTO EVIDENCE BY OI.
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0 10/05/90 0 0 O. MASNYK DECLARED TAPES IN OI POSSESSION REQUIRED TO BE TREATED AS i SAFEGUARDS PENDING FURTHER REVIEN. l 0 10/11/90 0 0 MOSBAUGH FIRED BY GPC. 0 10/30/90 0 0 ATLANTA CONSTITUTION AND AUGUSTA i CHRONICLE ARTICLES RE: GA PNR MISLED NRC ON GENERATORS. 2 0 0 MOSBAUGH INTERVIENED ON TV RE: EDG f 0 10/30/90 STARTS. i O 11/03/90 0 0 AUGUSTA CHRONICLE ARTICLE RE: NRONG EDG i COUNT i 0 11/06/90 0 0 2-90-020 CASE OPENED. l l C 01/25/91 0 0 MOSBAUGH ADVISED ROBINSON THAT DOL ISSUED ORDER (01/22/91) TO PRODUCE ALL j DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION.
- O 02/13/91 0 0 ROBINSON EXECUTED DECLARATION TO PREVENT GPC DISCOVERY OF 17 DOCUMENTS IN MOSBAUGH'S POSSESSION (INCLUDING DATA ON I HARDDISK). ,
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0 02/13/91 0 0 MOSBAUGH REFUSED TO ACCEPT RETURN OF 201 ORIGINAL TAPES. 0 02/21/91 0 0 RETURNED 201 ORIGINAL TAPES TO MOSBAUGH. 0 03/25/91 0 0 DISSOLVED CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT WITH MOSBAUGH. 83 / / PARTON 7 5 "WHAT SHOULD THE LER SAY?" (TO MOSBAUGH RE REV 1 TO THE LER). ealer' N e I eMuBeue eumm> 4 4
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Aufdenkampe: Allen Mosbaugh just walked in George so I'll put you on the speaker. The way my people came up with the greater than 20 starts is that they took the 18 and 19 starts and, based on the April 9th letter and they went and checked and found out how ; many starts they had subsequent to April 9th. And ! that's why you can say greater than 20. Bockhold: I think you can say greater than 20. You know, l we've even had more starts recently. We had a j start last, the other night. McCoy: We need to be sure that we know the number of l starts after we completed the comprehensive control test program. Aufdenkampe: I do have people right now going out through - my L people going out through the RO's log. ll Bockhold: From my numbers that I presented at the conference l they were verified correct by Jimmy Paul Cash who .) went through the operators' logs. !i 4 McCoy: We ought to use those numbers. Bockhold: okay so we will say greater than those numbers that we used in the conference. McCoy: Okay, those numbers you used in the conference were after they had completed the comprehensive !
- tests of the control system on _each dieself
) { Bockhold: That is correct. Those numbers were not before l that time. , 1 1 I i f-. a\.>
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. 4 ! TAPE 57. PAGE 90. LINE 20 THROUGH PAGE 92. LINE 3.
Aufdenkampe: That went through fine [ meaning through the PRB) . and his comments about an off-site source went through fine. The next page, root cause. No comment. The next page, on the 20 starts. Stringfellow: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Aufdenkampe: I'm struggling with that one. ' i Stringfellow: You struggled with that one, huh? Aufdenkampe: I'm struggling with that one. I'm trying to verify that still. Stringfellow: Oh, okay. All right. l Aufdenkampe: Okay. We think that's basically a material false statement. Stringfellow: Really? Aufdenkampe: Yeah. Well, we know for a fact that the B diesel tripped at least once after March 20th. Mosbaugh: Actually, it tripped twice after March 20th, or it had at least two separate problems.
]
1 Stringfellow: Well, do we need to take this more than 20 times ! each out, then? Aufdenkampe: That's what we're thinking, but I got Tom Webb viewing the reactor operator's log and counting. S j Stringfellow: Okay. " l l ) Aufdenkampe: And I don't know where he's at. When's Harrison j due back in the office? Stringfellow: He's supposed to be there now. Aufdenkampe: Oh, so you've got to hurry and get this up here, huh? 4 Stringfellow: Well, yeah. Yeah. well, I -- see , I had given him I've given . Shipman, you know, the -- a typed i version of what you guys have been looking at. So now, as soon as we get off the phone, I'm going to i run back in there and tell him what you told me. You know? /
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Aufdenkampe:- Okay. Anyway, I'm still looking for words for you on that one, but that sentence is going to have to .l change. l l l i i I I l I l l
TAPE 57, PAGE 96, LINE 7 THROUGH END OF PAGE 96. Stringfellow: We don't know yet, but now, you know, I just -- it just dawned on me what Al was saying a minute ago. In other words, if we say, And no failures or problems have occurred in any . of these starts, you're saying that that's not true. Aufdenkampe: Yes, I'm saying that's not true. Stringfellow: Oh, wonderful. Okay. Aufdenkampe: Which is also telling you that -- it's telling you something else, I imagine.- Because, you know, we -
- this has been written to the NRC once already.
Stringfellow: Yes, I know. That's exactly what I was thinking. Aufdenkampe: I'm working on that. Stringfellow: All right, John. Okay. Well, I'll be patiently waiting, or impatiently waiting, or however you want to look at it. Aufdenkampe: Okay. Well, I must be off. Stringfellow: Thanks. j 1 Aufdenkampe: Bye. j l l 1
TAPE 57. PAGE 104. LINE 8 THROUGH PAGE 109. LINE 4 shipman: Okay. and the other question we've been_trying to get an answer to is reassure George. that we had more than 20 valid starts since, you know, March the 20th, like we say in the LER. Mosbaugh: Yeah. You realize I think there's a problem with the way that's stated, because, you know, the machine -- we can -- you know, we got one of the guys trying to find what the total number of the valid starts is, but there were failures. Shipman: Yeah. The problem that we got, Alan, is the data that's in the LER is what George wrote and took and r
. told to the Ebneter last Monday in Atlanta. ]
Mosbaugh: Well, you know, if anybody said that there weren't any failures, that's just not true. Shipman: Well, if you look at George's outline that he made to take to Atlanta with him, he says, at that time, it was like 18 and 19. Mosbaugh: Yeah. Shipman: And without a failure. so, you know, somebody had given George that information. Mosbaugh: On the B? Shipman: Haven't had a failure since George went to -- Mosbaugh: No. On the B -- let me tell you what I know, okay? On the B machine, on the B machine on 3-22 at , 12:43, the machine tripped on high lube oil i temperature. { Shipman: caused by what? Mosbaugh: caused by the switch that gives you a high lube oil 3, temperature, probably. Shipman: No. I understand that, but did we not have a -- l Mosbaugh: I don't believe a high temperature physical j 1 condition existed. I believe - - { Shipman: Was that a valid -- considered a valid failure? l Mosbaugh: I haven't assessed these for being valid or not. ] 4 3
Shipman: See, because I could -- we could solve the problem that's created by that information by saying no valid failures. Mosbaugh: That may have -- let me find -- I think we got one , other one. It is on 3-23 at 17:31. The machine tripped on low -- this is B machine again -- on low jacket water pressure / turbo lube oil, pressure low. Shipman: okay. The first one was on what date, did you say? Mosbaugh: Three-twenty-two. Shipman: Okay. How -- you know, with that data, I think this thing's already been through the PRB a couple of times. How in the world did it get through the PRB? Mosbaugh: What's that? Shipman: The statement that -- Mosbaugh: The LER or -- Shipman: Yeah, the LER. 1 Mosbaugh: Well, I mean -- Shipman: That data was not available in the PRB? Mosbaugh: The previous time that this LER went through the PRB, I'm not sure if those statements were in there. i i Shipman: Jack says yeah, they were. l Mosbaugh: They were? Shipman: Yeah. Stringfellow: The last PRB added the parenthetical phrase "more than 20 times each." I say the last -- not today, but the previous PRB. , Mosbaugh: You know, this thing -- it came to the PRB, you know, 15 pages long the first time, and then it was basically tabled for a complete rewrite back to eight pages, and -- Stringfellow: It went back to the PRB as eight pages. ' Mosbaugh: It went back as eight and -- anyway. Shipman: (inaudible) that whole question is immaterial and,
you know, it's just -- it's sort of a bother. But what we need to do is find out what's correct and r2ke sure we only say what's correct. Mosbaugh: Yeah. I -- you know, what I have here is there-was a tabulation make of diesel activities, you know, i early on by Kocheri, and that's where I'm getting this ,information from. l And I believe these -- I believe this tabulation was provided to the Chafee i team. I Shipman: Well, the -- I think people have been reviewing the I diesel generator log, but that's -- would only -- ! as we talked the other day, that only went through the 13th. ' Mosbaugh: Yeah. Voice: (inaudible) Mosbaugh: Yeah. This data picks up on the 13th. Shipman: somebody must have looked. Alan, would you take that as a second thing and try to get me the correct information for that? It sounds like this whole statement needs to be just stricken. Mosbaugh: I basically don't have any better information than the two trips that I told you about on the 22nd -- Stringfellow: You certainly can say it's only for valid tests or valid failures. Mosbaugh: Let me talk to Stokes and Kocheri about them. Shipman: I guess in the point we're in now where this thing has been through the PRB several times and we've I had several review cycles up here and everybody's gotten accustomed to seeing that data, if we can use the data, we probably ought to. Certainly if it's not a valid statement, we would need to get it
-the heck out of here regardless of what George told Ebneter.
So, you know, anything you need to do to check to make sure - that the data you have from Paul is correct and valid, I would ask that you do that, or if you feel very confident that it is correct now, I'll just need to see what I need to do about , striking this statement. i
'Mosbaugh: Okay. I feel this is the best data there is and I believe it's accurate. I will verify with Kochari, l i-i though.
s
. Shipman: Okay.
Mosbaugh: and I will pursue trying to get conversation with the operator. Shipman: _Okay. Jack and I'are going to leave here and walk down to Mr. Harrison's office to go over his comments and what we've been able to do with those, and try to, you know, finish beating out what he wants to do to this thing. so if you want, you know, if you find somebody and want to call back, you might just call down there. Mosbaugh: What's the number? Shipman: 5581.
l 9 TAPE 57. PAGE 96. LINE 7 THROUGH END OF PAGE 96. Stringfellow: We don't know yet, but now, you know, I just -- it just dawned on me what Al was saying a minute ago. In other words, if we say, And no failures or problems have occurred in any of these starts, you're saying that that's not true. Aufdenkampe: Yes, I'm saying that's rot true. I Stringfellow: Oh, wonderful. Okay. Aufdenkampe: Which is also telling you that -- it's telling you something else, I imagine. Because, you know, we -
- this has been written to the NRC once already.
{ Stringfellow: Yes, I know. That's exactly what I was thinking. Aufdenkampe: I'm working on that. Stringfellow: All right, John. Okay. Well, I'll be patiently waiting, or impatiently waiting, or however you want-to look at it. Aufdenkampe: Okay. Well, I must be off. Stringfellow: Thanks. Aufdenkampe: Bye. l 1 I
TAPE 57. PAGE 104. LINE 8 THROUGH PAGE 109, LINE 4 Shipman: Okay. and the other question we've been trying to get an answer to is reassure George that we had more than 20 valid starts since, you know, March the 20th, like we say in the LER. Mosbaugh: Yeah. You realize I:think there's a problem with the way that's stated because, you know, the machine -- we can -- yo,u know, we got one of the guys trying. to find what the total number of the valid starts is, but there were failures. Shipman: Yeah. The problem that we got, Alan, is the data that's in the LER is what George wrote and took and told to the Ebneter last Monday in Atlanta. Mosbaugh: Well, you know, if anybody said that there weren't any failures, that's just not true. Shipman: Well, if you look at George's outline that he made to take to Atlanta with him, he says, at that time, it was like 18 and 19. Mosbaugh: Yeah. Shipman: And without a failure. so, you know, somebody had given George that information. Mosbaugh: On the B? Shipman: Haven't had a failure since George went to -- Mosbaugh: No. On the B -- let me tell you what I know, okay? On the B machine, on the E machine on 3-22 at 12:43, the machine tripped on high lube oil temperature. Shipman: caused by what? Mosbaugh: caused by the switch that gives you a high lube oil temperature, probably. Shipman: No. I understand that, but did we not have a -- Mosbaugh: I don't believe a high temperature physical condition existed. I believe -- Shipman: Was that a valid -- considered a valid failure? Mosbaugh: I haven't assessed these for being valid or not.
. . - - a-., .a . - .. a .,..u....
q . a , .a -- e-~. ....-w.- . . - . . - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - 1 P a Shipman: See, because I could -- we could solve the problem I i j that's created by that information by saying no valid failures. Mosbaugh: That may have -- let me find -- I think we got one 4 other one. It is on 3-23 at 17:31. The machine j tripped on low -- this is B machine again -- on low j jacket water pressure / turbo lube oil, pressure low. l Shipman: Okay. The first one was on what date, did you say?
; Mosbaugh: ,
Three-twenty-two. i Shipman: Okay. How -- you know, with that data, I think this thing's already been through the PRB a couple ! of times. How in the world did it get through the PRB? 3 Mosbaugh:' What's that? l Shipman: The statement that -- Mosbaugh: The LER or -- i
- Shipman
- Yeah, the LZR.
- Mosbaugh
- Well, I mean --
Shipman: That data was not available in the PRB7 i l Mosbaugh: The previous time that this LER went through the PRB, i there. I'm not sure if those statements were in 1 Shipman: Jack says yeah, they were. Mosbaugh: They were?
- Shipman
- Yeah.
i Stringfellow: The last PRS added the parenthetical phrase "more than 20 times each." I say the last -- not today, but the previous PRB. Mosbaugh: You know, this thing -- it came to the PRB, you know, 15 pages long the first time, and then it was l basically tabled for a complete rewrite back to eight pages, and --
- Stringfellow
- It went back to the PRB as eight pages.
Mosbaugh: It went back as eight and -- anyway. Shipman: (inaudible) that whole question is immaterial and, e
I i
- l. '
'* you know, it's just -- it's sort of a bother. But i ! what we make sureneed to do we only is what's say find outcorrect. what's correct and : ! Mosbaugh: Yeah. I -- you know, what I have here is there was i i a tabulation make of diesel activities, you know, i i ! early on by Kochari, and that's where I'm getting this information from. And I believe these -- I i believe this tabulation was provided to the Chafee j team. i Shipman: Well, the -- I think people have been reviewing the ! diesel generator log, but that's -- would only -- ; i as we the talked the other day, that only went through 13th. ' i ) Mosbaugh: Yeah. 4 j Voice: [ inaudible) Mosbaugh: Yeah. This data picks up-on the 13th. d Shipman: somebody must have looked.
- Alan, would you take that as a second thing and try to get me the t
correct information for that? It sounds like this whole statement needs to be just stricken. Mosbaugh: I basically don't have any better information than the two trips that I told you about on the 22nd -- Stringfellow: You certainly can say it's only for valid tests or valid failures. Mosbaugh: Let me talk to Stokes and Kocheri about them. Shipman: I guess in the point we're in now where this thing has been through the PRB several times and we've had several review cycles up here and everybody's gotten accustomed to seeing that data, if we can use the data, we probably ought to. Certainly if it's not a valid statement, we would need to get it j i the Ebneter. heck out of here regardless of what George told So, you know, anything you need to do to check to make sure that the data you have from Paul is correct and valid, I would ask that you do that, or if you feel very confident that it is correct now, I'll just need to see what I need to do about I striking this statement. l Mosbaugh: Okay. believeI it's feelaccurate. this is the best data there is and I I will verify with Kochari, though. 3
Shipman: Okay. Mosbaught and I will pursue trying to get conversation with the operator. Shipman: Okay. Jack and I are going to leave here and walk , down to Mr. Harrison's office to go over his comments and what we've been able to do with those, and try to, you know, finish beating out what he wants to do to this thing. so if you want, you know, if you find somebody and want to call back, you might just call down there. Mosbaugh: What's the number? Shipman: 5581.
TAPE 58. PAGE 8. LINE 7 ! r Aufdenkampe: Well, the way -- Alan Mosbaugh just walked in, George, so I'll put it in the speaker. The way my people came up with greater than 20 starts is they took the 19 and 18 starts and, based on the April ; 9th letter, and they went and checked and found out how many starts they had subsequent to April 9th. i And that's why you can say greater than 20. Bockhold: I think you can greater than 20. You know, we even s added more starts recently. We had a start last -- i the other night. l t McCoy: We starts need to be sure that we know the number of after we've completed the comprehensive control test program. Aufdenkampe: I do have people right now going out through -- my people going out through the RO's logs -- Bockhold: From my numbers that I presented at the conference, i they were verified correct by Jimmy Paul cash, who went through the operator's logs. McCoy: You ought to use those numbers. Bockhold: Okay. So we'll say greater than those numbers that were used in the conference. McCoy: Those numbers you used in the conference were after they had completed the comprehensive test of the control system on each diesel. Bockhold: That is correct. that time. Those numbers were not before Stringfellow: j Let me make sure I'm clear. Do we want to say ( inaudible) the comprehensive test program? Do we , want to say that kind of stuff, or do we want to t just say -- Bockhold: Yes, you can say that. I Mosbaugh: I don't think they better look at those logs. 4 Voice: Right. l Voice: [ Inaudible.) Voice: (Inaudible.) .i 4
,,s , , , . ,- - - - - - ~ , - - - - - - , ., , , , - - - ,,-,e - , , . , , - - , , - -,--e --
1 i.- l 1 1 i Voice: Yes, we're done with Hairston on that. 2 t voice: , [ Inaudible.] \ Voice: Hairston's happy with that one. Voice: The wording was [ inaudible.] ! Mosbaugh: He's going to add something. There's a new s sentence going in front of -- Shipman: Eighteen or 197 What did you )
- have in your presentation, George? Seventeen and 18 or 18 and i l 197 l l Bockhold
- Eighteen and 19.
- Shipman
- - could we say greater than 18, we mean more that 18 times.
i j Bockhold: Greater than 18 would be good. Shipman: Fine. l McCoy: Greater than 18, more than 18. One of them. ! Shipman: Okay. !. I understand John and A1, if A1 just walked i in, I understand that George just got off the phone i 1 with Jim Schwartzwalder and the operator and he is l satisfied now with the -- what the operator did , when he walked in the room. Mosbaugh: Yeah, I was down there, Bill, and I just ran up here. Yeah, we're done with that one. i , Shipman: apparently -- he --somehow he knew more about it than you and I did. McCoy: Well, he went down to the plant and talked (inaudible.] Mosbaugh: Well, no, I don't -- not really. Shipman: It sounds like to me the operator said he looked at l ] something more than the enunciators. Mosbaugh:
- He confirmed with the operator that the operator 1 did a comfortable with, you know, some statement i i that's kind of like that. !
i Shipman: He didn't lead the operator, did he? 1 Mosbaugh: I don't think so. i i k-2
L. 4 i Aufdenkampe: Not very far. 1 Shipman: Well, you don't need to lead him at all. The guy l might get an opportunity to testify at some time about that. So you all don't let Mr. Hairston lead 3 the operator. Voice I'm sure that we put words in his mouth. j 1 Hairston: But, no, he said he read them, because he had (inaudible.) Voice: okay. j Hairston: And Jim explained the reason it was put in there, because it ties in later, and Jim said that's the reason. It wasn't to make you think that the i
- operators just went down there and closed his eyes and hit the button,
- but the operator said he i
[ inaudible.) Actually, the operator said that he did more. ( operator says I've he [ inaudible)looked at several all the (inaudible) gages, and the ha 3- didn't see any problems on them gages. walkin by and he He said problams. didn't see any mechanical j He said he didn't look at it closely, it was dark, but, you know, he didn't see any rods sittin out on the floor. But you know, what we put 1 in there is less than what he verbalized to me. [ Shipman: okay. l make sure I know we --how you are, and I'm just trying to Hairston: j I don't want to hit nobody, I just want to make sure you know what the operators would say. k Shipman: Okay. i All right. ! Hairston: Of course, they'd probably say, Well, that's just Viat the shift supervisciF d tell us to do . Shipman: At's see. What other questions do we got? We got them start things straightened out. Voice: The other question we had, Bill, was... Hairston: So we got the starts... trips? So we didn't have no Shipman: No, not, not... McCoy: I'll testify to that. Shipman: Just disavow. What else did we have, Jack?
