ML20128G880
| ML20128G880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128G774 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-96-14, NUDOCS 9610090157 | |
| Download: ML20128G880 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1996014
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l ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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Docket No.: 50-458
License No. NPF-47
Report No.: 50-458/96-014
- Licensee
- Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI)
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Facility: River Bend Station
Location: P.O. Box 220
l St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
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Dates: August 11 through September 21,1996
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Inspectors: W. F. Smith, Senior Resident inspector
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D. L. Proulx, Resident inspector
Approved By: P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
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ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1: Supplemental inf ormation
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9610090157 961007
PDR ADOCK 05000458
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
River Bend Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-014
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and
j plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations
Throughout this inspection period, the plant was operated and maintained in a
professional manner with a proper focus on safety (Section 01.1).
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During walkdown inspections, the inspectors found the Low Pressur; Core Spray
and Low Pressure Coolant injection Train A systems in good materiz,1 condition and ,
properly configured for standby operation, as required by the Technical l
Specifications (TS). Plant housekeeping continued to be excellent (Section 02.1).
Although the inspectors observed only one operator crew conducting simulator I
training during this inspection period, it was evident that the licensee increased
training and provided more oversight to ensure successful and appropriate operator
training. The training was well structured and the subsequent critique was
constructive and self-critical. Additional attention to communications is needed
," (Section 05.1).
i Maintenance
Maintenance activities observed during this inspection period reflected the
licensee's efforts to improve the processes and worker performance. The quality of
maintenance action item (MAI) work packages were improved. The maintenance
y technicians demonstrated good ownership of their assigned tasks in that they were
self-checking, keeping their work areas neat and orderly, signing off documentation
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appropriately, and following procedures (Section M1.1).
All surveillance tests observed were performed properly and in accordance with the
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applicable procedures. Self-checking was evident as the test performers
manipulated valves and switches. The licensee's efforts to reduce personnel errors
appeared to be making progress in surveillance program performance during this
inspection period (Section M1.2).
A noncited violation (NCV) was identified for a missed localleak rate surveillance
test for two containment isolation valves. The licensee identified this issue while
implementing corrective action for previous surveillance program problems
documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-026. Ineffective record keeping
during previous refueling outages caused as-lef t leakage being designated as the
as-found value, which resulted in the licensee inappropriately deferring the local leak
rate test of two containment isolation valves (Section M1.3).
The inspectors noted poor performance on the part of the Facility Review
Committee (FRC) and the system engineer in that they did not perform effective
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reviews of the containment leak rate test program procedure prior to implementation
to ensure that the TSs were accurately implemented. (Section M3.1).
Enaineerina
The ventilation system engineers demonstrated a good questioning attitude when
they halted testing and identified the presence of volatile organic compounds that
could have been detrimental to the emergency filtration unit charcoal adsorbers
(Section E2.1).
The engineering operability evaluation of the exposure of the fuel building
emergency filtration unit charcoal adsorber to volatile organic compounds was
flawed in that it took exception to the TS requirement to sample and test the
charcoal adsorbers after chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating
with the system. The appropriate testing was initiated after intervention by licensee
management. This reflected poor performance on the part of the engineers l
(Section E2.1).
The licensee's controls over chemicals that were uniquely detrimental to
safety-related systems, structures, or components required clarifications, as
demonstrated by the uncontrolled release of volatile organic compounds in the fuel
building and the auxiliary building while operating emergency filtration units
containing charcoal filters. The licensee was taking appropriate actions to
strengthen this program (Section E2.1).
Plant Supoort
A violation was identified for f ailure to follow radiation protection procedures. An
individual exhibited poor attention to detail by entering the radiologically controlled
area (RCA) without a functional direct reading dosimeter (DRD). The licensee's
corrective actions for previous violations concerning RCA entries hava not been fully
effective in correcting this problem (Section R1.1).
The licensee identified two personnel errors that caused a weekly security system
test to be incomplete for 1 week. This was an isolated incident and was corrected
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in an appropriate manner. An NCV was identified for f ailure to comply with the
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River Bend Security Plan (Section S1.1).
