ML20125C036
| ML20125C036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1983 |
| From: | Smidth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Davis A, Dougherty D, James Keppler NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20125A606 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-415 NUDOCS 8506110641 | |
| Download: ML20125C036 (4) | |
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February 22, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: J. G. Keppler A. B. Davis D. J. Dougherty 4 . Warnick .
S. Lewis FROM: Pearl T. Smidth, RIII FOIA Coordinator
SUBJECT:
FOIA REQUEST 81-488 - ZIWJ:R Please review the attached draft of a portion of DRR's response to the requester regarding RIII's search for documents requested in December 1981.
Details regarding RIII's involvement begin at the bottom of the second page.
I am satsfied this draft correctly describes our involvement.
Do you concur?
I DRR needs our response by COB today.
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?lrk). k.iclQ 5 U.L The initial Freedss cf Infcrmatica Request was contained in a'l &
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i letter dated Nove cer 23, 1981 frca Thenas Cevine. Associate Oirecter, Governeent Acccuntability Prcject, Institute cf Policy Studies, addressed to Director. Office of Administration. N rclear Regulatcry Commission, Washington, DC 20555. The letter was received by the Division of Rules and Racerds (CRA) on Neverber 33. 1981 and was assigned a Freedom of Inforntion Act (FCIA) ccatrol number 814&E, On that day, a nescrands was sent tc the following: Wilda M llinix, the designated FO!A Cccedinatcr for the Cffice of Inspection and Enfercerent; Matalie Bro.n the designated FCIA Cccrdinatcr fcr the Of fice of Secretary and the Cffice cf the Co r:issicners; Rick Farrish, the designated FC!A Cccrdinatcr fer the Office cf General Ccunsel; and Art schnehelen the designated FCIA Coordinatcr for the Of fice of Inspector and Auditcr. Each of these FOIA Cecrdinatcrs.
I were requested in the reecranda to have their offices search fer records responsive to the request described in the request letter frors Themes Cevine which was attached to the ee crandum.
Ccples of the request were also provided to Jchn C. Carr Chief of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts 8 ranch; Carol Ann Aced, a Freedom of Jnferr.atier. and Privacy Acts Appeal Specialist, who l was assigned respmsibility for coordinating the responses of the several offices. Also inferation copies were previded to the following: D. Doncghve, Director; Office of Adelnistratim; Edward C. Shomaker, Attorney. Cffice of the Czecutive Legal Director; and M the Office of the Executive Director for 0;,arations. 'h>
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\ I /.y Memorandum dated December 9.1981 to John C
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Carr, Chief, freedom '
of Information and privacy Branch from Arthur Schnebelen t
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Auditor, transmitted six (6) documents with a on that the 'reconnend t they be disclosed to the requester and identified other nine (9) documents which they had found in their rfile g nated by but were o i i other NRC offices.
l By memorandum dated December i 10. 1981 from John i C. Carr to Wilda Mu111 nix, four of the documents e y identifi d b t
Mr. Schnebelen's memorandum were Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
v ew by the referred to he
! Two of the documents identified
! by Mr. Schnebelen were identified as being y avaliable made publicl pursuant to another FOIA request (f0!A-81-376) .
The maaining i
three documents identified by Mr. Schnebelen were det .
ermined to be ii
- s the same records located by Natalie Brown in the Offi Secreta ry. ce of the
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s By memorandum dated Decembec
- 11. 1981 to Carol Ann R eed from Natalie Brown three documents were identified o the requestar for disclosur and four documents were identified which were t i
rom public disclosure pursuant to Exemptian 5 of the Freed Act. om of Information !
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a j Wilda N111 nix upon reciept of the. request am Ward, had Willi Investigator, review it.
He determined there were no documents in
! the Headquarters Office of Inspection, and Enforcement except for t
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I 1981 memorandum.
Mr. 5tallo approved the release of these four documents. On December 14,1981 Ms. Mu111 nix checked with Mr. Keppler !
. regarding the release of these four documents, healsoapproved their release. Wilda Mu111 nix then informed Carol Ann Reed that the Office of Inspection.and Enforcement had no objection to the release of the four documents referenced in Mr. John carr's memorandum t
of December 10. 1981. Ms. Reed recognized that one of these four 4
l documents was also subject to FOIA request 81-376 and its appeal 1
81 A-15 With respect to that one document, Mr. William J. Dircks, ,
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Executive Director for Operations, determined on December 30, 1981, !
j that portions of the document needed to be withheld on the basis t
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that release was an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and 1
- would disclose a confidential source. Also transmitted to Ms. Reed l , ,, by Ms. Mullinix were three documents previously.provided to her by j pearl Smidth, i
i i I On December 31, 1981 in partial response to F0!A-81-488, portions '
of two documents and the four documents identified by Ms. Brown for 1 ,
1 withholding were denied. The remaining documents were released.
l 4 DRR maidtains a " form book" which Ms. Reed referred to during the
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, CaG MM MEMORANDUM FOR: Dudley Thompson, Director, Enforcenent and Investigation, IE FRON: James G. Kappler, Director, Ragion III
SUBJECT:
REGION III REVI5i 0F OIA SPECIAL INQUIRY CONCERNING ADEQUACY OF IE INVESTIGATION 50-358/80-09 AT WILLIAM H. ZDOER NUCLEAR POWER STATION At your request, we have reviewed the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA)
Special Inquiry "Re: Adequacy of IE Investigation 50-358/80-0 at the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station" in which OIA con'clude d that "...
the Region III (RIII) investigation effort did not adequately pursue all of the allegations in sufficient depth or breadth and lacked adeqeate documentation." We identified seven critical CIA findings in the sum =ary section of their report which apparently led them to this conclusion. Our review focused on these seven findings and included in-office work and further investigation at the site. For each of the critical findings we
, assessed its correctness and significance and provide a discussion to support our assessment. Our assessment along with some detailed supporting infor=a-
. tion is enclosed. It is our view that some of the CIA findings are fsetual however, none are significant with respect to facility adequacy or public ';
health and safety.
..Before consnencing on the seven critical findings we have a more fundamental problem with what appears te be CIA's basic philosophy regarding II's conduct of investigatibns. CIA suggests that each allegation and each problem found while investigating the allegation should be exhaustively pursued and documented to the degree that would be done in a criminal investigation.
While we are alert to potential criminal violations, it has been our policy to focus on safety and compliance in investigations as well as inspections
. (see 10 CTR Part 1, Section 1.64). As such, our approach has been to pursue an allegation to the point of determining that the health and safety matter of concern to the NRC has been or will be resolved; for example, that a hardware problem was corrected, was in a review process which would lead to its correction, or a process was developed to assure its correction.
Enormous resources would be required for IE to adopt the CIA philosophy and we believe there would be negligibleigublic health and safety benefit.
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Dudley Thompson , In the sub' ject II investigation the investigators made a decision as to which of Mr. Applegate's concerns were under NRC's jurisdiction and selected these for investigation. This was documented in a letter to Mr. Applegate and he offered no rebuttal to our planned course of action. The investigators then pursued these allegations to the extent necessary to deterzine whether the deficiencies identified by the allegations were corrected or were in a licensee's control system which provided for correction.
Subsequent investigation showed the deficiencies expected to be corrected were indeed c' orrected, except for one case which is not yet corrected but was and remains in the licensee's system to be corrected.
The investigation did not determine whether the correction or planned
- correction of any of the deficiencies resulted from Mr. Applegate's findings.
In retrospect we believe this should have been done because, if 'the corrections (or, planned correction) had been made as a result of Mr. Applegate's findings (and they were not), rather than the licensee's control system, than the investigation should have been broadened.
We request that you review the enclosed material. If you agree with our assess:ent, we recommend that it be the basis for a Comission meeting on this CIA report.
James G. Kappler.
- Director Inclosures Raplies to 0IA Findings '
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. MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Jr., Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: James G. Keppler, Director
. Region !!!
SUBJECT:
IImER COMMISSION MEETING - OCTOBER 27, 1981 At yesterday's Comission meeting, Comissioner Ahearne questioned why the Region !!! investigation of the Zimer allegations did not include taking a signed statement from Mr. Gittings, fomer Kaiser QA Manager. We were unable to answer the question at the meeting and we indicated we would get back to Comissioner Ahearne with an answer on this matter. Pertinent infomation obtained from our Investigator, Mr. McCarten, is provided below:
- 1. From the beginning of the investigation there was a fairly close working relationship between Region III and OIA because of the alleged falsification of records. In IE's investigation, the decision not to interview senior Kaiser and licensee personnel who may have been connected with these records, let alone obtain signed statements from them, was based on instructions received from OIA (Messrs Puglia and Gamble). This decision applied to Messrs Marstall. Oltz, and Schwiers---as well as Mr. Gittings.
- 2. Following discussions with the U. S. Attorney who was interested in the case, OIA representatives (Sinclair and Puglia), in the conduct of their investigation of potential criminal issues, interviewed Messrs Oltz and Gittings in June and July 1981. Mr. McCarten participated in the inter-views. The interview with Mr. Oltz was taped; however, the interview with Mr. Gittings was not taped (a decision made by OIA).
- 3. As far as we know, OIA interviews with Messrs Marshall and Schwiers have not yet been conducted.
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October 28,1981 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stellc, Jr. , Director
. Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: James G. Keppler, Director Region III SJBJECT: ZIMMER CCMMISSION MEETING - OCTOBER 27, 1981 At yesterday's Co. mission meeting; Commissioner Ahearne questioned why the Region III investigation of the Zimmer allegations did not include taking a
. signed statement from Mr. Gittings, fonner Kaiser QA Manager. We were unable to answer the question at the meeting and we indicated we would get back to Commissioner Ahearne with an answer on this matter. Pertinent infonnation obtained from our Investigator, Mr. McCarten, is provided below: ,
- 1. From the beginning of the investigation there was a fairly close working relationship between Region III and OIA because of the alleged falsification of records. In IE's investigation, the decision not to interview senice Kaiser and licensee personnel who may have been connected with these records, let alone obtain signed statements from them, was based on instructions received from OIA (Messrs Puglia and Gamble)~. This decision applied to Messrs Marshall, Oltz, and Schwiers---as well as Mr. Gittin'gs.
- 2. Following discuss' ions with the U. S. Attorney who was interested in the
. case, OIA representatives (Sinclair and Puglia), in the conduct of their investigation of potential criminal issues, interviewed Messrs Oltz and Gittings in' June and July 1981. Mr. McCarten participated in the inter-views. The interview with Mr. Oltz was taped; however, the interview with Mr. Gittings was not taped (a decision made by OIA). ,
- 3. As far as we know, OIA interviews with Messrs Marshall and Schwiers have not yet baen conducted.
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- October 30, 1981 IIDt0RAtlDUlt FOR: llilliam J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FR0!!: Janes J. 'Cumings. ' Director Office of Inspector and Auditor .
SUSJECT: OIA SURVEY OF liRC'S QA/QC PROGRAF!S Le are initiating a survey of liRC's Quality Assurance / Quality Control .
(QA/QC) prograas for iluclear Power Reactors Construction. Our initial
.cfforts will be to broadly survey tne OA/0C Programsto gain a general understanding of the prograr, sand, to identify areas for further analysis.
l'e anticipate that the principal focus of our survey will be on the OA/0C related activities of the Office of Inspection and Enforcecent (IE) including the regional offices. Our initial efforts will concentrate on acquiring cata concerning the irplementation of the QA/QC inspection program, progran results,' resource requirements, and application of resources.
Our plan is to begin the survey curing the week of floven.ber 2,1931. He '
will contact appropriate .!E officials to set up an entrance conference to discuss our survey plans.
cc: Comission (5)
Regional Directors V. Stello R.'DeYoung H. Denton J. Davis ~
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F. Remick T. Rehm Distribution: ,
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November 9,1981 ocrica e =seecToa 4
ANo AWOITOR Note for Jim Blaha
. Attached is a copy of the memoranda that pertains to the interview of Phil Gittings at the Ziner site. Also included is a copy of a memorandum dated November 7,1980, from W. W. Schwiers (CG&E) directing Kaiser Company to " turnover" systems prior to completing " certification" (review of
- Quality Assurance documentation). The
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Schwiers memo is attachment 1 and the other correspondence is included as attactinent 2.
John it. Sinclair Investigator i
' Office of Inspector & Auditor i
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(A November 23, 1981 MDf2J.T. I.lM 70F.: Ja: ass G. Esppler, Regional Ad=inistrator F30M: J. F. Streater, Chiaf, Easetor Projects Branch 2, DKFI l SUBJZCI: A.rvr.aaiGATCR/ INS?ECICE SIGNATURES ON TINAL ZDEZR IhTESTICATION 17.20EI 50-358/81-13 As a resul.t of ecnuments received from the Couxsission, ELD, IZ:RQ (ZIS),
IIII ::anagement, and participating investigators [ inspectors, the final _
. draft report which was the doet.znent the investigators /i=spectors reviewed .
prier to signing the twport cover page was revised. In those cases where I viewed the changes as substantive or potentially substantive, the involved isvestigator/ inspector was contacted to assure they were in agrea:nent with the changes. As of this date I am confident that the final report represents the collective view of the participants and manage =ent. In view of this, I elected not to da?.my the issnance of the report to obtain new signatures on the cover page.
t J. 7. Streetar, chief Emactor Projects Branch 2, DEFI 1, 9 ,j m , J ?) e. A 1 .
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- December 10, 1981 ,
MEMORANDUM FOR:' ' File n
FROM: David H. Gamble, Investigator Office of Inspector and Auditor < .
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SUBJECT:
ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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During the course of the OIA investigation into the adequacy of the earlier IE investigation of Thomas Applegate's allegations regarding Zimmer, it was suggested that DIA interview Terry Harpster. The first suggestion came from William Ward, Chief, Investigations Branch, Enforcement and Investigations Staff (EI), IE Headquarters. The second suggestion came from Ward's supervisor, Dudley Thompson, Director, EI. It was said that Harpster, who had previously been the principal NRC Inspector for '
Zimer, had information including a personal file which would expose a lot of problems at Zimmer.
OIA asked Harpster to bring whatever files or documents he had with him to his March 6,1981, interview. After reviewing them with OIA, he left them for copying. These copies are included as Enclosures A-1 through A-11. Enclosures B and C are a complete draft and final version, respectively, of Enclosure A-8, furnished subsequently by IE Investigator Peter Baci.
Enclosure D contains the results of the March 6, 1981, 0IA interview of Harpster.
Enclosures:
As Stated cc: A. Schnebelen, OIA J. Cumings, OIA I
File: 81-39
, 81-18 w/o attach j
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LIST OF ENCLOSURES .
A. File Transfer Record to Terry Harpster, IE, fm Dave Gamble. OIA, dated 3/9/81, transmitting Harpster's personal file re Zimmer.
- 1. Memo G. Gower fm J. Keppler, re Zimmer - Report of Investigation into Licensee Statements at ACRS Subcommittee Meeting, dated 7/31/79.
Attachment:
- a. Letter Borgmann fm Keppler, dated 7/31/79, re investigation by IE re accuracy of statements re l
staffing of Zimmer made by licensee during meeting with ACRS, w/ attach. Region III Report No. 50-358/79-21, for Investigation May 21-24, 1979.
- 2. Memo Thompson fm Keppler, re Erroneous Statements Provided By Applicant at Zimmer ACRS Subcommittee Meeting (AITS F30488H6),
dated 4/10/79, w/ Attach: Statement of Facts re Erroneous Info Given by Applicant at Zimmer ACRS Subcommittee Meeting.
- 3. Memo Keppler fm Thompson, re Apparent False Statements by Applicant at Zimmer ACRS Subcommittee Meeting (AITS F30488H6),
dated 5/2/79, w/ Attach: Ltr Keppler fm Borgmann re Region III wishes to interview CG&E re statements made to AC,RS, dated 5/18/79. j
- 4. Transcript of Testimony of Mr. Schott before Mr. Bender (ACRS) 4 pp only, undtd.
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- 5. Transcript of Testimony of Mr. Borgman before ACRS - 20 pp only, undtd.
- 6. NRC, Region III, Press Release #79-12, dated 3/22/79.
Attachment:
Ltr Hendrie fm Carbon, re Report on William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, dtd 3/13/79.
- 7. Package containing:
- a. Terry L. Harpster Statement, dtd 5/22/79
- b. John E. Menning Statement, dtd 5/21/79
- c. One page note containing names beginning with " Monday-Peter Baci"
- 8. Draft Investigation re Apparent False Statements by Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, Investigator: Peter E. Baci.
DN:50-358. (missing p. 14). *
.Page-2
- 9. Ltr Borgmann fm Keppler, re inspection conducted by T. Harpster and to discussions of our findings with Borgman, i Salay, Schott and others, dated 8/2/78.
Attachment:
Region III, Report No. 50-358/78-11 for inspection on May 23-26 and June 22-23, 1978, by Inspector T. Harpster, dated 7/31/78.
(10. Ltr Borgman fm Fiore111- re inspection conducted by T. Harpster February 28 and March 1-3,_1978, dated March 22, 1978.
Attachment:
Region III Report 50-358/78-06 at William H. Zimmer 4 site, conducted by T. L. Harpster on Feb. 28 and March 1-3, 1978.
ill . " Attachment 13A,' Table of Contents" B. Draft Investigation re Apparent False Statements by Cincinnati Gas and, Electric Company, Investigator Peter E. Baci, No. DN:50-358.
(w/ conclusions).
C. Ltr Borgmann fm Keppler, re investigation conducted by P. Baci on May 21-24,1979, at Zimmer Plant, dated August 3,1979.
Attachment:
Region III, Report No. 50-358/79-21, Investigation on $by 21-24, 1979, at Zimmer (w/ conclusions deleted).
w/ attachments: Statements by T. Harpster; J. Menning; J. Schott and letter Borgmann to Keppler,' dated May 18, 1979.
i D. Interview of Terry Harpster.
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(PENDNG iSSUANCEI FILE TRANSFER RECORD TO: FROM:
Terry Harp'st'er, IE David Gamble, OIA c/o John Craig, IE REQUESTER'S REFERENCE SENDER S REFERENCE DATE OF REQUEST DATE SENT March 9,1981 THE FOLLOWINGMC5);tXRREMRKX FILE (S) ARE TRANSMITTED FOR:
O REVIEW AND RETURN h RETENTION NAME FILE REMARKS
{Last. Fest. Middle) NUMBER
- 1. Terry Harpster's personal file re Zimer ,
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fACM: ' David H. C:mble. Investigatur 'O Office of Inspector and Auditor --i ' , ) 7. .
Q St:5.:ECT: ZD?iER t'UCLEAR PCWER STATION b' During the ccdarse of the CIA investigation into the adequacy of the >- f earlier IE investigation of Thcmas Applegate's allegations regarding .
21suner, it ws suggested that DI A interview Terry Harpster. The first iuggestion came fras idillia:n Ward. Chief. Investigations Branch, Enforcement ~
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! cnd Investigations Staff (EI). IE Headquarters. The second suggestion ' ><
P card frcs Ward's supervisor Dudley Thompson, Director. EI. It was said ~
that Harpster, who had previously been the principal NRC Inspector for -
- Zi aer. had information including a personal file which would expose a '
lot of prcblems at Zimmer.
0:A asked Harpster to bring whatever files or cc:. :nts he had with him to his March 6.1981, interview. After revie.ir.; thc. with O!A. he left them for copying. These ccpies are included as En:1ctures A-1 through A-11. Enclosures B and C are a complete draf t end final version, respectively, of Enclosure A-8. furnished subsequently by IE Investigator Peter Baci. -
Enclosure D contains the results of the March 6.1931. OIA intervicw of Ha rpster. . *h
Enclosures:
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.. February 25, 1982 MEMORAhTUM FOR: Robert F. Warnick, Director, Enforce =ent and Investigation Staff TROM: J. B. McCarteni Investigator SU3 JECT: ZI E R DOCUMEh"I AND INVESTIGATION LEADS Reference your February 2 letter regarding this subject. The following records which were not already in the Region III EIS files were turned over to the EIS Section.
- 1. My notes from eighty-four field interviews conducted between January 14, 1981 and August 13, 1981.
- 2. My interview notes and copies of all stata=ents related to the investigation of the Applegate and QC Inspector allegations. This includes transcripts of all taped interviews.
- 3. Copies of all documentation relating to the investigation of the '
Kaiser Nonconfor=ance Reporting Syste=.
NOTE: The original pages of the NR Log 3cok, and Nonconformance Reports found in the Inspection Raport have been turned over to -
OIA for custody.
- 4. Due to cy assign =ent to the Zion investigation team I was unable t'o review or aug=ent the computerized li'st of allegations so that all leads are tracked. I have, however, provided Investigator Foster with all the state =ents taken by me and copies of all =y interview notes so that he can perform this much needed task.
- 5. On three occasions during the Zi=.er investigation the Region III Enforce:ent and Investigation Staff has informed CIA and DOJ that Region III would pursue all issues which may constitute violations of cri-d nal law. The investigators currently assigned to this case have no training of any kind from a federally recognized Criminal Law Enforcenent Training Center, or any experience in the investiga-tion or enforcement of criminal law. The Region is not fu11 filling its co--4 t=ent to 01A and DOJ vithout assuring personnel with the requisite training and experience are assigned 'to this case. I i reco==end an individual from the II:HQ staf f with the proper experience
(' be assigned and be given the proper authority independent of the
'. Region III staff to conduct this investigation.
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,.4ebe're F. k'arnick February 25, 1982 .
t It is,ny recomnendation that at a minimum these records for various .
evidentiary purposes in either a criminal or civil case should be =aintained until all civil or criminal litigation is conplete. This includes final 1,1 censing of the plant and the conclusica of any private or government civil action. In =y opinien, these records should be maintained in the
. Region III Files for the -life of the plant.
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J.P' James B. McCarten Investigator ec: Region III Files James Cummings, CIA-Roger Fortuna, I&E l
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- ...* 799 RoCSEVELT ROAD CLEN ELLYN,ILLINolt $1037
. April 20, 1982 .
Bill Dircks:
Per your request, attached is a draft
- note summarizing what we know about the ex Region III investigator (Jim McCarten) providing information to Henry Myers concerning Zinsner.
Jim Kappler E
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{ NOTE FOR: W. J. Dircks. Executive Director for Operations -
TROM: Ja=es G. Keppler, Regional Ad=inistratsr i
SUBJECT:
TRANSMITTAL OT ZIMMER INVESTIGATION HATE 7.IAL ,
TO UDALL CCMMITIEE i
! During a telephone conversation with Jim McCarten, former Region III l investigator, on April 19, 1982, Region III learned that McCarten had 4
provided sacerial pertinent to the Zimmer ',Applegate) investigation to 1 Henry Myers subsequent to McCarten's leaving NRC. Infor=ation provided '
4 by McCarten to Robert Varnick, Director of Region III Inforcement and l Investigation staff, and other pertinent information is provided belev:
( , .
q 1. Subsequent to McCarten's resignation on February 27, 1982, he was
! provided by Regica III investigators a copy of a ecuputer listing of the renaining allegations being investigated by Regica III as an l outgreveh of. the Zi=er investigation. McCar en had been the principal investigator in the Zimer investigation and the purpose in having him review the ce=puter list was to make sure that all known allegations were' included in the follevup. investigation effort.
- The telephone contact was to get the results of his review. -
1 ,
- 2. McCarten told Warnick he had forwarded the computer list to Henry Myers (Udall Committee), along with copies of interview statements he had,,and some "other documentation." He indicated that he,had talked with Committee staff members on two occasions (did act say when) and they had I j requested him to send them all of the material he has relating to the '
l Zimmer investigation. We did not determine who initiated the contact between McCar:en and the Udall Comittee staff. '
- 3. McCarten also told Varnick that he provided his personal feelings abeu:
the Zimmer investigation to Committee staff members. He indicated he, i told them the following:
3
- a. NRC had not done a good investigation. The investigation focussed on the "Applegate allegations" rather than on safety issues he
,' thought should have been pursued. *
- b. NRC management had not let his pursue criminality. If he could have done it.his way, he believes he could have proven criminality j en the part of Zi=ner management. Regional management had told him to focus on Applegate and stay out of criminality issues.
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- 4. ,The reasons McCarten left NRC are probably threefold:
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He did not believe NRC investigations were sufficiently vigorous 1
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i with respect to criminality considerations;
- b. He did not get along well with the other Region III investigators; e
ad I' c. He had been denied a grade increase on at least two occasions because of writing inadequacies.
- 5. You will recall the subject investigation effort resulted in a fine 1 ($200,000); in changes in a number of-key people; in major upgrading
! of.the project quality assurance program for. ongoing activities; and in j a required verification program of work completed to date.
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. 6. During the investigation af. fort, Mr. McCarten expressed concerns fro =
4 time to time about the focus of the investigation and on documentation l . of the investigation findings. I know he was particularly concerned ,
4 that we brought in a second investigator to help close out and document t
- certain elements of the investigation. Notwithstanding, I thought he ;
i was supportive of the overall way the investigation was conducted. He
- concurred in the final report. During the investigation he had
', numerous occasions to discuss the investigation with Mr. C,ummings and other 01A representatives as well as representatives of the Department' ;
of Justice.
i 7. The Zimmer investigative effort has been coordinated with'01A and DOJ j on several occasions. The Department of Justice has continued to
- follow this investigation effort and plans to review all aspects of the case for possible criminal action after the total NRC investigative
! effort is completed, i .
- 8. The results of Warnick's call with McCarten have been discussed with ,
i Mr. Cummings. He plans to contact McCarten-for further information.
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- James G. Kappler ;
! . Regional Administrator 1
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- g *....j D cket No. 50-358 MI IS82 0I MDiORANDUM FOR: Region III File.s o THRU: J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator R. L. Spessard, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs J. F. Streeter, Chief, Projects Branch 2 [
FROM: D. R. Hunter, Chief, Projects Section 2B .
SUBJECT:
ZIMMER BRIEFING FOR CHAIRMAN PALLADINO - MAY 10, 1982 On May 10, 1982, Messrs. J. G. Keppler, R. F. Warnick, J. F. Streeter and D. R. Hunter provided a briefing for Chairman Palladino concerning the Zimmer proj ect. The major items discussed in the Briefing included the background, current situation, 'and future plans and schedules regarding the facility. The overview provided the Chairman was inclusive of the period of late 1979 through April 30, 1982, including the Investigation (50-358/81-13), the Immediate Action Letter-(April 8,1981), the NRC Independent Verification (50-358/81-27), the Quality ' Confirmation Program (August 21, 1981), and the Quality Confirmation Program status. A handout of selected viewg.aphs was provided to the Chairman and other attendees.
D. R. Hunter, Chief
, Projects.Section 2B Attachments: Vievgraphs ec w/o attachments:
N. J. Palladinc, Chairman -
W J. Dircks, EDO
. J. Cummings, Director, OIA '
R. C. DeYoung, CII ,
J. Roe, OC{
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T4y July 15, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR: William Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: James J. Cussaings, Director is 384 by office of Inspector and Auditor Wa
SUBJECT:
IIMMER - ALI.EGATION OF HARASSMENT BY NRC IN3PECTORS Reference is made to Jim Keppler's June 18, 1982, memorandum which attached a June 2, 1982, letter from James Harlow to Earl Borgmann, Vice President, Cincinnati Gas and Electric.
On June 30, 1982, I called James Harlow, Executive Secretary for the Greater Cincinnati Building and Construction Trades Council regarding the content of his June.2 letter to Earl Borgmann. Mr. Harlow advised me that the third paragraph of his letter to Borgmann was in error in that he had no information that NRC inspectors were harassing trade employees at the Simmer site. Harlow stated that he believed the harassment question was a two-way street, i.e., that in some cases QC inspectors were probably harassing trade employees.
In view of the above no further action is being taken by this office.
cca V. Stallo -
R. DeYoung
- J. Fitzgerald.
J. Keppler Distribution
/ OIA file al-39 '
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7 DATE ) ...../.15/..82 meronu m neaspencasese OFFICIAL RECORD COPY une m mi Sem
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4' ', #e UNITEJ STATES J[; 3, ~,j, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e REGION lll
- 8 798 ROOSEVELT Roa0
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j June 15. 1982 MEMORANDUM TOR: Ja=es J. Cummings Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor 1
l TROM: ,
James G. Keppler. Regional Ad=inistrator. Region III
SUBJECT:
ZIMMER - ALLEGATION OF HAPJLSSMENT BY NRC INSPECICKS The attached letter from the Creater Cincinnati Building and Construction Trades Council, ausging harassment by NRC inspectors, is provided for your information and any action you deem appropriate.
l Ja=es G. Keppler Regional Administrator
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Attachment:
Letter. dtd 6/2/82 g .
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NCINNATI. 721 4206 OHIO 45203],
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4.. 2 , June 2, 1982 PRINCIPAL STAFF l VDyn ) l= %
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Ml Lin l bbt. Earl Borgmann, Vice President UD b Cecinnati Gas and Electa.ic Company Ud?T 3rd and Main Streets Ch cinnati, Chu 45202 mTI dea't M't. Borgmanns or,,N tr
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ri t r. M With further refeAence to de recent incidents uhich allegedly ocentred at be Wittian Zhreer Nuclear Power St.athn concerning the harassment to N.R.C. Inspectou. I can assure you dat de Greater Cincinno.ti Baildhg and Construction Trades Council and it's af filiated local unions and ueir officeAs and membersh.ip do not condone this sort of activity and we furthermort believe tha.t the guilty person or peuons should be delt with as ptovided by law. One u hg that I have. Learned from many of .the workers on the Zimmer job is jhat theAe also is harassment bu the W Lt'. and onn!Lta conhet inspectou to the .individnnt wcicuees, and 1 am of he opinion that this practice has also got to cease for the good of the. ptojects under some very adverse jobsite condi.tlans. I fee.l conMdent the quality of workmansMp on Zimmer will equal or exceed that of anycther compa' table nuclear plant in the nation, and that ptoductivity under the circumstance.s is a.t a very Mgh Level. I am not suggesting to you that all of t.his could not be improved upon and to meet this objective 1 ptopose to you that a Tripartite Comnittee be selected from the Bailding Trades CouncLL, Kaiser Engineers and C.G. 6 E. to meet on a monthly basis to look into anys .to imporve. car relationship and overcome some of the adverse me.dia coverage . on Zimmer. 1 suggest to you that the ptablem of in-timidation and harassment of both workeu and inspectors are of a national levet rather than a local leuct. I uvuld app'teciate. he.aring from you at your earliest opportunity. Sincere.ly, .
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GREATER CINCINNATI BUILDING 1RADES COUNCIL Jeruo w/ kames Harlow Executive SEctetc.ty JHsJb ces Page 2 JUN 4 1982
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- k. Mark Athertine, Kaber Conpany M. Chantit Satin, Kabir Company M. James KeppitA, N.R.C., Glen Ellyn, TLLincia
- k. Fred Christanson, N.R C., Moscow, QMo' -
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August 2, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR: James Fitzgerald, Acting Director Office of Investigations FROM: James J. Cumings, Director.,7aa[# #'382 sf,,N Office of Inspector and Auditor ~- 4
SUBJECT:
ZIMMER INVESTIGATION . During the course of reviewing our files on Zimer in reference to a F0!A appeal, we discovered other documentation which may be gerinane to
, the ongoing Zimmer investigati~on. I have denied their release on that i basis. The three documents, with enclosures, thus discovered are forwarded herewith. ; ,
Attactinents:
- 1. Memo, Gamble & Puglia to File, dtd 6/15/81
- 2. Memo, Gamble & Puglia to File, dtd 6/19/81 -
- 3. Memo, Gamble to File, dtd 1,2/10/81 l
CONTACT: Ronald M. Smith, OIA 492-7170 - i Distribution: . t O!A Reading j ! OIA 81-39 V R$mith / \\
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t flovember 10, 1982 I MEMORANDUM FOP.: Chairman Palladino k . Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Ahearne Commlssioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine .. FROM: James J. Cummings, Director Office of Inspector and Auditor N'h.-[
SUBJECT:
ZI!!MER I The attached letters from Christopher Barnes, U. S. Attorney, Cincinnati, Ohio, are furnished for your information. By way of background, Jim Fitzgerald and I initiated a conference call with Mr. Barnes on October 28 in order to clarify some of the issues raised in his October 19 letter, particularly with regadd to his suggestion concerning a joint 11RC/rBI investigation. Based on our October 28 telephone conversation and as stated in Mr. Barnes' November 2 letter, he now believes that such a joint investigation is not feasible at this time. Both OIA and OI concur in this determination. Attachments:
- 1. Ltr fm Barnes dtd 10/19/82
- 2. Ltr fm Barnes dtd 11/2/82 cc: W. Dircks, EDO J. Fitzgerald, OI L. Bickwit, OGC J. Koppler, RO III .
Distribution OIA File 81-18 81-39 OIA rdr JY / I o. . l O
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- 1. At the request of CG&E, S&L conducted an audit of radiographic interpretation on October 21 and 22. 1976. (Tield Audit Report 75)
- 2. One recommendation from this audit was that unresolved interpretation conflicts between Peabody Testing and Kaiser should be dr.:ided by an independent reviewer. .
- 3. As a result of this recommendation CG&E identified all those radiographs on which there had been a difference of interpretation, and had these reviewed by a S&L* Level III radiographic reviewer on January 12 and 13, 1977. Weld CY606 was one of those welds selected for review because of an August, 1976 difference of opinion as to the acceptability of radiographic indications. The S&L interpretati:n was that unacceptable indications were present at film markers 8-12.
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- DO N07 wee tNo form se e ACCORD of eterovels, seneurrences, disposete.
esserenese, and umder eetwo F,Roed:(Neme, erg. armtof. Aeoney/ Post) Room No -Gidg. ' A. Bert Davis. RIII Pnene pee.
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^ i r: 7 Y-h September 3, 1981' NEMORANDUM TOR: James G. Keppler, Director, Region III FROM: James E. Foster, Investigator
SUBJECT:
CIA REPORT " ADEQUACY OF I&E INVESTIGATION 50-358/80-09 AT THE WII.I,IAM H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR P05.T.R STATION" I as very concerned about the adequacy and conclusions of the subject 3IA report. From my review it appears that the report does not deal with all questioned areas, significantly mischaracterizes statements made by Region III personnel, does not document interviews conducted, contains statements not supported by fact, and reaches inaccurate conclusions. It also appears that the investigative effort neither included interviews of pertinent licensee and contractor personnel, reviews of appropriate Region III investigative procedures, nor developed crucial information. Lack of attention to detail is evident in many areas. ' Three of the conclusions reached by OIA regarding the I&E investigation are: 1. The investigation failed to properly document the results of investiga-tion both as to interviews and material reviewed. 2. The investigation failed to determine the correct status and history of several welds. 3. The overall investigative effort was neither vigorous nor sufficiently broad in scope. These conclusions are unsupported, but do apply to the OIA review. The remaining OIA conclusion (uae of the phrase "not substantiated") has some merit, but would not alter the conclusions of the I&E investigative report. In sussary, the CIA effort appears totally deficient. Specifically: 1. The CIA report (Page 3 Paragraph 2, Page 4 Paragraph 3, Page 5 Paragraph 9) indicates that the matter reviewed is the agency handling of allegations by Thomas Applegate. These were i
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- l James G. Keppler September 3, 1981 l
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- a. Welds CY606, E811, 3 42 have been rejected by Peabody-Magnaflux i personnel but eccepted by Kaiser, j
- b. System flushing procedures were improper.
{ } c. Welds on Maia stese Relief pipe spools are defective but were ; i accepted by Isiser.
- N OIA report only contains a review of the handling of the first allega-tion. No detailed review of & other two allegations was performed or documented .
- 2. Although William Ward'(Chief, IE Investigations Branch) played a sub- f stantial part in the handling of this case by IE (his asse appears 20 i times in the CIA report, Pages 5, 10, 14, 20, 35, 36, and 34), he was act interviewed.
l I ! ' i
- 3. Several statenesta by RIII personnel (G. Phillip, K. Ward) were signifi- f castly mischaracterized or misunderstsod. I understand they are responding i
! separately. - i
- 4. IE !aspection Reports Nos. 50-358/78-39 and 50-354/79-17 are signifi-l castly mischaracterized as indicating a " chronic and long history of ,
i welding problems at Zianer" (0IA report Page 2). These reports deal ' i with radiographic technique, not welding problems. i !' 5. One of the CIA report attachments is a manual chapter from the Fundamentals 4 j of Inspection course meant as a training aid (written by Gersid Phillip). This is not an IE or RIII procedure. RIII does have procedures covertag ; } report format, statements, etc. pertaining to investigations. No reference ' i is made to these procedures. ) , j 6. For the three welds, CT606, WR-Kall, ER42, significant information was not i e obtained by OIA. I.ack of this information (weld chronologies are attached) I led to inaccurate conclusions. Relevant Noaconformance Reports were act l reviewed, and cognisant personnel were apparently not interviewed. No ! technically knowledgeable perseasel assisted in the review. Attention to ! i detail was lacking, as was understanding of construction practices. i ' ' As the report focuses considerable attention os a mosconfessence report (R E-2134) related to weld WR-I-811, it is evident that the circumstances ! surrounding this document were not understood due to lack of complete j information. . ) 7. Unsupported statements are characterised as fact. Ca pages 2, 12, and i 35, the conclusion is propenaded that CGE QA&S Manager William Schwiers ordered Floyd olta to "11ae out" a Noaconformance Report. The basis fos. b conclusion is apparently the interview of Gerald Phillip, who acted *' ' that schweira denied the action. 1 ! i
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l James G. Keppler - 3- 8*Ptember 3, 1981 l .
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A subsequent interview with 01tz indicated that Mr. Turner, then Kaiser ; ! QA Manager, his supervisor, advised his to line out one Nonconformance l Report, haowing that another was in esistence to track the seaconforn- ( l ias condition. Schwiers was characterized as being present for this L , anchange, but did not direct 01ta. This information was corroborated by a Mr. Deerwester, who indicated that he was present during the enchange. No information is presented is the CIA report to support the conclusion
. that this action was directed by Schwiers. [
( . i Da page 40, as support is similarly gives for the statement that ' l N ess Applegate brought information to CGE officials. ' C. Several commenta in the CIA report pertain to the investigative case l l file maintained by RIII. N se CIA criticises are from a crisiaal ; e investigation viewpoint rather than sa IE viewpoint. The one very l i . einer discrepancy, the lack of an Identifier Key for the sole alleger : 1 in the IE report (beas Applegate), was easily rectified. One : I criticise (lack of "results of interview" documentation) is for an l ] item act required and not believed necessary. 1 l
'9. portions of the presentations of interviews are unrelated to discussion of the adequacy of the IE investigation, and add nothing to the report.
Esamples of this are the mechanics of meeting with Applegate, what he A r was wearing, zeros aschine difficulties, etc. J 10. Several of the report attachments are of little or no significance, and ! j some (weld rod issue slips) are totally unreadable. Several attachments ! add nothing to the report but size and weight. ) i
- 11. The report does not esplain the thirteen day delay by CIA Director i
Cummings, but only states that "the Chairman was aware of that aspect of the case". N handlias of Applegate's allegations by OIA is very l } such a part of the agency response, and should be adequately detailed t 4 and esplained.
- 12. Wile ao interviews of licensee or contractor personnel are presented 1
in the 0!A report, I as personally aware that a site QC inspector was t interviewed en June 10, 1981. m 0IA report alludes to interviews of ' a QC inspector and a former superviser of Document Centrol, but docu-seats seither interview. An eetline of the CIA report is attached, j indicating docussated interviews and time frames. L i .
- 13. N report took 7.83 seaths to produce. N last documented action '
l La the report took place March 5,1981 (interview of E. !.. Williamson), 5.16 esaths prior to report finalizaties. i
- 14. m style and detailed contest of the reports of interviews with IE .,
perseasel strongly suggest that these interviews were tape recorded. " j Interviewees were set advised of such recording. ' 4 L
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I s - 7 i l James G. Keppler . 4 September 3, 1981 i !
- 15. !
Wile probably not of significance, the CIA report lacks signatures by the investigators or a Personnel Contacted listing. > 1 J. E. Foster l Investigstor , Attachments: As stated '{ l l l I t i t I i i n 4 k ] RIII Fost.r/s. 9/2/81- ,
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01A RIPCRT Readian Naaber Date Panefs) of Pares Summary Rackground 1-2 2 Details 3 1 Review of GAP noterial 3-4
, Meettag with Region !!! personnel 1/13/81 1
4-5 Intervtew of Gerald Phillip 1/14-15/81 5-16 1 Interview of Kavia Ward 11 1/27-28/81 17-19 2 Interview of Charles Norelius 1/26/81 - 19-22 3 Interview of Caston Tiere111 1/26/81 22-23 2 Interview of Duane Danielson 1/28/81 23 24 Interview of Richard Knop 1/23/81 1 24-25 1 Interview of James Donahue 1/15/81 25-26 Interview of James Keppler 1/29/81 1 26-28 2 Interview of Thomas Vandel 2/18/81 Reinterview of G. Phillip and K. Ward 28 33 $ 2/19/81 33 35 2 Interview of Ian Williamson 3/5/81 35 38 Revtew of Welding records 3 CY-606 39-40 2 RM-42 40 41 2 WR-K-811 42 1 43 1
, List of Attachments
- 1. Meso fres Ahearne to Cummings 12/15/80 1
- 2. Letter from Eastwood (Special Counsel) to Ahearne 12/29/80 2
- 3. GAP Petition (Request for Investigation) undated 24
- 4. Letter free Keppler to CG&E, trans-mitting II Report No. 50-354/80-09 (includes report) 7/2/40 53
- 5. Weld Package for CY-606 32
- 6. Weld Packa8e for RM 42/RN K-262 19 7.
Weld Packa8e for WR-K 811/kR K-916 9
- 8. Noaconformance Report No. E-2138 Revision 1 (typed version) 1
- 9. Noaconformance Report No. E 2138 (headwrittes version) 2
- 10. 11 !aapectors Naaual, Chapter 8 31 (Total Attachments 174)
_ : ~r r:~ r * '___ - ^
*^ ' ~ ' *
- --~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ -
O CT 606 CY 606 is a weld in the Cycled Condensate System located in the ground in the tank fars area, under a concrete slab. The line is sixteen inches in diameter (weld is 50.26 inches of weld metal). Design conditions for this line are 35 pois and 140 degrees T. Na:Laum operating conditions are also 35 psig and 140 degrees T. This line is S&L piping Class 3. CHRONOLOGY 07/ /76 Weld fit-up. 07/ /76 Weld performed. 07/15/76 RT of weld - reject. 07/16/76 RT read, reject 0-13, 13 26, unconsumed insert. 07/16/76 Approvals on WRD No. 1. 07/19/76 Al readed, PT of grinding - accept, weld performed. 07/21/76 Approvals for WRD No. 2. 07/23/76 Ground area, FT accept, weld performed. 07/26/76 RT performed. - 07/26/76 RT read, reject 0-12, 12-24, incomplete fusion. 07/27/76 Approvals for WRD labeled No. 2. 07/29/76 PT - accept. 08/02/76 RT for information only - reject. 08/04/76 PT reject grinj through & adjacent area, crack in weld edge. 08/09/76 RT performed.
- 04/09/76 RT read, 0-12 rejected.
08/10/76 EEI approval of above RT report. 08/10/76 Approvela for WRD labeled No. 3. 08/10/76 PT test of area - accepted. 08/11/76 RT of weld. 08/11/76 RT read - rejection areas 0-12 (Peabody-Magnailux Personnel). 08/12/76 P-M rejection overriden by M. Low - accept veld. 08/13/76 Causa plugs CY606GP, 606 CPS, 0060P welded. PT accept.
*01/13/77 S&L audit of radiography, areas 8-12 rejected for surface indications and linear indications.
*01/21/77 NR-E-633, documents above finding, grind out defect and reveld.
*02/11/77 Approvals on disposition of NR-E 633 04/14/77 ANI approval of 08/11/76 RT.
04/15/77 Approvals on WRD labeled 3A. 06/08/77 RT of area in 3A 0-13, 13-26 accept. 06/08/77 RT read and approved. 06/20/77 ANI review and approval of above RT.
*06/26/77 NR-E-633 closed.
07/19/77 Gaasa plu8 re-welded, FT accept.
*10/10/79 NES Review Begins
*10/12/79 NES review - technique and documentation deficiencies.
*Significant information not in CIA Chronology.
4 e s ow o e- - - memen sommesw or . w e,e s e- - e a e+ e s. , . . , , - m, - ee n,v. ,,
*01/02/40 Applegate told acceptance of CT 606 improper. (Daily Report) l
*03/03/80 Applegate interviewed h Phillip. !
04/07-09/80 Phility essite.
*10/03/40 2 E 5172 based es Es findiass for CT 606 and several adjace:t welds.
*10/27/40 Disposittoa of M -E $172, accept as is, A. Lanhaa.
*11/07-12/40 Approvals es R E-5172.
*11/12/40 2 -E-5172 eleoed. t
*11/17/40 Bas Seher metation en R$ documentation review checklist fars (closeemt).
'Significast taformation set ta CIA Chroselogy.
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. i
. . . . . . . . . . I i .
WR K 811 l WR R 516 (WR K-427) !
- (WR N 916)
(WR R=917) ! W E 811 Water and W E 827 were welds se the Aust11ary Su11 ding Closed Coeling System. Wold WR K-516, es the same line, is still is esistence. Welds W E-916, W-X-917 are replacenest welds. Weld WR K 411 was located is the , Aemiliary Building at elevaties 372'. i was 12.54 taches of weld estal). The line is 4 taches La diameter (weld ' i Desiga coaditions for this line are 120 peig and 105 degrees y. Masteus operatias condittens are 150 pets and 123 degrees y. The line is S&I. , i piptas Class C (final visual inspettica esty, not normally radiographed). ; i M LOGY ' 08/ /77 Approvals for productica of W K 516. ! 11/08/77 Censumable fasert placement and tack weld WR K 516. 11/09/77 WR I 516 welded AN! waiver es held point. i 01/29/79 WR R all weld fit up. 01/30/79 WR N 811 visual taspecties of final pass-scrept. eel 1 : aisplaced. <
*10/ /79 Inspector Setlock assisting with documentation locaties and terrecties. !
l 10/11/79 t
- . W t 2138(20) WR R 811 and WR R 516, believe missed AN!
heldpoint. [ i Disposities: RT, accept if RT acceptable. l *11/06/19 RT of weld WR K 516 per W t 2138DO. l *11/06/79 Probable date of RT of W X 811, radiestaphy set rotataed. i l Reject. (RT done twice).
*11/08/79 RT of W K 514 rejected for uscensumed insert, other defects. !
*12/03/79 NR E-2260. RT of WR X 811 shows adjacent weld WR K 827 us= }
l acceptable, uscensumed lasert. i Dispositisa Replace pup piece, "see related NR 2134.""'-' ; 12/14/79 NR t 1138 " Voided" (actually superseded), ..."see Revistoa 1." l *12/27/79 " Steve" tells Applegate R 411. "NER pipe" has "tasert fault." [
*01/07/80 Speed seas Ruts to Ps11 eat W R 516 se M1=1, RT reject. !
*01//v/80 NRt4138 Revision 1,(seerelatednAt2260).
t l Dispegies: Cut out sad roweld. 01/14/80 8pprovels sa NR t=2138, Revision 1 (weld WR K 514 set mentioned). l 01/16/80 Approval en X51 1 for welds W R 914. W K 917. ! 01/18/80 un R 916 fitup and weld. i 01/21/80 W t 2138R1 eleoed. . 01/24/80 W t 916 visual ins ,
*01/24/80 2 8 2240 eleoed.' pettica and setoptance. !
l 03/03/80 Applegate interviewed by Phillip. ! 94/07 09/80 Phillip easite. !
*08/ /81 RT for W R 516 found.
*08/ /41 W R S14 Re radiosterbed.
i
*Significant infessettes not la 01A Cheeselesy. i 3
_ -_.. , . . . . . . , . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ . . _ _ . . ;.__.._ _ . . _ . ~ _ . _ _
j l . COMMKXTS
, Accorums to CC Inspector Setlock, Floyd 01tz asked him to locate the XII 1 weld !.. story forms for welds WR K 811 and WR K 516.
Ie could not locate thee, en theandline.found that the AN! had listed hold points on the fit up for welds heldpoints for these welda.The ANI had no los notation to indicate that he had waived the heldpoints. NR E-2133 was written to document missing the Setlock taspection was not aware for WR-K 516. that the ANI had waived the hold potat on fit up information on approntmately AugustHe indicated that he first learned of this
. form for weld WR K 516. 15, 1981, when he was shows the KK!-1 I
genuine. He indicated that the form and ANI waiver are (It appears that at sees time the KKI-1 form for WR-K-516 was found, and the ANI waiver discovered.) Me 2138 also (RO) but stated does not that seehe was wrong anything not aware of NR-K-2260 with actions taken. aar of Revision 1 to He does feel that he should have been advised of the revision of NR K 2138, and that the
, dates actionsoftaken.
the original and revision sight have been shown to better document RT of WR K 811 could not be found, and RT of removed welds need not be re-tained. as WR K 827 had, and WR K 516 has this condition.It is very possible that , This would explain why
" Steve" (A11ea Sellars) told Applegate of sa " insert fault" La weld "K 811" as detailed La Applegate's daily report dated December 27, 1979. WR K 811 and the other welds had been accepted, and would not experience further review, as RT or other esamination would not normally take place on these welds.
and must be assumed to estet.If a weld is not subject to RT, certain defects are WR K 516 is planned, based on unacceptable RT of the weld.The licensee has indi Both the original NR K 2138(RO) and the subsequent Revision 1 incorrectly
, indicate was welded that on weld JanuaryWR 30,K1979.
811 was welded on November 9,1977 and weld WR K 516 and WR K 516) was as error that was made by QC !aapector Setlock whenAp NR K 2138 was drafted. read by R!!! Inspector K. Ward during weld documentation review.The error l w 1 e e
.e 4
_-~ '
F I . - i RH-42 RH-42 was a weld on line IRH01C18 in the Residual Heat Removal system. The weld was located in the reactor building at elevation 497'. The line is 18 inches in diameter (weld was 56.54 inches of weld metal). Design conditions for this line are 220 psig and 389 degrees T. Maximum _Class operating B. conditions are 240 psig and 358 degrees F. The line is S&L piping CHRONOLOGY - 08/06/76 Weldefit-up. 08/06/76 Weld performed. 08/09/76 RT of weld. 08/09/76 RT read by P-M, reject markers 36-48 (Notation: following repair). re-shoot 100% 08/10/76_ EE approval of above RT interpretation. 08/10/76 Approvals on WRD form. 08/10/76 RT of repair area. 08/10/76 RT read by P-M. 08/11/76 RT accepted by KEI. 08/11/76 Approval of repair. 09/16/76
*10/10/79 ANI review of 8/9/76, 8/10/76 RT reports, approval.
NES review begins.
*01/25/80 NIS review, porosity at film markers 53-55.
*02/12/80
*02/15/80 NR-E-5056 based on NES revieo findings.
NR-E-5056 dispositioned to ind out and repair defect. 03/03/80 03/21/80 Applegata interviewed by Phi.. lip. WRD form approvals. (
*04/07-09/80 04/14/80 Phillip onsite initiation of Applegate investigation.
PT of re preppe,d pipe ends, acceptance. 04/21/80 Approvals for WRD for new elbow. 04/23/80 PT of elbow end prep. accepted. 04/30/80 05/01/80 Veld fit-up breaks loose (Ref: KEIA No. 1008).
, Re-fit-up approved and weld started.
05/02/80~ ^ Root pass made. 05/05/80 Root pass approval. 05/06/80 RT of new weld. 05/07/80 RT approved by KEI.
*05/07/80 '
ANI review and approval.
*06/16/80 NR-E-5056 closed out.
*Significant information not in CIA Chronology.
COMTENTS The NES documentation checklist dated January 25, 1980, EII RT, on page 3 notes "NR issued to repair rejectable indication" andby R. A. Zieler,
" corrective action prepared by T. McCall, February 12, 1980".
ee 5
.x. .
_ _ _ _ _ _ ._ --- f
_ _ _ __ . . . . - . = . - --- - - - ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i l i l It appears that the decision to grind out and repair th markers 53-55 was misinterpreted to mean cut-out e defects theatentire film cut-out within then necessitated a new elbow, as fit-up could specifications. weld.not Weld b e accomplished he was in contact with Peabody-Magnaflux a e by Applegate, personnel af Otherwise, sation 1) of report he would not know of the NES review as not der he left the site. e on page 6 (Alle-50-358/80-09. e n
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.'o UNITED STATES I ., , ,
*N NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j ' f REGION lli ee 799 ROOSEVELT Road g OLEN ELLYN,ILLINOls 80137 s....
MP 8 1981 l l MM ANDUM TOR: James G. Keppler, Director - THRU: J.-F. Streeter, Acting Director, Enforcement and Investiga-tion Staff FROM: C. A. Phillip, Investigator
SUBJECT:
CO. M S ON OIA REPORT ON THE ADEQUACY OF IE INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 50-358/80-09) AT THE WILLIAM H. ZIMMF.R NUCLEAR POWER STATION The overall thrust of the CIA investigation and the basis for its =ajor criticism is their unstated premise regarding the primary purpose of an II investigation. ~his pre:.tise is that investigations of allegations are conducted to determine the literal validity of allegations, i.e. to confirm or discredit an alleger's statements. It appears that OIA is
! of the view that the primary objective is to make an accounting to the
) allager. While this is a secondary consideration and a consideration that has grown in importance in recent years, it is not the primary purpose of an investigation. I did not view our investigation as an effort intended to either vindicate or discredit Mr. Applegate. The primary objectives of II are to determine whether licensee's ac-tivities are in compliance with URC requirements and whether their ac-tivities constitute a hazard to the public health and safety and to take enforcement action when appropriate. One useful tool in pursuing those objectives is the investigation of licensee activities based on information provided by allegers and complainants. Such individuals l sometimes provide information not likely to be obtained through the normal inspection process and problems are identified which might other-wise go undetected. For that reason the NRC, specifically II, has encouraged contacts from allegers. As a matter of courtesy and in recognition of the alleger's interest in the matters he brings to our attention, we have followed the prac-tice of informing the alleger of our investigation findings. Not very many years ago, this was accomplished only orally, either personally or by telephone. It has only been in the last 5 or 6 years that we hava routinely sent a copy of our report to the alleger. The investigation conducted on the basis of information brought to us by , Mr. Applegate was conducted to determine whether the licensee's actions in the specific matters raised by him were in compliance with our re-quirements. The fact that our report characterizes an allegation as "not substantiated" or " partially substantiated" is perhaps unfortunate but it was not intended to convey an evaluation of the alleger or his allegations but merely to provide a brief bottom line. .To state that an allegation vas not substantiated is not to say that it is not true. It
~
_m , n s , r)., n .-, vi
.dib I f C4 / N{
a . s . James G. Kappler ' may very well be true but the investigation was not able to confir= it. The NRC cannot hold a licensee in concomplianca without providing a j sound objective basis for doing so. 1 Regarding the allegation that defective welds, specifically identified, had been accepted was approached from the standpoint of determining the status of these velds as of the time of our investigation. This was viewed as the point of interest to the NRC. Had the welds passed the
- point of further review or evaluation and were they defective? The his-tory of the welds was not viewed as significant. There was no attempt to determine whether these welds had at some time in the past been accepted. ~We normally withhold making a finding regarding a weld until no further action regarding it is planned by the licensee. I believe that with all of the information now available including that contained in the OIA report, no noncompliance regarding these velds has been identi-fied. The findings as set forth in our repott remain unchanged.
Since I am aware that the OIA conclusions and criticisms are being address-ed in a memorandum from you to Mr. Stello, I will not comment further here regarding them. I am also aware that Mr. Tester has prepared a memorandum to you containing.an evaluation of the investigation conducted by CIA. For that reason I am not addressing that subject in this memo-randum. The following are comments concerning statements in tihe CIA report which relate to information attributed to me which I consider inaccurate, in-completa or misleading. Ihese comments are keyed to the marked up pages
- of.the report which are attached.
- 1. (Page 4) - The main question I. posed during this meeting was whether this investigation was intended to determine whether I had violated i the law as charged by GAP. I J
- 2. (Page 5) - I indicated I had destroyed my field notes after holding l them for several months after the report was issued and that even- 1 tually destroying them was consistent with my normal practice.
i
- 3. (Page 5) - On August 4,1981 I advised CIA that this statement was in error. I .,ointed out that, when Wm. Ward briefed me on his telephone conversation with Applegate, he informed me Applegate had made comments which implied some inspectors' conduct might be included in the allegations. Wardc$seledmeagainstinvolvingany inspectors in the case until it was determined through an interview with Applegate whether allegations were being made about NRC per-sonnel. We agreed that two people should interview Applegate and Ward offered the services of Williamson for this purpose.
- 4. (Page 6 ) - This was not my observation; Applegate told me this. ,
l
- 5. (Page 6) - I did not characterize anything as " divorce" or " divorce-type".
l l l
.__m___._ __,i
, .n
James G. Kappler !
- 6. (Page 6) - Applegate's statement alluded to all of the infor=ation he
, discussed not just CG&E's failure to take action against Marshall. e
- 7. (Page 7) - More accurately, I said that Applegate told me that either CG&g or Kaiser had instructed PM to examine some pipe that had been
' unloaded by dumping it on the ground. He said PM had gone further and had radiographed the welds. The radiographs had showed that the welds were bad. CG&E and/or Kaiser ignored the results of the radiog-
- raphy because the welds had been checked and certified by the supplier
, and therefore radiographing the welds after the pipe was received at the site was not required.
! (NOTE: . It was subsequently determined that it was true that further NDE was not required. Because of their being mishandled when they were unloaded, however, the welds were re-examined to assure no damage had resulted. PM was instructed to radiograph them " Tor Infor- '
i nation only" because it was known that radiography was not appropriate and could not be an acceptable basis for determining whether welds of that kind were acceptable. Since radiographs of welds on three of the pipes showed " indications" they were placed on hold in the warehouse.)
- 8. (Page 7) - I stated the receipt inspection generally consists of a visual inspection to assure no damage was incurred in transit and
- , a check is made to assure required documentation pertaining to the items has been received.
- 9. (Page 8) - I informed CIA on August 4,1981 that this statement is incorrect. Applegate did not tell me or suggest that Murray would cooperate with NRC. .
- 10. (Page 9) - Applegate did not say the threats, etc. were the result of his attempting to bring the infonnation to the NRC.
- 11. (Page 9) - The statement about tapes indicating ec11usion is not appropriate in this context. During his initial telephone conver-
, sations with Ward and with me he implied he had tapes of this kind. I don't recall that he so characterized the tapes during our inter-view. :
- 12. (Page 10) - It would be more accurate to say I asked for clarification as to Tynar's whereabouts.
- 13. (Page 10) - Regarding communications with Norelius, I told them that I had briefed Norelius on the main points of my interview with Applegate and gave him the reports Applegate had provided me. I then prepared a letter to Applegate and Norelius concurred. I'm sure that among other things I informed Norelius of what position I had taken with Applegate regarding matters not under NRC juris- ;
diction.. l l
. . , - a :. - * . . - - .e--m .
., .~. __, , , , _ ,,
James G. 0 ;;;;.: ' I informed OIA on August 4,1981 that I had never said I relied en =y vast experience. I did say that Nore11us usually allowed me to work without a lot of supervision - possibly because I had been around a long t'
- 14. (Page 11) - I also said that I was reasonably sure that Kappler was made aware of the fact that Applegate had made allegations which would be investigated.
- 15. (Page 11) - I said I did not recall the specific details of our meeting with Schwiers but that I was sure we did not give him the F
specific allegations.
- 16. (Page 11) - The description of my interview with Applegate does .not bring out the fact that one of his assertions vaa that Sellers had a list of welds which were rejected by FM but which Kaiser /C05E t
had said vers acceptable and had overruled the PM findings. Wen Sellers denied having any such list or any practical =eans of identifying such instances, we decided on the spot to select a safety related system and to review the reader sheets for all velds in that
, system to check for instances of overruling by Kaiser.
- 17. (Page 12) - Regarding Tyner and flushing proble=s, I informed 07A that Ward and I had a lengthy interview with Tyner who made ecmplaints about the Zimmer site but did not provide any specific inferniation. He was repeatedly asked to provide specific informatie: ana his wife, who was present, even comented two or three times that he was not giving us anything specific that we could pursue.
- 18. (Page 12) - This statement is not accurate. I informed o n , and it's also in our investitstion report, ghat on the day following the Tyne interview, I asked T. Daniels, the Resident Inspector, about the hydro test. Daniels informed ac everyone (the licensee and the NRC) was well aware the test was invalid and would have to be redone. I didn't say anything about an inspection. I did say that'Daniels informed me the future hydro test would probably be witnessed 'cy an NRC inspector.
- 19. (Page 12).- The paragraph regarding the spool pieces is neither accur-ate nor couplete. Whila this is not crucial, it makes me vender whe-ther CIA understood the matter or bothered to read our report which
- I believe describes the matter. The following are specific inaccura-cies.
I
- Een we arrived on site on April 7,1980 the spool pieces were not in a " Hold Status. They had been installed and were not tagged. This was the basis for the noncompliance. There was, however, an open NR regarding three of the five spool pieces (see page 13 of our report).,-
_ _ . _ ...__ _ ~
t . James G. Kappler t i While it is true Kaiser, not PM, could accept or reject, that point is not pertinent in the context in which it appears here. The result of radiography performed for information purposes is not a basis for acceptance or rejection. Also, because of the naturn :f th: --'ds, good radiographs are not possible and the quality of the film accord-ing to ward was such that little, if anything, could be learned from them. The film therefore was not used or intended to be used as the basis for accepting or rejecting the velds and the last of a series of NR's which was first initiated before radiography was perforned remained open, that is unresolved. To stata an NR was subsequently issued is incorrect. An NR was initially written on July 5, 1979 and because of it the infor=ation only radiography was performed, the results of which were reported by Surveillance Report dated July 23, 1979. This NR was voided, being ' superseded by a series of NRs. l It is incorrect to state "... ultimately an NR was imprcperly written..." It was improperly altered in that a notation referring to another succeeding NR was lined through. To discuss the man er of Schwiers instruct?.ag someone to line through in this context ir s.kleeding. It appears to the reader that this was addressed during # first visit The alteration of the NR which permitted the p.pe to be released from the varehouse was one of the redsons for my secoGd visit to the site. It is also inaccurate to state Schwiers apparently told someone to line through. An employee told me this during my second visit to the site. Schwiers denied it. I did not conclude that he did or did not issue this instruction.
- 20. (Page 13) - Foster informed me that Applegate wanted me to call him so I did. I had no reason of my own to contact Applegate.
- 21. (Page 13) - Regarding identification keys, it was intended that one should be prepared if there is a need for one. Not every investiga-tion file needs one. I saw no need for one in this case.
- 22. (Page '13) - Regarding Johan, I advised CIA this statement is inaccur-ate in that Daniels contacted the site switchboard and was advised that I no one with that name was employed at the site. -
- 23. (Page 13) - While I regard contacts with the press as irrelevant to the purpose of the investigation, the information is aisleading, incomplete and inaccurate. th anel 9 and others contacted me after l Applegate went public. Channel 9 continued to contact me every few days and in that way they knew when my investigation at the site was concluded. They requested an interview either on the site or. .
outside the fence. I agreed to an interview but indicated that their l l
-l i
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- . ~ - _ . ,_
1
- -. . - - - . . ~ . - . - - - - - . - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - I f .
i
- James G. Kappler (
\
access to the site would have to be arranged with CG&E. I=nediately prior to our exit meeting with CG&E, Schwiers said Alta=uhle was on the telephone and wished to discuss the subject of my interview with the press. Schwiers said CG&E vould agree to allow Channel 9 ed interview me in Daniels trailer. I then spoke with Altamuhle who asked whether I would be villing to be interviewed by other news aedia people if he set up a press conference in downtown Cincinnati. Since I had already made a commitment for an interview with Channel 9, I felt I had no choice but to agree to meet with others. I told Altamuhle I would "make myself available" to the news media. I
- 24. (Page 14) - Although I informed OIA, their report emits the fact that Applegate stated he was. calling at this time from the offices of the Chic.ago Sun Times. Since he was in Chicago we arranged to meet him in the FBI's Chicago office. We did not ask him to come to Chicago.
Since the matter of Applegate's transportation is not relevant to the purpose of the CIA investigation I can only conclude that this information was included as a means of implying that Applegate was ill-treated by us. The implication is made that we requested Apple-i gate to come to Chicago from Cincinnati and then refused to provide him transportation to the airport after our meeting. If CIA could recall and saw fit to raport that we refused to give Applegate a ride,
, it is difficult to understand why they did not recall and report that i
Applegate made his contact with us from a Chicago. newspaper office. I regard this selective reporting as reprehensible.
- 25. (Page 14) - It is my impression that OIA interviewed Buckley but their report does not provide any information regarding the interview or state that it was conducted. 'It does not state that a copy of our report was sent t,o the FBI. )
- 26. (Page 14) - The report does not state that I attempted to interview A11 dredge during the next few days but was informed that he was out l of the country and would not return until about May 20, 1980. {
- Further, the report does not state that I contacted two other PM j personnel in Cincinnati by telephone or that we transcribed the tape i Applegate gave me. It also does not state we made the tape and draft transcript available to OIA or that it was available for review by '
Region III supervisors.
- 27. (Page 15) - This sentence should at least read: Region III was !
already aware of-problems relating to velding through numerous NRC inspections which had'previously been conducted before we heard from Applegate. Any people Applegate mentioned with the exception of Sellers were se-1 curity guards or pipefitters, most or all of whom had been fired fo'ir time card cheating. j .a e g.,,, w.. '+ = = + - ' * * * - - = = m-**==* * * * = - "+ - - e _N" _
. t James C. Kappler 7-
- 28. (Page 16) - I don't recall how I characterized 'the manual to OIA but in fact it is the manual for the fundamentals of Inspection course.
Its contents are a written discussion of various topics which are orally presented to grcu;: f !" :rsonnel periodically. The oral presentation is not a recitation of the written material. To por-tray the manual as an instruction which must be followed is incorrect. The paragraph quoted was written to convey the idea that telephone complaints, concerns or allegations are documented by a memo to file if an investigation is not considered necessary. Normally, if such a contact results in an investigation, a personal interview is arranged with the caller to obtain more detailed information. The telephone contact in those instances is not usually vritten up because of the ensuing interv1ev includes that information. r 29. (Page 16) - Ward selected the Core Spray System. We proceeded to the val],% and asked for all ralLography film packets on that system. Until we asked for them no one could have known we would look at the=. We stood there while they were pulled from the file and handed to us. 8
- 30. (Page 35) - Regarding there being no cover up, the report should state that another NR remained open. I think our report more clearly states why the lining out occurred.
- 31. (Page 35) - Regarding ultrasonic tests. OIA neglects to state that I informed them, and it is stated in our report, that the reports on the magnetic particle and ultrasonic incpections performed by PM were reviewed by Vandel and that we interviewed the PM personnel who performed these inspections. Both they and Pullman-Kallogg, who also performed ultrasonic inspections, concluded the velds ware acceptable. .