4 . c> S1 TAPE 58. PAGE 8. LINE 7 THROUGH PAGE 12. LINE B l 2 Aufdenkampe: Well, the way -- Alan Mosbaugh just walked in, George, ' 1 3 so I'll put you on the speaker. The way my people came 4 up with greater than 20 starts is they took the 19 and j 5 18 starts and, based on the April 9th letter, and they 6 : 7 went-and checked and found out how many starts they had { subsequent to April 9th. And that's why you can say 8 greater than 20. ]
! tockhold: I think you can say greater than 20. You know, we even l
lt added more starts recently. We had a start last -- the l l 11 other night. j 12 McCoy: We need to be sure that we know the number of starts 13 after we've completed the comprehensive control test 14 program. 15 Aufdenkampe: I do have people right now going out through -- my 16 people going out through the RO's logs -- 17 Bockhold: From my numbers that I presented at the conference, they 18 were verified correct by Jimmy Paul Cash who went 19 through the operator's logs. 20 McCoy: You ought to use those numbers. 21 Bockhold: Okay. So we'll say greater than those numbers that were 22 used in the conference. 23 McCoy: Those numbers you used in the conference were after they 24 had completed the comprehensive test of the control ) 25 systems on each diesel. I l 26 Bockhold: That is correct. Those numbers were not before that ! 27 time. I 28 Stringfellow: Let me make sure I'm clear. Do we want to say, "Since 29 3/20/90, DG1A and DG1B have been subjected to a 30 comprehensive test program? Do we want to say that kind 31 of stuff, or do we want to just say -- 32 Bockhold: Yes, you can say that. 33 McCoy: That's pretty clear. 34 Mosbaugh: I don't think they better look at those logs. gI' 35 Voice: Right. \b ! 36 Voice: (inaudible) 37 Voice: (inaudible)
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El Mosbaugh: Yeah he's done, we're done with.Hairston on that.
.2 Voice: (inaudible) 3 'Mosbaugh: Hairston's happy with that one.
4 Voice:. The wording was (inaudible). 5 Mosbaugh:
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He's going to add'something. There's a new sentence , li going.in front of --
, Shipman: Eighteen and 197 What did you have in your ! 8 presentation, George? Seventeen and 18 or 18 and 197 9 Bockhold: Eighteen and 19.
10 Shipman: Could we say greater than 18, we (inaudible) more than , 11 18 times. 4 12 .Bockhold: Greater than 18 would be good. 4 13 Shipman:- Fine. f j 14 McCoy: It wouldn't be more than 18 on one of them. It would be j 15 18. l 16 Voice: (Inaudible) 4 j 17 Shipman: Okay. I understand, John and A1, if A1 just walked in, ! 18 I understand that George just got off the phone with Jim
. 19 Schwartzwelder and the operator and he is satisfied now 20 with the -- what the operator did when he walked in the l; 21 room.
22 Mosbaugh: Yeah, I was down there, Bill, and I just ran up here. l 23 Yeah, we're done with that one. l24 Shipman: Apparently -- I don't know how George knows all this
- 1. 25 stuff, but apparently he -- somehow he knew more about i 26 it than you and I did.
27 Voice: Well, he went down to the plant and talked (inaudible). 28 Mosbaugh: Well,-no, I don't -- not really, I i 29 Shipman: It sounds like to me the operator said he looked at 30 something other than the enunciators. 31 Mosbaugh: He confirmed with the operator that the operator did a
~
i 32 cursory review of instruments. And the operator's
- 33. comfortable with, you know, ,some statement that's kind 34 of like that.
. 35 Shipman: He didn't lead the operator, did he? 2
i . 1 1 Mosbaugh: I don't think so. 2 Aufdenkampe: Not very far. 3 Shipman: Well, he don't need to lead him at all. The guy might 4
)
get an opportunity to testify at some time about that. 5 So you all don't let Mr. Hairston lead the operator. l l 6 Hairston: I'm sure that we put words in his mouth. 1 7 But, no, he said he read them, because he had l 8 (inaudible). ; l 9 Shipman: Okay. { 10 Hairston: And Jim explained to him the reason it was put in there, 11 because it ties in later, and Jim said that's the 12 reason. It wasn't to make you think that the operators 13 just went down there and closed his eyes and hit the 14 button, but the operator said he (inaudible). Actually, 15 the operator said that he did more. I've (inaudible) 16 several (inaudible) the operator says he looked at all 17 the gages, and he didn't see any problems on them gages. 18 He said walking by and he didn't see any mechanical l 19 problems. He said he didn't look at it closely, it was 20 dark, but, you know, he didn't see any rods sitting out 21 on the floor. But, you know, what we put in there is 22 less than what he verbalized to me. 23 Shipman: Okay. I know how you are, and I'm just trying to make 24 sure we -- 25 Hairston: I wouldn't lead nobody, I just want to make sure you 26 know what the operators would say. 27 Shipman: Okay. All right. 28 Hairston: Of course, they'd probably say, well, that's just what 29 the shift supervisor'd tell us to do. 30 Shipman: Let's see. What other questions do we got? We got them 31 start things straightened out. 32 Stringfellow: The other question we had Bill, was the -- 33 Hairston: We got the starts, so we didn't have no...we didn't have 34 no trips, i 35 Shipman: No, act. not... I 36 McCoy: I'll testify to that. 37 Shipman: Just disavow. What else did we have, Jack? 3
,1 TAPE 58. PAGE 20. LINE 11 THROUGH PAGE 26. LINE 10 2 Shipman: -- and that they should not be included because they 3
4 were part of the return to service of the diesel coming 5 out of the overhaul, and this count only included those 6 starts after we had calibrated all these sensors. John, you heard George Bockhold's logic. 7 Mosbaugh: Yes, so, but what I'm is, let's say we had ten starts on 8 9 the machine between the 20th and the time we declared it 10 operable or completed our logic testing, yon know, and 11 then interspersed in there on the -- maybe f;he third, 12 fifth and sixth starts were failures, you know, then I 13 think what we're saying is we would start counting at the ten point, if that was an example. 14 Shipman: Right. We would discount those starts prior to when we 15 did that calibration. 16 Mosbaugh: Sc we want to start it after we completed the logic, the 17 logic test? 18 Shipman: What I understood that George had done was started after 19 we completed the recalibration of all the 20 instrumentation. That's when we ought to have, you 21 know, as far as that instrumentation is concerned, 22 that's when we ought to have had valid set points and . 23 good instruments. That's what we're trying to show, 24 that the unit starts -- when that's been done correctly, 25 that the unit starts reliably, starts and runs reliably. 26 Does that make sense, and can we get to that data? l 27 Mosbaugh: We have the data. The question is, is what's that date 28 and time? You know, as soon as we get to the point at 29 which we want to start counting, we can get the count 30 pretty quick. 31 Aufdenkampe: Well, not pretty quick, but -- 32 Shipman: How do we get to that point, Al? 33 Mosbaugh: You know what? 4 I think part of the thing we did is we 34 went in and, you know, we changed out a bunch of 35 switches, we went in and then did logic tests, we went l 36 into the undervoltage tests, and then we finally ran the 37 38 surveillance on the macnine, and at that point that we 39 completed the surveillance on the machine, we called the machine operable. You know,...so the question again , 40 comes back to at what point are we going to start 41 counting. , 4
1 Shipman: Well, George said he started counting after we had 2 completed the instrumentation recalibration, okay? So 3 that's one point we can start counting, if we can define 4 that point. I can't define it. I don't know when that 5 was. Somebody generated the set of data that generated 6 the numbers 18 and 19 to George on that basis. 7 Aufdenkampe: That was Jimmy Paul Cash. 8 Mosbaugh: Jimmy Paul did. Let me go downstairs and talk to Jimmy 9 Paul and see... 10 Aufdenkampe: Okay. I'm trying to get Schwartzwelder up here. 11 Mosbaugh: Schwartzwelder? Okay. 12 Shipman: Okay. One other thing we could do, A1, you know, saying 13 we still continue to have problems with trying to define 14 this. We could back away frem this completely, and , 15 change this to say how many starts we've had since we 16 declared the diesel operable. 17 Mosbaugh: Yes, that -- le auidenkampe: That would be more -- 19 Mosbaugh: That's easy to define. We just go into OPS LCO's and . 20 find out when they cleared the LCO sud we'll know that 21 point real easy. That's an easy point to find. I think 22 the other point we'll have to find by talking to Jimmy 23 Paul Cash. 24 Shipman: The problem with that is that that number is going to be 25 significantly less, I think, than what George told 26 Mr. Ebneter, and, you know, it's going to create a 4 27 selling job for me, I think, but eventually, that the 28 only way we can tell a valid story that, you know, we 29 can defend if somebody calls Alan Mosbaugh, Bill Shipman 30 and John Aufdenkampe to testify. That's the story I
- 31 want to tell.
32 Mosbaugh: Well, I think -- you know, let me try some logic here. 33 We have these two failures, and now John says there are
, 34 three failures. You know, we're kind of saying, hey, 35 those are not valid failures, you know, because we were
- 3. coming out of maintenance on the machine and had yet to 4
37 declare it operable. That's how and why we're 38 discounting those failures. 39 Shipman: So we have yet to determine that coming out of an outage 40 on the machine, we had to go and basically do a complete 4 41 set of recalibrations of the instruments. That was the 42 logic that George used, not that we were declaring it 43 operable, because we obviously hadn't declared it 44 operable. 5
31 Mosbaugh: Well, one of those failures was when we were doing the, i 2 you know, an eight-hour loaded run. I would sure hope 3 4 to hell think that we had calibrated the instruments before we did an eight-hour loaded run. 5 Shipman: Well, not according to George. We hadn't recognized the , 6 need to go back and redo all of them then. Is that not 7 what he said, John Aufdenkampe? 8 Aufdenkampe: That's what I understood. 9 Mosbaugh: I'm just thinking from the standpoint of testing logic, 10 you know, you're going to do an eight-hour leaded run on 11 the machine, you know, obviously the component testing 12 ought to be done at that point. 13 Shipman: Well obv..., you know, on 1A obviously we thought we had r 14 done everything we needed when we returned it to 15 service. 16 Aufdenkampe: It was operable. 17 Mosbaugh: Yeah. It was declared operable. 18 Shipman: We found out that we hadn't, and George is saying, oh 19 oh, hey, gang, from the time we realized that 1A or 1B, 20 we had to do a complete recalibration and make sure we , i 21 had our facts together on all the instruments, we had ) 22 many many starts. I'm not trying to..., I'm trying to ' 23 defend George and -- 24 Aufdenkampe: Well, you know, the bottom line is on the B diesel, we 25 had done major maintenance on it. We were in the 26 process of testing to make sure it was working right. 27 During that testing process, we had it fail apparently 28 three times. 29 Once we got all the bugs worked out of it -- Since the 30 point we got all the bugs worked out of it that we had 31 -- we had -- and I'm kind of guessing, but uh, 27 32 starts, because I don't know where the three failures 33 are in the sequence of 27 starts, but we had X number of 34 starts. And George's argument to that is, after we got ; 35 all the bugs worked out, we had 18 starts. 36 Shipman: What he's trying to do is he's trying to show by data 37 that once you get the bugs worked out, like you say, 38 John, the diesel works fine. 39 Aufdenkampe: That's right. And that's regardless of the point of 40 ! declaration of operability or not. ! 41 Shipman: Fine. Right. i l 6 ; l l
al Aufdenkampe: You know, I think what we discussed on how to handle 2 those, the number of actual diesel starts, how we 3 4 discussed that before, I think we ought to just leave it at that. 5 Shipman: Just say at least 18 times each, huh? 6 Aufdenkampe: Yeah. 7 Shipman: Okay. l 8 Aufdenkampe: I mean, that -- somebody has gone and validated that 9 data, and that's what George presented. The data that's 10 been offered to us does not bring into question that 11 data. 12 Shipman: Okay. 13 Aufdenkampe: It tends to support that data. Would you take exception i 14 to that Allen? 15 Shipman: We're going to go with that. Jack Stringfellow's just 16 grinning from ear to ear. 17 Aufdenkampe: The only issue is, we can't let people be misled, think 18 that there were not failures until we started doing that 19 count. ! I 7
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/ 47 Page 52 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: Alarms. I 2 MR. CHAFFEF. : Alarms. 3 MR. POPE: I have seen spurious alarms several 4 times. You can go and cause an alarm on the diesel 5 generator when it is not in auto by taking a fuel transfer 6 pump off, you get an alarm on the control panel. Along with 7 that alarm may come one or two more alarms at the same time 8 and clear. Spurious alarms, I have seen those a lot of g times. 10 MR. WHITMAN: They are fairly sensitive, il MR. CHAFFEE: Is that common for enunciator panels j 12 to expect spurious alarms, is that part of the training just l i3 to expect that, or is this, is the diesel sort of a totall-
-[ 14 different animal in terms of having this problem?
15 MR. POPE: We have beer trained that alarms are 16 valid until you prove them unvalid. 17 MR. BOCKHOLD: Good. 18 MR. BURR: Until proven not valid. 19 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, is there anything else that i 20 anybody observed either starting or tripping the diesel that might have been some indication that something might have 21 l 22 gone wrong that needs a trouble shot? : , 23 MR. BURR: I think one additional, for information, i 24 last night we were checking for leaks and there were some l g leaku nn mnma mt ~ -a = i .
't
- ibe se, --- ne i
l = Page 53 I so air leaks would have contributed to that. I 2 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, can we get specific on that? 3 Can we identify specifically what leaks there were and how 1 4 they are tapped into each and every one of these, so we 1 5 can--maybe as we proceed with this, we will be able to null 1 6 down the cause for all of these. 7 MR. CHENAULT: Addi t' iona ll y , during--after the event I e happened, they ran the engine three times after that, and 9 then they initiated the work order to recalibrate these lube to all switches, on the 23rd, I believe it was, i i 11 At that time, they ran the engine and checked for 12 leaks and they did correct approximately a dozen leaks. 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Are they documented in terms of where 4 ! 14 they were located? 15 MR. CHENAULT: We could find it, yes. 16 MR. CHAFFEE: Yeah, let's see if they can find it. 17 That would help. 18 Now, I also got the impression and I don't remember 19 what the details were, but something about after the event 20 occurred and you ran the diesel, doing some troubleshooting 21 and some things, you found some problems. 22 Are all of the problems you found up here yet? It 23 seems to me that you found a ,roblem with some instrument 24 that T have the impression they are not covered by one of M . .' t he- - n n t r i e:S vp here, one of the ,::.: : i . '. .m r, l'
i Page 56 1 1 Okay, the next one is E14, low Jacket water ' 2 pressure. l 3 (Brief pause.) l 4 Then the last one is E68 and that was high crank l 1 5 case pressure. l
)
6 (Brief pause.) 7 There are relationship between those, they happened I a to be in the same system, the same trips and alarms. 9 MR. OWYOUNG: If I can inject something, those 10 par t icula r leaks, I monitored the group one pressure gauge. 11 The system pressure levels at 61 psi and the gauge was 12 reading 61 pai, so those particular leaks did not cause a i3 bleeding off or drop in the shutdown pressure level. [ 14 I personally would be concerned if the system 15 Pressure control air pressure level was at 61 psi and you 16 had a pressure, a group one pressure at around 58, then I 17 would start being concerned. I i 18 MR. CdAFFEE: What is, what do you mean by, I don't 19 know group one pressure. [! 20 MR. OWYOUNG: These monitors, we have a gauge in the 21 Panel that monitors the shutdown pressure level and as the 22 system falls, this gauge would indicate the system's falling f I 23 down, and that operated the trip. ' 24 MR. CHAFFEE: I see. That is the place that is t v poing to P3, in the' "ir '* y' i
!~' g i
i 1
Page 54 1 something that you tested three of them and you found one 2 bad and two were good. 3 MR. STOKES: It is the lube oli pressure switches. A Pressure sensor. 5 MR. OWYOUNG: That is the malfunction alarm. 6 MR. STOKES: That is the one they found bad. 7 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, I see, okay. So that is probably ' 8 what--oh, I see, that is the A sensor? 9 MR. STOKES: Right. 10 MR. CHAFFEE: What is the sensors you were testing l 11 today that were bad? l 1 12 MR. CHENAULT: High temperature jacket water. __ 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, and then you tested something 14 else after-- 15 Would you put down there where it says the A sensor, 16 that must have been on the 21st? 17 MR. CHENAULT: The 23rd. 18 MR. CHAFFEE: That was on the 23rd. Was there any 19 other testing that was done during that time during which 20 y'ou identified a problem > 21 MR. CHENAULT: Air leakage, a dezen air lines. l 22 MR. CHAFFEE: A dozen air lines. The sensor line 1 23 was on the 23rd. There was a dozen air lines, up there on 24 the sensor line leak. On March 23, they identified, you n H- eu 7h bt - deren air line Itaho, and they are going t:
- h
, ~
Page 55 1 get that information and we will see where those things are 2 all tied into place. 3 That is not something we can get while we continue d to talk? 5 MR. STOKES: No. 6 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, was there other air line leaks 7 found some later time than the 23rd. I guess it was 8 sometime last night? 9 MR. STOKES: There were some yesterday. I have got to those, the line numbers noted on here, if you want to put 11 those down. 12 MR. CHAFFEE: What are those? 13 MR. STOKES: Okay, line number E23H, I believe that i 14 is vibration. 15 E92, that is turbo charger low oil pressure. 16 Oh, the first one, by the way, we saw two places. 17 MR. CHAFFEE: The vibration one, you saw to places? 18 MR. STOKES: Yes, two locations. 19 (Brief pause.) 20 Okay, E18 la the next one. That is miso two places. 21 High temperature lube oil. 22 (Brief pause.) 23 Okay, the nevt one is E16B, tha+ is one of the high 24 temperature jacket water lines. 25 (Brief pae7e.) I
Page 57 I MR. OWYOUNG: Yes. 2 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. 3 MR. OWYOUNG: And with these particular leaks, that d pressure was up to 61 psi. 5 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Do you normally see--maybe they 6 were close to the point where this thing would trigger, but 7 I guess what you are saying is, if that was the case, you 8 would have seen this pressure, rather than the 61 pounds, 9 you would have seen it at-- 10 MR. OWYOUNG: You would have at, if it was close to 11 the trip point, you would have seen it around 48 psi or i 12 something like that, right close to the trip point. 13 MR. CHAFFEE: What you were telling me earlier was 14 that for P3 to trip, you have got to get down to 45 pounds, 15 and it will reset at 59, is that right? 16 MR. OWYOUNG: No, P3 resets, that particular P3 17 resets at 49 psi. 18 MR. CHAFFEE: I see, it was 49, so 45 and 61. 19 Why don't we write that down, P3 trips at 45 and 20 resets at 49 and the pressure that was seen, I guess at the 21 time all of these were taken-- 22 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes. MR. CHA" FEE: --61 pounds. Trips at 45 and resets 24 at 49. 75 MR. ACFEE: One ret- - ' eg .thic same line, when we 3 1
Page 58 1 received a low lube oil pressure sensor malfunction, we 2 checked control air pressure on the panel there, and it was 3 slightly above 60, I mean it was just a hair above 60. We 4 verified that air pressure. 5 MR. STOKES: And he said they looked at group one 6 Pressure at a time when all of these leaks were found and it 7 was - reading 61 pounds, indicating that the leaks, even if 8 there were leaks, were not having impact at the trip 9 circuitry, you know, the trigger point. 10 MR. CHAFFEE: You said just above 607 ll MR. ACREE: Right, the needle, it was just a hair i 12 above 60. - 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, well, I guess what this is, 3 14 those are the five potential, those are five enunciators is that came in as part of the diesel starting and tripping. j l 16 Of those five, there are certain of them that seem to have l 17 been substantiated by sensor problems. 18 The lube oil low pressure sensor malfunction, that 19 seemed to be clearly established as having been due to a 20 sensor delay. 21 The next one, lube oil high temperature, that one, 22 we are not sure about because it may be spurious, but it i l 23 lasted, in a long time; what have you done to try to figure 24 that thing out?
,, MP- CHENAIILT : Which one? ?
e
Page 59 1 MR. CHAFFEE: The one with the lube oli high 2 temperature that comes out the thermal couple. 3 MR. CHENAULT: We decided that it was an 4 indeterminate problem. 5 MR. OWYOUNG: If the reset button was not pushed, 6 right after that came in, you don't know if it cleared or 7 not. 8 MR. CHAFFEE: Right. 9 We have to take that one and a half minutes out. 10 MR. ACREE: There was one suggestion we might check 11 into, if the control room operator noticed it in the control 12 room, he would get an immediate reset. When he mashes his 13 button, Jt goes out. If we mash our milence without hitting
-' 14 our remet, it stays flashing, so we don't really know the 15 duration of the alarm but in the control room, you might.