- Physical security of the facility was adequately maintained during backshift
observat;ons. The security guard manning the Central Alarm Station (CAS) on
Septembe r 11,1996, used poor judgment by reading nonwork-related training
material while on watch (Section S1.2).
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- Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
The plant began this inspection period operating at essentially 100 percent power until
September 13,1996, when power was reduced to 65 percent to facilitate maintenance on
Reactor Feedwater Pumps B and C, change control rod configuration, and perform other
maintenance. Power was restored to 100 percent by September 16. The plant remained
at 100 percent power for the remainder of this inspection period. j
l. Operations
01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations including
control room observations, attendance of the licensee's plan-of-the-day meetings,
and plant tours. In general, the conduct of plant operations was professional and
reflected a focus on safety. The inspectors observed portions of the power
reduction during the weekend of September 13,1996, and noted that it was
performed in a carefully controlled manner.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O 2.1 Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
During routine tours, using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors walked
down accessible portions of the following systems:
- Low Pressure Core Spray
- Low Pressure Coolant injection, Train A
There were no operability concerns identified on either system and the material
condition was good. Housekeeping was excellent with very few minor exceptions
that did not affect system operability or functionality. The shift superintendent took j
prompt action to address the housekeeping items upon notification by the '
inspectors. Selected valves and switches were verified to be in the correct position.
The inspectors identified no substantive concerns as a result of these walkdowns.
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05 Operator Training and Qualification
05.1 Simulator Trainina
a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed operator training on the plant control room simulator to
observe and evaluate training methods used, management oversight, and operator
responses to simulated events,
b. Observations and Findinas
On September 5,1996, during a backshift inspection, the inspectors performed an
unannounced inspection of simulator training conducted for operators. The
inspectors noted that there were 3 instructors and an Operations management
representative present to observe the training. During the course of the evening,
the Director, Quality Assurance also observed portions of the training conducted.
The instructors simulated various scenarios where selected electrical power buses
were lost to demonstrate the annunciator alarm pattern that was expected. The
crew was attentive and found the exercise to be useful. A loss of reactor pressure
vessel level Channel A was simulated. This channel was controlling feedwater and
the level transient caused a turbine trip and reactor scram. The crew responded
appropriately and consulted procedures; however,3-way communications were not
always utilized and, at times, did not appear audible to the intended receiver.
The last scenario was a simulated loss of turbine plant closed cooling water during
power operations. The crew responded appropriately with a manual scram;
however, communications was in need of improvemem. The inspectors attended
the critique that followed the training scenarios and found it to be well structured
and se' mritical.
c. Conclusions
Although only one operator crew was observed conducting simulator training during
this inspection period, it was evident that the licensee increased training and
provided improved oversight to ensure successful and appropriate operator training.
The training was well structured, and the subsequent critique was constructive and
self-critical. Additional attention to communications is needed.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901,92700)
08.1 (Ciosed) Insoection Followup Item (IFI) 50-458/95025-02: Review of licensee's
actior.s for establishing requirements for verification of system status before
performing surveillance testing. The inspectors identified that management did not
provide clear direction for performing system operating procedure lineups prior to
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surveillance tesdng. Tne licensee issued Operations Policy 023, " System Operating
Frocedure Lineup Requirements," Revision O. to provide direction to operators in
performing lineups prior to surveillance testing. The inspectors reviewed Operations
Policy 023 and determined that it provided adequate direction to address the
inspectors' concerns. In addition, the inspectors interviewed several senior reactor J
operators and determined that they were knowledgeable of the new policy.
08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-458/96-006: Misinterpretation of I
containment isolation - shutdown requirements due to inappropriate basis wording.
This issue was discussed in Section 3.3.4 of NRC Inspection Report
50-458/96-002. A violation was identified for failure to implement TS 3.6.1.10.
11. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M 1.1 Maintenance Observations
a. Insoection Scope (62707)
The inspectors r'Merved portions of work and retesting activities covered by the
following compie; asintenance action items:
mal 307243- Overhaul of Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) 5217.