. WNV C. A. Phillip
- Investigator l
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_ . . _ _ . - . L_. . . - -- 4 investigation (April-May 1980). The CAP petition listing the allegations (pages 13 and it.) which were presented as not being appropriately investigated is included, with enclosures, as Attachment 3. - Meetint with Ration III Personnel On January 13, 1981 David H. Gamble, John R. Sinclair, and Arthur A. Schr.ebelen, Office of Inspector and Auditor, met with the following employees of II, Region III, at the regional office, Glen Illyn, Illinois: James G. Kappler, Director, Region III A. Bert Davis, Deputy Director Charles E. Norelius, Assistant to the Director Gerald A. Phillip, Senior Investigator Gaston Fiorelli, Chief, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch ' Kavin D., Nard, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Support Section f 2, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support 3 ranch i . The meeting was held at the request of CIA lo infor= these Region III personnel of the purpose of the CIA investigation being initiated. These employees were informed that the investigation was directed by the Chairman in response to Thcmas Applegata's allegations as described in the GAP petition to the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protectien Board. They were informed that DIA was investigating the NRC's handling of Applegate's original allegations, to include why cartain allegations allegedly were not addressed by 'NRC and whether Region III's investigation adequately dealt with the allegations that were addressed. At this point Mr. Phillip inquired whether the investigation was not g/ actually an investigation of his conduct. He displayed a copy of a draft of CAP's oetition which he said made numerous allerations aeatnst hda by name.fMr. Kappler then inquired as to whether he should be obtaining lawyers to represent each of his e=ployees. CIA confitned ' that Phillip's name .ves similarly used in the " final version" of CAP's petition.. O!A indicated to all employees present that they had an absolute right to have a lawyer present when they were interviewed but that DIA briefly could not advise them whether lawyers were necessary. . CIA did recount , that GAP had verbally advised CIA that they considered P M "'" ~~ 7'~O~ '
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i 3 i 5~ their allegations to be more against the NRC than individual e=ployees. CIA repeated that, similarly, the CIA investigation vould concentrate on how the agency handled the. matter. In response to a question about 0IA's ability to investigate a satter which also alleges that the Director of CIA did. not act quickly enough on the earlier allegations, the group was advised that the Chairman sus j asare of that aspect of the case. The amployees present raised no additional substantive questions. CIA asked each to locate any documentation of their activities such as notes which ther might have so thev could be reviewed during their interviews. g Phillip pointed out that he had destroyed his notes prior to having / M heard of GAP 's petition. *
/
. Interviev of Gerald A. Phill10 i
Mr. Gerald A. Phillip, Senior Investigator, Region III, II NRC, was
- interviewed on January 14 and 15,1981, by David Cachle, John Sinclair,
' and Arthur Schnabelen, CIA, at the NRC. Regional Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois. Mr. Phillip began the interview by explaining that his first knowledge of the Thomas Applegate allegations occurred approximately February 28, 1980. Phillip recalled that he was contacted by 3111 Ward, Executive Office for Operation Support (IDCS), II, during which Ward related that he had received information from one of the Ccamissioner's offices which l had been contacted by Applegate. According to Verd the information related to the Zimmer Nuclear Plant site and the initial determination l vas that there may be some significance to the information. Ward also - ' related that Applegate alleged that there uns a possible conspiracy between the site contractor and utility to cover up defective welding. Ward also stated that apparently. Applegate had made previous contacts with the NRC and felt that he was "getting the run-around" because he j did not see NRC taking any action. Phillip stated that he contacted Applegate the same day and obtained some of the general information concerning Applegate's claims. Phillip ! also stated that arrangements were made to meet and interview Appleeste j for more details.r enu11p recalled that after talking initially to j g Tjiplegate, he (Phillip) believed that there was information which appeared to be casting a shadow on NRC inspectors. Phillip contacted Ward at NRC ' Naadquarters in Bethesda and notified him of this fact.l Ward then informed Phi.111p that no inspectors should be brought in on the initial phase of the inquiry and'if additional personnel were required then Ward would make someone available from Readquarters. Phillip then stated that 'within the next few days arrangements were made to have another 2 investigator from Neadquarters meet Phillip in Cincinnati to assist on the interview of Applegate. verd advised Phillip that he would have e l l - _ , - . _ - . . . . . -
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4 1 . 4 I 1 i i r 6 . l l Len Winiamson neet Phinip in Cincinnati to help with the interriew. Phi uip explained that the initial, plans to interview Applegate were complicated by the fact that Applegate was very cautious in his instruc-tiods and guidelines for the meeting. As he recaued Applegate would not provide his address or the address of a neutral meeting place. Applegata had advised Phinip that when he or the NRC investigators arrived in Cincinnati they should can a specific telephone nu=her for additional instructions. Phillip stated that on March 3 after arriving in* Cincinnati,
- he contacted Applegate at which time Applegate instructed the NRC investigators to meet him at an address which turned out to be a church parking lot.
I PhiHip explained that he and Winiamson arrived early and eventually were approached by an individual who identified h1=self as Applegats. liter the initial meeting the three of them went to a roo ing house that 4 was located approx 1=ately one-half block away. Applegate advised phinip and Miniamson t< hat he had received threats as had the landlady at the My rooming house. lFrom Phillip's observattens it actearadithat Applegata rented a room in a house which was owned by a police =an and his wife. ' i Shortly af ter arriving at the house Ipplegate took off his jacket revealing that he was wearing a firearm. Applagate began by providing sona infor=atica pertaining to his background. Applegate told Ph11110 that be had been einployed by a security firs /which did work in diveres inves-iraci:nsk gg "Initiany ha (Applegate) had been assigned an investigation involving a i pipefitter" at the Zimmer site who had been suseec ed e' " playing e around" by his wife. Af ter the ] divorce-tves investigatienlhad been sta'rted, Applegate began to discover information of "ti=a card padding" i by individuals employed at the Zimmar site. Applegate inforned phinip that his supervisor, Major Cox, contacted the utility co=pany, Cincinnati Gas and nectric (CC&E), to advise them of the discovery. Subsequent to the contact the utility contracted with the security firm for the services of Applegate, provided him wi h a false identity, and instructed i him to look further into the time card padding. Af ter Applegate began the assignment he began to provide the utility with weekly reports which confirmed the time card padding and disclosed a degree of collusion between certain pipefitters and security personnel at the site. Applegate explained to Phinip and provided Phinip the opportunity to review security reports which described security guards' permitting pipefitters to leave the site during working hours without " clocking out." Applegate also explained that during the same cima frame (December 1979-January 1980) information began to be developed identifying the inegal sale of firearms at the site. Phi uip also indicated that Applegate had surfaced
' information disclosing that the site supervisor, Mr. Marshall, utilized site materials and personnel to perform work on his private residence.
According to Phi n ip, Applegate stated that Marshall's acts were dishenest,
- however, when he (Applegate) brought the information to the attention of CG&E the cocoany refused to take action assinst Marshall. IAccording to g6 Applegate the condoning of these type of acts was -going to have a major impact on CC&E and, in effect, put them out of business.
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' 7 Applegate continued by explaining sone of his concerns to Phillip about potentially faulty welding. Phillip explained that Applegate stated that FM was radiographing velds which were questionable. Applegate did not i appear to know who was resoonsible for their instructions: CC&T er l Kaiser. fWovaver, someone had directed FM to go back and "re-exa=ine 1
p velds." Applegate inforned Phillip that either CC&E or Kaiser ignored , g7 PM's radiographs of the velds because such examinations normally only constituted a visual inspection and not a radiograph. This according to j Applegate uns done at the direction of Mr. Marshall who instructed FM to
" examine" but not radicerach. l Phillip stated that he believed Applegate was referring to a specific shipment of pipe that had .been delivered to 4
the site in the fall of 1979 and improperly unloaded (dropped off the t:uck) without a quality control inspection. Applegate infor=ed Phillip that this incident took place around the time of an NRC hearing on Zimmer. Applegate said that mch controversy was generated at the hearing
. regarding fuel rods that were allegedly dropped; but in fact it was these pipes - not fuel rods - that were dropped.
As background, Phillip then provided a brief description of the supplier. Pullman-Kellogg and the delivery. Phillip stated that Full =an-Kellogg was the supplier (vendor) and therefore was responsible for the Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) verk related to 'the veld and the structure of the nice. I As a nor al procedure QC inspections are not V
'done at the site for adequacy of the equipment or the velds. Phillip g further stated that the equipment is inspected only for damage in transit and inventory purposes during a " receipt inspection" which does not include either visual or radiography examinations of velds.
Phillip said Applegate provided him with three specific exa=ples of welds mjected by FM but then approved by Kaiser. Applegate clai=ed 2 that one uns buried in concrete and he felt the utility was not going to do anything to correct it. 1 Another area related by Phillip pertained to Applegate's disclosure that l there were " problems" with a pipe flushing operations. Apparently, i someone had informed Applegate that as a result of banging pipes during , the flushing procedura deleterious substances came out of the pipes and i the " flushing" failed the test. The individual who observed this problem attempted to resolve it by raising the issue with his supervisor. i Applegate claimed that the individual subsequently quit because there was no action taken. As the discussion continued Applegate also stated , to Phillip that another individual at the site had been keeping a notebook i or log on his observations at the site. Applegate did not identify the - individual and could not furnish specific information, such as the content of the ic5 or why the individual vss keeping it. Phillip also ); recalled that Applegate mentioned having been trapped by a fire down in ' one area of the plant. .
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Applegate the: identified as indiv*. dual be the ca=e =f %- av v' e wa s
.e eleved hv C0&I. I Phillip stated that ace::di=g to Applegate. M: rav /
8 V [vas "all rir5 =eanise that he veuId ceeterate v*.th M. 4plega:e nen , ; proceeded to tall Phillip that he (Applegate) had provided Murray and ; , , schwiers. CA Superviser, informa:1cm abou: the alleged defe: ive we' ding ' l and the specific locaticas of the welds 1: qu estion. Phillip believed
- Aoplegate said that Schwiers had one veld tested, feu=d it to be defective, ,
- and the= related tha: :he weld would be fixed -
?hillip then stated tha: Applegate conti:ued de i=:erview by clat=ing that i= formation was developed pert =*
- g :s de *.*=e card paddi g. _
j Phillip further stated that Applegate i=f =ed '*- ^a: COE :::ified ' the Kaiser Corporati:n Isadquarters is Calif =ia of the ti=e card cheating. Subseque== to this notificati: represe::atives fr:= Iaise- > i case to the Zimmer site and 1. ore i=f::=ed that evide::e was eb:ai=ed . i that t==fi:ned the ti=e :ard paddi:g. 1:plegate also advised Phillip . that C0&E : 1d Kaiser tha: they had a= i.dividual woning u:dar::ver. Applega:e the: stated that shortly after cis =eeti:3 de under::ver cperati:n was te=isated because of :ve fae :rs: (1) Kaiser was ==v > aware da: someo e was under:over for C0&Z; and (2) the vife cf the ' 4 - subject of the orig 1=al divorce i=vestiga:1:n had made visits :s the - site a=d Applegate feared dat, if he unre Observed by h re , she =ight i rewcal his true identity. r Applegate relatad to Phillip that he had been ::yi=g :: bri:3 de 1 fer=a- , tio= to the a::ention of 110 because alth: ugh de ti=a card probles was bei:g addressed to acti:n was bei=g take: about the QC issues. A:plega:a l t:1d Phillip that he origi ally c=ntacted U.S. Se:ater Jch: Cle=='s office to asprise him of the i=fermati:= a=d cc:ais assistance. Se:ater C'e=='s . of* ice previded him wid the naea of Ja=es ----* gs. Oirect:r, CIA. 510. Phillip . hen explained da: Applegate cla1=ed he c::: acted % d gs by teleph=ca and related de informati:n cc:cemi=g the pr:ble=s a: the :
- timmer site. Applegate also related s Phillip that he (Applegate) became frustrated with "**-s as a result of several telephone c== versa- -
tions with c-**-: which cu?ntwated with C *:ss' requesti=g that Applegate provide'"something is writisg" cenpiling de allegations. Phillip stated that applegate thought abcut the request over a weekend
' sad became angry. According to Phillip, Applegate stated that he. was i
upset about the request because he (Applegate) had been i=curri g pers==ai expenditures to bring the information to someone's attention and ocv he was requested to do more. Applegate said he then called Chai:=as Ahear e's office whc apparently referred the matter to II. Phillip stated that Applegate stated that he provided the same information to the f't w*nnati office of the Tederal 3areau of ::vestigation (73I). Phillip explained to Applegate that the type of allegatiens b :cght to the attention of the FBI were items not' withis the jurisdiction of R0 and would not be addressed during an RO investigation. Phillip also s advised Applegate that allegations of crSt-m? activity at the site
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4 i 9 would have to be handled by the appropriate agency. Phillip said he explained that the cost of construction (i.e., cost overruns) also was not a matter within NRC jurisdiction. Phillip explained that Applegate ves not happy with his (Phillip's) explanation regarding the NRC's position but Applegate did not challenge the response. Phillip stated that the only other remarks made by Applegate related to - a variety of problems which allegedly indicated that there was mis-management and cellusien between pipefitters and security personnel. Applegata stated this demonstrated that there was not a proper ce==ia ent to building a nuclear plant. Applegate also stated that Ws a result of l N his attempting to bring infor=ation to officials of CG4Z as well as 1 others GRC. PBD 3 he had been threatened, run off the road and his i landlady had been harrassed and threatened over the telephone. Applegate g $provided audio-additional tapes. According infor=ation to Applegateto Phillip in the formon the information ofthe excerpts from tapes indicated l, collusion berveen high level managers of the project. Applegate played portions of tapes for Phillip Wich he (Applegate) believed corroborated his allegations. Phillip said Applegate controlled the recorder and only played selected segments for Phillip . describing the conter. in. I ' which each one occurred. Phillip explained that Applegate would not i
' release the tapes because he considered them to be " insurance." Phillip said that many of the tapes were difficult to understand; in those I
j instances, Applegate interpreted dat was being said. Phillip stated that, based on dat he heard on the tapes he did not heat any infor=ation l which indicated there uns some type of collusion or cever up going on at the Zimmer site. Phillip said that, after Applegate had skipped around on the tapes, Applegate confirmed that he had played all the i=portant parts. However, Phillip did state there ves seme infor=ation en the tapes that identified three specific welds dich uns detailed enough to check into during an investigation. Phillip stated that in his opinion cements like 20 to 30 percent of the velds at the plant are defective were too general and needed.nore support before they could be investigated. l I Additional infor: nation which Applegate furnished to Phillip, related to the manuf,acture and sale of belt buckles by personnel at the site. Phillip stated that he advised Applegate that, although some of the material used in the manufacturing of belt buckles any be required for construction purposes, it ses a problea dich should be addressed by CG&I, the licensee, and vos not within NRC's jurisdictional responsibilities. Applegate also provided information about people being fired for time card padding or cheating. As Phillip recalled, however, Applegate did not state that any of the individuals fired as a result of his investiga- ' ' tion into time card cheating were in fact the same individuals do had attempted to raise safety issues. Phillip advised that the only docu-i mentation furnished by Applegate during the initial interview were reports submitted by the security fira (Confidential Service) who e= ployed *: Applegate and were under contract to CG&E. Phillip said Williamson left l the interview to photocopy these reports at the Federal Building in I l mn -
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8 -. .,. - . . 10 Cincinnati. He said Winia= son spoke with an F3: agone and obtained a ' copy of a February la, 1980, F3I latterhead memorandum which confir=ed that Applegate had spoken with the FBI. The letterhead memorandum also reflected that an Assistant United States Attor=ey had declined prosecution on the matter. Phin ip recaned that he had a subsequent telephone conversation with
- Applegate on March 4,1980, during which they discussed two points: (1) ggf My what would be the best approach in trying to contact the individual who l ouit over the flushing operatiotvand, U.) to confirm details about an individual Applegate mentioned previously by the na=a of Seners (phenetic).
Apparently Seners was still employed at the site and had been keepi=g a
! list of defective velds rejected by PM but approved by Kaiser. Phinip said that he asked Applegate whether Seners ever shared this list with him as Seners said he would; Applegate responded negatively. Phillip said he also Applegate was confirmed referringwhich to, of the Seners brothers at PM was the ene i
Phinip then stated that, af ter returning to tihe Regien In office and _reviewingt seme oil the material furnished by Applegate, he (Phillip) had a discussion wits Chuck. Norelius, his supervisor, regarding the anega- / tions. Phinip explained that the meeting was heli to establish what
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issues were going to be investitated bv NRC. I fhinip also explaiaed that he had already made an initial assessnent of the information and had informad Applegate, in _ general tar =s.* of which allegati- is were within NRC'y jurisdiction. I Phi? lips the stated that he relied on his
! vast experience with the Ccumission and his professional experience in j judging what issues were goint to be investfrared i
- en,112.p cont.=uen my h / stating tsat there were additional discussions with region person =el after they determined that the weld 1=g a negations were going en be investigated. Phillip stated that Kavi= Ward, an 1:spector, had been assigned to assist him in the investigatien.
) YM111p said that Bin Ward, II Headquarters, contacted Phinip on
- March 13 to apprise him that Applegate had contacted IE Headquarters and
- informed them enat the PM trailer had been broken into and some records were anagedly stolen. Phillip then can ed Applegate on the same day to obtain specific information regarding the incident. Phinip recaned that Applegate could not provida any information related to specific
[ documentation which may have been taken from the PM trailer. The interview continued with Phi nip's explaining that the issues were l "scoped" but iniciany they were probably somewhat general in nature and i not very specific./ rnillip also stated that the early briefing of Norelius was general, however, he (Phinip) recalled providing all - available documents furnished by Applegate for review by Norelius. i Phillip then stated there were subsequent telephone conversations with Applegate after Region In sent the latter describing the anegaticas (issues) and scope of the upcoming Region In investigation. Applegate
- never indicated during thasa conversations that he was not satisfied or .,
that NEC was " limiting" or "too narrowly investigating" tha anegations. f
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e 11 Pertaining to questions about regional procedures and discussion of the initial allegations, Phillip responded by stating there were several discussions with different regional personnel. ' Phillip stated he had l conversations with Messrs. Nore11us, Kavin Ward, Vandel (Project Inspector), 3 Danielson (Kavin Ward's supervisor), and perhaps, Fiore111 and Knop. As Phillip recalled the discussions were general in nature and not too detailed. Phillip stated that he did not recall discussing the =atter 3 h $with James Keppler, the Regional Director. Phillip did state that 1.en Williamson's (assigned from II Headquarters) involve =ent was very 11=1ted and as a result he was not requested to write or docunent any infornation obtained during the initial Applegate interview. Phillip explained that he did not believe that there was ny advanced notification sade to the Zis=er .?ite and was about 95 percent certain that it was a "special unannounced investigation." Phillip stated there was no fixed policy on announcing investigations. however. erobab1v =est . are unannounced. I Fhillip indicated that he did not believe that a licenses could alter "coor eerformance" ranidiv eneud to affee- 4-:e=M- . eations.1 Phillip continued by stating that he and Kavin Ward initially vent to the Zimmer site and had an entrance inte-viev vie e hvd site CA Manager. e e-=. -5 . V f?h1111p was not sure how specifically they identified /
,,' I the allegations to Schweirs; they probably identified them as CA/0C 1 proble=s without seecifvine the area of welding. I After oeeting with Schviers they interviewed Alan Sellers, QC Supervisor for FM vho stated that he ves unaware of any list illustrating velds rejected by FM which were subsequently accepted by Kaiser. As a result Phillip and Ward l
decided to inspect a representative " system of velds" in order to determine whether or not there uns a problem with velds. Phillip recalled that Ward was familiar with velding at the Zi==er site and thereforefassecf?M \ p/4 to pull raciograpas anc "reacer snests" to ceter=ine nov =any EM radiogra:A
" rejects" were everruled bv Kaiser and subsecuentiv aceroved. I Fh1111p
- stated approximately 99 unid radiographs were checked and only two were overruled. Phillip explained that in both cases Kavin Ward concurred with Kaiser's interpretation of'the radiograph.
Concerning the three specific welds alleged to be defective, Phillip stated the radiographs were reviewed by Ward who discovered that problems with the radiographs and/or documentation existed but had been identified in a comprehensive revtev of FM radiographs conducted by another firm, NES. Phillip advised that Ward could better answer specific questions regarding the velds. Phillip then stated that he did not check into the " break in" of the FM ' trailer and, in fact, did not knov if the trailer was broken into or if
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documents vere taken. Phillip noted that the licensee is responsible for maintaining the reco'rd copies of all documents, so PM's copies were not the official ones. . i
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l i T. 12 ! l l Phillip stated that at that time he also atta=pted to address de allega- ! tion involving alleged problems in the " pipe flushing" procedures. I Phillip advised that the allegation arose from the initial allegations l made by Apslegate; however, after contactice the individual who had _
" Iknowledge of the problem (Tyner)t he [(Phillip) was unable to obtain any) b7 Specific information.f The individual did Inform Phillip, however, that ',
, the " hydro test" was run and the system was modified after the test thus ! invalidating the test. l This statement resulted in an inspection unich j y disclosed that the circumstances, as described by the individual, were 4 b8 factual. Phillip then stated that the " hydro test" was going to be rerun with an inspector present. hillip explained that the next allegation which was addressed had to do with the handling of five " spool pieces" (pipe). According to Phillip,
.at the ti-e that he and Ward 1 arrived on site these pieces of pipe were Jin a " hold starus."1 however, they vare not " tagged" as such. Lhe spools were shipped by the vendor, Pullman-Kellogg, and were "u= loaded" at the
' site by " dropping them off the truck onto the ground." Phillip stated the pipe was approximately 12 inches in diaceter and over a half-inch in vall thickness. Regarding the radiographing of the pipe, Phillip explained that the pipe las radiographed by PM for " info:mation purposes" and not as part of a regulatory requirement or appropriate test procedure.
@hillip stated that C:ME and/or Kaiser were therefore committing to radiographs and documentation as it related to the condition of the pi:e
' when a visual inspection would have been sufficient. N.ip notec taat l PM found " rejectable indications;" they did not.actually redeer t he pipe because oniv Kaiser could aceeet er re4etl/ Subsequently, an NI y was issued and ultimately an NR uns imprope-47 vritten which resulted in some of the otoe beine released from the varehouse and installed. ,
. However, one rusaining NR ves written which still kept the proble=s with l the pipe as an open item of nonconfor=ance. Therefore, Ph1111p did not believe there ses any type of cover-up; he said that Kaiser, by installing the pipe at this, point, was assuming the risk that the pipe might later be found to be unacceptable. Phillip then stated that none of the , individuals interviewed believed that there uns a " hardware problem,"
f only a "panerverk problem."/Phillip continued by stating that apparently
- the .QA Supervisor, Schwiers told someone to "line through" and void the N1L I Phillip stated he interviewed Schwiers regarding the alleged instruction i at which time Schwiers denied giving anyone instructions to line through items identified on an NR. Phillip concluded this portion of the interview i
' by stating that he did not take any sworn statements or vrite reports of interviews and did not believe it was necessary. . . ! Phillip continued by explaining that, even after he left the Zimmer site i he thought that maybe all the work had not been done - although he had told CG&E that there was one item of noncompliance. Af ter returning to Region III Phillip discussed the results of the investigation with Norelius and also told Norelius that he had some concerns and belirred l . j
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. that more verk was going to have to be de=e. Phillip then s:ated that he retur:ed to the site several weeks later with ancther h7.0 inspe::=r.
- Tom Vandel, to =aka further incuiries regardist the s:cols. i c.1. Aap 4
!statea that the pipe was checsac and t ey c= ca=::ated en the "paperverk p robles."
2 ; Phillip recalled that he received a call during the first day or so cf - the investigation fece another i=vestigator in Region III, Jim Tester, ' I
- who advised t=at Applegate had called the Region and explained that he (Applegate) was contemplating goi=g to the FM pecple and pcssibly the
] ' nev<cacers. This ec=urred about April 7. IceC. accordi:3 to Phillip. dp
- Millis then stated that he con: acted Ace'letatel and : Id hi= tha: he uns f ree to go to the press, however,1: elemted any chance of Applegate's maintaining his ceufidenciality. Phillip believed that Applega:e did 1 :
then go to .he press, probably the Chicago Sun Ti=es. 4 Is response to a question regarding pr:cedures for ide::1fk:g individuals cetracted a:d reecried in II investiga:1ces.I Faillip sa:ec ::a ::e l . pr:cecures do call f or mer.1=g an ice::1 fica:1:n key. /?hillip the: 1 s:sted that thera uns no ide=tificati:n kav for his invas:1gatien. Phillip said that he nede one attempt to contact an f.sdividual ca=ed
., "Ahan" who Aceterste et ai=ed uns koesi:t some twee of iour 41. I ?hillip_I gg said Reside = Isspec cr Cact als nn ucesssfullv_tried to loeste Jehaa.
_throuth the Zis=ar switchbosed. ] Phillip said he did =ct pursue the ; satter further because Applegate did so: supply any speci*ics of what
- the journal contained.
] Phillip continued by explat-Sg that shortly after Applegsta "ve:: 4 public" a reporter fro: Channel 9, Cincinnati, centac:ce '"- - - Mai: information about the investigation. *he reperter asked if he c:uld interview Phillto on the site er it the rate.1 Phillip nac a cascuss:.cn 4 vita Schwiers, QA Manager, CG&I, v4o stated that they would per=it . Channel 9 to come on the Zimmer site for an intarviev in Resident ! spector,
- (lLf # Daniels' office. Sonatise later, Mr. Altamuehle, C0&E public relatie=s officer. asked 7511113 if he we.uld atte d a press conference dev ::vn. w
' This apparently was dcne to provide the other represe=tatives of tue media an oppertunity to learn about tLe results of the investigatica at the site and not just pro <1de a story for one st.ation (Channel 9). Phillip then expla1=ed he went to the Resident Inspector's trailer and was interviewed by Chr.nnel 9. Later the see day he (Ph1111;) vent to downtova Cincinnati to attend the press conference. Appr:ximately 20-25 reporters were in attendance sad the two main points of i:. teres: vere the welds an the pipe spool pieces which he stated were "CK" and that the licensee was scing to be cited for an iten of noccca;11ance relating to records and violating " hold" procedures. As Phillip racalled, one
- reporter asked abcut drugs and alcohol on the site and the fact that wrkars were ecuing to wrk drunk or intoxicated. Phillip replied to i
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the question by explai=ing he did not know of the anegation, as stated. . When asked whether NRC was concerned about this, Phinip replied that it was the employer's concern because, even if a drunk welder made a bad weld, the licensee's QC inspection program was designed to catch faulty L workmanship. Phillip stated that Mr. Borgmann, V.P. of Engineering,
- CG&E, and Mr. Alteauchle were also present* in the press conference.
Phi nip explained that on May 7, 1980, he had several different telephene
- conversations with Applegate, Bin Ward (II Headquarters), and Rita Giordano (reporter for the Cincinnati Inquirer). Apparently Applegate had new infor=ation (capes) which he cla1=e'd indicated that CG&I.had lied to NRC .
and that there was a crdminal conspiracy. According to Phi n ip he etutacted Applegate who explained that he had evidence in the form of taped conversations with individuals which showed there was a conspiracy on the part of the licensee and Kaiser to prevent FM from disclosing defective velding at i the plant. Phinip stated that he decided that if Applegate, in fact, had lthis type or inf ormatied it would be better to interview Applegate i at an F31 office. This apparently was c=ncurred in by Bill 'Jard and ' Norelius. Phinip explained that he thea talked with Jim Oonahue, k Region III's Chief of Safeguards and req:ssted that ha =ake arrange =ents i i. for an interview date. Donahus then con:ceted Special Agent Robert Buckley, Atomic Enertv Desk. Chicato Field Of fice. FBI. phillie stated that the : ppt y -A4 interview took olace in the Direksen Federal Butidt- e ii devntev- Chieneel f i
~ at which time Applegate presented the "ttpas and made his allegations. '
Af ter listening to the tapes Buckley advised Applegate that he did not ' hear anything which constituted a violation of the Federal crd d-=1 l statutes. The taped conversations vers =adp by Applegate of telephcne conversations he had with representatives of FM, including the president of the company, Mr. A1 dredge. Phillip then stated that Applegate was not satisfied with the results of the interview and the fact that the F3: did not accept his (Applegate's)
- ' claim that the tanes were evidence of criminaliev.1 Phinip also stated that Applegate was complaining of not having aay money or t;ansportation to the airport for his return flight to Cincinnati and requested FBI or
- l. NRC transoortation. Phillis stated Acolerate's recuest was denied,_f7E~
the close of the interview Buckley advised Applegate that the NRC would provide him with any additional information obtained and a copy of the I gg $NRCreportwhentheNRCinvestigationwasconcluded., Phillip also told Applegate that he would further review the taped conversations (which , i Applegate provided) and interview A1 dredge. Later the same day Phillip explained he was caned' by a reporter, , Rita Giordano, wanting to know what happened at the meeting with the l )- i PBI. Phinip stated he provided Giordano basicany the same information ; described above. Phinip went on to explain that he then made attempts ! I to contact A1 dredge and eventua n y interviewed him on May 20, 1980. The peut contact with Applegate came on June 7,1980, at which time Applegate j l- MS stated to Phinip that he (Applegate) was "not sitting sein." Phinip #, l i l l l
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advised his a copy. Applegate that a report would be cening out and NRC would provide 1 In response to questions about velding problems at the Zi==ar site which i vare described in Applegate's " Confidential Report" compiled during his contract assig=nent at the site Phillip provided the following responses . 4d who may have had h:culedge of the velding problens; hovaverPhi not believe that it would have been fruitful to " track people down to, Phillip did , y obtain veld infernation" because Region III was already aware of uelding \_ difficulties and nu=erous NRC insoections had been ecoducted. I Phillip radiographs. Phillip also noted that individualIveldersl wuld no k a position to know what subsequent actions vere or w 5 ere not taken to
. correct deficient velds.
f Phillip ves then provided as cpportunity to review the list of allegations described in the petition to the Speelal Ccunsel. Upon reviewing the P_ , allegations Phillip provided a response to each allegation identifying allegations which had been previously addressed during either his investi-gationtions. allega or other Region III efforts and' thosa which appeared to be nev E Phillip said there was no explicit 5E policy on hev to write the " details" ? section of investigative reports. He said the investigator uses his E discretion to prepara the report in the vey which best presents the information to the reader. Phillip said that although so=eti=es the r the report by subject natter. report is a series of interviews, he often feels it is better to or are no stated: docu=ents which c:cprehensively su==ar12e what each vitnessHe sa a only by title) on each issue.the report presents what each vitness said (identifying them . that investigations of allegations are bestPhillip further stated that he believed - reported as follows: (1) . state the allegation; (2) list details provided by the alleger; (3) I state the findings; and (4) list details supporting the findings . - Phillip said he did not take acy written statements in this case He . vitness or alleger sign a statement.said it is up to each investigator's discretio when he asked an alleger to sign a statement containing his allegationsPhillip
- Phillip or help the doubted allegers that this approach be nore accurate. would help pin dovu the allegations s
Phillip said that he generally
- does notconflicting receiving obtain statements significant infor:fromnation.
any witnesses unless he feels e he vill b time the thought even entered his sind was in connection with thPhillip said the only of thethe fivenotation spool piecesbeing to be crossed installed. off the nonconformance ereport circu= stances which allowed f consensus, !. off unswhich he believed also included Norelius' view, was thatPhillip noted h crossing oot this identified [ini the syste7=that significant because the preblem was still
=
edad therefore lit turned out that stata=ents were[ c e we . . w i~ _ we * *
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4 _... ,.... . . _.. .. . 9 16 Phillip said that having II investigators administer oaths to witnesses is a relativelv new idea. He said that oaths are a useful tool, however
- they are not appropriate for use in every situation. Phillip said caths have been used only sparingly. Phillip noted that II investigators do -
not have general authority to administer oaths. He said that investigators must receive a written delegation of authority to administer' oaths in each case from the Regional Director and the delegation rust receive the , advance concurrence of the Office of the Executive Legal Director in . Headquarters. Phillip believed this was a rather cumbersace approval process if it is really intended that they use oaths. Phillip also noted the practical problem that an investigator does not icacw what the situation is until he gets into the field, yet the authority to administer oaths must be requested in advance. -
,;gg Phillip said that the jU. Inspectors Manual is a training tool l for new I
personnel. Phillip said he wrote Chapter 5 vnich addresses investigations. Phillip's attention was directed to paragraph 1 on page 6 which states: Ivery complaint or allegation received, regardless of the source or ' the avenue of com=unication involved, must be evaluated and docu-mented. There are instances wherein tha cosplaint or allegation obviously has no substance and it comes from an individual suffering from a mental disorder. Even in those cases, at least a me=o to the files should be prepared - documenting the contact, the general- ) content of any communications and the basis for the conclusion that the matter need not be pursued,further. Phillip responded that this passage means that investigators cannot
- dismiss entire contacts without appropriately-documenting it; however, it does not require itanization of specific allegations and how each one vould be handled.
Phillip said that people outside the nuclear field generally do not realize the number of checks and balances that exist at nuclear power ? plants. He said that as an example it would require a lot of collusion to get all the required signatures on a false document such as en NR. Phillip is' not stated that, although review of documentation is necessary, it true that II inspectors limit their inspections to " paper reviews." ' He said it uns more than common for inspectors to _ look at the hardware itself. He also pointed 'out that, .under the II modular inspection program, the licensees notify II of when certain tests and activities are to be performed and II-inspectors than witness them. Phillip said
- that in this investigation Kavin Ward reviewed radiographs, which Phillip considered to be "hard evidence." Phillip said that II does not have i
independent capability to perform its own radiographic testing to double-check the ' licensee's radiographs.. Phillip did not consider this to be a y problem because the licensee would not have thad ttmel to substitute radiographs after Ward and he had randomly selected the system they intended to review.
.1
- Changes incorporated pursuant to reinterview on 8/4/81.
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velds vould be reviewed. Phillip noted that, inasmuch as Applegate claimed he brought these velds to Schweirs' attention, the licensee =ay have expected that someone would be reviewing this veld se=e:1=e. ! Investicators' with Phinip only. Note - After a lunch break the interviav was continued Phi nip said he knew from his first visit to Zi=ner that the notation on NRJI-1911, Rev. 2 - which was holding up installation of the spool pieces - had been lined out; however, he .did not establish who lined it out. Phinip said he also realized on his return to the Regions 1 Office after the first visit that Applegate's anegation was that the spool pieces were bad at the factory - not that they were da= aged when unloaded from the truck. Phillip said that he discussed the matter with Neralius and, forinvestigation further these and other reasons, they decided that Phinip should do at Zi=ner. Phin ip said that the Zi=ner personnel knew aheadhe of was time.returning because he so infor=ed Schweirs a couple days 4 Phinip said he established that Mr. Oltz, with Kaiser's Docu=ent Control ' Unit, was the one who lined out the NR notation. Phillip could not recall NR byCitz' liningexcuse, f.t out was but incorrect. 01tz did agree that his =ethod of closing the Phillip said the varehouse =an who released the spcol pieces based on the altered NP. infor=ed him that he was present when Schweira directed 01tz to line out the notation.
~
I Y Phinip said he did not pursue the matter af ter Schweirs denied it because the " bottom line" was that there was no cover-up, as evidenced ;
.ad by fcne -otnert NR that remained oeen on the matter.JPhinip su V to be only a " paper prtblem." 1 Phiinp said that, t
in fact, the spool yy pieces s.1 -passed.....- ultrasonic tests PM and Pu112.an-Kallogg perfor=ed between ! Investizacors' Note - Toward the end of the interview, Ward returned to advise CIA that he had just learned from Len Wood of C0&E that the three velds are all safety-related. i K-262 and CT-606 are class 2 velds.He said K4916 is a class 3 veld and both l t
- Changes incorporated pursuant to reinterview on 8/4/81.
Interview of Everett L. Williamson, Jr. , Everett L. Winiamson, Jr., Investigator, Region n, II, was interviewed I I at the Washington National Airport, Washington, D.C. , on March 5,1981, by Investigators David Gamble and John Sinclair, CIA. i Winiamson said i he participated in an interview of Thomas Applegate which occurred sometime around March 3, 1980. Winiamson said that about a week before ' i that date his supervisor, William Ward, instructed him to meet Region III Investigator Gerald Phi nip in Cincinnati, Ohio, to assist Phillip in 'an investigation.' Williamson said that Ward informed him that Applegate I had caned NRC; he believed the Headquarters Duty Officer had received . and recorded Applegate's call and Ward caned Applegata back. Ward said g I l
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. . l SEP 41981 ME!ORANDUli FOR: 2. F. Warnick, Chief, Raactor Projects Section 23 FROM: A. Bert Davis, Deputy Director SU3 JECT: ZDO:ER INVESTIGATION, WELD CT-516
. . t s you know veid CT-516 va's' decernised to have indications when it was .
radiographed. This weld is in a system where RT is not required; the ". ,
*- KDE for velds in this 'systen is visual inspection.' I understand based on,the RT that the licensee plans to cut out and replace this weld, If the licensee is doing this because the RT has shown that the veld . '1 is u=acceptabla for the service intended, then this casts questions on i other velds in this systen.- We then need to =ake an evaluation ,
whether the other velds need to be further reviewed. If, on the b.ther hand, the licensee is replacing CT-516 just because the veld indications , have come to the attention of nany people, then there would be no reason . to become concerned about other velds in the systen. . j Please deternine the reason for replacing CT-516 and if appropriate, i assure other velds in the system are reevaluated. A. Bert Davis Deputy Director. , cc: P. A. Barrett - D. H. Danielson C. E. Norelius ' R. L. Spessard K. D. Ward - - ,
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i l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO." MISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT RIGION III Report No. 50-358/81-13 Docket No. 50-358 License No. CPPR-88 Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 Facility: William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station > Investigation At: William H. Zimmer Site, Moscow, Ohio, Cincinnati and vicinity, Sargent & Lundy, Chicago, Illinois, and Other Locations Dates of Investigation: January 12-15, 26-30, Februt ry 9-13, 16-20, 23-27, March 5, 9-13, 17, 20, 23-27, April-14-17, 20-23, 30, May 18-22, 31, June 1-5, 8-12, 17-13, 29-31, July 1-2, 6-7, 12-16, and August 10, 1981 Investigation Team Members: P. A. Barrett Date Reactor Inspector
, J. B. McCarten Date Investigator R. M. Burton Date Investigator E. C. Gilbert Date Investigator .
P. E., Baci Date Investigator 92 nb noe 144c n
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.:..se t v, .5i .i K. D. Ward Date Reactor Inspector C. Erb Date Reactor Inspector J. F. Schapker Date i Reactor Inspector
[ F. A. Maura Date Reactor Inspector ; l J. J. Harrison Date S'enior Resident Inspector Marble Hill F. T. Daniels Date Senior Resident Inspector Zimmer P. Gwynn Date Resident Inspector Zimmer Reviewed By: _ _ _ R. F. Warnick, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section 2B J. F. Streeter, Acting Director Date Enforcement and Investigation Staff A. B. Davis Date Deputy Director 2-
_ ... . _a_- ._ _ . , . __ . __ . _ James G. Keppler Date # Director Investigation Summary: Investigation ' from January 12 throueh August 10, 19'81 (Report No. 50-358/81-13) Areas Investigated: The NRC is investigating quality assurance and quality control problems at the Zimmer nuclear facility as a result of (1) allegations received on November _18, 1980, from an ex-quality . control inspector working at another construction site; (2) allegations received on January,1981, from the Government Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy Studies on behalf of Mr. Thomas Applegate; (3) allegations received from numerous plant workers and ex-plant workers during the course of the investigation; and (4) concerns independently identified by NRC inspectors during the course of the investigaiton. Results: This investigation has identified a number of quality related problems at the Zimmer site. While some actual construction deficiencies, have been identified, the majority of the problems identified to date focus - on the effectiveness of controls implemented by the licensee and its con-tractors for assuring the quality of work performed. In that regard, numerous deficiencies have been found concerning: traceability of materials, control of. weld rod, handling of nonconformances, interface between construction and quality control, quality records, and the licensee's overview of ongoing work. . 9
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CONTENTS 1 Page Reason for Investigation ............ .............................. 6 S umm a ry o f F a c t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Details
- 1. Personnel Contacted ...................................... 8
- 2. Scope .................................................... 11
- 3. Background ............................................... 11
- 4. QC Allegations ........................................... 12 a
4.1 Nonconfo rmance Repo rt Void'ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2 Bolt Hole Preparation ............................... 43 4.3 ASME Code Data Package Discrepancies ................ 44 4.4 Threatened Firing ................................... 52
- 5. Applegate/ GAP Allegations ....................... ........ 55 5.1 Unsuitable Piping Installation ..................... 55 5.2 Imp r o p e r Fi t t in g s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 5.3 Clogged Drains ........................,............. 66 5.4 Weak Valve Materials ................................ 69 5.5 Weld Rod Control .. ..................... ........... 69 5.6 Argon Gas Exposures ................................. 74 5.7 Damaged Prefabricated Piping ........................ 78 5.8 Prefabricated Pipe Welds ............................ 80 5.9 Des'ign Control ...... ............................... 89 5.10 Cable Tray Hangers and Loading ...................... 92 5 .11 Clo g g e d In ta k e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 5.12 Overpressurization Incident ......................... 105 5.13 Lax Fuel Security ................................... 109 5 .14 Al c o ho l a nd D ru g Ab us e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 5.15 Employee Dismissals ................................. 126 5.16 Radiographer Suppression ............................ 129 5.17 Indus t ry Bla cklis ting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 5.18 Inspector's Journal ................................. 142 5.19 Pipefitter Joke ..................................... 143
- 6. Allegations Received Through Site Interviews ............. 144 6.1 Inspector Harassmeat ................................ 144
; 6.2 Weld Inspection Criteria Deleted .................... 153 6.3 QA Surveillance Reports ............................. 156 4
E 7. Independent NRC Inspection Findings ...................... 159 7.1 Control of Structural Steel Beams and Beam Welds . . . . 159 [ 7.2 Cable Separation .................................... 163 l 7.3 CG&I Audits of Sargent & Lundy ...................... 166 l l
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- 8. Unresolved Ityms ................................... ... . 170
- 9. Open Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ ............... .. . 170 10.'.qExit Interviews .................................... ... . 171
- 11. Management Meetings ................... .... ............. 172
- 12. NRC Actions and Licensee Commitments ......... .... .. 173 Exhibits i
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= ~~ - -w-ewa - .m- e mg a . REASON FOR I.%~ESTIGATION On November 18, 1980, a former Quality Control (QC) Inspector for the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station contacted NRC Region III (RIII) and provided allegations concerning the Zimmer quality assurance (QA) program. The individual was interviewed and the investigation of the allegations received began in early 1981. On January 5,1981, the Government Accountability Project of the Institute for. Policy Studies (a non government agency), on behalf of Thomas Applegate, requested that the Merit Systems Protection Board investigate the conduct of an earlier investigation by RIII of allegations provided by Applegate.
.A list of nineteen allegations was included in the GAP letter.
This-investigation was initiated into the above matters. (The NRC's Office of Inspector and Auditor was assigned the task of determining the quality of the earlier investigation by RIII.)
SUMMARY
OF FACTS Since January 12, 1981, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been investigating alleged quality assurance and quality control irregular-ities at the Zimmer nuclear facility. This investigative effort is co= prised of four areas as follows: (1) allegations received on November 18, 19SC, . from a former Quality Control Inspector working at another construction site; * (2) allegations received in January 1981 from the Government Accountability Project of the-Institute for Policy Studies on behalf'of Thomas Applegate; (3) allegations received from numerous contractor workers and former plant workers during the course of the investigation; and (4) other problems I independently identified by NRC inspectors during the course of the investiga-tion. The investigative effort, which is still ongoing,.has thus far resulted in the interviews of over 90 individuals and the expenditure of approximately 182 staff days onsite by NRC inspectors and investigators. Although the investigation is continuing, a report covering efforts to date is being issued at this time in recognition of the significant public interest in this matter. In a related matter, the Government Accountability Project, in a letter to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, dated December 10, 1980, charged that NRC had failed to perform a thorough and complete investigation into allegations made in February 1980 by Applegate l and requested a separate investigation into that matter. 'An investigation has l
. been performed by the NRC Office oof Inspector and Auditor to review those I charges.
The current investigation has identified a number of quality-related problems at the Zimmer site. Although some actual construction deficiencies have been
' identified, the majority of the. problems identified to date focus on 'the ineffectiveness .of. controls implemented by the licensee and its contractors
. for ' assuring the . quality of work performed. In that regard, numerous
- deficiencies have been found concerning: traceability of materials, control of weld rod, . handling of nonconformances, interface between construction and quality control, quality records, and the licensee's overview of ongoing work. The total impact of these' quality assurance deficiencies on the actual quality of construction has yet to be determined.
+ H- s .
i In additien to the previously discussed quality defic:encies, numerous prn-
- blems have been identifed with respect to the accuracy of quality-related l records. This matter is being reviewed by the NRC Office of Inspection and Auditor for possible criminal considerations.
Based on these findings, consideration was given to the need to suspend construction activities. However, recognizing the nature of the problems disclosed (largely programmatic), and the fact that ongoing work would no; compromise the ability to accurately determine the quality of completed work, it was concluded that halting construction activities was not required. Rather, attention was placed on establishing controls to assure the quality
- of ongoing and future work and to define a program to both confirm the quality of completed work and correct any identified deficiencies.
Following a meeting with NRC on March 31, 1981, the utility implemented several actions to correct identified quality assurance weaknesses and to preclude their recurrence. These actions , which included sug=ented QA staffing upgraded procedures, improved training of QC Inspectors, rein-spection (100%) by the licensee of contractor QC inspectior.s, and other
.QC and QA program improvements were confirmed in an Immeditte Action Letter to the licensee on April 8, 1981.
By letter dated May 11, 1981, the Government Accountability project requested the Regional Director to recommend suspension of the construction permit because of repeated noncompliances with NRC regulations and nu=erous allega-tions of inadequate construction practices. The information provided was carefully considered; however, it was concluded that there was no basis at the present time to recommend such action. A comprehensive program has been developed by the licensee and NRC to confirm the adequacy of completed construction. This program cust be completed and i identified problem areas resolved before an Operating License will be granted. l In addition to witnessing and reviewing portions of the Quality Confir=ation l Program conducted by the licensee and its contractors, NRC will be conducting l a program of independent measurements to further evaluate the adequacy of con-struction. i
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DETAILS
- 1. Personnel Contacted Cincinnatic Gas & Electric
*W. Schwiers , QA Manager
*J. R. Schott, Plant Manager
*W. D. Waymire, Manager, General Engineer
*B. K. Culver, Manager, Generation Construction
*S. C. Swain, Site Construction Manager
*H. C. Brinkman, Principal MI - Nuclear
*R. P. Ehas, QE
*E. A. Borgmann, Senior V.P.
D. Kramer W. Murray, Senior Engineer B. Gott,. Field Structural Engineer L. Wood, QA & S Engineer F. Lautenslager, Security Supervisor Kaiser Enrineers. Inc. (KEI) J. P. Coyle, V. P. Power Division
*R. Marshall, Construction Superintendent.
*C. H. Stanfield, Construction Manager
*E. V. Knox, Corporate QA Manager
*P. S. Gittings, Site QA Manager F. J. 01:2, Supervisor Document Control S. Godsey, Lead Code Forms T. Schmidgall, Field Verifier T. Edwards, Field Verifier W. Puckett, Welding Engineer P. Norman, Piping Lead QC Inspector C. Cherry, QA Inspector D. Fox, Lead Mech. Piping Quality Engineer A. Lanham, Senior Engineer K. Shinkle, QC Engineer K. Burgess, Inspection Supervisor C. Burgess B. Winters T. Foster B. Lake J. Deerwester, QC Inspector D. Painter, QC Inspector ,
C. Oldenski -1 C. Camaron l W. Hamm, Sr., General Foreman Pipefitter
' D. Haff, Pipefitter Superintendent J. Mills, QC Inspector R. Baker, Inspection Supervisor J. Tyner, Kaiser Pipefitter Superintendent
*Present at exit interview on March 26, 1981.
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L. Cummings D. Parlier G. Adams', Structural' Superintendent or Ironworker Superintendent K. Taubien, NR Controller R. L. Reiter (NW)**, Document Reviewer i J. H. Mulkey, QC Inspector J. T. Sandlin, General Superintendent (Structural) A. Pallon, Jr., QC Inspector M. McCoy, QC Inspector S. Heath (NW), Inspection Supervisor W. Racer (NW), Lead Elect. Quality Engineer i M. Kopp, QC Inspector & QC Engineer & Lead Insp. Elect. ^ D. Donovan, lead Civil / Structural QA Inspector W. C. Dumford, QC Inspector (Trainee) J. Ruiz, QC Inspector. D. Taylcr, QC Inspector L. Q. Hendley, QC Inspector S. Burke, QC Inspector D. J. Luttman, QC Inspector D. O'Keefe, QC Inspector
. P. Brown, QCI Trainee
- S. Barger, QCI Inspector J. Movatt, QC Inspector B. Hargrove, QC Inspector T. Dakin, QC Inspector J. Tanner, QC Inspector J. Heimpold, QC Inspector
.W. Kitchen, QC Inspector W. M. Sharp, QC Inspector P. S. Wimbish, QC Inspector E. J. Kwalick, QC Inspector T. Smith, QC Inspector W. Smith, QC Inspector L. Ritchie, QC Inspector '
S. Tult (NW), QA Engineer G. Jodrey (NW), QC Inspector , E. Schroeder (NW), QC Inspector i R. Turner (NW), QC Manager M. Ward (NW), (QC Inspector Butler Services. Inc. J. L. Ramsey (NW), QC Inspector W. R. Jackson (NW), QC Inspector R. B. Price (NW), QC Inspector B. E. Tyree (NW), QC Inspector J. R. Booth (NW), QC Inspector M. E. White, QC Inspector
**NW indicates no longer working for that company.
9
~~ _ __.__ _ . . . . . _ _ . .. ._. .
Nuclear Enerav Services. Inc. ? R. Baker, QC Inspector Supervisor < J. B. Sullivan,' QC. Inspector V. Ferretti, QC Engineer-L. Ludwig,.QA Manager L. Anderson, QC Engineer
- Peabody Magnaflux, Inc.
i
- E. Aldredge, President i C. Wood (NW), PM Office Manager A. Sellars (NW), PM Radiographer S. Binning (NW),~PM Radiographer D. Hang'(NW), PM Radiographer .
D. Binning, PM Radiographer Yoh Security i J. Caplinger (NW), Sec. Guard Supervisor J. Bice, Security Officer - W. Ross, Lead Security Officer
.D. Simpson, Security Officer J. Hyde, Security Officer R. Wright, Security Officer i
W&W Protection Agency. Inc. D. Shinkle, Security Officer J. Bedinghause, Security Guard Supervisor N. C. Ward, President 4 Sargent & Lundy 1
'R. Pruski, Engineer T. McKenna, Engineer D. Fox U.S. Testing
- J. Ruiz (.W'),'QC Inspector C. Sheridan General Electric Company' T. F. Van Natta, Site Control & Instrument Engineer
~' T. E. Bloom I ' Westinghouse, Inc. Y. Reiter, Radiation Chem. Tech. _- -.. .. ,...._.~ . _.,._,_,.y ,____
,y _,
,_.4 .. _ ._ -. -J -
Confidential Service M. W. Cox, Director T. Applegate (NW), Private Investigator Hartford Steam Boiler and Insurance Co=cany
.L. Burton, Authorized Nuclear Inspector Individuals
- J.'Woliver, Attorney At Law A. Dennison, Attorney At Law L. Seiler, Attorney At Law Dr. J. Frankhauser, Professor, Univerrity of E. Hofstadter, Former Huskey employee
- Individuals A through I
- 2. Scoce
! This investigation focuses on allegations and concerns provided by Thomas Applegate, the Government Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy Studies, and for=er and present QC Inspectors. The report also documents those items independently observed by Region III . personnel in the course of the investigation. The report is not intende.d to be all-inclusive since there are additional allegations that will be documented in subsequent
- reports on this investigation.
- 3. Background In late 1979, while involved in an investigation for a client which was i of a personnel nature, Private Investigator Thomas Applegate (Confidential Service) found that one of the individuals was employed at the Zimmer con- ;
i struction site and was involved in " timecard cheating." Applegate approached his employer and Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (owner of Zimmer), with
~
this information and was awarded a thirty-day contract to investigate onsite timecard cheating. Timecard cheaters were identified and documented within two weeks,. and then Applegate, on his own decision, began to pursue rumors of improper site construction. CG&E, when told of the information gathered by Applegate, indicated that they were aware of the situations described. The thirty-day contract (December 10, 1979 through January 4,1980) was not extended despite objections by Applegate. In February- 1980 Applegate contacted the NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor. Subsequently, on February 28, 1980, he contacted the office of NRC Chairman 4 Ahearne and was referred to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Per-sonnel from Region III contacted Applegate by telephone on February 28, 1980, and he was interviewed in person on March 3, 1980. He provided a number of allegations, several of which did not relate to activities within NRC jurisdiction. A letter was sent to Applegate on March 11, 1980, detailing three allegations that were considered appropriate for investigation. The
- II -
- o -
, , , - , ~
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s investigation of the three allegations took place during April 7-9 and 30,
< May 1-2, 1980, and is documented in II Investigation Report 50-358/80-09 which was issued on July 7, 1980.
On November IS,1980, a former QC Inspector at Zimmer approached the Resident Inspector at another construction site. He indicated concerns rel.tive to the adequacy of the-QC program at Zimmer and indicated that the Kaiser QA Manager was improperly handling nonconformance reports, transferring QC Inspectors, allowing improper QC inspections, and not adequately supporting the QC staff. This individual was contacted on December 9, 1980. Investigation of these j allegations began on January 12, 1981. On January 5, 1981, GAP sent a letter to the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging that the RIII Investigator was negligent in the scope and manner of
- his performance of the-earlier investigation of the Applegate concerns, and
-requesting an investigation of the conduct of the earlier investigation.
This letter contained a listing of nineteen allegations that Applegate/ GAP felt should be investigated. Onsite investigation of the Applegate/ GAP allegations was initiated on January 27, 1981. During the investigation, Applegate and GAP personnel communicated with the RIII office on several occasions. They also provided affidavits from former contractor employees expressing concerns relative to site construction. Some of these affidavits contained new information, and others dealt with problems and issues already investigated. (Some are the same affidavits as those presented at the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Hearings.) During the investigation, several present QC Inspectors approached NRC personnel onsite and expressed concerns relative to the functioning of the QC program. Some of these concerns coincided with those expressed by the former QC Inspector, as outlined above, and some concerns related to new info rma tton. Those allegations and concerns that appeared to be most significant and most likely to produce substantive findings were given investigative priority. In the course of pursuing the items alleged, RIII inspectors performed inspections of areas of construction alleged to be deficient. In some cases, they observed conditions violating NRC requirements that had not been provided as allegations or concerns. Those findings are therefore considered as independently developed.
- 4. QC Allegations On November 18, 1980, an NRC inspector was contacted by an individual who identified himself as a former Quality Controi (QC) Inspector at Zimmer.
The individual alleged that there were irregularities in the welding QC program at Zimmer. On December 9, 1980, the individual was contacted by telephone by the NRC to obtain details of his allegations. During the conversation, he made the following allegations: I t 12 -
- 1. 'Phillip Gittings, Kaiser Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, was voidanc Nonconformance Reports (NRs) based on his reinspection of the acncon-forming items (pipe support hanger velds).
- 2. Bolt holes for large bore pipe support hangers were being made by burning with a welding torch rather than by drilling as required, and the inspection program did not insure that the burned bolt holes were inspected.
, 3. During system turnovers, QA Engineers Leccard Wood and David Fox were identifying numerous discrepancies when reviewing ASMI Code data pack-ages and the discrepancies were being recorded on exception lists in-stead of Nonconformance Reports. The individual said that the QA Engineers were being criticized for identifying of data discrepancies and questioned whether it was acceptable to document discrepancies on exception lists. 4 Phillip Gittings threatened to fire Individual I for refusing to accept a weld and Individual I was also nearly fired for using a magnifying glass when examining welds when, in fact, he was using a mirror to view the far side of a pipe weld. The individual advised that Inspection Sucervisor Rex Baker would have more specific information regarding this matter. On January 27, 1981, the alleger was re-interviewed by the NRC. He stated that the Kaiser QA Manager did not support the QC inspectors at' Zimmer. He said this was evidenced by the voiding of Nonconformance Reports (NR) when the NRs held up production, identified a nonconforming vendor veld, or if the Construction Department objected. He said, in his opinion, the Kaiser QA Manager was convinced by construction that the QC Inspectors were unquali-fied and were wrong when writing many of these reports. He said this was evidenced when Kaiser h' ired Gladstone Laboratories, an outside inspectics firm, to reinspect welds that were previously inspected and rejected by Kaiser , QC Inspectors. He said Gladstone personnel reinspected these welds, accepted some of them, and commented in their report that QC Inspectors at Zimmer were i "over-inspecting" and " nit-picking" duricg their inspections. He took excep-tion to Gladstone's findings and said they reinspected these p.cticular welds according to AWS Code, an inspection criteria that is less siringent than the site Special Process Procedures Manuals (SPPMS). According to the in- 1 dividual interviewed, this led the QC Manager to question the ability of his ' inspectors and listen to the advice'of construction personnel and outside consultants rather than his own inspectors. This resulted in a lack of , independence in the quality assurance program at Zimmer, a problem of which CG&E was aware but had not corrected. On January 27, 1981, the alleger provided a written, sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 1. 4.1 Nonconformance Report Voiding 4.1.1 Allegation As stated in Section 4 of this report, on November 18, 1980, an KRC inspector was contacted by an individual who alleged that Phillip Gittings,
- _ . , ~ . .
. a. . ___ . _ _ _
1 KatserLQuality Assurance (QA) Manager, was voiding Nonconformance Reports
'(NRs) based 1on Gittings' reinspection of the nonconforming ite=s (pipe support hanger welds). Between January 13 and July 4, 1981, 31 current and i.
former Kaiser QC Inspectors and QA Engineers were interviewed by NRC to obtain information regarding the initial allegation. Sixteen of those individuals provided information .that resulted in expansion of the initial allegation into the following areas:
- 1. ' The QA. Manager was arbitrarily-voiding NRs that were not written in
! error.
t
- 2. The QA Manager was diverting NRs by not entering them into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system.
- 3. NRs were being _ voided and their ite=s transferred to Surveillance Reports
+ (SRs).
- 4. NRs were being'impro'perly.dispositioned by the QA Manager and members '
of the Kaiser Material Review Board (MR3) who frequently dispositioned them as " accept as is" when " repair" or " rework" was appropriate per Kaiser specifications and industry codes and standards. 1 S. NRs were voided with the justification "to be reinspected af ter redesign" or " deficiencies would be rewritten on separate NRs." The nonconfor= ng . I conditions were'neither reinspected after redesign nor written on separate NRs.
- 6. NRs were voided by the QA Manager at the request of the Construction Department to avoid rework and schedule delays.
- 7. During revisions of an NR, nonconforming items were arbitrarily removed
{ by.the QA Manager. t (Several of the individuals interviewed provided copies of reports they stated they had retained because cf their distrust of the system.] J
- 4. 1.21 General Back2round 4.1.2.1 Nonconformance Reporting Systes
- .The Kaiser nonconformance reporting system was established to provide control of nonconforming material.- Kaiser Quality Assurance-Construction Methods Instruction (QACMI) G-4, Revision 9,~provides the following procedure
- The QA Department or Field Engineering may initiate an NR when members identify
- nonconforming material, equipment, construction work, or a deviation from i specified. requirements. The Inspector or QA Engineer initiates the NR and
' then contacts the Site Document Control (SDC) NR Controller'who makes a entry-in the NR Log and assigns a KEI Control Number (CN). .The NR.is then reviewed by the Inspector's supervisor or cognizant QA Engineer and forwarded to the SDC' NR Controller who issues the NR an NR Number prefixed with either i
and "E" or "N". NRs written on essential systems / components are given the "E" prefix and nonessential systems / components are given the "N" prefix. e E ss .m eh -es & v . j **=*,->-o.++>en.ne* -= ep < m . w p e. p
_ ;_ _ _a . _ _ _ __ _ T i The QA Manager can approve voiding of NRs "in instances where an NR has been initiated in error,_ due to interpretation or judgement of borderline conditzens, 4 duplications, or where a nonconforming condition has been corrected by the . Construction Department af ter a verbal or written communication from the QA 4 Department..." In these cases, the NR is stamped " Void" with a brief statement indicating justification for the voiding. A copy of the voided NR is required to be retained in the SDC and a copy returned to the initiator.
-The KEI Construction Engineer or his designee dispositions NRs as " accept as is", " rework", " repair", or "rej ect". The " accept as is" and " repair" 1
dispositions require review by the Material Review Board, which consists of
.-the KEI Construction Engineer, CG&E QA Engineer, Kaiser QA Engineer, CG&E sponsoring engineer, and the Sargent & Lundy Design Engineer (for essen-tial material or equipment only). In the case of an ASME Section III Code
. nonconformance, the Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) must be included on all " accept as is" dispositions. Records of all open and closed NRs are retained by the (SDC) NR Controller.
4 I 4.1.2.2 Previous Related NRC Inspection Findings 3 During an NRC inspection conducted December 2-3, 1980, the RIII inspector observed that of 20 NRs written to document American Welding Society (AWS) { welding deficiencies on hanger welds, eight had been voided with the j not'a tion " based on re-inspection." It was also observed that NRs had been ] voided by the issuance of Design Document Controls (DDCs). The inspector , informed site personnel and CG&E management during the exit interview on i , December 16,1980, .that these practices were contrary to site procedures and
' NRC requirements.
I The inspection report containing these items of noncompliance was issued on March 2, 1981 (IE Inspection Report 50-358/80-25). The licensec replied to these items by letter dated March 26, 1981, indicating that a Stop Work Order had been issued prohibiting voiding of NRs, and that this order _ had ! been subsequently rescinded when improved procedural controls were in place. The improved procedural controls consisted of limiting the authertty to void an NR to the Kaiser QA Manager, and the marking of superseded NRs as " super-l seded" rather than " void". The licensee's reply also indicated that Kaiser was performing a complete review l of voided NRs in response to a licensee audit finding. The review was expected to be completed by April 30, 1981, and full compliance with NRC requirements was to be achieved by May 5, 1981. Between December 15-19, 1980, and on l January 5,1981, Lon Ludwig, of Nuclear Energy Services, Inc., audited the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system for CG&E. i 4.1.2.3 Inte rviews 4.1.2.3.1 Interview of William Schwiers f ' On January 16, February 14, and March 22, 1981, William Schwiers,' CG&E QA . Manager, was interviewed by NRC. Schwiers stated that during an NRC site exit meeting held on December 16, 1980, Eugene Knox, Kaiser Corporate QA 15 - ed i A e W.y*=* - f=+= W=p .-wm e , , . . . , , ,g, ,, ,
. .5anager, and Phillip Gittings sere infer =ed that Kaiser was inproperly v::d:ng NRs. Schwiers said he directed Kaiser to aud:: all previously vo:ded NRs and present the results of the audit to CG&E by February 16, 1981. Schw:ers stated he also directed Gittings to cease improperly veiding NRs. He provided a c:py cf a memo he wrote to Gittings dated January It, 1951, in which he requested - Kaiser to respond to Field Audit Report No. 3:0 cencerning the voiding of NRs. A . copy of the memorandum and audit report is included as Exhibit 2. 4
, 4.1.2.4 Interview of Lon Ludvie On January 14, 1981, Lon Ludwig, Quality Engineering Manager, for Nuclear Energy Services, Inc. was interviewed by NRC. He stated that in December 1980 and. January 1981 he audited the Kaiser nonconformance reporting syste: for CG&E after NRC had identified that NRs were being improperly voided. Ludwig >
said his audit showed there were approximately 500 voided NRs, and between one-third to one-half of these were superseded and written on other NRs. He said that some NRs identifying nu=erous nonconforming conditions were had been separated and reissued en individual NRs. One-third of the NRs reviewed were voided as " written in error" without adequate explanation given to justify ! that comment. Ludwig stated that he reccamended Kaiser audit all voided NRs and provide a better explanatics as to why each was voided. . Ludwig stated that the voided NRs he reviewed c vered all areas of plant operation and constructice and dated frc= 1974 to the present. 4.1.2.5 Interviews of Phillip Gittings 4.1.2.5 ~.1 Janua ry 13. 1981. Interview On January 13, 1981, Phillip Gittings, Kaiser QA Manager, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that in October 1980 he voided 7 NRs that were written by , QC Inspectors who were in training. He: said he reinspected the welds identified in the NRs and, in his opinion, the welds set American Welding Society (AWS) Code requirements. He said tha: during an NRC inspectics in Decezber 1980, the inspector took exception to this practice and found the licensee in noncompliance with NRC requirements for i= properly voiding NRs. , Gittings said that, following the NRC inspection, the velds identified en the 7 NRs were reinspected by Gladstone Laboratories, Inc. at the request of Kaiser. He said Gladstone concluded that 4 of the 7 NRs were properly veided because the noted welds conformed with the AWS Code but that the other 3 NRs had minor discrepancies which did not meet the AWS Code. Gittings stated that approximately 500 NRs had been voided by Kaiser at the Zimmer project. A number of these NRs were voided and then revised and put '; on other NRs, or were voided after it was found they duplicated a previously reported nonconforming condition. He stated that the only NRs he voided for having been " written in error" were those from October and November 1980 that
-vere examined during the NRC inspection on December 2-3, 1980.
4 - _ _ _ ._ __ - __ . _ . . _ ._. _
._ _ _ _ _ . i._. _ . .
Gittings stated that during the past six months Kaiser had problems w:th scme of its QC Inspectors who were over inspecting. Gittings said many of the inspectors were critical of the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system and of the Kaiser weld inspection criteria for pipe support hangers and structural steel. He said there were differences of opinion on various code interpreta-tions, which he felt were cc= mon in any weld inspection program. 4.1.2.5.2 Julv 8,1981, Interview On July 8, 1981, Phillip Gittings was re-interviewed by NRC following the NRC investigation of the dispositions of a selected group of about 20 NRs. Gittings stated that the voiding of NRs by clerks and by SDC Supervisor Floyd Oltz was improper because neither the clerks nor Oltz were qualified to ma.ke engineering judgments concerning deficiencies identified on NRs. Gittings indicated that after a December 1980 NRC inspection he directed the NR procedure be changed so that only he could void an h7. "2GC Omf;* Chit'oEoduMIlowea"aW'QC~TEWe(T5Ft'ETn131W
+ 4 r buntered"TiitT tne satseraonectrrJT-crreportig* ._an .NE[and_.regtr+ ~
Cis't'e4 s When questioned about Tiis'-"fTIMTo'Tssu~e~NR's'witli'C'o'titror Nu::oers ' tN-547e, CN-5477, and CN-5479 written by QC Inspector James Ruiz on February 23, 1981, Gittings said he directed Rex Baker, Inspection Supervisor, to void those NRs. He said his action on those NRs was contrary to the Kaiser procedure that only permitted an NR to be voided if it was " written in error." Gittings said those NRs were not written in error. Gittings stated that he voided NRs at the request of Construction Department personnel, but added that he made independent evaluations and decisicas when doing so and was not compelled by construction personnel to void NRs. When questioned Gittings stated he did not know why Walter C. Dumford's NR (CN-4309) was not in the Kaiser nonconformance system and denied diverting that NR from the system. khen questioned about specific irregularities found during the 57C investiga-tion, Gittings concurred that the practices of voiding NRs by stating they "would be reinspected after redesign," by transferring the nonconformances to " punch lists" (lists of items to be corrected by construction), and by placing nonconformances on Surveillance Reports were not in accordance with Kaiser procedures. Gittings stated that Kaiser QC Inspectors were identifying problems at Zimmer. He said CG&E and Kaiser did not have enough sufficiently qualified inspectors. This was evident when Richard Reiter identified a significant material trace-ability problem when reviewing isometric drawings on small bore pipe systems. Gittings said Reiter had initiated a Surveillance Report correctly identifying the problem and he (Gittings) had not adequately answered the report. He said this problem warranted reporting to NRC; however, Kaiser did not do so. He said that eventually Kaiser hired two QA Engineers to review the documenta-tion and they found that Reiter's analysis was correct. [During this inves-tigation, the NRC inspectors reviewed the traceability problem and found Reiter's analysis to be correct.]