16 MR. POPE: I was looking at, I was in the control 17 room and I don't remember seeing that alarm. 18 MR. ACREE: You get a lot of alarms on start and 19 when you acknowledge them, the only one I remember seeing In 20 solid is the sensor malfunction and I was standing in front 21 of the panel. 22 MR. CHAFFEE: Did there anyone else in the control 23 room you think that might have seen that? 24 MR. POPE: Kyle Johns. 25 MR. ACRFE: Kyle Jones was also there. 4
Page 60 1 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, write down Kyle Johns next to 2 that, and we wl31 contact him. Could someone call him and 3 ask that question while we are talking? 4 MR. POPE: I will. (Leaving conference room.) 5 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, the turbo temperature low i 6 pressure is the trip they got, the trip signal they got at 7 the second trip and nothing has been done to try to find out 8 why that occurred? 9 Okay, what is going to be done to determine why it to occurred? 11 Does anybody know how it is going to be handled as 12 far as testing? Has it been calibrated or is there a sensor , i3 that needs to be calibrated, or how do you plan to check? [ 14 MR. STOKES: We just intended to do a functional I 15 test on it, a leak test, and verify the leakage, which would j 1 4 16 give us an indication of the erroneous trips. . 17 MR. KOCHERY: Run the bubbler test on it, without , 18 the lines connected, it is going to be those lines. 19 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, well, I guess what I am trying . 4 20 t'o find out, wouldn't it be proper to do calibration ont he 9 21 sensors? That in how you found the problem with the lube , 22 oil low pressure sensor malfunction, the 8th sensor failed, { . I 23 right? 24 MR. KOCHERY: Yeah. n MP CH?.FFEE: ? qucca that is how you found t hr:
! l l
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Page 61 1 problem with the one you found this morning. 2 MF. , KOCHERY: That's the temperatures. 3 MR. CHAFFEE: Yes, that is this one up here 4 (Indicating) this Jacket water temperature. 5 MR. BOCKNOLD: We weren't going to do a ca'tibration 6 and a sensor, on this thing? 7 MK. KOCHERY: We were not planning to do Jt, no. We - 8 were planning to do that bubbler check. The pressure switch 9 is a lot more stable in a temperature switch. 10 MR. STOKES: We can do a calibration check on it, 11 just to verify it is within caliber. 12 MR. CHAFFEE: Don't you think that would be a good 13 idea, because we got that trip alarm, so it must be real. I 14 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yeah, we will go ahead and do that in 15 the sensor, Ken. 16 MR. POPE: In answer to your question about the high 17 temperature alarm. Kyle said he did not remember seeing 18 that alarm either. The only one he does remember, and I do j 19 too, is the lube oil low level alarm which that is what Ray 20 Howard put the all in, right? 21 MR. CHAFFEE: You saw the low level lube oil alarm? 22 MR. HOWARD: It just came. It comes in until the 23 engine gets up and it normall goes out. We had some oil 24 there and so we went ahead and put some in it, but after it 25 was running
.l 1 t.
P W Page 62 i MR. ACREE: As I told you yesterday, it was after we
- 2 were running and we were slightly above minimum and Ray told 1 3- .
3 me he was adding it,.and we added it right off the start. ) ) 1 4 MR. CHAFFEE: But you did look at the alarm? j 5 MR. HOWARD: Yes, sir. i j 6 MR. CHAFFEE: I am not sure there is any 1 7 significance to that. g I guess under lube oil low level, just simply note 9 that the alarm was noted after the third start? 10 After the third start, and then they added oil. 11 So I guess the speculation is that the oil level, 12 after having started a couple of times, it used up some oil __ 33 and that is why you got it? ) l I 14 MR. HOWARD: It has a big pump, uses a lot of oil. 15 MR. ACREE: Yeah. i 16 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, so wa are going to, so under the i 17 turbo charger, the 'Sird one down, we are going to do 18 trouble shooting, which will consist of, what, the bubbler j l 19 test, the calibration of the instruction, is that--is there 1 20 a'nything else to be done on that? } 21 MR. STOKES: That's all. l l 22 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Jacket water temperature high, 23 that is the one that this morning we came in and that one 24 instrument was reporting, was that also the same on-- 1 n MR. Kam?ERY Th r ; . e l '9 ? oil temp. i. s
Page 63 1 MR. CHAFFEE: No, wait a second, I am getting 2 confused. 3 The instrument when we came in this morning that we d looked at was in the lube oil-- 5 MR. KOCHERY: Correction, this morning was the lube 6 oil temperature switch, not the jacket water. 7 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. This right here (indicating), B the sensor that you are talking, that was this? 9 MR. OWYOUNG: No, that is a different sensor. 10 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, that is the thermocouple. Il so this, we have got another one down here 12 somewhere. l 13 MR. OWYOUNG: The lube oil temperature, .that was l
'( 14 this morning.
15 MR. KOCHERY: The lube oli temperature sensor. 16 MR. CHAFFEE: Those are what provide the lube oil, 17 five lube all temperature trips. IB (Brief pause.) 19 And in that case, what they found on the 30th, I 20 guess, this morning, the 30th, was that--was it the high 21 lube oil temperature, is that a two out of three? i 22 MR. KOCHERY: No, one out of one. t 23 MR. CHAFFEE: One out of one, and they found that-- 24 was that also an emergency? The normal trip. Okay, they 25 found that the one sensor was ^199cJs!, I ;uans? l r1 i I
Page 64 i MR. KOCHERY: Yes, it was, it goes down slowly. 2 MR. CHAFFEE: The other thing that was found in 3 that, I won't say impossible thing, but I think we ought to 4 consider looking at was that we was told by the IC 5 Individual that what that sensor trips at in terms of 6 temperature, it is partially dependent on how quickly the 7 temperature it's in changes, he then told us that if you a were to just put it into, if you were to just heat it up 9 very quickly, it would trip at a much lower temperature than to it would if you heated it up real slowly, and so, because of 11 that, and I guess the people we talked to have actually 12 observed that, what At raises in my mind is a question an'to __ 13 how well defined the surveillance testing is in that the I 14 surveillance testing did identify, you know, what 15 temperature the trip should occur, but it doesn't tell you 16 how rapidly or slowly the various temperatures -- nor does 17 it tell you how rapidly or slowly the sensor should 18 transition from testing no flow to full flow and so I-- 19 MR. BOCKHOLD: You are using the word surveillance 20 testing, this is really calibration testing, and there is a 21 big difference there. i l 22 MR. CHAFFEE: Calibration testing. ' i 23 The reason I .m saying this is my impression is you 24 don't want to have these enunciators and alarms coming in v unnecessarily, and one nf the things per nac.n i a 20 e i 1
Page 65 1 down there was this particular one that was sluggish, the 2 statement was made,-well, it may have been like that the 3 laot time you looked at it, but different people have 4 different perceptions in terms of what this thing should do, 5 and so the comment made was, well, if different people have 6 different perceptions, then that sounds to me like the 7 sensor criteria needs to be refined a little bit, so that 8 people's perceptions don't enter into what is an acceptable 9 sensor. 10 Then, in pursuing that, what we got into was, well, i 11 apparently, since this thing is, the rate of temperature 12 changes is sensitive to it, perhaps that is where, is part __, 13 of the area where people are beginning to make their own
*I 14 personal judgment as to whether the sensor is okay or not.
15 But, at this point, my only comment is I think you 16 have got to look into that and decide whether your 17 acceptance criteria is as tight as it needs to be, to make 18 sure what goes into the system is the kind of sensor that 19 you want in that particular cell of the plant and get 20 everything calibrated and make sure it is operable. 21 MR. BIRNEY: I think what the technicians told you , 22 this morning was that we had observed the phenomenon of taking a sensor that was at ambient temperature and then , 24 putting it straight into a bath that was 170 degrees, which l t e,
, was substantinilv below its cet point and watching that
1 l Page 66 i sensor vent off immediately. That is thermal shock of that 2 sensor. Okay. That is what they observed. l 3 When we go through and perform our normal 4 calibrations, we are required to take three sets of data on i l 5 the trip. 6 We trip it, we reset it, three different times. By 7 virtue of the overall design of the temperature bath, it is 8 extremely difficult to raise or lower the temperature very g quickly. 3o It is a long drawn out process as we observed thia l i l morning. 11 I don't think that there is a method that we could 12 une that we would actually calibrate the temperature switch ___ i3 by increasing the temperature too fast and over shooting. I ! 1 i [ 14 mean that possibility exists, but I don't think that that 15 would create a problem, a problem to a thermal shock that i 16 the technician discussed with you this morning. 17 Our normal procedures for temperature switches and j 18 temperature elements is to bring it up nice and miow to 19 insure that we don't have a difference between the response 20 of the standard that we are using to measure the temperature ! 21 by ambient temperature that the temperature sensor itself 22 receives. 23 MR. CHAFF ~E: And I don't disagree with the fact , 24 that your procedure to heat it up is slow, but I do, you f n kove, cup- ., ew/ha we can talk te additienal people and get
i Page 67 3 a different perspective, but I did get the impression from 2 the people I talked to that perhaps the instrument that we 3 were watching respond that was sluggish in people's mind d could have been acceptable by somebody previously and I I i 5 think if that is true, I don't know if it is, but if that is 6 true, what that would suggest to me is what is sluggish and 7 what is rapid enough ought to be butter defined. 8 MR. BIRNEY: The sluggish response that they i 9 observed this morning would not have brought in unnecessary 10 trips, they would have prevented them. 31 MR. CHAFFEE: Well, okay, I don't dispute that. 12 MR. BIRNEY: Okay. 13 MR. CHAFFEE: What I am saying is, you know, whether ' [ 14 it would have brought in more trips or not, one of your 15 goals is to-- 16 MR. BIRNEY: To calibrate them as accurately as
!7 possible.
18 MR. CHAFFEE: And to have then a response, you know. i' 19 MR. BIRNEY: Right. 20 MR. CHAFFEE: On the other hand, I mean, when we 21 were talking about things to prevent having a trip, what 22 would be the results, and if you really have a condition, 23 you want it to trip, you want it to do that. 24 MR. BIRNEY: You want to see that trip, yes. 25 MR. CHAFFEE: * 'c e 8 n ' t- want to ree--an all T am
-3 I
Page 68 i saying is, I guess, I have the impression that you ought to 2 take a look at what is the appropriate responsiveness of 3 the sensors, and decide for yourselves whether or not what a that is ought to be more clearly defined in the procedures. 1 5 That is, you know, that is just something I throw ' 6 out. , 7 Okay, so we were talking about--okay, that was, the a discussion we just had, that was the lube oil high 9 temperature and what you found there was that you had this to one instrument that was responding sluggishly. 11 Isn't that what we were just talking about, lube oil I 12 high temperature? 13 MR. BIRNEY: Right. [ 14 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, what we need to--okay, high or 15 low lube oil temperature, either one, and what we need to i 16 may in these areas is it was operating sluggish as the 17 bottos line then, the high water temperature tripped, it was 18 sluggish, and they are going to replace that with a new 19 sensor. 20 MR. BIRNEY: That is probably being done now. 21 MR. CHAFFEE: And the other thing you just 22 sentioned, this sluggishness should have had the impact of I 23 Preventing a trip rather than a premature trip. 24 MR. BIRNEY: Based on the response that we saw in j l 25 the leg, yes , I l I.
I o Page 69 i MR. CHAFFEE: And that is a normal trip, not an 2 emergency trip. The emergency trip goes off the bearing, is 3 that what it goes off of? Lube oil bearings? d MR. BOCKHOLD: Emergency trips are low lube oli 5 pressure and high water jacket temperature. 6 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, the turbo charger trouble
. 7 shooting, we have got that.' We are going to treuble shoot ,
8 that with calibration-- 9 No, the trouble shooting on the turbo charger was 10 going to be do the calibration of the sensor and do the il bubbler test. Write that up there. Calibration and bubbler j 12 test. l l 13 The jacket water temperature high, that two out of l i 14 three is -- you have already checked all three of those 15 sensors and you found one of them that was reading low, is 16 that the story there? 17 MR. CHENAULT: Uh-huh. 18 MR. STOKES: At least one, we don't know about the 19 other two. 20 MR. CHAFFEE: Those are the ones that are being done 21 right now? l 22 MR. STOKES: They are done, we just don't have that l 23 information. 24 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, so under the second one, Jacket 25 water temperature high, put down, uh--the nne eb=+ was inw , [l
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- 3 disassembly and inspection or whatever needs to be done in l 4 the presence of Georgia Power and the NRC or something like
[ 5 that. I don't know. But if this issue is critical, we
, 6 shouldn't go march off and do anything until we're all in i
7 agreement about what needs to be done. , 8 MR. CHAFFEE: I agree with you. In fact, that's 9 what this dialogue has been about, it's to try to move 4 10 further along in that direction by giving you some of the 11 ideas we had. . 12 MR. McCGY: And the kind of thing that you're ( 13 talking about in locating micron particles and all is not 14 something that you can do in an instrument shop in a power 15 plant. 16 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. 17 MR. McCsi: And that's what's got me worried. 18 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Again, because what we're
- 19 very -- what we're pushing for to come out of all this is a 20 clear understanding of what's going on with these switches 21 because we think it's important to you as well as to the 22 industry to understand them because these switches are being 23 used on a lot of diesels at nuclear power plants around the '
24 country.
.it 25 MR. McCOY: Yes. That's kind of the thinking that
59 )
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3 we have, too, that this is more a -- this is a bigger 2 problem than Vogel's problem, and if we're going to go into ) 3 a research effort on these switches, which, you know, the 4 data we have here indicates that there's something wrong l 5 with the reliability of these switches, and we are hearing l 6 the same kinds of things from sorc of the other plants that i 7 we've contacted, that there are reliability problems with 8 these 75tches. If that's the case, then they probably 9 ought tw De taken some concerted effort to get to the botton 10 of the reliability of these switches, and it ought to be l 11 done in conjunction with the vendor, you know, as a generic ' 12 effort, I think.
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l d- 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. And also realize that at 14 this point within the agency, because there is some concern i 15 about the reliability of these sensors, and in fact it 16 resulted in the diesel not being able to start properly at 17 Vogel during the event of March 20th, it -- and there is ; 18 some concern within the agency in terms of how operable the 19 diesels are at Vogel. 20 MR. McCOY: We understand that, and, of course, 21 we're -- that's one of the key things that we monitor from a 22 safety point of view, is the reliability of our engines, and 23 ve want to be sure that we have highly reliable engines. 24 So, that's what we're trying to do, and we've -- you know, 25 we think our. testing program is good, and that our data
O 4 60 1 indicates our engines are at least as reliable as the rest it 2 of the enginas in the. industry in recent times. So, we've 3 got to address that issue. 4 The switches -- you know, one thing that was 5 different at Vogel was that these switches were in the i j' 6 circuits during under-voltage, and we are taking -- 11
- 7 MR. BOCKHOLD
- The thing that's different Et Vogel 1
{ 8 is we have a two-out-of three logic on these switches and. l j 9 some other people only have a one-out-of-one logic on some 4 10 of the switches at their particular plants. i j 11 MR. CHAFFEE: Right. But in this case at this l I j! 12 plant -- l 1 i j .t' 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: The overall reliability of Plant i i 14 Vogel's engine -- we meet the blackout rule for the higher j 15 classification of diesels. We have the 95 percent or 95 ! l
!. 16 times out of 100, our engines will start and load and
- 17 perform satisfactorily. So, we meet the highest l t
J l 18 classification on the blackout rule. 1 19 These switches -- we've had trouble at overhaul 20 times, but during normal plant operation and in between
, 21 overhaul times, the switches have been reliable.
22 MR. CHAFFEE: Right. But your monthly test may i 23 not be valid. 8 l 24 MR. BOCKHOLD: The monthly test is valid that the I. i 1 25- engine will start and run and appropriately come up to speed
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34 i i there is something -- that there is believed to be something i 2 wrong with them. 3 Some of the quarantined switches I think perhaps ! 4 are switches that were taken off and nothing was wrong with l 5 them, but they were just taken off as -- I 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: That were leaking a little bit but ! I 7 would have normally been acceptable, but we were very l 8 conservative and wanted to get the best switches we could 9 out there. 10 MR. CHAFFEE: I understand. There needs to be 11 another dialogue to talk about what switches are going to be 12 tested and so on and so forth. We will conduct that i 13 dialogue with Louis Ward. That's going to go on to look I 14 into the sensors. This is ongoing now, in terms of looking 15 into the impact of temperature variations in the system. Is 16 there any other rocks that haven't been looked into in terms 17 of the diesel's operation during the event? I guess not. 18 Region II, do you have any questions or comments? 19 MR. BROCHMAN: No. We are fully onboard and have 20 been talking with them with respect to diesel generator 21 operability issues. 22 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess that's all we have. Thank vm- m y muel', George. The transcribr timitw *, 24 names of the people that were talking. 25 MR. BOCKHOLD: Before we hang up here Al, I went
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8 1 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess if that's the case, it 2 certainly says it was jacket water. It seems to indicate 3 that it was jacket water temperature. I have to admit, it 4 surprises me that the jacket water temperature sensors could 5 be that bad if they only saw 163 degree water that two of 6 them would trip. I guess it's possible. 7 MR. BOCKHOLD: With the alarms that we had, it 8 reproduced the alarms exact?.y. 9 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess the other thing that 10 surprises me though is what I have been told is that the 11 jacket water temperature trip signals are emergency trip 12 signals, and they remain in when you do an emergency start.
' 13 If you were have hypothesized that the first and second trip 14 -- let's say the second trip was due to high jacket water 15 temperature, it is unclear to me why suddenly it is not a ;
l 16 problem for the emergency start. 17 There doesn't seem to be any clear pattern in this 18 whole thing in my mind. 19 MR. BURR: It's an intermittent problem. 20 MR. CHAFFEE: Is it your belief that it caused the 21 first two trips and obviously -- is that your -- 22 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, that's our --what we would say 23 is the probably cause. 24 MR. CHAFFEE: Somehow it fixed itself before the ( 25 third start?
9 I 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: An intermittent problem. 2 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess what is true is, we did see i 3 t. hat one high jacket water temperature sensor that they had 4 a problem in later testing once they pulsed it with pressure 5 it fixed itself; wasn't that right? , 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Correct. 7 MR. CHAFFEE: Let me ask this question, maybe this 8 is part of it. When they went to do the emergency start the 9 third time, is there some way that doing the emergency start , 10 could have had the effect of having a pulse pressured to the 11 jacket water temperature sensors that might have fixed one 12 of them without people realizing that could account for why 13 you didn't get -- I guess the other thing that is true is, 14 not just one fixed it but two fixed themselves, didn't they?
- 15 When they did the emergency start they didn't get j 16 a high jacket water temperature sensor malfunction either, j 17 did they?
l 18 MR. BOCKHOLD: That is correct. 1 19 MR. CHAFFEE: The two that went bad, both of them i 20 fixed themselves somehow for that third start one could 21 hypothesize. 1 22 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct. (! j 23 MR, CHAFFEE: So, I wonder if there is something i ! 24 about the emergency start method that perhaps pulsed both of 25 them? Hell, I don't know. After you did that testing, are ; i Y
~ . , , - , - ,
4 10 1 you now working on your MOD, or do you have the MOD in? 2 MR. BURR: We put the MOD in. We have done an 3 engine start without an air roll and a complete UV test 4 again, to demonstrate that the MOD works in a complete , 5 emergency mode. We tested the A-diesel with the MOD in an ! 6 actual condition that it would see in a blackout. 7 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess at this point as far as 8 getting to the root cause of what is going on with that 9 diesel during this particular test, the best hope is to hope 1 1 10 that when they go out and investigate these quarantined 11 switches that they will be able to reproduce, the fact that 12 they intermittently failed such that they would trip with a 13 temperature of down around 163 degrees. 14 of course, that would mean that they would have 15 basically been in a trip condition at the time when the 16 diesels started. Is jacket water temperature one of those 17 things that gets bypassed for a period of time? 18 MR. BURR: It is just bypassed for the first 60 19 seconds. 20 MR. CHAFFEE: What it tends to suggest then is 21 that two of those particular sensors, temperature sensors, 22 must have been in trip for the entire period up until the 23 emergency start. Maybe they just would not reset. That 24 tends to suggest that they were in the trip condition once 25 they were placed in the -- wait a second, that doesn't make
11 i b 1 sense. 2 They had to have worked properly previously or 3 when you did your previous testing you would have -- did you 4 guys have an records when you did your testing in 5' maintenance of these jacket water temperature sensors giving 6 you any kind of sensor malfunction? 7 MR. BOCKHOLD: In the data request that you asked 8 for associated with the switches, we have provided the data. 9 I can read through that because I just happen to have it on 10 my desk if you want. 11 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. 12 MR. BOCKHOLD: You want me to do that now, or 13 What? 14 MR. CHAFFEE: Yeah. Basically what I am curious 15 about is -- I guess I have this feeling that there must have 16 been a prior occasion when the particular jacket water 17 sensor probes that tripped in the event must have been found l 11B to have worked properly on some previous test with all the 4 19 testing you did. 20 MR. BOCKHOLD: We ran the diesel before the event 21 in accordance with the surveillance and declared it i 22 operable. We had done some prior starts on it and that type 23 of stuff. 24 MR. CHAFFEE: My question is on that start that 25 was done before the event where everything properly, is it
. _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ = . _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ .__ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _
3 t 12 l6 1 clear that the people would have recognized and did or did
- 2 not -- they must have documented that they had no high 3 jacket water temperature sensor malfunction alarms.
i
- 4 MR. BOCKHOLD: The documentation that we typically 5 have on it is just that the diesel ran satisfactorily. ;
5
! 6 MR. CHAFFEE: It sure seems strange that the
- l l 7 sensor probes would have been in a non-trip condition on a 4 +
- 8 start and after the diesel is secured they -- okay, I don't 1
i 9 know. There's no way that after -- after you guys secured 4 i
. 10 the diesel, did anybody bother to see if the temperature of j i
I 11 the jacket water area changed any after that -- that l I l l 12 wouldn't make sense either. b i 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: What we have is probable cause was i 14 associated with intermittent failures of the jacket water i i 15 switches. 16 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess that's as good a answer as 17 any. Do you anything, Rick? 18 MR. KENDALL: No. 19 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess on Monday you guys are going j j 20 to be going up and talking to Region II? 21 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct. j 22 MR. CHAFFEE: It sounds like at this point, as far 23 as any further troubleshooting of this, it's going to focus 24 on the quarantined sensors. 25 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct.