MAI 307244 - Overhaul of HCU 5241.
b. Observations and Findings
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On September 3,1996, the inspectors reviewed the work instructions contained in
MAls 307243 and 307244 and found them to be detailed sufficiently to ensure l
proper conduct of the HCU overhauls. The licensee had previously overhauled
40 HCUs during the refueling outage in January 1996 and incorporated many
lessons learned into the work instructions. The inspectors noted that the
maintenance technicians used good radiological work practices. The work was
done in a contamination zone. The technicians followed the procedw exhibited
good foreign material exclusion techniques, kept signoffs up to date and maintained
the work area clean and well organized. The inspectors verified the torque
wrenches were in current calibration and reviewed the clearance documentation to
ensure the proper boundaries were established. The clearance boundaries were
appropriate to the circumstances.
While working on HCU 5217, the technicians demonstrated a questioning attitude
and conservatism as they attempted to depressurize and disassemble the HCU.
Pressure was trapped in the HCU and could not be removed via the drain valve.
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The mechanical maintenance supervisor and the HCU system engineer were
consulted for assistance, which was particularly important because the plant was
operating at power and the technicians did not know which isolation valve was
leaking. A safe and effective solution was determined and the work proceeded.
The licensee completed postmaintenance testing of the HCUs on September 8, with
satisfactory resr'+s. The inspectors reviewed the test documentation and found
that all acceptance criteria were met.
c. Conclusions
Maintenance activities observed during this inspection period reflected the
licensee's efforts to improve the processes and worker performance. The quality of
MAI work packages were improved. The maintenance technicians demonstrated
good ownership of their assigned tasks in that they were self-checking, keeping
their work areas neat and orderly, signing off documentation appropriately, and
following procedures.
M1.2 Surveillance Observations
4. inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance tests during this
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STP-203-6305 High Pressure Core Spray Quarterly Pump and Valve
Operability Test.
STP-052-3701 Control Rod Scram Testing.
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STP-109-6302 Main Steam isolation Valve Quarterly Partial Stroke
Operability Test.
STP-051-0201 Channel Functional Test of Reactor Protection System
Actuation on Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure.
STP-505-5202 Division 2, Reactor Protection System Contrn! Rod
Block - Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated
Thermal Power - High Calibration.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors found that the surveillance tests listed above were conducted in a
professional, step-by-step manner and in accordance with the applicable
procedures. TS limiting conditions for operation were met and the systems were
restored apnropriately. Measuring and test equipment was verified to have been in
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current calibration. The inspectors reviewed the completed test documentation and I
noted that all acceptance criteria were met. l
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c. Conclusions 1
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All surveillance tests observed were performed properly and in accordance with the
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manipulated valves and switches. The licensee's efforts to reduce personnel errors l
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appeared to be making additional progress in the surveillance program performance
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during this inspection period. I
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! M 1.3 Missed Valve Leak Rate Tests )
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I a. Inspection Scope (92902)
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The inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to Condition Report (CR) i
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96-0319A, which identified that the local leak rate test for containment isolation
j Valves SWP-SOV-522B and -522D, which were tested together, was missed.
j b. Observations and Findinas
On September 10,1996, the licensee discovered that the testing interval for the
local leak rate test of Valves SWP-SOV-522B and -522D was inappropriately
extended from 2 to 5 years. The licensee's performance based containment leak
rate test program allowed the testing interval to be increased from 2 to 5 years, if
two consecutive as-found leak rate tests were satisfactory.
Valves SWP-SOV-522B and -522D had a satisf actory as-found leak rate test during
refueling outage (RFO) 4. During RFO 5, Valves SWP-SOV-522B and -522D f ailed
their as-found leak rate test and the licensee repaired the valves. The as-left leak
rate test for Valves SWP-SOV-5228 and -522D performed during RFO 5 was
satisf actory. When developing the local leak rate test schedules for RFO 6, the
engineers did not perform an adequate review of the localleak rate test results
obtained in RFO 4 and 5. Consequently, the as-left leak rate measured in RFO E,
was designated as the as-found value; therefore, the licensee did not perform local I
leak rate testing of these valves during RFO 6. The licensee noted that the loca!
leak rate test records kept during RFO 4 and 5 did not clearly differentiate between
as-found and as-left testing.