I ' " i._ . _ Y _. - _ _ _ _ __ 4.1.2.6 Interview cf Kathy Faubien On February 13, 1981, Kathy Faubion, Kaiser NR Controller, was interviewed by NRC. She stated that Kaiser procedures permit an inspector to call for a Control Number (CN) for an NR. She is required to issue a CN to the inspector, make an entry in the Kaiser Log of Nonconfor= ng Material (NR Log) describing the nonconforming ites, and note the initials of the inspector calling for the number. She stated she never " whited out" an entry for a CN in the log. Faubion indicated that the QA Manager stamps all voided NRs with a red " void" stamp. When she receives a copy of the voided NR, she marks through the CN entry in the log with red ink. She said inspectors frequently call for control numbers and do not subsequently send the NR. In these cases, Faubien said she makes the same " void" entry in the NR Log. Sha said that prior to December 1980, . Floyd Oltz, Kaiser QA Engineer-Records, had the authority to void NRs; however, William Schwiers, CG&E QA Manager, . directed that this authority be vested solely in the Kaiser QA Manager. She said since that time Oltz has not voided any NRs. 4.1.3 Investigation Con:urrent with the conduct of the interviews, the NRC impounded all NRs that had been voided for any reason to assure that all pertinent NRs would be available for this investigation.- The approximatley 500 NRs impounded had been identified during an audit of the NR system by Nuclear Energy. Services, Inc. (NES). NES had performed the audit for CG&E following NRC inspection findings described in Section 4.1.2.2 of this report. Region III personnel reviewed all impounded NRs identified by NES and all NRs provided by individuals interviewed and determined that about 100 of them appeared to fit the alleged categories. Of those 100, about 20 NRs were selected for intensive investigation into their disposition. The results of the investigations of the selected NRs are presented as individual investi-gation efforts in Sections 4.1.4 through 4.1.19. Summary conclusions and findings of the overall investigation in this area are then presented in - Section 4.1.20. 4.1.4 Disposition of Nonconformance Report CN-5412 4.1.4.1 Backgruund Information On December 29, 1980, Walter C. Dumford, Ka'iser QC Inspector, initiated Sur-veillance Report (SR) 2886 to document that a suppression pool liner plate was tensioned before a QC Inspector arrived to verify the initial tensioning. The corrective action to resolve that condition was for an inspector to be present during the seven and thirty day tension checks to verify that the plate was being tensioned properly. i On February 3,1981, Dumford initiated an NR (assigned CN-5412) which also i reported that a suppression pool liner plate was being tensioned in violation l l '_-_J T ~L-_ -- ___-rL__--__-___-______ ~~*
-_ .__--_~~~~ _L . - _ . _ - _ a_
- _r_-_ _
l ;aAI. o, li i: i, of an applied." bold" tag. The NR states " Hold tag was applied while Vall i Plate 10D was in process of being tensioned. Once hold tag was applied ! tensioning was continued until tensioning was completed." 4.1.4.2 Investigation
- 4.1.4.2.1 Interview of Walter Dumford on February 11, 1981, Walter C. Dumford, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed
- by NRC. He stated that on February 3,1981, he was inspecting suppression i
pool wall plates and noticed that a bolt on a plate was not perpendicular to 2 the plate. He said construction personnel were preparing to tension the plate i when he told them he was going to place a hold tag on it, to which they [ responded "try and stop us." i' Dumford said he left the area to discuss the matter with his supervisor, Dennis Donovan, who told him to initiate an NR for the nonconfor=ing belt. ! and to place a hold tag to preclude tensioning of the plate. He said he returned to the suppression pool, placed a hold tag on -the plate, and construction personnel ceased tensioning the plate. He said, however, as he left the area, he heard the tensioning machine reactivate and observed j that the tensioning crew had ignored his hold tag. Dumford stated he advised Donovan of the occurrence and Donovin told hi= to write an NR documenting continuation of tensioning af ter a hold tag had been
~
j applied. - Dumford called the NR Controller, was issued CN-5412, and docu-
- mented the violation of the hold tag. He said that a few days later he was t
- called into the-Kaiser QA Manager's office and was told by the QA Manager, 1 Phillip Gittings', that the NR should not have been written since it was "a software (procedural) problem and not a hardware problem." He said Gittings
! then said, "I'm going to. void this NR because we do not need this kind of paperwork floating around because this is the kind of stuff that causes investigations." Dumford stated that Rex Baker and Dennis Donovan,-who were also present at the meeting, disagreed with Gittings conclusion and advised i Gittings that they felt it was a valid NR. i Dumford indicated that Dennis Donovan called the NR clerk a few days later
- and was told CN-5412 had been reassigned to another NR (the original report ,
had not been entered into the NR system). Dumford provided a copy of the original NR CN-5412, which is included as Exhibit 3. ; Dumford said this incident was a typical example of Kaiser QA management not supporting the QA program on site and being influenced by construction con-siderations. Dunford stated that, in his opinion, the Kaiser QA Manager was . influenced by construction and QA was not independent at Zimmer.
! On February 11, 1981, Dumford provided a written sworn statement attesting -
- to the preceding information,-a copy of which is included as Exhibit 4 !
l 4.1.4.2.2 Interview of Dennis Donovan on February 13, 1981, Dennis Donovan, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on February 3, 1981, Walter C. Dumford contacted him 4 e 0
, , , n _
7 _ 7 , _ _ _ - , -m__
~ ~ - . _ .-. _ _
about a Surveillance Report written against terisioning of bolts on a suppres-sion pool plate without QA coverage. Donovan said he called Ken Shinkle. I the QA Engineer responsible for the suppression pool area, and advised hi= of the incident. He said Shinkle told him to write an NR. Donovan stated he wrote the NR and instructed Du= ford to place a hold tag on the plate. Donavan said Dumfo.d later returned to the trailer and told him that he had placed a hold tag on the plate, but craft personnel had ignored the tag and continued i tensioning the plate. Donovan said he told Dumford to write a second NR l against the continuation.of work after a hold tag had been applied. Donovan ' stated he initialed the second report and called the NR clerk who assigned it CN 5412. The NR was forwarded directly to Inspection Supervisor Rex Baker for review. Donovan said that on February 4,1981, he, Baker, and Dumford were called into Phillip Gittings' office and Baker gave the original copy of the NR to Gittings. Donovan related that Gittings said, "This report is going to be l l voided because this is the kind of thing that starts investigations." ! Donovan said that Gittings commented that inspectors should only write NRs against hardware probitms and not against software problems, and ignoring a hold tag was a proce dural ,(software) violation. Donovan said he and Dumford explained that construction had ignored the hold tag, to which Gittings replied, "If I was in their position I would have done the same thing." Donovan said he responded that a hold tag was the ! strongest QA control mechanism on site and, if one was ignored, an NR should ! be written. Donovan said he and Baker told Gittings they disagreed with hi= and the meeting ended. Donovan said that a few days later he called the NR controller concerning the disposition of CN-5412 and found that the number had been reissued to another l NR. Donovan indi:ated that in his opinion, this was an example of Kaiser QA management not supporting the inspection program at Zimmer. l On February 13, 1981, Dennis Donovan provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding infor=ation, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 5. i 4.1.4.2.3 Interview of Kenneth Shinkle On February 18, 1981, Kenneth Shinkle, Kaiser QA Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on February 2, 1981 he received a telephone call from Dennis Donovan regarding a bent bolt on a suppression pool plate. Shinkle stated he told Donovan this should be documented on an NR and a hold tag l should be placed on the plate to prevent tensioning. Shinkle stated he l later that learned an NR was written and Walter C. Dumford had affixed a l hold tag to the plate. Construction personnel subsequently ignored the l tag. Shinkle said he also learned that a second NR was written by Dumford for violation of the hold tag which he initialed and forwarded to Rex Baker, Inspection Supervisor. l l 20
Sh:nkle stated he later that learned Phillip Gittings, after discussicas w:th Dumford, Donovan, and Baker, did not enter the NR into the system. Shinkle said the report had been assigned a CN and the inspectors' supervisor had concurred it was a valid NR. Nevertheless, Gittings told Shinkle it was not going to.be processed because "The whole thing has been blown out of proportion." Shtnkle stated in his opinion that Kaiser management does not support the QC
; program at Zimmer, construction dominates activity at the site, and QA is not independent of construction influence.
On February 18, 1981, Kenneth Shinkle provided a written sworn statement attesting to.the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 6. 4.1.4.2.4 Interview of Rex Baker On March 3, 1981, Rex Baker, Kaiser Inspection Supervisor, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that in early February 1981 he attended a meeting in Gittings' office with Dennis Donovan and Walter C. Dumford. He stated that during this meeting Durnford said construction had continued to tension a suppression pool plate after he had placed a hold tag on it. Baker stated he agreed Dumford was correct in writing the NR for the hold tag violation. He said Gittings disagreed and stated in his opinion construction was right to continue tensioning the plate after a hold tag had been affixed to it. Baker stated he did not know the disposition of the NR and that it was in Gittings' possession the.last time he saw it. 4.1.4.2.5 Record Reviews On February 11, 1981, the NR Los was reviewed. The log indicated CN-5412 (E-2996, Revision 1) was written on-February 2,1981, for welds having lack j of penetration. This entry does not reflect that CN-5412 had been assigned { to another report written by inspector Dumford on February 3,1981, for ) violation of a hold tag. The Equipment Name or Process Entry column in the l NR Log and the Specification column showed evidence that " white-out" was ! used to cover previous entries in the log. A copy of the NR Log page and NR E-2996, Revision 1, is included as Exhibit 7. 4.1.4.3 Findinas and Conclusions Based on record reviews and interviews of personnel, it was established that CN-5412 was not entered into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system. 4.1.5 Disposition of Nonconformance Report E-5108-4.1.5.1 Backaround Information On May 19, 1980 NR E-5108 was issued identifying a 4-in.-long pipe piece installed per DDC M-1108 in the residual heat removal (RHR) system for which material traceability could not be established. The NR also reports that Weld 80 located near this pipe piece was inside of a vall penetration (M-13), in violation of licensee specifications. The NR was stamped " void"
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.C I
on June 20, 1950, by Floyd Oltz, QA ::g::eer-se:ords. wt: added a te indicating it was voided because " acceptable docu=entat:o: was faced" that established saterial traceability for the p:pe piece. A copy of NR E-5'CS is included as Exhibit S. 4.1.5.2 Investigatio: , 4.1.5.2.1 Interview of Richard Reiter On March 25, 1981, Richard L. Reiter, fermer Kaiser Document Revtewer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was esployed at Zimmer from November 1975 to November 1980. He indicated his job had been to review isonstric drawings and insure that related documentation, such as weld data records, set ASMI Code requirements and that the drawings were correct. He said he found discrepancies l <- between drawings and associated documentation and conditions in the plant. Reiter stated that numbers for pipe sections a:d weld data records did : t . match. He said he wrote NRs on the traceability p chle: and was so ec:cerned about the dispositions of those NRs that on Oct:ber 21, 1980, he wrote Sur-veillance Report (SR) 2819 to Floyd Oltz, his != mediate supervisor. He . stated in SR 2819 that he questioned the dispesitto: of NRs dealing with lack of material traceability and stated with refere:ce to traceability of s=all-bore piping that when reviewing isemetric drawings he was maki:g assu ptiens which he felt ce=pr:mised his integrity. He also asked for a written directive telling him te sake these assu=ptions, or for Kaiser to reevaluate all small-bore isometrics to insure that there was adequate docu=entation i to allow traceability of the material. Reiter stated that 01:2 responded to the SR by indicating that all the pre-cedures were approved and were adequate to meet regulatory and ASME Code requirements and that Reiter was to continue using the approved procedures and practices in effect. Reiter stated he disagreed with the dispositie: of the SR and shortly thereafter terminated his employment with Kaiser, because he felt he was being forced to compromise his integrity. A c:py of SR 2819 is included as Exhibit 9. On 1951, Reiter provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding informatica, a copy of which is also included as Exhibit 10. 4.1.5.2.2 Record Reviews and Field Observations Region III personnel examined the 4 in. section of pipe between Velds 82 and 82a identified on NR E-5108 and on isometric dravi=g PSK RH 15. No heat or identification number on the pipe piece was found. Weld data sheets (KEI-1 forms) were reviewed for Welds RH-82 and RH-82a that joined the pipe piece to the RER system. Both forms had notatiocs initialed and dated "RLR 6/19/80' identifying the heat number for the ' pipe piece as Heat No. 232661. [The initials "RLR" were determined to be the initials of Richard L. Reiter.] The veld records indicated weld dates of June 15, 1976, (Weld RH-82a) and October 14, 1976 (Weld RH-82) four years prior to the heat number being noted. The inspector reviewed relevant veld records, material certificates a:d drawings, and found no justification for utilizing Heat No. 232661 for the pipe piece. i
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Region III personnel reviewed the following records related :o the dispositten
- of this NR:
NR E-5108, dated May 19, 1980 KEI-1 form No. 4826, dated January 21, 1976 KEI-I form No. 1852 Construction Piping Inspection Plan for Residual Heat Removal
. System, Inspection Plan No. RH-15, dated June 16, 1976
- 4.1.5.3 - Findinas and Conclusions Based ~on record reviews, interviews of personnel, and field observations,-
it was established that NR E-5108 was improperly voided since documentation was not found to justify voiding the NR. Disposition of Nonconformance Report CN-4309 4.1.6 4.1.6.1 Backaround Information On January 7,1980, QC Inspector Michael McCoy obtained NR CN-4309 to identify a deficient weld fitup on a 1-3/4-in cover plate to beam W32X260 located on the reactor pedestal support structure. McCoy stated in the NR that; parts to be fillet welded were not as close as practical (as required), but were separated by more than 3/16 in. A copy of NR CN-4309 is included , as Exhibit 11. 4.1.6.2 Investination 4.1.6.2.1 Interview of Michael McCoy On February 11, 1981,. Michael McCoy, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on January 7, 1980, he initiated an NR for welds on the ; reactor pedestal support structure that did not meet code requirements. McCoy stated his supervisors concurred in his findings, and he received number CN-4309 from the NR Controller. He said that after he wrote the NR it was returned to him without disposition. McCoy stated that in addition to voiding this NR, NRs were frequently inadequately dispositioned. He attributed this to the QA Manager's lack of support for either the inspectors or the QC program I at Zimmer. i On February 11, 1981, Michael McCoy provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 12. 4.1.6.2.2 Record Reviews On February 11, 1981, the NR Log was reviewed. .The log indicated CN-4309 was assigned to NR E-2417 which identified' deficiencies in electrical conduit bracing in the control room. A copy of this NR is included as Exhibit 13. i During this review, it was noted that there was evidence of " white-out" in the Specification and Equipment Name or Process, columns of the log. A copy of the NR Log page is alos included as Exhibit 14. i i I l 13 :
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4.1.6.3 Findings and Conclusions Based on recerd reviews and interviews of personnel, it was established that NR CN-4309 was never entered into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system. 4.1.7 Disposition of Nonconformance Reports CN-4955 through 4959. CN-4930 and CN-4931 4.1.7.1 Background Information On July 9 and 22, 1980, NRs assigned CNs 4955 through 4959, 4930 and 4931 were written by inspectors Joseph Mills and G. McCann. The NRs identified weld deficiencies on pipe supports in Diesel Generator (DG) Room A. The 7 NF.a had been assigned CNs but no NR number. Copies of the 7 reports are included as Exhibit 15. 4.1.7.2 Investigation 4.1.7.2.1 Interview of Joseph Mills On June 2,1981, Joseph Mills, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that in July and August of 1980 he identified nonconforming welds while inspecting pipe support hangers in DG Room A. He said he identified these welds on NRs that were assigned CNs 4955 to 4959. He said his supervisor, Rex Baker,. concurred the NRs were valid. Mills stated that in August 1980 he was reassigned from pipe support hanger inspection to structural welding inspection, and a week after his. reassignment the NRs he wrote were returned to his desk without being processed. Mills stated that other NRs written by Inspector G. McCann were also returned to him. Mills stated that in March 1981 he learned of an NRC investigation into the NR system and turned in the 7 unprocessed NRs to the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. He said~the Senior Resident Inspector asked him to reexamine the welds in DG Room A to see if the nonconforming welds he identified were still uncorrected. Mills stated his reinspection indicated that in each case the condition that he had previously identified had been repaired, and the welds were now acceptable. Mills stated that apparently someone had used the in-formation on the NRs to correct the nonconforming conditions. He said, however, this was not done via the Kaiser NR system'since the original NRs and all copies had been returned unprocessed. On June 2, 1981, Joseph Mills provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 16. 4.1.7.2.2 Interview of Floyd Oltz On June 19,1981, Floyd 01tz, Kaiser QA Engineer-Records, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he reviewed the NR Log and found that NRs assigned CNs 4955 to 4959 and 4930 and 4931 had been voided with the comment " Void-NR not issued." Oltz stated that in these instances Kaiser did not retain a copy of the NR in the voided NR file because reports voided as "not issued" are usually returned to the inspector. 24 - ., r-.--- , .- e . - - , ~ . . .- . _ , ~ . - .c . .
m _ . _. ._._ _ i 4.1.7.2.3 Interview of Lynn Anderson , On June 9, 1981, Lynn Anderson, QC Engineer, Nuclear Energy Services, Inc.,
- vas interviewed by NRC. He stated that he is contracted to work as a i QC Engineer for CG&E. Anderson stated he is currently conducting an audit of the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system. Anderson said that on June 4, i.
1981, he checked the disposition of NRs assigned CN-4955 to CN-4959. He [ stated he reviewed the NR Log and found that'those CNs had been assigned and the reports had been voided on September 30, 1980. Anderson said he checked all of the Kaiser and CG&E NR files and could not locate those NRs. Anderson j' concluded that, although CNs had been issued, the reports had never been entered into the active or voided NR files. !
- 4.1.7.2.4 Record Reviews and Field Observations
! hhen the NR Log was reviewed on June 10, 1981, it was found that CN-4955 to j' CN-4959 had been entered into the NR system; however, the entry had been lined through with the comment " Void-NR not issued" and dated September 30, 1980. A review of the NR Log for entries CN-4930 and CN-4931 indicated that they had also been entered into the NR system; however, the comment " Void-NR not issued" and dated September 30, 1980, was entered in the log book page for j each entry. Copies of the pertinent NR Log pages are included as Exhibit 17.
- On June 2, 1981, NRC personnel inspected the areas in DG Room ~A identified on NR CN-5955 through CN-5959, CN-4930, and CN-4931. In 2 of the 7 cases, j
{ it appeared that the welds.had been reworked, but this could not be determined 1 for the other 5.. However, the nonconforming conditions identified on the NRs l were not evident on the welds inspected. i 1 4.1.7.3 Findinas and Conclusions i Based on record reviews, interviews of personnel, and field observations, i it was established that these NRs were voided but were not retained in i Kaiser files; however, copies of the reports had apparently been returned i to the inspector. l' 4.1.8 Disposition of Nonconformance Report E-2466 l 1 i 4.1.8.1 Backaround Information ~ t During a routine inspection conducted December 27-28, 1979, and
- December 17-18, 1980 (IE Inspection Report 50-358/79-37), the inspector i determined that the QC inspection program for safety-related hangers was j inadequate. As a result of the inspection findings, a management meeting e
- was held at the site on January 17, 1980, and a later meeting was held at
- i. the RIII office on March 7, 1980. Corrective actions committed to by the licensee included a 100% reinspection of all installed hangers and restraints .
j by Kaiser QC Inspectors. This commitment is documented in IE Inspection . 1 Report 50-358/80-05, Paragraph 6. On January 3,1980, Kaiser QC Inspectors inspected large bore pipe hangers l' in Diesel Generator (DG) Rooms A, B, and C. They inspected welds on pipe i .
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L support hangers, concrete embedment bolts, and'the configuration and locati:n i of pipe support hangers. The inspectors identified nonconfor= tag Kaiser and f vendor welds on 5. hangers, and improperly embedded bolts. 'They identif:ed
~
a total of 124 nonconforming pipe support hangers, and initiated NR E-2466
' to document this condition. On June 30, 1980, NR E-2466 was voided with the comment "each hanger listed will be issued on a separate NR." A copy of the first 5 pages of this NR is included as Exhibit 18.
1 4 t 4.1.8.2 Investigation {l ' 4.1.8.2.1 Interview of Rex Baker t On March 3,1981, Rex Baker, Kaiser Inspection Supervisor, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was aware that the NR in question was voided and said .i . the reason for the voiding was that all hangers were subject to reinspection because of redesign and new seismic safety criteria. Baker said QA Managers
- _ Phillip Gittings and Kenneth Bumgartner directed that previously inspected i pipe support hangers that were not redesigned would not to be reinspected.
] He said that, since all hangers were not replaced due to the redesign effort,
- some of the -nonconforming hanger welds identified on the subject NR would n
- t l be reinspected. Baker stated that the voided NR was not redisposittened or j~
reopened. Baker indicated that, in his opinion, this was not done because of an administrative oversight by the QA Manager. [ Investigator's Note: The statement that pipe support hangers that had not
.been redesigned were not being reinspected will be reviewed further to deter- '
i .mine if it is contrary. to a licensee commitment documented in IE Inspection Report 50-358/80-05, Paragraph 6. .This is an unresolved item pending comple-tion of that review (358/81 ).]
', 4.1.8.2.2 Record Reviews 1
NRC personnel reviewed the NR Log to ascertain if the hangers identified on a NR E-2466 had been issued on separate NRs as stated. This review indicated that of the 124 nonconforming pipe support hangers only 25 had been issued j on other NRs. Of those 25, 8 had been reworked, 7 had been voided, and the j disposition for the remaining 10 was still open. As of February 12, 1981,
' the other 99 hangers identified on NR E-2466 had not been reissued.~
\ NR E-2466 was reviewed by NRC personnel and it was noted that there was a
- ' comment on Page~2 of the NR' stating that an asterisk identifies "what appears to be vendor supplied welds" on pipe support hangers. While reviewing the 31 page NR, it was found that 15 of the 124 pipe hangers identified have an asterisk identifying them as vendor-supplied hangers. These 15 entries on NR I E-2466 were crossed out without engineering justification. A copy NR E-2466 l is included as Exhibit 19.
l i 4.1.8.3 Tindinas and Conclusions Based on record reviews and interviews of personnel, it was established that NR E-2466 was improperly voided because the condition (reissuance on 1 1 T l 7 I-' _- _ Il _ *
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l other NRs) for the voiding was not fully implemented. It was also established that vendor welds were omitted f rom the NR without engineer:ng justification. < 4.1.9 Disposition of Nonconformance Report E-2836 I 4.1.9.1 Backaround Information i i
- On June 22,1980, NR E-2836 was written by Inspection Supervisor Rex Baker
- ' after an audit by Nuclear Energy Services, Inc., indicated there was no final
~
, weld radiograph for Weld WS737 (service water system). There was a comment in i the." Description of Nonconformance" section of-the NR stating that the only i radiograph available was an "information shot of the root layer" of the weld
; [now buried underground]. The NR was dispositioned " accept as is" on i October 24, 1980, because the weld data form (KEI-1) reported that the final
] weld had been radiographed and accepted by-Kaiser personnel on April 5,1976. 4 This form indicated review and approval of the final radiograph by the
- Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) on April 15, 1976. The " accept as is" E disposition of NR E-2836 was initially rejected by the ANI on November 7, 1980; however, he approved the disposition on November 11, 1980, based on .
! the KEI-1 form entry showing that a final review of the film was performed by the ANI. The NR E-2836 was voided on November 10, 1980, with a comment
- "see Revision 1 for new disposition." There is a comment on the original 4
NR which says " Void stamp in error - Rev. I cancelled when ANI accepted disposition on 11/11/80." NR E-2836, Revision 1, shows the same nonconform-
- ing item with the disposition to " accept as is" and the NR is signed by the j appropriate members of the Material Review Board. Both the original NR and Revision I were closed on November 13, 1980. Copies of NR E-2836 and E-2836, j Revision 1, are included as Exhibit 20.
1' . 4.1.9.2 Investination f 4.1.9.2.1 Interview of Rex Baker i
- j. On June 4,1981, Rex Baker, Kaiser Inspection Supervisor, was interviewed j by NRC. He stated that on October 22, 1980, he initiated NR E-2836 after >
j an audit found that there was no radiograph of completed Weld WS737. Baker j stated he forwarded the NR to Arch Lanham, Xaiser Construction Department, ! who 'dispositioned the NR as " accept as is" based on an entry on the weld 4 data form. The form indicates a ' final radiograph of this weld was performed 1 on April 5,1976, and was accepted by both a Kaiser welding engineer and the
- j. ANI on April 15, 1976.- Baker said the NR was returned to him and he told Lanhas the disposition of " accept as is" was contrary to ASME Code require-
~
i J seats because there was no final radiograph of the veld. Baker said he told Lanham that an entry in a KEI-1 form was insufficient evidence that the weld had been radiographed. j Baker stated he is a qualified Level III Radiographer and that he had previously i reviewed the Kaiser radiographic repo'rt and the accompanying film dated
- i. April 17, 1976. He said he told Lanham the film was an "information shot" of
! the root layer pass and not a radiograph of the final weld. Baker said Lanham j indicated _the disposition was correct because the radiograph review block on i j the KEI-1 form was' checked and if QA did not have the film he could care less, i i t
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Baker stated he told Lanham that construction would have to excavate the well and radiograph it, to which Lanham replied, " Bob Marshall would never let us dig it up." Baker stated Lanham dispositioned the NR as " accept as is" yet he knew there was no radiograph in the record for the final weld. Baker stated that on November 7, 1980, Lowell Burton, .he site ANI, rejected the disposition on NR E-2836 but later rescinded the rejection and agreed with the " accept as is" disposition based on the KEI-1 form entry that the final review hadgenuf armed by the ANI. 4khC*liF?.]hE4aMfWos'itT5_QQ Ma'c, cept.asIf's$nd nPTefrisEJUoY.Fpjac>rr,.in rne .cisposgioh ,because. it 'wap 6,(ontr R M ICodetresup en g g 4.1.9.2.2 Interview of Lowell Burton on June 5,1981, Lowell Burton, ANI for Hartford Steam Boiler and Insurance Company, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that after reviewing NR E-2336 he erroneously accepted the disposition of the NR on November 11, 1980. Burton said he had reviewed the record radiographs for Weld WS737 and found there was no radiograph of the final weld. He stated he has directed CG&I to reopen the NR to reflect this nonconforming condition. Burton stated he based his previous acceptance on a review of the weld data form and his personal notes showing that on April 15, 1976, he reviewed the final weld radiograph and found it to be acceptable. Burton indicated that during 1976 he reviewed up to 100 radiographs per day and could have mistakenly entered in his notebook or on the KEI-1 form that he had reviewed the final weld radiograph for Weld WS737. 4.1.9.2.3 Record Review Region III personnel reviewed NR E-2836 and associated documentation, including the Kaiser Report of Radiographic Examination and accompanying radiograph. There was no final radiograph for Veld WS737. The radiograph referenced as accepted by the ANI on April 15, 1976, is actually a radiograph of a partially completed weld. The radiograph of the incomplete weld dated March 31, 1976, was reviewed by the ANI on April 15, 1976. Apparently, the radiograph of the root pass was mistaken by the ANI to be a radiograph of the final weld. The following records were reviewed by the RIII inspector: NRs E-2836 and E-2836, Revision 1. XII-1 forms for weld WS737, dated April 10, 1976 Kaiser Engineers Radiographic Examination Report, dated April 15, 1975 (and accompanying radiographic film packet) 4.1.9.3 Findings and Conclusions Based on record reviews, interviews of personnel, and examination of the radiographic film for Weld WS737, it was established that NR E-2836 was im-properly dispositioned as " accept as is" and closed on November 13, 1980. The proper disposition for this NR would have been " rework," which would include radiographic examination of the final weld.
4.1.10 Disposition of Nonconformance Report E-1777 4.1.10.1 Background Information Oh April 3,1979, Inspector Terry Dakin wrote NR E-1777 stating that veld 195A2 (isometeric Drawing RI-195) on a pipe support hanger in the primary contaic=ent area bad been performed without QA documentation. Dakin perfor=ed a post-weld inspection and found the weld acceptable; however, no rod slip (also referred to weld rod slip, and KII-2 form) was found to ensure that the proper filler metal had been used. The disposition of this NR was to " rework" and cut out the weld. This NR was voided on April 30, 1979, with the comment
" rod slip located." A copy of NR E-1777 is included as Exhibit 21. .
4.1.10.2 Investigation 4.1.10.2.1 Interview of Vincent Ferretti On June 4, 1981, Vincent Ferretti, Level III Radiographer and QA Engineer, Nuclear Energy Services, Inc. , was interviewed by NRC. He stated he had conducted an audit of the Kaiser nonconfor=ance reporting system. As part of this audit, he had reviewed NR E-1777 and the associated isometric drawings. Ferretti stated that the drawing shows 4 hangers and 6 field welds for each hanger. The isemetric drawing and attached weld red issue slips show, as stated in the NR, that there is no weld rod. issue slip for Weld 195A2. Ferretti stated the weld rod slips attached to the drawing should identify particular filler metal used for each veld, but he was unable to ascertain what filler metal was used. Ferretti stated the discrepancy identified in the NR was correct, and he directed the NR be reopened and redispositioned. Ferretti stated that in his opinion this NR was improperly voided. 4.1.10.2.2 Interview of Flovd Oltz On June 4, 1981, Floyd Oltz, Kaiser QA Engineer-Records, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he had reviewed NR E-1777, the weld data sheets (KII-1), and weld rod issue slips (KEI-2). He said that his review indicated that the NR had been improperly voided. Oltz stated that the disposition " rod slip located" was improper, because the rod slip used to justify the voiding of __the VR does not specifically identify the weld in which the weld rod was used. 5,,nTWnaid at Toune ncthras,,in.c.tne_recoru_WNdTR7(l. Wit,f,f,_rtriviWillifQ.
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4.1.10.2.3 Record Reviews RIII personnel reviewed the following records related to the disposition of this NR: NR E-1777 l Isometric Drawing No. N4713 RI-195 (Reactor Isolation System) l KEI-2 forms 111515,139801,126964,126963,126960,174535, and 174534 i
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t.1.10.3 Findi=gs and Conclusions Based on record reviews and interviews of personnel, it was established that there was no justification for the voiding of NR E-1777 because there was no rod issue slip (KEI-2) in the weld dati package for Weld no.195A2. 4.1.11 Disposition of Nonconformance Report CN-5122 4.1.11.1 - Backaround Information On October 16, 1980, Kaiser QC Inspector Mark Priebe wrote 1GL CN-5122 follow-ing the initiation- of Surveillance Report (SR) 2800 reporting that the flexible outer coating of conduit installed in the Containment Building was splitting for an unknown reason. This NR was not assigned a NR number, yet it was voided cn January 2,1981, with the comment "see attached Surveillance Report No. 2800." SR 2800 was the report used to issue the NR. A copy of NR CN-5122 is included as Exhibit 22. 4.1.11.2 Investination 4.1.11.2.1 Interview of Steven Burke On June 11, 1981, Steven Burke, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. Burke stated that the nonconforming items listed in NR CN-5122 " covering. splitting and separating from electrical cables in the containment building" still exist'ed. Burke indicated that he concurred with Priebe's report that this' probles was serious 'and warranted the issuance of an NR. Burke said Priebe's NR was not written in error, as he identified the same problem at the same locations identified by Priebe. 4.1.11.2.2 Record Reviews Kaiser QA SR 2800 dated June 11, 1981, indicates that on October 9,1980, the outer coating of flexible conduit used in the containment area was splitting for unknown reasons. The corrective action statement in the SR states the deficiency could be serious enough to warrant formal reporting to the NRC. Also included in the corrective action section of the SR are comments that NRs CN-5122 and CN-5196 were voided in lieu of this SR. The
" corrective action verified" section of the SR is stamped " nonapplicable" and dated October 14, 1980. An October'15, 1981, a memorandum attached to the SR from Robert P. Ehas (CG&E) to the Kaiser QA Manager indicates that in Ehas' opinion this satter did not warrant reporting to the NRC. A copy of SR 2800 and attachments is included as Exhibit 23. )
4.1.11.3 Findinas and Conclusions 4 Based on record reviews, interviews of personnel, and field observations, it was established that NR CN-5122 was improperly voided. The SR used to initiate the NRs was apparently used later as justification to void the NRs. These NRs were never introduced into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting systes. ' The l*41ser nonconformance reporting procedure was not followed and this report was misfiled in the " Inspection Report" file. Apparently NR CN-5196 was dispositioned in the same manner. l _ j
4.1.12 Disposition of Nonconformance Report E-2232 4.1.12.1 Background On November 21, 1979, QC Inspector L. Wood initiated NR E-2233 documenting conconforming conditions for Veld WS62GP in the Service Water System. The weld lacked evidence of fitup inspection, welder qualification, and material traceability; however, a final visual inspection of the weld was made and the weld was accepted. On December 21, 1979, M. Teltner, QA Engineer, disposi-tioned the NR and directed it to be " reworked" and cut out. On January 24,
- 1980, the NR was voided with the comment "KE1 form corrected" which was initialed by Floyd Oltz.
The KEI-1 form was initially annotated to reflect that weld procedure, weld qualifications, heat numbers, and ficup would be verified by the QC inspector during inprocess inspection of this weld. The form was annotated with a "NA" superimposed over an mark previously made by a weliing engineer. I NR E-2237, dated November 23, 1979, for the Closed 2coling Water System, reports the same nonconforming condition (i.e. ,14:4 of weld traceability and welder qualification) on another veld. The disposition for this report was " rework;" however, it was also voided by Floyd Oltz on December 19, 1979, with a comment " void rod slip found." This disposition was identical to that of NR E-2233. Copies of NR E-2233 and E-2237 are included as Exhibit 24. 4.1.12.2 Investigation 4.1.12.2.1 Record Reviews NRC personnel reviewed NR E-2233 and related documentation. This NR was voided after the weld data record (KEI-1) form was " corrected." The correction was actually a deletion of previous stipulated hold points, and there is no documentation included to support the engineering basis for deleting the hold points. The following records were reviewed while tracking the dispositions of these NRs: . NRs E-2237and E-2233 KEI-1 forms 18391 and associated KEI-2 forms KII-1 f orms 2554, 2552 and 2560 (Note: During the review of records, Floyd 01tz said he had deleted the hold points f rom the KEI-1 form; however, no signature or date of deletion was noted on the form.] 4.1.12.3 Tindinas and Conclusions Based on record reviews and interviews of personnel, it was established that NRs E-2233 and E-2237 were improperly voided because previously stipulated 31 - I e4 ep e h e=* - e b aw@f Mr -
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. . . . . .~.-. -- hold points were celeted by a document revtever who did not provide engineer ng justification. 4.1.13 Disposition of Nonconformance Report NRC-0001 4.1.13.1 Background Information On February 11, 1981, QC Inspector James Ruiz initiated an NR (given identifer NRC-0001' for this investigation report) identifying nonconforming welds on drywell steel in the primary containment. Ruiz described the ncnconforming condition as an electrode weave exceeding 3/4 in. The NR was not assigned a CN or NR number. The NR had a comment written in the " Disposition" section stating it was "sent back with no reply." This NR was provided to NRC by Inspector Ruiz. A copy of NRC-0001 is included as Exhibit 25. 4.1.13.2 Investigation 4.1.13.2.1 Interview of James Ruiz On February 25, 1981, James Ruiz, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on February 11, 1981, he performed an inspection of a beam located in the Primary Containment Building and noted a nonconforming condition on a weld. Ruiz ttated he wrote an NR on this cendition and submitted it to his supervisor, Dennis Donovan, who concurred and forwarded it to Rex Baker, Inspe,ction Supervisor, who also concurred. Ruiz stated 'that the next day Baker informed him Phillip Gittings, the QA
' Manager had returned the report saying that inspectors were not to write a report against a procedural violation. The NR was then returned to him, without assignment of a CN. Ruiz stated he took exception to Cittings' decision prohibiting inspectors from writing reports against procedural violations. He said the welding procedures delineated the welding speci-fications, parameters, dimensions, and other inspection criteria for judging whether a weld is acceptable.
Ruiz provided a sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 26. 4.1.13.2.2 Interview of Phillip Norman On June 3,1981, Phillip Norman, Xaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on this date he accompanied the NRC Inspector to the Primary Containment Building during his inspection of drywell steel Beam 31. Norman stated be concurred that the electrode weave on a weld on Beam 81 exceeded 3/4 in. 4.1.13.2.3 Record Reviews and Field observations Region III personnel visually examined the weld inspected by Ruiz on drywell steel Beaa 81 located in the Primary Containment Building. The weld displayed an electrode weave in excess of 3/4 in. 32 -
-. - . . . . _ - .. . - , - - . . . .. - ... ,_=
. . .. . . . - - . _. - .. . - ~ .
R II personiel reviewed the NR Log and all Kaiser NRs initiated bet-een February 11 and February 20, 1981. The NR written by Ruiz en February !!, 1981, was not found in the Kaiser files and was apparently not entered into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system. 4.1.13.3 Findings and Conclusions Based on record reviews, interviews of personnel, and field observations, it was established thai NR NRC-0001 was never entered into the Kaiser noncon-formance reporting system. The questioned weld on Beam 81 in the Primary Containment drywell area was visually inspected by NRC personnel; the deficiency identified by Ruiz and reported in the NR was confirmed. The veld is not necessarily defective; however, it did exceed specifications as stated by Ruiz in the NR. The nonconforming condition identified in tne
-y
- NR had not been corrected.
4.1.14 Disposition of Nonconformance Report E-1661 and E-1662 4.1.14.,1 Background Information On February 8,1979, Kaiser QC Inspector David Painter initiated NRs E-1661 and E-1662 identifying nonconforming welds on pipe support hangers in the drywell pneumatic system. Both of the NR were dispositioned as " rework" cc May 2, 1979. On November 11, 1980, the NRs were voided by Floyd Olt: with a comment that the nonconforming hangers would be reinspected after design analysis. Copies of NR E-1661 and E-1662 are included as Exhibit 27. 4.1.14.2 Investigation 4.1.14.2.1 Interview of David Painter On January 14 and June 4, 1981, David Painter, Kaiser QC Inspector, was
, interviewed by NRC. He stated that as a lead inspector he supervises three other inspectors involved in the inspection of pipe support hangers at Zimmer. Painter stated that. inspectors wrote a group of NRs identifying nonconforming conditions in pipe support hangers that have been disposi-tiened as " Void-will be reinspected after design analysis." Painter indicated that when this comment was made, a 100% reinspection was planned for all pipe support hangers. He said that plan was rescinded and hangers are now being inspected according to an M-12 checklist that checks only for configuration and location of the hanger after it is redesigned. Painter indicated the QA Manager said that any hangers previously accepted prior to design changes and not affected by the design changes would not to be rein-spected. Painter said this negated the earlier commitment used as justifi-cation for voiding the NRs, and now inspectors were finding nonconforming welds on hangers that had previously been inspected and accepted. Painter stated Gittings was told about this, and he repeated that if a pipe support hanger had been previously inspected and accepted he was not initiating a NR for reinspection findings.
[As noted in Section 4.1.8.2.1 of this report, the scope of the licensee's program for pipe support hangers is an unresolved item (50-358/81 ).)
4.1.14.2.2 Record Reviews RIII personnel reviewed the following records related to the disposition of this NR: NRs E-1661 and E-1662 Kaiser isometric drawing for Line No. RYIB2BA34 Kaiser isometric drawing for Line No. IIN61AC34 (drywell pneumatic system reactor containment) 4.1.14.3 Findings and Conclusions Based on record reviews and interviews of personnel, it was established that NRs E-1661 and E-1662 were improperly voided because the condition (rein-spection af ter design analysis) for the voiding was not fully implemented. 4.1.15 Disposition of Nonconformance Report E-2996 4.1.15.1 Background Information On February 2, 1981, Rex Baker, Kaiser Inspection Supervisor, initiated NR E-2996, Revision 1, reporting that full penetration welds on T-Quenchers Serial Nos. 001, 003, 007, 0011, and 0012, were found to have a lack of penetration at the backing ring (i.e., split backing ring). However, the rest of the weld was acceptable. The nonconforming T-Quenchers are located in the suppression pool main steam relief system. The NR was dispositioned on February 9,1981, as " accept as is" by Arch Lanham, KEI Construction Department. Lanham's justification for acceptance was that a split backing ring does not affect the integrity of the weld. The licensee's architect-engineer, Sargent & Lundy (S&L), took exception to this disposition and directed that the T-Quencher welds be ultrasonically examined. On February 24, 1981, all the T-Quenchers were ultrasonically examined and found acceptable with the exception of No. 007. S&L dispositioned the NR as acceptable, with the exception of No. 007, indicating that additional data was required to resolve No. 007 because it was not ultrasonically tested as directed. The Kaiser Material Review Board (MRB) agreed with S&L's disposition and granted conditional approval of the disposition of the NR in March 1981. NR E-2996, Revision 1, was dispositioned as closed on March 17, 1981. This NR was closed without any evidence that the required additional examination of T-Quencher No. 007 had been completed. A copy of NR E-2996, Revision 1, is included as Exhibit 28. 4.1.15.2 ci- cigation 4.1.15.2.1 Interview of Rex Baker On June 3,1981, Rex Baker, Inspection Supervisor, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he wrote NR E-2996, Revision 1, en February 2,1981, and that
_ _ _ _e_ . . _ _ - _ _ . . -_. - _- ._ ~ i it was improperly closed on March 17, 1961. Baker stated that T-Quenener No. 007 was not ultrasonically exa=ined as directed by S&L. Baker said the NR was improperly closed by a clerk in the Document Control office on Maren 17, 1981. Baker related from NRC that he learned, E-2996, Revision 1, was closed,
, ifter which he initiated NR E-3172 (which references E-2996 and addresses the issue that T-Quencher No. 007 was not adequately tested as directed :n NR E-2996).
4.1.15.2.2 Interview of Floyd Oltz I On June 3,1981, Floyd Oltz, Kaiser QA Engineer-Records, was interviewed
? by NRC. He stated that NR E-2996, Revision 1, was initiated by Baker on February 2,1981, for nonconforming welds on T-Quenchers. Oltz stated that S&L directed the T-Quenchers be ultrasonically examined to establish 1 their acceptability. He said that apparently T-Quencher No. 007 could not be ultrasonically examined so S&L dispositioned the report as acceptable, with the exceptica of T-Quencher No. 007.
w Olt: stated he gave the NR to Kathy Faubien, NR Controller, who read the initial , disposition of " accept as is" on the NR and did not read the exceptions placed in the rest of the disposition colu=n by the architect-engineer. 01:2 said Faubion mistakenly closed the NR because she assu=ed the condition was " accept i_ as is" when in fact S&L had only granted partial acceptance. Olt: concluded this NR was improperly closed due to a clerical error. 4.1.15 .2.3 Interview of Kathy Faubien On June 4, 1981, Kathy Faubien, Kaiser NR Controller was interviewed by NRC. She stated she closed NR E-2996, Revision 1, on March 17, 1981, because the top of the disposition block-on the NR had the comment " accept as is." Faubion said she closed the NR but did not read the additional comments in the " Disposition" column. Faubion stated that in May 1981 Rex Baker told her 7 ~ she had improperly closed this NR. She said Baker then initiated NR E-3172 documenting the nonconforming condition for T-Quencher.No. 007. 4.1.15.2.4 Record Review Region III personnel reviewed documentation and radiographs associated with NR E-2996, Revision 1. The deficiency, (i.e., split backing ring) is permissible under ASMI Codes for Class C welds and the condition was not nonconforming. However, an ultrasonic examination was performed to verify the location of the split to be in the backing ring and not in the veld. Records indicated that on February 24, 1981, the questioned T-Quenchers were ultrasonically examined (with the exception of Quencher No. 007) and found to be acceptable. It appeared that further ultrasonic testing (UT) or other nondestructive examina-tion should have been conducted on T-Quencher No. 007; however, NR E-2997, Revision 1, was mistakenly closed on March 17, 1981, without examining T-Quencher No. 007. i Region III personnel reviewed the following records related to the disposition of this NR:
* ^
35 - E ! e- o m'me6-w --r= .- a a-e'-g y , g ,e e.egege-d'"*h awg.-- -A . y . ,.,,p..m ,
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. NRs E-3172, dated May 11, 1951, and E-2996, Revision 1
. Nuclear Energy Services, Inc. Report of Ultrasocic Examination, dated February 14, 1961 Sargent & Lundy Engineers, memo dated March 5,1981
+ KII-I form for T-Quenchers 011, 003,.007, 009, 011, and 012 4.1.15.3 Findings and Conclusions Based on record reviews, interviews of personnel, and review of radiographs by RIII personnel, it was established that this NR was improperly closed on March 17,1981, because the required ultrasonic testing of T-Quencher No. 007 was not performed. 4.1.16 Disposition of Nonconformance Report CN-4389 4.1.16.1 Background Information On January 3,1980, D. J. Luttmann, Kaiser QC Inspector, initiated a 33-page NR that was assigned CN-4389. This NR reported various nonconforming conditions in electrical cable, trays, and hangers in the Auxillary Building. The NR was voided by Kyle Burgess on December 2, 1980, because the "NR was initiated just prior to [the] inspector leaving the job. A lot of the ite=s - listed were acceptable in this area. Some items needed reinspection." This NR was recovered from the Site Document Control Vault on June 4, 1980, apparently having been. misfiled with " Inspection Reports" identifying nonconforming material found during receipt inspections. Although the NR was " voided," it was stamped " Inspection Report" in the block reserved for assignment of the NR number. A copy of the first 5 pages of NR CN-4389 is included as Exhibit 29. 4.1.16.2 Investigation 4.1.16.2.1 Interview of Kvle Burgess On June 18, 1980, Kyle Burgess, Kaiser Inspection Supervisor, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he voided the NR assigned CN-4389 on December 2, 1980. Burgess stated that. Inspector D. J. Luttmann was an electrical inspector who had reported various nonconforming conditions in the electrical area. He indicated that he voided this NR because Luttmann had left the site and some of the items had been found to be acceptable; however, some were valid non-conforming conditions. Burgess could give no reason why the voided NR had been placed in the Inspection' Report-file. 4.1.16.2.2 Record Reviews Region III personnel reviewed the following records related to the disposition of this NR. NR CN-4389, dated January 23, 1980. . Kaiser Procedure QACMI G-4, Revision 7, dated April 7, 1980. ! l l 1
- 7. ..
4.1.16.-3 Findings and Conclusions Based on record reviews and interviews of personnel, it was established that there was insufficient reason to justify the voiding of NR CN-4389. 4.1.17 Disposition of Nonconformance Report E-2191 4.1.17.1 Background Information On November 2, 1979,.NR E-2191 was initiated by Richard L. Reiter to report that the consumable insert in a weld in the Closed Cooling Water System was not traceable. Reiter said there was no heat number on the weld red issue slip (KIE-2) for the consumable insert in weld WR-523 on Drawing PSK WR-9. Reiter commented in the text of the NR that he confirmed this by looking at
- the original copy of the KEI-2 form. The initial dispositica of this report was " accept as is" with the reason given that all consumable inserts are purchased as Class I (safety-related) traceable materials. The NE was closed on November 8, 1979, and was reopened after the. Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) rejected this disposition on January 7,1980.
On February 19, 1980, NR E-2191 was voided with the conment that it was redispositioned on NR E-2191, Revision 1. NR E-2191, Revision 1, was voided on February 22, 1980, by Floyd Oltz, with a comment that the weld rod issue slip had been found. There were no engineering or Material Review Board i concurrences on this disposition, Copies of NR E-2191 and E-2191, Revision 1, ar.e included as Exhibit 30. 4.1.17.2 Investigation 4.1.17.2.1 Interview of Richard L. Reiter On March 25, 1981, Richard L.- Reiter, former Kaiser Document Reviewer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on November 2, 1981, he initiated NR E-2191 af ter he observed that Kaiser weld data form (KEI-1) No. 23037 for j Weld WR-523 did not have a heat number for the consumable insert that was used. Reiter stated he checked the weld rod issue form, Kaiser warehouse files, and identical copies of the weld rod issue forms, and found no record ) ' oof the heat number. Reiter stated that if any entries was.found on any of the weld rod issue forms, these entries were false and were made after November 2, 1979. Reiter provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 10. ; , I 4.1.17.2.2 Interview of Floyd Oltz l On February 25, 1981, Floyd Oltz, Kaiser QA Engineer-Records, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that NR E-2191 was written by Reiter when he found no heat number for the consumable insert on Weld WR-523. The NR was dispositioned by
. Louis Boetger with a disposition of-" accept as is" because all consumable 4 l inserts are purchased as Class 1 nuclear grade material. Oltz stated that the l ANI disapproved this disposition on January 7, 1980. This NR was voided on l Februa ry 19, 1980, and was redispositioned on NR E-2191, Revision 1. Oltz
. 37 -
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1-stated that he voided NR E-2191, Revision 1, on February 22,195;, w:th a comment that a weld rod issue slip with a heat number for the consumab;e insert was found. Oltz stated that Arch Lanham had found the rod slip for the weld-with a heat number for the consumable insert. 4.1.17.2.3. Interview of Arch Lanham On March 25, 1981, Arch Lanham, Kaiser Senior Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he dispositions NRs for the Construction Department
- at Zimmer. Lanham stated that he frequently searches for lost documentation, such as rod slips, when resolving NRs in which a lack of adequate documenta-tion was cited as the nonconforming condition. He stated that, in the case of NR E-2191, the nonconforming condition .was lack of a heat nu=ber for the
' consumable insert for Weld WR-523. Lanham provided his copy of NR E-2191 with field notes he wrote when dispositioning the NR. Lanham stated'the original disposition of the NR was " accept as is"; however, 3 on December 17, 1979, he 'noted that Floyd Oltz had the original copy of the NR and he noted on his copy, "could there be more than one rod slip for insert?" Lanham stated there is also a notation that on January 22, 1980, the NR was l still not back from the architect-engineer. After reviewing his notes, Lanham stated that it appeared be reviewed the KEI-1 form and original rod slip [KEI-2 form) and found that he had inspected weld WR-523 on October 17, 1977. He stated there was no heat number for the consumable insert on the KEI-1 form; however, he had reviewed weld rod issue slip No. 97957 and found a heat nu=ber for the consumable insert. Lanham indicated that the heat number for the consumable insert was marked in ink on the carbon form (gold copy of form No. 97957) and was circled in red with his initials. Lanham stated he recalls that he made this entry on
- the gold copy of the form in October 1977 while inspecting the weld. He said 4 there was no heat number on the weld rod issue form and he called the weld rod shack to obtain a proper heat number for the consumable insert. Lanham said he did not make the entry on the form during November 1979 through February 19S0 while dispositioning this NR.
1 4.1.17.2.4 Record Reviews Kaiser isometric Drawing PSK WR-9 for the Closed Cooling Water System was reviewed for line No. 1WR17A3 2-1/2, weld WR-523. The Kaiser KEI-1 form shows , a notation that the heat number for the consumable insert is No. 6059491. I Weld rod issue slip (KEI-2 form) No. 97957 (gold copy) shows that Heat-No. l 6059491 is the only entry written in ink on carbon form. Two other copies of KII-2 form No. 97957.(white copy and blue copy) do not have similar entries for the heat number. Copies of the weld data sheet (KEI-1)~and accompanying weld issue forms (KEI-2) are included as Exhibit 31. 4.1.17.3 Findings and Conclusions Based on record reviews and interviews of personnel, it was established that NR E-2191, Revision 1, was improperly dispositioned because there was no review by the Kaiser Material Review Board and because information from a weld rod 2 issue form (KEI-2), which is a non-QA document, was used to disposition a-QA F document (NR). x . _ . . _ m,
4.1.18 Disposition of Nonconformance Reports CN-Said. CN-5a77. CN-Sa79 4.1.18.1 Background Information On February 23, 1981, Inspector James Ruiz initiated three NRs, nu=bered a CN-5476, CN-5477, and CN-5479, reporting nonconforning conditions on drywell support steel in the Primary Containment Building. Ruiz stated that 'Jelds 63, 58, and 3 were full penetration groove welds requiring 100% coverage by non-destructive examination by either. radiography, magnetic particle, or ultrasonic testing but no tests had been documented. He also found that all 3 velds , lacked documentation for the backing strips, filler metal, welder qualifications, i' or welding procedure. The NR Log shows that NRs CN-5477 to CN-5479 were voiced 2 with the notation " Void-NR not issued" on February 27, 1981. Copies of these NRs were not retained in the Kaiser SDC files. Copies of NRs CN-5476, CN-5477, 4 and CN-5479 are included as Exhibit 32. i 4.1.18.2 Investigation f 4.1.18.2.1 Interview of James Ruiz On February 25, 1981, James Ruiz, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that the Kaiser QA Manager was arbitrarily voiding NRs and he had no assurance that repor s he initiated would be entered into the Kaiser , i nonconformance reporting system or that the conditions he identified would be corrected. Ruiz provided NRs CN-5476, CN-5477, and CN-5479 and stated these l had been initiated by him on February 23, 1981. He indicated he did not think i they would be processed properly by the nonconformance reporting system. t Ruiz provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 26. 4.1.18.2;2 Interview of Dennis Donovan On June 10, 1981, Dennis Donovan, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he had reviewed NRs CN-5476, CN-5477, and CN-5479 and concurred with them. Donovan stated that Ruiz erred in his identification of one defici-ency on these NRs, because a Design Document Change (DDC) had been written by S&L that eliminated the nondestrucive examination (NDE) requirement for welds on these beams. Donovan questioned S&L's waiver of this requirement and said it was contrary to S&L Specification H2174 that requires 100% nondestructive examination of all Class I welds. Donovan stated he had reviewed the DDC and found that S&L waived the nondestructive examination for " ease of construction." He said that, in his opinion, this was not an adequate justification for the noted disposition. Donovan advised that the Kaiser Cocstruction Department is repairing these and other cantilever beams in the Primary Containment , Building. 4.1.18.2.3 Interview of Rex Baker On June 10, 1981, Rex Baker, Kaiser Inspection Supervisor, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on February 23, 1981, Inspector James Ruiz identified ' nonconforming welds. on some cantilever beams located in the Primary Containment Building. Baker stated Ruiz initiated and he concurred in NRs CN-5476,.CN-5477, and CN-5479. Baker stated Ruiz documented nonconforming conditions such as 39 - e e.m . ,g y 6.wwe= *-*9,,ew- _e+_ gw w. .,
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I lack of nondestructive examination of full penetration welds, mater a1 trace-ability and welder qualifications. Baker stated that on February 27, 1981, he voided these NRs with the comment
" Void NR not issued." He stated he voided these NKs after a meeting in February 1981 with Phillip Gittings, Kenneth Shinkle, and Robert Marshall during which the nonconforming conditions identified by Rui were discussed.
Baker said that during the meeting Marshall stated that the welds on these cantilever beams were to be cut out by Kaiser; therefore, these nonconformance reports should be voided. Baker stated that he voided these NRs on Gittings* instructions and gave Gittings the original copies of all 4 NRs.
-4.1.18.2.4 Interview of Kenneth Shinkle On June 11, 1981, Kenneth Shinkle, Kaiser Mechanical / Civil / Structural QA Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on February 23, 1981, QC Inspector James Ruiz initiated NRs CN-5476, CN-5477, and CN-5479.
Shinkle stated he reviewed these NRs and found-that Inspector Ruiz had erred in identifying one nonconforming condition. He stated that a DDC had
! been issued by the licensee's architect-engineer that waived NDE requircrents for the nonconforming beams identified by Ruiz.
1 Shinkle stated that he questioned the justification for this DDC because the text of the DDC said "for ease of construction" NDE is waived. Shinkle said that the welds identified in the NRs are Class I welds because they are welded to the containment liner plate and both S&L specifications and : ASMI Code requirements require 100* NDE for Class I welds. 4 Shinkle stated Ruiz did not err in identifying the remaining nonconforming conditions, such as lack of material traceability and welder qualifications. Shinkle advised that the cantilever beams in question hold up walkways, pipe support hangers, and heating and ventilation ducts in the primary containment building. Shinkle stated that he attended a meeting in February 1981 with Rex Baker, i Phillip Gittings, and Robert Marshall, regarding Ruiz's NKs. Shinkle stated i that Marshall wanted to repair the beams on a case-by-case basis and perform a visual inspe: tion of the welds. Shinkle statec that Gittings agreed with this approach and told him to work with the Construction Department to rework the welds using KEI-1; repair cards without processing the NRs Ruiz had written. Shinkle stated that to the best' of his knowledge the nonconformances written by Ruiz were~ never entered into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system. He stated that this was especially significant'in light of the fact that in February 1981 there was an NRC investigation into irregularities in the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system. Shinkle stated that after Gittings directed him to resolve'the issues identified he conducted an inspection of cantilever beams located at the 572-f t elevation of the Primary Containment Building. Shinkle indicated he found that there was no final QC. inspection on any of the 27 beams and , . 40 - 4-- .e-. . , __
l l 1 l l
- had no record of fitup inspection. Sh:nkle stated he ident:fted the sa.e nonconforming conditions, lack of weld filler metal and backing strip trace-ability, and lack of evidence of welder qualification for these welds. In addition, Shinkle stated he conducted a visual examination of the welds and a . in many cases the welds did not appear to meet Code requirements Shinkle stated he advised Robert Marshall of the above and Marshall stated he did not want to repair the nonconforming conditions because modifica-tions had been made to the beams to add side plates and those plates would have to be removed to conduct inspections of the affected welds. Shinkle 1 advised.that the Construction Department is now in the process of removing the questioned beams. ;
4.1.18.2.5 Interview of-Thomas McKenna On August 10, 1981, Thomas A. McKenna, Sargent & Lundy Structural Project Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. McKenna stated that DDC-712 waived non-destructive examination of full-penetration groove welds on cantilever beams supporting walkways in the primary containment area. The DDC'was written in 1975 to waive the NDE examinations for " ease of construction." He said that at that time the beams supported personnel walkways only and had no appendages affixed.
. McKenna said, in hindsight, that a better explantion of the engineering basis for the waiver could have been written on the DDC (i.e. , the beams supported minimal loads). He said that the S&L waiver of NDE for these welds did not consitute a waiver of other qual'ity requirements, such as visual inspections I
of the welds required by the AWS Code. . McKenna stated that since 1975.there has been extensive redesign of the suppression pool area and the beams now support safety-related pipe supports, air ducts, and-electrical cable tray support hangers. He said that in April 1981, an individual on site questioned the quality of these welds. He said'that during visual inspections the welds were found to be of poor ." quality and documentation reviews indicated that the required docucentation of quality inspections could not be found. He said these nonconforming conditions are currently being addressed and corrected,'and the previous DDC waiving nondestructive examinations of these welds was rescinded on May IS, 1981, by DDC-2635. He said the welds will be repaired and radiographed or magnetic particle tested. McKenna'said he reviewed.NRs CN-5476, CN-5477,.and CN-5479 and stated DDC-712 addressed Item 1 on those NRs concerning a failure to nondestructively examine; these welds. He said, however, the DDC did not waive other nonconforming conditions identified on the NRs, such as traceability of weld ~ filler metal, evidence of fitup inspection, and that the welds did not meet AWS criteria. McKenna stated the voiding of this NR based only on the DDC was- improper and he would not have approved its disposition. He said S&L does not receive voided Nonconformance Reports f, rom Zimmer for engineering review and would not have reviewed this NR if it had been voided by Kaiser. 41
~_ _ __ _
l l l 1 4.1.18.2.6 Record Reviews ; On June 6, 1981, Regina Rudd, Kaiser NR Controller, was contacted and asked to retrieve NRs CN-5476, CN-5477, and CN-5479 from the Kaiser Site Document Control Center. Rudd stated that she conducted a sear:t of the open, closed, and voided nonconformance report files and could not lccate the nonconformance reports assigned these numbers. Rudd provided a copy of the NR Log page reflecting that on February 27, 1981, NRs CN-5476, CN-5177, and CN-5479 were voided with a comment " Void-NR not issued." A copy of the NR Log page is included as Exhibit 33. 4.1.18.3 Findings and Conclusions Based on record reviewsand interviews of personnel it was established the NRs CN-5476, CN-5477 and CN-5479 were not entered into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system. 4.1.19 Summarv Findings and Conclusions , All of the allegations made by the QC inspectors were f:und to be correct. It was found there were widespread irregularities in the system. Kaiser procedures permit voiding of a NR only if the NR was " written in error, duplicated, or the nonconforming conditions has been c:rrected. .by con-struction." A computerized listing provided in July 1950 indicated that 1,031 NRs were voided, between January I and March 31, 1981, including those that were actually . superseded rather than voided. Some were voided by the QA Manager, some by the QA Engineer-Records, and some by a clerk. A chronological breakdown of the number of voided NRs per month , is included as Exhibit 34. The dispositions of a selected group of about 20 reports, either voided or alleged not to be in the reporting system, were reviewed and it was found that in 15 cases the NRs were either voided improperly, improperly dispositioned, closed in error, or the disposition was not fully implemented. In several cases, the justification used for voiding the NR was erroneous (e.g. , it was found the QA Manager was voiding NRs which were not written in error). In some cases, the NRs had been reviewed by a Construction Engineer and " rework" was ordered, yet the NR was later " voided." It was found that some of this activity occurred after an NRC inspection on December 2-3, 1980, in which the licensee and the Kaiser QA Manager were-told that this activity was contrary to NRC requirements. It was also established that,-following the NRC inspection, the Kaiser QA Manager had on three occasions not entered NRs (CN-4309, NRC-0001, CN-5412). into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system. This investigation also disclosed that an NR was improperly dispositioned as " accept as is" when " rework" was appropriate. In one case (NR E-2836), the " accept as is" disposition was contrary to ASME- Code requirements. NRs that- identified multiple nonconforming conditions were voided improperly with a comment that the NR was being " revised" or that "each deficiency would i be issued on a separate NR" or items would be " reinspected." It was determined
-that nonconforming items were not reissued on separate NRs and were not re-inspected as stated on the NR at the time of voiding. It was also found that during " revisions" some nonconforming items were removed from NRs without 1 ' j ustification.
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, _.7
The allegation that the Kaiser QA Manager voided NRs at the request of the Construction Department was correct; however, the QA Manager stated that he had made an independent decision when doing so. This investigation established that nonconforminF conditions identified by Quality Control Inspectors were improperly dispositioned. It was also established that the licensee failed to take effective corrective action following the December 1980 NRC inspection. This widespread problem of improper handling of NRs is addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 4.1.20 Items of Noncompliance One item of noncompliance was identified (failure to process conconfor=ing items in accordance with documented procedures). 4.2 Bolt Hole Preparation 4.2.1 Allegation - Bolt holes for large bore pipe support hangers are required to be made by drilling rather than burning (flame cutting). Although some instances of burned bolt holes have been identified, there is no inspection program to assure the bolt holes are inspect,ed.
- 4. 2. 2' Investigation 4.2.2.1 Review of Procedures H. J. Kaiser Co. Instruction M-12, " Inspection Instructions for Pipe Hangers, Support and Restraint Installation," Revisions 9, 10, and 11, states the following in Paragraph 3 0:
"Any essential hanger base plate installed by HJK shall require the removal of at least one (1) nut / washer in order that the HJK Quality' Inspector may verify the correct bolt hole size in the plate.
"During inspections, if the HJK Quality Inspectors observe the bolt hole size to be incorrect (or eccentric), the inspector shall issue a Nonconformance Report (NR)."
In Paragraph 4.4.9.d, it states:
"The tolerance for base plate bolt holes is as follows:
3/8" p and 1/2" 9 - 1/8" larger than nominal bolt 9
-5/8" 9 and larger - 3/16" larger than nominal bolt 9 :
l [9 is symbol used for bolt hole diameter]
" Torch cut holes that have not been reamed are unacceptable. I (Use QACMI M-15 checklist to identify.)"
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The procedure requires inspection of the baseplate bolt hole 1ccat:cn. bolt hole sizes, tolerances, eccentricity, and location of baseplate based on a single sample per plate. The CG&E QA Manager indicated in a telephone conversation that all bolt holes were being inspected and that the procedure was being revised to require inspection of all bolt holes. The licensee's past inspection program for examining bolt holes was consistent with the sample size used in II Bulletin 79-02, " Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts." 4.2.2.2 FSAR Requirements The Zimmer FSAR, Table 3.8.2, commits to ANSI N45.2.5-1972 (Draf t),
" Supplementary Quality Assurance Requirements for Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Structural Concrete and Structural Steel During the Construc-tion Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." Paragraph 5.3 of ANSI N45.2.5 states, in part, that burning of bolt holes is not per=itted.
4.2.2.3 . Licensee Position During a telephone conversation on July 23, 1981, the licensee stated that the materials affected by Instruction M-12 were not structural steel as defined by th'e American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual, Seventh Edition. Therefore, the licensee's position was that the require-ment not permitting burning of bolt holes does not apply. In a subsequent telephone conversation the CG&E QA Manager indicated that NRC appeared to be taking the co-burning requirement out of context. He indicated the paragraph containing the no-burning requirement refers to the condition of contact surfaces of friction types of connections, bolt hole alignment, and the correction of fabrication errors. This is an unresloved item and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-358/81 ). 4.2.4 Findings and Conclusions The acceptability of torch cutting bolt holes (the applicability of ANSI Standard N 45.2.5 prohibiting burning of bolt holes) is unresolved and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. The licensee's past inspection program for examining bolt holes was consistent with IE Bulletin 79.02,
" Pipe Support Base Plant Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts."
The licensee is currently inspecting all bolt holes. 4.2.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 4.3 ASME Code Data Package Discrepancies 4.3.1 Allegation It was alleged that during system turnover, Quality Assurance Engineers, (QAEs) Wood and David Fox were reviewing documentation in ASME Code Data
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packages and-ident:fy:ng numerous discrepancies in these parkares, whien were being recorded on exception lists instead of nonconforman:e reports.
'The alleger questioned whether it was acceptable to document d:screpanc es on exception lists. .He also said the QAEs were being criticized for identi-fying too many discrepancies during their reviews.
~
, 4.3.2 Background Information The licensee is required by the ASME Code to maintain certain records which are evidence that the Quality Assurance Department has inspected materials, components, and processes (welding and nondestructive examination) to ensure systems are constructed in accordance with accepted industry standards.
The documentation packages are filed and retained in the Kaiser Site Document Control (SDC) Center and are turned over to the licensee when a system is completely installed and ready for preoperational testing. Pr:or to system . turnover, these packages are reviewed for accuracy and completeness by QAEs who verify that the packages arecomplete. 4.3.3 Investigation I 4.3.3.1 Interview of David Fox - On January 14, 1981, David Fox, Sargent & Lundy (S&L), was interviewed by
- NRC. He stated that from January to December 1980 he was employed by S&L and subcontracted to CG&E to review ASME Code Data packages. Fox stated
~ he identified discrepancies in these packages and recorded them on exception lists which were forwarded to'Floyd Oltz, SDC. Oltz would attempt to rectify the problem. If this was not possible, he would initiate a cocconformance i report for the deficiency. Fox stated that some common deficiencies he identified during his reviews were a lack of. mill certifications for steel used in the various systems, missing valve data reports, and that QC in-i spectorsthad not properly filled out the inspection reports in the packages. Fox stated he heard rumors that Phillip Gittings, QA Manager, said he was being too " nit picking" ~ during his reviews of the Code Data packages. Fox stated that at one time he made up a_ list of the common proble=s he found during the reviews and forwarded them to Floyd.Oltz and Philltp Gittings and suggested they give QC Inspectors additional training _in the area of
- . inspection documentation. Fox stated he later discussed the matter with
! Gene Knox, Kaiser Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, who advised him that'the requested classes would be given.
4.3.3.2 Interview of Phillip Gittings On February 16, 1981, Phillip Gittings, Kaise~r QA Manager, was interviewed by NRC. He said two KEI QAEs are involved in the Kaiser review of ASME Code 1 -Data packages. _Gittings identified these individuals as Individual H and Individual E. i-4.3.3.3. Interview of Individual H On February 20, 1981, Individual H, Kaiser QC Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he had been employed at Zimmer since December 29, 1980. Individual H stated he is responsible for reviewing ASME Code Data packages e + gene anem eM 4 e .m *"*l'", '
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for the diesel generator, diesel oil, and main steam rooms. He sa:d vn:le reviewing the packages he ensures that the docu=entation in the package is complete, accurate, and that the inspection data on the isometr:c drawings and accompanying weld data forms have been properly filled out by Kaiser QC Inspectors. Indivifuni H stated during these reviews he noted that heat numbers certifying pipes as nuclear grade steel on weld data records do not match the heat numbers listed on the isometric drawings. Also, heat nu=bers listed en the isometric drawings, when checked with certified material tes
-reports, are not for the material that, according to the drawing, was sup-posedly installed.