13 e 1 MR. CHAFFEE: Louis, how are you doing on coming , 2 up with some tests for the switches in general and 3 eventually more specifically the quarantine switches? 4 MR. WARD: I spent most of the afternoon yesterday 5 with Rick Kendall and Harvey Wyckoff -- I have a real good 6 feeling of what I believe the concern is or what the 7 immediate interest is or was at that time on the switches, 8 the reliability of those type of switches in general. For 9 the short term, we would be lcoking at taking a couple of 10 new switches from stock and doing a reliability test on them 11 and then leading into the failure evaluation of the ones 12 that are in quarantine. 13 They expressed an interest in handling that Step 1 14 if you want to call it that, the reliability demonstration 15 on the new switches. That information is available for the 16 IIT report, and the quarantine would be a longer term 17 evaluation. 18 MR. CHAFFEE: I understand. Again, obviously, the 19 first priority is to find out what went wrong with those 20 switches. That priority takes precedent over whether it is 21 found out before or after the IIT report is issued. 22 obviously, if the story of these switches including what 23 caused them to fail during the event could be found before 24 the report goes out, that would be our -- that would 25 obviously be what we would like to happen. l i
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1 2/2 that are dealing with that and not having that information, 2 because it makes it very hard to validate that we have a 3 proper understanding of what is going on in the diesel 4 sensors. ! 5 so, are you guys close to being able to giving 6 that to us? 7 MR. AUFDENKAMPE: John Aufdenkampe. We have 8 worked, ever since you gave that to us, on consolidating 9 that data in the format you have asked for. We worked over l 10 the weekend and we will be working, we worked on it 11 yesterday and today, and will be able to fax it up to you 12 tomorrow morning. 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. 14 MR. BROCKMAN: Please send us a copy, too. 15 MR. CHAFFEE: Next is, again we have asked for the 16 diesel starts and stops. And I guess what is true is that 17 we have gotten it in one form, but I guess it wasn't 18 complete, or what we have gotten seems to not be consistent 19 with some other information we have. So we are, I guess we 20 are a little frustrated and a little confused that we cannot 21 seem to get a finalized complete picture on that. And I 22 can't, we can't tell, just because the difference documents 23 we look at are for some reason in conflict uith it. But we 24 need to have a licensee's position on what the starts were 25 and what the stops were and we need to get that document.
I 5 t 1 MR. AUFDENKAMPE: Al, again, this is John 2 Aufdenkampe. What I will have Herb do is, we will get with 3 I Kenny Stokes and make sure that the diesel log is totally up 4 to date. That is how we keep track of our starts and stops. 5 and we will fax you the latest copy of the diesel log. l 6 MR. KENDALL: John, this is Rick Kendall. Maybe a i 7 good thing also would be to have Ken give me a call. He has ; 8 my number. And I can better explain what it is we are 9 trying to get.
]
1 10 MR. AUFDENKAMPE: Okay, Rick, we can do that. 11 MR. CHAFFEE: Because I think what Rick wants is, 12 you know, when the diesel started and stopped, how was it 13 started, did you ever have any problems, that sort of stuff. 14 MR. KENDALL: One of the problems we were having 1 15 was that we were listening on yesterday's call where we 16 understand there has been something like 16 successful I 17 starts in a row of the 1-A diesel generator. And we go 18 back, and we try to count them up, and we don't get that 19 many. So somewhere along the line we are missing a few and 20 we want to complete the picture. 21 MR. CHAFFEE: So it sounds like what would be good 22 is, when you have the product, probably call Rick and go 23 over it with him, so that we can make sure we have an 24 agreement. I i 25 MR. WARD: Al, this is Lewis Ward. Just so we are i
l l I 1 all thinking of the same request, is this since March 20th, ' 2 since day one? 3 MR. KENDALL: The best thing to do is to have Ken 4 Stokes call me, I think. Paul Kochery prepared a table that 5 discussed the starts between starting with the 20th, l 6 starting on March 20th, and going through, I guess, the , 1 7 first phase of troubleshooting. But it does not go beyond 8 that point. 9 MR. WARD: Okay. So it is 3-20 up through today. 10 MR. CHAFFEE: I am going to say something here, 11 and Rick, you can correct me. We want to know all the 12 diesel starts and stops since the time the diesel went into i 13 this outage because we want to understand what your testing 14 is as well. Now, as far as the stuff prior to the outage, I 15 guess what is true there is that is a secondary priority. 16 First, let's get the stuff that takes the outage up to a 17 current day and then once we've got that and we've digested 18 that, then the secondary priority, we can go back and look 19 at the stuff prior to that; is that what you want, Rick? 20 MR. KENDALL: I had not asked for starts prior to 21 the outage. 22 MR. CHAFFEE: So then let's get the stuff that 23 goes from the outage on so we can get a clear picture of 24 what has happened to that diesel since all the outage work 1 25 was done to it.
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17 1 MR. CHAFFEE: Sounds good. 2 MR. BROCKMAN: Is tomorrow an NRC holiday? 3 MR. CHAFFEE: No. 4 MR. AUFDENKAMPE: Ken Brockman, this is John 5 Aufdenkampe. 6 MR. BROCKMAN: Yes, John. 7 MR. AUFDENKAMPE: There is no restraint -- the 8 testing of those switches is not impacting the release on 9 criticality, is that correct? 10 MR. BROCKMAN: To my understanding that is 11 correct. 12 MR. AUFDENKAMPE: Then Monday and Tuesday is okay. 13 MR. BROCKMAN: I understand ~. 14 MR. KENDALL: Louis, this is Rick. Would you give 15 me a call also when you have a better idea on the schedule? 16 Louis Ford, are you on the phone? 17 MR. FORD: Yes. 18 MR. CHAFFEE: Rick asked if you could give him a 19 call. 20 MR. FORD: I will give you a call, Rick. 21 MR. CHAFFEE: He just asked if you would give him 22 a call with the schedule as soon as it got a littic more 2; firm:d up. - 24 MR. FORD: Yes, I will. 25 MR. CHAFFEE: Let's keep going on then to -- let
OPEN ITEM TRACKING SYSTEri (00409-C) STATU UNIT ID:C CONTROL 4- 19094 REAS0n[LELETEL.C#fff d'05tS) ---MODE--- 1 2345s CURRENT:900516 TYPE:OPEN ITEM ENTERED:?00516 DEPARTHENT:MANAGEtiENT DUE:900615 SECTIO?! riANAGEMENT CLOSED- 0 PERSON G.POCKHOLD SJURCE DOCUMENT:PRB 90-67 RELATED DOCUMENTS' '*P 00-8.7-01 KEYWORDS-RETURN TO C.TYNAN RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS COMMENTS ~0R COMMITMENT 19094 : LEASE NOTE OR ATTACH OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE FOR CLOSURE DETERMINE l uwmEo A REVISION TO THE LETTER OF CERTIFICATI04 TO THE NRC IS I r'EEDED SINCE A REVISION TO THE SITE AREA EMERGENCY LER (1-90-06) UAS ISSUED. 6 ESP. INDIVIDUAL SIGNATURE: .... _ . ___ ___ DATE: _ _ M_/... VERIFIED BY __-________--- -__-_--_ DATE:_____-_ . LAST PAGE: i h.ul S hc'n[4c.h r+- S nc2. w e re vise d -4Lt. L e e.- [ h v W ' isse Mo. cj WL le be ~ h Cla_r u dd se . p p t 4 .5 - U -c- ,% s kW-5) M +PR_S o CLe. k_ vn . , a
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! ELV-01729 i 0415 t Docket No. 50-424 i U. 3. Nuclear Regulatory commission
- ATTN: Document Control Desk j Washington, D. C. 20555
. Gentlemen: .
- V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT -
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT l LDSS OF 0FFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY i i In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the j enclosed revised report related to an event which occurred on March 20, 1990. i This revision is necessary to correct the information related to the number-of successful Diesel Generator starts subsequent to the comorehensive test program Dl as discussed in the original report and our April 9, 1990 letter (ELV-01516). . The previous LER stated that the Diesel h nerator had been started at least 18 i times without failures or problems. The number of starts was determined by counting Diesel Generator starts regardless of whether or not the test
- constituted a valid test in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108. This i revision to the LER reflects the results of valid tests since the March 20s 1990 i- event.
i
- sincerely, l
l W. G. Hairston, III . W6H,::I/NJ5/gm
Enclosure:
LER 50-424/1990-006-01 xc(seenextpage)
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ELV-01729 0470 Docket No. 50-424 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 centlemen: V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT i LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the enclosed revised report related to an event which occurred on March 20, 1990. 4 This revision is necessary to clarify the information related to the number of successful diesel generator starts as discussed in the original LER dated April ' 19, 1990 and to update the status of corrective actions. If the criteria for
' the ccmpletion of the test program is understood to be the first successful test in accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
" Diesel Generator Operability Test," then there were(VEGP) procedure 14980-1 10 successful starts of Diesel Generator IA and 12 successful starts of Diesel Generator IB between the completion of the test program and the end of April 19, 1990, the date the LER 50-424/1990-06 was submitted to the NRC.
In order to correct the LER and to provide more useful and up to date 1 information the LER has been revised to state the number of valid diesel i generator tests in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108 rather than the number of successful starts since the event. The number of valid tests was established by reviewing diesel generator testing. data.from. March 21 through Jo e 7, 1990 Sincerely, W. G. Hairston, 111 ' WGH,!!I/HWH/gm
Enclosure:
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er:clesed revised rbport!related.jd TMs revis'io'n is nacelsiry Yoiclaci successful diesel [generato Kstd tM _# ^ T* 19, 1990 and:our-earlier;1stter?.1 'b # tho status oFcorre~cflke factioiiss 4 i=itW81Fdj@ 2t M Ginsrator-IMhad. j ealigtsrt' l ritoh)'dyt.*S' R*- "
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f p z? '90 ;2: M ;t,:5cc7co-vosu n f ELV-01729 0470 Docket No. 50-424 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 l Gentlemen: V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company enclosed revised report related to an event which occurr(GPC) ed onhereby March submits 20, 1990.the This revision is necessary to clarify the information related to the number of successful 19, 1990 and diesel generator starts as discussed in the original LER dated April to update the status of corrective actions. If the criteria for the ccmpletion of the test program is understood to be the first successful test in accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
- Diesel Generator Operability Test," then there were(VEGP) procedure 14980-1 10 successful starts of Diesel Generator IA and 12 successful starts of Diesel Generator IB between the completion of the test program and the end of April 19, 1990, the date the LER 50-424/1990-06 was submitted to the NRC.
In order to correct the LER and to provide more useful and up to date information the LER has been revised to state the number of valid diesel generator tests in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108 rather than the number of successful starts since the event. The number of valid tests was established by reviewing diesel generator testing. data. from. March 21 thro @ Jone4,1996-; Sincerely, W. G. Hairston, 111 WGH,111/HWM/gm
Enclosure:
LER 50-424/1990-006-01
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PROC /REV 0. Eff / 06- ' . 10: _ 86)Am[d_m b ipe- PRE COP 9ENT REVIEW SHEET Page / of 'I . THRU: PR8 M Date '/j /d/90 I The PR8 has reviewed the attached procedure and recomunends approval with comments as noted below. Mandatory (M) cosenents shall be incorporated prior to approval of the procedure. l board. If not incorporated the procedure shall be resubmitted to the f;r later inclusion. or otherwise resolved.You have the responsibility to deterufne whether the Optional (0) comunents should be in This procedure does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. No. Section M/0 PR8 Initials Comuments 1: a 2. b. M Resolutions i bOrc R u oo r ci -10 3 fmo ppt wee L. add addci,i d uso&k % 2. b. ws) c. ' c) 2 9f'd.Ml"? M HMH =0 n CLLtd t h Ge-p At Cpo m t~ oF 2co* f L _ ,,_ -) ,) 9.3 3 z) %~ ^1 AM14 0dcl -tKa.l- llc An,a it A usa.J g? w a n w c a A A r 1 ,.,, jd 'if use t ' *
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Changes to this procedure other than those addressing the board's cosaments wl)) requjre resubmittal to the board. Upon res'; jut lon of'the above'comunents. the procedure'should be forwarded to the General Manager for approval.Upon approval the procedure should be returned to the PR8 Secretary for further processing.
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Pn8 Glass 0. LEl'- / oos . 10: _ M Aut ' ei h,oc PR8 C0f0ENT REVIEW SHEET Page ~2- of 2 THMl: , PR890- 59 Date v//B/vo The PRS has reviewed the attached procedure and reconuends approval with comments as notedEndatory below. (M) cosusents sh611 be incorporated prior to approval of the procedure. board. If not incorporated the proceduct shall be resubmitted to the You have the responsibility for later 1rclusion, or otherwise resolved. te determine whether the Optional (0) connents should be included at this This rocedure does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
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i LER 1-VU-d i LCSS OF OFFSITE POWER LEAUS TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY EVENT DATE. 3-20-90 f l AOSTRACT I On 3-20-90, Unit 1 was in a refueling outage and Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. At 0020 CST, the driver of a fuel truck in the switchyard backed into a support for the phase "C" insulator for tho' Unit 1 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) 1A. The insulator and line fell, causing a phase to ground fault. ; Both Unit 1 RAT 1A and Unit 2 RAT 28 High Side and Low Side l breakers tripped, causing a loss of offsite power condition I (LOSP). Unit 1 Diesel Generator (DG) 1A and Unit 2 DG 28 started, ; but DG1A tripped, causing a loss of residual heat removal (RHR) j to the reactor core since the Unit 1 Train B RAT and DG were out I of service for maintenance. A Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared and the site Emergency Plan was implemented. The core , heated up from 90 degrees F to 136 degrees F before tne Du was i emergency started at 0856 CST and RHR was restored. At 0915 CST, the SAE was downgraded to en Alert after onsite power was restored. The direct cause of this series of events was a cognitive personnel error. The truck dr1ver failed to use proper backing procedures and hit a support, causing the phase to ground fault and LOSP. The most probable cause of the DG1A trip was the intermittent actuat1on of the DG Jacket water temperature switches. Corrective actions include strengthening policles for control of vehicles, extensive testing of tne DG and replacement of suspect DG temperature switches. C 1 a,
A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This event is reportable per: a) 10 CFR50.73 (a)(2)(1v), because an unplanned Eng1neered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the ESF Actuation System Sequencer started, and b) Technical Specification 4.0.1.1.3, because a valid diesel generator failure occurred. Additionally', this report serves as a summary of the Site Area Emergency event.
- 8. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT Unit 1 was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0% rated thermal power.
reactor The had refueling outage. been shutdown since 2-23-90 for a 45 day scheduled the initial The reactor core reload had been completed, tensioning of the reactor vessel head studs was complete, and the outage team was awaiting permission from the control room to begin the final tensioning. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level was being maintained at mid-loop Train with the A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump in service for decay heat removal. The temperature of the ROS was being maintained at approximately 90 degrees F. Due to the refueling outage maintenance activities in
~
some equipment progress, was out of service and several systems were in abnormal configurations. out of service for a required The36 Train 8 Diesel month Generator (DG18) was maintenance inspection. The Train B Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) had been removed from service for an oil change. The Train 8 Class 1E 4160 Volt switchgear, 18A03, was being powered from the Train 1A A RAT through its alternate supply breaker. was All non-1E switchgear being powered from the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) by backfeed from the switchyard. dams had been removed, but only All Steam S/G's Generator 1 and (S/G) nozzle 4 had their primary manways secured. Maintenance personnel were in the process of restoring the primary manways on S/G's 2 and 3. RCS level was being ma1ntained at mid-loop for valve repairs and the manway restorations. S/G In addition, the pressurizer manway was removed to provide a RCS vent path. C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On March 20, 1990, at approximately 0817 CST, a truck driver with security escort entered. the protected area in a 4 Although not a member of the plant operating staff, fuel truck. was the driver a Georgia Power Company employee belonging to a group under contract to perform various plant services. 6 4
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1 1 Tho criver , found that enecked the weiding macnine that was in the area and i it did not need fuel. and was in the process of backing He returned to the fuel truck support cut of the area when he nit a ! holding the phase "C" insulator for tna RAT 1A. The insulator and transformer tripped. line fell, causing a pnase to ground fault, and the i At 0820 CST, and Low Side both Unit 1 RAT 1A ano the Unit 2 RAT 28 High Side ! breakers tripped caus.ng a loss of offsite power { condition (LOSP) to the Un,t 1 Tra,n A Class 1E 4160 volt buss i 1AA02, the Unit 2 Train 8 Class 1E buss 28A03, and the 480 volt i busses supplied by 1AA02 and 20A03. ! 4160 volt buss 18A03 also lost power The Unit 1 Train 8 Class 1E since RAT 1A was fascing both Trains of Class 1E 4160 volt busse.- caused the associated ESF Actuation System Sequencers The loss of power to send a start signal to one Unit 1 and one Unit 2 Diesel Generators. DG1A and DG28 started and sequenced the loads to their respective busses. is provided Further description of the Unit 2 response to this event in LER 50-425/1990-002. One minute and twenty sacenas after the DG1A eng1ne started and sequenced the loads to the Class 1E bus, the engine tripped.
)
This again causeo an undervoltage (UV) condition to class 1E bus t 1AA02. The UV signal is a ma1ntained signal at , However, the sequencer. since DG1A was coasting down from the trip, 1 shutdown logic did not allow the DG fuel racks or the i starting air solenoids to open and start the engine. This caused the engine starting logic to lockup, signal was reset. a condition that existed until the UV For this reason, DG1A did not automatically re-start after it tripped. After the trip, panel operators were dispatched to the engine control to investigate the cause of the trip. According to the operators, several annunciators were lit. evaluating the condition, Without fully the operators reset the annunciators. During this time , a Shift Supervisor (SS) and a Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) went to the sequencer panel to determine if any problems were present on the 1A sequencer. The SS quickly pushed the UV reset button, then reset the sequencer by deenergizing and energizing the power supply to the sequencer. This caused the air solenoid to energ1re for another 5 seconds which caused the engine to start. the first time. This happened 19 minutes after the DG tripped The engine started and the sequencer sequenced the available loads as designed. the breaker and the engine tr1pped After 1 minute and 10 seconds., a second time. It did not automatically described above. re-start due to the starting logic being blocked as j and tbs By this time, operators, a maintenance foreman diesel generator vendor representative were in room. the DG was The initial report was that the Jacket water pressure trip the cause of the trip. representative The maintenance foreman and vendor observed that the Jacket water pressure at the l gauge was about 12-13 PSIG. The trip set point is 6 PSIC and the i
, alarm setpoint is 8 PSIG. Also, the control room observed a lube I oil sensor malfunction alsrm.
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Fiftcon minutos ofter the second DG1A trip, DG1A was started Trem the engine
' control panel using the emergency start breakglass t button. The engine started and loads were manually loaded. When 4 the DG is started in emergency mode, !
are bypassed. all the trips except four i However, all alarms will be annunciated. During the emergency run, no trip alarms were noticed by the personnel either at the control room or at the engine control panel. only alarms noted by the control The room operator assigned for DG operation level were lube oil pressure sensor malfunction and fuel oil High/ Low alarm. At 1040 CST, RAT 19 was energized to supply power to the 4160 volt buss 18A03. DG1A supplied power to the 4160 volt buss 1AA02 { until 1157 CST, at which time the 1AA02 buss was tied to RAT 18. A Site Area Emergency was declared at 0840 CST, due to a loss of all off-site and on-site AC power for more than 15 minutes. The-Emergency Director signed the notification form used to inform off-site government agencies of the emergency at 0848 CST and notifications began at 0857 CST. Due to the loss of power, which-rendered the primary Emergency Notification Network l i nope ra bl e , (ENN) was not and some mis-communication, the initial notification received by all agencies until 0935 CST. Subsequent notifications were made with'out difficulty. 1 The Emergency Director . instructed personnel to complete various tasks for restoring containment and RCS integriva. All accomplished work was and maintenance personnel exitr.- containment by i 1050 CST. . The SAE was downgraded to an Alert Emergency at 0915 CST after restoration of core cooling and one train of electrical power. By 1200 CST, plant conditions had stabilized with both trains of-electrical power being supplied from off-site sources (RAT 18) After discussions with the NRC and local government agencies, the-emergency was terminated at 1247 CST and all agencies were notified by 1256 CST. e D. CAUSE OF EVENT s Direct Causes:
- 1) The direct cause of the loss of offsite class 1E AC power was the fuel truck hitting a pole supporting a 230kV lines for RAT 1A. '
4
- 2) The direct cause of t'ha ' ass of onsite cic.4 1E AC power was the failure of the operable DG, DG1A, to start and load the LOSP loads on bus 1AA02.
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- 1) The truck driver met all current site training and qualification requ1rements, including holding a Class 2 Georgia drive 's license. However, site safety rules, which require a flagman for backing vehicles when viewing is impaired, were v1olated.