The licensee performed a local leak rate test of Valves SWP-SOV-522B and -522D
on September 11. The results were satisf actory. The system engineer performed
an operability assessment and determined that although the testing interval was
inappropriately extended, the valves could have met their intended safety function. I
The inspectors noted that NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-026also discussed a
missed surveillance because of inappropriately deferring a localleak rate test due to
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designating the as-left leak rate as the as-found value. The licensee identified the
missed surveillance of Valves SWP-SOV-5228 and -522D during a review of the
performance-based leak rate test program as corrective action for the missed leak
rate test discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-026. Failure to perform
the local leak rate test of Valves SWP-SOV-522B and -522D during RFO 6 is a
violation of TS 3.0.2. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being
treated as an NCV, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Specifically, the violation was identified by the licensee, was not willful, actions
taken as a result of a previous violation should not have corrected this problem, and
appropriate corrective actions were being or had been completed by the licensee
(50-458/96014-01),
c. Conclusions
An NCV was identified for a missed localleak rate surveillance test for two
containment isolation valves. The licensee identified this issue as part of the
corrective action for previous surveillance program problems documented in NRC
Inspection Report 50-458/96-026. Ineffective record keeping during previous
refueling outages led to incorrect designation of the as-lef t leak rate as the as-found
value.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
M 3.1 Review of Containment Leak Rate Testina Proaram Procedure
a. Inspection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure ADM-0050, " Primary
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program," Revision 4, to determine the
effectiveness of the licensee's process and to ascertain compliance with the TS.
b. Observations and Findinas
Procedure ADM-0050 implemented the requirements of TS 5.5.13 for a
performance-based containment leak rate program. This procedure specified the
administrative limits for each of the containment penetrations as well as the
frequencies. The normal frequency for testing each valve was 2 years, which could
be increased to 5 years, if two consecutive as-found local leak rate tests were
within the administrative limits of Procedure ADM-0050.
On August 27,1996, the inspector reviewed Procedure ADM-0050 and noted that
it conflicted with the TS. TS 5.5.13 states that the provisions of TS 3.0.2 (which
allows an extension of most surveillance intervals by 25 percent) are not applicable.
However, Step 5.6.3.4 of Procedure ADM-0050 incorrectly stated that test
intervals may be extended by up to 25 percent. The inspector informed the
licensee and 1 CR was written.
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The licensee reviewed all previously completed local leak rate tests under Procedure :
ADM-0050 to determine if any testing frequencies had been inappropriately !
extended. The licensee did not identify any late surveillances. The inspector ,
reviewed the licensee's records and confirmed the licensee's evaluation. The
licensee revised Procedure ADM-0050 to correct the discrepancy.
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l The system engineer developed Procedure ADM-0050 based on the Nuclear Energy ;
institute (NEI) guidance contained in Guideline NEl 94-01 " Industry Guidelines for l
l Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," i
Revision O. Paragraph 10.1 of this industry guidance stated that the frequencies of I
the local leak rate testing under the performance-based containment leak rate test
program could be extended by 25 percent, consistent with the plant's TS. Because l
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the NEl guidance document contained this statement, Step 5.6.3.4 was added to
Procedure ADM-0050, which stated that the test intervals may be increased up to
25 percent. The system engineer did not specifically review the TS to ensure that
Procedure ADM-0050 adequately implemented the TS requirements. In addition,
the inspectors noted that the FRC did not perform an effective review of Revision 4
to Procedure ADM-0050 prior to issuance to ensure that Procedure ADM-0050 was
consistent with the TS.
c. Conclusions
Procedure ADM-0050 allowed for extension of local leak rate testing intervals of up
to 25 percent, which conflicted with TS 5.5.13. This discrepancy did not result in
any missed or late surveillances; however, the FRC and the system engineer did not
perform effective reviews of Revision 4 to Procedure ADM-0050 prior to
implementation to ensure that this procedure was consistent with the TS.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700) l
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-458/96-011: Missed drywell floor drain surveillance. This issue
was discussed in Section 51 of NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-005. A violation
was identified for failure to implement TS 3.4.7.