Individual H stated that some heat numbers on the isometric drawings had been changed, crossed out, or " whited out" without justification for the changes. Also, there was no evidence that these changes were verified by QC personnel in the field, and he had no assurance that changed nu=bers on the records actually represent what is installed in tne plant. Individual H stated te has found similar unexplained changes in the records when reviewing weld f data and weld rod issue forms and other documentation in the packages. On February 20, 1981, Individual H provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information a copy of which is included as Exhibit 35. 4.3.3.4 Interview of Individual E On February 20, 1981, Individual E, Kaiser QC Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he has been employed at Zimmer since December 22, 1980. Individual E stated he reviews ASME Code Data packages for the main ste?m, ; - diesel generator, residual heat removal and low pressure core spray syste:. He stated he ensures that the data on isometric drawings, weld rod issue forms, and other inprocess QC inspection documentation is properly recorded in the packages. He has noted during his reviews that heat numbers en the isometric drawings certifying pipes as nuclear grade steel do not match the heat numbers for the same pipe listed on the weld data record. Individual E stated the weld records are what the QC inspectors verified as being installed,during their field inspections, yet the isometric drawing reflects other heat numbers for the same pipe. . Individual E said he attempted to resolve these contradictions and found when he reviewed certified material test reports that the heat numbers for the pipe on the drawings were not for the same type of material that was installed in the system. Individual E attributed this to Kaiser's failure to follow proper procedures for the docu-mentation of both in process and final inspections. This has resulted in a loss of material traceability from many areas of the plant. Individual E said he has reported specific problems on exception lists that were forwarded to Floyd Oltz,-Document Control Supervisor._ Individual E stated Floyd Oltz improperly changes heat numbers on records without field verifica-tion or any engineering justification in order to disposition what he has reported on the exception lists. Individual E cited an. example where he reported that, contrary to the ASMI Code, Kaiser QC Inspectors had not veri-fied the 1/16 in. fitup gap on small-bore stainless steel instrument lines during most of their in-process inspections. This gap ensures that the weld does not crack when the pipe and weld cool. Individual E stated that there 4 a_.-...- _ - - - _. _ . - - _ = ; _
- - .- -- - . - - - - - = - -.C. a .- . _. are over-1,000 socket welds where this gap was unverified, yet Kaiser resolved this problem by testing a sample of 20 welds when ASMI Code requires a 10 C'. verification of socket weld fitup. Individual E stated he has no faith in the accuracy of records at Zimmer and would not approve any of the systems he has reviewed to date because the documentation does not meet industry codes and standards. On February 20, 1981, Individual E provided a written sworn st.stement ' attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 36.
'4.3.3.5 Interview of Leonard Wood > j On August 3, 1981, Leonard Wood, CG&E QA and Standards Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that from 1973 to 1981 he reviewed. ASMI Code Data packages for vendor components supplied to Zimmer. Wood said he occasionally noted that documentation was missing, material certifications were to the wrong specification, or required documentation had not been included in the packages.
He said he contacted the vendors involved and was furnished the necessary documentation. Wood said he was not criticized for identifying these problees, and in most cases he resolved them on his own. 4.3.3.6 Record Reviews A Region III inspector reviewed ASME-Code Data packages for the diesel generator, cooling water, starting air, and fuel oil piping systems. These records indicated that a number of in-process QC inspections were not per-formed for proper pipe fitup, proper weld procedure, proper weld filler metal (traceability), and welder qualifications. .These inspection criteria are required by ASME Code, Section III, 1971 Edition, Winter 1972 Addenda, 1 Articles NA-4130(a), NA-4420, NA-4510, NA-4442.1, NB-4122, NA-4451, NB-4230, and NB-3661.5(b). Also, Kaiser procedures outlined that these inspection ~ criteria are to be entered on the weld data form (KEI-1 form). The inspector found the following:
- 1. Required inspections were not performed. This condition was documented in QA Surveillance Reports (SRs) 2367, 2370, 2380, and 2412, which identi-fied 39 welds in.the diesel generator subsystems in which the required in-process inspections were not performed.
In addition, the licensee had a partial listing of over 400 socket welds (including welds other than the diesel generator system) where inspections , for proper pipe fitup (cleanliness, mismatch, and socket engagement) was l not performed. ASME Code, Section III,1971 Edition, Article NB-3661.5(b) ! states, "...a gap of approximately 1/16 inch shall be provided between l the end of the pipe and the bottom of the socket before welding." , i H. J. Kaiser Procedure Number SPPM 4.6 Rev. 8, paragraph 6.2.1 states.
"All welds shall be inspected at the following stages: ...At fitup for cleanliness, mismatch, and minimum socket' engagement. Socket welds shall have an approximate end-gap of 1/16 inch prior to welding for all-sizes."
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r _ .- c . - _. J .[--,-n- me 4 .-% , .m _. An SIS Report dated November 14, 1979, authored by the Author::ed Nuclear Inspector (ANI) (Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company) and the H. J. Kaiser response letter dated December 4, 1979, which responded to the audit, said an agreement was made that 20 of the un-verif4.ed socket welds would be selected at random to be radiographed to verify proper fitup. One of the 39 velds identified on Surveillance Report Nos. 2367, 2370, 2380, and 2412 was chosen to be radiographed. No engineering justification was given to allow acceptance of all of the socket welds based on the sample of the 20 that were radiographed. A second SIS Report from the ANI dated February 11, 1981 reported that additional welds were made after December 4, 1979 without verification of fitup. The ANI indicated that all the welds, for which the fitup was not verified after December 4, 1979, should be radiographed. The Region III inspector found no engineering justification for acceptance of the 400 questioned socket welds based on a radiographic examination of only 20 of the socket welds. The licensee had not implemented in-process inspections to verify proper socket weld fitups during subsequent inspec-j tions. This reflects the licensee took inadequate corrective action.
- 2. Data packages for the diesel generator system indicated that there was final visual inspection of all applicable welds.
- 3. A review of KEI-I forms (weld data records) indicated that personnel had. transferred information written on KEI-2 forms (weld rod issue slips) to KEI-1 forms in order to justify weld rod traceability, date of welding,
- and welder qualifications. The KEI-2 form is a construction document used by the welders to obtain weld rods from the weld rod issue point.
There is no QC significance for the KEI-2 form, yet QC inspectors and document reviewers were allowed to transfer weld rod heat numbers entered 4 on the KEI-2 form by the storage personnel to the KEI-1 form (QC weld record). This can only be done.at the time and place of.the weld activity.
- Therefore, any information transferred from the KEI-2 form to any QC document after the time of or away from the weld activity would not be creditable QC verification.
In addition, Region III inspectors noted a considerable number of dis-crepancies between the weld data records (KEI-1 forms) and the weld rod issue forms (KEI-2 forms). The records showed discrepancies between i the heat numbers for the weld rod used, identification of the welder i performing the particular veld, and dates the welds were made. It was found that document reviewers were resolving these discrepancies by altering KEI-1 forms to match the KEI-2 forms. In effect, the QC records, which supposedly provide independent. verification, were being changed to conform with Construction Department records. Alterations appeared to be arbitrary.in that some of the documentation for welds within a certain line changed, but no changes were made for.other welds of identical circumstances. The following are examples of the altered records:
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- a. ' Welder and Rod Heat Number (used for traceability) Cha r.r e s (1) Drawing M-479-3-DG-121 for line IDGD9AB-1/2 contains weld records'for Welds A-4 through A-21 which, according to QA Inspector No. 81, were made by welder K0E using weld rod Heat No. 065118 during March 1978. Additional weld red issue forms (126508, 126509, 126510, 126511, 126884,.126885, and 126890) exist indicating that welder LFC, using weld rod Heat No.
77402, may have worked on Welds A-4 through A-21. Because of these weld rod issue forms, the Document Records personnel changed the QA records to include welder LFC and rod Heat No. 77402 on Welds A-4 through A-13, A-18, A-20, and A-21. No explanation was given why the records for Welds A-14 through A-17 and A-19 were not changed. The RIII inspector verified that only the welder identi- ! fication symbol, K0E, appears near the welds in question. (2) Drawing M-479-3-DG-119 for line IDG7AB-1/2 contains weld records for Welds A-4 through A-21 that, according to QA
. Inspector No. 81, were made by velder LJP during March 1978. Veld red issue forms (KEI-2) 123346 and 119061, enclosed with the drawing, showed that welder LJP =ay l
have worked on Welds A-4 through A-6', A-8 through A-11, and A-15 through A-17. Weld rod issue fonn 119066 indi-cates that welder-K0E may_have worked on Welds A-4 through A-21. As a result of these KEI-2 forms, the Document Records personnel changed the QA records on January 29, 1981, for Velds A-6, A-7, A-13, A-14, and A18 through A-21 by crossing out the welder symbol LJP and the date March 29, 1978, and replacing them with the. welder symbol K0E and date
- March 22, 1978, respectively. No explanation was given why the records for welds A-4, A-5, A-8 through A-12, and A-15 through A-17 were not changed.
The inspector verified that only velder identification symbol LJP appeared near all the welds. (3) KEI-I form for weld number 79DG on line IDG37AA2-1/2 showed the heat number.of the consumable insert used was - 6059491. On January 26, 1981, the number was crossed out and changed to 6058921 to agree with KEI-2 form 123099. The weld number written on the gold copy of the KII-2 form 123099 was too faint to read. The inspector checked with the Welding Department,.but the original (white copy) of KEI-2 form 123099 could not be located. The licensee was previously cited in IE Inspection Report 50-358/ 79-15 for transferring information from KEI QC inspector's notebooks to KEI-1 forms. No apparent actions were taken to assure that the proper veld pro-cedure was used on any of the unverified in process weld activities. 49 .-
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- b. . Veld Date Chanees (1) The KEI-1 form, for Jeld A-7 on line IDG5A3-1/2, indicated the final weld inspection was performed by QA Inspector No.
! 81 on April 5, 1978. The date was crossed out and changed to April 6,1978 on January 27, 1981 because weld rod issue form 118920 indicates welder LJP may have worked on A-7 on April 6, 1978. (2) The KEI-1 form for Veld A-20 on line 1DGD2A3-1/2 indicated that final weld inspection was performed by QA Inspector No. 81 on April 10, 1978. The date was crossed out and changed to April 11, 1978 on January 27, 1981 because veld red issue form 123834 indicates welder LPJ may have worked on A-20 on - April 11, 1978. Failure to take adequate corrective action when inspections for proper pipe fitup were identified as not having been performed; and failure to take adequate corrective action when information concerning weld filler metal traceability, welder identification, and welding dates was found to be missing from the weld data records or was questioned are contrary to 10 (33 50, Appendix 3, Criterion XVI, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 16.1 (50-358/81 ). These concerns are addressed in the-licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 4.3.3.7 Observations The only data package (diesel generator system ASME Code Data package) that
- had passed all inspections and had received final acceptance approval by Kaiser Quality Assurance was reviewed by the inspector and many discrepancies were found. As a result, the inspector performed detailed field observations of the piping systems (i.e., cooling water, starting air, and fuel oil ) for Diesel Generators A and C. Nc=erous discrepancies were identified during these observations as follows
- 1. Piping--The traceability of some of the piping components- was not main-tained. Summaries of the discrepancies are as follows:
~a '. Some-heat numbers recorded on the isometric drawings did not match the heat numbers on the installed components. These piping components are listed in Table 4.3-1 to this report. ,
Table 4.3-1 Discrepancies Between Installed Piping and Tracability Records Heat or Part Identification No. Isometric. Item in According Actually Drawing No. Line No. Question to Dwg. Installed l l ISK~M-428 IDG28AB1 90' ells M276 M267 DG-19 tee M315 M274 pipe HE6247 8464 i 1 50 -
Table 4.3-1 (cent:nued) < Heat or Part - Identificatzen Nc. Isemetric Item in Accord:ng Actually Drawint No. Line No. Question to D r. I: stalled ISK M-425 IDG28A31 flange RVA CSS DG-103 ISK M-42S IDG27A31 pipe EI62:7 16E4 DG-16 16D2 ISK M-428-S- IDG01A3! pipe EE6247 3416 DG-68 ISK M-767 IDGT2AA1/2 90* ells M395 M252 DG-113 ISK M-42S-6 IDG2SAE1 pipe ED7123 T*424402' DG-24 ISK M-42S IDG2SAE1 flange RD2T C35
-DG-105 ISK M-242 IDGCSAA3/4 pipe EA001 JE9922 DG-53 90' ell M262 MS7 IDGF6AA1/2 pipe EA001 EA0170 1DGCSEA3/4 pipe EA001 JE9922 90' ell M262 MS7 IDGF6BA1/2 pipe HA001 EA0171 ISK M-42S IDG25AC2- pipe 516405 502S91 DG-26 415007 90' ell M2S7 M273 ISK M-42S IDG25AC2 pipe 516405 502S91 DG-27 415007
- b. Some heat numbers recorded on the isometric drawings had bee: =arked or " whited out" and then an incorrect heat number recorded. For example, ISK M-242-2-DG-53 was apparently changed to indicate heat number EA-001 for the 3/4 in. and 1/2 in. installed piping. Based on the records for accepted heat numbers, sember EA-001 represented 1 1/4 in. piping.
- c. Three heat nu=bers (EA-0170, TV 24402, and 502S91) found en the installed piping do not appear on the records of acceptable heat numbers.
- d. In many instances, heat numbers could not be found en the installed component. Therefore, a co=parison c:uld not be made'to the nu ber recorded on the drawings.
W 51 -
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m .; m* . . --s ~ Failure to maintain heat number identification for the above piping, and veld rod indicates a serious lack of control and is contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criterion VIII and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 8. (50-358/81-13-0?).
- This concern is addressed in the licensee *s Quality confirmation Program.
4.3.4 Findings and Conclusions l As a result of the investigation of this allegation, significant quality < assurance deficiencies over and above those alleged have been identified. It was determined that discrepancies in the documentation in AS.9I Code Date packages were being recorded on exception lists; however, this was permitted by licensee procedure and is acceptable to NRC. There was no evidence that criticism of Quality Assurance Engineers for identifying discrepancies adversely ' impacted their work. , Major discrepancies were identified in Quality Assurance records and the apparent improper modification of those records. This matter has been referred to the NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor for possible criminal consideration. Potential problems were identified related to adequacy of facility construction, such as material traceability and use of proper materials, proper socket veld fitup, proper weld procedure, and welder qualifications. These matters are being addressed in the licensee's Confirmation Program to determine the adequacy of plant construction. 4.3.5 Items of Noncompliance Two items of noncompliance were identified (failure to maintain heat number traceability for piping and weld rod; and failure to take adequate corrective action for identified deficiencies involving (i) not verifying proper pipe fitup, and (ii) missing or questionable weld data record information regarding weld filler metal traceability, welder identification, and dates welds were made.) 4.4 Threatened Firing 4.4.1 Allegation Robert Marshall, Kaiser Construction Superintendent, directed Phillip Gittings, Kaiser QA Manager, to fire Individual I (QC inspector) for using a magnifying glass to inspect a weld. 4.4.2 - Background Information CG&E retained Kaiser Engineers, Inc. (KEI), to construct the Zimmer plant. Kaiser maintains a Quality Assurance (QA) Department headed by the QA Manager and consisting of Quality Assurance Engineers (QAE) and Quality Control (QC) Inspectors. - QC Inspectors perform field inspections of all safety-related components. Some QC Inspectors are employed by Kaiser and some by outside inspection firms' that are retained to increase inspection manpower for a limited -time in particular areas. During 1979 and 1980, Kaiser retained l a number of contract inspectors (supplied by Butler Services, Inc.) to increase inspection manpower. In November 1980, all of the contract QC 52 -
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inspector positions were terminated and some contractor empl:yees were offered positions in the Kaiser QC organization. 4.4.3 Investigation 4.4.3.1 Interview of Rex Baker On January 13 and March 3,1981, Rex Baker, Kaiser Inspection Supervisor, was interviewed by NRC. He. stated that in August or September 1980, the Kaiser QA Manager (Phillip Gittings) directed him to fire Individual I af ter Gittings had been told by Robert Marshall, Kaiser Construction Superintendent, that Individual I had used a magnifying glass to inspect a weld. Baker said he told Gittings that according to the American Welding Society (AWS) Code, Individual I could use a magnifying glass during his inspecticas and therefore there were no grounds to fire him. Later that day, Gittings told Baker to retain Individual I but to transfer him from pipe support hanger inspections to structural steel welding inspections. Baker said that Individual I was not threatened with firing for his failure to accept welds, but was reassigned due to 'his poor productivity and lack of completed inspectiocs. On January 13, 1981, Baker provided a sworn statement attesting to the pre-ceding infor=ation, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 37. 4.4.3.2 Interview of phillip Gittings On January 13 and 15 and July 8,1981, Phillip Gittings, Kaiser QA Manager, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that Scott Swain, CG&E Site Construction Manager, had told him he had seen Individual I inspecting a pipe support hanger with a magnifying glass. Gittings said he told Rex Baker that if Individual I had been using a magnifying glass he wanted him off the site immediately. Gittings indicated that Individual I later came to his office and told him he had not been~using a magnifying glass to inspect welds, but had been using a mirror. Based on that information, Gittings said he rescinded the termination order. Gittings stated that Swain and other construction personnel had given him
" bad reports" on inspection activities of Individual I and his lack of completed inspections. He then directed Baker to transfer him from pipe support hanger inspection to structural welding inspection activities.
4.4.3.3 Interview of Robert Marshall _ On January 15, 1981, Robert Marshall, Kaiser Construction Superintendent, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that in the summer of 198G QC inspectors performed visual AWS weld inspections, rejected 95% of the welds on pipe support hangers, and initiated more than fifty nonconformance reports documenting nonconforming hanger welds. He said that he and Scott Swain, CG&E Site Construction Manager, were touring the plant discussing this problem when they observed Individual I inspecting a weld with a mirror, flashlight, and pick. 53 -
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Marshall indicated that later that day Swain told Gittings that an inspect:r was using a magnifying glass to look at a weld. Gittings responded that he would. fire the inspector. Marshall stated emphatically that he did not direct Gittings to fire Individual I, and later they both concurred that firing the inspector was too drastic an action to take. 4.4.3.4 Interview of Scott Swain On January 15, 1981, Scott Swain, CG&E Site Construction Manager, was interviewed. He stated that in November 1980, he and Robert Marshall were touring the diesel generator rooms and observed Individual I inspecting a pipe support hanger weld with a flashlight, pick, and another tool. Swain said Marshall identified this tool to him as a magnifying glass. During a meeting concerning the high rejection rates on visual inspections of pipe support hanger welds, Swain mentioned this to those present. Gittings responded that he would fire the inspector involved if he found the inspec-tor was using a magnifying. glass to visually inspect a weld. Swain stated he later learned the tool was a mirror, and that Gittings was not going to fire the inspector involved. 4.4.3.5 Interview of Individual I On February 20, 1981, Individual I, former Butler Services, Inc , QC Inspecter, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was employed at Zimmer from October 8, 197.9 to December 1980. He stated that he was performing a pipe support hanger
. weld inspection in the diesel generator room in November 1980 when he noticed that Robert Marshall and Scott Swain were observing his inspections. At one point, they looked at the tools he had with him. Shortly afterwards, Individuale I was called into Rex Baker's office and Baker said Phillip Gittings had been told by Marshall and Swain that he was using a magnifying glass to inspect a weld.
Individual I said Baker also related that Gittings had been asked by Marshall to terminate the inspector. He indicated he later met with Gittings and was again told that Marshall had seen him using a magnifying glass to inspect a weld and wanted him off the site. Individual I stated he later met with Baker and explained he did not have a magnifying glass with him when observed and that the tool Marshall had seen was a mirror. He also added that, even if he had been using a magnifying glass, both the AWS Code DI.1, Section 6.5.5, and Kaiser Procedure SPPM 4.6 ,(Revision 8 recognized and approved the use of a magnifying glass for weld inspection. Individual I stated that he demanded Baker and Gittings document the reason for his proposed termination and he advised Baker he would consult with his attorney and fight the termination. Individual I provided a sworn statement attesting to the preceding informa-tion, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 38. 4.4.3.7 Interview of Jesse Ruiz On February 18 and 20, 1981, Jesse Ruiz, former Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that QC Inspectors at Zimmer were being
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wn. . . . . - - -- - harrassed and intimidated by Kaiser construction personnel. Rui: said that his brother, James Ruiz, had been threatened with the loss of his job for allegedly using a magnifying glass to inspect a weld when he was actually using a mirror, a common weld inspecticn tool. On February 20, 1981, Rui: provided a sworn statement attesting to the pre-ceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 39.
-4.4.4 Findings and Conclusions A QC Inspector was threatened with dismissal by the QA Manager af ter the Construction Superintendent advised him (incorrectly) that the QC Inspector used a magnifying glass to visually inspect veld surfaces. The QC Inspector protested the planned dismissal and was not dismissed; however, he was re-assigned to another area of inspection.
4.4.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified.
- 5. Applegate/ GAP Allegations On January 5,1981, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) requested an investigation into the conduct of an earlier RIII investigation of concerns provided.by Thomas Applegate. In addition to this request, they provided a list of nineteen allegations, .some of which appeared to contain information known to NRC, and some of which v' ere new information. A commitment was made to review the nineteen allegations even if they appeared to pertain to known situations.
To clarify the allegations provided, a meeting was held between Applegate. Thomas Devine (GAP representative), and RIII personnel on February 26, 1981. The meeting was recorded, and a transcript was produced. Some of the allegations provided concern issues that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the NRC, and have been brought to the attention of the appropriate agencies for action as they consider appropriate. Other alle-gations were provided during this meeting and in correspondence from GAP, some of which are not addressed in this report but will be reviewed and documented in subsequent reports. A review of outstanding allegations indicates that their investigation would not change the conclusions reached in this report. In a letter dated July 22, 1981, GAP responded to an RIII request to identify specific systems or equipment their sources believed to be deficient. Their response included many plant systems and was not acceptably specific. 5.1 Unsuitable Pipina Installation 5.1.1 Allegation "KEI knowingly installed and ripped out unsuitable main steam relief piping, at an estimated labor cost of $320,000."
. $5 n.n . ..- _ -- . . - - .
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. -.a _ t. _ ..'.___ _. _ 5.1.2 Background Infor=at:en The Zimmer facility uses a General Electric boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark II containment system design, which includes a pressure suppression pool in the lower levels of the containment building. Based on actual Mark I operating experiences related to safety relief valve actuations and large-scale testing of the more recently designed Mark III containment design system, new suppression pool' hydrodynamic loads associated with
-postulated loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA) were identified that had not been explicitly considered in the original design of the Mark II containment system. These newly identified loads result from the dynamic effects of dryvell air and steam being rapidly forced into the suppression pool during a -postulated LOCA or safety relief valve actuation. When this possible pro-blem was first identified, General Electric and NRC and its consultants per-formed an in-depth review of the General Electric Mark II containment system design. Utilities owning facilities that would use the Mark II containment system also formed an owners' group to share calculations, evaluations, and acceptable modifications'to the Mark II containments.
The NRC effort in reviewing.the new dynamic loads was divided into two programs: a short-term evaluation program for the lead plants (Zimmer, La Salle, Shoreham), and a long-term program for final detailed evaluation of'the adequacy of modifications. The description of the NRC evaluation is available in NUREG-0487, " Mark II Containment Lead Plant Program Load Evaluation and Acceptance Criteria," published in November 1978.* This document indicates that the lead plants > those first to use the Mark II containcent system, would be reviewed by NRC to determine the acceptability of modifications made in their design to accommodate the, identified loads.
. NUREG-0474, "A Technical Up-Date on Pressure Suppression Type Containments in Use in U.S. Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants," issued in July 1978,* details the ongoing NRC monitoring of the modification and analysis program. KUREG-0371, " Task Action Plans for Generic Activities (Category A),"
issued in November 1978,* identifies review of the Mark II pressure suppression containment as Generic Task A-8. NUREG-0510, " Identification of Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants, Report to Congress," issued in January 1979,* identifies two generic tasks as being related to the analysis of suppression pool dynamic loads and safety relief valve loads / temperature limits for BWR containments. In the lead plant program load evaluation, NRC approved the design basis used for modifications to the suppression pool system, including a device known as a "T quencher" as part of the safety relief system, and additional equipment, such as base and wall plates, to support these new installations. NRC does not have regulatory jurisdiction over the construction costs of a nuclear power plant.
*These documents are available fcr inspection at NRC public document rooms or for purchase from the NRC/GPO sales program, Washington, DC 20555.
..__,__..s____ , . . _ - - - _ - - _
n ___ _ _ _ _ _ -_ . _. ._ _ _ -_
-5.1.3 Investigation 5.1.3.1 Interview of Individual A On February 24, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual 4 stated that Kaiser had installed a large portion of the main steam relici (MSR) piping, knowing that sections of it would later have to be removed. He recalled that 2 years after its installation-Xaiser removed large sections of the piping at and below the 525-f t level of the reactor containment building but left the pipe sections above that level in place.
On April 22, 1981, Individual A provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested that the statement not be attached to this report. 5.1.3.2 Interview of Individuals B and C On April 14 and 16, 1981, Individuals B and-C, identified as having provided information regarding this allegation to representatives of GAP, were inter-viewed by NRC. They both stated that they had no information concerning this allegation. 5.1.3.3 Interview of H. C. Brinkman During the period of February 9-13 and 23-27, 1981, discussions with H. C. Brinkman, ~CG&E Principal Mechanical Engineer,' indicated that experi-mentation had revealed the need to redesign the relief. system based on newly identified discharge loads. Therefore, several utilities, including CG&E, decided on a modification to replace the already installed " rams head" safety relief valve (SRV) discharge devices with " quenchers." In 1975, CG&E decided to start designing the quencher modification, knowing that part of the piping to be installed would later have to be removed due to the identification of new discharge loads. -The basis for the decision was .that approximately 90 to 97% of the original quencher modification would likely be acceptable and therefore only 3 to 10% would be subject to rework. CG&E concluded that it would be less costly to proceed with installation activities rather than delay the construction schedule until the quencher modification design was complete. To date, the modification installation is not complete. 5.1.3.4 Reeced Review and Onsite Observations The MSR modification has required (in part) the replacement of 10-in. Schedule 40 pipe with other 10-in. Schedule 40 pipe of different geometric configuration, 10-in. extra-strong pipe, and 12-in. extra-strong pipe (thicker walled pipe). During this investigation, the licensee provided cost figures for the modi-fication to date, which exceeded the alleged amount. NRC made no attempt to corroborate the licensee's claim that it was cheaper to proceed with an installation known to require rework before installation actually took place. 57 -
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The RIII inspector revtewed all revisions to the KII :secetr:c draw:n; PSE-n:E, Sheets 21 and 21A, that were pertinent to the quencher mcdification of the ma:n steam relief piping. The revisions identified the following changes: Rev. No. Implemented Change Date Rev. O Redrawn--original configuration replaced 9/8/76 Rev. 1 Hangers added 3/31/77 Rev. 2 Eight lugs added 1/10/78 Rev. 3 Hanger changed 5/5/78 Rev. 4 New spool pieces added, welds MS212 and MS195 4/3/79 voided per S&L Rev. 5 Piping tee section added 6/18/79 j Rev. 6 Weld MS160 and a 4-in. dimension added 10/1/79 Rev. 7 Field-marked.(redline) updates added 1/9/80 Rev. 8 Welds K-461 and K-463 changed; weld K-592 8/27/80 changed to K-593 per NR-2499; hanger detail section D-D added Rev. 9 Weld K-592 changed to K-461; weld K-593 9/4/80 changed to K-594 a The RIII inspector reviewed the QC documentation for the following main steam relief piping . field welds: 160, 160A, 267A, 2673, 267C, 267D, 2683, 268C, 459, 460, and 461. The records showed that the welds had been accomplished in accordance with the appropriate code (ASMI Section III 1971, with Summer 1973 Addenda). The RIII inspector interpreted the radiographs for the following main steam relief piping field welds: 160A, 459, 460, 461, 462, and 594. There were approximately five to seven radiographs for each of these welds. Va rying numbers of radiographs were necessary to cover the entire 360 degrees of each pipe weld. The radiography was performed in accordance with the appropriate code (ASMI Section III 1971, with Summer 1973 Addenda). The R:II inspector identified no unacceptable weld indications on the radiographs. 5.1.4 Findings and Conclusions The quencher modification to the main steam relief system was being made with the knowledge of NRC. CG&E personnel stated they made an econcaic decision to install piping for the main steam relief system quencher modification with the knosledge that approximately 3 to 10% would have to be removed due to con-tinuing. identification of changes in design loads. Because NRC does not have
! regulatory jurisdiction over construction costs, no attempt was made to determine the estimated labor cost for the portion of pipe that was installed and removed.
The safety importance of this allegation is limited to whether the main steam relief piping is installed properly. RIII has concluded that the modification is being properly installed and tested, except for the improper voiding of one NR as discussed in Section 4.1 of this report. 58 - _g
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5.1.5 Items of Noncompliance ~ No items of' noncompliance were identified. 5.2 - Improper Fittings -
; -5.2.1 Allegation "2000 pound fittings were installed in 1979 on residue head valves, although j 5000 pound fittings are required."
An interview with the individual originating this allegation revealed that 4 the " residue head valves" or " residue heat valves" were not the components
! .of concern. The components involved in both allegations 5.2 and 5.4 were the hydraulic actuators for the recirculation flow control valves.
4 Allegations 5.2 and 5.4 are both addressed in this section because the investigation determined that both allegations were addressing the same component. j 4 5.2.2 - . Background Infornation Hydraulic actuators are used to open and close some plant valves. Actuators
- on the reactor recirculation system are provided with drain lines in case j hydraulic seals in the actuator should leak. These drain lines are not pressurized (open to atmospheric pressure) and only serve to contain possible leaking hydraulic fluid.
, 5.2.3 Investination i 5.2.3.1 Interview of Individual A i On February 24, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by i representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual A stated that Individual F had told him that 6000-lb pressure fittings were required on j the hydraulic lines in the residual heat removal system, but Individual F was told by a supervisor to install 3000-lb fittings. j- On' April 22, 1981, Individual A provided a written statement attesting i to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be attached to this report. I 5.2.3.2 . Interview of Individual F i. on March' 20, 1981, Individual F was interviewed by telephone. Individual F , stated that he had heard about a valve'that had been broken, but he did t not have any firsthand knowledge of the incident. Individual F said he knew of cases in which " half-life" (3000-lb in place of 6000-lb) fittings were used. Two specific cases recalled by Individual F will be followed
~
- i. - up in a subsequent. inspection (50-358/81 ).
Individual F repeatedly stated that it had been three years since he had been at Zimmer and that- he could not rememberf further. specifics. i 59 -
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l l l 5.2.3.3 Interview of Individual B On February 10, 1981, Individual B, who had been previously interviewed by representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual B stated that 3000-lb fittings were installed on two recirculation flow control valves when 6000-lb fittings were required. He identified the fittings as } being socket welded to two small hydraulic lines on the valves in question. Individual B stated that, 'to the best of his knowledge, this deficiency had not been corrected. Individual B stated that in 1979 it was reported to him that a pipefitter bumped into the valve and a small hydraulic fitting on the valve fell off. He said the fitting was later identified as a nonconforming item by Kaiser, and a design document change (DDC) was issued directing the fitting be repaired. He stated the valve in question was manufactured by General Electric, and General Electric later repaired the broken fitting on the valve. On April 14, 1981, Individual B provided a written state =ent attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be attached to this report. 5.2.3.4 Interview of T. F. Van Natta On June 25, 1981, T. F. Van Natta, Site Control and Instrument Engineer for General Electric, was interviewed by telephone. Van Natta stated that the adaptor connecting the drain line to the hydraulic actuator body on a recirculation flow control valve had been broken off. He said that he did not know whether or not a pipefitter had broken the adaptor. Van Natta indicated that the originally installed adaptor was adequate for the designed service, but it was susceptible to mechanical damage from adjacent construction activities that were being performed. Therefore, the decision was made to replace the original adaptor design with the stronger flange desigr. defined in General Electric Field Deviation Disposition Request No. KN-1-299, dated December 18, 1978. Van Natta said that the actuator and three of the four hydraulic lines connect-ing to the actuator had a design test pressure of 3000 psig. He said the fourth line, which was addressed in Field Deviation Disposition Request (FDDR) No. KN-1-299, was the drain line to the hydraulic system, which has a design test pressure of 200 psig and normal operating pressure of 0 psig since the drain line is open to the atmosphere at the drain tank. Van Natta stated that the actuator drain ports and lines were separated from the relatively high pressure (3000 psig) side of the actuator by two seals (a main seal and a backup seal), each of which have a design pressure of 3000 psis. 5.2.3.5 Interview of T. E. Bloom On June 30, 1981, T. E. Bloom, a General Electrie employee, was interviewed by NRC. Bloom stated that the nipple (adaptor) on the hydraulic actuator to the recirculation flow control valve for recirculation loop A had been broken. 60 -
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5.2.3.6 Record Review
- 1. The RIII zuspector reviewed General Electric FDDR No. KN-1-299 (des:gnated as nonconformance request) dated December 18, 1978, which addressed the recirculation system flow control valve actuator. The FDDR ind:cated that the following had occurred:
"The threaded adaptor which connects the drain port on the actuator body was broken off during installation of the 1/2" NPT [ National Pipe Thread]
hydraulic piping. This adaptor is not suitable for this application where the connection is susceptible to damage and does not provide take down capability." The final disposition of the FDDR was as follows:
-" Replace the defective adaptor with short tube threaded to the actuator and socket veld to a special flange attached to the actuator count ledge.
- A mating flange with a Viton "0" ring joint is also provided similar to the other actuation piping connections."
The FDDR indicated that the flange modification was complete on July 13,
'1979. The FDDR did not identify the specific actuator (Loop A or Loop 3)
~
?? ' that had the defective adaptor.
- 2. The. hydraulic actuators for the two recirculation flow control valves
~ and their respe.ctive piping, components, locations, and classifications were identified on the following drawings (Table 5.2-1):
Table 5.2-1. Hydraulic Actuator Data Sargent & Lundy Piping and Instrumen- Kaiser Engineers Components tation Drawings Iso =etric Drawings L l Recirculation Looo A
- 1. Actuator No. IB33F060A-- M-47 Sheet 1 of 2 Rucker drawing #81999-F-402 Revision T Revision M; Rucker Control S/N SP19025
- 2. Piping (lines), components M-47 Sheet 1 of 2 (fittings), welds, class- Revision T
, 3, ' ,. .. I ifications, and locations
- a. ' Line 01RR39AD 3/4" M-47 Sheet 1 of 2 M-464-3-RR-243 and (and low point drain Revision T M-464-3-RR-245
. IRR41AD*)
- Low point drain lines are installed in the lovas'. points of each hydraulic line to provide system maintenance. Low poir; ain lines are not the same as n e
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1 the hydraul:c system drain lines (IRR39AC and IRR40A:', h:ch are funct:enel parts of the hydraulic systen. Table 5.2-1. Hydraulic Actuator Data (continued) Sargen & Luncy Piping and Instru=en- Kaiser Engineers Components tation Drawings Isometric Drawings b.**Line #1RR39AC 1/2" M-47 Sheet 1 of 2 M-464-3-RR-241, hydraulic system drain Revision T M-464-3-RR-244 and line (and low point drain M-464-3-RR-247 line IRR41AC*)
- c. Line #1RR39AB 1/2" M-47 Sheet 1 of 2 M-464-3-RR-242 and (and low point drain Revision T M-464-3-RR-246 line IRR41AB*)
- d. Line #1RR39AA 3/4" M-47 Sheet 1 of 2 M-464-3-RR-239 and (and low point drain Revision T M-464-3-RR-240 line IRR41AA*)
Recirculation Loop B
- 1. Actuator No. 1B33F060B M-47 Sheet 2 of 2 Rucker Control S/N 19028 Revision P
**The disposition to-FDDR No. KN-1-299 was applied to both drain lines
#1RR39AC and #1RR40AC.
- 2. Piping (lines), components M-47 Sheet 2 of 2 (fittings), welds, class- Revision P ifications, and. locations
- a. Line #1RR40AD 3/4" M-47 Sheet 2 of 2 M-464-4-RR-263 and (and low point drain Revision P M-464-4-RR-259 line IRR43AD*)
b.**Line #1RR40AC 1/2" M-47 Sheet 2 of 2 M-464-4-RR-262 and hydraulic system drain Revision P M-464-4-RR-257 line (and low point drain line IRR43AC*)
- c. Line #1RR40AB 1/2" M-47 Sheet 2 of 2 M-464-4-RR-261 and (and low point drain Revision P M-464-4-RR-258 line IRR43AB*)
- d. Line #1RR40AA 3/4" M-47 Sheet 2 of 2 M-464-4-RR-260 and (and low point drain line Revision P M-464-4-RR-256 1RR43AA*)
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Tha drawings indicated that the actuators and the pertiens of the respective piping located inside the drywell were classif:ed as ASME Section III Class B. The portions of the respective piping located outside the drywell and past the the isolation valves were classified as ASME Section L'.I Class D (nonsafety related).
- 3. The RIII inspector reviewed an S&L design document change that specified a. change in design pressure for three hydraulic lines from 6000 psig to.3000 psig and for the drain line from 3000 psig
~to 150 psig for the actuators for the two flow control valves.
The Kaiser isometric drawings reflected the design pressure changes specified in the DDC. [ Note: Revision 5 to drawing M-464-4RR-257 reflects an example of the specified change.
- 4. The RIII inspector reviewed the S&L Mechanical Department Piping Line List dated May 29, 1981, which specified the following con-ditions for the hydraulic lines (Table 5.2-2):
Table 5.2-2 Hydraulic Line Conditions Maximum Designed Field Operating Operating Test Pressure Pressure Pressure Line No. (psig) (psig) (psig) I'RR39AA 2200 3000 3000 1RR39AB 2200 3000 3000 1RR39AC* 100 150 200 1RR39AD 2200 3000 3000 1RR40AC* 100 150 200 1RR40AD- 2200 3000 3000 1RR40AA 2200 3000 3000 1RR40A3- 2200 3000 3000 l
*These were the drain lines affected by FDDR No. KN-1-299.
The RIII; inspector reviewed the material-takeoff record listed on each of the respective Kaiser isometric drawings indicating that all-the material and components (piping, fittings, and valves) met or exceeded the design conditions identified on the S&L Mechanical Department Piping Line List. The.RI'II inspector reviewed the KII-1 weld data records listed on each of the respective Kaiser isometric drawings. The records-
. indicated that velds had been made in accordance with the ASME Code Section III-1971 Edition, with the-following exceptions:
- a. Line #1RR39AA (Drawing No. M-464-3-RR-239,; Revision 3)-- l Recor'ds do not reflect dates when welds were !
made for any-of the welds.
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z - Line 41RR39AA (Drawing No.~M-464-3-RR-2ac. Rev: sten 71-- Recorded dates for welds-A-1, A-2, A-3, C-2 and C,5 indtcate the welds were dye penetrant tested (PT) before they were made.
- b. Line #1RR39AC (Drawing No. M-464-3-RR-244, Revision 4)--
Records do not reflect dates when welds were made for.any of_the welds. Line #1RR39AC (Drawing No. M-464-3-RR-241, Revision 4)-- Records do not reflect dates when welds C-6, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-10, and C-11 were made.
- c. Line #1RR39AD (Drawing No. M-464-3-RR-243', Revision 4)--
Records do not reflect dates for any of the-welds. Line #1RR39AD (Drawing No.-M-464-3-RR 245, Revision 5)-- Records do not reflect dates when welds C-5 (rewo.rk), C-6, C-7, C-8, and C-9 were made.
- d. Line #1RR40AB (Drawing No. M-464-4-RR-257, Revision 8)--
Record reflects QC verification of weld A-1 with written signoff instead of required QC stamp; weld test (PT) records not available for. welds A-2, A-3, and B-2.
- e. Line #1RR4 AC '(Drawing No. M-464-4-RR-262, Revision 7)--
Weld data records written to replace lost weld records for welds E-2 and E-4, without justification to assure in-process inspections were performed.
- f. Line #1RR40AD (Drawing No. M-464-4-RR-259, Revision 6)--
Records do not reflect dates when welds B-2, B-5, and B-6 were made; weld test (PT) record was not available for weld B-2. Line #1RR40AD (Drawing No. M-464-4-RR-263, Revision 7)-- Weld test record was not available for welds i A-1 and A-7. The final quality assurance engineer's review of the preceding KEI-1 weld data records had not been performed as 'of June 29, 1981. Therefore, the listed exceptions are unresolved pending the final ! QA engineer's review and completion of appropriate dispositions j
).
(50-358/81 ; 1
.\
- 5. The RIII inspector reviewed Kaiser Engineers, Inc., Quality Assurance Construction Methods Instruction (QACMI) No. M-10, Revision 6 (dated November 16, 1978), and Revision 7 (dated. September 13, 1979). Both revisions of QACMI M-10, entitled " Pressure Testing of Piping Systems,"
complied with ASME Code Section III, 1971 Edition, Article NB-6000. 64 -
y u.. u.....~ - r The RIII-inspector reviewed the folleving hyd::statt: test reperts for the respective hydraulic lines (Table 5.2-3): Table 5.2-3 Hydrostatic Test Results Test Pressure (psig) Actual Design Max. Actual 10-Min. Line No. Max. Allow. Initial Holding Report No. IRR39AA 3000 3180 3010 3000 RR-28 - 3/2/79 Retest 9/27/79 IRR39A3 3000 3180 3010 3000 RR-27 3/1/79 Retest 9/27/79 1RR39AC (Drawings 200 225 215 150 RR-53 241, 244)- 9/27/79 (Drawing 200 215 210 160 RR-26 247) , 2/26/79 1RR39AD 3000 ' 3180 3010 3000 RR-25 3/5/79 Retest 9/27/79 1RR40AA 3000 3180 3010 3000 RR-32 3/6/79 Retest 10/4/79 1RR40AB 3000 3180 3010 3000 RR-31 3/14/79 Retest 10/4/79 1RR40AC 200 215 210 160 RR-30 3/2/79 Retest 10/4/79
-IRR40AD 3000 3180 3010. 3000 RR-29 3/5/79 Retest 10/4/79
. The preceding hydrostatic pressure tests were performed by using the system power unit to pressurize the lines through the actuators, as described in General Electric File No. VPF 3300-111-1 (Rucker Control Technical Manual No.- TM 81999, paragraphs 5.7.3.1 through 5.7.3.9). Therefore, the actuators as well as the lines (pipes, fittings, valves, etc.) were subjected to .the
test pressures. The hydrostatic test reports indicated that the tests na: been performed in accordance with QACMI No. M-10. Revision 6 and Revisten 7 according to the effective dates. i 5.2.3.7 Field Observations On June 29 and 30, 1981, the RIII inspector visually inspected both of the hydraulic actuators.and all of the attached lines (from the actuators te the penetrations leading out of the drywell). The inspector identified no unacceptable weld indications in any of the welds connecting the actuator, flange, or piping. The inspector noted that all of the welds were socket welds. 'The general piping installation, routing, material' identification, and welds were as specified on the respective isometric drawings. The hydraulic system drain lines connected to the actuators for both of the recirculation flow control valves were installed in accordance with TDDR No. KN-1-299 dated December 18, 1978. 5.2.4 Findings and Conclusions . The investigation revealed that the design pressure rating of three hy:raulic lines connected to the recirculation flow control valve actuators had*:een changed from 6000 psig to 3000 psig, and the design pressure rating of the drain line had been changed from 3000 to 150 psig. These design changes are considered acceptable by NRC and the licensee. An adaptor to a drain line on a hydraulic actuator to a recirculation flow control valve (not the valve itself) was broken, and a sit'e control document was written that identified this condition. The cause of the broken adaptor was not documented and could not be determined. The item was modified to be less prone to damage. The material used.in the connections to the actuator was as specified on the installation drawings. The hydraulic systems were satisfactorily pressure tested. The concern identified by the allegation, though not known previously by the NRC, had been adequately addressed by the licensee. 5.2.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 5.3 Clogged Drains 5.3.1 Allegation
. "A radioactive waste drain is clogged with concrete which carelessly was poured into the drain."
5.3.2 Background Information Plant procedures require drains to be flushed with water prior to plant operation to confirm that the drains are clear of all restricting debris.
. The.radwaste floor drains will not handle any radioact ve liquid until suc.'.
material is generated following the start of plant operations. The terms "radwaste drains" and " radioactive waste drains," as used by
. interviewed individuals, are synonymous terms for these floor drains, which normally drain ;small amounts of radioactive water that can leak from such sources as valve packings. .The drains are designed to carry potentially radioactively contaminated water to the waste treatment facility. , 5.3.3- Investination I 5.3.3.1 Interview of Individual A On February 24, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual A stated
. that, while concrete finishing work was under way in the radioactive waste disposal area, he suggested to Kaiser construction personnel that a pipefitter be assigned to the concrete finishing crew to assure concrete
'did not enter and clog the ficor drains. However, they disagreed with this suggestion and, instead, directed the floor drains be covered with duct tape to prevent concrete from entering and clogging the drains.
1 Individual A stated that concrete did enter the lines and clog the radio-active waste drains. On April 22, 1981, Individual A provided a written statement attesting to the preceding informatio'; n however, he requested that the statement not be attached to this' report. 5.3.3.2 Interview of Individual B l Individual B. stated that he worked as a pipefitter during 1976-1977, and - worked with the drain flushing crew for the radwaste system. Individual B stated that during this period he observed floor drains in- the system that were clogged with concrete, which he and others unsuccessfully tried to j remove. 5.3.3.3 Interview of Test Coordinator and Startup Engineer Telephone interviews were . conducted by the Senior Resident Inspector on
- Februa ry 12, 1981 with the Test Coordinator, who was responsible for the 4
radwaste building drain flushing activities,- and on February 13, 1981 with the Startup Engineer, who was responsible for drain system flushes. Both J individuals indicated that some drains were found to be plugged with , unspecified debris. In all of those cases, the drains were cleared and . flow was verified. 5.3.3.4 Record Review and Onsite Observation The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed CG&I Flushing Procedure No. DR, Rev. O, for the: drain system, approved on September 23,'1977. The purpose of~this procedure was stated as follows: "This document details the pro-cedure-for cleaning the liquid radwaste floor drain and equipment drain piping to the various plant: sumps and drain tanks. The floor drain and
-.= .
equipment drain piping shall be flushed until they flow f reel. and a'l large particulate matter is removed." Appendices to the Flushing Procedure indicated that 152 of a total of 169 of the potential radioactive waste drains related to the radwaste building , floor drain tank, the floor drain sludge tank, the radwaste floor drain sump, the floor drain collector tank, and the chemical waste tank had been flushed and verified in accordance with the procedure. The appendices indi-cated that the verifications had been made in 1979. The licensee stated that the flushing activities were continuing. The Senior Resident Inspector made visual inspections of all of the accessible radwaste drain ports identified on Sargent & Lundy drawings A-533 Rev. F, A-534 Rev. F, and A-515 Rev. N. These drawings identified the drains in the radwaste building (elevations 496 ft, 527 ft, 513 ft, and 511 ft) and in the auxiliary building (elevations 567 f t 5 in. , and 547 f t). None of the ebserved drain ports were visibly plugged. The following floor drains
.were ' covered with tape at the time of the inspection and were. therefore not inspected:
- 1. Radwaste Building--elevation 527 ft
- a. Drain Y-20
- b. Drain Y-17
- 2. Auxiliary Building--elevation 567 ft
- a. Drain L-26
- b. Drain G-26 (elevation 562 ft 5 1/4 in.)
- c. Drain G-22'
- d. Drain G-20
- e. Drain G/H-20 (elevation 562 ft 6 3/4 in.)-
- f. Drain H-22 (elevation 562 ft 7 5/8 in.)
- g. Drain H/J-24
- h. Drain G/H-22 5.3.4 ' Findings and Conclusions Neither the flushing records, the personnel interviews, nor the Resident Inspector's observations confirmed or denied that drains had been clogged with concrete. NRC interviews with site personnel indicated that some drains had been clogged with unspecified debris. However, the investigation
~
confirmed that 152 out of a total of 169 of the potential radioactive waste
-drains were cleared of all restricting debris. The 17 drains that remain to be flushed are identified in the same controlled flushing procedure as the 152 that have already'been flushed. RIII will determine the status of the remaining 17_ drains prior to authorizing for plant operation (50-358/81 ).
5.3.5 Items of Noncompliance No' items of noncompliance were identified. rr _ ~~_ - ___- -__ _ _ _ __ _ r ~ -_' - _ - - - -
5.4 Weak Valve Materials 5.4.1 Allegation "A residue heat valve broke when a pipefitter bumped into it, raising new questions about the quality of metal used for valves." An interview with the individual originating this allegation revealed that
-the " residue head valves" or " residue heat valves" were not the components of concern. The components involved in both allegations 5.2 and 5.4 were the hydraulic actuators for recirculation flow control valves.
Allegation 5.4 is addressed in allegation 5.2 because the investigation determined that both allegations were addressing the same component. 5.5 Weld Rod Control 5.5.1 Allegation "Sensicive parts on welding rods are possibly damaged through storage at
' improper temperatures and possibly lost through failure to follow proper paperwork and labeling requirements."
This allegation addresses two weld rod concerns:
- 1. Weld rods were possibly absorbing moisture due to improperly controlled rod temperatures prior to consumption, which resulted in unacceptable welds.
- 2. Weld rods were not controlled because the paperwork and labeling requirements were not being properly followed. Therefore, welds may have been made with incorrect weld rods.
5.5.2 Background Information For pressure boundary (pipe) welds, the ASME Code, Section III-1971 Edition Article NB-2440 states, " Suitable storage and handling of electrodes, flux and other welding materials shall be maintained. Precautions shall be taken to minimize absorption.of moisture by fluxes 'and cored, fabricated and coated electrodes." ASME Code, Section III-1971 Edition, Article NA-4460, states, " Measures shall be established to provide work and e.xamination instructions for handling, storage, shipping and preservation of materials, parts, components, and appurtenances to prevent damage or deterioration. When necessary for particular products, special protective environments, su-h as inert gas atmospheres, specific moisture content levels and temperatures, shall be provided and their existence verified." For structural welds, the AWS D1.1-1972 Code, Section 4.9.2, states, "All electrodes having low-hydrogen coverings conforming to AWS AS.1 shall be purchased in hermetically-sealed containers or shall be dried at least one
houri at temperatures between 700'T and 800*F bef ore be:nr used. Electrodes shall.be dried prior to use if'the hermetically-sealed container shows F evidence of damage. Immediately after removal from hermetically-sealed
. containers or from drying ovens, electrodes shall be stored in ovens
-held at a-temperature of atileast 250'F. E70XX electrodes that are not used within four hours, E80XX within two hours, E90XX within one hour, and E100XX and E110XX within one-half hour after removal from hermetically-sealed containers or' removal from a drying or storage oven shall be redried before use. Electrodes which have been wet shall not be used."
The_ covering of low-hydrogen weld rods is hygroscopic (attracts moisture) when not heated or.otherwise protected from moisture-containing air. Water ] contains . hydrogen, so moisture absorption is undesirable. If a low-hydrogen weld rod is allowed to cool below approximately 100 to 125'T and is not. protected from normal atmosphere, it will begin to
- attract moisture. The longer the rod is exposed, the more moisture will be absorbed. If a significant amount of moisture is absorbed, the resulting weld will contain porosity (gas pockets or voids). Such porosity will be
- -- evident _in visual inspections of root or filler passes of weld metal, and
- j. will be visible in radiographs of the weld. In practice, an experienced 1 welder will- recognize that a rod has absorbed significant moisture by the way.the weld is progressing, and will return or discard the affected rods.
i i 4-j If a low-hydrogen weld rod has. absorbed very slight amount _s of moisture, it will not have a significant effect on the-resulting weld, its strength, j or anticipated service life. , 1 i Kaiser Procedure SPPM No. 3.3, Revision 6, dated June 25, 1979 which was l-effective during September and October 1979, states the following:
"6.4 The Weld Rod Clerk shall issue all filler material on a weight basis.
He shall record on the KEI Weld 2 form the weight of all bare rod and . covered electrodes issued. I i "He shall also, record on the KEI Weld 2. form the heat number and/or'
' lot number for bare rods, consumable inserts and backing rings, and the-heat number and-lot number for covered electrodes prior to use.
?
"7.3 The Weld Rod Clerk shall weigh all bare rod and covered electrodes returned to-Central Storage and record the weight on the KEI Weld.2 I -form. A new KEI Weld 2 form will be made out for each new issue of j electrodes to and for each welder."
1 [ 5.5.3 Investination i 5.5.3.1 Interview with Individual A I' On February 24, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by l representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he had j observed unaccounted for weld rods (weld rods without accompanying KEI-2 weld rod issue forms) and had seen weld rod warming ovens unplugged and l- not being maintained at-the proper temperature. i ' ~ 70 t jc ' ~ -%--. -
.:3.i . z .; :. ' Individual A also stated that during September and October 19'9 a pipefitter was not assigned to the weld rod issue point to account for weld rods during the evening shift. He stated that weld rod and weld rod issue slips were left out unattended for anyone to pick up and use.
On April 22, 1981, Individual A provided a written statement attesting to the preceding-information; however, he requested the statement not be '
. attached to this report.
5.5.3.2- Interview with Individual B On April 14, 1981, Individual B, who was previously interviewed by representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that Kaiser required weld rod ovens be maintained at t.he proper temperatures at all times. He said he could not state that every welder maintained his oven at the right temperature, but as a supervisor he assured his own men did. He stated that veld rod issue forms -(KEI-2) were occasionally lost and, in those cases, it was a common practice for welders to get a blank issue for=, falsify it, and present it to the -Kaiser Quality Control -Inspectors in order for the weld to pass inspection. He said this was often done months after the fact by Kaiser construction supervisors who falsified weld red issue forms to complete weld documentation packages. He indicated that., by doing this, they did not have to cut out and rework welds. [ Note: Statements alleging _ falsification have been' forwarded to th.e NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor for investigation.) On April 14, 1981, Individual B provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be attached to this report. 5.5.3.3 Record Review and Inspection The Resident Inspector reviewed the receipt documentation for E7018 (low hydrogen) weld rods purchased on orders No. 34356, 35720, 37587, 39075, 39382, 39556, 39971, and 40318. The receipt documentation indicated that the E7018 rod had been received in sealed moisture-proof containers. The Resident Inspector also verified that low-hydrogen electrodes (rods)
.that had not been issued to the field were clearly identified and stored in a clean, limited access, and dry area. In addition, in the field issue rooms'(rod shacks), the low-hydrogen rods were either in sealed containers or in holding ovens 'at temperatures above 250*F.
The licensee provides portable rod warmers to be used near the work activities to maintain the weld rods in a dry condition until used. KEI Welding Tiller Materials Control Procedure No.:SPPM 3.3, Revision 7, paragraphs'3.5.4.2 and 3.5.4.3, respectively, state:
"When covered electrodes are. removed from a holding oven to be issued to welders they shall be placed in a portable rod warzer.
Only one ' classification and heat or lot of electrodes shall be , L . . . - - . L.- ...... _ .- - - - -
._ _ o _ _
e stored in each individual portable rod warmer. Each pertable rod warmer shall be uniquely marked for identification purposes and shall be checked on a monthly basis to assure that each red warmer maintains a correct temperature between 175'F and t00*F.
"All covered electrodes exposed to ambient conditions for more than four hours without coming in direct contact with water shall be returned to central storage for rebaking..."
The Resident Inspector reviewed the December 1980 record for the Daily Temperature Check of holding ovens W50, W27, W38, W25, W39, W19, Wil, and W26. The record indicates that oven W50 was 5'F under the specified 250*F on 3 of the 22 days checked; oven W25 was 5'F under the specified 250*F 1 of the 22 days; oven W39 was 15*F under the specified 250*F on 1 day out of 22; and oven W26 was 10*F under the specified 250*F on 1 day out of 22. Although.these instances violated the letter of the procedure,
- the rods were still hot enough to ensure no moisture was absorbed. An item of noncompliance was not issued because of the lack of significance of this observation.
The Resident Inspector reviewed the record for the monthly check of portable ~ rod evens (warmers). The record indicated that the temperatures of 209 warmers were checked on January 3,1981 and that all were within the required range of 175* to 400*F. The Resident Inspector also observed that unacceptable red warmers in the field issue rooms were properly tagged to preclude their use and were
' segregated in a clearly marked' area.
A review of reports of past NRC inspections disclosed instances when (1) weld rod has been found lying outside containers or ovens, (2) portable ovens were not plugged in, (3) oven temperature indicators were not calibrated at the specified frequency, (4) holding ovens containing different type rods, and (5) other control procedure requirements were not adhered to. These items are documented in Inspection Reports No. 75-05, 76-07, 76-11, 77-02, 79-07, 79-15, 80-07, 80-14, and 80-19. The portable rod warmers not being plugged in and holding ovens containing
. different types of rods were not violations of the ASME or AWS Codes.
5.5.3.4 Physical Control of Weld Rods The paperwork used to account for veld rod is the weld rod issue form (KEI-2). The weld rod issue form requires signatures from the welder, the velder's foreman, and the weld rod issuer permitting the welder to obtain weld rods for a' specific weld from the rod shack (field storeroom). ) The RIII inspectors reviewed KEI Daily Timecards (personnel time records) j for 21 different days, and some respective weld rod issue forms (KEI-2 forms), to determine if a weld ' rod clerk was assigned.to the field and red I shack during,the second shift for September.and October 1979. The timecards l l i
~
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+-vre - - _ ., . . . -- .-, . . . l
+
- ndicated that two ind:viduals (K. Kern and G. Jones) had -or~r.ed over:- e (after 4:00 p.m.) in the rod shack for 1 :o a 1/2 hr c 20 of the 21 days (1 hr for .10 days,1.5 hr for 2 days, 2 hr for 3 days, 2.5 hr for 2 days ,
3.5 he for 2 days, and.4.5 hr for I day).
- The following inconsistencies were ide:tified between the tizecards and :ne l
weld rod issue forms:
~
- 1. On September 5,1979, only Kern was assigned to the red shack for I tr during the second shif t, bst the signature mark on weld form 200379 did not' appear to resemble Kern's signature mark and there was no signature mark for the rod clerk on veld form 2003S0.
- 2. On September. 10, 1979, no one was assigned to the red shack duri:g the second shift, but veld rod issue for=s 200431 and 20C432 had ser:bbled marks indicating a rod clerk's signature.
- 3. On September 11, 14, 18, and 28, 1979, Kern was the c:1y one assigned to the rod shack for I hr during the secced shif , but the signature on forms 200465, 200485, 200486, 200458, 185618, 185617, 185732, 155745, and 185733 appeared to be representations of Jones' initials.
4 On September 17 and October IS,1979, ocly Jones was assigned to the rod shack for 1 hr during the second shif t, but the scribbled signa-ture on forms 200487,185614, and 18474' appeared to be representations of Kern's signature.
- 5. On September 19 and 26, 1979, only Kern was recorded as being assig ed to the rod shack for 3 1/2 hr duri:g the second shift, but the signa ure on forms 185630, 185631, 185712, and 185713 appeared to be represe::stic:s of Jones' initials.
- 6. On October 3 and 5, 1979, only Kern was recorded as being assigned to the rod shack for 2 hr during the secced shift, but the signature en forms 184690,184662,184661, and 184660 appeared to be a representa-tion of Jones' initials.
- 7. On October 4,1979, only Jones was recorded as being assigned to the rod shack for 1 hr 18 min during the secced shift, but the scribbled signature on forms 184710, 184711, and 184712 appeared to be a repre-sentation of Kern's signature.
The velders identified on the above veld rod issue for=s were pipefitters and boilermakers working on the second shift during Septe:ber and October 1979. The RIII inspector noted that the alleger was one of the assigned pipefitters and boilermakers. The issuance of weld rod was to be performed by the veld red clerk as described in H. J. Kaiser Procedure SPPM #3.3, Revision 6. This procedure also specified requirements to control weld rod te=perature and traceability at the rod shack.
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The CG&E QA . Manager informed RIII by telephone on August 13,19S1, that the licensee *s review of all timecards for the dates in question showed the appropriate weld rod clerks were working on the days in question. He indicated the KRC did not review all of the timecards. This is considered to be an unresolved item and will be reviewed during a subseqient inspection (358/81 ). In addition, RIII inspectors on numerous occasions have observed weld rods lying uncontrolled in the construction area. , The concerns regarding the physical control of welders identified during the investigation of this allegation are addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 5.5.4 Findings and Conclusions Based on the findings of this investigation, there have been instances when (1) weld rods have been stored at. improper te=peratures, (2) portable ovens were not plugged in, (3) oven temperature indicators were not calibrated at the specified frequency, (4) weld red issuance has not been controlled, and (5) welds rods were observed lying uncontolled in the construction area. The concerns identified by this and other allegations'and by previous
' inspection findings collectively are viewed to be significant and have potential safety importance. These concerns are being addressed by the licensee in the, Quality Confirmation Program.
5.5.5 Items of Noncompliance No new items of noncompliance were identified. 5.6 Argon Gas Exposure 5.6.1 Allegation
" Argon gas valves for flushing . oxygen from pipes routinely are left open by the day crew, causing the night crew to be overcome by gas, a problem about which CG&E Safety Director Cummings expressed disinterest."
~ In an affidavit provided to GAP by a pipefitter (Individual A) formerly employed at Zimmer, it was alleged that workers on the day shift routinely crimped and wired argon gas hoses shut rather than closing the gas valves l at the source upon leaving work. The pipefitter stated that this practice. ! resulted in argon gas leaking from the hoses and caused the workers on l the night shift to suffer from dizziness. The pipefitter further stated he advised former Kaiser Safety Director Larry Cummings of his concerns and that Cummings indicated he was not interested, becasse argon gas would not hurt anyone. ; i on February 26, 1981 during a meeting between NRC Region III personnel, ) a GAP representative, and Thomas Applegate, Applegate alleged that he re- f ceived information from James Bedinghaus indicating that, in late fall or ) early winter 1980, his son, John Bedinghaus, had been overcome by argon ! gas while conducting fire watch rounds in the area of the containment vessel. l
- ~ _ . . - _ ___ 5.6.2 Background Information Argon gas is a " shielding gas" used to purge or displace the oxyg'en inside ' pipes in certain welding procedures, to prevent the metal from oxidizing during welding. Argon gas is colorless and odorless. It is also heavier than oxygen and therefore settles in low areas, displa-ing oxygen. This occurs in the same manner that water displaces air as it is poured into and fills a glass. MAPP (which actually refers to a trade name) refers to combustible gas used in welding, typically for heating and cutting various metals. It does not displace oxygen as argon gas does. It is colorless but it has an odor which can be described as " noticeably foul." MAPP gas is generally not toxic, although significant concentrations may be ignited and become explosive. NRC does not regulate the use of the subject gases. On February 6, 1981, the NRC Region III office telephoned the Cincinnati, Ohio, office of the U.S. Department of Labor, occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). During a conversation with OSHA representative John Phillips, it was determined that the allegation involved a matter over which OSHA has primary jurisdiction. An understanding was also reached that any action necessary to resolve this matter would be taken by OSHA. A letter confirming this understanding, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 40, was forwarded by Region III to the Cincinnati OSHA office on February 19, 1981. By letter dated May 15, 1981, the Cincinnati OSHA office advised the NRC Region III office that an investigation of conditions in the containment suppression pool area had been conducted by OSHA on February 4-5, 1981. The letter stated OSHA addressed a previous complaint alleging leaks of argon gas at Zimmer and concluded that an air contamination or oxygen deficiency situation did not exist. A copy of this letter is included as Exhibit 41. 5.6.3 Investigation 5.6.3.1 Interview with James Bedinghaus On March 12, 1981, James Bedinghaus was interviewed by telephone. He stated that he was a second shif t security supervisor employed by W&W Security at the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station from February to November 1980. He stated that while on duty, sometime in October 1980, an incident occurred during his shif t in which Security Officer Gayle Spencer became ill due to inhala-tion of gas. Spencer was assisted back to the guard house to recover from his illness and was later sent home. Bedinghaus learned from Spencer that Spencer was making his rounds in the area of the reactor vessel when he apparently became ill from inhalation of gas. Another worker in the area (whose identity Bedinghaus does not know) advised Spencer there was an argon gas leak where he was located and that he should leave the area imme-diately. Bedinghaus immediately reported this information to Kaiser Safety Inspector Dan Parlier, who went to check the area where the incident had occurred. Shortly afterwards (approximately 1/2 hour), Parlier contacted Bedinghaus and advised him there was a MAPP gas leak, rather than an argon gas leak, in the area where Spencer had been. Bedinghaus indicated he was not aware of any argon gas incident involving his son John.
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~- _ . . _ . _ . _- m. _ _ _ _ __
;A'Ji 8/15/61 i
On March 25, 1981, Bedinghaus provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 42. i 5.6.3.2 Interview with John Bedinghaus On March 12, 1981, John Bedinghaus was interviewd by telephone. He stated that he was a security officer employed by W&W Security at the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station from October 1980 to January 1981. He advised that while employed at Zimmer he was never involved in any incident when he became ill from or was overcome by argon or any other type of gas. On March 25, 1981, Bedin'ghaus provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 43. 5.6.3.3 Interview with Daniel Parlier On March 12, 1981, Daniel Parlier, Kaiser Assistant Safety Representative, ' was interviewed by NRC. He stated that to his knowledge there has never been an incident where anyone was overcome by argon gas. He also stated he did not believe such an incident occurred because being overcome by argon gas would likely cause suffocation, an incident of which he would certainly be aware. Parlier acknowledged that he had discovered instances when craft workers had crimped argon and MAPP gas hoses and had wired them closed rather than shutting the gas off at the source. He indicated he considered this practice a serious safety concern and whenever the practice wis observed he immediately brought it to the attention of the appropriate craft supervisor. Parlier checked the Kaiser Safety Department's " Unusual Incident Reports" for October 1980 to determine if a report of the incident involving Security Officer Spencer had been prepared. He located a report describing the incident in question and included the following information:
"On October 27, 1980, at 6:30 p.m. a Mapp gas leak located in the reactor suppression pool area at elevation levels 503' and 518' was investigated by Daniel Parlier. Parlier reported that Security Officer Gayle Spencer was in the reactor suppression pool at the time of a mild Mapp gas leak. A reading taken with a M.A.S. [ intended as an abbreviation for the manufacturer "Mine Safety Appliances"] Explo-simeter registered 0* on the upper and lower areas of the suppression pool. Spencer complained of a headache and feeling tired. He was advised by "First Aid" to see a physician if his condition worsened or Security Supervisor James Bedinghaus was to send him to a doctor if he became worse while still at work. Parlier took action to correct the Mapp gas leak by turning off the gas manifolds in the reactor building and disconnecting the gas hoses from the manifolds."
A copy of this " Unusual Incident Report" is included as Exhibit 44. In addition to the " Unusual Incident Report" prepared by Parlier, he sent a note dated October 27, 1980, to his supervisor, Mike Hoyman. In the note 76 -
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, (which was apparently a " cover note" for the incident report), Parlier advised Hoyman of the incident and concluded that the incident was a result of the craf t workers "not disconnecting their gas hoses f rom the manifolds."