- 2) The root cause for the fa11ure of DG1A has not been conclusively determined. There is no record of the trips that t were annunciated after the first trip because the annunciators were reset before the condition was fully evaluated. Therefore, the cause of the first trip can only be
- postulated, but it was most likely the same as that which caused the second trip. The second trip occurred at the end of the timed sequence of the group 2 block logic. This logic allows the DG so achieve operating conditions before the trips become active. The block logic timed out and the trip occurred at about 70 seconds. The annunciators observed at the second trip included Jacket water high temperature along with other active trips. In conducting an investigation, the j trip conditions that were observed on the second DG trip on 3-20-90 could be duplicated by venting 2 out of 3 Jacket i water temperature sensors, simulating a tripped condition.
The simulation duplicated both the annunciators and the 70 l sec. trip time. The most likely cause of the DG trips was l intermittent actuation of Jacket water temperature switches. j Following the 3-20-90 event, all three Jacket water temperature switches, which have a design setpoint of 200 degrees F, were bench tested. Switch TS-19110 was found to have a setpoint of 197 cegrees F, which was approximately 6 degrees below its previous setting. Switch TS-19111 was found to have a setpoint of 199 degrees F, which was approximately the same as the original setting. Switch TS-19112 was found to have a setpoint of 186 degrees F, which was approximately 1 17 degrees F below the previous setting and was re-aoJusted. 1 Switch TS-19112 also had 4 small leak which was Judged to be acceptable to support diagnostic engine tests and was reinstalled. The switches were recalibrated with the manufacturer's assistance to ensure a consistent calibration technique. During the subsequent test run of the DG on 3-30-90, one of l the switches (TS-19111) tripped and would not reset. This
- appeared to be an intermittent failure because it i subsequently mechanically reset. This switch and the leaking j
-citch (TS-19112) sore replaced with new switches. All I subsequent testing was conducted with no additional problems. l O
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- A test of . the Jacket water system temperature trans,ent
- l. .during engine starts was conducted. The : purpose of this test 1
was to determine the actual Jacket water temperature at the i switch locations with the engine in a normal standby lineup, ! l and then followed by a series of starts without air rolling l the engine to rep,licate the starts of 3-20-90. The test , showed that Jacket' water temperature at the switch lochtion , decreased from 'a standby temperature of 163 degrees F to ~
- approximately 156 degrees F and remained steady.
i < l Numerous sensor. , calibrations (including Jacket water j temperatures), . special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple { engine starts' and runs were performed under various
- conditions'. Since 3-20-90, DG1A and DG10 have been started ;
more than 20 times each and no failures or problems have
; occurred during4 any, of these starts.
In addition, an undervoltage start. test without air roll was conducted on g 4-6-90 and DG1 A started and loaded properly. ! Based on the above facts, it is concluded that the Jacket i water high temperature switches were the most probable cause , j of both trips on 3-20-90. , l l . . . .: '
- 4. ANALYSIS OF EVENT ' ' . ' ' . l
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. The loss of offsite. powen' to Class "E buss 18A03 and the failure i of DG1A to start and operate successfully, coupled with DG18 and l RAT 1B being out of.' service for maintenance, resulted in Unit 1
- being wicpout. AC power', to both Class 1E busses. With both Class
- 1E busses doenergized;. the RHR System could not perform its i required safety funct. ion.'(Sa' sed on a noted rate of rise in the i RCS temperature of. 46!dec~rees F in 36 minutes, the RCS water would not have been.Ini2pec,ted to begin boiling until approximately 96 minutes after.>'theF be~ ginning of the event. Core exit I i thermocouples measured aMcomparable rate of temperature rise.
- . .'V i 4 Restoration of RHR and closure of the containment eauipment hatch were completed well within the estimated 96 minutes for the projected onset of bo114*i'g r in the RCS. A review of information obtained from the Pr'o' cess and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS)- and , grab sample analysis indicated all normal values. As e result of this event , no increase in radioactive releases to either.the containment or the environment occurred.
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. available to ensure the continued safe operation of the plant:
- 1) The maintenance on RAT 18 was completed and the RAT was returned to service approximately 2 hours into the event.
- 2) Offsite power was available to non-1E equipment through the generator step-up transformers which were being used to "back-feed" the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) and supply the non-1E busses. Provided tnat the phase to ground fault was cleared, Class 1E busses 1AA02 and 18A03 could have been powered by feeding through non-1E bus 1NA01.
- 3) The Refueling Water Storage Tank could have been used to manually . establish gravity feed to the RCS to maintain a supply of cooling wator to the reactor.
Consequently, neither plant safety nor the health and safety of the public was adversely affected by this event. A more detailed assessment of this event and an assessment of potentially more severe circumstances will be performed and included in a supplemental LER. F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1) a)A management policy on control and operation of vehicles has been established. b) Temporary barricades have been erected which directs authoriration for control of switchyard traffic to the SS. 2) a)The Loss of Off-site Power (LOSP) diesel start and trip logic has been modified so that an automatic " emergency" start will occur upon LOSP. Therefore, non-essential diesel engine trips are blocked upc6 LOSP. The Unit 2 DG's will be modified by 4-30-90. b)The DG1A test frequency was increased to 3 times a week until 4-20-90 when test feequency will be changed to once every 7 days in accordance with Technical Specification Table
- 4.8-1. This frequency will be continued until 7 consecutive valid tests are completed with no more than one valid failure in the last 20 valid tests. Including the two valid failures of this event, there have been a total of four valid failures in 70 valid tests of DG1A as of 4-18-90.
3). Further corrective actions w111 be addressed in a supplemental LER. O 7
. . - 'o l 1 G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
+
- 1. Failed Components:
Jacket Water High Temperature Switches manufactured by California Controls Company. Model # A-3590-W3 , l 1
- 2. Previous Similar Events:
None , I
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- 3. Energy Industry Identification System Codes Reactor Coolant System - AB !
Residual Heat Removal System - BP ' Diesel Generator Lube Oil System - LA , Diesel Generator Starting Air System - LC j Diesel Generator Cooling Water System - LB Diesel Generator Power Supply System - EK Safety Injection System - 80 13.8 kV Power System - EA 4160 volt non-1E power system - EA 4160 volt Class 1E power system - EB Chemical and Volume control System - C8 Containment Building - NH 480 volt Class 1E Power System - ED F.ngineered Safety Features Actuation System - JE Radiation Monitoring System - IL l r*
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l w c re.rr-- ; ELV-01545 0342 Docket No. 50-424 l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen: l V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the ' enclosed report related to an event which occurred on March 20, 1990. ' Sincerely, f W. G. Hairston, III WGH,III/NJS/gm
Enclosure:
LER 50-424/1990-006 xc: Georaia Power Comoany Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. l Mr. R. M. Odom Mr. P. D. Rushton NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission , Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator l' Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle J ( 1 e
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On 3-20-90, Unit I was in a refueling outage and Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. At 0820 CST, the driver of a fuel truck in the switchyard backed ;nto a support for the phase "C" insulator for the Unit 1 Reserve Auxiliary l Transformer (RAT) IA. The insulator and line fell causing a phase to ground fault. Both Unit 1 RAT 1A and Unit 2 RAT 2B High Side and Low Side breakers tripped, causing a loss of offsite power condition (LOSP). Unit I Diesel , Generator (DG) 1A and Unit 2 DG2B started, but DGIA tripped, causing a loss of i residual heat removal (RHR) to the reactor core sincs the Unit 1 Train B RAT and I DG were out of service for maintenance. A Site Area Emergency (SAE) was / declared and the site Emergency Plan was implemented. The core heated up to 136 degrees F from 90 degree F before the DG was emergency started at 0856 CST and RHR was restored. At 0915 CST, the SAE was downgraded to an Alert after onsite power was restored. The direct cause of this series of events was a cognitive personnel error. The truck driver failed to use proper backing procedures and hit a support, causing the phase to ground fault and LOSP. The most probable cause of the DGIA trip was the intermittent actuation of the DG jacket water temperature switches. Corrective actions include strengthening policies for control of vehicles, extensive testing of the DG, and replacement of suspect DG temperature switches. / 1
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0l 0 l6 _ or 0l8 : A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This event is reportable per: a) 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), because an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the ESF Actuation System Sequencer started, and b) Technical Specification , 4.8.1.1.3, because a valid diesel generator failure occurred. Additionally, , this report serves as a summary of the Site Area Emergency event. , B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT l Unit I was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0% rated thermal power. The reactor had been shut down since 2-23-90 for a 45 day scheduled refueling outage. The j reactor core reload had been completed, the initial tensioning of the reactor vessel head studs was complete, and the outage team was awaiting permission from the control room to begin the final tensioning. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level was being maintained at mid-loop with the Train A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump in service for decay heat removal. The temperature of the RCS was being maintained at approximately 90 degrees F. Due to the refueling outage maintenance activities in progress, some equipment was out of service and several systems were in abnormal configurations. The Train B Diesel Generator (DG18) was out of service for a required 36 month maintenance inspection. The Train B Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT 18) had been removed from service for an oil change. The Train B Class IE 4160 Volt switchgear,1BA03, was being powered from the Train A RAT 1A through its alternate supply breaker. All non-1E switchgear , was being powered from the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) by backfeeding j from the switchyard. All Steam Generator (S/G) nozzle dams had been i removed, but only S/G's 1 and 4 had their primary manways secured. Maintenance personnel were in the process of restoring the primary manways on S/G's 2 and 3. RCS level was being maintained at mid-loop for valve l repairs and the S/G manway restorations. In addition, the pressurizer manway was removed to provide an RCS vent path. C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On March 20, 1990, at approximately 0817 JT, a truck driver with a security ! escort entered the protected area in a fuel truck. Although not a member of the plant operating staff, the driver was a Georgia Power Company employee belonging to a service group used to perform various plant services. The driver checked the welding machine that was in the area and found that it did not need fuel. He returned to the fuel truck and was in the process of
-backing out of the area when he hit a support holding the phase "C" insulator for RAT 1A. The insulator and line fell causing a phase to ground i fault, and the transformer tripped.
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VEGP - UNIT 1 o ;5 ;o ;o ;o ;4 l2 l4 9;0 __ 0l0; 6 _ 0, 0 0;3 or 0;8 rixm - ., c, m .,nn At 0820 CST, both Unit 1 RAT 1A and the Unit 2 RAT 2B High Side and Low Side breakers tripped causing a loss of offsite power condition (LOSP) to the Unit 1 Train A Class IE 4160 volt Bus lAA02, the Unit 2 Train B Class IE Bus 2BA03, and the 480 volt busses supplied by 1AA02 and 2BA03. The Unit 1 Train B Class IE 4160 volt bus IBA03 also lest power since RAT 1A was feeding both Trains of Class IE 4160 volt busses. The loss of power caused the associated ESF Actuation System Sequencers to send a start signal to one Unit I and one Unit 2 Diesel Generators. DGIA and DG2B started and saquenced the loads to their respective busses. Further description of the Unit 2 response to this event is provided in LER 50-425/1990-002. One minute and twenty seconds after DGIA started and sequenced the loads to , the Class IE bus, the engine tripped. This again caused an undervoltage (UV) condition to class lE bus lAA02. The UV signal is a maintained signal at the sequencer. However, since DGIA was coasting down from the trip, the shutdown logic did not allow the DG fuel racks or starting air solenoids to open and start the engine. This properly caused the engine starting logic to lock up, a condition that existed until the UV signal was reset. For this reason, DGIA did not automatically re-start after it tripped. After the trip, operators were dispatched to the engine control panel to investigate the cause of the trip. According to the operator, severa Without fully evaluating the condition, the annunciators were lit. operators reset the annunciators: During this time, a Shift Superviso % (SS) and a Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) went to the sequencer HM1 to determine if any problems were present on the 1A sequencer. The 5S pushed
-g the UV reset button, then reset the sequencer by deenergizing and energizing l jM. the power supply to the sequencer. This caused the DG air start solenoid to energize for another 5 seconds which caused the engine to start. This
/ happened 19 minutes after the DG tripped the first time. The engine started and the sequencer sequenced the available loads as designed. After 1 minute i and 10 seconds, the breaker and the engine tripped a second time. It did
) not automatically re-start due to the starting logic being blocked as described above. By this time, operators, a maintenance foreman and the jedieselgeneratorvendorrepresentativewereintheDGroom. The initial
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- report was that the jacket water pressure trip was the cause of the trip.
The maintenance foreman and vendor representative observed that the jacket
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The trip setpoint is 6 PSIG and the alarm setpoint is 8 PSIG. Also, the control room observed a [O Q ,. lube oil sensor malfunction alarm. l
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VEGP - UNIT 1 o ls jo lo lo l4 l2 ; 4 9l 0 - 0l 0l 6 - 0 l0 0j 4 or 0l8 tre u - ., < - ne - ,,nn Fifteen minutes after the second DGIA trip, DGIA was started from the engine control panel using the emergency start breakglass button. The engine started and loads were manually loaded. When the DG is started in the ; emergency mode, all the trips except four are bypassed. However, all alarms I will be annunciated. During the emergency run, no trip alarms were noticed by the personnel either at the control room or at the engine control panel. The only alarms noted by the control room operator assigned for DG operation were lube oil pressure sensor malfunction and fuel oil leve! high/ low alarm. I At 1040 CST, RAT IB was energized to supply power to 4160 volt bus 1BA03. DGIA supplied power to 4160 volt bus lAA02 until 1157 CST, at which time bus 1AA02 was tied to RAT 18. A Site Area Emergency was declared atc0840 CST,,due to a loss of all offsite and onsite AC power for more than-IS minutes. The Emergency Director signed the notification form used to inform offsite government agencies of the emergency at 0848 CST and notifications began gt'0857' $T. Due to the loss of power, which rendered the primary Emergency. _ cation , N l Network (ENN) inoperable, and some mis-communication, the h it ' trent notificationwasnotreceivedbyallagenciesunti{'0935 CST. not+ficatium, we, ; pria wit hmet di ff3484.ty . - The Emergency Director instructed personnel to complete various tasks for restoring containment and RCS integrity. All work was accomplished and , maintenance personnel exited containment by 1050 CST. The SAE was downgraded to an Alert Emergency at 0915 CST after restoration of core cooling and one train of electrical power. By 1200 CST, plant stabilized wi both trains of electrical power being conditions supplied fromha (*offsite source (RAT IB). After discussions with the NRC and local government agencies, t e emergency was terminated at 1247 CST and all agencies were notified by 1256 CST. D. CAUSE OF EVENT Direct Cause:
- 1. The direct cause of the loss of offsite Class IE AC power was the fuel truck hitting a pole supporting a 230kV line for RAT 1A. This was a cognitive personnel error on the part of the truck driver. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location that directly contributed to this personnel error.
- 2. The direct cause of the loss of onsite Class IE AC power was the failure of the operable DG, DGIA, to start and load the LOSP loads on buss IAA02.
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VEGP - UNIT 1 o ls lo lo lo l4 l 2l4 90 - 0j 0l 6 - 0l0 0l5 of 0 l8 rm a - - . -- we , ,,,, m., ,,,, Root Cause:
- 1. The truck driver met all current site training and qualification requirements, ir.cluding holding a Class 2 Georgia driver's license.
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/ vehicles when site safety viewing isrules, impaired, which were require violated. a flagman for backing
' 2. The root cause for the failure of DGIA has not been conclusively determined. There is no record of the trips that were annunciated after the first trip because the annunciators were reset before the !
condition was fully evaluated. Therefore, the cause of the first trip l can only be postulated, but it was most likely the same as that which caused the second trip. The second trip occurred at the end of the i timed sequence of the group 2 block logic. This logic allows the DG to I achieve operating conditions before the trips become active. The block i logic timed out and the trip occurred at about 70 seconds. The l annunciators observed at the second trip included jacket water high temperature along with other active trips. In conducting an investigation, the trip conditions that were observed on the second DG trip on 3-20-90 could be duplicated by venting 2 out of 3 jacket water temperature sensors, simulating a tripped condition. The simulation duplicated both the annunciators and the 70 sec. trip time. The most likely cause of the DG trips was intermittent actuation of the jacket water temperture switches. Following the 3-20-90 event, all three jacket water temperature switches, which all have a design setpoint of 2000F, were bench tested. Switch TS-19110 was found to have a setpoint of 197 degrees F, which was approximately 6 degrees below its previous setting. Switch
, TS-19111 was found to have a setpoint of 199 degrees F, which was approximately the same as the original setting. Switch TS-19112 was found to have a setpoint of 186 degrees F, which was approximately 17 degrees F below the previous setting and was re-adjusted. Switch TS-19112 also had a small leak which was judged to be acceptable to support diagnostic engine tests and was reinstalled. The switches were recalibrated with the manufacturer's assistance to ensure a consistent calibration technique.
During the subsequent test run of the DG on 3-30-90, one of the switches (TS-19111) tripped and would not reset. This appeared to be an intermittent failure because it subsequently mechanically reset. This switch and the leaking switch (TS-19112) were replaced with new I switches. All subsequent testing was conducted with no additional l problems.
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,!".'o'!Eo'.f"5Ee E"o "'l$'Est' s#"lA' ,7.".'J' s TEXT CONTINUATlON 5 ""le'/o'a*'s'u'." fain'*="E'e'IEc'I'4'3Ns'UE "f2 o,?"t.*/,i".'Jf".ra'31,o 'Ca'?!?' Ed"A' t*?,;;
wahaGtufht ko suoCE? na5=swGTom oc MW3 8 &C'L't v aus vis poc. g y ., vug g . (y, LEA huustaess l pact asi "a- 00 ; '." t';',t VEGP - UNIT 1 o {s lo lo lo l4 l 2l4 9l0 - 0 l0l6 ; - 0l0 0l6 oF 0l8 rm a . ..e ,, n n A test of the jacket water system temperature transient during engine starts was conducted. The purpose of this test was to determine the actual Jacket water temperature at the switch locations with the engine in a normal standby lineup, and then follo,ved by a series of starts without air rolling the engine to replicate the starts of 3-20-90. The test showed that jacket water temperature at the switch location decreased from a standby temperature of 163 degrees F to approximately 156 degrees F and remained steady. Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), : special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs . l were performed under various conditions. Since 3-20-90, DGIA and D ! 7 have been started several times (more than twenty times each) an o i b failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts. 1 ' addition, an undervoltage start test without air roll was conducted on 4-6-90 and DGIA started and loaded properly. Based on the above facts, it is concluded that the jacket water high s temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on 4 (y @)3-20-90. b E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT The loss of offsite power to Class IE bus IBA03 and the failure of DGIA to start and operate successfully, coupled with DGlB and RAT IB being out of service for maintenance, resulted in Unit 1 being without AC power to both Class lE busses. With both Class lE busses deenergized, the RHR System could not perform its required safety function. Based on a noted rate of rise in the RCS +emperature of 46 degrees F in 36 minutues, the RCS water would not have wen expected to begin boiling until approximately 1 hour and 36 minutes after the beginning of the event. Restoration of RHR and closure of the containment equipment hatch were cordated well within the _stimated I hour and 36 minutes for the projected onset of boiling in the RCS. A review of information obtained from the Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS) and grab sample analysis indicated all normal values. As a result of this event, no increase in radioactive releases to either the containment or the environment occurred.
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. .., n . , o m, ho 3,,, o. ' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 'l"' 7?o'.""C.E"o"'IEiv' ,#"fis' E".'.",lj TEXT CONTINUATION ?U"la'o'."rf'IfEiME'eUEcL".'A'Ef '"s' "Eff!
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VEGP - UNIT 1 o ls lo lo lo l4 l 2l4 9l 0 - 0l0l 6 . 0l0 0l7 op 0; 8 rm ,, - . - = , , m.,,m Additional systems were either available or could have been made available to ensure the continued safe operation of the plant:
- 1. The maintenance on RAT IB was completed and the RAT was returned to service approximately 2 hours into the event.
- 2. Offsite power was available to non-lE equipment through the generator step-up transformers which were being used to "back-feed" the Unit l 3 Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) and supply the non-lE busses. Provided g
that the phase to ground fault was cleared, Class IE busses lAA02 and
. IBA03 could have been powered by feeding throus _
r non-4EJus 1N_A01. .
- 3. The Refueling Water Storage Tank could have been used to manually establish gravity feed to the RCS to maintain a supply of cooling water to the reactor.
Consequently, neither p arpafety nor the health and safety of the public was adversely affect 1 this event. A more detailed assessment of this ) event and an assessmenic-@e kvent had it occurred under more Auste circumstances will fie pe rfo ed and included in a supplemental LER. , F. CGRRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. A management policy on control and operation of vehicles has been established.
- 2. Temporary barricades have been erected with signs which direct I authorization for control of switchyard traffic to the SS. l
- 3. The Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) diesel start and trip logic has been modified on Unit I so that an automatic " emergency" start will occur upon LOSP. Therefore, non-essential diesel engine trips are blocked upon LOSP. The Unit 2 DG's will be modified by 4-30-90.