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111. Enaineerina
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E 2.1 Control of Chemicals
a. Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed CR 96-1597, wherein the licensee identified the presence
of volatile organic compounds while the fuel building charcoal filtration unit
(HVF*FLT2B) was running. The inspectors reviewed the engineering response in
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support of the CR and evaluated the licensee's recently implemented chemical
control program improvements for adequacy to prevent the uncontrolled use of
chemicals that could be detrimental to safety-related systems, structures, or
components.
b. Observations and Findinas
On September 4,1996, while preparing to conduct inservice testing of the fuel
building ventilation filtration system, the system engineers noticed that a compound
containing 35 grams of volatile organic compounds per liter was being used to
repair minor cracks in and around floor and wall penetrations. Being knowledgeable
that volatile organic compounds could be detrimental to the charcoal adsorbers
installed in emergency filtration systems, the engineers halted the test before the
fans were operated.
After initiating CR 96-1597, the engineers researched the potential consequences of
exposing the filtration system to the volatile organic compounds and concluded that
the available quantity was significantly less than the amount that would be released
from the application of 8 gallons of paint. The licensee had previously determined
that exposing emergency filtration systems to the volatile organic compounds
released by 8 gallons of paint would not degrade the charcoal filter efficiency by
more than 0.1 percent.
Although the fuel building emergency filtration system was not operated in the
presence of the volatile organic compounds on September 4, the licensee reviewed
previous dates the compound was used. On August 26, the compound was applied
and Fuel Building Filtration Unit HVF*FLT2B was placed in service during the 16- to
24-hour drying period of the compound. Also, between May 20 and July 15, the
compound was used in the auxiliary building at times when the standby gas ,
treatment filter trains were operated. The engineering evaluation for operability
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written in support of CR 96-1597 stated, in cart, that there was no concern over <
the operability of t F.e filtration units discussed above because the quantity of volatile
organic compounds released and adsorbed by the units was less that the equivalent
of volatile organic compounds released by the application of 8 gallons of paint. The
engineering evaluation also stated that sampling of the charcoal adsorbers was not
required.
The inspectors expressed concern to the Operations and System Engineering ;
Managers that TS 5.5.7 requires, in part, that a laboratory test of the charcoal I
adsorber be obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52. The managers
indicated that they knew that testing of the charcoal adsorbers was required by
TS 5.5.7 regardless of the quantity of volatile organic compounds released while
the fans were running and that they were already taking actions to reverse the
engineering evaluation.
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For immediata corrective action, the licensee commenced obtaining representative
charcoal samples from all six safety-related emergency filtration units, as well as
performing in-place filter and adsorber testing, which complied with the TS. As of
the end of this inspection period, two charcoal adsorbers were sampled and tested
with satisf actory results.
The inspectors questioned what other compounds were on the Approved Chemical
List for use in the power block that could have been uniquely detrimental to
safety-related systems, structures, or components. The inspecters also questioned
l what controls were in place to guard against the effects of volatile organic
compounds and chlorides, for example. In response, the licenses established
specific controls on known compounds that released volatile organic compounds,
chlorides, and sulfates. For the long term, the licensee indicated that the following '
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actions would be taken: (1) search the Approved Chemical List for other harmful
compounds that need special controls, (2) establish single discipline responsibility )
for charcoal adsorber sampling, (3) establish programmatic gu; dance on the 1
threshold for charcoal sampling, (4) revise system operating and abnormal operating !
procedures as appropriate, and (5) reevaluate the adequacy of Procedure RBNP-040,
" Control of Chemicals," Revision 7A.
c. Conclusions
The ventilation system engineers demonstrated a good questioning attitude when J
they halted testing and identified the presence of volatile organic compounds that
could have been detrimental to the emergency filtration unit charcoal adsorbers.
The engineering operability evaluation of the August 26 exposure of the fuel
building emergency filtration unit charcoal filter to volatile organic compounds was
flawed in that it took exception to the TS requirement to sample and test the
charcoal medium after chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with
the system. This reflected poor performance by the engineers. The required testing
was initiated after intervention by licensee management when they became aware
of the flawed evaluation. The licensee obtained the results of the charcoal adsorber
analysis within the time contraints required by TS.