(Disconnecting the hoses from the manifold would have necessitated that the gas be shut off at the manifold.) A copy of the " cover note" is included as Exhibit 45. During a subsequent telephone conversation on April 24, 1981, Parlier was questioned regarding how he perceived former Kaiser Safety Supervisor Cummings' attitude toward gas leak incidents at Zimmer. He stated it was his opinion that Cummings was very conscientious regarding this problem and it appeared to his Cummings considered gas leaks to be a serious safety concern. Parlier also remarked he did not believe Cummings ever expressed disinterest in gas leak problems or said they were unimportant. 5.6.3.4 Interview with Larry Cumminas On April 27, 1981, Larry Cummings was interviewd by telephone. He stated that he held the position of Kaiser Safety Supervisor at the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station for approximately two years until he left the site in May 1980. He verified that he was aware of instances in which workers at Zimmer crimped and wired argon gas hoses closed rather than shutting the argon gas valves off at the source._ Cummings remarked that these instances occurred "less than frequently, but more often than they would like." He was unable to specify approximately how many cases of argon hose crimping the Safety Department had detected while he was at Zimmer. Cummings denied expressing disinterest in.the argon hose crimping problem
. and advised it was a topic of concern at many Safety Department meetings.
He stated that the crimping of argon hoses was a . bad work practice; however, it was one that was hard to pin down because it was extremely difficult to catch the individuals responsible. Cummings said he felt Kaiser had an adequate safety system for preventing serious argon gas problems and incidents at the site. He explained that it was Kaiser's practice and policy to place eine safety lamps wherever workers were located in low-lying areas, particularly the suppression pool area. These lamps serve as warning devices in that they remain lit unless a gas buildup reaches the lamps' air inlet and puts out the flame. When-ever a safety lamp goes out, it is an indication of gas in the area and a signal for the workers to immediately evacuate the area. Cummings stated he knew of no instances when any workers were ever overcome int argon gas. 5.6.4 Findinas and Conclusions No evidence was obtained to show that the argon gas valves were routinely left open, that persons on the night crew had been overcome by argon gas, or that Safety Director Cummings expressed disinterest in the argon gas problem. Notwithstanding the above, it was determined that there had been instances when craft workers had crimped ~ arson gas hoses and wired them closed rather than' shutting the gas off at the source.
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DEATT 8/15/81 i l , ~This matter is under the.jurisdicat' ion of the U.S. Department of Labor, , Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). An OSHA inspection . did not confirm a situation of air contamination or oxygen deficiency at ! [ the time of their inspection. j-5.6.5 Items of Noncompliance } No: items of noucuarliance were identified. ,
! 5.7 Danaaed Prefabricated Pipina 4
5.7.1 Alleaation !
! " Prefabricated piping received in 1977 has defective welds, but construe-
- tion supervisors told crews not to repair them because the welds were nade ;
! offsite." i f -During an interview with Applegate and GAP representatives, this allegation 1 was clarified to be piping received July.3, 1979, the subject of one of j Applegate's prior allegations. . l
.i 5.7.2 Backaround Information The following summarizes the initial investigation of this allegation as
{ documented in IE Investigation Report No. 50-353/30-09. 4 . , On June 29 1979, Pullman Power Products of Williamsport, Pennsylvania, 4 also known as the M. W. Kellogg Company, shipped five prefabricated pipe spool pieces by truck to the Zimmer site for installation in the main steam relief (MSR) system, a safety-related systes. The spool pieces were received on July 3,1979, and nonconformance report E-1911 was written on
' July 5, 1979, stating the spools had " rolled off the truck onto the ground."
The nonconformance report had the effect of placing the spool pieces in a !' " hold" status in the Kaiser warehouse. The welds on the five spool pieces I were later radiographed. The radiographs displayed apparent rejectable weld 4 indications in welds on three of the five spool pieces. . On September 18 - through 28, 1979, despite the issuance of the nonconformance report, the
- spool pieces were released to construction and installed. As documented
{- in IE Investigation Report No. 50-358/80-09, the licensee was found to be
! in noncompliance with NRC requirements for the release of the spool pieces i prior to establishing acceptability. During April and May 1930, the welds l on the spool pieces were enasined ultrasonically and by magnetic particle j testing and found to be acceptable.
) On April 8, 1980, the RIII inspector reviewed the radiographs on all five j spool pieces (IMS083312-68, IMSO98A12-1AM, IMS08BA12-58H, IM511B12-7BH,
- and 1M510BA12-1CH). The files (radiographs) were marked "For Information i Only" because an acceptable radiographic technique could not be established ;
j -because of the configurations and thicknesses of the spool pieces. L i RIII personnel determined that radiography was not the correct nondestructive }- esamination (NDE) technique for the spool pieces. The geometrical configura- , ! tions and relatively large thicknesses of the spool pieces would prevent
- l ;
l' 7s .
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L'ATT N ;5 F 1 accurate displays of weld indications on the radiographs. A weld Indicaticn shown on the radiograph could be caused by distortion. The ultrasonic and magnetic particle tests ultimately performed on the installed spool pieces were correct techniques. 5.7.3 Investigation
- 5. 7 . 3.' 1 Interview with Individual A On April 24, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by repre-sentatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual A stated he had provided information to GAP regarding this allegation, and he was referring to five prefabricated pipe spool pieces manufactured by Kellog that fell off a truck during their delivery to the site. He stated that Peabody Magnaflux (PM) radiographers examined the pieces and found defective welds on some of them. He said construction personnel installed the spool pieces in the plant, disregarding PM's finding on the welds.
On April 22, 1981, Individual A provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information; howcVer, he requested the statement not be attached to this report. 5.7.3.2 Interview with David Hang on February 24, 1981, David Hang,- former PM Level II Radiographer, was inte rviewed. He stated that in August 1979 Anthony Pallon, KEI Welding Engineer, asked him to radiograph MSR spool pieces that had fallen off the truck on delivery to the Zimmer site. Hang said the examination was to determine if any of the welds on the pieces had cracked from the impact of the fall. Mang indicated that three of the five spool pieces he examined had what appeared to be unacceptable radiographic indications. He said he reported this in the Report cf Radiographic Examination submitted to Pallon and also told Pallon that radiography was the wrong technique to use to examine welds of this configuration. Hang said he advised Pallon that an ultrasonic examination should be performed in this case. Hang also stated the spool pieces were ultrasonically examined in April 1980 and the welds were found to be acceptable. On February 24 and April 23, 1981, Hang provided written sworn statements attesting to the preceding information, copies of which are included as Exhibit 46. 5.7.3.3 Record Reviews On February 24, 1980, RIII Inspector Kavin Ward reviewed records that indi-cated the five spool pieces were ultrasonically examined by Pullman Power Products (Kellogg) in April and May 1980 and examined by magnetic particle testing by Peabody Magnaflux in April 1980. The records showed that welds on all five pieces were acceptable. The magnetic particle records indicated that piece 1-MS-11B-12-7BH, weld No. V, had a linear indication approximately 1/4-in long, which was ground, retested, and found acceptable. ] i I
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i; DFJJT S/15/81 The RIII inspector determined that the ultrasonic and magnetic particle tests were valid examinations for the spool piece welds. 5.7.3.4 Field Observations 4 On February 24, 1981, RIII Inspector Kavin Ward made visual examinations of all of the welds on the five spool pieces and identified no unacceptable
. indications. The spool pieces had been installed in the main steam relief systes prior to the time of the visual examinations.
5.7.4 Findings and Conclusions { The subject of this allegation was investigated by NRC in early 1980. At j that time radiographs displayed apparent rejectable veld indications in i welds on three of five spool pieces. One item of noncompliance was cited ~ + in IE Investigation Report No. 50-358/80-09 for releasing and installing the spool pieces before determining their acceptability. Subsequently, the licensee and RIII independently determined that ultrasonic testing, ) rather than radiography, was the correct nondestructive testing technique i for exasining welds of that geometry and thickness. The welds were i examined by ultrasonic and magnetic particle testing and determined to j be acceptable. 1
, 5.7.5 Items of Noncompliance i
No new items of noncompliance were identified. 5.8 Prefabricated Pipe Welds
^
5.8l1 Allegation "At least three sources contacted by (Thomas} Applegate confirmed that an estimated 20% of the plant prefabricated welds are defective." ! l During an interview with Thomas Applegate and a GAP representative (Themas Devine), Applegate stated that this information came from either
- Individual A, Individual B, Allen Sellars, Steve Sellars, or David Hang ;
(no specific source was named). Also, Steve Binning, David Linning and James Tyner were named as having additional information. The name Steve Sellars is in error, as no such icdividual was employed at Zimmer. , It appears that this was a reference to Steve Binning. j 5.8.2 Backaround Information i Radiography is similar to a medical X-ray procedure, with the exception that i , a small but intensely radioactive material (source) is utilized to produce the l
; radiation. The. radiographic film that is produced is like an X-ray and can be l a permanent record. Nuclear welding codes often specify radiographic testing I (RT) as'a required examination. In many cases, the weld root pass (bottom
, portion of the weld, or first welding pass) is radiographed for information, { and to determine if the root is acceptable. The completed weld is radiographed
- for formal code acceptance. Nuclear welding codes contain detailed standards l ,
l 4
,, -- 7, -
_ _ . _ _. . _ _ _ _ ~ _ . _ . . - - . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _._ _ ~- -. - - - - . -- i . Dh/JT S/lia.: i for radiography, including extent of exposure and clarity of the resulting radiographic film. i - A radiograph is interpreted (read) by an interpreter. Radiographic interper-ters are assigned levels of authority and responsibility based on examination and length of experience, with a Level III radiographer being the highest level. When a radiograph is read, a " reader sheet" is filled out. The reader sheet identifies the weld, date of radiography, radiographic technique, inte rp re ter , areas of the weld included, and the conclusions of the interpreter. The reader ' sheet is normally filed with the radiographs it represents. i Many types of defects or discontinuities can be detected through radiography, including incomplete fusion, cracks, pososity, slag, oxidation, undercut, and other defects. The welding Code applied indicates the requirements for weld !
- i. acceptability, and defects say be acceptable as provided in the relevant Code.
j Many interpretations are. highly subjective, and it is possible for interpreters j to disagree on the acceptability or rejectability of an observed defect. In ; ! some cases, additional radiography may be performed to provide additional in- t I -formation. As long as the pipe is not inaccessible, subsequent radiography ! is normally not difficult or too time-consuming. i ! In practice, the most common occurrence is that a section of a weld, rather than the whole weld, will include rejectable defects. The section of the ' l weld containing the defects is then removed through grinding, re-welded, and
- re-radiographed. If the repair radiograph is acceptable, the entire weld can be accepted. ,
Pipe, spool pieces, and piping formations are purchased from various vendors. These items contain welds, and vendors are required to perform nondestructive
- . examination of these welds according to applicable codes and standards. ASME Section III standards require 100% nondestructive examination for safety-related welds. When radiography is required, radiographs are provided to the utility
- purchasing the ites for review and permanent filing.
5.8.3 Investination 5.8.3.1 Interview with Individual A
- On April 24, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by representa-tives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual A stated he was a pipefitter assigned to assist employees of Peabody Magnaflux (PM), the fire responsible for radiographic examination of pipe welds onsite. He said that in his opinion
, 20% of the prefabricated pipe welds manufactured by Kellogg were defective, i Ne indicated that be based his opinion on a statement made by PM personnel that they had observed defective welds on prefabricated pipe spool pieces manufactured by Kellogs on four occasions when they examined Kaiser welds in the residual
- heat removal (RNR) system. He conjectured that the defective welds were not i found by Kellogg because he understood it was Kellogg's practice to radiograph j 10% versus 100% of their welds. Me said FM radiographers Allen Sellars and '
i David Binning reported this to CG&E personnel, who allegedly told them not } to examine the. welds because they were vendor supplied.
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tRATI S/15/t1 Individual A stated an incident involving prefabricated piping occurred in August 1979 when PM was asked to radiograph' welds on sections of main steam relief (MSR) spool pieces (addressed in Allegation 5.7) that had fallen off
. a truck on delivery to the site. He said that, while examining the spool pieces, PM personnel found 5 of 20 welds examined to be defective. He said CG&E overruled PM's findings on this examination, but PM retained copies of their reports and could provide investigators with further information regarding this matter. ,
Individual A also stated he had a discussion with Robert Marshall, Kaiser Construction Superintendent, during which he told Marshall that 20% of the prefabricated welds in the plant were bad. He said Marshall agreed with the statement. On April 22, 1981, Individual A provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be attached to this report. 5.8.3.2 Interview with Individual B On April 14, 1981, Individual B, who was previously interviewed by representa-tives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual B stated that, during a telephone conversation he had with GAP representatives, he responded in the affirmative when asked if 20% of the prefabricated pipe welds in the plant
. were defective. He said he had heard from Individual A that 20% of the pre-fabricated pipe welds were defective.
Individual B said he had no specific information regarding this allegation because he was not involved in the fabrication of large bore pipes of the type manufactured by Kellogg, and was not in a position to provide information about defective welds on these pipes. He said that to quote him as generally confirming that 20% of the prefabricated welds in the plant are defective was a sisquote. He said he merely confirmed a rumor that the pipe welds in question were defective. On April 14, 1981, Individual B provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be attached to this report. 5.8.3.3 - Interview with James Tyner On April 16, 1981, James Tyner, former Kaiser Pipefitter Superintendent, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was . contacted by a GAP representative who asked him if be was aware that 20% of the prefabricated pipe welds were defective and that Rcbert Marshall had concurred with this statement. He said he responded to the GAP representative that he could not support that statement and said the prefabricated welda would have to be radiographed and the results evaluated before he could make such a determination. Tyner said the pipe welds in the plant are good, and attributed this to Kaiser's Walder Qualification Program which identified unqualified welders and prohibited thee from working on safety-related welds.
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- . - . .~ --. ._ _ ,, d Ch.iii $/15/61 Tyner recalled that on one occasion PM radiographers examined a Kaiser field weld and found a defect (porosity) in the adjacent Kellogg weld. He said this piping was part of the class D portion of the closed cooling water system and was not safety-related piping. He indicated that the radiographers may have applied safety-related standards to a nonsafety-related pipe and therefore found rejectable defects in the welds. Tyner stated this was not indicative of 20% of the prefabricated pipe welds being defective. 5.3.3.4 Interview with Robert Marshall On April 16, 1931, Robert Marshall, Kaiser Construction Superintendent was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he never commented to Individual A that 20% of the prefabricated welds in the plant were defective. He did recall a conversation in which he commented to Individual A that the workers
~ Individual A was supervising were having a high weld rejection rate on pipe support hangers on which 'they were working. He said he never mentioned that a percentage of the prefabricated piping was defective and he was not aware of any defects in these pipes. Marshall stated that Anthony Pallon, Kaiser Welding Engineer, had not reported any probless with the acceptability of Kellogg welds and a nonconformance report was never written on this subject.
Marshall recalled that in August 1979 PM radiographed some Kellogg prefabricated spool pieces that had fallen off a truck. He said PM reported some of the welds were defective. The radiographs were subsequently reexamined by Kaiser's Level III Radiographer, Rex Baker, and NRC Inspector Kavin Ward. He said Baker and Ward determined that the geometry of the welds was such that it distorted the, view of the weld and rendered the radiographic examination invalid due to the use of an Leproper technique. 5.8.3.5 Interview with David Nana on February 24 and April 23, 1981, David Hans, former PM Level II Radiographer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated PM was responsible for conducting radio-graphic. examinations of field welds for Kaiser at Zimmer and did not routinely radiograph welds on prefabricated pipe spool pieces manufactured by Kellogg. He stated 20% of the prefabricated Kellogg welds onsite were not defective. He said on occasion, when Kaiser welders cut into a Kellogg weld or if a Kaiser weld overlapped a Kellogg weld, FM would examine and find defects in the Kellogg weld. In each instance, these defects were reported to Kaiser on the' radiographic emanination report and forwarded to Anthony Fallon for corrective action. Mang stated that in August 1979 Pallon-asked him to radiograph a group of MSR spool pieces that had fallen off of a truck on delivery to the site. The emasination was to determine if any of the welds had cracked from the ispect
.of the fall. Nang indicated he disagreed with Psilon on this and told his radiography was the wrong examination technique. He said the spool pieces were schedule 844 pipe (3-1/2-in wall thickness) with welds 1-1/2-in. wide, which
- would require ultrasonic esamination to determine if any welds were defective.
When examining these spool pieces, they would be radiographing at an angle through laminations in the steel, which would prevent them froe seeing some defects and would exaggerate others. Mang said he examined the spool pieces E 33
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DEATI Ell 5/61 for "information only" purposes and reported his findings to Pallon. Hang said he found five of the twenty welds were unacceptable based on the radio-graphs; however, the spool pieces were later ultrasonically examined and found acceptable. He indicated that ultrasonic examination was the proper technique to examine the spool pieces and is the valid examination. On April 24,.1981, David Hang provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which included as Exhibit 47. 5.8.3.6 Interview with Steven Binninz On April 15, 1981, Steven Binning, PM Level II Radiographer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that, while assigned to the Zimmer site, he was responsible for performing radiographic examinations of pipe welds fabricated by Kaiser welders onsite. He said he did not routinely radiograph prefabricated spool pieces manufactured by Kellogg since these were previously examined by Kellogg prior to delivery. He said he had no basis to judge if 20% of the welds on prefabricated spool pieces were defective. He did recall one occasion when David Hang examined Kellogg spool pieces that had fallen off a truck. Hang initially found defective welds but he later determined that the radiographic technique distorted the view of the weld and the technique used was therefore unacceptable.
; on April 15, 1981, Steven Binning provided a written sworn statement attesting ,
to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 48, l 5.8.3.7 Interview with David Binning On January 19 and April 15, 1981, David Binning, PM Level I Radiographer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated PM did not routinely examine welds on prefabri-cated spool pieces manufactured by Kellogg. He recalled that, on one occasion, David Hang examined some Kellogg spool pieces that had fallen off a truck on delivery to the site. He stated that Haag, while apparently taking "infor-sation shots" of the welds, found defective welds in his initial examination. After a further examination of the film, Hans had determined the geometric configuration of the radiograph was wrong and the examination was invalid. Binning said that, to the best of his knowledge, he never heard PM employees mention that 20% of the prefabricated pipe welds in the plant were defective. 5.8.3.8 Interview with Allen Sellars on April 15, 1981, Allen fellars, FM Level II Radiographer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated FM was primarily responsible for the nondestructive examination of welds fabricated by Kaiser personnel onsite. He said that he occasionally enseined pipe field welds that junctured with prefabricated pipe manufactured by Kellogg and had observed defects in the adjoining Kellogg welds. He said he noted this on the Report of Radiographic Examination which would then be subeitted to Anthony Pallon, who would review the film and assure rejectable defects were corrected. Sellars indicated he was aware that, when one examines one weld and another juncturing weld, frequently the geometry of the juncturing weld causes defects to appear on the fils, which 34
i i ) 4-DhATT 8/15/81 j .' 1 i= i i , are actually distortions of the weld. He stated that when he identified defects in Kellogg welds he would be asked to reexamine them after the t defects had been corrected by Kaiser. Sellars stated be was not being over-ridden by Kaiser for his identification of defects in either Kaiser field welds or Kellogg welds. He said the defects he identified in overlapping ; 4 Kellogg welds were so few that it would be incorrect to say 20*. of the pre- ; i fabricated welds in the plant were defective. Sellars said Kellogg examined all of the prefabricated spool pieces prior to their delivery to the site , and that it was Kellogg's responsibility, not that of PM, to examine these , , welds.- ; Sellars recalled an incident in August 1979 when Anthony Pallon asked >
- j. David Hans to radiograph some Kellogg spool pieces that had fallen off the i truck on delivery to the site. Sellars said Mang attempted to radiograph !
j- the spool pieces in question, but the fils quality was poor and the technique I , was wrong, which caused exaggerated flaws in the radiographs of the spool : ] pieces. When Sellars and Hang initially told Pallon about this, Pallon ! 1 requested they-continue the examination anyway. Sellars stated the spool ; j pieces were later ultrasonically examined and found to be acceptable. , i He indicated that ultrasonic examination was the proper technique to use ! ! when examining welds in this cor. figuration. Sellars said the ultrasonic i examination did not detect any defecte in the spool pieces. On April 15, 1931, Allen Sellars provided a written sworn statement attesting i to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 49. i j 5.8.3.9 Interview with Wayne Draffon : l On Tebruary 19, 1981, Wayne Draffon, PM I.evel III Radiographer, was inter- ,
- viewed by NRC. He stated that he was employed at Zieser from January to 1 August 1980 and during this period supervised FM radiographers onsite.
Draffen stated that on occasion Kaiser requested FM to examine Kellogs pre- , fabricated pipe welds. He recalled discussing with the radiographers one ! incident that occurred prior to his arrival onsite when PM was asked to j radiograph some Kellogg spool pieces that had fallen off a truck. The radiographers informed him that, when Kaiser personnel requested the exam- i instion, they knew radiography was the wrong technique to use. He said t they told him the_ geometric configuration of the welds was such that radio-i ! l graphy would distort the view of the weld. Draffon indicated that he later i j reviewed these films during an NRC investigation and concluded the geometry [ was such that radiography distorted the view of the welds. He stated the i spool pieces in question were later ultrasonically examined and found to be : ] acceptable. j { !. Draffon indicated the FM radiographers had told him that, while examining i Kaiser field welds, they occasionally noticed a defect in a Kellogg weld that overlapped a Kaiser weld. He said the defects would be noted on the examination report and forwarded to Kaiser. Draffon cautioned that when j welds overlap or come to a juncture one had to be careful _the geometry of
- the situation did not distort the view of a weld. Draffon said be knew of j no reason why any PM employee would state that 20% of the prefabricated welds
- onsite were defective.
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D:.*Ji 5, 3 5 :.1 5.8.3.10 Record Reviews Region III inspectors reviewed radiographs of the following field and shop welds in spool pieces in the residual heat removal (RHR) system (the system identified by Individual A as containing defective welds) to determine if there were any unacceptable indications in the welds or adjacent material (see Table 5.8-1). Table 5.8-1 Welds in the RER System Weld Diameter Line Weld Diameter Line No. No. (in.) No. No. (in.) Field Welds 1RH08BB10 RH176 4 IRH08BBIO RH174C 4 1RH08BB10 RH178 4 1RH08BB10 RH177 4 1RH16C14 RH203 4 1RH08BB10 RH179 4 1RH13BB4 RH205 4 1RH13BB4 RH224 4 1RH08BB10 RH174A 4 1RH13BB4 RH226 4 6 1RH20B6 RH115 6 1RH36B6 RH116 10 1RH06BB10 RH137 10 1RH08AA10 RH109 10 1RH07BB10 RH141 10 1RH07BB10 RH140 1RH36A6 RH123 6 1RH07BB10 RH145 10 10 1RH08CA10 RH104A 10 1RH08BA10 RH105 10 1RH07BA10 RH76 10 1RH08BA10 RH104 20 1RH02B2C0 RHISB 20 1RH02B6 RH15 20 1RH02BC20 RH16A 20 1RH02BC20 RH16 20 1RH02BC20 RH16C 20 1RH02BC20 RH16B 20 1RH02BA20 RHS 16 1RH02BC20 RH14 20 1RH02BA20 RH6 20 1RH02BA20 RH8 20 1RH02AA20 RH2 20 1RH02AA20 RH1 20 1RH02BA20 RH4 20 1RH02AA20 RH3 20 1RH02AC20 RH10 20 1RH02BA20 RH9 20 1RH0AC20 RH11A 20 1RH02AC20 RH11 20 1RH01DA16 RH37 16 1RH02AC20 RH12 16 1RH01C18 RH44 18 1RH02BA20 RH39 18 1RH01C18 RH41 18 1RH01C18 RH43 20 1RH02AB20 RH18 20 1RH02BC20 RH17 28 1RH02AB20 RH19A 20 1RH02AB20 RH19 20 1RH02BA20 RH40 16 1RH02BB20 RH2O 18 1RH01C18 RH262 18 1RH01C18 RH261 Shop Welds 4 16 1RH01DB16-24 3 16 1RH01DB16-25 A 20 1RH02BA20-3 A 20 1RH02BA20-6 20 1RH02AB20-17 A 20 1RH02AC20-10 A 18 1RH01C18-31 A 18 1RH01C18-31 A 86 -
DhATT 6/1N bl k l The RIII inspector reviewed approximately five radiographs for each. of the 62 welds. No unacceptable indications were identified in either the welds
- or the adjacent material.
In addition to the welds in Table 5.8-1, the inspectors reviewed radiographs of 206 prefabricated pipe (shop) welds (700 radiographs) for acceptable radiographic testing (RT) technique, weld quality, and documentation (see Appendia B). Radiographs of the welds were reviewed per ASME Section III,1971 Edition, with Winter 1972 Addeada, and M. W. Kellogg Co. procedures ES-414. ES-415, , and E5-416. No unacceptable radiographic technique deficiencies were , identified in 517 of the radiographs and no unacceptable indications were identified in the respective welds. However,183 of the radiographs were l made without required shiss under the penetrameters. An additional four . radiographs were made with insufficient shiss under the penetrameter. , ASME Section III,1871 Edition, with Winter 1972 Addenda, Appendix IX, paragraph IX-3334.4, states, "The shim thickness shall be selected so that , the total thickness being radiographed under the penetrameter is the same , as the total weld thickness...." i 1 M. W. Kellogg Co. (pipe manufacturer and agency performing the radiography) : Radiographic Procedure No. ES-414, dated September 26, 1972, paragraph 4.1.8, I states, "Wherever required, shias shall be used to produce a total thickness ' under the penetraneter equal to the nominal thickness of the base metal plus , the height of the crown or reinforcement. Shias shall be of a radiographically . similar material to the weld metal." . The insufficient shimming of the penetraneter in radiographs of, the noted welds is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 11.2 (50-358/81-13-13). All of the radiographs in which the penetraneters were insufficiently shissed i were previously accepted by the fabricator (M. W. Kellogg), the Authorized Nuclear Inspector (Martford Steas boiler Insurance Company) at the fabri-cator's shop, the site radiographer (Nuclear Energy Services), and the licensee at the site. (Special identification of the 206 welds for which : radiographs were esamined is included as Exhibit 50.) A penetraneter is a device used to determine the image quality of a radio-graph, usually a this strip of metal of a thickness specified as some percentage of thickness of the material being radiographed. Placed on ' i the part being radiographed, it is normally required that it be of material radiographically similar to that of the itse being inspected. Various sised holes, multiples of the penetrameter thickness, are on the strip. The ability of the radiograph to show some definate sized hole establishes its quality. The essential hele of the penetrameter is used to determine if the radiograph has been sufficiently exposed to show weld indications ' that are in noncomformance with the ASME Section III Coder Sufficient shimming of the penetrameter is necessary to assure that the total thickness l
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LhATI b/15/b1 under the penetrameter is the same as the total weld thickness, thus estab-lishing a valid reference for identifying weld indications. An insufficiently shimmed penetrameter will give false assurance that the weld had received sufficient exposure to reveal any unacceptable indications in the portion of the weld that is thicker than the metal ander the penetrameter. The licensee disagreed with the NRC interpretation of Paragraph IX-3334.4 of the ASME Code, Section III-1971, regarding the use of shims under the l penetrameter. This matter was discussed in a meeting on April 30, 1981, f between representatives of RIII, RIV, the State of Ohio, the National j Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, and the licensee and his consultants. The meeting is documented in IE Inspection Report No. 50-358/81-16. The representatives from the State of Ohio and the National Board concurred with the NRC's position. A program that may demonstrate the adequacy of the radiographs in question is being implemented by CG&E and is included in the Quality Confirmation Progras. This progras is described in Section 11. 5.8.3.11 Verifiestion . Region III inspectors also verifted that the following welds matched the I respective radiographs by comparing a sketch (onionskin) made by the RIII inspectors, of the welds depicted in the respective radiographs for the following welds: Pipeline No. Weld No. 1FC36CA621 B IMS20B3169 A 1FC02AB818 B IMS20B3169 D ITC39CA621 C 1FC02AB818 A 5.8.4 Tindinas and Conclusions Interviews with the individuals identified by the alleger did not provide specific information of any defective weld. Therefore, the RIII inspector examined more than 700 radiographs to determine the acceptablility of the welds. No unacceptable welds were identified; however, 187 radiographs could not be interpreted because of an unacceptable radiographic technique. To provide further assurance that both prefabricated and field welds are satis-factory, the quality of the welds and the radiographic technique have been addressed in the Quality Confirmation Program. 33 - - . . _ m ._ _ , _ , _ . _ _ _ , . _ __
ma
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DhiTI S/15/b; "
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5.8.5 Items of Noncompliance " One item of noncompliance was identified (failure to assure that radiography 'I test requirements for shimming the penetrameter had been satisfied).
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5.9 Design Control - 5.9.1x Allegation - 2
" Engineering " designs" routinely are drawn af ter the fact to conform with im piping that al-eady'had'been installed."
5.9.2 Background Information Problems associated with the design and installation of large-bore piping and pipe suspension systems were identified by the RIII inspection program L beginning in May 1978. Similar problems were identified for small-bore - piping and pipe suspension systems beginning in February 1980. Seventeen 2 inspections have covered these large-bore and small-bore pipe and piping - suspension systems. _ J Problems related to installations not being in accordance with design ' drawings were identified for large-bore piping and pipe suspension systems in an August 1978 RIII inspection and for small-bore piping and pipe sus- ; pension systems in a February 1980 inspection. The resolution of these i problems is being followed in the RIII inspection program. , y 5.9.3 Investigation B a-a 5.9.3.1 Interview with Individual A -- On April 24, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by " representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual A stated -- Kaiser construction personnel used " construction aids" rather than final - =f design drawings when fabricating and installing pipe support hangers on site. He stated that if a pipe support hanger or pipe piece was moved, j the construction aid was changed in the field without an engineer's ,, concurrence. He said there was no assurance that the pipe was in the proper location or was installed as designed. He characterized this as designing pipe hanger and support systems "af ter the fact" because the 7 construction aids were used as the final drawing after installation. j Individual A said the systems were not installed to follow drawings approved 1 by an engineer, but rather the pipe support system was installed by construc- d tion and the engineer took the construction aid and made it into the final i drawing for the system. He said this occurred because Sargent & Lundy (S&L), 7 the architect-engineer, did not have enough engineers assigned to the site as to draw and approve design changes on the pipe support system or to provide ;j accurate and updated design drawings for the craft personnel to use when ~*
, installing the systems. -'
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r LhATT S, M.El ( E On AI,ril 22, 1981, Individual A provided a written sworn statement attesting to tne preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be y attached to this report.
? 5.9.3.2 Interview with James Tvner P
k On April 16, 1981, James Tyner, for=er Kaiser Pipefitter Superintendent, was interviewed by NRC. He stated his concern about Kaiser's practice of 5_ installing pipe supports from " construction aids" or " field sketches" rather
- _ than from approved design drawings. He said construction was far ahead of r_ schedule and the designers were behind in this area. He stated that pipe i supports as drawn on the construction aid occasionally did not fit in the e location they were designed for and were moved arbitrarily and noted in red on the construction aid. This change was then transposed to the final
[ drawing without an engineer's evaluation of the change. Tyner indicated g) that this resulted from poor initial design on the construction aid itself. E ' Tyner also said that, in his opinion, the 1:.censee did not hav- qualified engineers or engineering support staff on site to properly dra; the con-struction aids to match actual conditions in the plant.
?
I 5.9.3.3 Interview with Individual B C ( On April 14, 1981, Individual B, who was previously interviewed by
. representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual B stated that
( he was provided with a field construction drawing or construction plan [ when installing systems in the plant. The system would be installed and y the engineering staff would be shown where construction personnel had made w changes or alterations in the installation of the system. He characterized a this as construction designing the systems while they were being installed,
& rather than designing the system by engineers. Individual B indicated that i in 1977 Kaiser Quality Control Inspectors contracted from Butler Services, f Inc., saw this practice and directed that it be stopped because it was .- contrary to Quality Control Procedures.
L g On April 14, 1981, Individual B provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be
; attached to this report. ?
1 S.9.3.4 Review of Previous NRC Inspections ii!
! NRC has previously identified problems with the installation of pipe hangers
(_ and the related quality assurance inspection program. The w problems were
$ documented and notices of violation vere issued in Region III Inspection g _
Reports No. 78-10, 78-18, 78-22, 78-27, 78-32, 79-03, 79-10, 79-11, 79-22, 79-37, 80-05, 80-13, 80-16, 80-22, 80-25, 81-04, and 81-17. L
- 1. RIII inspection of large bore piping and pipe suspension system design and installation was initiated in May, 1978. By the latter part of
_ 1978, RIII was aware that most of the existing installations were not f in accordance with the design, due to implementation of an inadequate {
~_
installation and QA/QC program. The situation was further compounded i
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- l. by the updating of GE design criteria that inval2 dated the prev 2ous engineering design and calculations. Since then the licensee has determined that all installatiens are considered preliminary and that
.;1 ) final calculations will be performed prior to system test and acceptance.
'3 Because of this, RIII has not inspected large bore piping suspension
's system hardware since 1979. The findings relative to support installa-
,, tions not in accordance with design and inadequate design review remain i open.
- 2. RIII inspection of small bore process and instrumentation piping and 44 ? pipe suspension system design and installation was initiated in February, "y 1980. Problems relative to field design changes being made without S&L approval are documented in Inspection Report 80-05. At present, the
. -l design of small bore systems is contracted to Nuclear Power Services, Inc.
4s (NPS). RIII review of the NPS program and its implementation will be a part of future routine site inspections. (}
;; 3. RIII inspections of small bore CRD piping and pipe suspension systems
' ; ,- design and installation were performed in December, 1980. The inspection identified. inadequacies in design and the QA/QC programs and as a result ~ .( CG&E issued a Stop Work Order. RIII followup inspection in June, 1981
- lc (Report No. 81-17) resolved most of the findings, however, the present
.? RCI design control provisions relative to procedures; verification and approval re=ains open.
[h - C The corrective measures to resolve these problems have been and continue to
~
_ be closely monitored by Region III. 5.9.4 Findings and Conclusions
; There have been cases of both large- and 'small-bore piping and pipe suspension systems being installed without proper design control. Field installations have been made that were not in accordance with approved design docu=ents.
i This problem was initially identified for large-bore piping systems during
" a May 1978 RIII inspection. It was initially identified for small-bore le piping systems during an RIII inspection.in February 1980, which was con-
'.* ducted as a result of ar2 allegation concerning small-bore piping problems at another RIII facility.
.-[ These problems have resulted in items of noncompliance, management meetings with the licensee and licensee stop work orders, one of which was confirmed in an Immediate Action Letter. Resolution of these problems is not complete
- } and is being followed in the RIII inspection program.
, . ;~. , 5.9.5 Items of Noncompliance 7
; -. j No new items of noncompliance were identified. ?
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l l iMTT L/15;t 1 5.10 Cable Tray Hangers and Loadinc 5.10.1 Allegation
Shock-absorbing electrical tray hangers previously found unsatisf actory are still unsafe due to faulty welds, and electrical cable trays remain ;
dangerously full." , 5.10.2 Background Information During an interview on February 26, 1981, Thomas Applegate and a GAP ! representative, Thomas Devine, indicated that Edwin Hofstadter was the
- source of this allegation. l Hofstadter was employed by Husky Products, the Zimmer cable tray vendor, between February 8,1973 and August 4,1978. He wrote a letter of com-i plaint that he sent to various parties on August 18, 1978. RIII personnel contacted him by telephone on September 9,1978, and he was interviewed by RIII personnel on Septembei- 29, 1978. His allegations, relating to materials i I.
and welding on cable trays supplied to the Zimmer and Clinton sites, were investigated in detail by RIII, and the findings related to Zimmer are i documented in IE Investigation Report 50-358/78-21. The RIII investigation 4 resulted in one item af noncompliance (a deficiency), but cable tray materials l and welding were considered acceptable. i During the 1978 RIII investigation, Hofstadter sent a series of letters to the NRC (dated September 30, October 9, 19, 20, 31, December 15, 1978,
- and February 11, 1979) stating his concerns and expressing dissatisf* action i with NRC investigation findings. On February 2, 1979, a public press con-ference was held in Cincinnati wherein RIII personnel met with Hofstadter, 3
a lawyer representing Ralph Nader, and representatives of Citizens Against A Radioactive Environment (CARE), an intervenor group, to discuss the NRC investigation. At RIII's request, a vendor inspection of Husky Products was performed by j Region IV personnel during February 12-15, 1979 (Report No. 99900356/79-01). 4 The inspection did not identify significant deficiencies (QA Manual lacked description of duties or policy statement, _ weld procedure 107 lacked welding parameters for metal under 1/4-in.). i On March 9, 1979, CARE sent a letter to various media representatives, taking }. issue with the RIII finding of cable tray acceptability. Subsequently, the Mississippi Valley Power Project (MVPP), another intervenor group, introduced the acceptability of cable trays and cable tray loading as contentions in the Zimmer licensing hearings. These contentions were accepted for litigation, and extensive testimony by NRC, Husky Products, CG&E, Hofstadter, and MVPP personnel is documented in the hearing transcripts. A review of the Atomic Safety Licensia: Es.ra hearing transcripts indicated that they-did not reveal any significant information not included in the i RIII investigation report. The conclusion of cable tray acceptability has not been altered. 92 -
. -= - , -_--
DRAFT 8/15/b1 Hofstadter made no allegations concerning cable tray hangers, and these were not supplied by Husky Products. A report (50.55e) was submitted to NRC by the licensee concerning cable tray hanger welding deficiencies on July 17, 1978. A followup report was sent to the NRC on October 30, 1978. Review of the licensee's corrective actions was performed during an inspection conducted during March 21-23, 1979. During that inspection, corrective action appeared to be acceptable, but had not been completed. 5.10.3 Investigation 5.10.3.1 Interview of Edwin Hofstadter Edwin Hofstadter was contacted by telephone on July.31, 1981. He stated his concerns dealt with cable tray (fittings) welding, and he had no knowledge of cable tray hangers. He expressed concern regarding cable tray loading at Zimmer. ' 5.10.3.2 Observations and Reviews Concerning Cable Trav Hanger Velds The following findings address the present review of the allegation as expressed by GAP in their letter of December 10, 1980, to the Merit Systems Protection Board concerning cable tray hangers and cable tray loading. RIII inspectors made visual inspections of both vendor and field welds on the following Superstrut cable tray hangers in the cable spreading room and blue switchgear room, and at an elevation of 473-ft in the auxiliary building. The following data was noted for the cable spreading room:
- 1. No. 14H11FEC145--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 2. No. 14H11FEC147--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 3. No. 4H2FEC193--no unacceptable weld discontinuities; foot connection covered with fireproofing
- 4. No.15HITEC160--no unacceptable weld discontinuities; foot connection covered with fireproofing
- 5. No. 70HFEC165 (cross brace member No. 23HV5FEC294)--welds had irregular profile, porosity, and undercut
- 6. No.15H2FEC175 (second horizontal member from the top)--weld had undercu*
l
- 7. No.14H11FEC146 (cross member)--an apparent vendor weld had undercut l and slag
- 8. No.16H1FEC156 (weld marked rejected)--weld had spatter and undercut All of these welds were painted; therefore, the RIII inspector examined for relatively large discontinuities only.
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ihAT1 5/15.11 The unacceptable welds identified on hangers 70EFEC165,15H2FEC175, ' 14H11FEC146, and 16HITEC156 were not controlled in any QA document. This
- is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, and the Wm. H. Zimmer i QA Manual, Section 15 (358/81-13-09).
The RIII inspectors reviewed approximately 180 construction inspection l plans (CIPs) and inspection records for the hangers in the cable spreading room (elevation 536 ft in the north section of the auxiliary building). The licensee stated that inspections documented on the CIPs also included vendor 1 welds, even though the records only reflected field welds. The vendor welds j were inspected because of repairs necessary to close the 10 CFR 50.55(e) report telephoned to NRC on July 17, 1978. The 10 CFR 50.55(e) report - indicated that vendor welds on Superstrut cable tray hangers, which were used only in the cable spreading room (PW Industries hangers are utilized elsewhere and appear acceptable), did not meet the visual inspection requirements of AWS DI.1-1972. The CIP records and the 10 CFR 50.55(e) report indicate that all of the final field and vendor velds were reinspected after repairs were made to welds on more than half of the 141 hangers. These were accepted by the licensee in December 1980 and January 1981. No inspection records were available to indicate that in process inspections of either the field or vendor welds were made to verify proper filler metal, weld procedure, welder's qualifications, surface conditions, etc., as required by the AWS DI.1-1972 Code, Section 6. Certificates had been supplied by the vendor stating that the material met the purchase specifi-cation requirements. The RIII inspector requested the licensee to obtain the in process and field weld inspection records for the hanger welds made by the vendor (Superstrut). A letter dated May 1,-1981, from Midlanc-Ross Corporation to CG&E was provided to the RIII inspector on June 1,1981 The letter indicated that Superstrut had been acquired by the Midland .iass
- Corporation in January 1978, and that no records could be located with j respect to in-process inspection of hangers supplied to Zimmer.
Discussions with pertinent QC management and inspection personnel revealed that the welds documented on the above CIPs-had 5 en inspected after having been painted. The licensee stated that field visuel examinations of tray hanger welds were based on H. J. Kaiser Company Pro.cedure No. SPPM 4.6, Revision 8, dated August 29, 1980, paragraph 5.1.3, which states, " Surface condition--joint surfaces to be examined shall be cleaned and free from slag, rust, are burns, paint, dirt, or other contaminants that would interfere with the examination." The licensee stated that paint-(Galvanox) applied to the hanger welds did not interfere with visual examination and, in some cases, actually highlighted discontinuities. AWS D1.1-1972 Code, Section 3.10.1, states, ".. . Welded joints shall not be painted until after the work has been completed and accepted...." The apparent lack of in-process and adequate final inspections of the
- above field and vendor hanger welds is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 10.1.2 (358/81-13-10).
The RIII inspector requested the design acceptance criteria that was used by QC to evaluate the undercut on hanger 15H2FEC175. ' The licensee provided 94 - w $ v + -,c- gg te m --w- - ,y- p
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- a. k.0 , 5;' 15 f b l S&L Specification H-2713, Supplement 7 Standard EP-117, and H. J. Kaiser Procedure No. SPPM 4.6, Revision 8, paragraph 5.2.9, which allows up to 1/16-in. undercut on the cable tray hanger welds. The 1/16-in. criterion does not comply with AWS D1.1-1972, Section 3.6.4, which states, "For buildings and tubular structures, undercut shall be no more than 0.01 inch deep when its direction is transverse to primary tensile stress in the part that is undercut, nor more than 1/32 inch for all other situations."
Further review of Procedure No. SPPM 4.6, paragraph 5.2, revealed other noted exceptions to the AWS D1.1-1972 code. These exceptions included fillet weld size and weld convexity. On March 5, 1981, S&L provided a documented investigation program of fillet weld size for P-W Industries cable pan hangers, purchase order No. 7070-25102. This program was perforeed by Gladstone Laboratory of Cincinnati to substantiate the design adequacy of the undersized fillet welds at the flare bevel joints of the cable pan hangers. The study was based on a sample of 95 welds cut from P-W cible tray hangers. The 95 welds were sectioned and etched to determine actual weld size and relative weld quality. Only one weld was identified as rejectable due to a lack of fusion. Although this study may justify that the veld size was adequate where the weld penetration was not measurable by normal visual techniques, no justification was pro-vided to substantiate the exceptions to the AWS D1.1-1972 Code requirements concerning veld convexity and undercut. These deviations from the AWS Code are contrary to 10 CTR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, the Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR,. Table 3.8.2, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 3.3 (358/81-13-11). The following data was noted for the blue switchgear room hangers (eleva-tion 525 ft and drawing E-96):
- 1. No. 1H029--no unacceptable veld discontinuities
- 2. No. SR25--foot connection covered with fireproofing; no visible unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 3. No. 5H30 (2)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 4. No. 1H077--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 5. No. 1H079--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 6. No. 1H133--no unacceptable weld discontinhities
- 7. - 2 Nos. 5H19--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 8. No.109HV4 (east and west sides)--had unacceptable weld discontinuities that were controlled on construction inspection plans (records)
- 9. No. 1H28-2--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 10. No. 1H28-1--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 11. No.1H29--no unacceptable weld discontinuities 95 -
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- 12. No. SH30--no unacceptable weld discontsnutties
- 13. No. 1H077--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 14. No. 1H133--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 15. No. SH19 (4)--no unacceptable veld discontinuities l
{
- 16. No. 5H3(12)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities l
- 17. No. 5H2(12)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities j
- 18. No. 5H25--no unacceptable veld discontinuities; foot connection covered with fireproofing.
r The following data was noted for elavation 473 ft auxiliary building hangers:
- 1. No. SH009 (drawing E-91)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 2. No. 4H3 (drawing E-14)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 3. No. 2H1 (drawing E-14)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 4. No. 5H010 (drawing E-91)--no unacceptable veld discontinuities
- 5. No. 5H012 (drawing E-91)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 6. No. 6H1 (2) (drawing E-14)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities
- 7. No. 6H1 (1) (drawing E-14)--no unacceptable weld discontinuities Four to six welds were inspected on each of the preceding hangers.
Several of the tray hanger foot connections (where the hangers are attached to the structural beams) were covered with fireproofing and could not be
. inspected. Therefore, the RIII inspector requested QC inspection documen-tation to assure that the welds covered by fireproofing were acceptable.
The licensee provided a copy of Surveillance Report (SR) No. 2893 dated January 8,1981, which stated that 94 of 179 (Superstrut)-cable tray hangers in the cable spreading room have one or both foot connections covered with fireproofing. The SR requested clarification as to what QC should do since the foot connections had not been inspected. As of March 27, 1981, the SR had no disposition. < This item is unresolved pending resolution of SR No. 2893 sad action to resolve other hanger connections throughout the plant that were covered before they were inspected (358/81-13-12). The concerns identified above are addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program.
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LhAri f./15 ni 5.10.3.3 Observations, Reviews, and Intervie.s Concerning Cable Tray Loadine The RIII inspector made field observations, reviewed and discussed site control measures, and reviewed and discussed the design basis and verifica-tions regarding cable tray loading. Tray loading was considered in three aspects: cable ampacity or thermal loading; physical weight loading; and the commitments in the Zimmer FSAR, Section 8.3.3.1.
- 1. The following cable tray routing points (nodes) were selected for the reviews and discussions:
- a. 1057A--yellow division / power tray--selected because of the high design index (DI) of 1.44 (see 5.10.3.3 paragraph 3 for explanation of design index).
- b. 2015A--blue division / power tray--selected because of the high DI of 1.46.
- c. 2023A--blue division / power tray--selected for verification of DI accuracy (DI of 1.18).
- d. 2038A--blue division / power tray--selected because of the high DI of 1.44.
- e. 2039A--blue division / power tray--selected during field observa-tions because of the appearance of being highly filled.
- f. 1073A--yellow division / power tray--selected for verification of the number of cables installed.
- g. 2086B--blue division / control tray--selected during field observa-tions because of the appearance of being highly filled.
- h. 1104B--yellow division / control tray--selected because of the high DI of 1.54.
j i. 2027A--blue division / power tray--selected because of high DI of 1.46.
- 2. The RIII inspector and a licensee represen'tative counted the cables in the following tray nodes and compared the counts with the number of cables listed in the S&L Cable Pan Loading Report, dated February 2, 1981:
Node Field Count Report Count 4
- a. 1057A 27 27
- b. 2025A 24 23 (see explanation below)
- c. 2039A 39 39
- d. 1073A 32 33 (see explanation below)
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LhATl h/15/El To accomplish steps (2)(b) and (2)(c). S&L uses the design inc'ex program. The design index is a measure of tray fill and is expressed mathematically as follows: Design Index Useable = The sum of the (cable diameters)2 area of the tray where useable area (UA) equals tray width times design depth-of-fill (design depth-of-fill is based on square cables) and 50% of the tray cross-sectional area. , For 24 in. x 4 in. power trays, the total area equals 96 sq in. atd useable area equals 24 in. x 2 in. equals 48 sq in. 2 DI = E(d UA
)
where E = summation d = cable diameter This equation is consistent with the Stolpe method. " Percent Fill" is not consistent with the Stolpe method because the depth of the tray is used rather than the depth of the cables in the tray. Peri:ent fill is also based on the actual cable cross-sectional area rather than the square cable that is assumed in the Stolpe method. Expressed mathe-matically, Sum cable er ss-sectional areas x 100 Percent Fill = Total cross-sectional tray area i where the sum of cable cros's-sectional areas equals E(pi x r ) : with r = radius of the cable and pi = 3.1416. l l Thus, 2 Percent Till = E (pi x r ) x 100 Total area - I The relation between design index and percent fill is therefore j 2 E(pi x r ) x 100 Percent Fill _ Total area Design Index E(d ) . Useable area i since the total area (TA) equals 2 times the useable area (UA) and d = 2 x r.
- 100 -
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aa: ._ _ _. __ _ _ n. ; . _ _ _- _ _ . . .2 _ . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ L.;ATI E.13/E! 2 pg d Elpi x ! } x 100 I~E (d2) x 100 FF _ 2(UA) , 2 UI 2 2 E(d ) E(d ) UA
={Ix100=39.3%perDI .
Thus, for a 4-in.-deep tray: 39.3% Actual Fill = 1.0 Design Index = 2-in. design depth-of-fill (square cables) 50% Actual Fill = 1.27 Design Index = 2.54-in. design depth-of-fill (square cables) 60% Actual Fill = 1.52 Design Index = 3.04-in. design depth-of-fill (square cables) and for a 6-in.-deep tray: , 39.3% Actual Till = 1.0 Design Index = 3-in. design depth-of fill (square cables) Based on the preceding relationships between -design index and depth of square cables, and the fact that S&L has used a 2-in. depth-of-fill as the basis of selecting cables for particular aspere loads, the cables in tray = odes with a DI over 1.0 would have to be re-evaluated considering the increased depths. This ite= is unresolved pending completion of the re-evaluations (35S/81-13-15). The above design basis for cable ampacity was a deviation fron the design (FSAR) that was not identified on any control document. This is
- contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, and the Wm. E. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 3.6 (358/81-13-16).
~
On March 17, 1981, the S&E Assistant Manager of Electrical Engineering stated that appropriate modifications to. the FSAR would be submitted. Also, specific consideration would be given to the differing types of cable insulations, addressed -in the previously discussed publications (standards), when compared with the cable insulations used in Zimmer.
- 4. The RIII inspector reviewed S&L Instruction No. PI-ZI-10.1, Revision 0, -
dated February 6,1975, paragraph 4.5, which states, "The Senior Elee-trical Project Engineer shall assign an electrical engineer to run thermal loading calculations for all power tray routing points with a design,index exceeding 1.25. He shall compare these loadings, in vatts per feet, with the vatts per feet limits established for the design indexes involved."
- 101 -
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m_. 4 N __ u.L._ _ _.y m._ ;.J- _ T . _c _ _ DLA)T bl15lE1 1 + The RIII inspector requested the thermal calculations fer tray nodes l 2025A, 1057A,.2038A, and 2027A that-had dis in excess of 1.25. S&L provided calculations for nodes 2025A, 1057A, and 2027A. These calculations were performed in 1978 and 1979 and had not been reviewed
'or approved. S&L described these as-interim calculations, which would
;have to be redone after all of the final electrical loads in the plant
. were established and defined. Thermal calculations had not been per-formed for tray node 2038A.
S&L provided a controlled list. dated February 24,1981 of 37 routing points (nodes)'with design indexes over 1.25. Thirty-four of these tray points exceed the 50% tray fill requirement specified in the FSAR, Section 8.3.3.1. Tray nodes 1104B and 2025B also exceed 60% ,
' fill. The S&L Assistant Manager stated that thermal calculations (both allowable and. actual) will be performed in the near future for fall power trays with a LI over 1.25. These calculations will be provided to NRC Region III. This item is unresolved (358/81-13-17).
- 5. Neither S&L Instruction No. PI-ZI-10.1, Revision 0, nor any other j document established controls to verify the thermal loading power of j Teable (penetration) sleeves and the physical (dead weight) loading i of trays (power, control, and instrument).
- a. The Cable Pan Loading Report included the design indexes of f sleeves. ' Sleeve #SL111 had a reported DI of 1.29 and sleeve l
#SL105 had a reported DI of 1.26. A controlled list of power sleeves with a DI over l.25 was not.mainta.ined.
I b. S&L stated that a design index of 1.25 would be used as the factor to determine when calculations would be performed for physical (dead weight) loading.
~
l The lack of design control measures to verify the adequacy of the thermal loading of power sleeves and the physical loading of trays is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, and the Wm. H. Zimmer ! .Q A Manual, Section 3.11.2 (358/81-13-18). 1 S&L revised Instruction PI-ZI-10.1, Revision 1, Sections 4.5, 4.6, and l 4.7, on March 18, 1981 to include requirements to verify and control the thermal loading of power sleeves and the physical loading of all trays
'(power, control, and instrument) that have a design index over 1.25.
S&L' stated that calculations for the physical loads of all power, l
. control, and instrument trays, and for thermal loads of' all power j sleeves with a design index over 1.25, will be performed in the near I future. These ' calculations will be provided to NRC Region III.
4 The RIII inspector requested the justification for using the design ! index program for the determining factor for physical loads since the
- design index program had absolutely no relation to physical weight.
L The RIII inspector also requested justification for using the design
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DRAFT S/15/61 index of 1.25 as the determining limit for performing design calcula-tions. S&L stated that both of the justifications would be provided to NRC Region III. .This item is unresolved pending evaluation of the justification for using a design index program (358/81-13-19).
- 6. The RIII inspector observed a note on the bottom of the thermal calcu-
. lation sheet dated December 27, 1979 for cable tray #1057A. The note indicated that two cables "#VC016 and VC073 are overloaded." The noted overloaded cables were not identified on any control document that would have required appropriate evaluation and disposition. S&L personnel stated that a control program did not exist for such design deviations. This is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,- Criterion III, and the Wm . H. Zinner QA Manual, Section 3.6 (358/81-13-20).
- 7. The RIII inspector determined the physical weight of yellow division control tray 1104B.
The total weight of the cables for tray 1104B was determined to be p 3j o6 = 36.53 lb/ft2 Therefore, tray 1104B (DI 1.54) is in compliancg with FSAR Section 3.10.1.2.3, which allows up t:o 40 lb/ft . Problems identified during investigaiton of this allegation are addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 5.10.4 Findings and Conclusions This allegation raises concerns of potential safety importance that cannot i be. assessed without further inspections and evaluations by the licensee and NRC. Cable tray hanger weld deficiencies in the cable spreading room had been reported to the NRC in July .1978 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The licensee's corrective action of this matter was completed in January 1981. Although this matter was being carried as an open inspection item by NRC,
~
the licensee's 'inal corrective action was not reviewed prior to this investigation effort. This investigation effort disclosed that the hanger welds throughout the plant'had not been inspected before the welds were painted or coated with fireproofing.
-.The acceptability of electrical tray hang.er welds is unresolved pending (1) additional inspections of hanger welds, which will be made after paint 4- and fireproofing have been removed, and (2) establishment of the quality
, of those welds for which in-process inspections were not performed and for which inspection criteria deviated from AWS Code requirements. 3 The acceptability of electrical cable trays fill and loading is unresolved pending the completion and review of tray-loading calculations for. several
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l tray-routing points; re-evaluations of cable selections; establishment of the actual design basis and verification measures for cable tray loading; establishment of. design measures to verify the thermal. loading of power j sleeves and the physical loading of trays; and establishment of measures
- - to control design deviations.
1 It should be noted that the time to determine compliance with ampacity
. requirements is at the completion of the electrical design. According to the licensee and A/E this was to be accomplished.
i- - These concerns are addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program.
- 5.10.5 Items of Noncompliance Six items of noncompliance were identified. (Failure to identify and control unacceptable welds on four. cable tray hangers; failure to execute the programs for inprocess and final (before painting) inspections of cable tray hanger welds; failure to assure 'that appropriate weld inspection criteria (1/32 inch l
undercut) was specified in design documents; failure to control deviations
- from the design basis for cable ampacity; failure to establish measures to 3
assure verification.of the design adequacy of the thermal loading of power sleeves and the physical loading of trays, and failure to establish measures to assure that design deviations, identified by S&L engineer, were controlled). i These items have generic applicability-to-plants designed by S&L and are being forwarded to NRC Region IV, Vendor Inspection Branch for generic followup.
-5.11 Clogged' Intake
- 5.11.1 Allegation
Sand and mud choke the feedwater pumps and it take flues carrying makeup j water to the cooling tower, because of a flaw in the plant's design.
Pumps used to rectify the flaw quickly burn out." During an interview with Thomas Applegate and a GAP representat:ve - (Thomas Devine), it was clarified that this allegation pertained to the river intake. The river intake provides service water, not feedwater. 5.11.2 Background Information 10 CFR 50.55(e) requires licensees to report to NRC major defects found during . construction or operation of power reactors. These reports are public documents, maintained in NRC files and Public Document Rooms. The licensee reported silting conditions in CG&E letters QA-1148 dated June 20, 1979, and QA-1168 dated July 23,-1979, and service water pump ' impeller wear conditions in letters QA-1196 dated September 6,1979,
- QA-1239 dated December 31,1979, and QA-1371 dated December 17, -1980, that were sent to NRC Region III pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55 (e) . Copies of these letters are included.as Exhibit 51.
4
- 104 -
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LhATl A/15/F1 The silting ano pump impeller wear conditions, along with the measures te correct these conditions, are described in Appendix J of the km. H. Zimmer FSAR, Revision 69, dated December 1980 (see as Exhibit 52 of this report).
-5.11.3 Investigation A review was made of the 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports and related documents.
Additional investigation was not performed by RIII because the matter was known and resolution was in progress. The corrective measures to be taken, as described in licensee submittals, have been reviewed and accepted in Subsection 9.2.1 of FUREG-0528, " Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Related to the Operation of Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear power Station, Unit 1," Supplement 1, issued in June 1981 by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The implementation of these corrective measures is unresolved pending completion of the corrective measures described in the Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR, Appendix J, Revision 69, dated December 1980 (50-358/81-13-31). 5.11.4 Findings and Conclusions The licensee reported the silting condition concerning the service water intake structure to NRC Region III by telephone on June 18, 1979 and by letters QA-1148 on June 20, 1979 and QA-1168 dated July 23, 1979 pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e). The plant design and operating procedures had to be modified to control the silting condition. Accelerated service water pump impeller wear was reported by the licensee by telephone on August 10, 1979, and by letters QA-1196 dated September 6, 1979, QA-1239 dated December 31, 1979, and QA-1371 dated December 17, 1980, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e). The silting and pump impeller wear concerns are open items pending co'mpletion of corrective measures described in the Wm. H. Zimmer Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Appendix J, Revision 69, dated December 1980 (including a sedimentation monitoring program and plant modifications) and review by RIII inspectors. The implementation of these corrective measures will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.' 5.11.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 5.12 overpressurization Incident 5.12.1 Allegation "A design flaw in the heat exchanger control panel permitted an operator mistakenly to force 1200 pounds of pressure through pipes only meant to handle 300 pounds, ripping the pipe and soaking electricians with a hard spray of water that would have been radioactive had the plant been in operation."
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f 5.12.2 Background Information 10 CFR 50.55(e) requires licensees to report to NRC major defects found during construction or operation of power reactors. These reports are public documents, maintained in NRC files and Public Document Rooms. The licensee reported the overpressurization incident in CG&E letter QA-1106 dated March 2,1979 (see Exhibit 53) pursuant to the requirements of 10 CTR 50.55(e). The report indicated that on January 19, 1979, during a construc-tion test to demonstrate the flow rate through the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system orifice, the steam jet air ejector was overpressurized and failed. The report alludes to two operator errors as the cause of the overpressurization. The errors involved two administrative 1y controlled valves, which were incorrectly documented as closed. " Administrative 1y" means that the valve positions- (e.g. , open, closed, etc.) are verified and documented in accordance with site procedures. Although water in the KPCS system is not presently radioactive, it can be contaminated during normal operation. The 10 CFR 50.55(e) report also stated that the design, utilizing two administratively controlled valves, was permitted by the ASME Section III Code, and concluded that the overpressurization incident was not due to a design deficiency, although a check valve would have compensated for the two operator errors. 5.12.3 Investigation 5.12.3.1 Interview with Individual A On April 22, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by representa-tives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual A stated he recalled an incident when the heat exchanger control panel was pressurized with 1200 pounds of pressurized water when it was only meant to handle 300 pounds. He said he learned that high-pressure water entered the low-pressure system and ruptured pipes in the low pressure system. He said two electricians in the area were doused with water when the pipes ruptured. He related that othe.r plant employees said this incident occurred because an operator apparently failed to turn off a valve allowing high-pressure water to enter the low-pressure system. On April 22, 1981, Individual A provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be attached to this' report. 5.12.3.2 Interview with Individual B On April 14, 1981, Individual B, who was previously interviewed by representa-tives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual B stated be recalled an incident when the " alpha air injector condenser" on the ground floor of the turbine building was injected with high pressure water instead of low-pressure water and the pipes in the condenser ruptured. He said other workers in the
- 106 - ' " * ***eN- -"* se. _ _ . _ _ , , _ ,
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DhAT1 6/15/!'
-plant told him this occurred because an operator failed to close the high-pressure valve and the high-pressure water entered the low-pressure system
- that ruptured the lines.
On April 24,1931, Individual B provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be attached to this report. 5.12.3.3 Record Review ! Region III inspectors have previously reviewed the overpressurization concern as documented in the following excerpts of IE Inspection Reports No. 79-06, Section 8;-No. 79-23, page 4; No. 79-29, pages 4 and 5; and No. 80-06, page 2. Report No. 79-06, Section.8 i
"The inspector reviewed the event of January 19, 1979, during which high pressure core spray (HPCS) water entered the condensate (CD) and low pressure core spray (LPCS) systems because valves IE22-F003 and F031 had been left open causing a rupture of the steam jet air ejector condenser IA. The review consisted of interviews with testing and operating personnel and a review of the licensee's final report on his investigation of the event. The review
~
showed that: i "a. Procedure OP.KP.01-4, Revision 0 was used to lineup, fill and vent the HPCS system.
"b. At the complet' ion of the fill and vent operation the operator never completed Step 5.1.5'which required him to close valves 1E22-F003 and F-31. With these two valves open the CD and HPCS systems became i
crosstied thru the cycled condensate (CY) system. The operator claims l . he _ informed the Shif t Supervisor that he had lef t the two valves open i while the latter does not recall being told. This failure to follow ] procedures is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and is considered to be an example of an item of noncompliance (358/79-06-06B) of the infraction level. i "c. For some unknown reason, valve IE21-7025 which had been safety tagged closed under Switching Order No. 781317, dated November 16, 1978, was in the open position. This completed the cross connection of the LPCS and HPCS systems. Violation of Switching Order No. 781317 is contrary . to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and is considered an example of an item of noncompliance (358-79-06-06C) of the infraction level. The switching order was cleared on January 24, 1979. The-corrective action which the licensee is currently taking regarding a previous noncompliance with the safety tagging procedure (358-79-01-01) . is also applicable to
~
this event, therefore the inspector stated no response to this item of noncompliance is required.
"d. Paragraph 13.0 of Safety Tagging Procedure EC. SAD.02,- Revision 00 allows for the operation of equipment for test purposes without the
- removal of the safety tags. It is possible that valve IE21-F025
- was operated for test purposes- thru tags and subsequently lef t1open by
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LLaFi E/15/F1 error. The inspectors have objected to Paragraph 13.0 of the Safety Tagging Procedure.
"On March 21, 1979, the licensee issued operating memo 79-2, Revision 9, which specifically requires that "Do Not Operate" tags must be removed before energizing electrical equipment or opening valves. An exception is made in the case of electrical testing conducted by EOTD in which case only the EOTD master tag will be left in place.
"e. On December 12, 1977, a General Electric system engineer recommended that a check valve be installed on line IRP18A3 downstream of valve IE22-F013) because a similar overpressurization of a small section of low pressure piping had occurred. The recommendation was rejected because the licensee thought that two valves (IE22-F003 and F031) plus administrative controls were sufficient to prevent recurrence. The licensee stated the check valve vill be installed. All other ECCS systems have check valves in the line from the CY system.
"The inspector stated his concern regarding repeatable occurrences where a lack of communication or understanding between parties have resulted in damage to equipment. It is our intention to closely monitor the licensee's performance during the preoperational test program to deter-mine the adequacy of plant staffing and training as fuel load date approaches."
Report No. 79-06, page 2
"(Closed) Noncompliance (358/79-01-01). Failure to follow safety tagging (switching order) procedure. The inspector found that the licensee is conducting safety tagging refresher training for all operations personnel and systems engineers as stated in their letter, Borgmann to Heishnan, dated February 28, 1979."
Report No. 79-23, page 4
"(Open) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report: Overpressurization of the steam jet air ejector heat exchanger (tube side). The inspector established that a check valve has been installed as stated in the licensee's report dated March 1, 1979 (QA-1106). This item remains open pending further review'by NRC Operations Branch."
Report No. 79-29, pages 4 and_5
"(Closed) Overpressurization of the steam jet air ejector heat exchanger (tube side). NR number 7247R1, dated February 21, 1979, stated that over pressure to 1200 psi of the LPCS piping system occurred in addition to others. The A-E (Sargent and Lundy) analyzed the piping system and valves with dispositions as follows:
"1. Carbon steel piping 3/4" up to 12" acceptable since stress was well below yield point.
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;.A?1 6.15/E; "2. The one stainless steel 3/4" pipe is likewise o.h.
"3. Six hundred pound valves are acceptable with the pressure experienced only being a repeat hydro test.
"4. Three hundred pound and 150 pound valves the manufacturer should be
-consulted.
"S. The relief-valve causing the problem should be retested and reset.
"Further information available (Construction Engineering Report dated April 14, 1979) stated that the valve manufacturers recommended a seat leakage test be conducted on the valves and that this test was performed without any leaks being detected and it further stated that the relief valve had been removed, tested and reset of set points done. The NR was signed as completed on October 25, 1979. The inspector indicated that he had no further questions regarding this item."
Report No. 80-06, page 2
"(Closed) Noncompliance (50-358/79-06b). Failure to follow OP.HP.01-4 valve lineup. (Not closing valves IE22-F003 and IE22-F031.) The inspector reviewed the licensee's action to prevent further non-adherence to proce-dures and found them acceptable."
The licensee's General Engineering Department's report of April 24, 1979 . (excluding attachments and tables) that documents the final disposition of NR-7247R1, is included in Appendix B. 5.12.4 Findings and Conclusions The overpressure event referred to in the allegation was reported to the NRC in March 1979, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The event was caused by operator errors, that incorrectly permitted two valves to remain open, rather than inadequate system design. The actions taken by the licensee to assure the quality of the affected piping and components and to prevent recurrence had been reviewed by the NRC prior to the allegation and found satisfactory. 5.12.5 Items of Noncompliance No new items of noncompliance were identified. 5.13 Lax Fuel Security 5.13.1 Allegation "There have been periods when there were no security surveillance cameras during nuclear fuel deliveries to the site, and perimeter security con-sisted for an extended period of only a four foot chickenwire fence."
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II.*.Il b/ } 5/ b } 1 On February 26,1981, during a meeting between NRC officials. Thomas Devine (GAP representative) and Thomas Applegate at the Region III NRC office, they
- advised that, among others, former Yoh Security Officers Jeffrey Hyde and
' Ronald Wright were aware of periods of time when the nuclear fuel was left unattended. It was alleged these situations presented a threat to the public health and safety and lef t the fuel susceptible to terrorism, thef t, and/or i . diversion.
> In addition, it was alleged that the walls of the fuel storage area were
" blow-out" walls, designed to give way during tornadoes.