- 4. The DGIA test frequency was increased to three times per week until 4-20-90 when the test frequency will be changed to once every 7 days in accordance with Technical Specification Table 4.8-1. This frequency i will be continued until 7 consecutive valid ;asts are completed with no l more than one valid failure in the last 20 valid tests. Including the two valid failures of this event, there have been a total of four valid failures in 69 valid tests of DGIA as of 1157 CST on 3-20-90 . I
- 5. The defective DG temperature switches have been replaced. d .4b 1
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- TEXT CONTINUATION 2 ""le'd'ah.". M U"f'0%II,'c'.". ','s'df 7.,"s' ~"!c "f.!
Of"t.'/.T.'J?".",,'UT,*,o".'in'?c?',4Pe tif.'? O, MahaGE We h? AND SUDGE f WasmsNGTON DC 20503 p &C#ts t v haut its DOCatt huMGEA128 Lg p evenet a 161 f PAGE (31
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VEGP - UNIT 1 o is !o j o j o l4 E 14 9l 0 0F reno- .== _ nac e m., n,, Ol0 i6 - 0l0 0l8 018
- 6. Further corrective actions will be addressed in a supplemental LER.
G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
- 1. Failed Components:
Jacket Water High Temperature Switches manufactured by California Controls Company. Model #A-3500-W3
- 2. ..evious Similar Events:
Nonc
- 3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:
Reactor Coolant System - AB Residual Heat Removal System - B Diesel Generator Lube Oil System - LA Diesel Generator Starting Air System - LC Diesel Generator Cooling Water System - LB Diesel Generator Power Supply System - EK Safety Injection System - BQ 13.8 kV Power System - EA 1460 volt non-lE power system - EA l 1460 volt Class IE power system - EB Chemical and Volume Control System - CB l Containment Building - NH 480 volt Class IE Power System - ED Engineered Safety Features Actuation System - JE Radiation Monitoring System - IL l EC F.nsa aanA aWs
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- TO: LARRY ROSINSON, NRC OI FRON: ALLEN MOSBAUGH During my interview with you on 2-8-90, you had ask about rumors that I had heard.I conferred with Art Domby prior to answering your question.I discussed with Art Domby the information I later told you and one additional piece of information that I did not tell you.
Art suggested that I did not have to tell you because it was not related to the question ano I concurred. However since that time I have decided that the information may be germain to your investigation and may assist you in determining the truth. Based on this I relate the following: On or about 10-13-88 at the beginning of a meeting Skip Kitchens said " I got to use my license today." He may have said " yesterday" I am not sure.Then there was some mention of the chemical addition valves.He also said something to the effect that he didn't often get an opportunity to use his SRO license. There were a dozen or more people present at that time. I have tried to recall which meeting this occurred in but can not say for certain.I believe that it occurred in the Adminestration Building large conference room but it could have been the War Room.I think that it may have been a George Bockhold staff meeting or another meeting called by the general manager.It also could have been a Daily Status Meeting. I am not exactly clear on the exact time and place but the statement "I got to ur~ ' license" made by Skip Kitchens I clearly recall with - talete certainty. I My conversation with Art Domby (off the record) as closely j as I can recall was as follows: ALM-- I heard from Carolyn Tynan that Skip opened the valves and I heard from Lee Mansfield that some operations personnel had refused to open the valves.Those are the rumors. Also Art I remember a meeting, I can't recall for sure which one it was but I remember Skip saying " I got to use my license today " and 7 there was some discussion of the dilution valvas and he said "He didn't often get a chance to g { use his license". / 1 Domby- Well I have privliged information from other f interviews on that.Do you want to know what that is? ALM-- No.Not really. 1 e / (
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l 9 Domby- Well I can tell you that you are 180 degrees out. ALM-- So what should I answer to them? Domby- Well he has ask about the rumors so let's answer that.He hasn't ask about the other so we don't have to tell him about that. ALM-- OK At the conclusion of the interview you ask if there was anything else that I would like to say.I answered, no not at this time.At that time I thought of my discussion with Art Domby and the information that Art said we didn't have to tell you.I did not mentien the information at that time again because of the advice Art Domby had given to me. l l 3 1
TO: LARQY ROBINSON. NRC O! l FROM: ALLEN MOSBAUGH l During my interview with you on xx-xx-xx, you had ask about rumors that I had heard.I conferred with Art i Domby prior to answering your question.I discussed with Art Domby the information I later told you and one I add 1tlonal D1ece of information that I did not tell you. ; Art suggested that I did .,ot have to tell you because it was not related to the aus.stion and I concurred. ; However since that time I have decided that the information may be germain to your investigation and may assist you in determining the truth. Based on this I relate the following: i On or about 10-13-88 at the beginning of a meeting , Sk1p Kitchens sa1d
- I got to use my license today." -
He may have said "yksterday* I am not sure.Then there was some ment 1on of the chemical addition valves.He also said something to the effect that he didn't often get an opportunity to use his SRO 11 cense. \ There were a dozen or more people present at that time. I have tried to recall which meeting this occurred in but can not say for certain.I believe that it occurred in the Adminestration Building large Conference room but It could have been the War Room.I think that it may have been a George Bockhold staff meeting or another meeting called by the general manager.It also could have been a Daily j l Status Heating. I am not exactly clear on the exact time and place but the statement "I got to use my license" made by Skip Kitchens I clearly recall with complete certainty. ; I l l l l l
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..h er d ' Ltonfirsation 'af Action' Letter dated)MarchApril 23, 1990. 9,1990 In that lettar and in (ELV-01516 , Coorgia P j j[D i ,7 Yeeting' notes 6GPCreper'tedthatDieselGenerator(DG)1Ahadbeenstartco
- 18 1sies and DC 15 had been started 19 times with no failures or problems h', '
! ~ ,vp? be en. March 20'and April 9, 1990. Similar information was reported in l W 'd . plen.0 of Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-424/1990-006 dated April 19, '.9M
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$45)that ported in our telephone calls to the NRC. we subsequentlym'y.. -c i b 4 .
information wat in error n That DG 15 had problems on ' l t ' N 7 13r and T34 as indicatea an Ta e. Lattached to _thit_19ttep.*. 4,hfk?*ermore,
# Furth M4!h%WU ' e'
- there l . s# ~ were more starts m e:
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In Fvision 4 to LEA 50-424/1990-006 datedjune 29, 1990 (ELV-01729), GPC- ts /Jer.
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K *att4Ented to' clarify the correct camber of Of starts occurring l'n this time ' period by using regulatory guide terminology.(i.e. valid vs. successful starts). (- f"i
'" -TMs"revtsed LER accurately reports the number of valid DG starts during the
; i l ' period of March 21 through June 7,1990. However, during the OSI it was po W.M :i out that the revised LER did not adequately clarify the numbers in the April 9t, 1ette y J.tw
,,(ry.co, cu-sc.
l Th .. G n the April 9th letter and the originial LER appear to be the res,.'t 1 of two factors. First, there y ccr fusion in the Ostinction between a l successful start and a valid a b t War, start attempt: vare made to test e i DG's 1A and 18, A start was com i .d uccessful when M was starte:' r' either ran without problems or was ;rier; onelly shut down n;e to testing tr.
! progress. The term 'successfd' was r,.,er intendard to imply ' valid" in the .
context of Regulatory Guide 1..c5 Second, an error was made by the ind k i' who.prformed the Mt+61 count o' Co : arts. > ' e ' 'l + _
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- *' M"ef 31 start attempts and 29 of these attempts were considered successful afterFor.!. DG
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j START i h Q&Il SUCC115 f.11LHRE Caenis
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'03-t!-M X Post-maintenance testing, Post-matatonance testing.
i d._.it! 120 lit 03-11-M 03-11-M X. X Post-maintenance testing. j *f tt3 03-t!-M X post-asintenance testing. 3
;. i 124 03-t!-M X Post-maintenance testing.
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tempiPatW F but start attempt was considered successful
- > since run time was I hour and 39 i minutes.
! -133 03-23-90 .X 134 03-23 90
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X Engine ran fev approximately one ! l
- - . - minute, tripped on low Jacket i .,
water pressure and was started i again approximately 13 minutes l
- later (start 135).
135 03-23-M X ! 134 03-24-90 # X ! 137 03-27-N X , j 130 .,03-27-90 X ! i 03-tf-N I ! @ 103 139 di43-27-N A,WA. %. .
,<,x ,- '
. . c . #.
-141 03-tf-N X
,j - 142 ,. 03-tf-N 1
- '143 '08-8890 -X Valid test.
- 144 03-88-00 X 2
*38990
, X j wy145 ggg ,
' 34.gg.gg 7,WX' '
w ~'
=
y' s N-OS-N cX , ~f l,,1147 ICJ M-05-M ~X Valid test.
$v,,.- . J s. y 3,q w;... .. -y .
) .41.
. Valid startp falkres,and test are noted. All other starts are considered ,, '
be ato ' Guide . 100. .-g -
.;" l
. Total >
s ite not c ting1' starts.
' TM -. %Ill.d'W1Wi122. !!3. m. .I l s int'esancei test " *.
l
J
- _
TABLE 1 l]odon .lOIt
- +
l
' O!ESEL CENERATOR 1A
, RVN *WD pg3c ags g og i START s TRtP L mig g[&gil, Tim a_ _
ru n to e.+~ rm e
- i, ~~
! 139 03-29-90 No ~li ~Ye 5 140 03-20-90 no ~ im ves '~~ ~ gewge rc M.4mre,o ae
. m . e 3,Aer,u w *.~r- <a
- >l41 03~-10-se__. _ys3_ __W ~" ~J.io 03-10-90 _ _ _ _Mp ww% RM J sA F +4Grnco let cese Au r,oa R w y i
j ~ 143 _ _ 103-10-# ." __3_Ej vgi.__Ee . ._. A...,po S.A os s e,u.47,c- av o #
.53;t5;po 2.c- ac sg3 n144 ~
e ene.<J n d
! 145'-~~" MS-23-90~ ~~ ves (o- Pc 5 raerep <~ Aou o c . c.w 03-tf-M ysf _.0.m_ _ .N4. u V res r s ran i H. '
l - y?t48 ';03 - ~t9:90 gs 50 m oc 05;3F90 ' Ws_~T_IAbl_._ s ?).7 85E ff#r W ,'M*T*La<** i 2.14L 03;30;90 45 ~ ~ ~ c - No TAq m. ar,oa ,i>r 1 149 ~ 03;35;t0 vd c- po TAie s.nu st,oa Tea r i ~150
'151
) uo ra e 5 <,4e nou res r I
03;35~N-~ l~NEL 03-30~-90:..'. sis .cn .NO rA*PS1.5cATioJ'ssi t1S3 .% . . . . . yo _ op;pcc moo _ Evac.r.racr 5153 -W90
'glS4 . .
f:OT-3F50__....yg5... v5 =:x. . . .uo . coe.s.r. eco_ fur _ rerr
'155 :53-3l -90 YE5 2m No . efi. Ace $0 FddhiTdfi-
_.La _ No e Ai FSi m4_.furtcy re; r 155 03-3L-55 _ YES 4 l
.03-3L-90 _ ysi . .R)m No B e 6 8tE T s i r $ 2.
- ,' 157 _. N_o____._JE4o( -Aip nes' ras r 1 lW kP3-3L-99 7 . M .__ 6
_ im. we m og rat p_..r,.. t g .rs t i 159 .. 103-3L-se vel _.
.sa-3hys ves 24 uo sex 3o.A rmp ris,os re.5 r 150- ;
III :.8 3 - 3 3 - Ve5 ..Ls . ..Jo . . . .. seseur c6 A es T*if rea m rc$r 78 9 T-im resr 163 03-3L-90 se5 ~~ 7Em 90 143 03-3L-90 Nes 2h 00 _. _f v v Ts5r 5 re.dr e 2. l
~56-9 +- NES inh- N_o_._ poam+t.r-aq refr.,
- 144 i 165 _-04-0 WW - yss W No .yfgkry waxen n me Tasr u04-05-50 % vs5 i_. 9o_ ac d r wareg wake r,asr
' f 65 "" . _ " **N rJ ++g >'espp gnexer w eR._ g p rag, -
l ,j.184 l l47 2%y MO Lo5F TAtP he D F,u n 'c T.. Ti f t ' j ' IC C Z __ t'Y55 WE5 t & he #o poAm h 5'uno_TK5T ., s j t 16$~ C - j - lCi,0n $D N ONGEp%$- ! W*" '
.r N$$ .
2- Ndon Table
]* ~TAs4;
. DIESEL. GENERATOR 18 i
i START gvp wup mm D ' 2 ( ' 8 ' V ggIg ggfig ria l i L
~oT ~.: Nd~ P s r m ~ r a .n, eme c.n ,,os l ite Of-11-90 yo - . _ c._ _Nc. .. . a> r p.e,s.r. 8 ;v ra e+n ~o
- 121_ _ l03-ul-90 un
- fit _ 03-E-90 . uo. _ y., nc ,we ..~r(.u, erar oc+ e -
. 03-L-90 Nn n no oc u m :. r u , 2 0,. w . a e n m
~ lts e u r r u ra. , c, v e.r e
- ~124 .
QS-J -90 uo 4,- No i.,s,.
- r=r res r eu u-r
!!5 03-i b 90 G. Ne j $~ ?lt6
~03-t f- T ~ E ,g.Ss I. Uo iunct rssi =c a ^ ^**r, . ?.~ '
ves 6n uc ec> r <~ r un wso r.n .- ! u- lti o+ 03-tt-90 wr ~, r cysmsa .rN-l
- 7~
i n ,&@Ila 83-88-90 tcs 3., Mc pcsr wT c.?mWp r@? w 139 m-EE-90 vES % l 03-EE-90 s&C % __ tuo aqwiss.e ~< p e e sir 'i<nrus,- 130
..yes 2 .,_ . _ po vu.rac e ewa,o <<acu.r wasr IST _ _03-tf-90~ po> r wr t.cw res r e tw in sP i
D 133 Q3=ll=90 po l'h k t- YES 03-l3-99 .yes 7 k re _ ..y o Pc> r eyyrpro res r ^ l +* 133^ T34 03-23-90 No L ve5 lbsr m.ur u4e rest tazo rase
. .W-l3-w ye5 4 rd- No ps r etwr uc4o rsir
- l ljl por 44mr J4o re.r.r i+Tav4ul.,
l' G.k...e s ' lbt4=w No 3_J. No ' l" J 03 't1-9tV ~~~yss tme uo . suaece rsr ! 138 ~ ..3'03-17-96 ~ ~ yes - 723,3 .po rsig s,, set-m.,;c rs.5 r ra,p s,momr,w rur !' 139~~. 03-t1-90 yes ~ no~
, 145 ~x 03-t7-90 was ~ 'A uo ' rn,e 5,%rr resr T41 3 0 3~~ t F 9 9 #S 6, Mo '~ rAo P fr Mut Aries. rt"C r ITi~ ~ 03-l 7-99 4ES V) A.b ..LL.CY65IN ...
f4T 03-l H l vsf 1%Ar UC /veg e t 3 4 1 ._._.. l l I44 + 03-l H > AES % vo Lpto moo act s i T. ;r 93~, WS A. No L Ps-O _ mod F vM9 r 72 r,~ 145 . . .. )? j . ISS ~ 94=94 - VES .thkr WO % rswru r Leno TGf f. .. Lg y TRtP mod faucT:TasT l*4 I47 ~1tz - .. m g.g me 4 %tNO -
. _ RL. .
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1 h't.,, NefdMYTbWRTemptris wk 24
.. m. .yartem.yof'mpost- p. not c~ountim stnrta 44 . . , , ,.
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Mi d,t ?NN.,:'t bi5Nb[A % M-..~p. ,> a u . mh ,!' q' 1. ' . Nuclear. Regulatory Consission - Renten !! lsih
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1 !- g CLA g CATION OF RESPONSE TO CohFIOLATION* ,4. F 0F ACT10ll LETTER
. g' " *"9 g N'J# : %
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W"MMW.O ' .2 .; I er i
, i 1 fActionJLatter' dated) March 23,ItM.il 9, 19M (ELV-01516 ...' y
,?Coorg t{ng tbq)GPC reported that Diesel Generator (06) 1A had been startco
,c s and OG 1 _ had been started 19 times with no failures or problems 'g l
>a f le,e, .0 March et Licdhsee 20'a'nd Event April 9,19M.'
Report (LER) Similar 50-424/19M-006 information dated was reported April 19,,(990 in ; [ . 'D j sv - .6114ggrted ininformation our telegn waterrorJn ens on: that hone DE cal.1s N hadto_ the prob' NRC. we subsoeven
** 134 as indicates:aa Tableltttached to thin'lett -
? j'rffUrd a re,- were more starts to
. n w m ,. p ; ted g ,.than , the c m ,.u g nQ j number,reporte p fy , w.,9 r,n. s 41 ten to 50-424 ne 29 1990 gf 1
$,*at ed to' clarify the co/1990-006 rrect' numb edat of 'itarlsoccur(rinELV-017tt),GPC.s ' +
' i+ pTMe 'sr1" revised Ltt occurately reports successful'staFts). the num [.1 91 1
W period of March 21 through June 7, 19M. .Howeier. during the'05I it was* pointed ~.Y
% out,that the revised LER did not adequately clarify the numbers in the April 9t'. l
",g.lette'{es.eo, 3 ,,,c k.f +,.,
wo-
. n the April 9th letter and the originial LER app.ar to be the resu't I of two actors. First, there u g confusion in the d atinction between a successful start and a valid M M Mar; start attempt: were made to test c e DG's 1A and 18. A start was cos.: 's .d uccessful wheti - DE was starte:' W
. . , either ran witbest problems or was tri,en:'onally shut down due. to . testing .in
- progress. The ters 'successf0
- was r.s,er intended to imply 'valtd' in Ibe
' context of Reggiatory Guide 1.;CS. Second, an, error was made 'by the ~indive d ,
. .E
,3 Who,.gformed th,4AM441 Count of N *. arts. ** % "'N #77" ~~ ,
g., ,
- i
~7 1
'. -8 TEL. tot 1-20!Hrn-79e5 e679 Ptt5 .F 1i A Ar-2EH'99 89:48 !D SCMPC040GTIE 1 i t
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ffftg 02059 Nuclear .* .r4 Regulatery " m,- - Connission
, fn 9 ... -,. .a.e -
a . 4 j sl*..),y ' page Q- 3 ( g[ y. f ~p, f . .
-- . h-v ..
vi t.
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=.,,.- y e
x d s i4 . .,4. , , . g. D. Y, p, i PitummarizetheDGsta/{sfortheperiodindicated. For D8 1A, thers was s' total 4 ' Mef 31 start attempts and 29 of these attempts were considered succwsful after 'For DG .,,.c18 1 {
",' the
- two failures associated with the March to event.
;- total o194 start attempts evRI.ei,4 : ;;;t=mstnt=::: stav4-ettemp46)- and.,34'$2; gj ;-'
,e of these attempts were constdered successful.
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< '. 6 1 d t. % e .
l %. . _ Nr. 8 R. Osaser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle ynamen,,,, a m. m m m . m m a.w,. a ,_. gung . a, ..
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in. NO:1-2EEHTM-7895 a679 P84 #
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Initial failur;e (valid). . ;,'d. i
. 2n.= r.,rw%r, t : w . ' '-
'Ist kes-to-M X
'V 103 .".~ 03-to-N e X Inttial failure (valid). <4 <2
,~ 03-20-M X Yalid start. 'J o .e
,.t
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pg ( 143 03-to-M X 'gycg 144 03-30-90 X . 145 43-23-N X 1;. 'W"w;$94
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i les e 03-23-N X j
.3 i '
147 03-ts-M X X - 4 '* W l I 1C3 kO3-30-M X e_ E s.%dik,idf m c : ., hb l
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.,X
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p? 150 151 "#-30-N "X '/ .
- 4'"?4 M('6 ist 03-30-90 I " - - '-
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'153 %itB-30-M %X 154 03-30-90 903-31-M QX
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'6;rl;T.)M,
' , NL 185 ' : a,.. .
156 443-81-N 6X N 157 03-31-M I 150 03 31-90 X i 159 03-31-90 K 1 IC3 ,: 03-31-N k.K ~ 'e c
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5^ 161 03-31-90 *1 q,~e-
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9N 4RT W,@ Valid Tost. -m '$4;
#164 401-90T'<..;X
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- % @j.e3-31-90
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ciG:A i m c% . . 166 3 4 04-06-N '9v1 <!#- .% .
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'187 ,04-06-00 '"X .
% .s vk il 103 t' 04-00 N I Valid Test. '
Eh Q[ h"g g:phthg$cta tJalfd Test. ,g. . . ,,
' *:
- dhhhb iankg,f f%L;i , ~ , . . .. . .m ( 4jfG.RitQ
- l. Valid starts failures and tests tre noted. All other sitrts are considered rar=8.tebenon-vaIld~ ~ m g t.p e to se a. e m 3 . - gulatory Guide a,a. .
4-,,p-1.108.
.. . /
- y. .,ec.,Q$ey g.. g;,,
Total number
'; S. t.w t
attesets s ais.31. S p ..,r' erq.. O.ac: p p Q3., ,avd q'd'. p M
+ans N'MW k . =, .,,:,l- ...