The licensee's controls over chemicals that were uniquely detrimental to
safety-related systems, structures, or components required clarification. This was
demonstrated by the uncontrolled release of volatile organic compounds in the fuel
building and the E.uxiliary building while operating emergency filtration units
containing charcoal filters. The licensee was taking appropriate actions to
strengthen this program,
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E2.2 Review of Facility Conformance to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
Descriptions
A recent discovery of a licensee operating a facility in a manner contrary to the
UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares
plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While
performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the
applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The
inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant
practices, procedures, and/or parameters.
IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R 1.1 Improper Dosimetry Practices
a. Inspection Scone (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in response to CR 96-1606, which
described an improper entry into the RCA.
b. Observations and Findinas
On September 5,1996, a radiation protection technician identified that an individual
entered the RCA without an operable DRD. The individuallogged into the radiation
work permit system and was properly briefed by radiation protection personnel.
The individual then removed his DRD that had been properly logged into the access
control system for use in the RCA and put his DRD back in the rack containing
several DRDs that were not in use. The individual became momentarily distracted,
picked up the wrong DRD, and entered the RCA. This DRD had not been properly
logged into the RCA access control system and was not operable to measure dose
rates and totalintegrated dose. The face of the DRD taken into the RCA read
" Pause" and the individual did not check that the f ace of the DRD read in terms of
dose rate and integrated dose when entering the RCA. A radiation protection
technician exiting the RCA found the energized but unattended DRD at the RCA
access control station and contacted the individual that made the improper RCA
entry. The licensee wrote CR 96-1606 to enter this item into the corrective action
system.
The licensee noted that the individual did not comply with Radiation Section
Procedure RSP-0203, Revision 13, Section 4.6.1, which required DRDs for all RCA
entries. However, the individual received no unmonitored dose and did not exceed
any regulatory limits. The inspectors noted that a violation documented in NRC
inspection Report 60-458/96-03 cited three incidents where personnel entered the
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RCA without DRDs. The licensee's corrective actions for the violation, which were
directed toward improvement of self-checking to prevent recurrences of RCA entries
without proper dosimetry, should have reasonably prevented the improper RCA
entry of September 5. Personnel entering the RCA without a functional DRD
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constitutes a f ailure to follow radiation protection procedure requirements and is a l
violation of TS 5.4.1.a (50-458/96014-02). l
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For corrective actions, the licensee had an accountability session with the individual
involved and removed the DRD storage rack from the log-in area, in addition, ;
radiation protection management planned to contact several other licensees to
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obtain information on how other licensees controlled RCA entries.
c. Conclusions
An individual exhibited poor attention to detail by entering the RCA without a j
functional DRD. A violation was identified for f ailure to follow radiation protection i
procedures. Licensee corrective actions for previous violations concerning RCA j
entries have not been fully effective in correcting this problem, i
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S 1.1 Security System Operational Testina
a. Insoection Scope (71750) l
The inspectors reviewed an incident identified by the licensee in CR 96-1605,
where security system testing was not completed during the required test interval.
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's determination of the causes and the
corrective acticos taken,
b. Observations and Findinas
On September 5,1996, during a routine review of records, security personnel
discovered that, on August 28, the weekly functional tests of 13 intrusion detection
zones and the remote controlled locks on the primary access point turnstiles were
not completed. These tests were to be performed in accordance with Security Test
Instruction STI-301-07-01," Security System Operational Test," Revision 9.
Consequently, the test interval was inadvertently extended by 1 week. The tests
were satisf actorily completed the following week on September 4. The inspectors
reviewed the results of the licensee's actions related to this issue and noted that
the acceptance criteria for each test were met.
The licensee determined that the cause was personnel error. The security officer
performing the test was not the person usually assigned the task and did not realize
that there were two pages to the test. Similar tests performed on other days of the
week were written on single pages. The inspectors noted that the testing
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performed on Wednesday was unique in that both of the two pages had blanks for
comments on the bottom, which implied that the test ended with the first page.
Another contributing cause was failure of the security shift superintendent to review
the completed test.