5.13.2 Background Information d On June 26, 1978, NRC Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1823 was issued to CG&E authorizing receipt, possession, inspection, and storage (at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station) of 2,000 kilograms of uranium-235 (U-235) reactor fuel at an enrichment not to exceed 2%. The U-235 CG&E received was in the form of new (unirradiated) reactor fuel assem-blies. These e semblies are stored on the 627-ft level (seventh floor) of the reactor building in the spent fuel pool area. Nuclear fuel enriched above natural levels but less than 10% in the U-235 isotope is defined under 10 CFR 73.2(y) as "special nuclear material of los strategic significance." -The physical protection requirements for possession of special nuclear material of. low strategic significance at a fixed site are set forth in-10 CFR 73.67(f), which states the following: i "Each licensee who possesses or us'es special nuclear material of low strategic significance at fixed sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50, J shall:
"(1) Store or use the material only within a controlled access area,
"(2) Monitor with an intrusion alarm or other device or procedures the controlled access areas to detect unauthorized penetrations or activities,
* "(3) Assure that a watchman or offsite response force will respond to all unauthorized penetrations or activities, end
"(4) Establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of such material."
The licensee is obligated to abide by the preceding requirements and any special' conditions set forth or committed to in Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1823. A licensee (prior to being granted an operating license) is not required to comply with other more stringent physical security requirements of 10 CFR 73 and related Appendix B. 6 I f 4 110 -
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lJ.AT7 E/15it i e During NRC safeguards inspections conducted on September 25, 1979 (heport No. 70-2838/79-01) and January 22-23,.1981 (Report No. 70-2838/81-01), it was determined that the licensee was complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(f) and License No. SNM-1823 with regards to protection and storage of the nuclear fuel. NRC License No. SNM-1823 requires that administrative controls be used to control access to the new fuel storage area. To implement the pro- ] visions of the license and 10 CFR 73.67(f), the licensee wrote and ) included in the Station Administrative Directives, Procedure No. SE. SAD.03 l Rev. 1, which is entitled " Interim Access Control, New Fuel Storage Area." The primary purpose of this directive (as well as subsequent related pro-cedural issuances and revisions) is to provide the administrative require-J ments- for access control to the 627-ft elevation of the reactor building during receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel, in accordance with their NRC licens'. Procedure No. SE. SAD.03 Rev.1, requires that a minimum of one watchman be stationed at the location where normal entry and/or exit to the 627-ft elevation is controlled. The watchman's purpose in being stationed at this location is to control access and maintain surveillance of the 627-ft elevation during receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel.
" Watchman" as used in this context is defined by 10 CFR 73.2(d) as "an individual, not necessarily uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the course of performing other duties."
In August 1979, when CG&E was preparing to receive the first shipment of nuclear fuel, CG&E contracted with Yoh Security, Inc., to provide ten security officers (watchmen) for the sole purpose of providing security for the receipt and subsequent storage of the nuclear fuel. Yoh Security personnel were required to adhere to the policy and/or procedures pre-pared by CG&E Security Supervisor, Frederick Lautenslager. CG&E di.d not exercise direct supervision over Yoh Security personnel, but provided the procedural requirements through the Yoh Lead Security Officer. CG&E is not required by NRC regulations to have armed security officers for protection of new unirradiated nuclear fuel; however, the licensee chose to arm Yoh Security personnel with .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolvers. There was no NRC requirement for such watchmen to be trained and/or to qualify with their assigned firearms. Subsequent to NRC ex-pressing concern that the armed officers did not have specific firearms 4 training and qualification, CG&E (effective as of March 1980) took action to assure that all security officers assigned to armed security respon-sibilities were trained and had qualified with their assigned firearms
-in accordance with procedures CG&E established. Prior to March 1980, armed security officers were selected based.on previous firearms training experience that they had acquired from former military and/or police service.
Deliveries of nuclear fuel to Zimmer took place during the period August 15 through September 7, 1979. The shipping casks (containing two fuel assem-blies each) in which the nuclear fuel was delivered measured approximately 15 ft in length by 21 in. in width and 11 in. in height. The fuel assemblies themselves were contained within a metal shipping container that was, in tufn, enclosed within a wooden shipping container. A wooden and metal
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p. shipping container together composed what is referred te as a single sh:ppu..
- - cask. A wooden shipping container by itself weighed approximately 760 lb.
a metal shipping container approximately 620 lb, and each fuel asse:bly
- approximately 685 lb. This made the approximate total weight of a single 3-shipping cask (with two fuel assemblies enclosed) 2,750 lb. Subsequent to receipt of a shipping cask at the site, the metal shipping container was uncrated from the wooden shipping container at the ground level. The metal
. container (with fuel assemblies enclosed) was then lifted by crane to the '
627-ft level of the reactor building.(refueling floor) and temporarily stored in the metal containers. After the fuel assemblies were removed from the metal containers, they were inspected for possible damage, channelled, and then lowered into fuel racks located inside the spent fuel pool for storage.
. As a further assurance that the fuel has not been . damaged while in storage, it will be~ examined by the licensee prior to loading it into the reactor.
Unirradiated fuel, although radioactive, does not pose a significant health l and safety problem regarding radiation emissions. It is only subsequent to being loaded into the reactor and becoming irradiated during plant operatien that the uranium becomes contaminated with the intensely radioactive products I of the fission reaction, causing it to be highly radioactive. The nuclear fuel, in its cu'rrent form, contains a low percentage of U-235
-enrichment, has little or no potential.for use in any type of nuclear weaper.,
and thus .has been defined as "special nuclear material of low strategic i significance." ! Additional security-related background information is also contained in , l' Section 5.14.2.. . 5.13.3 Investigation , 4 , 5.13.3.1 Interview with Jeffrev Erde i
- On March 26, 1981, Jeffrey Hyde was interviewed by NRC. Hyde was aise >
i interviewed by telephone on June 9, 1981. He stated he was employed as i a security officer with Yoh Security and stationed at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station from August 1979 to October 1980. While stationed '- l-at Zimmer and assigned the duty of protecting the nuclear fuel, Hyde advised he became aware of approximately fourfoccasions when.the fuel was left unattended. He related that these instances occurred while the fuel was at ground level (prior to the time it was moved to the 627-ft level) , with each instance lasting approximately 4 to 5 minutes, except for one i that lasted approximately 10 minutes. Hyde explained that,' subsequent to r receipt, the nuclear fuel was soved by maintenance workers with the help r 4 of a crane.from the ground. level to the 627-ft level where it is-currently stored. _During this operation, there were usually two or three Yoh Secur:ty Officers stationed on'the 627-it level as the fuel was raised by crane and brought to rest on that floor. -On various occasions, there were no security officers at the ground level' watching the fuel as it was being moved and raised to the 627-ft level-because officers were not required to watch the , " fuel _ during times-It was under the' control and/or observation of maintenance workers. Hyde stated the problem arose when the maintenance workers ended i
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- their work-shifts and left the area before he arrived at the gr:und leve!
c~ to keep watch over fuel that had not yet been moved te the 627-ft level. This resulted in the fuel being left unattended during tnese periods. (It should be noted.that the licensee's procecures did not. require centinuous surveillance of the new fuel until it was in storage in the new fuel storage area). Hyde wa's asked what, if any, personal knowledge he had of the fuel being i left unattended while it was stored on the 627-ft level. He stated that t . he did not recall any instances when the fuel (while on the 627-ft level) was left unattended, except during those instances when the area radiation + monitor- (ARM) alarm was sounded. Hyde explained that, during occasions when the ARM alarm was sounded, security procedures required all persons
- to be present on the 627-ft level to be evacuated to a lower elevation level (floor). He indicated that, once everyone was evacuated to a lower
- elevation (e.g., the 593-ft level), access to the 627-ft level could still be controlled without a loss of security integrity (individuals r
going to the 627-ft level would have to pass through the 593-ft level). - On March 26, 1981, Hyde provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 54. 1 L 'I 5.13.3.2 Interview with Ronald Wright On March 10,' 1981, Ronald Wright was interviewed by NRC. Wright was aise l interviewed by telephone on March 12, 1981. He stated that he was employed as a security officer with Yoh Security and stationed at the Wm. H. Zimmer-Nuclear Power Station from October 1979 to October 195C. Vright was asked what, if any, personal knowledge he had of the nuclear fuel being left un-attended. He responded that the only times he recalled leaving the fuel unattended was once when he evacuated the 627-ft level during an eartnquake and cace during a tornado warning. He indicated that, although he left the
! 627-ft level on those cecasions, he was still able to centrol access tc the 627-ft level from a lower elevation of'the reactor building (e.g., the 593-ft level) without loosing security integrity. .
Wright also noted that when instances arose during which no other security officers were available and he had to leave the 627-ft level for some reason, he would call the control room and someone would relieve him at his post until he returned. , He stated to the best of his knowledge there was always someone present on the 627-ft level watching the' fuel pool area where the fuel was stored, except during the described anstances. On March 10, 1981, Wright provided a written statement attesting to the pre-ceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 55.
~
- 5.13.3.3 Interview with Frederick Lautenslager On February 24-25 and March 13, 1981, Frederick Lautenslager was interviewed by NRC. 'He stated that he is employed as the CG&E Security Supervisoy and
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s has been assigned to the Vm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Statior. since A';ust. 19"S. Lautenslager verified that no security surveillance cameras were used i - during nuclear fuel deliveries in August-September 1979 and remarked ,that
?
there is no requirement for surveillance cameras to be used during deliveries.
- . He noted that surveillance cameras were subsequently installed in December 1980 (part of required security for an operational plant).
With regard to the protection of the nuclear fuel during delivery, Lautenslager L remarked that, although there was no requirement for security for the nuclear fuel while it was being unloaded from the delivery trucks and unerated, CGEE i provided armed security Protection and surveillance over the fuel (beginning at the time it arrived on CG&E property). They also maintained this security profile during unloading, uncrating, inspection and subsequent storage of the fuel on the 627-ft level. i Lautenslager stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the nuclear fuel has not lacked armed security protection at any time since it was received at Zimmer. He also: stated that once the fuel was placed in the spent fuel pocl for: storage, as well as during fuel inspection, access to the storage area has been under security control of the officers assigned to station security.
- The.only time the access control security officer is permitte'd to leave the 627-ft elevation is during evacuations covered by written security proce-dures. Lautenslager advised that, to his knowledge, there has been only one incident in which the officer left the 627-f t elevation. This inci-dent, which occurred during an earthquake, involved the security officer moving to the 593-ft elevation where he was still able to control access ,
to the 627-f t. level and. prevent any loss of security integrity. . On March 27', 1981, Lautenslager provided a typwritten statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 56. Frederick Lautenslager was interviewed by telephone on June 3, 1981, cen-
' cerning the allegation that " perimeter security censisted for an extended period of time of only a four foot chickenwire fence." He stated that he recalled a fence fitting that general description being' used around the 3 plant site some time age and described the fence as an " owner controlled
! fence," which marked the boundary line of CG&I's property. Lautenslager indicated that the fence wculd have been on. areas outside the jurisdiction of the station security system, the primary concern of which was protection
, of the nuclear fuel.
5.13.3.4 Interview with James Caplinger - I On March 12, 1981, James Caplinger was interviewed by FRC. He stated that he was employed as a lead security officer with Yoh Security and stationed at the W'.m H. Zimmer Nuclear Pcwer Station from August 1979 to October 1980. With regard to protection of the nuclear fuel, Caplinger advised that, to
' his knowledge,' the fuel was never left unattended except during requirad evacuations. He explained that during an evacuation of the seventh floor fuel ' storage area the security officers repositioned themselves on the si.xth.
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On March 12, 1981, Caplinger provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 57. 5.13.3,5 Interview with William Ross On March 11, 1981, William Ross was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was employed as-a lead security officer with Yoh Security and stationed at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station from March 1979 to February 1980. Ross stated he personally felt that a minimal job had been done to protect the nuclear fuel. He also stated that he did not recall any times during which he left the fuel unattended. On March 11, 1981, Ross provided a written state =ert attesting to the precedtng information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 58. + 5.13.3.6 Interview with John.Bedinghaus On March 12, 1951, NRC staff interviewed John Bedinghaus by telephone. On March 25, 1981, he was interviewed in Villiamsburg, Ohio. He stated that he was employed as a security officer with W&V Security and assigned to nuclear fuel protection duties at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station from October 1950 to January 1981. Bedinghaus was questioned about the adequacy of nuclear fuel security during the time he had been stationed at Zimmer. He stated that the fuel storage area on the seventh floor was well protected and the security officers assigned to fuel protection were conscientious in performing their duties. Bedinghaus also indicated that,"to his knowledge, the fuel was never left una; tended and no unauthorized persons were allowed entry into the fuel storage area. On March 25, 1981, John Bedinghau: provided a written statement attesting to the preceding informatier. a copy c f which is included as Exhibit 59. , 5.13.3.7 Interview with David Siepsen On March 11, 1981, David Simpson was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was employed as a security officer with Yoh Security and stationed at the km. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station from September 1979 to October 1980. Si=pson was questioned about the adequacy of nuclear fuel security during the time he had been stationed at Zimmer. He advised it was his opinion that CG&E's procedures for protection of the nuclear fuel were good and the protection of the fuel itself was more than adequate. Simpson stated that he had no complaints or concerns regarding the adequacy of the pro-tection of the nuclear fuel at Zimmer. On March 11, 1981, Simpson provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 60. ,
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h v *i . _ ^. J. : 4 _. n :_ _ . r ~ _ ~ i--- Z L _.nn._ 1_1,- . 15.13.3.8 Interview'with Jaees Sice On April 20, 1981,-NRC staff interviewed James Bice by telephone. He stated he was employed as a security officer with Yoh Security and stationed at the
'Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station from September 1979 to July 1980. Bice was. questioned about the adequacy of nuclear fuel security during the time i he had been stationed at Zimmer. He stated that, to his knowledge, there were no instances when the fuel was left unattended except during evacuations (covered by written procedures) following area radiation monitor (ARM) alarms.
On those occasions when .the seventh floor was evacuated following an ARM alarm, the security officers would move to the sixth floor, secure the elevator, and is continue to control access to the seventh floor from the sixth floor. Bice ; indicated there was no loss of security integrity during these instances 5.13.3.9 Review of Unattended Tuel , j Fuel was apparently lef t' unattended :for short periods of time tup to 10 i minutes) while at ground' level during receipt and transfer to tr.e fuel pec1 storage area (627-ft level). There is no evidence that the fuel was left . . unattended, .except during authorized evacuations, while in permanent storage. i In view of the protection afforded the fuel by the shipping container and the
- . fact that there was no evidence that the shipping containers had been opened, this matter is not viewed as-significant.
1 i 5.13.3.10 Review of Storage Area Vall Design
~
i The Zimmer FSAR, 'Section 3.3.2, " Tornado-Loading," states that "all siding and roof. decking of any superstructure ,is designed and detailed.to blow- off ' when the design _ tornado. approaches the station, and the bare frame is de-signed to resist tornado -wind forces". A design wind velocity of 90 mph was utilized. The design has been reviewed by NRC and judged acceptable. In this regard, i ! 1. The blow-out design feature is to protect safety structures from collapse; r [ 2. The-spent fuel storage facility, which will store the spent fuel under water once it becomes radioactive, is designed to preclude significant ,
-loss of watertight integrity of the pool and to prevent missiles from
- contacting fuel within the pool; i'
- 5.13.4 Findings and Conclusions i .
Security surveillance cameras were not installed during nuclear fuel deliveries to'the. site and NRC regulations did not require them to be in service at that : time. Interviews with former security guards ' confirmed. the nuclear fuel while
- inside it's-metal shipping container was left unattended for-periods of time l I
up to 10 minutes on' occasion. This practice _was acceptable. Since the fuel
- has been onsite, there has been no known attempt to steal or damage the fuel.
, The fuel has been inspected and will be visually examined again before it is loaded into the reactor. { - 116 - 4-
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The alleFation that the perimeter security cons:sted cf only a -f t cr. : c r. c t - wtre fence was confirmed by one individual; however, NEC regu;at: ens d: n r. prescribe site security requirements prior to issuance of the operat:ng license. The FSAR states "all siding and roof decking of any superstructure is designei and detailed to blow off when the design tornado approaches the station.' This is an acceptable design. i 5.13.5 Items of Noncomnliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 5.14 Alcohol and Drug Abuse 5.I'.1 Allegation "A lax attitude toward employee behavior was evidenced by complete disregard of drinking and drug use on the site, and routine hiring of temporary laborers prene to violence." On February 24, 1981, during a meeting with KRC officials, Thomas Devine (GAP representative) and Thomas Applegate at the Region III NRC office, they advised that, among others, former security officers Ronald Wright, Jeffrey Hyde, and David Simpson had knowledge of " people who were drunk on the job;" " people who were frequently intoxicated;" and " construction workers walking around smoking. dope, drinking moonshine liquor, getting drunk...." . 5.14.2 Background Information A brief h: story and description of plant security is provided in the following paragraphs. Portions of this information are based on state-ments received during interviews with Frederick Lautenslager, CG&E Security Superviser, and Norborne C. Varc, President of V&V Protection Agency, Inc., the_ current security service contractor at Zimmer.
" Construction security" may be defined as the protection of property used in and for construction activities at Zimmer, and the protection of those areas in which construction is taking place. NRC does not impose security requirements on licensees during plant construction. Construction security does not extend to the 627-f t level (seventh floor) of the reactor building (spent fuel pool area) where the nuclear fuel is stored, and does not extend to those areas specifically released by the construction project manager and signed for by the CG&E Electric Production Department (EPD). The protect:en of the above areas'not related to construction and the protection of the nuclear fuel is defined as " station security." " Construction security" and
" station security" are two separate security operations.
From the start of plant construction until September 1976, the H. J. Kaiser Company maintained its own security force that was respon-sible for construction security matters at Zimmer. In September 1976, V&W'took over from Kaiser and became the sole security contractor, using
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the same security procedures that had applied to Ka:ser's secur:ty fcr:f.. The primary responsibility for construction secur:ty is vested in the construction-project manager, although in essence W&W has been informal;;. delegated the authority to conduct security activities on his behalf. In August 1979, while preparing to receive the first shipment of nuclear fuel, CG&E contracted with Yoh Security to provide ten security of ficers (armed watchmen) for the sole purpose of providing security for the receipt and subsequent storage of the nuclear fuel. Yoh Security per-sonnel were required to adhere to policies and procedures prepared by-CG&E Security Supervisor Frederick Lautenslager; however, CG&E did not exercise-direct supervision over the Yoh Security Officers. The CG&I Security Supervisor coordinated the requirements of CG&E security pro-cedures through the.Yoh lead security officer, who had responsibility for implementing those directives. Specifically, the jurisdiction of the CG&E Security Supervisor and Yoh Security Officers extended only to areas that were included under the definition of "sta' tion security." The re f o're , from a security standpoint, the primary concern of the CG&E Security
. Supervisor and Yoh Security was protecting the spent fue'. pool area where the nuclear-fuel was stored and controlling access to that area on the 627-f t level (seventh floor) of the reactor building.
At the request of Yob Security officials in October 1980, CG&E terminated Yoh's contract to provide officers for station security. W&W, upon Yoh's leaving, assigned some officers exclusively for station security. The V&W officers assignej to . station security conducted security activities in accordance with the same procedures and under the same supervisory structure as those that had applied to Yoh. (Additional security-related background information is also contained in Section 5.13.2.) The allegation was reviewed to determine if it had an significance regarding matters under EC jurisdiction; specifically, the rev:ev attempted to ceter-mine if the adequacy of construction of safety-related systems was compromised by individuals who performed work in safety-related areas during times when their-ability to perform their job was impaired due to use of intoxicants. To help make this determination, two basie questions were asked of persons interviewed, who stated they observed workers who in their opinion were intoxicated. In essence, the following questions were asked:
- 1. Did you ever observe anyone who in your opinion was intoxicated to the point where their ability to perform their job was impaired?
- 2. If so, where did you observe these individuals?
5.14.3 Investination 5.14.3.1 Interview with Ronald Wright On March 10, 1981, Ronald Wright was' interviewed by NRC. he stated that he= was employed as a security officer with Yoh Security and was stationed at Zimmer from October 1979 to October 1980. While stationed there, he observed what he believed to be evidence of alcohol and drug.use by workers at the Zimmer site. At least once a week while on patrol at.the site, Wright would
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y find quant: ties of bher cans on the auxil:ary buildinF ro:f and in a lunen.brea: 3 area that was then located in the diesel generator room. He related that c r. many occasions (he could not recall a specif:c number) he discovered wnat appeared to be marijuana cigarette butts in one or two small roo=s accessible - from the rooftop of the radwaste building. Wright stated that on one occas:cn - be discovered four or five capsules of material (colored black and yellow or _ black and onange) that appeared to be some type of drug. These capsules were ; discovered between the two locker rooms on the second floor of the service building. ~Vright was unable to recall what disposition he made of these _ suspected narcotic materials and was unaware whether any analysis was ever performed to identify the materials.
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Vright related that he was personally aware of two separate instances in ] which construction workers, who in his opinion were intoxicated to the point . that they. v'ere unable to perform their duties, reported for duty at the seventh floor entrance to the spent fuel storage pool. The two workers ; involved in these incidents were refused access to the spent fuel pool area on those occasions. ( Hp also stated that, in his opinion, a former Yoh lead Security Officer was j very intoxicated on at least two occasions when he reported for work and -- (based on the smell of his breath and his conduct) was somewhat intoxicated a on other occasions. - 1 On March 10, 1981? Vright provided a written statement attesting to this information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 55. {_
- s. 2 S.14.3.2 Interview with Jeff rey Hyde On; March 26, 1981, Jeffrey Hyde was' interviewed by NRC. He stated that he was employed as a security officer with Yoh Security and was stationed at -
Zi=mer from August 1979 to October 1980. While stationed at the plant, he z observed what he believed to be evidence of alechol use indicated by the ; empty beer cans and liquor bottles in various areas of the plant. Hyde was a able to recall only one instance when he observed a construction worker vne , y in his opinion, appeared to be intoxicated to the point that his ability to d perform his job was impaired. He observed this worker at the seventh floor 2 entrance to the spent fuel pool area. Hyde indicated that when the workers j condition was noted, he was prohibited entry to the fuel storage area, 3 removed from the fleer, and suspended from work assignments on that flocr. - Hyde also stated that he observed on several occasions (more than five but - less than ten 7 a former Yoh lead security officer who, in his opinion, was 3 intoxicated to the point that his ability to perform his job was impaired. 5 On March 26, 1981, Hyde provided a written statement attesting to the above information, a copy' of which is included as Exhibit 54 5.14c3'.3 Interview with Das ' Siepson On March 11, 1981, David Simpson was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was = employed as a security officer with Yoh Security and was stationed at j i N 119 - - 2 - 5 a _- ._ _ _ ___ ; y
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r . . - E Zimmer from September 1979 to October 1950. bhile stat:cned there, h-observed what he believed to be indications of alcohol use by the workers at Zimmer. Simpson advised that on many occasions, particularly on the main floor of the turbine building, he discovered quantities of empty beer _ cans and liquor bottles. He remarked that, although he never observed an;. _ workers who, in his opinion, were intoxicated to the point their ability to perform their job was impaired, he believed it was reasonable to assume some workers' ability to perform was at times impaired, based on the number of empty beer cans and liquor bottles found. = Simpson stated he had no personal knowledge regarding the extent of drug use, although on one occasion while outside the reactor building, he detected the oder of what appeared to be burning marijuana. Simpson indicated he had no knowledge of any former Yoh Lead Security Officer being intoxicated while on duty and, in his opinion, the former [ 1ead officer never appeared to be intoxicated while on duty. On March 11, 1981, Simpson provided a written statement attesting to the
- preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 60.
5.14.3.4 Interview with William Ross On March 11, 1981, William Ross was interviewed by NRC. He stated be was employed as a lead security officer with Yoh Security and was stationed at the Vm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station from March 1979 to February 1980. While stationed there, Ross observed what'he believed to be indications of alcohol and drug use by workers atLZimmer. Ross advised that, on a fev g occasions, he had seen construction workers drinking beer during their - lunch hours, although he had never noticed whether this drinking had any 3 apparent affect on the workers' ability to perform their jobs. Ecs:
- indicated Yoh security officers were instructed not to confront workers E who were observed drinking in nonstation security areas but rather to u obtain information such as the payroll number or name on their hard hats that could be used to identify the individuals. If identifying information was secured, it was referred to the construction project manager or W&W, E because they had jurisdiction over construction activities.
Ross recalled one occasion when he observed a worker who, in his opinion. [ was intoxicated, although he could not determine whether the worker was intoxicated to the point that his ability to perform his job was impaired. Ross observed this worker at the seventh floor entrance to the spent fuel pool storage area shortly af ter the worker was refused access to the fuel storage area by a fellow Yoh security officer. (Based on Ross' description , of this incident, it appears he may be referring to the same incident that former security officers Hyde and Wright described.) [ Ross also advised that on one occasion he found what appeared to be mari-juana cigarette butts on a roof top area located between the reactor and m turbine buildings. Ross related he was not able to determine whether workers were using drugs to the extent that it impaired their ability to perform their jobs and had not formed an opinion in that regard. 120 -
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m_ m- .._c . _ _ . _ . m. . _ _ . _ _ ._ ._ l On March 11, 1981, Ross provided a written state:ent attesting te th > infor:atzen, a copy of which is included as Ex:ib:t 5E. ! 5.11.3.5' Interview with James Bedinehaus On March 25, 1981, James Bedinghaus was interviewed by .N'RC. He stated that he was employed as a second shift security supervisor with V&% Protection Agency, Inc., and was stationed at Zimmer fro = yebruary 1980 to Neve=ber
. 1980. While employed there, Bedinghaus noticed what he believed to be evidence of alcohol use by workers at Zimmer, as indicated by workers he encountered who smelled cf alcohol and had tne appearance of being intex-icated. Bedinghaus specifically recalled approxi=ately three occasicas c:
which he observed workers who, in his opinion, were intoxicated to the point j that their ability to perform their job was impaired. These workers were observed attempting to enter the site through the main gate. Sedinghaus indicated that, while he was assigned to the gate, workers whc in h:s opinion were intoxicated were refused entrance to the site. Sedinghaus also stated he was aware of an incident when a seccad shtf t security officer encountered a group of een with beer who were in twc aute= chiles leaving the site via the main gate. During that enecenter, the security officer observed that the men in ene autecebile had open beer inside their vehicle and the other automchile contained a case of beer inside the trunk. The occupants cf both vehicles indicated they were coming from an onsite CG&E fire schoc1; however, none cf them had identification cards er visitor passes. Ledinghaus expressed the opinien that the first shift security officers had not checked the identificarica or issued passes to these individuals at the ti=e they entered tne plant. 3edinghaus also expressed his belief that security was lax in the areas
.rttrelled by VE%, and WE securtty efficers were ~present ensite erre fer dispir; purposes rather than for providing prcperty prctectic:.
With regard to alleged drug use, Sedinghaus stated he had =o perscnal knowledge of drug use at Zi==er, although he had ebserved ind:viduals whc, in his cpinion,. appeared tc be intoxicated or "stened" en something other than alechol. On-March 25, 1931, James Bedinghaus provided a written statement attesting to this information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 61. 5.14.3.6 Interview with James Caplineer On March 12,.1981, James Caplinger, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he'was e= ployed as a lead security officer with Y:h Security and was stationed at Zi=mer fro = August 1979 to October 1980. While stationed there, Caplinger observed what he believed to be evidence of alechol and drug use by workers at Zimmer. This evidence was in the-fcrm of e=pty beer cans and what appeared to be marijuana cigarette butts detected by Caplinger ensite. Althcugh he detected evidence of alcohol and drug use, Caplinger stated he never perscnally observed anyone drinking intoxica:ts or. smoking marijuana. He indicated that, if he had he would have reported the individual' to their superior and that person probably would have been fired.
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_ . _ _ - J^ Caplinger also remarked tha:, based on h:s 20 years exper:enre :n t!.s U.S. Army as a sen:or nonecem:ssioned of f:cer and observat::n ci alech:1 and drug abuse among that population, he would not chara:terize the use of alcohol and drugs at Zimmer as widespread. On March 12, 1981, Caplinger provided a written sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 57. 5.14.3.7 Interview with James Bice On April 20, 1981, James-Bice was interviewed by telephone. He stated that he was employed as a security officer with Yoh Security and was stationed at Zimmer from September 1979 to July 1980. While employed there, Bice detected several instances of alcohol use by construction workers at Zimmer. He related that on approximately four to six occasions he personally observed workers consuming alcoholic beverages while onsite. These instances of alcohol consumption usually occurred during lunch hours in locations that included the electrical shop and a break area located in the turbine-building. Beer and whiskey were among the alcohol:c beverages consumed onsite. Bice recalled two specific instances involving the presence of alcohol: one during which he observed a worker pouring " Jack Daniels" whiskey into a Coke soda can and the other during which he found a bottle of what he believed to be " moonshine" liquor (based on its smell) in the turbine building. In addition to instances where the consumption and presence of alcoholic beverages were observed, Bice also recalled removing quantities of beer cans (approximately 300 while stationed at Zimmer) fro = inside a few small 2 rooms that were accessible from the second level of the reactor building. Based on his experience at Zimmer, Bice speculated that approximately 25'. of the workers there consumed alcoholic beverages, usually during their lunch hours. Despite his observations regarding the extent of alcohol use, B:ce saic that en only one occasion did he observe a worker who, in his opinion, was intoxicated to the point that his ability to perform his job was impaired. l This worker was observed at the seventh floor entrance te the spent fuel pool storage' area. Based on Bice's description of the incident, it appears he may be referring to the same incident that former security officers Hyde, Wright, and Ross described. Regarding alleged drug use, Bice stated he did observe what he believed to be evidence of drug use at Zimmer. Bice related that, during the course 1 of his routine security rounds each day, he would find approximately three to four . apparent marijuana cigarette butts. He :ndicated that to his knowledge there were no analyses made of the cigarette butts he detected, although based on their appearance (the presence of seeds common to tne marijuana plant)-he was convinced the butts were from marijuana cigarettes. Bice stated he prepared approximately 10 to 11 field incident- reports regarding ~ suspected alcohol and marijuana use while he was stationed at Zimmer and these ' reports were forwarded to CG&E Security Supervisor
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. Fred.Lautenslager. He remarked that' Lautenslager adv: sed nim c:. ont ,
occasion there was nothing Yoh Security and the CGLE Security Superv:s:r could;do about these instances _(since they apparently occurred in areas
.under W&W Security's jurisdiction) and not to worry about such incidents.
$ - Bice. verified that all the instances of alcohol and drug use he observed
- occurred in areas under W&W Security's jurisdiction, except for-the incident on the1 seventh floor involving an apparently intoxicated worker, c l
Bice also advised that on one occasion he observed two CG&E employees in the reactor control room who weref smoking what appeared to be marijuana. He- said, however, he did 'not confront the workers regarding their suspected conduct, and he.does not recall preparing a field incident report abcut the event. 1 5.14.3.8 Interview with Dennis Shinkle On' March 26, 1981, Dennis Shinkle was interviesed by NRC. He stated that . he'has been employed as a security officer with the W&W Protectien Agency. . Inc. .from approximately 1976 to the.present. During that time, he was off work for about six to seven months from January to July 1980. While
, stationed at Zimmer,.he has primarily been assigned to main gate security.
- Shinkle indicated that he'has detected evidence of alcohol use by the workers there. Shinkle'specifically recalled one incident that took place during the Fall of 1979. -The-incident involved four or five construction workers who had apparently brought alcoholic beverages onsite during their
. lunch' hour. He related that a -construction supervisor first observed the
! workers with the alcoholic beverages and requested that Shinkle accompany } him to corroborate this observation. When Shinkle did so, the supervisor j took immediate action and the workers were fired. Shinkle was ' asked whether he had ever observed- any workers who in his i opinion were. intoxicated to the point that.their ability to perform their- ; F job was impaired. He replied that on several occasions (he was unable te i estimate- how many) he had observed workers ' attempting to enter the site 1 _by the main gate who, in his opinion, appeared to be intoxicated. Shinkle , denied entry..to the site to any workers he observed at the main gate who ' l appeared to be intoxicated. I Shinkle indicated that it was difficult to prevent workers from bringing
- - alcoholic beverages onsite, particularly.when there were large numbers of I ' workers entering the siteLat approximately the same time. Although security' officers would of ten conduct a cursory search of lunch _ containers and coolers for ' alcohol, . they could .not (lawfully or practically) search the person ~of each worker who entered the site. The same problem applied to searching the motor vehicles permitte'd onsite. Security of ficers .could
' conduct.a cursory-search of'the vehicle trunks and a visual search of'the inside.of-the vehicle; however,'they could not individually search each s
occupant. With regardi to alleged drug use, .Shinkle stated that~ he never ' observed, j and was not-personally aware of, any drug use by workers at Zimmer. e 123 - . ca : .- _z - , ._
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5.1 .3.9 Interview with Norborne Ward On March 27, 1981, Norborne C. Ward was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he is President of the W&W Protection Agency, Inc., and has held that position since V&W became the construction security contractor at Zimmer in September 1976. From September 1976 to October 1980, he was stationed
-on a full-time basis at Zimmer and thereaf ter visited the site to oversee security operations usually twice a week.
Ward indicated that he is well informed about security-related matters and incidents at Zimmer. He explained that W&W inherited Kaiser's security procedures and basically has continued to conduct security activities in-accordance with those guidelines. Ward related that, during the time W&W has been security contractor there, he has become aware of instances of alcohol use by construction workers at Zimmer. Ward indicated that a'.cohol use onsite became a real concern and certain measures were initiated to reduce the problem. In July 1980, W&W began the practice of searching the coolers and lunch containers brought onsite by the construction workers. This action was somewhat effective in preventing . some workers from bringing alcoholic beverages-onsite. Also, a contributing factor to the problem was the sale of liquor by certain individuals in the parking lot outside the site. Ward stated that a " crackdown" on parking lot .tiquor sales was initiated in 1977 when state law enforcement officials were contacted. These officials subsequently came out to the site and, to his knowledge, made at least one arrest for liquor sale violations. Ward was asked whether he had ever observed workers whc, in his opinion, were intoxicated to the point their ability to perform their job was impaired. He replied that instances of workers being intoxicated to that extent were relatively rare and he estimated that, since W&W became a security contractcr in 1976, approximately 25 intoxicated workers were observed and denied access to, or were ejected from, the site. The most common occurrence of this was when intoxicated workers came to the site on payday to pick up their checks. . Ward remarked that the worker involved would take the day off and, af ter they had been drinking and were already intoxicated, would come to the site at 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. just to pick up their paychecks. On those occasions, when a worker entering the site was determined to be intoxicated, Ward would deny the worker's entry to the site. Ward indicated it is difficult to enforce rules regarding use of alcohc1 on s i t.e . He explained W&W security officers have been instructed to identify (if possible), rather than _ confront, workers who are observed consuming alcoholic beverages on site. This is usually done by trying to obtain identifying information, such as a payroll number or a name f rom the individual's hard hat. If identifying information is obtained, the matter is then referred to the individual's supervisor for action. Ward-expressed the opinion the biggest problem af fecting security in general is that Kaiser and CG&E allow too many motor vehicles on site. He indicated the large number of vehicles permitted ensite increases the potential for contraband being brought on and/or taken offsite without detection. Ward
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-also' stated that. since he has been at Zimmer, there has been 12 tlc trcu!.e with regard to violent' acts. He could recall only one incident when tu cconstruction workers were involved in a fight.
Ward mentionedithat, during the time Thomas Applegate was onsite, there ,
.were'six or seven security officers on-duty during each shift.
5.14.2.10 Interview with Frederick Lautenslager l On February 24-25'and March 13, 1981. Frederick Lautenslager was interv2ewed
.by NRC. He ; stated that he is employed -as the CG&E Security Supervisor and has been~ assigned to the'Zimmer since~ August 1978.
Lautenslager was. questioned regarding his knowledge of alleged alcohol use by workers at Zimmer. He stated he has no personal knowledge of anyone drinking alcoholic. beverages onsite and he has never observed anyone drink.ng alcohol onsite.
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Lautenslager'was also questioned regarding his knowledge of alleged drug -j use-(particularly marijuana) by workers onsite. He indicated he has ne " personal knowledge of 'any drug use and is aware of no incidence of mari-juana use by anyone at Zimmer. Lautenslager related that on one occasion
'a'Yoh Security. Officer discovered and turned over to him some cigarette butts which appeared to be hand-rolled. He stated since many of the craft
_ personnel roll their own cigarettes and since there was nothing to indicate that the butts found by the security officer were in fact marijuana, no further action was taken other.than to notify 'W&V security personnel that
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. the hand-rolled cigarette butts were found. . Lautenslager also stated that he has never received a report of auy indi-viduals drinking alcohclic beverages er smoking marijuana onsite. On March 27, 1981,. Lautenslager provided a typewritten statement attesting to-the preceding information, a ecpy of which is included as Exhibit 56. 5.14.3.11-Field Observations While.at Zimmer, the NRC resident inspector has observed evidence of alcohol : us_e by workers. During approximately 507, of the time he has spent touring the. plant while conducting inspection aetivities, he'has observed empty beer cans in various_ safety-related areas of the plant. On'a less frequent basis, , he-has'also_ observed empty'"hard_ liquor" bottles-(e.g.,' whiskey bottles). The areas :where empty cans and bottles were observed included the cable spreading room,.the two residual heat removal rooms, the'related residual
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theat removal heat exchanger rooms, a_nd the reactor building. Within these - areas, the locations he observed e=pty alcoholic beverage containers were generally.. hidden and isolated. .! The. quantity of empty beer cans in these. areas varied greatly from time to ' time. On some' occasions (generally in the winter months),'as many as 10 to H 12' empty beer cans could be found in-any. of the noted locations of the plant ' (although some of the cans ~may have been there a" month or more since the
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last time the area was cleaned). On other occas ens (generall In the sunr" - months), only a few cans would be present in these same locations. The resident inspector has never personally observed anyone consuming alech:1:c beverages. He recalled observing instances in the diesel generator room and reactor building when workers were drinking beverages from non-alcoholic beverage containers (e.g. , thermos bottles) and, upon seeing him approach, made an apparent effort to conceal the containers from which they were drinking. These instances led him to suspect that workers concealed intox-icants in and consumed intoxicants from non-alcoholic beverage containers. Observations of beer can accumulations in different areas of the plant have been documented in various NRC inspection reports and that on at least twc occasions the beer can litter situation has been brought to the attention of the Construction Project Manager, Scott Swain. The resident inspector has never observed anyone whc, in his opinion, was intoxicated to the point where their ability to perform their job was impaired. In the inspectors opinion, the drinking of alcohol at Zimmer is not as bad as he has seen at other construction sites. The resident inspector has observed approximately ten marijuana cigarette butts duri:g his plant tours and he recently found two marijuana cigarettes. The resideat discussed this matter with the Kaiser Construction Project Manager. 5.14.4 Findings and Conclusions The NRC investigation identified evidence that there had been some drinking and drug use onsite. No attempt was made to examine the attitude of manage-ment toward drinking, drug use, or violence; however, based on interviews with site personnel coupled with NRC site observations both pricr to and during the investigation, a widespread problem was not evident. An adequately functioning quality assurance program would assure detection and ctrrect, ion of any adverse effects from construction personnel whose abilit;es have been impaired while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Since we have questions regarding the quality assurance program based on other findings of this investigation, the licensee Quality Confirmation Program will assure construction defects have been identified. 5.14.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 5.15 Employee Dismissals 5.15.1 Allegatio.
" Employees fired for time [ card] cheating had been cheating with the express approval of management, and only time cheaters fired were vocal and knowledgeable critics of plant QA and safety."
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a - . - . ~. - . ..: . L L. _ 5.'15.2 Backeround Informatien Thomas Applegate's investigation into timecard cheating at Zimmer found that five individuals (three construction workers and two guards) were involved in " timecard cheating" (i.e., absent from work onsite but recorded as being at work). All those individuals involved were terminated by their respective employers. 5.15.3 Investigation j L5.15.'3.1 Interview of Construction Worker The NRC interviewed one of the construction workers who had been terminated for timecard irregularities. .The other terminated construction workers could not be located. No attempt was made to interview the two guards alsc terminated because they were not directly involved in assuring adequacy of plant construction. The construction workers were those who would have had knowledge of " plant QA and safety" (construction problems). 5.15.3.2 Interview of Individual A On February 24, 1981,. Individual A, who was previously interviewed by representatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual A stated Kaiser terminated his employment in January 1960, af ter Thomas Applegate uncovered irregularities in his timecard. He said he was no.t fired for his criticism of plant safety and it was not until after he was terminated that he . - provided any information to GAP. Individual A said that although he had serious concerns about. construction work at the plant, he was no.t fired by Kaiser for criticizing plant QA and safety. On April 24, 1981, Individual A provided a written statement attesting
. to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement net be attached to this report.
5.-15.3.3 - Interview of Individual B On April 14, 1981, Individual B, who was previously interviewed by repre-sentatives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual B stated that he would not characterize himself as a " vocal critic" of plant safety. He stated he had concerns about the QC program'at Zimmer which he related to
; the RIII Investigator. However, he said he was fired for irregularities in his timecard and not for his concerns.about the QC program.
On April 22, 1981,- Individul B provided a written sworn statement attesting to.the preceding _information; however,.he requested the statement not be attached to.this report. 5.15.3.4 Interview of William Murrav
- On April 14, 1981, William Murray, CG&E Senior Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that from December 10, 1980 to January 4,.1981 Confident:al l Service (CS) was hired by CG&E to investigate alleged timecard irregular-l 127 - l
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it:es at Zimmer. He stated CS entered inte contract with CG&I af ter A;;1egate told them he had uncovered evidence of employee timecard cheatin,. Murray stated.the investigation was contracted for a 30-day period. Dur2ng that. period, Applegate identified two. guards and three construction personnel who were involved in timecard cheating. Murray indicated that all five of the individuals Applegate identified had been terminated. He denied that the only individuals terminated were those who were vocal and knowledgeable critics'of plant safety, and stated emphatically that the individuals f: red were fired solely for irregularities in their timecards. Murray also stated that Major W. Cox, Director of CS, felt that the inves-tigation was compromised when Murray left Applegate's reports unattended in his desk. Murray said that at that point the contract was ending and he and Cox concurred timecard cheating was rot widespread. Both agreed that, because of the questions about the security of the operation, the contract should be terminated. However, Murray said Applegate stated that he was concerned about the QA problems he had identified and wanted to continue investigating. Murray said the concerns Applegate raised had already been identified by the CG&E QA group and he saw no reason to continue the investigation. He said Applegate was adamant in his insistence to centinue the investigation, so he referred him to William Schweirs, Quality Assurance Manager. .Schweirs agreed there was no need to investigate these matters further and advised Applegate of his conclusion. Murray said the contract was terminated with Cox's approval, but over Applegate's objections. Murray provided a letter from CS regarding the contract termination, dated January 4, 1980, and is included in Exhibit 62. In a subsequent telephone conversation, Murray stated that Individual B wa's not one of five identified by Applegate nor was he fired at CG&I* s directicn fer timecard cheating, but that he may have been terminated by Kaiser fer another timecard matter. 5.15.3.5 Interview of Maior W. Cox On April 30,.1981, Major W. Cox, Director of CS, was interviewed by NRC. . Cox stated he employed Thomas Applegate as a private investigator for CS. He indicated that in November 1979, when Applegate was investigating another matter, Applegate came across evidence of employee t'imecard cheating at i Zimmer. Cox stated he was reluctant to pursue the matter, but on several occasions Applegate approached both him and CG&E about this matter. Cox said Applegate continued to pursue the matter and CG&E formally requested J. CS-to. investigate the matter. Cox stated the investigation was contracted to last 30 days during which Applegate would work undercover onsite with the primary task of investigating employee timecard cheating. Cox'said the CS investigation began on December 10, 1979 and ended on January 6,1980,
, and identified several employees who were involved in timecard cheating.
Cox said the operation ran its course and was terminated at the end of the original 30-day contract period.
- Cox stated that during the last weeks of the investigation, Applegate said he found. evidence lof irregularities-in pipe welds and in the plant QA program.
4 Cox told William Murray about this'and Murray said CG&I was already aware of
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pmu y aa a x ==. : w- ., - .- - y the problems Applegate had identified and did no: need to persue thet further. Cox recalled that Applegate had learned there was a d:sarreemer.: betwee:.
- Peabody Magnaflux (PM) employees and CGEE over the interpretati:n of X-rays taken of some pipes on site.
Cox said there was no attempt by CG&E to cover up any of Applegate's dis-
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closures. Cox said'it appeared to him that CG&E was already aware of the problems Applegate identified and-Applegate was net providing them with
- any 'new information. Cox stated that after the 30-day contract period, both he and CG&E decided feo terminate th.e . contract. Cox stated Applegate
-disagreed with this decision and wanted the investigation to continue so
'he could pursue irregularities he had identified in the QA program. Cox said CG&E denied Applegate's request.
Cox said that in his' opinion Applegate held a grudge against CGEE for ending
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the investigation over his objections. .He indicated that since January 1950 he has had no further contact with Applegate regarding the Zimmer investi-gation,'and Applegate has taken custody of all of the tape recordings and copies of reports he made during the investigation. 5.15 3.6 Record Reviews. The Confidential Service memorandum dated January 4,1980 authered by Major W. Cox, Director of CS, was reviewed by the investigator. The first paragraph of the letter addresses.Cox's concerns about the security of CS confidential reports. The letter indicates Cox objected to security breaches during the investigation and asked GC&E to terminate the investigation. How-ever, Cox did state in' the letter that, based on information he had, he did. net concur with CG&I*s' conclusion that Applegates allegations regarding questionable construction were without mer:t. 5.15.4 Findings and Conclusions The two, former employees interviewed by GAP were contacted by N?.~. They denied they had been fired for any criticism of plant QA and safety, but rather had been fired for timecard cheating. There was no indication from the interviews that management approved of timecard cheating. 5.15.5 Items of Noncompliance
. No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.16 Radiographer Suppression 5.16.1 Allegation "CG&E had warned PM manageraces to silence the radiographers at Zimmer, who were criticizing CGLE's consistent approval of welds rejected by PM."
. On February 26, 1981, Thomas Applegate provided further information regarding the allegation. He stated he' learned that on the weekend of January 9-10, 1981, Individuals D and E had probably broken into the
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Peabody Magnaflux (PM) trailer onsite. He alleged that during this burglary those individuals removed records of an instance where CG&E had overridden PM's rejection of welds. 5.16.2 Background 'nformation CG&E did not have personnel with direct nondestructive examination responsi-bilities, and as such, would not have been involved with " overriding" of PM radiograph . interpretations. . Additional background on radiography is in-cluded in Section 5.8.2. On July 3,1979, five prefabricated pipe spool pieces manufactured by Kellogg
.were received at the Zimmer site (see Section 5.7). Kaiser personnel wrote Nonconformance Report E1911 stating that the " spools were rolled off of truck onto ground and striking other spools." .On July 6, 1979, Kaiser directed that the welds on the spool pieces be radiographed.
On July 21, 1979,-David Hang of PM radiographed the spool pieces and identi- ! i fied rejectable defects in welds on three of the five spool pieces. PM for-- t warded the_ findings to Anthony Pallon, KEI Welding Engineer. The reports and film identifying the examined welds were then reviewed by Pallon and filed in j the Kaiser Document Control Center, three radiographs of welds with apparently rejectable defects were filed with a nonconforming report. On April 8, 1980, these films were reviewed by NRC Inspector Kavin Ward who determined that the - I welds had the wrong geometry for radiography and the films were not acceptable.
. On April 25-28, 1980, PM personnel performed magnetic particle and ultra-
, sonic inspections of the questioned spool pieces and concluded on the basis
; of these examinations that the welds on the spool pieces.were acceptable.
On April ~ 28, ~ 1980, -Kellogg performed ultrasonic examinations of the same spool pieces and also found them to be acceptable. The above information including details of processing of nonconformance report E-1911 is included in IE Investigation Report No. 50-358/80-09. t 5.16.3 Investigation j 5.16.3.1 Interview of Individual A On April 22, 1981, Individual A, who was previously interviewed by representa-l tives of GAP, was interviewed by NRC. Individual A statt.d PM radiographers I Allen Sellars and David Binning had told;him, on two occasions', that they
. found defective welds in Kellogg prefabricated spool pieces. He said they
- had discovered the defects when examining Kaiser field welds that joined the-spool pieces in the residual heat removal system. .He said they also found similar defects in five of twenty welds on the main steam relief-(MSR) spool
- pieces that had fallen off a truck on delivery .to .the site.
~
I Individual A stated that PM personnel told him CG&E overrode their rejec-
- tion of. welds on the MSR system and had retained a copy of the examination report and radiographic film in their files. He said CG&E overrode PM '
when.they' examined prefabricated spool pieces, but they were not overridden in their weld determinations.for Kaiser welds, i
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Individual A also stated that in January 1979 CG&I hired undercover private investigator Tho=as Applegate who had questioned PM e=ployees about this examination. He said Applegate and Allan Sellars had met at the Riverview Inn to discuss the matter. A few days af ter this meeting, Sellars met Individual A casite and told him his supervisors had advised him not to discuss the matter with anyone. He said Sellars later informed him there had been a burglary of the PM trailer, and the film and examination reports for the MSR spool pieces which PM had retained were missing. On April 24, 1981, Individual A provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information; however, he requested the statement not be attached to this report. 5.16.3.2 Inter"iew of Thomas Acclegate On February 26, 1931, Thomas Applegate was interviewed by NRC. He stated he had a telephone conversation with Ernest A1 dredge, President of PM, in which Aldredge said weld records were missing from the PM trailer onsite. Applegate said be subsequently learned that there was a break-in of the PM trailer on the weekend of January 9-10, 1980, and that records were taken from the trailer. He indicated Security Officers Ronald Wright, James Bedinghaus, and David Simpson had told him Individuals D and I were probably involved in the break-in and had stolen records from the trailer. Applegate said PM is now unable to " defend itself" against CG&E in a dispute about the acceptability of welds PM examined on the MSR system since its records were stolen. He stated that although these welds had been examined by PM and found defective they were. later accepted by CG&E. Applegate said that since the burglary PM has instructed its e=ployees not to say anything about this matter for fear of industry-wide reprisals against PM. 5.16.3.3 Interviews of Security Officers Between February I and March 15, 1981, the individuals listed below were interviewed by NRC. They could not provide any information concerning the break-in of the PM trailer in January of 1980. All of these individuals are former Security Officers at the Zimmer site and all stated the break-in had not been reported to the Security Department. They stated that they were unaware of the identity of any individuals who might have con =itted the break-in. David Simpson, Felicity, Ohio, Police Department Ronald Wright, Felicity, Ohio, Police Department James Bedinghaus, former Security Officer, Zimmer Nuclear Power Station
- John Bedinghaus, former Security Officer, Zi=mer Nuclear Power Station Jeffrey Hyde, former Security Officer, Zimmer Nuclear Power Station James Caplinger, former Security Officer, Zimmer Nuclear Power Station William Ross, Investigator, Clairmont County, Ohio Welfare Department 131 -
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5.16.3.4 Interview of Ernest Aldredge
-On April _10, 1980, Ernest A1 dredge, PM President, was interviewed by NRC.
Aldredge stated that to the best of his knowledge PM radiographers at the Zimmer site were not' consistently overridden in their weld determinations.
, He stated that Charles Wood, PM's Cincinnati Office Manager, had never reported this problem to him.
Aldredge also stated that from January through June 1980 there was. an NRC investigation at Zimmer as a result of complaints made by Thomas Applegate, a private investigator, who- had been hired by CG&E. He indicated Charles Wood informed him that PM employees had apparently told Applegate that there were defective welds at the plant. Aldredge stated Applegate subsequently contacted both the NRC and the local press about PM personnel telling him about defective welds, charging that PM had been overridden in their dewisions to reject welds.
'Aldredge'said that, as the result of the NRC investigation and newspaper articles about it, he contacted the Public Relations Officer of his parent
, company, Magnaflux Quality Services. They advised him that due to the sensi-tive nature of nondestructive examination of nuclear power plants it would be bad publicity for PM to,make any public statement, since the statement j could be misconstrued by the press. A1 dredge stated he was therefore 4 advised to not make any. statement to TV reporters or any other members of the media. He indicated he also advised Charles Wood it would be in the best interest of PM not to make any statements at that time.
'Aldredge said PM's contract 'at Zimmer.was not renewed due to production problems that had.been attributed to frequent breakdowns of the film processing machine onsite. He said information such as this could impact the ccmpany's professional reputation, so he felt it was best not to make a statement about why PM's contract was not renewed.
I Aldredge stated that there had been no attempt to silence the radiographers at Zimmer regarding public statements about the investigation. Aldredge provided a ' sworn statement on August 17, 1981, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 63. J . . 5.16.3.5 Interview of William Schwiers [ On April 23, 1981, William Schwiers, CG&E Quality Assurance Manager, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he would forward a letter to the investigator outlining the reasons PM's contract was terminated at Zimmer. Subsequently, Schweirs provided an unofficial memorandum outlining his reasons'for termi-nating PM's contract in April 1980. A retyped copy of the provided memo is included as Exhibit 64. Schweirs stated.the ' contract was not terminated because of PM's ' criticism ~of ."CG&E's ' consistent approval of welds rejected by them." 5.16.3.6 Interview of Charles Wood On April- 15,1981, Charles Wood, PM Cincinnati Office Manager, was inter-viewed by NRC. He stated that' since 1972, PM has been employed as the firm
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L .:._~;L: : w ., T -. responsible for nondestructive examination-at Zimmer. He said PM has con-ducted both ultrasonic, liquid penetract, and radiographic examinations of - large-bore and small-bore pipe welds onsite. Wood said PM's responsibility was to examine welds and present their preliminary findings to Kaiser. Kaiser personnel would examine. radiographs and make the determination if a ; j weld was accepted or rejected. He stated Anthony Pallon, KEI Welding Engineer, was responsible for reviewing PM's work and was not " consistently overriding" i PM on_ their decisions to accept or reject a weld. He said Pallon supported L PM's work onsite and,' when a defective weld was identified, assured that the weld was repaired. Wood stated that.CG&E hired Thomas Applegate in January 1980, and apparently (
-Applegate talked to . number of PM employees about their work onsite. Wood said Applegate called him in January 1980 and identified himself as r
" Thomas Jackson," a CG&E Cost Accountins Engineer. Wood indicated that at i
,that time there was a question about PM being retained onsite due to-problems in meeting production goals. '
Wood advised there~was discussion among PM employees about the contract , renewal, and.he learned PM employees had told Applegate that PM had iden-tified defective welds in the plant. Wood said it was PM's responsibility to identify defective welds and report their findings to Kaiser. Kaiser 1
, would assign a status of either repair, hold, or rework to the defective
! weld. Wood indicated that when his employees _ told Applegate that there , were " bad welds," they were referring to defective welds they had iden- '
.tified and reported to Kaiser. Wood stated his employees had answered ' Applegate's questions in good faith, assuming he knew the meaning of the
- . term bad welds" (that were identified as needing repairs by the Kaiser Quality Control system).
Wood stated that on one occasion Applegate called him and asked him if there'were " bad welds in the plant" and he responded in the affirmative. He'said he assumed Applegate knew what a defective weld was and that Applegate was qu'estioning (as an auditor) PM's ability to identify weld defects. . Wood said.Applegate later went to the newspapers and' quoted Wood and other PM employees as saying "there are defective welds" in the plant. i Wood said that rejectable welds are identified by nondestructive examination j , and are repaired under the quality' control system. Wood said that later there was a series of very controversial newspaper 2 articles about Zimmer construction. He consulted with PM's attorney, Charles Russ, who advised him that' media representatives could misconstrue anything he said and cautioned him to instruct his employees not to discuss the matter with the media. Wood safd there was no attempt to " cover up" J
.any'of PM'.s~ activities onsite, and their records accurately report their .
findings. Wood ' indicated that af ter the discussion with their attorney he advised PM employees to'not make any further statements regarding the matter.
- Wood said PM employees were receiving phone calls from media.representa-tives and a number of PM employees were disturbed about the calls. He felt
-it was PM's responsibility as their employer to advise them not to discuss Applegate's charges with media personnel.
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Wood said Applegate charged PM was " overridden" in their veld evaluations, and that its contract was not renewed by CGE because PM had continued to reject velds. Wood stated the contract was not renewed because of problems in meeting production goals onsite and not for any disagreements over PM's weld examinations. l Wood recalled that Allan Sellars told him in January 1980 that there had l been a break-in of the PM trailer. Sellars reported to Wood that no l equipment was missing, but he was unsure if Sellars had told him that any records were taken. Wood said PM retains the blue copy of all its examination reports for billing purposes; however, the X-ray film of a weld and other copies of examination reports are the property of CG&E and Kaiser and are retained by them. l On April 15, 1981, Wood provided a written statement attesting to tne preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 65. 5.16.3.7 Interview of Allan Sellars On February 19 and April 15, 1981, Allan Sellars, PM Level II Radiographer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he was employed at Zimmer from April l 1976 to April 1980, and performed radiographic examinations of Kaiser field l welds and occasionally examined welds on spool pieces manufactured by Kellogg. ! He indicated that when he identified defective Kaiser or Kellogg welds he identified them on the examination report and forwarded the report to Anthony Pallon, KEI Welding Engineer. Sellars stated he was not overridden by Pallon when he identified defects in either ~ Kaiser or Kellogg welds. Sellars did recall an incident in the Summer of 1979 when PM was asked to examine welds on some Kellogg MSR system spool pieces that apparently fell off the truck on delivery to the site. He said he and David Hang
- radiographed welds on the spool pieces in question, but the film quality i was poor. He indicated the geometrical configuration of the welds was j such that it would exaggerate flaws in the welds and project them on the film at varying angles, distorting the view of the weld. Sellars said that he had told Pallon radiography was the wrong technique to use in this case, but Pallon said to conduct the examination anyway. Sellars said Hang observed some unacceptable indications (defects) on the resultant radio-graphic film and noted this on the examination reports. Later, during an NRC investigation, these spool pieces were ultrasonically examined and the j welds were found to be acceptable.
l Sellars also stated that af ter the investigation there was considerable publicity regard.'ng PM's work'onsite, and he was told by PM management I not to comment to members of the press because anything he said could be taken out of context. Sellars said this was not an attempt to intimidate or silence him about PM's work onsite. In his opinion PM's contract was i not renewed due to production problems, which he attributed to breakdowns in the film processing machine. Sellars said another factor in CG&E's decision was audits that were critical of PM's work onsite. He indi-( cated the contract was not terminated for problems in their identification i of defective welds. Sellars also stated the PM trailer had been broken into; however, he was not aware of anything taken during the break-in.
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l On April 15, 1981, Allan Sellars provided a written statement attest:ng to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 49. l - 5.16.3.8 Interview of David Hang On March 27, 1981, David Hans, former PM Level II Radiographer, was inter-viewed by NRC. He stated he was employed at Zimmer from September 19, 1976, i to August 1979. Mang said he was responsible for conducting radiographic l examinations of large bore pipe welds. Hang indicated that he was not overridden on his weld determinations by Anthony Pallon, KEI Welding Engineer. To the contrary, Hang said welds PM accepted were frequently found unacceptable by Pallon and Pallon would request PM to reexamine the welds. When Pallon found a defect in a weld that PM had not detected, he would order the weld repaired. Hang said Pallon, as a Level III radiographer, had the final say in acceptance or rejection of a weld. Hang recalled that in August 1979 Pallon asked him to examine some pipe ! spool pieces on the MSR system that had fallen off of a truck on delivery to the site. Hans said he took one radiographic " shot," evaluated the film, and enneluded that radiography was the wrong technique to use when examining the spool pieces. Hang said he told Pallon that the geometric configuration of the spool pieces was such that it distorted the view of the weld and might exaggerate flaws that would appear as defects on the film. Hang indicated Pallon requested he examine the remainder of the welds by radiography and these examinations revealed apparent rejectable defects on three spool pieces. Hang said he reported the results of his examinations to Pallen and retained the PM copy of the reports and film in a special folder in the PM trailer onsite. He added that ultrasonic examination would be the proper nondestructive testing technique to use to examine pipe welds in l this geometric configuration, and he later learned the spool pieces had l been ultrasonically examined and found acceptable. Hang said he left Zimmer in August 1979 and, on his return in March 1980, he was informed by Allan Sellars that there had been a break-in. of the PM trailer and the file on the MSR pieces was missing. Hang stated that in April 1981 he reviewed the radiographic examination reports for the MSR i spool pieces that were recovered from the Kaiser Document Control Center. Mang verified that the reports and films were the originals from August 1979. He indicated 'these examination reports were for the three welds he found unacceptable, and apparently were filed by Kaiser with a nonconformance report. ( On April 23, 1981, David Hang provided a written statement attesting to i the preceding information, ,a copy of which is included as Exhibit 47. t
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w -. .. u . .. w. _ - .. . _ -. . . . - ._ a . - - - u .. . . . !. s . 5.16.3.9 Interview of Wavne Draf fon On February 19, 1981, Wayne Draffon, PM Level III Radiographer, was inter- i viewed by NRC. He stated that he was employed by PM at Zimmer from January 19 to April 1980. Draffon said it was PM's responsibility to radiograph Kaiser field welds onsite. He said PM performed a radiograph of a weld and did a preliminary review to ascertain if the weld was rejectable. He indicated PM did not have authority for final acceptance of a weld but that the KEI welding engineer who reviewed the radiographic film was responsible for final accept-ance. Draffon stated PM was not frequently overridden in its weld determina-tions and that welds accepted by PM were frequently found unacceptable by Kaiser. Draffon said he learned that radiographers occasionally observed defects in Kellogg welds when they overlapped Kaiser welds. These cases were reported and forwarded to Kaiser to determine if the Kellogg weld should be repaired. Draffen stated that when welds junctured, the geometry of the juncturing welds is frequently not the same and therefore radiographic views of the weld may be distorted. He indicated that inexperienced Level I or II Radiographers would often examine juncturing welds and report rejectable defects, not recognizing that the view was distorted. Draffen said a more experienced radiographer can discern this and find the weld acceptable. Draffen stated that when he arrived on site a problem similar to this had apparently occurred where PM radiographers examined MSR spool pieces that had fallen off the truck and found the welds unacceptable. In fact, the view of the weld was distorted
- due to configuration problems. Draffon said the spool pieces were later ultrasonically examined and found to be acceptable. Draffon commented that this appeared to be an isolated instance, and CG&E or Kaiser did not often override PM in their veld determinations. .
Draffen stated he had heard that the PM trailer was broken into, but this occurred prior to his arrival onsite. He learned that Thomas Applegate, a private investigator, had called the trailer and told employees it had been broken into. He said, however, employees searched the trailer and found no records or equipment missing. Draffon also stated that PM's contract was terminated in April 1980 at the customer's request. He said this occurred because the volume of work was slowing, and PM had experienced production problems, which he attributed to frequent breakdowns in the film processing machine onsite. - 5.16.3.10 Interview of Steven Binning . On April 15, 1981, Steven Binning, PM Level II Radiographer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was employed at Zimmer from April 1978 until April 1980. Binning said he received his Level II certification in October 1979 and routinely radiographed large bore pipe welds fabricated by Kaiser onsite. Binning said PM radiographed welds, developed the film, did a preliminary examination to determine if the welds were acceptable or rejectable, and then forwarded their report to Anthony Pallon, KEI welding engineer, who made the final determination nu the acceptability of the welds. He in-dicated Pallon did not consistently override PM in their veld determination and would sometimes reject welds that FM had initially found acceptable.
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He frequent!- directed them to re-shoot welds that Kaiser had repaired after PM ha i dentified rejectable defects in the welds. Binning recalled one occasion where PM examined some prefabricated spool pieces fer the MSR system that were manufactured by Kellogg and had apparentl; fallen off a truck on delivery to the site. He said David Hang examined the spool pieces and determined there were rejectable indications in some welds.
- Binning said the radiographs were later evaluated by Kaiser, it was found l the weld geometry precluded correct interpretation, and the welds on the spool pieces were not defective. Binning said Hang. retained copies of his report of this particular examination.
! Binning also stated that in January 1980 he received a telephone call from an unidentified individual who told him the PM trailer had been broken into. He said he immediately checked the back door and found the lock had been pried off and apparently the trailer had been entered. Binning said he inventoried the equipment in the trailer, checked the files, and found the only items missing were the examination reports and films for the MSR < spool pieces that had been examined by Hang earlier. He indicated he told Allan Sellars and Wayne Draffon about the burglary but did not discuss it with anyone else. , Binning said PM management never told him to be silent about activities that occurred at the site. He said PM's contract was not renewed because of production problems, which he attributed to their film processor fre-quently breaking down. He also stated that NRC had audited PM's radiation safety operations and technical work and these audits were critical of some aspects of the EM operation. Binning said PM was not asked to leave the site for their identification of defective welds, and PM employees were not harassed or intimidated by Kaiser or CG&E. On April 15, 1981, Steven Binning provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 45. 5.16.3.11 Interview of David Binning on January 19 and April 15, 1981, David Binning, PM Radiographer's Assistant, was interviewed by NRC. He indicated that, as a Radiographer's Assistant, he was not responsible for reading or interpreting film or making ar.y weld determinations. He said he worked with both David Hang and Allan Se.'lars and did not recall them commenting that Anthony Pallon overroce the=. He stated that PM usually radiographed Kaiser field welds; however, on one occasion they radiographed Kellogg prefabricated pieces. He said he re-called Hang took some "information only" shots of some prefabricated pieces and identified rejectable indications in some welds. He indicated Hang. reported this to Pallon, but he was not aware of the final disposition of the report. Binning also said that in January 1980 there was a break-in of the PM trailer and records were taken; however, he did not recall what records were missing. He said at about the same time the burglary occurred, Thomas Applegate con- , ducted an investitation and later notified NRC and the local press concerning 137 - _.___I___m__
DRAFI 5,D.M I PM's work. He said he was told by Sellars not to say anything about the investigation;because he (Sellars) was getting harassed by the press and Applegate about it. Binning said he was never told by PM management to
" cover up" anything about their activities at the site. Binning volunteered that PM had production problems onsite, which he attributed to the film processor breaking down and holding up production. .
5.16.3.12 Interview of Robert Marshall On April 16, 1981, Robert Marshall, KEI construction Superintendent, was interviewed by NRC. Marshall stated PM was not oveiridden by Pallon on weld determinations at Zimmer. He said Pallon.did not report to him that he overrode PM on their weld findings. Marshall also stated that the PM radiographers with whom he spoke after Applegate made his disclosures to the press did not support the claim that Pallon was overriding them in their weld determinations. He recalled one incident when PM was asked to examine some MSR spool pieces that had fallen off a truck on delivery to the site. He said that in April 1980 he reviewed the radiographs taken of these spool pieces and he, Rex Baker,
.KEI Welding Engineer, and NRC Inspector Kavin Ward examined the films. All concurred that the welds were of the wrong geometry for radiographic examina-tion. Marshall said that on some of the films the geometric configuration had distorted the radiographic view of the welds. He added that.this examination was an exception to ' common practice because PM normally radiographed Kaiser
. field ~ welds but not welds on Kellogg prefabricated pieces. Marshall advised
-that the MSR spool pieces were'later ultrasonically examined and found to be acceptable.
5.16.3.13 Interview of Anthony Pallon On August 13, 1981, Anthony Pallon, Sr., was interviewed by NRC. Pallon stated he was employed at Zimmer as. a Xaiser Quality Assurance Engineer, Welding / Nondestructive Examination from April 1, 1977 to July 8, 1980. He stated his position involved the review of PM radiographic reports of examination 'for pipe welds at the plant. Pallon stated he did not consis-tently override PM in their weld determinations at Zimmer and, on the contrary, frequently. rejected welds that PH found acceptable. He said, on less than ten occasions PM radiographers identified nonconforming vendor welds while examining an adjacent Kaiser weld. He said in each instance he directed the nonconforming veld to be repaired or replaced. He stated he could'not make a determination about 20*. of the prefabricated pipe welds in the plant being defective, since PM did not radiograph them, he did not review the radiographs, and he would not'make an unqualified statement about their acceptability. Fallon said in April 1980 that PM's contract at Zimmer was not renewed and Nuclear Energy Services (NES), Inc., took control of the radiography work at Zimmer. He attributed this to poor management of the PM operation at
-Zimmer, coupled with equipment problems that affected PM's ability to perform the required' amount.of radiographic examinations. .He said he privately told PM personnel'about this. months before the contract was terminated, but they
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*. :.:.: . :. . .:, . 51 1took no~ action (i.e. , hiring of additional personnel and repair of the film fprocessing machine) te increase their production at the si e.