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'T&lv '
W OY pterf,g,n. qavch j TA8LE 2 h,k bY DIESEL CENERATOR 18 START
- L 0011 SE111 f.AILH81 fdttEXII
- v. . . .x st <. -
!_ 120 ~ 03-t!-M X Post-maintenance testing. d it! 03-21-M X Post eaintenance testing. l 'Itt 03-21-90 X.. Post-maintenance testing. i ^f123 ~'03-t1-90 X Post-maintenance testing. t
. i 124 03-11-90 X Post-maintenance testing.
" 125 03-t2-90 X
- t' Its 03-tt-M X
- ;: 127 03-ft-M X 120 03-It-M X l ; 129 , 03-It-M X
- 130 ,03-82-90 X F' i f( <!31 03-12-90 -
i g138 03-It-M X CL[ne trippleen nigh lube oil l " temperstWChet start attempt i was considered successful i / since run time was I hour and 39 minutes. a l -133 03-23-90 .X 134 03-23 90
~~
X Engine ran for approximately one i
- . - sinute, tripped on low Jacket water pressure and was started i egain approximately 13 minutes
! later(start 135). ' 135 03-23-M X ! 134 03-24-M _X
- 137 03-27-N I l .130 .,03-27-M X
- 139 03-17-M I l 4A103 -AT03-27-98 , javX . A.. ;3, .w' .
. . . ..; , e -
' ~
!g L141 03-tf-M .X
- " ' 14t ,P 03-tf-N X i^ 143 ' 03-RS-N I Valid test.
! 144 03-89 90 X i .145 *3- 9 98
, I
- **103
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- . . 147 ' ..E M-84-Na.; A e M-05-M .
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P.06 J 0 51 -- 1U-90 WED 15329- Wh Ia$ 8 ebIowerFax1 8ne e TO: LARRY ROBINSON. NFC OI FROM: ALLEN MOSBAUGH During my interview with you on xx-xx-xx, you had ask about rumors that I had hears.I conferred with Art DomDy prior to answering your question.I discussed with Art Domby the information I ster told you and one additional piece of informat on that I did not tell you. Art suggested that I did not 1 ave to tell you because it was not related to the quest an and I concurred. However since that time I hasa decided that the information may be germain to your investigation and may assist you in determining the truth. Based ( 1 this I relate the following: On or about 10-13-88 at t is beginning of a meeting k l Skip Kitchens said " I got tt use my license today." {
- He may have sa1d " yesterday" am not sure.Then there was )'
some mention of the chemical addition valves.He also said something to the effect that un didn't often get \n opportunity to use his SRO 11 :ense.
- r' .
There were a dozen or more pe)ple present at that time. I have tried to recall which 1eeting this occurred in but i can not say for certain.I bel eve that it occurred in the Adminestration Building large conference room but it could have been the War Room.I thin that it may have been a George Bockhold staff meeting or another meeting called by the general manager.It als, could have been a Daily Status Meeting. I am not exactly clear on the exact time and place but the statement "I got to use my li ense" made by Skip Kitchens I clearly recall with complet certainty. I I 1 i l I I l l l l
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O e e TO: LARRY ROBINSON, NRC OI FROM: ' ALLEN MOSBAUGH During my interview with you on 2-8-90, you had ask about rumors that I had heard.I conferred with Art Domby prior to answering your question.I discussed with Art Domby the information I later told you and one additional piece of informatjon that I did not tell you. Art suggested that I did'not have to tell you because it was not related to the question and I concurred. However since that time I have decided that the information may be germain to your investigation and may assist you in determining the truth. Based on
- this I relate the following:
On or about 10-13-88 at"the beginning of a meeting ' Skip Kitchens said " I got to use my l'icense today." He may have said " yesterday" I am not sure.Then there was some Mention of the chemical addition valves.He also said something to the effect that he didn't often get an opportunity to use his SRO license. There were a dozen or more people present at that time.. I have tried to recall which meeting this occurred in but can not say for certain.I believe that.it occurred in-the Adminestration Building large conf,erence rocm but i ts could have been the War Room.I think that it,may ha've been a George,Bockhold staff meeting or another meeting called by the general manager.It also cou14 have, been a Daily Status Meeting. I am not exactly clear on the axact_ time and place but the statement "I got to use my license," made by Skip Kitchens I clearly recall with complete certainty. My conversation with Art Domby (off the record) as clos 9 1y as I can recall was as follows: - ALM-- I heard from Carolyn Tynan that Skip opened the valves and I heard from Lee Mansfield that some operations personnel had refused to open the valves.Those are the rumors. Also Art I remember a meeting, I can't recall for sure which one it was but I remember Skip saying " I got to use my license today " and there was some discussion of the dilution valves l and he said "He didn't often get a chance to use his license". Domby- Well I have privliged informatibn from other interviews on that.Do you want to know what that is? ALM-- No.Not really. Domby- Well I can tell you that you are 180 degrees out.
a 1 ALM-- So what should I answer to them? Domby- Well he has ask about the rumors so let's answer that.He hasn't ask about the other so we don't have to tell him about that. ALM-- OK At the conclusion of the interview you ask if there was anything else that I would like to say.I answered, no not at this time.At that time I thought of my discussion with Art Domby and the information that Art said we didn't have to tell you.I did not mention the information at that time again because of the advice Art Domby had given to me.
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l l I 1 i l l PRESENTATION TO REGION !! NUCLEAR RE6ULATORY COMISSION ON I VOC!i.E SITE AREA EER6ENCY i MRCH 20,1990 i AGENDA e OPENING REMARKS C. K. MCC0Y < e EVENT REVIEW IEAM CRITIQUE G. BOCKHOLD 9 IRUCK/ SWITCHYARD e 0FF-SITE NOTIFICATIONS e PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY e COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATE / SITE e MID-LOOP OPERATIONS e DIESEL IESTING/0PERABILITY G. BOCKHOLD e QUARANTINE COMPONENTS 6. BOCKHOLD e UNIT 2 G. BOCKHOLD 1 1 Q . nians
*"l Y pio g ggy yldemedh
INITIATING EVENT l FUELING TRUCK STRUCK INSULATOR SUPPORT INSIDE I THE LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD CAUSING A FAULT TO THE 1A RESERVE AUXILIARY IRANSFORMER. , l e DIRECT CAUSE TRUCK DRIVER AND ESCORT WERE INATTENTIVE TO SAFE OPERATION OF THE TRUCK. e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES I CONTROL OF VEHICLES NEAR VULNERABLE AND SENSITIVE AREAS NOT ESTABLISHED. l MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT STAGED INAPPROPRIATELY. THE USE OF GROUND-GUIDES INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA WAS NOT CLEAR. 4 l i d 7 e i 2
Interoffice correspondence GeorgiaPower A 1 i DATE: March 27. 19J0 < RE: Vehicles In Perimeter Area FROM: G. Bockhold. Jr. I TO: Site Personnel i l Due to the recent plant event of March 20, 1990, the following shall be i implemented immediately: All vehicles within the Perimeter Area (PA) in editch the driver does not have merview visibility Wt that am farver than a
- pickup truck, am required to have a Wagman at all times ideen the vehicle is backing up.
. Additional policies / procedures on this issue will be forthcoming. l 4 E 4 l 3 4 4
EERGENCY PLAN IPFLEENTATION DURING THE EMERGENCY, OFF" SITE NOTIFICATIONS WERE LATE AND/OR DELAYED BEYOND THE 15 MINUTE TIME LIMIT. 6 DIRECT CAUSES POWER TO THE PRIMARY ENN (1E EMERGE
- POWER) WAS LOST.
ALL EMERGENCY AGENCIES WERE NOT INCLUULD ON THE BACKUP ENN. (BURKE COUNTY AND GEMA l ADDED 4/6/90) e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES l CONTROL ROOM COMMUNICATORS AND SUPERVISORS WERE NOT FULLY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM CAPABILITIES. (PRIMARY ENN IN ISC HAD POWER FROM THE SECURITY SYSTEM DIESEL.) THE SERIES METHOD OF NOTIFICATION CONTAINED UNSATISFACTORY DELAYS. EMERGENCY DIRECTOR DID NOT ENSURE PROMPT NOTIFICATICM OF OFF-SITE AGENCIES. AMPLIFYING INFORMATION WAS NOT PROVIDED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. 4 1
Intoroffice Correspondence GeorgiaPower A DATE: April 4, 1990 RE: Emergency Notification Network (EINI) Communication FRCM: George Bockhold, Jr. TO: Emergency Directors (ED) and Consunicators To ensure that ENN connunication. is timely. Emergency Directors will ensura that the following improvements are implemented:
- 1. Inwediately upon the declaration of an emergency, the consrunicator (Shift Clerk) will perform a roll call to determine the operability of the ENN while the message is being prepared by the ED.
- 2. Burke County and GEMA is in the process of being added to the backup ENN and this will be installed and tested within the next few days.
- 3. The ED will personally ensure notifications are timely and problems are resolved. The ED will assign extra personnel or use TSC facilities to solve commenication J problems as necessary. l l
- 4. The TSC uses different power supplies than the Control l Room and TSC casuunication systems may be operable l when Control Room systems are not. !
ED's l Since Burke County must respond quickest to most emergencies l will ensure that Burke County receives the highest priority for ENN j notifications, We are investigating improved cons 4 nication hardware and techniques. l i In the meantime, your personal attention to ENN consnunications must ensure
- that we do not have the problems that we experienced on 3/20/90.
l . 4%ut . G8/gww s 5
i EERGENCY PLAN IFLEENTATION l DURING THE EMERGENCY, SITE PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY NEEDED IMPROVEMENT. 1 e DIRECT CAUSE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES DID NOT PROVIDE l FOR THE SITUATION OF NOT EVACUATING THE SITE. (GENERAL MANAGER'S MEMO OF 4/6/90) l e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES l l THE INITIAL PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS DELAYED APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES. PERSONNEL WERE ALLOWED TO RE-ENTER THE PROTECTED AREA. ; PAGE ANNOUNCEMENTS AR5 DIFFICULT TO HEAR IN SOME PLANT AREAS. THE COMPUTER GENERATED PRINTOUT DID NOT ALLOW QUICK IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL. THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR FAILED TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE AFTER DECIDING NOT TO EVACUATE PERSONNEL. l 6
int:roffice Correspondence GeorgiaRmer A , DATE: April 6, 1990 RE: Accountability During Emergencies Log: NOV-00426 FROM: G. Bocki.old. Jr. 10: All Emergency Directors and Site Personnel In the event of site emergency conditions', we will implement the following revised procedures. These changes will enhance personnel accountability and safety and ensure better infonnation flow for employees. They will also provide flexibility to the plant when responding to emergency situations. When the Emergency Director (ED) makes an emergency classification, he will make the appropriate tone and page announcement on the plant PA system. He will direct site personnel to the appropriate. locations. If you can not hear the page, report to your supervisor. He or she ulll direct you appropriately. Normally non-essential personnel will report to the Admin. Building auditorium or parking lot. David Phillips, the Financial Services Supervisor, has authority to coordinate eith the ED and control the disposition of non-essential personnel. In his absence, the senior person present will contact the Security Captain for additional assistance. Emergency Response Organization (ER0) personnel should report insnediately to the appropriate facility. Other shift personnel, supervisors, and managers on-site should report initially to the OSC. Overflow personnel will assemble in the maintenance machine shop area. When directed by the ED. the security department will initiate accountability. The security department cannet account for personnel who fall to log into the appropriate E N (e.g.. centrol room. TSC. or OSC) so it is essential un comply with the ED's instnsctions as soon as possible. Your assistance taplementing these instructions will ensure we manage emergencies better and provide plant personnel with sufficient - information to keep them informed of abnormal plant activities. Thaik you for your assjstance. N G8/ erd 7 xc: Department Heads NORMS
1 i i EERGENCY PLAN IPylFENTATION COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CORPORATE AND ISC NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED. e DIRECT CAUSES l l THF STATUS LOOP TELEPHONE BRIDGE WAS NOT OPEPABLE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EMERGENCY BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF POWER, l l 8
i l l i l l l BID-LOOP OPERATIONS l l ACTIONS TO RE3Fv..] TO LOSS OF CORE COOLING AT MID-LOOP SHOULD BE IMPROVED. l e DIRECT CAUSE 1 THE " LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL" PROCEDURE SHOULD PROVIDE IMPROVED GUIDANCE FOR A LOSP CONDITION. e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES THE " LOSS OF RHR" PROCEDURES ARE TOO NARROWLY FOCUSED FOR MODE 5 & 6 CONDITIONS. DIRECTIONS FROM THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WERE NOT ALWAYS EXPLICIT. 9
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- NORMAL 36 MONTH OVERHAUL AND INSPECTION i
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16 lh 3/20 EVENT IN OVERHAUL f 5 STARTS, TROUBLESHOOTING SENSOR CALIBRATION
-4 LOGIC TESTING E-RUN BUBBLE TESTING MULTIPLE STARTS (14)
UV RUN TEST ; 6 MONTH RUN SURVEILLANCE DIESEL OPERABLE UV RuN TeSr SENSOR CALIBRATION LOGIC TESTING <r-E-RUN BUBBLE TESTING LUBE OIL DCP RUN MULTIPLE STARTS (5) DCP UV RUN FUNCTIONAL UV RUN TEST 6 MONTH SURVEILLANCE , DIESEL OPERABLE HI JACKET WATER RUNS (3) DCP UV RUN TEST 18 SUCCESSFUL STARTS 19 SUCCESSFUL STARTS 10
l
.. l QUARANTINE COPPONENTS TEMERATURE SWITCHES e 1A PROBABLE IRIP CAUSE JACKET WATER IEMPERATURE (2/3 LOGIC) 1 INTERMITTENT f 1 POST CALIBRATION LOW (186*F & VENTING) !
e 1A OTHER TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 1 LUBE 0!L IEMPERATURE (SLUGGISH) l l e 1B TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS f i II JACKET WATER IEMP (VENTING) 2 LUBE OIL TEMP (VENTING 8 CALIE.) PRESSURE SWITCES e 1A l 1 LUBE OIL PRESSURE (IRIPPED) ! l 2 LUBE OIL PRESSURE (CONSERVAT!YELY REPLACED) e IB 2 Losic (wouLD NOT TRIP ENGINE) 4 11 I l
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- e UNIT 2 TRIP UNIT 2 RAT B TRIP / PRIMARY DIFFERENTIAL IRIP t
TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSE PROPER 4 e CAUSE DIFFERENTIAL RELAY CT SET 3000/5 VICE 2000/5
- 1
! e CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l IEST THE REMAINING RELAYS ON UNIT 2 I UPDATE SWITCHYARD DRAWINGS BASED ON AUDIT CLARIFY EXISTING POLICIES FOR SWITCHYARD I 12
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' $ Eor"[:Une w e w ooeresoes a ELV-01516 2, 0011 l Docket No. 50-424 1, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coenission i Region II
- 10., Marietta Street, N. W.
! Atlanta, GA 30323 l ATTN: Mr. 5. D. Ebneter i l
Dear Mr. Ebneter:
V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT i CONFIRMAT10R OF ACTION LETTER I On March 20, 1990, a sit's area emergency was declared due to a loss of offsite i Anver concurrent with a loss of ons' te emergency diesel generator capability.
- rollowing the event, GPC received a Confirination of Action Letter dated March 23, 1990 concerning certain actions we were taking. We have reviewed the March 20th event and the a propriate corrective actions necessary for entry into Mode 2 have been accomplis mi. Therefore, we are requesting approval to return Unit I to Mode 2 and subsequent power operation. The following discussion
! provides justification for this request. 4
- In accordance with Yogtle Electric Generating Plant procedures, an event review
- team has investigated the events leading up to and following the site area
- emergency. The event review team has presented the results of it's review to .
j management and those recommendations considered important for continued safe j plant operation have been implemented. These include establishment of a
- management policy en centrol and operation of vehicles (see attsched letter from j George Bockhold to site personnel); upgrading of emergency nott(1 cation network j
communications (see attached letter from George Bockhold to Emergency Ofrectors ' and Communicaters ; retesting and calibration of both Unit 1 emergency diesel generator contesi) systems; temporary barricades to prevent unnecessary entry 1 into low voltage switchyard areas; and communications of immediate corrective actions related to operations to licensed operator . I i in addition, the event review team report also contains a number of longer-tern l recosmondations which require additional management review and evaluation. 5 These include the sequencing of outage activities; plant conditions during emergency mid-loop notificationoperations; post-maintenance system upgrades; changing diesel diesel generatorfunctional testing; logic; and contro j re-evaluating the duties and responsibilities of the Emergency Director. I.
i 1 i n?48 P03 T cPo- D '90 06:06 !D:5CNC,PCC-VCGTLE TEL NC:1-205-sr'-7985 j . I^
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! U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j Region !!
i ELV-01516
. Paan Two The most significant occurrence during the event of March 20, 1990, involved the failure of Diesel Generator (DG) 1A to remain running to support shutdown cooling. Georgia Power Company, utilizing utility and vendor technical experts i
has investigated the DG failure and has determined the following:
! a. During bench testing, all three jacket water temperature switches wet ;
found to be set higi during the OG maintenance inspection in early March
; . All three were
- 1990 (by approximately 6-10 degrees F above the setpoint)have differed from adjusted downward using a calibration technique that say t that previously used.
f h. Following the March 20 event, all three switches were again bench tested. 4 Switch TS 19110 was found to have a setpoint of 197 cogrees F which was l approximately 6 degrees F below its previous setting. Switch TS 19111 was l, found to have a setpoint of 1 H degrees F which was approximately the same
- as the original setting. Switch TS 19111 was found to have a setpoint of 186 degrees F which was approximately 17 degrees F below the previous l' setting and was readjusted. Switch TS 19111 also had a small leak which l
was judped to be acceptable to support diagnostic engine tests and was i reinsta led.
- c. During the subsequent test run of the 06 on March 30, one of the switches l
4 (TS 19111) tripped and would not reset. This appeared to be an This switch and the intemittent failure because it subsequently reset. were replaced with new switches. All subsequent leaking testing has been conducte with no additional problems. switch (TS 19112)d
- d. The Unit 1 jacket water temperature switches have been recalibrated with the manufacturer's assistance to ensure a consistent calibration technique.
1 i e. Subsequent testing indicated that the diesel annunicator indication of March 20, 1990 is reproduced on a high jacket water temperature trip. l ! f. A test of the jacket water system temperature transient during engine starts was conducted. The purpose of this test was to detemspe the actual Jacket water temperatum at the switch locations with the engine in a 4 normal standby lineup, and then followed by a series of starts without air i rolling the engine to replicate the starts of March 20. The test showed l that jacket water temperature at the switch location decreased from a
- standby temperature of 163 degrees F to approximately 154 degrees F and remained steady.
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- crJ tscos. Sirce Marcti 20, tM 1.1 % nas :Hivn started 18 times, a9c in; 15 OG nos coen started 19 times 'to f ailures or proolens inve occ ured duri99 any of these starts. H 4:di:' cn , ar. uNe*vC
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a v gn state of ctesel reliability. e
- 1. Operators are being trained prior to their .est snt(t to enss e : at t ey urderstand that an emergency reset wil" override tre P.195 facket aater tempera tt.r e tr's. Alarm rescense preced res will be <e,' ad *. a: 'en s emerge :y reset functions petor to A:r'1 30, 1990.
d a-
- 2. The andervoltage start feature of tre .rtt . OGs nas :een ecci te: 345 -
the non-essential engine trips are bypassed. Howeve , a'ae,s are . provided to nform the operaters of off ncnnai cor. cit *ons. ,iM s : ar.;e will be implementec on ',, nit 2 prior to April 30, 1990.
- 3. GPC 's evaluating the possibiittf of a design enange 3rd 'ecrM :0 -
Soec'.fication change to delete the jatset water ntgn emocritt. s :; . m ent'ai engine trip.
.~
$PC has reylemed air quality of the 9/G air system incisdir.g 1evooint
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control ant has ceneleded that air quality is satisfactory. H t'a' of higher than expected dewcoints were later attributed to 'aC ty a'< Instruwntion. This was co,'irred oy internal 'aspec.a cn of cra receiver on Apr'i 6, 1990, the perioai: replacement of tre c:nt:; a'r - c1
'itters last cone in Maren, ;990 unic.r >nowed no incica: f cn o' csere.*
aily air recet eer blowcovns witn no signi(':act water c'sc?arge. a Sa>ed vri t * > u a > , t on - .9 :tc 9Re - 4t'ar.'e !- acrt v. .st,. - 5 fin sh reviewieg tro act e.* ew aiv s s ; . a ,, .::ve , a . ss- .. t ransmit a sorrary anc scner. lo et e act':r. am . .: to i ne-tttC by '4ay ;5. 1950. ins a:ritistrat- a p ;. 3ca 4: ne: ' vebteles in the perimeter tres a';' 4.,, og sei ,6 . N y M
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@c-12 '90 06:06 !D t EOtCPC::-vCGTLE TEL NC: 1 .22*
b* ja,,y 4& e re.d* ' r.i'7 'Ic j GeorgiaPower d I L i U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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- g. Since March 20, 1990, GPC has perfonned numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), extensive logic testing, special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple e ine starts and runs under various conditions. Since March 20, the 1A DS been started 18 times, and the l
l 4" r 0 15 DE has been started 19 times. No failures or problems have occurred
- during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage start test
' without air roll was conducted on April 6,1990 and the 1A D/G started and loaded properly. j j Based on the above facts, we have concluded that the jacket water hi@ temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on Mard 20, 1 1990. 1 In addition, the following actions have been or are tM ng implemented to ensure l a high state of diesel reliability. l 1. Operators are being trained prior to their next shift to ensure that they l understand that an emergency reset will override the high jacket water i temperature trip. Alarm response procedures will be revised to address I emergency reset functions prior to April 30, 1990. l 2. The undervoltage start feature of the Unit 1 DGs has been modified such that the non-essential etyine trips are bypassed. However, alarms are still ! provided to infons t w operators of off normal conditions. (This change j will be implemented on Unit 2 prior to April 30,1990.)