Corrective actions implemented by the licensee included personnel actions against ,
the security officer and the security shif t superintendent. In addition, Procedure I
STI-301-07-01 was revised to eliminate the misleading comments blank from the !
bottom of the first page of the test instruction for Wednesday to make the l
procedure more consistent and user friendly. The licensee logged the incident in the I
safeguards event log as required by 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix G. l
Failure to complete security system testing is a violation of the River Bend Station
Security Plan and 10 CFR 73.55(g)(2), but is considered an isolated incident that
was corrected in an appropriate manner. This licensee-identified and corrected
violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy. Specifically, the violation was identified by the licensee, was
not willful, actions taken as a result of a previous violation should not have
corrected this problem, and appropriate corrective actions were completed by the
licensee (50 458/96014-03).
c. Conclusions
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The licensee identified two personnel errors that caused a weekly security system l
test to be incomplete for one week. This was an isolate 1 incident and was l
corrected in an appropriate manner. An NCV was identified for f ailure to comply
with the River Bend Security Plan.
S1.2 Backshift Observations
a. Insoection Scope (7175_0_)
The inspectors observed security practices on the backshift to ascertain compliance
with NRC requirements.
b. Observations and Findinas
On September 11,1996, the inspectors observed security practices during
off-normal hours. The inspectors noted that the protected area was properly
illuminated, personnel properly displayed identification badges, and personnel
entering the protected area were properly searched; however, the inspectors noted
that the security guard in the CAS was reading nonwork-related training material (a
college text book) and did not appear to be dedicated to monitoring the protected
area or vital area portals. The security guard in the CAS was reviewing a textbook
in preparation for first-responder qualifications. The inspector informed the security
superintendent, who stated that security force personnel were allowed to review
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work-related training material during their official duties as long as it did not
interfere with their security responsibilities; however, security management stated
that college text books did not constitute work-related material. Further, the
licensee noted that no alarms or challenges to the physical sec.urity of the facility
occurred during this shift. The security superintendent stated that, although no
violations of NRC requirements occurred, the security guard in the CAS used poor
judgment in reading nonwork-related training material during backshift hours.
c. Conclusions
Physical security of the facility was adequately maintained during backshift
observations. The security guard manning the CAS on September 11 used poor
judgment by reading nonwork-related material while on watch.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee managernent at the
conclusion of the inspection on September 26,1996. The licensee acknowledged the
findings presented. l
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORM ATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. P. Dimmette, General Manager, Plant Operations
J. R. Douet, Manager, Maintenance
J. Holmes, Superintendent, Chemistry
H. B. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security
M. A. Krupa, Manager, Operations
T. R. Leonard, Director, Engineering
D. N. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing
J. R. McGaha, Vice President-Operations
W. H. Odell, Suoerintendent, Radiation Control
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551 Onsite Engineering
IP 61726 Surveillance Observations
IP 62707 Maintenance Observation
IP 71707 Plant Operations
IP 71750 Plant Support Activities
IP 92700 Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
IP 92901 Followup - Plant Operations
IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance
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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened
50-458/96014-01 NCV Missed local leak rate test at required surveillance
frequency (Section M1.3)
50-458/96014-02 VIO Failure to enter RCA with proper dosimetry (Section R1.1)
50-458/96014-03 NCV Missed weekly security system functional test
(Section S1.1)
Closed
50-458/95025-02 IFl Verification of system status for surveillance testing
(Section 08.1)
50-458/96014-01 NCV Missed local leak rate test at required surveillance
frequency (Section M1.3) l
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50-458/96014-03 NCV Missed weekly security system functional test
(Section S1.1)
50-458/96-006 LER Misinterpretation of containment integrity - shutdown
(Section 08.2)
50-458/96-011 LER Missed drywell floor drain surveillance (Section M8.1)
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
CAS Central Alarm Station
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report
DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter
EOl Entergy Operations, Incorporated
FRC Facility Review Committee
HCU Hydraulic Control Unit
IFl inspection Followup Item
LER Licensee Event Report
mal Maintenance Action item
NCV Noncited Violation
NEl Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PDR Public Document Room
RCA Radiologically Controlled Area
RFO Refueling Outage
TS Technical Specification
VIO Violation
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analpsis Report
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