'5.16.3.14 Record Reviews The RIII inspectors reviewed reader sheets for radiographs of field welds
.made between October 1979 and March 1980 to determine if CG&E or Kaiser personnel had accepted welds previously rejected by PM. The results of that review are given in Table 5.16-1.
Table 5.16-1 Radiographic Reader Sheet Data Reader Sheet Reader Sheet
. Weld No. Ident. No. Weld No. Ident. No.
- 1. RH-113 RH-31 26. RE-75A RI-I
- 2. RI-7 RI-11 27. K-288 WX-8
- 3. RH-53 RH-20 28. RH-86 RN-64 4 RH-55 .RH-20 29. @A3 DO-2
- 5. K-73 RH-20 30. SC3 DG-25
- 6. RH-40 RH-26 31. HGK-250 HG-16
- 7. K-494 MS-37 32. RD-K4 RD-1
- 8. FW-454> MS-30A 33. 1MS22AC2 MS-315
- 9. HG47A2-1/2 NR-E-2252 34. DG03AA-3/4 DG-88
- 10. K-926 WR 35. P.L.2M20803 LC-13
- 11. K-455 MS-26A 36. K-483 MS-43
- 12. MS22AA2 MS-311 37. K-499 MS-39
- 13. K-84 RH-38 38. 1RRBIAA-3/4 RR-122 14 P.L.2M20795 LC-19 39. K-288 RT-2
- 15. LP-9 LP-3 40. FC-5 FC-14
- 16. K-507 MS-44 41. K-33 FW-4
- 17. K-508 MS-45 42. FVK-31 FW-2
- 18. K-448 MS-27A 43. LP-13 LP-11
- 19. HP-19B HP-5 44. CYK-221 CY-49
- 20. FC-93 FC-29 45. WR41AA3 WR-44
- 21. K-414 'MS-24A 46. FW58A FW-2~
- 22. K-523 MS-27A 47. K-877 WR-2
- 23. RH-54 RH-20 48. HP-55 HP-4
- 24. RH-56 RH-20 49. K-475 MS-34
- 25. RH-46 RH-20 None of the reader sheets for the welds in Table 5.16-1 indicated 'that Kaiser personnel had accepted radiographs that had previously been rejected by PM.
5.16,4 Findinas and Conclusions Seven current and former PM employees who were interviewed denied any attempts by PM management to silence them for their weld determinations. In addition, the radiographers, CG&E, and PM management personnel denied
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- that PM was consistently overridden in its weld determinations. A re.iew l of PM radiographic examination reports did not reveal a pattern of P
- :
j being overridden by Kaiser in their weld determinations. The PM trailer had been broken into on the weekend of J,anuary 9-10, 1981.
- It was not established that this was done by Individuals D and E. Seven security officers who Applegate indicated had information regarding the break-in were interviewed and said they had no knowledge of any break-in of the trailer or of any information regarding the involvement of Indivi-( duals D and E in such a break-in. After the break-in, PM's copies of examination reports of Kellogg prefabricated main steam relief spool pieces were determined to be missing. Three of the eight reports on the spool pieces l were found in the Kaiser Document Control Center filed with a nonconformance
! report, but five of the reports are still missing. The reports and films j were reviewed by the PM employee who did the initial examination of the welds and who verified the reports and films are the originals. He said the ' reports filed with the nonconformance report are for the welds thought to be defective, and the missing five reports are of the radiographs of l
. . the acceptable welds.
! 5.16.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified. . 5.17 Industry Blacklisting 5.17.1 Allegation
" Union pipefitters and PM employees have been intimidated by fear of utility j and industry-wide reprisals should they complain about the QA practices."
5.17.2 Background Information No additional information was provided. . 5.17.3 Investination f 5.17.3.1 Interview of Individuals A and B On April 22 and 24,1981, Individuals A and B, both union pipefitters, werd interviewed by NRC. They stated they had not been intimidated or subjected to reprisals for their criticism of QA practices at Zimmer. Individuals A and B both stated that they were fired in January 1980 as a result of the findings cf Thomas Applegate's investigation into their involvement in timecard cheating. They have since been re-employed by CGfi subcontractors
- at Zimmer and other CGE sites.
5.17.3.2 Interview of William Schwiers On January 16, 1981, William Schwiers, QA Manager (CGE), was interviewed by NRC. He was asked to provide the names and current place of employment for Kaiser QC inspectors who had left the site since January 1, 1979. A
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list was subsequently provided, indicating that a total of twenty-three QC inspectors had left the site since that date. Fifteen were known to be employed at other nuclear power plants under constructien, two were employed as QC inspectors in defense-related industries, and there was no known place of employment for the remaining six inspectors. Schwiers said there has been no attempt by CG&E to engage in any form of industry-wide reprisals against employees who left Zimmer. 5.17.3.3 Interview of Ernest A1 dredge On April 10, 1980, Ernest Aldredge, President of Peabody Magnaflux (PM), was interviewed by NRC. He stated that neither PM nor its employees had been subjected to any reprisals by CG&E or other utilities for their work at Zimmer. Aldredge indicated that he was contacted by private investigator Thomas Applegate who asked him about the termination of the PM contract at Zicmer. He stated he told Applegate the situation at Zimmer could affect PM's performance record in the industry. Aldredge said the contract was terminated because of production problems that he attributed to a lack of adequate staffing on PM's part, and frequent breakdowns of their onsite film processing machine. Aldredge also said he was advised by Charles Wood, the PM Cincinnati Office Manager, that NRC had audited PM's records onsite and had found deficiencies. Aldredge said be talked to Applegate about PM being receved from other con-tractor's bid lists because of the work at Zimmer, but he was referring to their poor performance record at Zimmer affecting other contracts. He indi-cated that he was not referring to any systematic attempt by CGLE to engage in any intimidation or reprisals against PM for its woth onsite. Aldredge stated that during the conversation with Applegate he was concerned that the professional and business reputation of PM not be tarnished. He indicated he felt that Applegate misunderstood what he said and falsely accused CG&E of engaging in " industry-wide" intimidation of PM. 5.17.3.4 Interviews of PM Employees Between January 19 and April 15, 1981, seven current and former PM employees were interviewed by NRC. They denied that they had been placed in fear of , utility or industry-wide reprisals should they complain about QA practices at Zimmer. The results of these interviews are reported in Sections 5.7.3, 5.8.3, and 5.16.3. 5.17.4 Findings and Conclusions Two fired union pipfitters and seven current and former employees of Peabody Magnaflux, which included the individuals interviewed by GAP, were contacted by NRC and they denied having been intimidated or sua-jected to industry-wide reprisals for their criteism of Zi: amer QA practices. 9 141 - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _= . - - -
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5.17.5 Items of Nonceepliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 5.18 Inspector's Journal 5.18.1 Allegation "A KEI employee has kept a detailed journal of safety hazards and incidents at Zimmer." On January 29, 1980, Thomas Applegate was interviewed by NRC. He stated that an individual named Yohan Reiter had told him he maintained a detailed journal of safety defects while employed as a radiation waste chemistry technician at Zimmer. 5.18.2 Background Information It is common practice for inspectors performing certain types of inspections to utilite notebooks to record their cbservations. Such notes can later be used to generate surveillance reports, nonconformance reports, or other documents as required. 5.13.3 Investigation 5.18.3.1 Personnel Record Review The NRC Senior Resident Inspector reviewed CG&E personnel records and found an individual named Yohan Reiter. Inquiry indicated that Reiter was employed by Westinghouse, Inc., in Bra:il. Personnel records confirmed that Reiter had been employed at Zimmer at the time Thomas Applegate was onsite. 5.18.3.2 Interview with Yohan Reiter On February 5,1981, Yohan Reiter of Westinghouse, Inc. , was interviewed by telephone. He stated he was formerly employed as a radiation chemistry technician at Zimmer. He said he recalled meeting Thomas Applegate in the radiation waste disposal area during a routine inspection. Reiter also recalled commenting to Applegate that his field notebook was his " paper brain" in which he recorded the results of his field inspections. He said the notebook listed deficiencies identified during system walkdowns of the radioactive waste disposal system. Reiter indicated that he used the note-book to record deficiencies such as malfunctioning gauges or acid eating through floor tiles, which were then recorded on an equipment service list and corrected by the plant maintenance staff. He said that to his knowledge all of the deficiencies he identified were properly corrected by the licensee. He added that during meetings with his supervisor, Dean Erickson, and other members of the Radiation Protection Department staff, the adequacy of the resulting corrective action was discussed. Reiter indicated that he was not keeping any detailed journal of safety defects at the plant and, if he had any concerns regarding the safe opera-tien of the plant, he would have contacted the NRC himself.
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L.J! i, ;5. il 5.15.4 Findines and conclusions The individual who was alleged to have kept a " journal of safety ha:ards and incidents at Zimmer" stated that the " journal" was a field inspection notebook. He stated he used this notebook to record deficiencies he identified during system walkdowns of the radiation waste disposal system. He said that to his knowledge all of the deficiencies he identified were properly corrected by the licensee. 5.18.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 5.19 Pipefitter Joke 5.19.1 Allegation "A co==en ' joke' among pipefitters at Zicmer is that they will be hundreds of miles away when the plant goes on line, due to their predictions of a disastrous accident." 5.19.2 Background Information No additional information was provided as to the source or significance of the " joke" or statement. 5.19.2.1 Media Interview-During interviews conducted by Bettina Gregory of ABC News (broadcast on
.May 19, 1981), Edwin Hofstadter made a similar comment. Hofstadter was neither a pipefitter nor site employee, as detailed in Section 5.10.2.
5.19.3 Investigation 5.19.3.1 Interviews Sixteen pipefitters interviewed by RIII inspectors could not provide any information concerning any specific equipment desi'n g or installation deficiencies. During one interview, a QC inspector indicated that this joke had been heard in the plant. 5.19.4 Findings and Conclusions It was determined that the alleged statement had been made. The NRC is addressing the allegations and safety concerns identified during this investigation. The only other way that the NRC can deal with an allegation such as this is to determine if the quality of the plant is adequate. The NRC inspection program, the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program, and the preoperational testing program will enable this determination to be made.
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> . m- .. . . _ . - - - . . . - - . . . - --.-_.; 5.19.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 6.0 Allegations Received Through Site Interviews During interviews conducted at the Zimmer site, the investigators and inspectors received additional allegations. A number of these allegations coincided with or added detail to those in Section 4 and are included in that Section of this report. 6.1 Inspector Harassment 6.1.1 Allegation QC inspectors have been harassed by construction personnel who have repeatedly doused them with water. QC inspectors have been transferred following com-i plaints from construction personnel.
- 6.1.2 Background Information l Some friction between QC inspectors and construction personnel is expected due to the very nature of the system. That friction can be increased when construction personnel take the view that QC inspectors are "over inspecting" or overly critical. It is management's responsibi.'..y te take action to assure that f riction does not develop unhealthy attitudes that adversely affect construction quality.
6.1.3 Investication 6.1.3.1 Interview of Phillip Gittings On January 13,15, and July 8, Phillip Gittings, Kaiser QA Manager, was interviewd by NRC. He stated that Rex Baker told him of one incident in September 1980 when a QC inspector was doused with water while performing an inspection. Gittings stated Baker told him that the person who had doused 'the inspector had been identified and fired by construction manaFement. Gittings stated that Swain and other construction personnel had given him
" bad reports" on the inspection activities of Individua*. I, a QC inspector, and his lack of completed inspections. He then directed Baker to transfer Individual I from pipe support hanger inspection to structural weld:ng inspection activities. Gittings also indicated that in January 1980 he directed Baker to reassign QC Inspectors Ruiz, Wimbish, and Hendley because of problems with their inspection activities. ,
6.1.3.2 Interview of Dennis Donovan On March 10 and 11, Dennis Donovan, Kaiser Lead Civil (structural) QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he was aware that water had been dumped on QC Inspectors Janice Mulkey and Anthony Pallon, Jr., by craft personnel during the course of their inspections.
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n_a - . . _ - - - . . _ . . - . . ,_. .- .-. . - . - - Donovan stated that on February 16, 1981, James Ru:z was invcluntaril:. reassigned from inspections in the drywell area to the fabrication shcr. Donovan explained that be had been Ruiz's lead supervisor and was directed by Rex Baker to make the reassignment. He stated that Baker offered nc explanation for the reassignment except that the Kaiser QA Manager had requested he reassign Ruiz. Donovan stated it was obvious to him that Baker disapproved of the reassign-ment. He indicated the reassignment resulted from a personality conflict between Ruiz and Jerry Adams, Ironworker Superintendent, who felt that huiz was too strict and " nit-picking" during his inspections. Donovan stated that Adams had complained to him about Ruiz's inspections and had discussed this matter with Baker. Baker indicated that Ruiz was a good inspector, was net overly critical, and was justified in citing the various deficiencies he discovered in Adams' area. Donovan speculated that Adams had complained about Ruiz to General Superintendent James Sandlin who then talked to Gittings, who decided to remove Ruiz from the inspection area. Donovan added that concurrently he had heard unsubstantiated rumors that QC Inspectors Hendley, Vimbish, and McCoy were also going to be reassigned because of criticism of their inspection findings by Kaiser construction personnel. On March 11, 1981, Donovan provided a sworn statement attesting to the pre-ceding information, which is included as Exhibit 66. 6.1.3.3 Interview of Janice Mulkey On March 11 and 12, 1981, Janice H. Mulkey, Kaiser QC Inspector, was inter , viewed by NRC. She stated that on three or four occasions between August 1979 to August 1980 water had been thrown on her f rom above by craf t personnel while she performed inspections. Mulkey said she never saw the responsible individuals but on each occasion she reported the incident tc her supervisors (K. Shickle, J. Setlock, or S. Heath). She recalled that on ene occasion Heath threatened to remove all the QC inspectors fron the site if water continued to be thrown. Mulkey said Robert Marshall was then apprised of the incidents. Marshall then told the craft superintendents to assure that the water-throwing incidents stopped or he would terminate eight craft personnel who were suspected of being responsible. Mulkey said the water-throwing incidents adversely affected her performance and caused her difficulties in concentrating on her inspection activities because she had to be constantly vigilant for water being thrown on her. Mulkey also stated that, when water was thrown f rom three stories above her, it struck her with such force that on one occasion it knocked the breath out of her and on another caused her to bruise her knee. She indicated that other QC inspectors had also been doused with water. On March 12, 1981, Janice Hulkey provided a written statement attesting to the preceding information, a copy of which is included as Exhibit 67. 6.1.3.4 Interview with Anthony Pallon, Jr. On February 10. 1981, Anthony Pallon, Jr., Kaiser QC Inspector, was inter-viewed by NRC. He stated that since January 1981 he has performed visual
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. . _ _ . - _ m - m _ . _ . _ _ _ . . .__ _ ._ . weld inspections in the suppression pool area to ensure these welds me; A'45 Code requirements. Pallon said the previous inspector in this area had been lan, and he began rejecting about 50% of the welds he inspected. Soon af terwards, he was being called to inspection points by craf t personnel who would douse him with water from above when he arrived. Pallon said this occurred about two or three times a week and he had been squirted with a fire extinguisher while performing an inspection the night prior to this interview. Pallon said be was also told that Douglas Haff, Kaiser Pipefitter Supe'rin-tendent, had told QC Inspector Joseph Mills that he would have Pallon fired. Pallon said Haff on one occasion harrassed him when he returned from lunch . ty directing security personnel to search him and Joseph Mills for alcohol. j On February 10, 1981, Pallon provided a sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, which is included as Exhibit 68. 6.1.'.5 Interview of Joseph Mills On February 10, 1981, Jeseph M. 'ls, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that, while performing inspections in the suppression poc1 area, both he and Anthony Pallon had been called to inspection points and doused with water. Mills felt it was significant that Pallon was doused in excess of six times in one month. Craf t personnel were apparently doing this because of Pallon's weld rejections. Mills indicated that Douglas Haff, the superintendent in this area, told him he would get Pallon fired because he was " nit picking" on his inspections. Mills said he ignored this comment because it was impossible for Haff to fire a QC inspector. Mills indicated that later Haff attempted to harass him and Pallon by having them searched by security guards for alcohol when they returned free lunch one day. He stated these actions did not affect his inspection activzty, although he did feel that the QA program at Zimmer was understaffed. procedures were poorly written, and the existing program lacked support from Kaiser management. 6.1.3.6 Interview of Michael McCoy on February 11, 1981, Michael McCoy, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on one occasion during the spring of 1980 he and QC Inspector Charles Belcher were called to an inspection point by craf t personnel. McCoy said when they arrived at the inspection peint an attempt was made to douse them with water thrown at them from above. On February 11, 1981, McCoy provided a sworn statement attesting to the pre-ceding information, which is included as Exhibit 69. 6.1.3.7 Int erview of John Sullivan On February 19, 1981, John Sullivan, Nuclear Energy Services Inc. , was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he personally has never been doused with water but that he was aware Kaiser QC Inspectors Anthony Pallon and Rick Sizemore had been doused with water while performing inspections in 146-
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.< .4 Li B, i i the suppresion pool area. .Sullivan stated that whea S22emere was doused he was performing an inspection using a 220-volt magnetic particle test 2ng machine, and, if water had struck the machine, Sizemore might have been electrocuted. He indicated that Construction Superintendents Edward Stanley and Douglas Haff were standing in the area when this incident occurred.
Sullivan also related another incident when he and Pallon were searched by security personnel when they were returning from lunch one day. He stated that, in his opinion, Haff and Stanley were attempting to harass Pallen because of Pallon's inspection activities in their area. On February 19, 1981, Sullivan provided a sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, which is included as Exhibit 70. 6.1.3.8 J,nterview of Billy Tyree [ Oc February 18 and 20,1981, Billy Tyree, former Kaiser QC Inspector, was
' interviewed by NRC. He stated that he was employed at Zimmer from September 24 to November 20, 1979, by Butler Services, Inc. Tyree stated that he was aware that buckets of water were thrown on QC inspectors by Kaiser construction' workers . Tyree indicated that he never observed such incidents, but he recalled that on four or six occasions QC Inspector Janice Mulkey was doused with water, and had reported these incidents to her immediate supervisor.
Tyree also stated that two or three other QC inspectors were also doused with water, and he conjectured this was done to limit the thoroughness of inspections by QC personnel. He was unaware of any inquiry or investigation to identify the individuals involved in the dousing incidents, but learned that a construction worker named "Frenchie" was considered to be generally
- responsille for some of the water-throwing incidents.
On February 20, 1981, Tyree provided a sworn statement attesting to the pre-ceding information, which is included as Exhibit 71. ! 6.1.3.9 Interview of Richard Price On February 18 and March 7,1981, Richard Price, former QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated be was employed by Butler' Services, Inc., from September 1975 to November 28, 1980, and by Kaiser from December 1 to 24, 1980. Price stated he was aware that, on at least twelve occasions, construe-tion k rkers poured buckets of water on QC inspectors who were conducting inspections in the containment building. He stated his opinion that the water yas thrown on the inspectors because they were conscientious and re-fused to accept inferior or nonconforming work oy craft personnel.
- Price stated he heard rumors that two Kaiser construction workers nicknamed l "Frenchie" and " John Boy" were the individuals responsible for throwing water.
He indicated that Kaiser management was apprised of these incidents and construction personnel were unofficially told that they would be terminated if there were any further incidents of water being thrown on QC inspectors. I s x h
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lim i N 15. t I On March 2, 1981, Price provided a sworn statement attesting to the precedinc information, which is included as Exhibit 72. 6.1.3.10 Interview of Winston Jackson On February 18 and 20,1981, Winston Jackson, former QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he was employed at Zimmer by Butler Services, Inc., from July 1979 to November 1980. Jackson stated he was aware of several incidents when buckets of water were dumped on QC inspectors by craf t personnel while they were performing inspections in the containment building. He indicated that in his opinion these incidents represented harassment of QC inspectors by construction personnel, and he added that these incidents were reported to Kaiser management. He stated he was not aware of any action Kaiser tsuk concerning this matter. On February 20, 1981, Jackson provided a sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, which is included as Exhibit 73. 6.1.3.11 Interview of James Ramsey On February 18 and 20,1981, James Ramsey, former Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated he formerly worked at Zimmer for Butler Services, Inc., and also for Kaiser Engineering between July 1979 and December 14, 1980. Ramsey stated that QC Inspectors Janice Mulkey and Michael DePuccio were doused with water by construction personnel while performing inspections in the containment building. He indicated that, in
, his opinion, these incidents amounted to harassment of.the inspectors by construction personnel. Ramsey said these incidents were reported to Kaiser management and an investigation was conducted into the matter, but he was unaware of any outcome of the inquiry.
On February 20, 1981, Ramsey provided a swarn statement attesting to the preceding information, which is included as lxhibit 74. 6.1.3.12 Interview of Individual I On February 18 and 20, 1981, Individual I, former Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He indicated that he was aware of incidents of QC inspectors being harassed by construction personnel. Individual I stated that two inspectors in particular were subject to harassment in the form of buckets of water dumped on them while they were performing their inspections. He said the above incidents were reported to Kaiser management but nothing was ever done about the problem. Individual J indicated that he had heard that General Foreman Walter Hamm was aware of the identity of the individuals involved in the incidents but was protecting those individuals. 6.1.3.13 Interview of Dennis Taylor On February 19, 1981, Dennis Taylor, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed
- by NRC. He stated that in October or November 1980, while performing a magnetic particle inspection of a weld in the reactor containment building, he was hit with a stream of water from a fire extinguisher. Taylor also
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. . - - _ _ _. - l
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__ .-. . . = . . . ...~.:.- imt.: a st il ;.i indicated that QC Inspector Anthony Pallon was frequently doused with water while performing inspections in the suppression pool area. In Taylor's opinion, Pallon was being harassed by craft personnel in this area because he was rejecting welds made by the craft personnel. 6.1.3.14 Interview of Jesse Ruiz On February 18 and 20,1981, Jesse Ruiz, former Kaiser QC inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He indicated that construction workers were pouring buckets of water on QC inspectors who were performing inspections. He said that these incidents were brought to the attention of Robert Marshall, Kaiser Construction Superintendent, who stated that anyone throwing water on a QC inspector would be fired. However, no formal investigation or report was made of these incidents. 6.1.3.15 Interview of Walter Hamm, Sr. On March 26, 1981, Walter Hamm, Sr. , Kaiser General Foreman, was interviewed by h*RC. He stated he was aware that water had been thrown on several QC inspectors, including Janice Mulkey. Hamm indicated that the culpable indi-viduals were never identified and no disciplinary action was ever initiated. He stated that according to rumors individuals nicknamed " Fat Frenchie,"
" Skinny Frenchie," and one pipefitter nicknamed " John Boy" were involved in the incidents. Hamm identified these individuals but he was unable to substantiate their involvement. He personally warned all 'of these indi-viduals that he would terminate them if he found they were throwing water on QC inspectors. .
Hamm was critical of the QC inspection activities at Zimmer and stated that QC inspectors often rejected work that, in his opinion, was acceptable. He also mentioned that he frequently had difficulty in finding inspectors when he needed them to respond to an inspection point in a timely manner. Hamm stated that the QC inspectors delayed construction and increased construc-tion expenses because of their critical inspections. He indicated that he had frequently criticized the inspectors personally and had cdmonished them for their inavailability to perform inspections. On March 26, 1981, Hamm provided a sworn statement attesting to the pre-ceding information, which is included as Exhibit 75. 6.l.3.16 Interview of Rex Baker On January.13 and March 3,1981, Rex Baker, Kaiser Inspection Supervisor, was interviewed by NRC. Baker stated that in January or February 1981,
. Phillip Gittings suggested that QC Inspectors Ruiz, Hendley, and Wimbish be reassigned because they were " nit picking" during their inspections and writing too many~nonconformance reports. Baker disagreed with this sugges-tion and expressed his opinion that the inspectors were performing inspections in accordance with Kaiser procedures and were writing valid nonconformance reports. 'He stated that he did move-Inspectors Ruiz and Hendley from weld inspections in the reactor building to inspections in the fabrication shop.
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Dkal l 6.1 b : 1 Baker also stated that, when he first arrived on the site, he learned from the previous Inspection Supervisor that the lead welding inspector, Kenneth Shinkle, had also been reassigned. Baker also understood that QC inspector Janice Mulkey was doused with water while performing an inspection, but he was not exactly sure how or when the incident occurred. 6.1.3.17 Interview of Kenneth Shinkle On February 18, 1980, Kenneth Shinkle, Kaiser QC Engineer, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that from November 1977 to February 1980 he was lead pipe support hanger inspector at Zimmer. Shinkle stated that in February 1980 Kaiser was involved in a 100% reinspection of all pipe support hanger welds. He said his inspectors were rejecting up to 95% of the hangers inspected and initiating nonconformance reports for deficient hanger welds. Shinkle stated that he was called into a meeting with both CG&E and Kaiser management, who criticized his group's high rate of rejection, their inspec-tion techniques, and the continuing identification of deficiencies on welds that were found acceptable during previous inspections. He said those Kaiser officials present initially denied they had committed Kaiser to a 100*4 ~ reinspection, but later in the meeting they admitted this was the commitment for reinspection of pipe support hangers. Shinkle stated that at the end of the meeting a Kaiser official asked him, "Do you understand who you work for now?" He took this comment as an attempt to intimidate him and to pressure his inspectors to accept pipe support hangers undergoing inspection at the time. Shinkle stated that the next day be submitted nonconformance reports for deficient welds on pipe support hangers, and Kaiser management removed him from his job later that af ternoon. He learned that William Schwiers, CG&E QA Manager, had objected to Kaiser about Shinkle's reassignment but was told Robert f.arshall had said "it would be a cold day in hell before he'll [Shinkle) touch another pipe hanger." Shinkle stated that he has never been reassigned te pipe support hanger inspection activities. . On September 1,1980, Shinkle was prometed to Quality Assurance Engineer for civil / structural activities, the job description for which states that he is responsible for pipe support hanger inspections. However, Phillip Gittings told him that this was a typing error in the description and he would have nothing to do with pipe support hanger inspection activities. On February 18, 1981, Shinkle provided a sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, which is included as Exhibit 76. 6.1.3.18 Interview of Mack White On March 11 and 25, 1981, Mack White, QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on March 11, 1981, at about 10:30 p.m., he was conducting an inspection in the drywell area of the primary containment building at Level 524. White indicated that at this time an unknown individual dumped
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Ukidi h/15/51 I a few gallons of water on him from above. He looked up but was unable to identify the individual as he ran away. l l White stated he reported the incident to the NRC, QC management personnel, ' and to Construction Superintendent Adams. He said that Adams commenced an l inquiry to attempt to determine who was responsible, but was unsuccessful. l White stated he had no, idea who threw the water and he was unable to speculate on what prompted the incident. On March 25, 1981, White provided-a sworn statement attesting to the pre-ceding information, which is included as Exhibit 77. 6.1.3.19 Interview of James Ruiz (hi February 25, 1981, James Ruiz, Kaiser QA Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that on February 22, 1981 he was reassigned from inspections in the primary containment building to inspections in the fabrication shop. Ruiz stated that Rex Baker had commented to him at the time of his transfer that "you were doing too good a job and so they transferred you." Ruiz stated ! that prior to his reassignment he had disagreed with Ironworker Superintendent ' Jerry Adams,-who accused him of " nit-picking" inspections. Ruiz stated be was told by Dennis Donovan that Adams had gone to James Sandlin, Kaiser General Superintendent, and asked Sandlin to have the QA Manager remove him from the containment area. Ruiz stated that his reassignment was an example of Gittings' lack of support for QC inspectors and proved that the QA Department was not independent of construction influence at Zimmer. On - Februa ry 25, 1981, Ruiz provided a sworn- statement attesting to the pre-ceding-information, which is included as Exhibit 78. . 6.1.3.20 Interview of James Sandlin On March 13,1981, -James T. Sandlin, Kaiser General Superintendent (struc-l tural), was interviewed by NRC. He indicated that QC Inspector James Ruiz had been unable to establish or maintain a good working relationship with' construction personnel or his fellow inspectors. Sandlin stated that Ruiz conducted. inspections without listening to any advice and did not solicit the cooperation of construction personnel or other,QC inspectors. Sandlin stated that Ruiz had been unnecessarily critical in his inspections and had been accused of " nit-picking." He indicated that this had caused , conflict between Ruiz and Gerald Adams, Structural Superintendent, and he brought this matter to the attention of the QA Manager asking him to resolve the situation. Sandlin denied that he asked Gittings to reassign Ruiz from , the primary containment area. . ! On March 25, 1981, Sandlin provided a sworn statement that attested to the preceding information, which'is included as Exhibit 79. . 6.1.3.21 Interview of Gerald Adams ( On March 13 and 25,E1981, Gerald Adams, Kaiser Structural Superintendent, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that he received numerous complaints from- l
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- -ai ! 6 /1ME 1 construction personnel regarding the inspections of QC Inspector James Ruiz.
He said that in his opinion Ruiz was too critical and " nit-picking" on his ~; inspections, thereby delaying construction activities. Adams indicated that Ruiz did not cooperate with craft personnel and, in his opinion, was inspecting according to ASME Code requirements when he should be following the less stringent AWS Code requirements. Adams stated that he had accused Ruiz of holding up construction and being overcritical in his inspections. He also threatened to have him terminated If he persisted in his unjustified delays of construction. However, Adams denied threatening to have Ruiz terminated unless he accepted welds that did not meet AWS criteria. Adams stated he had complained to Donovan, Baker, ' Sandlin, and Gittings about Ruiz's inspections and specifically suggested to Baker that it would be better for both him and Ruiz if Ruiz was reassigned to another area. However, Adams denied any responsibility for initiating Ruiz's reassignment. On March 25, 1981, Adams provided a sworn statement attesting to the preceding information, which is included as Exhibit 80. 6.1.3.22 Interview of L. Q. Hendley On March 9, 1981, L. Q. Hendley, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that in February 1980 he was reassigned from pipe support hanger
- inspection duties to the fabrication shop. Hendley stated that his supervisor, David Painter, told him he was "doing his job too well and that is the reason for your reassignment." Hendley stated that, after his reassignment, noncon-formance reports he had written were dispositioned as " Accept-As-Is" by the QC Manager.
4 6.1.3.23 Interview of David Hang On February 24, 1981, David Hang, Kaiser QC Inspector, was interviewed by NRC. He stated that prior to his employment by Kaiser he worked for Peabody Magnaflux, the firm which had been responsible for nondestructive examination 4 of welds at Zimmer. He said that in March 1980, while inspecting welds in - the containment building, he was doused with a bucket of water from above. - Hang indicated this was not an unusual occurrence and that this had happened to other QC inspectors before and after this event. Hang also stated that during the summer of 1978 he was re-inspecting a weld he had previously rejected when a pipefitter threatened him with bodily harm if he.did not pass the weld. Mang said he did not report the incident to anyone, but was intimidated by this threat and did not enter that particular area for some time. On February 24, 1981, Hang provided a sworn statement attesting to the pre-ceding information, which is included as Exhibit 81. 6.1.4 Findings and Conclusions Quality control inspectors were harassed by construction personnel who dumped water on them from above. In one case,-inspectors, when entering j l' - 152-W
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i the site, were searched by security personnel who allegedly were instructed to perform the search by Construction Department supervisors. There was no indication that any of these activities were condoned by Kaiser or CG&E management. There were indications that action was taken by Kaiser t to' identify and disipline those harassing QC inspectors. The Kaiser Quality Assurance Manager reassigned Quality Control inspectors on four occasions af ter the Kaiser Construction Department criticized them. In a :related finding, NRC inspectors found that some of the nonconformance
- reports generated by these inspectors prior to their reassignment were im-
- properly voided or were not entered into the Kaiser nonconformance reporting system following their reassignments (see Section 4.1). QC inspection supervisors interviewed stated that the Kaiser Quality Assurance Manager reassigned inspectors because construction management complained about their inspection activities.
6.1.5 Items of Noncompliance No items of noncompliance were identified. 6.2 Weld Inspection Criteria Deleted An allegation concerning the deletion of required weld inspection criteria was received by the NRC during the investigation from a site employee. The } - employee showed the Region III inspector copies of KEI-1 forms (weld inspection
.recor sd ) that supported the allegation.
1 6.2.1 Review of Weld Inspection Records The Region III inspectors observed that veld inspection criteria utilized , to verity weld prceedure, welder qualification, filler material, joint cleanliness, bevels, and damage had been deleted or designated as not applicable (N/A) on the following KEI-1 forms (weld inspection records): Table 6.2-1 Weld Inspection Records System or Isometric Beam or Other Component Drawing # Mark # Information (1) Drywell Support Steel S398B 29 Detail E of S-437 (2) Drywell Support Steel S398B 2 stiffeners Line No. NKC 1/2 x 6-3/4 17S493 x 25-1/8 (3)'Drywell Support Steel S398A 125 Line No. EL-535 191' (4) Drywell Support Steel S398B 67' Detail 13 or 493 Detail 2 of 447
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- - - , . , ~ . - , ,, , - , .
~y_.- . _,. . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ _,_,_ - DhhTi Bil5lL1 Table 6.2-1 (continued)
System or Isometric Beam or Other Component Drawing # Mark # Information (5) Drywell Support Steel S398A C-63 Bottom Plate (W8 x 10) (6) Drywell Support Steel S398A W8 x 17 Cum Lugs (7) Service Water System PSK1WS32 SSH Line No. 1WS17A18 The records for the drywell support steel indicated that the deleted criteria existed at least from July, 1980 to January, 1981. The record for the weld in the service water system indicated the criteria was designated as not applicable in November 1979. The inspection criteria to verify proper fitup and tack welds was also designated N/A for the above weld activities on the service water system. 6.2.2 Code Requirements The welding activities were governed by ASMI Code Section III-1971 Edition , or by the AWS DI.1-1972 Code. The applicable requirements of both codes are as follows: ASME Code, Section III 1971 Requirements
- 1. NA-4130- "As used in this Section of the Code, Quality Assurance comprises all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all components, parts, or appurtenances are manufactured and/or installed (as applicable) ,
in accordance with the rules of this Section."
- 2. NA-4420- "The manufacturer'and/or Installer shall maintain a written description of the procedures used by his organization for control of quality and examinations, showing in detail the implementation of the quality assurance requirements of this ,
Section of the Code."
- 3. NA-4510- "Inprocess and final examinations and tests shall be established '
to assure conformance with documented instructions, procedures, and drawings."
- 4. NA-4442.1- " Welding and brazing materials for all classes of construction shall be controlled in accordance with NB-4122...."
1
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DF.A.r7 Sf j 3f g j i NB-4122- " Welding and brazing materials shall be identified and controlled so that they can be traced to each component and/or installation of a piping system, or else a control procedure shall be employed which ensures that the specified materials are used."
- 5. NA-4451- "...Hessures shall be established to assure that processes in-cluding welding and heat-treating are controlled in accordance with the rules of this Section of the Code and are accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures."
e
- 6. NB-4230--identifies specifir requirements for fitting and aligning of weld joints which must be verified.
AWS DI.1-1972 Code Requirements , 1. Section 3.1.1- "All applicable paragraphs of this section shall be observed in the production and inspection of welded assemblies and structures produced by any of the processes acceptable under this Code."
- 2. Section 3.2.1- " Surfaces and edges to be welded shall be smooth, uniform, and free from fins, tears, cracks, or other defects which would adversely affect the quality of strength of the weld. Surfaces to be welded and surfaces adjacent to a weld shall also be free from loose or thick scale, slag, rust, moisture, grease, or other foreign material that will prevent proper welding ...."
- 3. Section 3.3.1- "The parts to be joined by fillet welds shall be brought into 'as close contact as practicable. The gap between parts shall normally not exceed 3/16 inch ....
- 4. Section 3.3.7--addresses tack weld requirements which must be verified.
i '
- 5. Section 6.1.1- "The inspector designated by the Engineer shall ascertain that all fabrication by welding is performed in accordance with the requirements of this Code.
- 6. Section 6.1.3- "He" (the inspector) "shall be notified, in advance, of the start of any welding operations."
~
- 7. Section 6.2- "The Inspector shall make certain that only materials conforming to the requirements of this Code are used."
- 8. Section 6.4.1- "The inspector shall permit welding to be performed only by welders, welding operators, and -tackers who are qualified in accordance
.with the requirements of 5.2."
- 9. Section 6.5.2- "The Inspector shall make certain that only welding procedures that meet the provisions of 5.1 'and 5.2 are employed."
- 10. Section 6.5.3- "The Inspector shall make. certain that electrodes are used only in the positions and with the type of welding current and polarity for which they are classified."
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- 11. Section 6.5.4- "The inspector shall, at suitable intervals, observe the technique and performance of each welder, welding operator, and tacker to make certain that the applicable requirements of Section 4 are met."
The weld inspection criteria were deleted or designated as not applicable
, on weld inspection forms used routinely to inspect welds. This appears t be contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Sections 3.3 and 3.13.1 (358/81-13-26).
This matter is addressed in the licensee.'s Quality Confirmation Program. 6.2.3 Findings and Conclusions Weld inspection criteria were deleted from weld inspection forms used to document inspections of welds between July 1980 and January 1981 and were designated as not applicable for one weld made in November 1979. This concern is addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 6.2.4 Items of Noncompliance One item of noncompliance was identified (failure to delineate required ! weld inspection criteria). l 6.3 QA Surveillance Reports An allegation concerning Surveillance Report. procedure violations was 4 received by the NRC from a site employee during this investigation. The allegati'on stated that Surveillance Reports were not being transferred to Nonconformance Reports in 30 days as required by' procedure. 6.3.1 Record Re' views i The Region III inspectors reviewed the H. J. Kaiser Company Instruction QACMI G-14, Revision 3, for initiating and documenting QA Surveillance Reports (SR). Page 1, paragraph 2, of the procedure states that..."sur-veillance reports will be used to identify...an in-process nonconformance which can-be corrected without processing a Nonconformance Report (NR)." Page 2, paragraph 5 of the procedure states "Except in extenuating circum-stances, QA surveillance reports which identify in-process nonconformances will be transferred to a NR when the non-complying condition has not been acceptably corrected within 30 calendar days." The following QA Surveillance Reports identify in-process nonconformances (deficiencies): No. 2899 dated December 18, 1980--bolt torque verification missed l No. 2903 dated January 14,1981--weld (fitup and preheat of 60') verifications missed No. F-2909 dated Janaury 16, 1981--bolts missing or loose f - 156- , j
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D.; AFT E/15/El No. 2914 dated Janaury 15,1981--NDE weld hold pozn s (!!T and VT) bypassed
- . No. F-2941 dated January 28,1981--broken flex, bolts fail to torque, etc.
No. F-3070 dated March 24,1981--bolt installation not verified No. F-3071 dated March 24, 1981--elongated holes in baseplate I No. F-3072 dated March 24, 1981--elongated holes in baseplate No. F-3073 dated March 24, 1981--bolts do not meet torque requirements i No. F-3074 dated March 24, 1981--bolts stripped . I No. F-3075 dated March 24, 1981--bolt holes elongated No. F-3076 dated March 24, 1981--hanger needs snimming and spalling
- repair No. F-3082 dated March 25, 1981--cable is too short No. F-3083 dated March 26,1981--unacceptable welds ,
No. F-3099 dated March 27, 1981--bolt deficiencies , No. F-7000 dated Maren 30,1981--weld deficiencies, missing braces,
.etc.
No. F-7006 dated April 1,-1981--weld deficiencies
- No.'F-7019 dated April 6, 1981--weld deficiencies I The disposition of SR F-2899 indicated that based on a rejection rate of less than 1% of the verified torque on other bolts, the bolts on approxi-mately.10% of the attachments (conduit straps, non-engineered hangers, etc.)
in various areas (Plan No.1 of EI drawing 150-2, Revision D, for example) were acceptable without . required torque verifications (one bolt per. attachment). The disposition, dated January 15,-1981, was made by a H. J. Kaiser Quality Assurance Engineer and not by design control measures commensurate with those i applied to the original design.
-The disposition dated January 14,1981, on SR F-2903 indicated that welds A3 and A4 on pipe line ISK RR-298 were acceptable-as-is based on normal ambient temperature plus the sample' verification by radiography of fitups on 20 out of approximately 400 other welds. The disposition was made only by the H. J. Kaiser QA Manager and not by design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design.
-The disposition dated January 25, 1981 on SR F-2914. indicated that the welds '
(DB 177 to DCS 80) were-acceptable based on visual examination (VT) of weld DB 177'and the magnetic particle testing (MT) of-the root pass connecting 157-l y e -% yw w .-oyumwr-rm- 4.- sa hh p.,-J. _s pwg._w wi_---- 9 m *rv" r are -e e p -"my 4---W prt
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2._ IM IT s/15/61 DB 177 to DCS 80. Thus the final MT was waived. The disposition was made only by a H._J. Kaiser Quality Assurance Engineer and not by design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. If the items addressed on SRs F-2899, F-2903, and F-2914 would have been docu-mented on nonconformance reports (NRs), H. J. Kaiser Company Instruction QACMI G-4.would have required dispositions to-have been made by the Material Review Board. The Material Review Board is comprised of the KEI Construction Engineer, CG&E QA and Standards Engineer, KEI QA Engineer, CG&E Sponsor Engineer, and the S&L Design Engineer. The nonconforming items accepted in SRs F-2899, F-2903, and F-2914' represent changes to the original design. The 30 day period specified in Instruction QAMCI G-14, Revision 3, in essence, permitted nonconforming items to be dis-positioned without design control measures commensurate with those applied
- to the original design if the SR was dispositioned without being transferred to an NR. This is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and the W. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 15.9 (358/81-13-08).
The inprocess nonconformances identified on SRs F-2909, F-3070, F-3071, F-3072, F-3073, F-3074, F-3075, F-3076, F-3083, and F-7019, were not dis-i positioned or acceptably corrected _as of August 12, 1981, and were not trans-ferred to NRs within 30 calendar days. This is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix i B, Criterion V and the W. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 5 (358/81-13-09). The dispositions to the inprocess nonconformances identified on SRs F-2941 and F-3099 indicated that some of the items had been acceptably corrected and the others had been transferred to NRs. ! The dispositions to the inprocess nonconformances identified on SRs F-3082, i F-7000, and F-7006 indicated that all of the items had been transferred to NRs. The concern of nonconforming items being documented on Surveillance Reports , is addressed in the licensee's Quality Conformation Program. 6.3.2 Findings and Conclusions [ Instruction QACMI G-14 which only required in-process nonconformance to be 4 transferred from Surveillance Reports to Nonconformance Reports if not acceptably corrected within 30 days, was inadequate. The 30-day period did not assure that all nonconformances which constituted design changes were subjected to design control measures commensurate with the original design. I These design control measures would have been required if the in-process nonconformances were documented on Nonconformance Reports. Some of the SRs were not transferred to WRs as required by QACMI G-14. This concern is addressed in the licensee's' Quality Conformation Program. j i 6.3.3 Items of Noncompliance l Two items of noncompliance were identified (inadequate procedures to assure nonconformances are subjected to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design, and failure to follow procedure to t i .
- 158-i , _ ,,. , . , ,m, _r ii _+
at. - - _ . _ - ~ _ . . . - - . . . . _ , _ _ . z_ _ . . - _ . _ _ ^ DF.Af i 8/15/f.) j transfer in-process nonconformances identified on Surveillance Reports to Nonconformance Reports in 30 days). 7.0 Independent NRC Inspection Findings During the course of the investigation, RIII inspectors performed independent inspections of various plant areas during allegation reviews. In those areas where deficient conditions were observed, further inspection undertaken to determine the extent of the deficient conditions. 7.1 Control of Structural Steel Beams and Beam Welds During the investigation of the allegations addressed in Sections 4 and 5, the.RIII inspector identified a beam with an unacceptable weld and two beams that were only tack welded into place. Therefore, the RIII inspector decided to make a more in-depth inspection and review the controls of structural beams and beam welds. The inspections and reviews included visual examinations of approximately . twenty-five structural steel beams in the blue switchgear and cable spreading rooms, and reviews of related documentation.
, 7.1.1 Beam Observed in Blue Switchgear Room The area observed in the blue switchgear room (elevation 546 ft) was 8 ft 3 in.
west of workline G, 16-ft 6 in. east of workline H and between columns 22 and 54 of S&L drawing No. S-546, Revision AB. The following six discrepancies were identified:
- 1. A W8 x 17 beam (8 ft 3 in. long), positioned east to west and located I ft 9 in. south of column 24 and 10 in. below elevation 546 ft, was l not specified on any pertinent design drawing. The beam appeared to be permanently installed and traceability of the beam heat number was not maintained. After extensive and unsuccessful efferts by QA personnel, construction personnel were requested to identify any document th&;
would control the unspecified beam. Construction personnel previoed Design Document Change (DDC) No. S-2050, dated May 29, 1980, containing only the signatures of two site construction engineers, who were identifying some of the additional W8 x 17 beams in the area covered by S&L drawing No. S-546. The DDC had no S&L architectural engineering signatures of approval as of March 27, 1981. The DDC did not identify any specific beams. The licensee identified S&L drawing E-189, Sheet 3, Revision H, Note No. 17, which allows W8 x 17 beams to be installed and then be submitted
.on a DDC for S&L approval.
- 2. A V8 x 17 beam (6f .t 3 in. long), positioned north to south and located 13 ft 8 in west of workline G and 1 in. below elevation 546 ft, was not specified on any pertinent design drawing, was not documented on any QC record, and had unacceptable welds.
- 159-
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- 3. A WS x 17 beam (5 ft 5 in. long), positioned east to west and located 8 ft 10 in. south of column 24 and 1 in, below elevation 546 ft, was not specified on any pertinent design. drawing, was not documented on any QC record, and had unacceptable welds.
4 A W8 x 17 beam (2 ft 8 in. long), positioned north to south and located 9 ft 6 in, west of workline G and attached to the beam addressed in paragraph 7.1.1.3 and extending north, was not specified on any perti-nent design drawing and was not documented on any QC record.
- 5. Two W8 x 17 beams (8 ft 3 in. long), positioned east to west, with one
, located 5 ft 3 3/8 in. and the other located 9 ft 7 7/8 in. south of column 24, were only tack welded in place. They displayed no identi-fication or heat numbers and were not documented on any QC record which indicated in-process weld inspections were not performed. The beams were identified on DDC-2087, which was incorporated into S&L drawing No. S-546, Revision AB. DDCs and S&L drawings by themselves do not assure QC verification.
- 6. Re-entrant corners on several W8 x 17 beams had notches instead of the .
1/2 in, minimum radius required by the American Institute of Steel Con-struction (AlSC), seventh edition (1969), page 4.113. The locations of these unacceptable beam corners are shown in Figure 7.1 of this section and are noted by (7) in Figure 7.1. i ' The location-of the above discrepancies, additional unacceptable welds, unacceptable re-entrant corners,.and nontraceable beams are shown in Figure 7.1' of this section. The welds identified in the preceding paragraphs as unacceptable do not comply with the requirements of the AWS D1.1-1972 Code for one or more of the following. reasons: slag was not removed; weld profiles had excessive , 2 convexity-or concavity, blowholes, porosity and/or undercut. t i 7.1.2 Beams Observed in Cable Spreading Rooms i The inspectors identified the following discrepancies in the cable spreading
- rooms:
1
- 1. A W12 X14 beam No. F2500/8-66B4 had a weld.that was incomplete. 'This beam was directly above cable tray hanger No. 4HV8FEC231, which was attached. The beam was located approximately~11 ft south of the north wall at the stairwell.
- 2. The traceability of the heat numbers was not maintained for two'.W8 x 17 beams, located south of and parallel to beam No. F2500/8-66B4 (above).
The first beam was located immediately adjacent to beam F2500/8-66B4..
'The second beam was the fourth beam south of beam F2500/8-66B4. The first beam was installed flush to the ceiling of the cable spreading
' room. .S&L drawing No. S-546, Revision AB, specifies the first beam i
to be' installed 1 in. below the ceiling. i-
- 160-t
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- 3. A weld on the 5 in. channel beam that was supporting HVAC hanger No. 2071 had irregular weld profile, excessive undercut, porosity. and l craters that were not filled. The channel beam was located 2 ft north and.1 ft west of the cable tray hanger No. 13H2FEC008. The Waldinger, Young and Bertke (W-Y and B) Inspection Report, dated February 19, 1980. i indicated that the weld was acceptable. i 1
- 4. Two W8 x 17 beams, located in the northeast corner (north of WL-16 ;
and east of WL-X), were only tack-welded into place. The beams were ,
-specified on DDC No. E-3834 dated October 20, 1978. DDC E-3834, which affected eight drawings, was posted-on, but had not been incorporated ,
into, S&L drawing No. S-546, Revision AB, dated October 22, 1980.
- Heat No. 72161 (purchase order No. 31134) was marked on the southern beam. The traceability of the heat number of the northern beam was not maintained.
The beams were not identified on any QA inspection record, which would have indicated their status. In-process inspections were not performed on the tack welds. i [ INSPECTOR NOTE: Some of the welds inspected by the RIII inspectors were painted. Therefore, the inspections were for relatively large deficiencies.] 7.1.3 ~ Installation Deficiencies
- 1. For the beams identified on DDCs and addressed in paragraphs 7.1.1, items 1 and 5, and 7.1.2, item 4 above, no measures existed that would identify to QA the installations and work that was done by construction L. before the DDC was incorporated into the drawings. Thus, no measures existed to assure that all of_the required QA inspections related te DDCs (e.g., welder qualification, proper filler metal, traceability of materials, etc.) would be performed. This condition was previously identified in-IE Report Item No. 358/80-15-04. ' The corrective actions taken, which had not yet been reviewed by the NRC, with regard to -
Item No. 358/80-15-04 did not include the DDCs written prior to the . implementation of those corrective actions and did not include the DDCs that are and have been implemented prior to receiving the S&L approvals. - This. item is unresolved pending the complete resolution of IE Item No. 358/80-15-04 (358/81-13-63). - 2. Failure to control unacceptable welds (addressed in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2), the five beams with unacceptable re-entrant corners, and the four. beams that were installed and not identified as a requirement on any design document is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion-XV, and'the Wm. H. Zimoer QA Manual, Section 15.2.2-(50-358/81-13-03).
- 3. Failure to maintain the traceability of the nine structural beams,
- addressed .in Section 7.1.1 and 7.1.2, is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appen-dix B, Criterion VIII, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual,-Section 8.2, (50-358/81-13-04). ;
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1,r.Afi E.15 fi These problems and the adequacy of the structural steel are addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 7.1.4 Unapproved Structural Beam Vendors Several thousand feet of W8 x 17 beam were purchased on the following order numbers from vendors not on the approved vendor list, which means the respective vendor QA programs had not been evaluated for compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. P.O. No. 10275, PBI Steel Exchange, 2400 ft P.O. No. 12868, U.S. Steel Supply, 1500 ft P.O. No. 16321, Frank Adams Co., 1012 ft P.O. No. 10009, Frank Adams Co., 1024 ft P.O. No. 9761, Frank Adams Co.. 1472 ft P.O.-No. 9628, Frank Adams Co., 450 ft P.O. No. 9872, U.S. Steel Supply, 300 ft These beams were not controlled to prevent their use in safety-related systems. The licensee stated that these beams had been made available for installation in safety-related systems based on the mill certifications and without regard to the vendors not being approved. Mill certifications were available for these beams. The licensee stated that the credibility of the mill certifica-tions-would be established. Failure to assess the effectiveness of the controls to assure the quality of the mill certifications and structural beams, supplied by the above vendors, is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 7.3.1 (50-358/81-13-06). This concern is addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 7.1.5 Bristol Steel Erection Inspections The RIII inspector reviewed the Bristol Quality Control Steel Erection Report Inspection Report Q-7, dated July 14, 1975, for.the inspection of the beams installed on elevation 546 ft between column rows 15-22 and F-L. The RIII inspector determined that the Bristol Steel and Iron Works, Inc. QC inspector failed to document details of his inspections, such as the welding materials (rod type) used, the welder, the -specific weld activities inspected, and/or bolting or welding procedure number when applicable. This is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 17.1.1 (358/81-13-52). This concern is addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 7.1.6 Findings and Conclusions-In their examination of approximately 25 structural steel beams, the NRC inspectors identified significant problems. Welds on nine structural beams were unacceptable. Five beams had unacceptable (notched) re-entrant corners. Four beams were installed which were not specified on any design document.
.The traceability of nine structural beams was not maintained. In addition, measures had not been established Jto assure that required QA in-procress
- 162-so,
- _ _ _ _ . _ - . . ___ s. _ - . _ _ __. _: _ ___..__ _
Ti.M : t /15 4 : inspections related to Design Document Changes would be performed; the 12-censee did not assess the effectiveness of the controls to assure the quality of mill certifications and structural steel beams supplied by three vendors; and details of steel erection inspections were not documented. These concerns are addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 7.1.7 Items of Noncompliance Four' items of noncompliance were identified (failure to control unacceptable we,1ds, unacceptable re-entrant corners on beams, and unspecified beams; failure,to maintain traceability of beams; failure to assess the effectiveness of vendor quality assurance; and failure to maintain sufficient documentation of steel erection inspections). 7.2 Cable Separation During the investigation of the allegation addressed in Section 5.20, the RIII inspectors identified two cable installations that did not comply with the cable separation criteria defined in the Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR. During checks for caUle separation on routine plant tours, the inspectors identified additional cable separation violations. 7.2.1 Cable Separation Requirements The applicable cable separation requirements for the Zimmer facility are as follows:
- 1. IEEE Std. 383-1974 defines Class IE as: "The safety classification of the electric equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling and containment, and reactor heat removal or otherwise are essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environ-ment."
l
- 2. The Zimmer FSAR, Section 8.3.1.12.2, states, " class.IE cable is assigned to a division according to Table 8.3-19."
- The divisions are comprised of the systems addressed in the Class 1E definitions.
"A Class IE cable is routed only in its division tray conduit, etc."
"Each non-Class IE cable which has any part of its length in a division tray, conduit, etc., or which connects to a Class 1E power system is a division-associated cable and is not routed in tray, conduit, etc. of another division."
The terms " division-associated," " associated," "non-Class 1E," " balance-of-plant," " nonessential," and "non-ESF (non-engineered safety features)" are all used interchangeably. 163-
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- 3. FSAR Section 8.3.1.13 states:
.2"... Balance-of plant cables not associated with reactor protection or engineered safety features systems, when assigned to a tray section ,
with a Class 1E segregation code, are routed only in trays with that i segregation code." i
.3"... Cables will have either green, yellow, or blue identification '
for ESF cable; orange for reactor protection system cable; white for balance-of-plant cables; and white with another color for associated cables."
- 4. FSAR Table 8.3-16 states, "A nonessential cable may be run in nonessential or ESF tray, but shall not occupy more than one tray system."
- 5. FSAR Section 8.3.1.11.2.1.d. states, "In the cable spreading room, cable tray risers (chutes) are used to route the cables into the bottom of control panels located in the control room above. Here a 1-foot horizontal, 3 foot vertical-sepa'ation r is maintained."
- 6. FSAR Section 8.3.1.12.1.3,- which addresses instrument cables states,
" Low-level signal cables are run in trays and/or conduits separate from all power and control cables."
7.2.2 Observed Cable Separation Violations During a brief tour of the cable spreading room while inspecting others matters, the RIII inspectors observed four violations of cable separation criteria as follows:
- 1. On the east side of the cable spreading room, at approximately WL 26, yellow / white (associated) cable No. RE053 extends from a 2-in. conduit (which also contains blue / white cable No. RE058), passes approximately 4 in. vertically above the blue Class 1E cables contained in tray No.
2072C, and enters blue / white sleeve No. 79. Contrary to the above FSAR criteria, cables No. RE053 and RE058 were routed in the same raceway and cable.No. RE053 was not installed a minimum of 3 ft above tray 2072C.
- 2. On the south side of the cable spreading room,. green instrument tray No. 3029K, which was 6 in, wide and approximately 50 f t long, was installed inside white control tray No. 4638B. The installation was in accordance with S&L drawings E-223, Revision G, and E-224, Revision F.
Green cable No. WS714, green / white cable No. TI725, and other cables were installed in the green tray. Blue / white and yellow / white cables were installed in the remaining white tray. Contrary to the FSAR criteria, the green and green / white cables were essentially installed in the white tray; the green, green / white, blue / white and yellow / white cables were not separated by a minimum of I ft horizontally; and the green tray containing instrument cables was not separate from the white. tray containing control cables.
- 164- . }
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- 3. Near the stairwell at the center of the cable spreading room, two blue cables, No. R1103 and CM111, were routed from blue tray No. 2077A into j green tray riser (chute) No. 3025A, which extended up to the control room. Green cables No. HP073 and HP096 were among the cables installed in riser 3025A.
Contrary to the TSAR criteria, the blue cables were routed in the green division riser and were not horizontally separated from the green cables by at least I ft. The licensee documented blue cables No. RI1O3 and CM111 on Nonconformance Report No. 7549, dated March 18, 1981, as a result of the NRC finding. No QC inspection requirements existed to verify separation criteria for cables extending up and out of raceway located in the cable spreading room to the control rcom.
- 4. In other areas of the cable spreading room:
- a. White tray No. 4080K contained many different division-associated cables including blue / white cable No. TI192, yellow / white cable No. RR781, and green / white cable No. TI816.
- b. White tray riser No. RK4627 contained yellow / white cables No. TI942 and No. TI943, and blue / white cables No. TI808 and TI760.
- c. White tray riser No. 4139 contained many blue / white and yellow / white cables.
The routing of blue / white, yellow / white, and/or green / white cables together in white trays appeared to be a widespread design practice. This design is contrary to the FSAR Section 8.3.1.13.2 as previously stated above. The installed conditions identified in paragraphs I, 2, and 4 of 7.2.2 apparently resulted from designs that deviate from the FSAR. These devi-ations are contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 3.1 and 3.6 (358/81-13-21). The installed condition identified in paragraph 3 of 7.3.2 apparently resulted from construction activities for which required QC inspection veri-fications had not been translated into an inspection procedure. The lack of QC inspection for the installed condition in paragraph 3 is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 10.1.2 (358/81-13-22). The adequacy of cable separation is addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 7.1 3 Misrouted Nonsafety Kelated Cable In the instrument-relay room, yellow / white conduit No. RR199 extended from white tray No. 4157A to yellow tray No. 1040B. The conduit and trays
- 165-
_ _ = . . . ._ ._ ._ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . lirJi G 15/E1 contained yellow / white cable No. RR199 and white cable No. DC258 (also mislabelled DC257). Following the cable installation (pull) card, cable No. DC258 was designed to be routed through tray No. 4157A, but not tray 1040B. Since cable No. DC258 was a nonsafety-related cable there were no QC inspection requirements to verify the routing. The misrouted cable identified in paragraph 7.3.2.5 of the installed conditions apparently resulted from contruction activities for which the FSAR does not require QC inspection verification. The misrouted cable does influence cable separation and tray loading and, therefore, will have to be appropriately dispositioned. This item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection . (358/81-13-23). 7.1.4 Cable Tray Riser Chutes With the exception of the green tray riser, identified in paragraph 3 of 7.2.2, the RIII inspector did not observe any other risers (chutes) installed in the cable spreading room. The licensee stated that only eight chutes had been designed and installed in the spreading room and that alternate methods for achieving cable separation were being considered. S&L drawing No. E-98-FE, Revision D, Note 4, required that the portions of cables in the cable spreading room not enclosed or protected by sheel chutes be coated with a 1/8 in. (af ter dry) application of fireproofing material. During a telephone conversation on May 7, 1981, the licensee stated that the design identified on drawing No. E-98-FB was being reconsidered for alterations. This item is unresolved pending implementation of the final separation design requirements for cable risers in the cable spreading room (358/81-13-49). With re' gard to the installed conditions identified in paragraph 7.3.2, items I, 2, and 4, and 7.3.3 the licensee stated that either the field installations would be changed to comply with the FSAR or appropriate changes to the FSAR with engineering justifications would be submitted to NRR. 7.2 5 Findings and Conclusions Four locations were identified in which the cable separation requirements had not been maintained as specified in the FSAR. The adequacy of cable separation is addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 7.2.6 Items of Noncompliance Twc items of noncompliance were identified (failure to establish measures to assure that the design basis for cable separation as set forth in the FSAR was translated into drawings, and failure to establish a program to require verification of cable separation in the cable spreading room). 7.3 CG&E Audits of Sargent & Lundy During the investigation of allegation 5.10, the RIII inspector identified that Sargent & Lundy did not have a program to control design deviations (nonconforming designs) when identified by the S&L engineers. Therefore, the RIII inspector requested for review all of the CG&E audits of S&L to determine if CG&E had assessed the effectiveness of the S&L nonconformance program.
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Phall bi!5 : 7.3.1 CGAI Audits of S&L The Region III inspector reviewed the following CG&E audits of S&L. Audit Dates Audit Number When Noted 2/15-16/72 8/8-9/74 8/7-8/75 7/28-19/76 11/14-15/77 77/24 9/6-7/78 78/07 10/16-17/78 78/09 11/27-30/78 78/10 1/30-31/79 79/01 12/18-19/79 79/07 3/5-6/80 80/01 10/21-22/80 80/04 The audits did not address in depth the effectiveness of the nonconformance program. The RIII inspector observed caly two items in all of the audits, covering a 9-year period, that concerned the S&L nonconformance program. These two items, identified in one audit, were designated as deficiencies, which concerned distribution and logging of nonconformance reports. The deficiencies appeared to have been identified during audit activities which were not directed at the nonconformance program. (The deficiencies were apparently resolved in. Audit 77/24 which indicated that S&L Project Procedure
#PIZI-8.1, Revision 0, had been prepared to describe responsibilities and instructions, and t'o require a log and a file of nonconformance reports).
The audits of the nonconformance program should have addressed such things as implementation, design reviews, identification of acceptance or rejection, disposition control, and notification of affected organizations. - Failure by CG&E to perform an audit to determine the effectiveness of the S&L nonconformance program during the past 9 years is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII, and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 18.1 (358/81-13-23). . This concern is addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 7.3.2 General Audit Context The audits generally appeared to be reactive in nature in that specific problems, which had been previously identified, were audited. The audits did not appear to be directed toward identification of new and generic problems. The audits appeared to identify adverse findings for which there were no corrective action taken or followup audits. This matter is unresolved pending a re-review by CG&E of their past audits of Sargent & Lundy, General Electric, H. J. Kaiser and four CG&E internal departments (358/81-13-80).
- 167-
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~ . . ~ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _. _._ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ . _ . . LhM i L,1* ill 7.3.3 Recurrences of Problems with Design Calculations, Reviews, and Verifications The CG&E audits of S&L were identifying a recurring problem concerning the performance of design calculation, reviews, and verifications by S&L. The specific problems identified in each audit are described in Table 7.3-1. Table 7.3-1 CG&E Audit Findings Audit Date or No. Problems 8/8-9/74 (a) ITE Imperial drawings of essential equipment had not been signed and bore no evidence of a design review. (b) There were inadequacies in documenting design reviews. (c) Structural design calculation were not in accordance with new procedures. (d) No direct evidence was available of the S&L review of vendor design calculations. 78/07 (a) S&L had not maintained a' record of support design calculations. (b) DDC #2973 was approved without review by EMD even though a major support location change was clearly identified on the DDC. (This item was identified in the details of the audit report, but was not cited and had no apparent followup on subsecuent
-audits.)
78/09 (a) Very little data was available to justify the embedment criteria of 4.5 times the normal diameter of concrete expansion anchors. (b) Calculations could not be located which would verify that a structured review was performed to show that no reinforcement was needed for a 24 x 68 radial beam which was cut at both flanges. 78/10 (a) Calculations were not available for all valls to substantiate the statement that block walls were." judged to be OK."
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DRAT 1 8/15/E1 Table 7.3-1 (continued) Audit Date or No. Problems (b) Calculations were not available to back up design signatures which indicated design verification for five design changes approving core bores. (c) No approval signatures were found on any calculations for structural steel modifi-cations (including Beam #86) due to pool hydrodynamic loads. The modification had been released for construction. (d) Audit finding was closed based on calcula-tions which were in progress but not yet complete. The calculations were for beams (embedded plates) in the primary contain-ment to verify that the plates can support additional loads. 80/04 (a)' (1) The calculation required to evaluate the clamp deflection on a pipe support was not performed. (2) Also, the weld calculation was not . performed on the most critical weld. (b) Calculations performed by NPS were incomplete in that'the deflection due to torsional rotation of the beam was not included. (c) Calculations performed by NPS were not in reasonable order, which made them difficult to follow. None .of the audits which identified the above problems, or corrective actions instituted addressed the generic and programmatic cause of design calculations, ' reviews, and verifications not -being performed to preclude repetition. Failure
'to determine the cause and to take corrective action to preclude repetition is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IVI and the Wm. H. Zimmer QA Manual, Section 16.5 (358/81-13-24).
This concern is addressed in the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program. 7.3.4 Findinas and Conclusions CG&E has not performed a comprehensive audit to determine the effectiveness of the Sargent & Lundy nonconformance progras. Past audits identified a
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EKATT E/15/61 recurring problem involving design calculations, reviews, and verifications for which the cause was not determined and corrective action was not taken to preclude repetition. CGEE will undertake a re-review of all past audits of Sargent & Lundy, General Electric, Kaiser and four internal departments as a part of the Quality Confirmation Program, i~ 7.3.5 Items of Noncompliance 4 Two items of noncompliance were identified (failure to perform a comprehen- [ sive audit of the S&L nonconformance program, and failure to determine the cause and preclude repetition of a recurring problem).
- 8. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, 4 or deviations. Unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 4.1.8.2.1,
-4.2.2.3, 5.2.3.2, 5>.2.3.6, 5.3.4, 5.5.3.4.1, 5.5.10.3.2, 5.10.3.3, 5.10.3.3, 5.10.3.3, 5.11.3, 4.1.8.2.1, 7.1.3, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 7.3.2.
4
- 9. Open Items
- When this investigation was initiated, the NRC interviewed numerous quality t control inspectors, construction craftsmen, and management personnel who i provided information that deserved review by the NRC. The information pro-i vided was prioritized with the highest priority giv'en to the initial four allegations received from a former Zimmer contractor QC Inspector (Section 4),
the 19 allegations received from gap /Applegate (Section 5), and the most 3 significant statements and allegations received from contractor employees and ex-employees (Section 6). Other allegations and statements were given lower i priority. These concerns will be investigated and/or inspected and the
- findings and conclusions will be documented in future reports until the in-vestigation is complete.
As noted in Section 3, GAP provided a number of affidavits from various
- individuals. In those cases where an individual's concerns or allegations
- have previously been reviewed by NRC, those. individuals will be contacted i to determine
q 1. If they have information not previously provided. ! 2. If they have significant details to add to information previously provided.
- 3. If they believe their concerns / allegations have been inadequately - '
. addressed. If future inspection findings (either by the licensee or the NRC) reveal i significant construction deficiencies, these will be addressed in revisions to the' quality conformation program and the NRC independent measurement program as appropriate. i , l- 170
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- 10. Exit Interview In addition to the management meetings and enforcement conferences held as described in Section 11, the inspectors and investigators met with licensee representatives periodically during the investigation and on March 26, 1981. Attendees at the March 26 meeting are designated in i ~ Section 1, Personnel Contacted. NRC attendees at the meeting are designated at the end of this section. At that meeting the NRC investi-gation team described the reasons for the investigation; the findings regarding each completed allegation; and safety concerns identified during the investigation, which are described below. The team leader indicated that the investigation was not yet complete, that the findings would be ,
. reviewed with NRC Regional and Headquarters Management, and that enforce-ment action would be discussed in subsequent enforcement meetings. At the NRC's request, the licensee agreed to meet with Region III representa-tives on April 10, 1981, in the Regional Office to discuss identified concerns and proposed corrective actions.