- 3. GPC is evaluating the possibility of a design change and Technical
- Specification change to delete the jacket water high temperature trip as an
- essential engine trip.
4. Int nitial reports of ints were later attributed to faulty - instrumention. is was confirmed by internal inspection of one air ph4 receiver on April 6,1990, the periodic replacement of the contal air filter; last done in March, IMO which showed no indication of corrosion and
- daily air receiver bloudowns with no significant water discharge.
l S. Based on discussions with the NRC in Atlante on April 9,1990, GPC will finish reviewing the event review team's long ters recensendations and will transait a suemary and schedule of the actions taken or to be taken to the NRC by May 15, 1990. The adeinistrative procedures that specify control of vehicles in the perimeter area will also be revised by May 15. t j
. , - - ~ ,
TEL 'C:1;225-9" '9ei '740 805 0 f see-12
- 90 26:2'7 l0:5CNCPCC-vCGT.E i
- GeorgiaPcmer A I U. 3. Nuclear Regulatory c0egal3310n i
Region !! ELV-01516 Paam Four
- 6. GPC W111 continue to work with the Ili and an independent lab to evaluate
. the instruments currently under quarantine. Upon completion of the the lab test, calibration procedures will be revised as necessary to ensure consistent performance. Completion of these investigations, reviews, tests and corrective actions justify GPC's determination that the DG's are operable. GPC will continue to ! work with the Transamerica DeLaval Incor> orated owners Group to improve DG reliability. GPC will also review possisie improvements to protective
- instrumentation and controls.
Based on the above discussion, we have completed the appropriate corrective actions necessary to safely operate the unit. We request NRC approval to alltu Unit I to return to operation. 4 Should you have say questions, pieise inquire. Sincerely, g),k. !!==-?M l W. G. Hairston, III i 1 l W6H,I!!/NJs/gm Attachment i xc: Geornia Power C - any
! Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
Mr. R. M. Odos Mr. P. D. Rushton NDRMS U. S. Nuclear 8- latarv c-intian Document Control )esk Mr. T. A. Reed L Mr.R.F.Aielio,icensingProjectManager,NRRSenior Resioent Inspector, Vogtle
MA-20 '92 12:28 l0:5CNCPCC-vcGT: E TE! T: 1-225-9"' "999 ac t? 202 f I l
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"" April 19, 1990 ;
7 5
; ELV-01545 0342 )
Docket No. 50-424 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Countssion ATTN Document Control Desk l Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen: WGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LOSS OF 0FF11TE POWER' LEADS To SITE AREA EMERGtNCY In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power company hereby submits the enclosed report related to an event which occurred on March 20, 1990. Sincerely,
,J.,b. k ? - R W. G. Hairston, III WGH.III/NJS/gm
Enclosure:
LER 50-424/1990-006 xc: saarein Power e - anv
' Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. G. Beckhold, Jr. ' Mr. R. M. Odoe Mr. P. D. Rushton NORMS U. S. u,laar Reaulatory r-1stian Mr. 5. 1). Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR !
Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle l r ! I i
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= ,,,.. = 7 910 On 3-20-90, Unit I was in a refueling outage and Unit I was operating at 1005 l i
power. At 0820 CST, the driver of a fuel truck in the switchyard backed into ; i a support for the phase 'C' insulator for the Unit 1 Reserve Auxiliary l RAT) IA. The insulator and line fell causing a phase to ground l Transformer fault. Both (Unit 1 RAT 1A and Unft i RAT tt High Side and Low side b n akers < s ! tripped, causin on (LOSP).A and Unit i DG2B started, but 061A Unit 1 Diesel Generatur (DG) L g a loss of offsite power condit med, causing tri a loss of residual heat renoval (RNR) to the reactor core since t se Unit 1 Train B RAT and
- DG were out of service for maintenance. A site Area Emergency ($AE) was
- declared and the site Energency Plan was implemented. The Reactor Coolant
,i System heated up to 134 degrees F from 90 degree F before the DG was emergency started at 0856 CST and RHR was restored. The initial notifications were not sade within the required 15 minutes due to the loss of power to the Emerpency i
. .At 0915 CST, the SAE was downgraded to an A ert l
NotificationNetwork(ENN)tored. after onsite power was res i The direct cause of this series of events was a cognitive personnel error. The i truck driver failed to use proper backing procedures and hit a suport, causing : i the phase to ground fault and LOSP. The most probable cause of tte DGIA trip was the intomittent actuation of the OG jacket water temperature switches. Corrective actions include strengthening policies for control of vehicles, I
' e,.xtensive
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wese l% - - - VEGP - UNIT 1 e to f e lo te l 4 21 g4 9g0 __ 0l0 16 ) go 02 op 0p 4 l w .r a m== aar a.-manw em ,I A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This event is reportable por: a) 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), because an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the ESF ' Actuation System Sequencer started, and b) Technical Specification 4.8.1.2.3, because a valid diesel generator failure occurred. Additionally, l this report serves as a summary of the Site Area Emergency event. i B. UNIT STATU$ AT TIME OF EVENT Unit I was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0% rated thermal power. The reactorThe had ! l 4 i been shut down since 2-23-90 for a 45 day scheduled refueling outage. i reactor core reload had been completed, the initial tensioning of the reactor vessel head studs was complete, and the outage team was awaiting Reactor ! permission from the control room to begin the final tensioninfl. level was i l l Coolant Residual Heat Remova System (RCS)l (RHR)being maintained at approx temperature of the RCS was i ' 90 degrees F. i Due to the refueling outage maintenance activities in progress, some l
- l equipment was out of service and several systems were in abnormalwas out of ser configurations. The Train 8 Diesel Generator (0618)in 8 Reserve Auxiliary 1
a required 35 month maintenance inspection. The Tra , Transformer (RAT 18) had been removed from service for an etl change 1BA03, was being powered from the i The Train B Class 1E 4160 Train A RAT 1A through its alternate suppVolt switchgearly breaker. All non-1E switchgear l by backfeeding ! was being powered from the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT)had been from the switchyard. All Steam Generator (5/6) neazle dans i removed, but only 5/G's 1 and 4 had their primary manways secured. Maintenance personnel were in the process of restoring the primary manways RC5 level was being maintained at mid-loop for valve ! on 5/G's 2 and 3. In addition, the pressurizer - repairs and the $/8 manway 7estorations. manway was removed to provide an RCS vent path. C. DESCRIPTION OF DENT on March 20, 1990, at approximately 0817 CST, a truck driver with a security escort entered the protected area in a fuel truck. Al not a member of - any employee the plant operating staff, the driver was a Geortlta Power belonging to a service group used to perfom varLous plant services. The driver checked the welding machine that was in the area and found that it did not need fuel. He returned to the fuel truck and was in the process of i backing out of the area when he hit a support holding the phase "C" insulator for RAT 1A. The insulator and line fell causing a phase to ground fault, and the transfomer breakers tripped. i _. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ __ . ._
c.PG-2C '90 12:40 lC 5CNCPCC-vCG LE TEL NC: 1-205-97~'-7985 a912 PC5 W a a m eaa w ,es misesa . , , , , .
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At 0820 CST, both Unit 1 RAT 1A and the Unit 2 RAT 28 High Side and Low $1de breakers tripped causing a loss of offsite power condition (LOSP) to the the Unit 2 Train B Class 1E Unit 1 Trainand Bus 2BA03 A Class the 4801Evolt 4160busses volt supplied Bus IAA02,by 1AA02 and 28A03. The Unit 1 Train B Class 1E 4160 volt bus 18A03 also lost power since RAT 1A was feeding both Trains of Class IE 4160 volt busses. The loss of power caused the associated ESF Actuation System sequencers to send a start signal to one Unit I and one Unit 2 Diesel Generators. OGIA and DG28 started and i sequenced the loads to their respective busses. Further description of the l Unit 2 response to this event is provided in LER 50-425/1990-002. One minute and twenty seconds after DGIA started and secuenced the loads to the Class 1E bus, the engine tripped. ThisagaincausecanundervoltakeThe UV sign (UV) condition to class IE bus 1AA02. at the sequencer. However, since DG1A was c.oasting down from the trip, the shutdown logic did not allow the DG fuel racks or starting air solenoids to open and start the engine. This properly caused the engine starting logic l to lock up, a condition that existed until the UV signa was reset. For i 1 this reason, DGIA did not automatically re-start after it tripped. i After the tri), operators were dispatched to the engine control panel to , ! investigate tte cause of the trip. According to the operator, several annunciators were lit. The operator briefly reviewed several instrument read-outs and detected no immediate problem. In order to restore emergency power, the operator reset the annunciators without delaying to evaluate or record the annunciators that were present. During this time, a shift i and a Plant Equipment operator (PE0) went to the sequencer ! Supervisor (55)ineifanyproblemswere1resentonthe1Asequencer. The SS i panel to determ l pushed the UV reset button, then reset t w sequencer by doenergizing and energizing the power supply to the sequencer. This caused the DG air start ! solenoid to energite for another 5 seconds which caused the engine to start. This happened Ig minutes after the DG tripped the first time. The engine i started and the sequencer sequenced the available loads as designed. After l 1 1 minute and 10 seconds, the breaker and the engine tripped a second time.
- It did not automatically re-start due to the starting logic being blocked as described above. By this time, operators, a maintenance foreman and the diesel generator vendor representative were in the 06 room. The initial report was that the jacket water pressure trip was the cause of the trip.
This report was discounted because the maintenance foreman and vendor l representative observed that the jacket water pressure at the gauge was j
- about 12-13 PSIG. The trip setpoint is 4 PSIG end the alars setpoint is 8 PSIG. Also, the control room observed a lobe oil sensor malfunction alars.
4
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~ ~ *"Y1fIe E In'uYe Ia*fIer the second DGIA trip, DGIA was started from the engine i
control panel using the emergency start breakglass button. The engine 5 started and loads were manually loaded. When the DG is started in the } emergency mode, all the trips except four are bypassed. However, all alarms j will be annunciated. During the emergency run, no trip alarms were noticed i by the personnel either at the control room or at the engine control oanel. l The only alarms noted by the control room operator assigned for DG operation were lube oil pressure sensor malfunction and fuel oil level high/ low alarm,
! neither of which would have tripped the diesel.
At 1040 C$T, RAT 18 was energized to supply power to 4160 volt bus IsAo3. l DGIA supplied power to 4140 volt bus 1AA02 untti 1157 CST, at which time bus
- i. 1AA02 was tied to RAT 18.
!' A $lte Area Emergency was declared at 0840 CST, due to a less of all offsite and onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes. The Emergency Director signed the notification fore used to infom offsite government i agencies of the emervency at 0848 CST. The shift clerk attempted to i l initiate offsite not' fication utilizing the primary Etel in the control roon l
- but found it inoperable due to loss of power. The shift clerk then went to l l
the back-up ENN and initiated notification after roll call on this system at l l 0857 CST. Due to the loss of power w l Notification Network (ENN) inoperable,hich and some mis-coemunication, rendered tie the primary El l initial notification was not received by all agencies until 0g35 CST. l l The Emergency Director instructed personnel to complete various tasks for l restoring containment and RCS integrity. All work was accomplished and maintenancs personnel exited conta neont by 1050 CST. i I The SAE was downgreded to an Alert Emergency at 0915 C5T after restoration 1 of core cooling and one train of electr' cal power. By 1800 CST, plant - conditions had stabilized with both trains of electrical power being
- supplied from en offsite source (RAT 15). After discussions with the NRC and local government egencies, the emergency was terminated at 1t47 CST and l
all agencies were notified by 1256 CST. l D. CAWE OF EVENT i Direct Cause: i 1. The direct cause of the loss of offsite class IE AC power was the fuel l truck hitting a pole supporting a 130kV line for RAT 1A. This was a j cognitive personnel error on the part of the truck driver. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location that directly ' contributed to this personnel error. l
- 2. The direct cause of the loss of onsite Class 1E AC power, was the failure
- of the operable 06, 061A, to start and load the LO$P loads on buss 1AA02.
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UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) . 1 TEXT CONTINUATION l = me==. sein. ! ., . . . , .e. .
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YEGP - UNIT 1 w 0 18 4 o ls io io le l4 :2 1 4 9p - 00$ 1 Op 015 l a ... i , ww .
- 3. The direct cause of the failure of the primary ENN system The in the primary ;
i control room was the loss of electrical power to Unit 1. ! i ENN in the control room is powered from Unit ! Class IE AC power. ) j Therefore, when Unit I lost Class IE AC electrical power, the primary i ENN in the control room did not work. l' Root Cause: f l l 1. The truck driver met all current site training and qualification ' ' requirements, including holding a Class 2 Georgia driver's license. However, site safety rules, which require a flagman for backing vehicles when viewing is impaired, were violated.
- 2. The root cause for the failure of DGIA has not been conclusively determined.
There is no record of the trips that were annunciated l after the first trip because the annunciators were reset before the i condition was fully evaluated. Therefore, the cause of the first trip l can only be postulated, but it was most likely the same as that which caused the second trip. The second trip occurred at the end of the timed sequence of the group 2 block logic. This logic allows the TheDG to block achieve operating conditions before the trips become active. The logic timed out and the trip occurred at about 70 seconds. i annunciators observed at the second trip included jacket water high j In conducting an investigation, temperature along with other trips.the trip conditions that were obse couldbeduplicatedbyventing2outof3p'acketwatertemperature he simulation duplicated l sensors, simulating a tripped condition. l both the annunciators and the 70 sec. trip time. The most likely cause of the OG trips was intermittent actuation of the jacket water l temperature switches, i Fe11owing the 3-10-90 event, all three jacket water temperature i were bench tested. t switches, switch TS-19110 which all tohave was found have aasetpoint design of 197 setpoint ofwhich
$witc 200*F. degre was approximately 6 deprm oelow its previous se'afag.
- save a setpoint of 199 degrees F, which was T5-1911) was found to Switch TS-19112 was
! approximately.the same as the original setting.found Switch to have a s
- degrees F below the previous setting and was re-adjusted.
TS-19112 also had a small leak whic5 was judged to be ecceptable to l support diagnostic engine tests and was reinstalled. The switches were l .' recalibrated with the manufacturer's assistance to ensure a consistent calibration technique.
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APR-22 'I'0 .2: 4 l0:5CNCP00 CG*LE *EL .0 1-225-67 7995 a912 POS T l 1 a mesma *=*, e ,,, ,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ! , g e uama eanaae.seene
""'" ""=*HIE.E UCEN88E EVENT REPORT (LER) . TEXT CONTINUAtl0N
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VEGP - UNIT 1 05 { O p 16 - 010 016 or o la le le le l4 l2 l4 9l0 ne w -. . e w am m m I Durini the subsequent test run of the DG on 3-30-90, one of the switcses (TS-19111) tripped and would not reset. This appeared to be j an intermittent failure Mcause it subsequently mechanically reset. )' This switch and the leaking switch (TS-19112) were replaced with new switches. All subsequent testing was conducted with no additional problems. ! A test of the jacket water system temperature transient during engine i starts was conducted. The purpose of this test was to detemine the actual jacket water temperature at the switch locations with the engine in a normal standby lineup, and then followed by a series of starts The l - without air rolling the engine to replicate the starts of 3-20-90. test showed that jacket water temperature at the switch location decreased from a standby temperature of 163 degrees F to approximately 156 degrees F and remained steady. l d ^ f Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs 4 were performed under various conditions. After the 3-20-90 event, the control systems of both engines have been subjected to a comprehensive t, test program. Subsequent to this test program, DGIA and DG1B have been Q started at least 18 times each and no failures or problems have
/W occurred durini any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage k start test wit 30ut air roll was conducted on 4-6-90 and DGIA started and loaded properly.
Based on the above facts, it is concluded that the jacket water high . temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on 3-20-90. E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT The loss of offsite power to Class 1E bus 18A03 and the failure of DGIA to start and operate successfully, coupled with 0G18 and RAT 18 being out of service for maintenance, resulted in Unit 1 being without AC power to both class IE busses. With both Class 1E busses doenergized, the RHR System could not perfo m its required safety function, lased on a noted rate of rise in the RCS tosperature of 46 degrees F in 36 minutues, the RC5 water would not have been expected to begin boiling untti approximately 1 hour and 36 minutes after the beginning of the event. Restoration of RHR and closure of the containment equiposet hatch were completed well within the estimated I hour and 36 minutes for the projected onset of boiling in the RC5. A review of information obtained from the Process and Eff. vent. Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS)is event, noand gra analysis indicated all: normal values. As a result of th increase in radioactive releases to either the containment or the environment occurred.
j G R-22 *90 12:44 ID:SONCPCC-vCGTLE TEL NC:1-205-9"-?685 u912 P29._.. _J _ q *a'ga*** j ,
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n, _ _ . _ _ VESP - ON!T 1 o Is le te le f 12,4 9,0 _ Opg 6 _ 0,0 0 ;7 or op i avu . mmnase aa.wim i Additiona'l systems were either available or could have been made available l to ensure the continued safe operation of the plant: j
- 1. The maintenance on RAT 18 was comp?oted and the RAT was returned to 1 service approximately 2 hours into the event.
j
- 2. Offsite power was available to non-1E equipment through the generator i step-up transformers which were being used to 'back-feed
- the Unit and supply the non-1E busses. Provided Auxiliary that the phase to ground fau was cleared Class IE busses IAA02 and Transformers (UAT)lt
! i. 18A03 could have been powered by feeding through non-lE bus INA01. t
- 3. The Refue11pg Water Storage Tank could have been used to manually l establish gravity feed to the RC5 to maintain a supply of cooling water i
to the reactor. Consequently, neither plant safety nor the health and safety of the public was adversely affected by this event. A more detailed assessment of this l j event and an assessment of the event had it occurred under more severe circumstances will be performed and included in a supplemental LER. F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS t
- 1. A management policy on control and operation of vehicles has been established.
l
- 2. Temporary barricades have been erected with signs which direct autwrization for centrol of switchyard traffic to the 55.
4 diesel start and trip logic has been l 3. The Loss of Offsite power (Lo$P)tomatic ' emergency
- start will occur modified on Unit I so that an au upon LOSP. Therefore, non-essential diesel engine trips are blocked upon LOSP. The Unit 1 DG's will be modified by 4-30-90.
j 1
- 4. The 061A test frequency was increased to three times per week until 4-10-90 when the test frequency will be changed to esce every 7 days in i accordance with Technical Specification Table 4.5-1. This frecuercy i
will be continued until 7 consecutive valid tests are completec with no Including the more than one valid failure in the last 20 valid tests. two valid failures of this event, there have been a total of four valid failures in 69 valid tests of OGIA as of 1157 C$f on 3-10-90. i j
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UCENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI
- TEXT CONTINUAT90N
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men . 3E55BERT. , 1 i " ~ " ' .i.i.i.i.i 4ei op _ o-p is oio ois .o is l In addition,
- 5. Tha defective DG temperature switches have been replaced.
1 i Teliability of this type of temperature switch under vario This program is designed to aid in determining the failure mode of the i .tuspect switches. i
- 6. A back-up ENN systes powered from the AT&T system,aswhich been reviously es1sted and was operational for South Carolina agencies, Instructions have 1 estended to include Georgia local and state agencies.
) bean given to Emergency Directors and Ceamunicators concerning use of ! the energency communication systems. j 4 7. Further corrective actions will be addressed in a supplemental LER. 1 1
- 6. AD0!TIONAL INF0ftMAT!0N j 2 d 1. Failed Components:
Jacket Wster High Temperature Switches manufactured by California l Controls Company. 1, Model #A-3500-W3
- 2. Prevleus similar Events:
' None i
- 3. Energy Industry Identification Systes Code:
I Reacter Coolant System - AB { Residual Heat Removal Systes - B i Olesel Generator Lebe 011 Systes - LA 1 Diesel Generator Starting Air Systes - LC Diesel Generator Coeling Water System - L5 s y system - EK < Olesel Generator Power su Safety Injection System - 13.8 kV Power System - EA 1460 volt non-1E power system - EA
- 1460 volt Class IE power systes - E8 Chemical and Volume Control Systes - C8
. Containment Building - NH 480 volt Class IE Power System - ED Engineered Safety Features Actuation System - JE Radietten Monitoring System - IL l
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