- The inspectors identified the following concerns:
)
- a. Structural beams with unacceptable welds and re-entrant corners with notches.
- b. Inadequacies in the QA program of the structural steel erector (Bristol).
~
- c. Lack of traceability of material in structural beams, small bore piping, and weld rod.
- d. Surveillance reports not being converted to nonconformance
- reports in 30 days. ,
- e. Structural welds inspected after painting.
- f. Radiograph technique inadequate on 25* of the prefabricated welds reviewed by NRC. (Penetraneters were not adequately l
shimmed.) 3 Nonconformance reports being improperly voided.
- h. A green cable tray was designed and installed inside a white tray.
- i. Lack of inspection control to verify cable separation. (Three examples of failure to maintain cable separation were identified.)
- j. Lack of design controls by Sargent and Lundy to require verifica-tion calculations for thermal loading of power sleeves and dead weight loading of all trays, to document design deviations ident-ified by engineers, and to document deviations from the FSAR.
- k. Inadequate action taken by CG&E to obtain correction of repeti-tive problems identified by CG&E in audits of Sargent & Lundy.
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- 1. Lack of audits of the Sargent & Lundy nonconformance program.
- m. Weld inspection criteria was deleted from the weld data sheet (KEI-1 form) from approximately July 1980 to February 1981.
- n. Lack of socket weld fitup verification on numerous small bore pipes.
- o. Installation of structural beams which were not required on any design documents,
- p. Doubts about the accuracy of weld records. Information from the weld rod issue slips was being transferred to the seld data sheets.
- q. Lack of control of design document changes.
-r. Site procedures allowed more weld undercut than AWS DI.1-1972.
. RC Personnel Attending Exit Interview March 26, 1981 P. A. Barrett, Reactor Inspector R. M. Burton, Investigator F. T. Daniels,-Senior Resident Inspector E. C. Gilbert, Investigator, IE:HQ T. P. Gwyn, Resident Inspector F. A. Maura, Reactor Inspector J. B. McCarten,. Investigator ,
J. F. Schapker, Reactor Inspector K. D. Ward, Reactor Inspector R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B
- 11. Management Meetings In addition to the exit meeting held at the site on March 26, 1981, meetings involving licensee and RIII senior and/or middle management were held on March 31, April 10, April 30, June 2, June 3, and August 5; 1981. These meetings are summarized below.
Following the exit meeting held at the Zimmer site on March 26, 1981, Mr. E. A. Borgaann met with J. G. Keppler and R. F. Warnick on the af ternoon of March 31, 1981, in the Region III office to discuss the significance of the NRC investigation findings and required corrective actions. As a result of this meeting, on April 8,1981, Region III sent an Immediate Action Letter (IAL) to the licensee documenting ten corrective measures that CG&E had initiated or were planning to take concerning the problems identified by the NRC investigation team. The ten measures were established to provide assurance that similar problems do not recur during ongoing and future construction activities. The IAL and the required corrective measures are described in Section 11,-NRC Actions and Licensee Commitments. An' enforcement conference was held in the Region III office on April 10,' 1981, between E. A. Borgmann and others of his staff and J. G. Keppler and other NRC personnel to discuss CG&E's proposed corrective Action program
.for deficiencies identified in the NRC investigation and the measures to be
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_. .2 ._ . a DrATl EtiS/El taken to assure acceptable quality of future activities. This enforcement l conference is documented in IE Inspection Report No. 50-358/81-14 ; A followup meeting was held in the RIII office on April 30, 1981, between W. - D. Waymire and others representing CG&E and R. F. Warnick and others of the NRC staff, to discuss the status of measures being taken to assure l acceptable quality of ongoing activities at the Zimmer project and to dis-cuss the latest draft of the licensee's proposed corrective action program for deficiencies identified. Details of this meeting are documented in IE Meeting Report Fo. 50-358/81-16. ,
-A working level meeting was held on June 2, 1981, between W. D. Waymire and others representing CG&E and R. T. Warnick and others from the NRC at the Zimmer site to discuss the licensee's proposed quality confirmation program and the additional measures required to identify and correct construction deficiencies, to establish confidence in quality records, and to verify the quality of existing construction. This meeting is documented in IE Meeting Report No. 50-358/81-20.
The. Region III Director, Deputy Director, and the Section Chief met with CG&E's President, Senior Vice President of Engineerint Services and Electrical Production, and the Manager of the General Engineering Department (Acting Manager of Quality Assurance) on June 3, 1981, to discuss matters relating to NRC's Zimmer investigation. Topics discussed included the originating allegations; NRC findings relative to the allegations; problems identified during the investigation; the NRC's Immediate Action Letter of April 8, 1981, establishing controls to assure the quality.of ongoing and future work; the program to confirm the quality of completed work; the. licensee's internal problem identification and resolution system; status of the NRC's investigation; the role of NRC's Office of Inspector and Auditor in the investigation; and public and congressional interest in the Zimmer project. This meeting is documented in IE Meeting Report No. 50-358/81-20. An enforcement conference was held on August 5, 1981, in the Regional Office between J. G. Keppler, RIII Regional Director, and others of his staff and W. H. Dickboner, CG&E President, and others of his staff. Topics discussed included the NRC investigation, the findings of the investigation, items of noncompliance resulting from the investigation, escalated enforcement action
.being considered, the status of the investigation, the release of the report
! and a possible public meeting in Cincinnati, the status of the licensees quality confirmation program, CG&E organization changes, and other corrective
. actions being taken by the licensee. This meeting is documented in IE Meeting
. Report No. 50-358/81-11.
,12 . NRC Actions and Licensee Co amitments 12.1 Concernina Ontoint and Future Work Based on the investigation findings, consideration was given to the need to suspend construction activities. However, in recognition of the nature of the problems (largely programmatic), the status of the project (95%
complete), and the fact that ongoing work would not compromise the ability t .. 173 1
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DRATT 6/15/81 to accurately determine the quality of completed work, it was decided that stopping construction work was not required at that time. Rather, attention was placed on establishing controls to assure the quality of ongoing and future work. Following a meeting with NRC on March 31, 1981, the utility committed to implement ten specific actions to correct identified quality assurance weak-nesses and to preclude their recurrence. These action were confirmed in an Immediate Action Letter (IAL) dated April 8, 1981. These actions were:
- 1. Concerning QA Staffing CG&E will increase the size and technical expertise of the CG&E QA organization by adding individuals qualified in the areas of radio-graphy and nondestructive testing, piping supports and hangers, welding, structural design and fabrication, electrical design and construction, and metallurgy. (CG&E will utilize temporary personnel qualified in these area until premanent staff members have been. hired.)
- 2. Concerning Independence and Separation Between Kaiser Construction and Kaiser QA/QC CG&E will take action by April 15, 1981, to assure independence and separation of the QA/QC function performed by Kaiser from the con-struction function.
- 3. Concerning QC Inspections Using the personnel described in item 1 above, CG&E will conduct 100%
reinspections of QC inspections conducted by Kaiser and other contractors after the date of the IAL. This will continue until the revised CG&E audit program as described in item 10, below, is implemented by these qualified individuals and RIII releases this requirement.
- 4. Concerning QC Inspection Procedures All QC inspection procedures will be reviewed and revised (where appropriate) by qualified design engineers and QA personnel. These reviews will be conducted by personnel independent of the construction organization to confirm that the procedures include appropriate inspection requirements and applicable hold points. The construction activities controlled by these QC inspection procedures will not be performed after the date of the IAL until the applicable procedure has been reviewed and approved.
- 5. Concerning Training QA/QC personnel at the Zimmer site will receive training on any new procedures and practices resulting from actions taken to fulfill provi-sions of the IAL prior to implementation of the procedures. In addition, refresher training will be given prior to June 1,1981, on (1) the iden-tification and documentation of nonconformances, deficiencies, and
- 174-4
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problems, (b) the procedure for resolving nonconformances, deficiencies, N and problems, (c) the feedback mechanism for informing the identifying 2 individual of the resolution of the nonconformance, deficiency, or problem, - (d) the avenue of appeal should the identifying individual disagree with = the adequacy of the resolution. g
- 6. Concerning Deviations from Codes and FSAR Statements a
Prior to May 1, 1981, the procedures governing the identification, reporting, and resolution of deviations from Codes and FSAR statements g\ E will be reviewed for adequacy and revised as appropriate. The proce-dures will require CGE to review and approve the resolution of any suck deviations.
- 7. Concerning the Voiding of Nonconformance Reports E The procedures governing nonconformance reporting will be reviewed for i adequacy. The review will be accomplished not later than April 10, 4 1981. The disposition of each nonconformance report together with appropriate justification will be documented. =
- 8. Concerning QA/QC Records The review and alteration of existing QA and QC records has been stopped.
a F These records will be controlled by CGE until a program defining records A control, usage, and adequacy has been prepared by CGE and agreed to by 3 RIII. -.
- 9. Concerning Conditions Adverse to Quality ?=
+
CGE will perform a 100*/, review of all surveillance and nonconformance 4 reports written by contractor personnel after the date of this letter. $ This program will continue until RIII releases this requirement. ig
- 10. Concerning the Audit Program ?
The exisiting CGE audit program will be reviewed and revised by June 1, 1981, to include technical audits of construction work and f more comprehensive and effective programmatic audits. ( M Follow up inspections by the Senior Resident Inspector and specialist 4 inspectors from the Region III office have confirmed implementation of i the re3uirements of the letter. Details of these follow up inspections 4 are documented in IE Inspection Reports No. 50-358/81-15, 50-358/81-18, E and 50-358/81-19. . 12.2 Concerning Existing Construction Work $
'8 l Because of the problems identified during the NRC investigation, Region III i had .taken the position that a comprehensive review and reinspection effort 3 by'the licensee must be accomplished to confirm the quality of the exigt_ing ]
construction work. This quality confirmation program addresses the problems 5 identified in the investigation and includes the following: n 3
. as
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. 1. Conerrning Structural Steel Problem: . Some unacceptable welds have been identified.
. Some beams have unacceptable re-entrant corners.
. Some beams have been installed but did not show on design drawings.
. Several hundred feet of beams were received from an unapproved vendor and can not be accounted for as to where installed or other disposition. (However, mill certs are available).
. Heat number traceability has not been maintained for some beams and steel plate.
. Some structural welds were painted before they were
, inspected.
. Cable tray foot connections have not been inspected and they are covered with fire-proofing.
Action: 1. Compare structural steel drawings against plant as-built conditions. 2 .' Determine which welds were not inspected or were inspected after the weld was painted or coated.
- 3. For embedments, uncover one end of ' bean. If bolted, and drawing shows welded, do not assume other end is bolted. Uncover other end also. If welded and drawings shows bolted, uncover the other end also.
- 4. '
Remove paint and other material from the welds that may preclude proper weld inspection. If weld coating can not be removed without affecting the surface of the weld, quantify the number of such welds and propose an alterna-tive program for confirming the quality of these welds. The NRC/ Region III must approve the alternate program.
- 5. . Conduct a 100% visual inspection of accessible struc-f tural steel field welds or justify less.
}
- 6. Conduct 100% visual inspection of accessible Bristol shop welds or. justify less.
- 7. Perform 100% inspection of field cut re-entrant corners on beams which could affect safety related systems or equipment' or justify less.
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- 8. Determine the acceptability of welding procedures and welder qualification used on the job, special require-ments called out in these procedures, and types of weld rod specified for field welding.
- 9. Determine the acceptability of all field procured steel plate and structural shapes received onsite.
- 10. To ensure that the structural steel problems are not generic within Zimmer, determine the acceptability of other field procured essential material, i.e.: piping, weld rod, fittings, cable, etc.
- 11. Write nonconformance reports on all unacceptable welds, unacceptable re-entrant corners, unacceptable materials, drawings errors or omissions, etc. Propose disposition to NRC/ Region III for approval before starting corrective action.
- 2. Concerning Weld Quality Problem: . In process inspections were not performed for some welds (cable tray hangers and beam welds).
. Because of previous inspection findings indicating continuing problems with weld rod control (storage, temperature, issuance, documentation), there are questions as to whether or net field welds have been made using improper or unacceptable weld rod.
. ' Weld rod heat numbers have been transferred to the Weld Data Sheet from the Weld 2 Form by individuals other than the QC inspector who inspected the weld.
. Weld inspection criteria deleted from the Weld Data Sheets from approximately July 1980 - February 1981. I Action: 1. Identify code welds for which traceability of a credible weld rod heat number was required but not maintained (failure to perform required inspection or failure to maintain required documentation) or for which there is questionable traceability. Justify less than 100%
determination.
- 2. Identify all Weld' Data Sheets that were altered by transcribing information from Weld 2 Forms. If the original entry on the Weld Data Sheet indicates an adequate weld, the NRC will accept that veld provided the welder's stamp on the material corresponds to the
~ Weld Data Sheet entry.
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- 3. For all AWS structural steel Weld Data Sheets from 7/80-2/81 for which criteria were deleted on Weld Data Sheets for code welds made in the field, check to ensure that no hold points were violated. Review
- all Weld Data Sheets for the time frame established (7/80-2/81) and identify those with deletions, omissions, obvious errors, and applicable items marked "Not Applicable." 4 Verify proper. weld procedure, welder's qualification, fitup, and proper filler metal verification / control. Determine if any hold points were violated. For those code welds -for which this information has not been adequately maintained, demonstrate that those welds are acceptable or provide justification for accepting the welds. $uch demonstration or justification must be approved by RIII.
- 5. For all code welds which lack traceability and quality documentation and-for all code welds with questionable i
traceability and quality documentation, identify on a a nonconformance report. Quantify the number of such ^ welds and propose a program to determine the accept-ability of the welds and the acceptability of the . material in the welds. The NRC/ Region must approve the program. i
- 6. Review other in process inspection records for possible alteration.
- 3. Concerning Traceability of Heat Numbers on Piping r
Problem: . Some heat numbers found on installed small bore piping do not appear on the records of accepted heat numbers. Some heat numbers recorded on isometric drawings do not match the heat numbers on installed piping.
. Heat numbers could not be found on some installed small bore piping.
Some heat numbers recorded on the isometric drawings had been marked out and incorrect numbers recorded. (Heat number for a different size pipe). Action: 1. Conduct an inspection of 100% of the accessible field installed small bore piping identified on attached i' Enclosure 1 for traceability in accordance with ASME Code requirements. ,
- 2. For systems on Enclosure 2, attached, compare existing documentation against accessible field installed small bore piping for traceability in accordance with'applic- l able code requirements. Conduct a sampling program
- 178--
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l i DhAll b/15/61 l l utilizing lot sizes sufficiently large to statistically demonstrate a 95% confidence factor that 95% of the sample is acceptable. i
-3. Provide justification for acceptability of inaccessible J small bore piping.
- 4. For large bore piping designated on Enclosures 1 and 2:
- a. Identify all field modifications.
2
- b. Walkdown 100% of the large bore piping involved in the field modifications. Compare documenta-tion against the installed large bore piping for traceability in accordance with ASME requirements.
2 c. Justify less-than 100% identification and walkdown of large bore piping involved in field modifications.
- 5. If heat number traceability on ASME work can only be established by the Weld Data Sheet, then it will be necessary to establish the credibility of the heat 4
number on the Weld Data Sheet. ! 6. Write nonconformance reports on all heat number defi-ciencies found, propose disposition to NRC/ Region III for approval, proceed with disposition after NRC con--- currence.
- 4. Concerning Socket Weld Fitups Problem: . Socket weld fitup to assure disengagement was not verified on some small bore piping.
Actions: 1. Identify all small bore piping socket welds for which verification for disengagement does not exist as docu-mented on QC inspection records.
- 2. In all ASME Class I, II, and III systems, radiograph 100% of accessible welds not having verification of disengagement or justify less. Provide justification for radiographing less than 100% of the inaccessible socket welds for which verification of disengagement does not exist -
- 3. Write Nonconformance Reports on all unacceptable socket weld fitups, propose disposition to NRC/ Region III for approval, proceed with disposition af ter NRC concurrence.
i
+
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- 5. Concerning Radiographs Problem: . Radiograph technique did not meet the ASME code in that the penetrameters were'not adequately shimmed in approxi-mately 180 out of 700 radiographs reviewed by the NRC.
Action: 1. Demonstrate that the existing radiographs of large piping supplied by the CG&E piping fabricator are adequate to identify weld deficiencies by: (a) Review the shop radiographs to identify those that are either not chimmed or that are inadequately shimmed to determine, for each pipe size and thick-ness, the films which contain the least sensitive penetrameter image (essential hole or slit) where . the density of.the penetrameter is greater than the density of the area of interest. (b) Retadiograph the welds identifed above, if accessible, using as nearly as possible the original technique plus the penetrameter shimmed to at least the total weld thickness including reinforcement on the same film, all in accordance with the code, (c) If the essential hole or slit in the penetrameter is visible af ter shimming to at least the total thickness of the weld including reinforcement, all radiographs of that pipe size and thickness will be determined to be acceptable.
- 2. This program must be acceptable to the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors and the State of Ohio.
4
- 6. Concerning Cable Separation Problem: . The NRC identified six examples of failure to meet cable separation criteria.
Note: The original FSAR criteria did not stipulate separation requirements from an essential cable tray to a non-essential tray. The FSAR criteria is to be clarified for separation of essential, associated and non-essential cable in both cable trays and' conduits. Action: 1. Conduct a 100% inspection for separation of essential; and associated cable (a) which are installed between the cable spreading room and the control panels in the main control room, and (b) at all penetrations (walls or floor).
- 180-m n -., ~,e -. y_ .w. - - e I T- y. .- -. _ .,yy -.%
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- 2. Perform a 100% computer assisted analysis of asso-ciated cables to provide assurance that separation criteria for Class IE circuits have been met.
- 3. Using the clarified separation criteria, conduct an inspection of associated cables to arrive at a 95%
confidence level that 95% of associated cables are properly separated in trays and conduits.
- 4. The six examples are to corrected.
- 5. Any problems identified in the above inspections and review are to be documented on nonconformance reports.
Proposed disposition to be reviewed and concurred in by NRC/ Region III prior to initiating action to accomplish the disposition. i
- s. Noter If there are conflicts between these commitments and new requirements imposed by NRR, the more conservative requirements will be applicable.
- 7. Concerning Nonconformance Problem: . Nonconformances documented on surveillance reports.
. Nonconformances documented on punchlists.
. Nonconformances documented on exception lists.
. Nonconformances not documented.
. Nonconformances dccumented but not entered into the systen.
. Nonconformances voided rather than being dispositioned.
Action: 1. Review all surveillance reports and identify all that should have been nonconformance reports.
- 2. Review QA pre-op turnover punchlists and exception lists to identify any items that should have been documented on nonconformance reports.
- 3. By letter to each past and present QC inspector, solicit nonconformance reports that were not entered into the cystem.
- 4. Write nonconformance reports for each such nonconform-ance identified.
- 5. Review all previously voided nonconformance reports. .
Proposed disposition to be reviewed and concurred in by NRC/ Region III. Proceed with disposition after NRC concurrence.
- 181-4
- .i _ __ w .s_ __ u a. - _ __ _ , _ _ _
IAM 1 S/15/61
- 6. Review at least 300 previously dispositioned noncon-formance reports to assure proper disposition. If this review discloses any that have been improperly i dispositioned, additional nonconformance reports (the number to be agreed to by the NRC/ Region III) will be reviewed.
t
.8. Concerning Design Control and Verification
-Problem: . S&L had no formal procedure requiring verification of, design calculations for thermal loading of power sleeves and dead weight loading of all trays.
. Three examples were identified in which S&L design
-deviated from the FSAR:
(a) Cable Tray Loading: The actual design basis - differed from that stated in the FSAR. (b) Cable Separation: (See Item 6, "Concerning Cable Separation"). 1 (c) Weld Acceptance Criteria: Site procedures take exception to AWS DI.1-1972 inspection acceptance criteria-for undercut. The FSAR does not stipulate the exception.
. S&L had no formal procedure for documenting design deviations when identified by engineers.
- Action
- 1. Considering all disciplines, determine that procedures i exist requiring design calculations for those items
- - requiring a final verification af ter fabrication and/or installation. Items to include such areas as piping, pipe supports, electrical cable and cable trays, and structures. Define the items that have not been com-pleted~ relative to final design calculations, verifica-tions, and reviews and establish measures to assure
. their completion.
- 2. Review the adequacy of S&L's program for controlling deviations from the FSAR.
- 3. Review the FSAR for correctness and consistency with respect to the design by the' responsible system engineers.
- 4. For item c. above, meet _AWS code or change FSAR com-mitement to reflect the way the plant is built.
15 . Designers shall review their files to identify all
- design deviations. These deviations shall be docu-mented and properly dispositioned.
.182-
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w-a_ _ l LkATT 6/15/S1
- 9. Concerning Design Document Changes Problem: . Some design document changes (DDCs) have not been adequately controlled through distribution and inspection.
Action: 1. Establish an accurate and complete computer listing of DDCs. The list when finalized shall contain the status of every DDC including the status of construc-tion.
- 2. Review each essential DDC and applicable QC records to determine if all in-process and final inspections have been performed. Justify less than 100%.
- -3. Document all deficiencies identified.
- 4. Take appropriate corrective action to resolve all
> deficiencies.
- 10. Concerning Subcontractor QA Programs Problem: . The Bristol Project Superintendent was responsible for both the steel erection and the erection quality control.
. The Bristol field inspection program failed to document specific welds inspected and details of the inspection.
Action: 1. The quality of the Bristol work will be confirmed under Item I, "Concerning Structural Steel."
- 2. For all safety related activities performed by other than Kaiser and GE, provide assurance that QA programs were acciptable or that work is acceptable.
- 11. Concerning Audits Problem: . Past audits by CG&E identified repetitive problems regarding design calculations and verifications not being performed. Corrective action by S&L and followup by CG&E was not adequate.
. CG&E had not audited S&L to verify compliance with and the effectiveness of the S&L nonconformance program.
Action: 1. Past CG&E audits of HJK, S&L, GE, EPD, EODT, GED, and GCD are to be reviewed to determine the depth and adeguacy of these audit,s particularly with respect to the 18 criteria of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. Assure appropriate closeout of audit findings.
- 183-
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DRATT S/15/E1
- 2. Identify deficiencies in the past audit program.
(Applicable Appendix B Criterion not audited.)
- 3. Justify acceptability of areas not audited and provide this justification to RIII.
The licensees quality confirmation program will be revised as necessary in the event additional adverse conditions are found. This program must be completed and identified problem areas resolved before an Operating License will be granted. 12.3 Proposed Independent Measurements by NRC a In addition to witnessing and reviewing portions of the confirmation program
- conducted by the_ licensee and its contractors, the NRC will be conducting a sampling program of independent measurements to provide further confidence as to the adequacy of construction. This program will independently verify on a sampling basis the licensee's Quality Confirmation Program.
ENCLOSURE 1
- 1. CY-01 Cycle Condensate System - Essential Portions
. 2. DG-01 Diesel Generators -
- 3. DO-01 Diesel Fuel Oil Systems
- 4. -RD-02 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System
- 5. RH-01 Residual Heat Removal System - Essential Portions
. 6. RI-01 Reactor. Core Isolation Cooling System
- 7. SC-01 Stand-by Liquid Control System
- 8. Containment Isolation - Valves and Connecting Piping
- 9. HG-01 Primary Containment Combustible Gas Control System
- 10. HP-01 High Pressure Core Spray System
- 11. LP-01 Low Pressure Core Spray System '
- 12. MS-01 Main Steam System to Second Isolation Valve
- 13. NB-02 Nuclear Boiler System - Automatic Depressurization
' 14. NB-04 Nuclear Boiler System - Reactor Pressure Vessel
- 15. VY-02 Core Stand-by Cooling - Equipment Cooling South
- 16. VY-03 Core Stand-by Cooling - Equipm'ent Cooling North
- 17. WR-01 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System
- 18. WR-02 Reactor Water Closed Cooling Water System (Inside Containment)
= 19. WS-01 Service Water System - Essential Portions
- 20. -Stand-by' Gas Treatment
- 21. Feedwater - Essential Portions
- 22. Piping that comes into contact with the primary coolant up to the first containment isolation valve outside containment.
ENCLOSURE 2
- 1. CM-01 Containment Monitoring System (Possible Code Requirements) c 2. FC-01 Fuel Pool cooling and Clean-up System ,
I
- 3. PR-04 Liquid Process Radiation Monitoring System l
- 4. PR-06 Off Gas Post Treatment Radweste Monitoring System RR-03 Reactor Recirculation Pumping System l 5.
184 I
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DRAl l t,15/h1
- 6. RT-01 Reactor Water Clean-up System
- 7. IN-01 Dry Well Pneumatic System
- 8. LC-01 Leakage Control System
- 9. NB-01 Nuclear Boiler System - Jet Pump Instrumentation
- 10. OG-01 Off Gas Processing System
.11. VR-02 Reactor Building Ventilation System
- 12. Reactor Building Equipment Drain
- 13. Dry Well Floor Drain and Equipment Drains
- 14. Reactor Water Sample
- 13. Radwaste Collection
- 16. Recirculation Pump Seals System ,
- 17. Fire Protection-
- 18. VP - Primary Containment Ventilation
- 19. VC - Control Room Ventilation
- 20. VX - Switchgear Rooms Ventilation t
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-MEMCRANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Bradferd Comissioner Ahearne -
Comissioner Roberts
- FROM:
. fu., James J. Cumings, Direct: j W !Y Office of Inspector and Aucit:r SUBJEU: ACEQUACY OF IE INVESTIGATION 50-255/30-09 AT THE WILLIAM H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR PCWER STATICN
[,jg/}.AttachedpleasefindOurre;crtentitled,"AdetuacyofIEInvestiga:icn 50_-353/20-09 at tne William H. Zimmer Nuclear P wer Stati:n" ca:ed w
' OU ' ~f, dQuiv 30, 650 This incuiry was conducted pursuan: : a Cecer:er 15._1:20, fece fome* Clah.an Ahearne_ directing that thRffice of M .f ' ameran umIns;ec:cr anc Auci:cr (OIA) (t3, ermine wne,tbe- t.ieJ e c
_/w? ct tne l gif,k.e Art.c -a'ae tiltgci:".s. mrt.LIIL_had of Mr. Thomas Appiegate c:ncuctec an acecua:e recar:iing activities a: in_ves;l;Oa:icn
- Ee~ITfer g>,,
f[p@:g'.=** Nuclear Pcwer Statien.
- g. OIA's everall finding is that the IE investigati:n Of A;olega t's M.
allegations, IE Re;or 50-358/80-Og, was unsatisfac::ry. Our finding is based en the following:
- f. The investigation failed to prcperly document -he results of investigaticn both as to interviews and ma arial reviewed. .
2 The investigation failed to detemine the c rrect status and history of several welds. 3 The overall investigative effort was neither vigcrous nor sufficiently broad in scope. N. *he finding of "not substantiated" with regard te the allegatien that defective welds in safety-related systems had been accepted is not consistent with the facts. In evaluating the sufficiency of the IE investigation in this instance OIA made a conscious effort to temoer our evaluation process with the ,
/
very obvicus fact that few investigaMbns can successESTthstand the p CAUTICN O'r^ dea /'- g fg g .,,.. The attached document is furnished for cMirial i
'
- IT VT k ,. purpests. Inf:rmation contained hersin should g %. as dis:!: set only t NMC personnelwhose duties requite 3::ess and sh:uld n:t be further Sssernir.:: d unless s:henvist inti:stad. -
~
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Cc=.ission - 2-criticism of a Monday mcrning quarterback; unfortunately, we still
. .' cencluce that the overall investiga-ive effer in this instance was
. unsatisfactory. In our opinien res:ensibility for this situa:1 n mus be shared not only by the 19cividuals who were specifically assigned ::
the case but also by re;ienal officials who failed to properly su ervise . the case. gay y,p,g yy llo scecific corrective rocc.dendatiens'ar'e'b'e4n'emade bv Of A it tus
.t.12e.secause we are nes1 tan: to cenciuce tnat tne,overali IE investiga-ttve program is deficient based en this instance. - A mere ex ens 4va 53 view cf the IE investigative crecram is clanned 4 --= a= - -a.
after w- n we will ce emine t f c: enc- va -a---anda tieas are warnn ad.
Attachment:
As Stated cc: '4. Dircks, w/ attach . V. Stello, w/ attach . J. Ke;pler, w/ attach P
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- 4. F.nal te: Ort 3 Smit *N ':r te,.e.:g; :.e t . ea:=e- i ==.: r , . .. , . c . .
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- .s 10 3' 07 tit: d .C:sts;.3,36r, 26 con or anactes 4 cament sera : .J.
F Q ett: c:.i.m set. asis far eat srsc:sswa el t.*e s..acase cet. ment (si
. . . e. w e ..n . Cf..ca :t inssect:t and Astter. -
I l l l 1 I I OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR I 1 , U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I 1 _ e n-, xo f/o s f - a..y,
/
p ., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION EXEMPTION .(bl(.5.)(7) 0FFICIAL USE ONLY . l .
. - . . . . _ . . = _
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__ _ _ .~ _____ . _ __ SW_m" In Dece:ber 1980, the Cove: =ent Accou=:abili:y P cj ec: (CA?) =ade allega:1ces en behalf of Mr. Ihc=4s Applega:e to the ef f ec: tha: (a) po:eccially faulty"cciscructics existed 4: the Zi=e Nuclear Pcuer Station, Moscow, Chio, and (b) the NRC f ailed to properly investiga:e the f aulty cions::ue:1o= allega:1 ens when they were first brough: to :he NRC's attention in **Wm--r to en- by Mr. - Applegate. - ne Office of Inspec::: and Auditor (OIA) vas di: acted to i=ves:igate GA?'s latter,allega:1cs, i.e., wheths: the Offica'of Inspection and Inf orce=ent (II)itRegi n~ III adequately investigatid Mr.-Applegate's Februs:7 1980 allega:1cns. '"he scope of this :sper: extends nei:he: co :he evalua:1on of. ether Regien III actions relating to Zi==U =oi- t6 i;h's questics of allegedly f aul:y' ' 7" " censt:uction"a Zi==sE
- During the period bece=ber 1980 through Feeruary 19812 partine:: curren:
and for=e Regien III perso:sel were interitaved :o identify shat was d:ne as a resul: Bfiche initial allega:io:s =ada by Applaga:e. C' available doc.:=en tatie- -ni m-'-- to II retiena.1 1-ves:ita:1ve ereced :res _ A*pt'!- /~9 and ccpies of i=spection and i=ves: iga:1on : sports pertaining :: :n e -
~
- T 2 J- * -
Ii=e site var..i'revi~ewsf. Review of the caterial fu =ished by CAP in Oece=ber 1930 disc 1: sed : hat culy a li=1:ed nu ber of the CAP allegaciens had been b: ugh: :o the attenti:n of the Region I'! II i=vestigative staff by. Applegate in ,,,, Febraary 1980. g:u ,'
~
. 3ased en is:erriews cendue:ed a Region III, CIA ,dete m =i.ned,tha:
- :he 1:1tial inv'estigative effer: conducted by Region III nac assessed the allegacicas, had received available acerin, and had 1:1:iated an investiga:icn 1 : thesa allega:icns that Region III deter =ined :: he with the purries of the NRC. Regi:nal person =e1 advised tha: the investigative effort was c: due:ad is accordance with II p;ccedures and that they believed tha: the repor: thercughly doc =ented discoveries surfaced during the investiga:1 =.
1 OIA review ofj-he invest:ca: .ve nie disclosed dnafargate e a dec=en:a-1:n. ) For exa=ple,4;Lhe _inves_:_ga::ve itief contains no detaileo cocu=en:ati:n reflec:ing the tresulfs of interrievivi:h Apelegate or principal vi:nesses_ j and ae enrailed -s e -" c- --,aas -oi -Aa velding decu=en:atien rev:.eved by :he investigators with :egard to the specific welds allegee :o de ~ defective. CIA review of Zi=ner veld 1:3 records revealed that of the :hree allegedi? defective velds specifically identified by Applegate in his firs: allega:ica, two had been __repai_ red or replaced, ens (X-811) sher:1y before and the other (RM-4D durine the M investicative effer at the facili:v. The IT. investigative report did not identify the dates on which the veld 1:3 rework was conducted on veld _K-811 or that a nonconfor=ance recor: (NR)_ on K-811 that had initially hge- elesed with ehe neestien "accese as is" l vpen- veided_and rectened to order e5. unie e 2: ou t ._ D e ::ves:1ga:1:n l also (Ailed to date:=1:e tha- veld RR-42 had been_ es:__ out and replaced ,- l ~ , , , - . - _ . . . . . - . . _ , ._ y , .,. ,_ _ , _ _ _ , . _ _ _ . ,_
.- j l
2 i 4 *af:e: :he ini:iatien of the II invas:igation. Inte: rieus of :he invas: iga:::s disclosed :ha: : hey had no knowledge that velding repair on RH-11 had aken place. In fac: nene of the velf s in eue* '-- ==-* d-seec e_d :y d'~ M M M* the inves tiga:ive tea = ,,,pr_ vas ali te--d-e-- veldi .g docu=ent a-ien 57/ Mym.::::'S-
~
e31,,,,yf.f3 '-- --e d--es-1a- % K96 gd::::,3,g , Applegate's second original allegation concerning the installati n of gg, [e.m!LE " safety-related prefab 1:a:ed pipe centaining allegedly defe::ive velds was partially substantia:ed by the II,invas:1ga:ien., This al,lega:ica, as 1: related to i=p;c' perly " closing out" a= hA and insta111:s the pipe, resul:ed in the region. identifying one ites of non-c==pliance.,a,nd . issuist the licensee an? "inf acticn." .However, _the II investiga:Len ' ~ ~~"
@d g'g,gg nei:her fully investigaiad nor accu'r'a' ely :Ec :ed h---- on th_ s aseec: ef :h_'e. . . ' gf' case. Du ring :ne investiga:: cn cf :nis allee s::.cc , a : .enivas_
/
g-j,
#dk/ f *****"*- thme *e al eratits of :ne NR - which :eleased e-. s cel eieces J
WAt? f er installati':-n - vas ordered bv__ the Cir ed- ari_ Gas _and Electric ,- ~ - 4 Ce=oany (C0&I) Quality Assurance (CA) ".anater. The II reeer: oniv ican_:ified this individual as "a C0&I official" - thus obscurin: fred d ide reader that th: sf al: era:::nf vas carec:ac cy :he licassee's sanic; official responsible ic :na :=ple-e- stics of the QA p;cgra= a: Zi=e r . I: addi:1:n to so: reper:ing this/fae:. 6E did eer fulle inves-itate :he_
- circu= stances su : undin 'the CA w.a:ater's ::dar_._
NEUW. .W
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0:A's revieu e' ree:rFa=gg ~? d 2=:erviews of e,1==a: verse.ne: did ==: develcp any additional 1:fer:a:1:n regarding :he thiri a!lega:ica - inade<;uate pipe flushi g p;ccedures - that was not ide :1fied in :he II investiga:1:n report.
' 'One of Applegate's main allegations was "that def ective velds in safe:y-related sys: ens have been accepted, a=ong :)es velds CY 606, HR 12 si:)
an d I " ' . " **! reeerts. *- O and M , e!y ;j:.d is ,:ue clea :aa:ef prior
.<erier.II inspec:icns
&_. was we.. Qegien awa.e .. c.e uhr--i -
N O 8_ ./ g.- ' -- e'h i s t e--r e# **1dit: e:eble-s a: Zi=ar : specifically, that b/
- unace.-- w . va' 4 'n saf ety-related systa:s had for all intents and
- u- eses been accepted by both the con::ae:or and, in sc== cases,.the licensee. Based upon these inspecti:ns, Barien I*: recuired :he 11 cense 3 4/.? 4.m
" a Q y .
fg to re eviev radicgraphs and reports of all veles unich had been accepted g'_, p 1 Jgg;gg ior turncver pris to operation; this reviev star:ed in Cetober 1979 and
- porticus of this review are still being studied by Regicn I!I. Nonetheless, 4 the Region III report found that Applegate's allegation in this regard
< vas "not substantiated" because the velds had not yet received " final acceptance." In fact, Applage:e was correct in saying that defective velds in ssf e: r-rela:ed svne=-= had been accep:ed. To say that Applega:e's ellegation was not substantiated appears to be .a cuestien of se= anti:t-and is he- c--sistent with tha Imees2 Ln su==ar-i :he Regien III investira tive effort dd4 -- " d a e" s * = N "-me all of the allecatiens in sufficiere-- deeth e- b endeh ard 12 eked adecumee docusentatien. _
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- In es:17 Dece=ber 1950, N?.C received a c=py of a peti-i filed vi:h :he Office of the Special Ceussel cf the Meri: Systa=s ?:::ac:1:n 3:ard by the CA? of the hstitu:e f : Policy 5:udies (not a Gover==en:a1 age::y) on behalf of The_as k*. Applega:e. ~3ased up the kliega:i= s 1: this
***i-1 N3C Cha =an Joha* Ahea=e reques:ed by se=crand= dated
{ eee=re 15. .fo=e1980](Attach =e:: 1) , " . . . tha t the CIA cc:due: as invas:1ga:ics i=:o vne: e fae Cffice of Inspec:ics and Inforce=e : e adue:ed an adequa:e investigatics of the allega: ices presas:ed := 1: by Th :as *J. Applegate regarding ac:ivities a: the 21111a= E. Zi==e Suclea: ?:ver Statice." The Chai=as further diree:ed that II invas: iga:e :he safety issues raised by the CA?'pe:1:i:' 5. CIA' fe=a11v reenived the OA? Se:iti:n by a ::ansti::a1 lette- datedn;een- e- 'o-
'0503 f :: :Me Cf e cf !_t e-SVec .a1 Ceu-s el ( A: se*- *-e 2' .
O!A se: vi:h CA? a:fe se-isti*'ies~ e .'hanua-- 9 1951G and c= seve:21 4 cc:asicas : ereaf:ar, :: discuss ::e allega::: s a: whi:h times addi:1 :a1 docu:en:ati:n was p;:vided afte: 5AC agreed b : espe:: the ::sfiien: tali:7 of CA?'s seur:es. Sacause the addizi::a1 dec=es:s:i: rela:ed :: I saf a:7 issues, O!A p::vided i: to II fc: 1:s i:vestiga:10:. Ouring these =esti:gs CA? exclained thg-_9ei- alistatiens should ee- he e-et led as eers e- = ' e C*->'d ?h1111p rather thev vare m**eed-e ihm- e n '30 A . A id me: ::::eriv address :he allet_ati: s.
/
1 4 . , D c. .a.. . .a Res*. e 2 ! CA? Ma:ertal ~ Duri:s the period Oe_ e=ber 30.108" th uith March 4 19 81. C!.n. ~tevie4st,
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- sei-hele :ee-'--t v'-h GA? re:re s e .:seives 1-4 -h,A'.,,,eed addi-12 ai dee -
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, :1uding no: art:ec stata=ents and tape :ec : dings) related to issues identified in the ' original peci:10 . In addities, other W docu=entatics was p: vided which appeared to per:ain to separa:e allega: ices Mdastrg7 af constructics 1 egularities at the Zi==:e site. Much of the 1 fe=ati:=
#/ furnished after the 1:1:1a1 O!A/CA? =eeting ect:ained s:stenen:s and
- inte
- siews of individuals which occurred at poin:s in ti=e fc11=ving the Regica I!! II investigacica cf the Applegate allega: ices. As a result of the docu=ent review g,,y,,p nunsee:ed and lace confi =ed :ha: sa.v ef i che allenatiens described in the ve:itten were, in fae , ne: breur-- t-- l the attent:en e3 the Reti:n III perscenal at the ti=e of the initial l i
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t c 3 ? theid allega:1ons to be = ore ggains: the EC_ han individual e=ployees.
.. A C*.A repeated ,t_ hat , s1=11a:17, PA O M i m stigt110_n E.e;id eencent ste_ _
# 5ev -he qggy handled the _=at:e ,.
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7. I
!' In response to a ques:1'on a' bout OR's ability 'to 1 ves:1ga:e a r.a::e: [f;i,p !
which also alleges that the Directo: of CIA did not.ae: quickly enough i on the earlier. allegations, ,,the group was advised that the Chai =an ve_s g; '
# aum-e af ekme asoect of. the casa. d ; ., . . . . . ,.,..;,..<.. .. ,
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Be eEp"l'oyees p'res'est ;ai[s[ed"no, additional,, subs:antive ' dussticas., CIA , l askad each. to locate any documentation of their activities suen as sotes which they might have so .they could be reviewed -during their interviews. Phillip pointed .ou: that.he had destreved his -ceen prier.co.having . l heard of GAF's pet 1:1on. , , , , .,., ., In:er riev ef Gerald A. Phillip Mr. Gerald A. Phillip, Senior Investiga:::, Regien III, "I, NRC, was , int e rviewe d on 3 -" * ' l 2-"' 1981, by y.gcd,,,qnhle. Johndinclai . i and Arthur SchnebelerL 01A, at the NRC Regional Office Glen Illyn, Illinois. - 7 //.0 /MFM.
- Mr. Phillip began the interview by explaining that his firs: 'movledge W Ev'44 '4
. r.f the Ihemas Applage:e allegaticas occurred appr:xi=atelv Tebruary 2e, Ws dd7
.1980. Phillip recalled that he was contacted by lill XaY Ixecu:1ve g~,jjg/
Cffice for Operation Support (2005) . II, during whiai".iard related tha: he had received information fro = ene of the Cc==issioner's offices whi:h W, - had been contacted by. Applegate. lee rdine to ^a-ci the inf or =a: ion
~ # *
) related to the Zimmer Nuclear Plant she and th's 1:fi:ial dete =ina:ica was that there may be some significance to the infc =atien. M 'aise 4 related that Applegate alleged .that there was a possible conspi:acy between the site contractor and utility to cover up def ective velding. Malso stated that apparently Applegate had made previous centacts with the NRC and felt that he was "getting the run-around" because he did not see NRC taking any action. - Phillip stated that he contacted Applegate the sa=e day and obtained l some of the general information concerning Applegate's claims. Phillip i also stated that arrangements were made to meet and interview Applegate f or more details. Phillip recalled that after talk.tng initially to l ! Applegate, he (Phillip) believed that there was information which appeared ' to be casting a shadow on NRC inspectors. Phillip contactad aT,,,. at NRC Naadquarters in Bethesda and notified him of this fact. @ then , I informed Phillip that no inspectors should be brought in on the initial i j phase of the inquiry 'and if additional personnel were required then flaE!7 l s would make someone available from Headquarters. Phillip then stated l that within the next few days arrangements were made to have another i - investigator from Headquarters meet Phillip in Cincinnati to assist on the interview of Applegate. Q advised Phillip that he would have l I W j
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I a 6 ien W11Lia=sen mee: Phillip in Cinci: .a:1 to help vith the in:e: view. l - i Phillip explained tha: the initial plans :o interviev Applegate ' vers' .
- ce= plica
- ed by the fac:~:ha: Applaga:e was very cautious in his ins: uc-tions and guidelises .for the meeting. As he ree'alled Applegate vould not provide his address or the address of a neu: al see:isg place. Applegate
. had advised Phillip that when ha or tha NRC investigators at ived in a Cincinnati they shculd call a specific telephone number f or additic a1 instructions. *- Phillip stated that on March 3 af:e arriving in* Cincin=a:1, he contacted Applegate at which time Applegate ins::ue:'ad the NRC investiga:c;s i to meet him.at an address which.; ur:ed ou: :o be a church pa: king lo:. .; Phillip explai=ed that he and Williamson a :ived es:17 and eventually
- , were approached by an ' individual who iden:1fied ht=self as Applega:e. -
' Af ter ,the 1s1:141 =eeting the..three..of the= vas: c a' roc _ing houser.:ha: '
,vas located approxi=ately. one-half block away. . Applage:e advised Phillip '
{ and Williamscu .that he had received threa:s as had the landlady a: the roc =ing house. 7:o= Phillip's observa: ions 1: appea:ed that Applega:e re :ed a roem is a house which was ov ed by a police =a and his wife. the hcuse A:elerate ::ck cf f his !acke: revealing
- [ Sher
- 1y af ter arri ing atthat he was wearing a firea s./ Applags:e began by.p :v;cang
! pe.;a :;ag :s asa s*-ue.. ... ,Applegate told Phillip that he had been i e= ployed by a security fir = vhich did work in divorce 1:vestigacicas. Initially he (Applegate) had been assigned an investiga:ica involving a "pipef t::er" at, the Zi=mer si:e wh'o had been suspec:ed of ";1aying arousd" by his wif e. Af ter the divorce-cype invas:1gation had been , . ,, star:ed, Applegate began to discover inic =4:ica of "ti=a cart padding'* f by individuals a= ployed a: the Zi==e si:e. Applegate 1:f or=ed Phillip '
. :ha: his supervisor, Major Ccx, centacted the utill:y ::=pany, Cinci::sti Cas and Electric (CC&I), to advise them of the discovery. Subseques: :o the contac the utili:y c:ntrae:ed vi:h the securi:7 firm !c: :he
- services of Applega
- e, p;cvided his vi:h a false identity, a:d ins:::::ed hi= to Icek further into the ti=a ca:d padding. 'Af:e Applega:e began the assign =en: he began to provide the u:111:y with weekly reports which cenfir=ed the time card paddi:3 and disclosed a degree of cellusion between cer:ain pipeft::ers and security personnel at the si:n. Applagtze explained to Phillip and provided Phillip the opper: uni:y_ to reviev 3 tecurtev reports,which described security guards' permitting pipefi :ers to leave the site during vo king hours withou: " clocking out " Applegate .
also explained tha: during the same time frame (December 1979-January - 1980) information began to be develooed identifytng the 111ecal sale of i firearns at the site. yh:111p also indicatec :na: Applegate had surfacec l r inicr ation disclosing that the site supervisor, Mr. Marshall, utilized
- site sacerials and personnel to perform work on his private residence.
- According to Phillip, Applegats stated that Marshall's acts were dishenest,
- I however, when he (Applegate) brought the information to the attentien of
- CC&E the company refused to take action against Marshall. According to j Applegate the condoning of these type of ac
- s was going to have a =ajor misse:t on_CC&E and. in effect, put then out of business.f i
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- i Applegate cont 19ued by exp1 Ening ss=e of his concerns to Phillip ab u:
potentially faulty velding. Phillip explain' d ethat ' Applegate'.'sia:ed tha: '" PM was radiegraphing velds which were questionable. .'Applegate 'did'ne: appear to kuov who ves responsible for their instive: ions: CC&I or . p g * ! Xaiser. However, someone had directed PF. to go back and "re-exa=ine
- velds." Applegate informed Phillip that aither CC&I or Kaiser ignored
~
7WI /I N
?"'s radioernuhn of the velds because such exa:inations nor=all, ea' r y/ gyp J M constituted a visual inspectacr. ar.c act a ractograon. This accordi r_: ,,-a-Ascletate was cene at the direction ef 'd . Marshall uno inst ucted FM to l "_exa=ine" mu t not radioera q ?hillip stated that he believed Applegate /I'.....
was referring to a specific shipment of pipe that had been delivered to the site in the f all of 1979 'and'j.= properly 6nloaded (dropped off' the ' truck)l without a quality'. centrol inspection. . Applegate inf or=ed Phitook llip i that this inciden' t ' a p1' ce' aro6'n'd
- Zi==ar. Apple' gate said that
- nach c'catreversi was generated at the' hearing regarding fuel rods that were allegedly d:Opped; but in fact 1: vas
. thes e pipes . not. fu.e.l rods ... .t.ha.t we.r.e. .d:c.p ped.
~
l As backs; und, Phillip. t'han provided a brief de'scriptio'n "cf the' supplier, } Full =an-Kellogg and the delive:f. .?hillip stated tha: Full =an-Kallegg was the supplier (vendor) and .therefore was responsible for the Quali:y Assurance (QA) and Quality Conti 1 (QC) verk related to the veld and the structure of'the pipe. As a nor=al' procedure QC inspections are no:
- done,at the site for adequacy of the equipment or the velds. Phillip
}
- d urther stated tha: the equipment is inspected only for damage in :: ansi:
and inven: cry purposes during a ." receipt inspection" which dcas ::t include either yisual or radiography examinations of welds. Phillis said 'Aeolegate trcYided hi= vith three e-eeffte **m- *e= *i e j N uel ds _si,ected bvEJ_: tnen__a 7 ,py & b Q 'ser. that one va n hu g ed * - -- r et e anc ne f el t tne utility ves -e A:pletste :lat ed ret .2 to i f d_o ant hint te eer net it. 4 Another area related 57 '?hillip pertained to Applegate's disclosure that i there vere " problems" with a pipe' flushing operations. Apparently, someone had informed Applegate that as a result 'of banging pipes durins ! the flushing procedure deleterious substances cane out of the pipes and j 4 the "fldshing" failed the test. The individual who observed this problem l attempted to resolve it by raisina the issue with his supervisor. Applegate claimed that the individual ' subsequently quit because there i was no action taken. As the discussion continued Applegate also stated j to Phillip that another individual at the site had been keeping a notebook
- or log on his observations at the site. Applegate did not identify the individual and could not furnish specific infor=ation, such as the content of the log or why the individual was keeping it. Phillip also i
recalled that Applegate mentioned having been trapped by a fire down in one area of the plant. 4 q .%. .} * ;
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a s ff0 (Nic,J'l. D s*? g /hu'S Q ts? 2/.;;U/5 C u Applega:e then identified an individual by the na=e of 52 :ay who was
~~
e= ployed by CC&I. Phillip s:a:ed thst,.according :o Applega:e,-Marray
.vas "all right" . meaning .that he,yould cooperate with GC. Applegate.the .
proceeded to tell Phillip that he (Accleeste) had crevided Mu- av aad_ - Schwiers , CA Suce-riser infor:ation_a:ou- :he a15e ted de *ge-t re s,1d<--[ and tne sce_e._81c locations of the velds *- eu e s t_ie ._ _Phillie belter d_ bM* Ae-larate said tnar Senvie s had one veld tet-ad 8- -s **~k. d.e.--e... N e W4E and then related that the veld would he **-ed_ ' " m qAr.f Phillip then stated that Applegate- continued the-interviev by clai=ing that in'or=ation was dqveloped pertaining to the ti=e card padding. .. Phillip further stated .that Applegate i=f or=ed hi= tha: CC&Z noti'ied the Kaiser Corporation Headquarters:in California;of the t1=e card cheating. Subsequent-to this notification, represen:atives fro =. Kaiser ca=e to the Zi==ar site and _ vere i=f ormed that evidence vas.obtained . that confir=ed the ti=e card paddirg. Aoplegate also advised Phillip k
.that CC&Z :old Kaiser that they had an individual working undercover. . I Applegate then. stated tha;.sho::1y after. this.=eeting the undercover. .
operation was te=1nated because of two factors:' (1) Kaiser was'nov avare that se sone was undercover for CC&I; and-(2) the vif e of the subject of the original divorce investigation had =ade visi:s to the si:e and Applegate feared that, if he were observed by her, she =1gh: reveal his true identity. { Applegate related to Phillip that he had been trying to bring the inf:: a-
* ",:1on to the attentica of NKC because although the ti=e card proble= vas 4
being addressed no action was being taken about the QC issues. Applega:a cid Phillip that he, originally contacted U.S. Sena:o: John Glenn's office to apprise hi of the inf or=ation and obtain assistance. Sena::: Clenn's office provided h1= with the name of Ja=es Cu= sings, Director, O!A, 57.C. Phillip then ceplained that Applegate clai=ed he contacted Cu:::ings by telephone and related the infor=ation concerning the ;;oble=s at the Zi=ner site. Applegate also related to Phillip that he (Applegate) became frustrated with Cur =:1ngs as a result of seve al tele-bre e: .ve sa-
! Qas with Cu==in,n which cul=1nated with Cu==:ings' requesting that _
. Applegate provide "something in writing" ce= piling the allegations. Phillip stated that Applegate thought about the request over a weekend and becar.e angry. According to Phillip, Applegate stated that he, was upset about the request because he (Applegate) had been incurring personal expenditures to bring the information to someone's attention and now he i was requested to do more. Applegate said he then called Chai =an Ahearne's
- of' ice who apparently referred the matter to II.
Phillip stated that Applegate stated that he provided the same infor=ation to the Cincinnati office of the Tederal Bureau of Investigation (73I). Phillip explained to Applegate that the type of allegations brought to the attention of the TBI were items not within the jurisdiction of NRC and would not be addressed during an NRC investigation. Phillip also ' advised Applegate that allegations of cr1=inal activity at the site . e 8
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; . would have to be~ handled :by the appiopria'te age:cy. - Phillip 'sai.#hel ekplained that the cost of'-construction (i.e'. . cost overruns) also was---- - l not a =atter within h*RC jurisdiction. Phillip explained that Applegate i
was not happy with his (?hillip's) expla:ation regardi=g the NRC's position but Applegate ^ did not challenge the...res;: case.. . . . . . . . . ' . . Phillip stated that 'the 'dni'y other remarks lade by* Applega'te related 'to a variety of problems which allegedly indicated 'that there was'=is-- l annage=ent and collusion between pipeft::ers and securi:y personnel.,'" ;-- i Applegata stated th.is ;de=enstrai:ed that there was not a proper con =1=sent to building a nuclear plant. ;Applegate also stated tha as a result, cf ggd ,, his atta:pting to bring information to of ficia' Is of CCE as well as -- Wg pZr others, (NRC, T3I) .- he had been threatened, run-6ff"the
- road and his
~
la'adlady bad been harrassed and threatened over the telephone. ~Applegate )@M."**
. Provided additional it. formation to Phillip in the for= cf excerpts f::=
audio tapes. According to Applegate the infor=ation on de tapes 1:dicated collusion be:veen high level =anage-s of the project. Applegate played portions of tapes fer Phillip which he '(Applegate) believed
- co::cbc:sted
! his allega:1:ns. Phillip said Applegate cen::elled the' recorder and. 4 c:*.ly played selected segments for Phillip - desc:ibing the centar:"i:
! which each one occurred. Phillip explained that Applega:e would :: '
l' release the tapes because he considered the= to be " insurance." Phillip said that =any. of the tapes sure difficult to understand; in those instances Applegate interpreted what was being said. Phillip stated
; * "that,. based on wha, he heard on the tapes he did not hea: any inf::=atica which indicated there uns sc=e type of collusion or cover up going on a: ! the Zi==ar ' site. ?hillip said tha:, af ter Applegate had skipped around on the tapes, Applegate cor. firmed that he had played all the i=portan:
- parts. However, Phillip did state there was sc=e infor=ation on the l tapes tha: ide::1fied :hree specific welds which was detailed enough to check into during an investigation. Phillip stated tha: in his opinien
} comments like 20 to 30 percent of the velds at the plant are defective were too general and needed note support before they could be invas:1 gated.
- Additional information which Applegate furnished to Phillip related to j the manuf,acture and sale of belt buckles by personnel at the site.
2 Phillip stated that he advised Applegate that, although some of the satorial used in the manuf acturing of belt buckles ney be required for construe:1on purposes, it was a problem which should be addressed by CCE, the licenses, and uns not within NRC's jurisdictional responsibilities.
; . Applegate also provided information about people being fired for time ; card padding or cheating. As Phillip recalled, however, Applegate did l not state that any of the individuals fired as a result of his investiga- '
tion into time card cheating were in fact th's asse individuals who had attempted to raise saf ety issues. Phillip advised that 'the only docu-
- nentation furnished by Applegate during the initial interview were l reports submitted by the security fira (Confidential Service) who a= ployed i
Applegate and wre under contract to CCE. Phillip said Villia: son lef t the interview to photocopy these reports at the Tederal Su11 ding in ., b i l l
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- 26 4
Cenahue said Applegata questi:ned why Phillip had no: :alked :s core individuals is his investiga:icn. Applegate na=ed several individuals but Donanue could no: recall thei names. D:nahue recalled tha: Phillip responded tha: 1: vas unnecessary bedause he had :escived :he,, issues.
- Dcna$uesaidi: va's also clear that Applaga:e had a hard :i=e ac:sp ing the difference betwee: wha:.:GC was :sspensible.for and wha: he fel: lGC should be looking at. .,,Donahus believed tha: .Applega:e f al: tha: II investigators should be criminal investigators who looked at all c;1:1:a1 ,
violations f:ca, pet y ,thef:a through f alse documes:s. ,- Denahue .said, , . i Phillip explained to Applegate that NPC had no jurisdictie: en catte:s,, such as time clock violations and indust:ial property p:ctactien. ... Donahue said Phillip had feo rep ~ eat.this explana:1'on several :f=is .ind ?: vas clea:If rom th..e.disiu.s'..s~i.o.n tha.t. this .w.a.s. sod t.h's f.irsi.:~. 1=a..?hillip. . . . . y had told Applesate.this... . : Dodahua said' ApplegAfi.fal: ~t h's Cov'ern=eni Thould haie bees "beholde : fo his f or providiss thought the Cov'e:n=en: a s'feaf'iirvice."".He' ihduld have pifd saidfor .: hat, his ::1 p'i f::= exa:ple, Cindi:nati Applegate to Chicago and the T3I should have ::ansported hi= :o the'ai:pers.
... . . . . .. 1 Denah.uessaid he has k cv 2h1111; a l:. g ti..=e, thsf: .. careers h.av.in..g, dove: ailed. De.ahus.had caly the highes p tise f e':. Ph1111;'.s j,udg=en and investigative ahdlities.
j i In:e:-riev ef Ja:es Ka: ele: On Janua:-r 29,'1991 S . James Kappler, Director, Regies Ill,15, was
, ,in:erviewed by A--.u- Schnehelen, $cacist Assistant and M ? T ia.clai r _.
I-vesM m -- 0% Mr.;,Kappler was app;;see of the nature cf the 1:ves: iga:1:n
. and requested to furnish isforma:1on resa:M:s his role or involveman:
in the investigatien- conducped by Gerald ?hillip at the Zi=:e Nuclea Pever 5:scien during 1980. . Mr. Kappler explained that his recollectica of the initial 1 ves:1ga:1:n was li=1ted. According to Kapple: he did not actively par:1cipate in the decisien-making peccess as to what informa:1on provided by the " alleger, Thomas Applegate, was going to be investigated. Kapple: stated that the regional procedures would not normally :equire a see:1r.g with the investigative staff to determine what allegations would or vould not be addressed. Routinely there is a weekly seeming involving
! sanagement and periodically seatings with* personnel involved in various specialized activities, includist investigations, during whi:h he would receive reports on the status of a particular activity. Kappler continued by explaining that the decision-making process pertaining to allega: ices received by the investigative staff would nor= ally only require decisions to be made within the invas:1getive unit and their i= mediate supervisien.
e 1
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Xep;*er added tha: the particular inves:1ga:icn 1: ques:1:n and resul:ing invas:1ga: ve repc;; is f airly typical of hev an allega:1:ns are i=vestiga:ed and 4:cu=ented by the regi:n. Kepple: also stated tha: he was ::: sure
- ha: anega:1:ns c reperts would be hand;ed any,.dif f ere::1y,,is;,R.e fu:ure. .. .
.* -t e - Si:.. -
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Kepple then sca:ed that investiga:icus concerning allega:icns a: con-
.struction si:es are differe:: than those relating to f acili:ies which have operating reactors. The distisc:1on is that cens::uction projects have so =any more, people ipvolved in,various, phases. cf, c: s::ve:ie a: .,
the* sites. . A probles arises in deciding hov =uch,isvestigative work is required to resolve the anegation and whether :ha i=vestigative effor: i is properly sc= ped. .In the investiga:1c
. in. ques:1 :, Keppler,. recalled i ,
thae, there was an allegatica,of cces::ue:ics c . craf.. persen=el; reporting to work drunk, and drinking on, the, jc'p.2, Accc:di:g ::,,Kapple: this pa-ti:ular ites or anegation was cct addressed because it. was a general-type aneg'a:icn and no: supper:ed by =uch 'in the way of specific inf or:atics. Kapple the: stated tha: he was not cer:ah that a ge:eral allega:10: such as this would be taken and invas:1 gated or hvestigated 1:-depth. A proble: such as work =en drinki:g a: the site
- is, basicany a lice:see
=anage:::: probles.with NRC's 2: ares: being,in whether c ,, ot ther.e.vas a health and. safety 1 pac: related c the vo-k. Kappler explained tha:
the purpose of the,QA p;cgra is : ensure tha: any unac:eptabla,uc:k does no: re:ain uncer:ected. NRC hspects agains: the CA p::g:a= :s de:e:=ine if the work is being dcne co;;ec:17 Kepple also stated that he believed Regien H invas: iga:ive procedures-required tha: an alleger be info: ed cf what allegati:.s c; issues v,e e
- withis the jurisdiction of ,NRC and vert scing :: he 1:vestiga:ed. ' ,
Kapple: added tha:'1: vas also a regic=al policy to ree:::ac: the an age at the eccelusi:n ef, the investigative eff y:: to p;cvida hi vi:h an e:rplacacien of what had been ides:ified or resolved. la sc:a casas repor:s of investiga 1ca were see: :o the allegers af:e: the ::=ple:1:n of the verk. . f -
.'d.r. Kappler was questioned as to why the 'investiga:ive : a= did not identify the da:es of veld repal:s c report descripticus of discrepa:cies identified in the radiography review. Kappler :ssponded by stating tha:
, he was not awars that the velding anegations had not been thoroughly ' addressed and reported. CIA explained that one of the main issues which the IE investige ion was actively pursuing had to do vi:h alleged defective velds being ini:ially accepted by Kaiser. In order :s supper; that anegation Applegate provided the identification of three specific welds K ni, RH I.2, and CT 606. The II " findings" replied :o the stipulated anegation by stating that one of the velds had been replaced, without mentioning when the corrective work had takes place, and therefore did not pursue whether or not a defective veld may have been accepted. In addressing the two remaining velds II explain *ed that "sene discrepancies" were identified in the radiography review but decided not to undertake any additional investigative offort. t i i i l n,-. .na...-. -
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- 28 Keppler explained that he was unaware o.Ethe specific allegati:n as dese:1 bed, however, he would accept OIA's description of -he events.
Kappler the stated that if the 1:was:1ga:1:n had not given any = ore response than tha: described, by O!A * : hen the allega:1on was no: .
".. l thoroughly addressed. Tepple also sta:ed*:ha: he could unders:and.Whf ' ;
- Applegate or anyone caking an allegEton vould be ups'e:' vi:h the :esui:s of the invas:1gatica and would feel that the issues or .cencerns vara no: ;
. appropriately addressed. -- - -
1
. l
. Kapple: vas advised that 1: vas the lack of docu=entation _vhich produced I questions regarding the adequacy df the invas: iga:icn. Is. thi,s par:1tular ;
. instance the lack of inf :u,;1en in :he reeert e chiped _vith limited _
succo::ing dect=en:acion does not pe=i: anycne reading tha repc : :o
- uncerstanc vnat invas:tgative ef f ort- ac:ually :cok place. Kapple:
. stated that:1: appeared the rep'c:: required additienal', or" 3: leas: =cre '
- M-
" specific. inf ornacion to'* address
'the
'all'e~gation.
,- .: . a: " . , . . . .
Kappler concluded by explaisi g 1: vas his per:ep: ion that the obvious weakness identified as a resul: of the CIA effer :alateed to the entire Region 117. investigative progra=, ra:he: than :he perf e=ance of individuals. Kappler then s:sted that apparently he and the . regional =anagemen: had not been revieving the resul:s of the invas:1gative progrs= :: ensure that there ve:e clear and c = plate responses to the allega:1ons'in :he investiga:1cn reports.* Tolleving this stata=ent Keppler suggested the possibili:y of additional review of future invas:1gative reports to see if the language clearly answered the question (s) raised. Kappler then stated that one alta=a:ive vould be to fu=1sh the reporn :s the Publi:' Af f airs Cf fice who could review the sa:erial f cs a non-tech =ical perspeq:ive
$ and see if the language clearly explains what was done. Kapple: believed
, this veuld increase the region's ability to provide co=ple:e a:d u:darstandable respenses to allega:1cus. . .* -
- - --~
- Changes ine:rpora:ed pursuan: to reinterview on S/3/,81.
Interviev ef *he=as I. Vandel - l Mr. Thomas I. Vandal, Residan: Inspector,. Wolf Creek Nuclear Si:e, Wolf Creek, Kansas, was interviewed on {ej;rp '*a' at the Kansas City Airport, Kansas City, Misseuri, bv Dav4 C2:ble and _Jeh- S*-im' . Investigators, CIA. Mr. Vandel was advised that the purpose of the investigation and interview was to dete=ine what knowledge he had pertaining to allegations raised by Thc=as Applegate regarding deficiencies in construction at the William H. Zi=:e Nuclear Site, Mcscou, Ohio. Mr. Vandel began the interview by explaining that he had been involved with_the 21:ner nuclear construction site 8er aceroxir.atelv 8've m -* vandet also stated tha: 1: vas cne usual policy f or a Projec: Inspecto (FI) to be assigned to a particular f acili:y for only approx 1=stely { l three years. Ihe purpose is to prevent familiarity between NRC inspectors and the licensee and enable a rotation of inspectors. Vandal stated J 2 i l
. . l
_ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ - - . _ . _ . . .. ...__.m_ v. _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . . . , , . , . _ . _ i
i 4 4 . 29 7 s that the reason he had been extended for evo additions! . years was the 7 request 'of :vo 's'u pervisois, fron Region 'I!!. Mr. O. W. Kayes and Mr. Dick Knop.
..Vandel also sta~ted that :during the period .he was ?I.at Zir..e: he had been involved with as many as seven nuclear utill:1es and inspeciions at those f acilities. Two of the facilities for Wich he was alsomthe FI f ' was tne Midland !!uclear ' Site and the Clinton Nuclear Site.
n m. Vandel continued by sta:ing that he did not believe that even at this time'.there .vas an NRC resident inspector at the Zir.=e site d o was responsible for .or experienced solely in . construe:1on. .Vander. stated , 7dd
^'-
. chat the first..NRC . inspector .to be . assigned at Zi==ar was who vas respo'esible .1or preoperational inspection at the faci.1 y.
- l Vandel also stated shar the' facility is so close to ce=ple:lon thai -
- Daniels would be 'an appropriate , inspector. to. b's.at..the site when they
; start precaerational':* testing.a s. - . . .a - -
Vandel explained that as he recalled there vers NKC hearings regardin;; i ~ other allegations at .Wich..he test.ified over a year ago. -.!he hearings dealt with questions regarding the licensing of the project. Also - f involved in doing sc== research about allegations. 'which vote raised by i interveno 3: cups, was NRK. Vandel explained there were several issues j he ceuld recall Wich were being addressed by the NRC: (1) cable trays l and velding -regarding the cable trays; '(2) installation of water tight doors and alleged deficiencies; and, (3) vated intake s:::ctures in the
.. plant and rotating screens to bring in river water. Vandel further
* **s tated he believed the allegations were a. resul: of intervenors challenging l 4 these particular areas and the Ato=ic Safet
- and I.icensing 3 card had requested the staff, both NRK and II to inv$stigate and report back to
- the board. .. - -
i Vandel stated that he re:e=bered the Applegate allegations and briefly I could recall Wat Applegate's role had been at the plant. According to Vandel, Applegate had been an undercover 1' aves:1 gator a:picyed by the licensee, CG&E at the Zinmer Nuclear Site. Sometime af ter Applegate lef t the site and uns no longer'amployed by CC&I, Vandel believes Applegate 3 called the Region III office and made allegations regarding the Zimmer site. Vandel stated that he could not remember Wat the specific allegations were, however, Vandel stated there ves one specific area that he was personally involved in regarding the delivery of pipe spools at the site and their subsequent " dropping off a truck." This was the particular area, or one of the areas that Carry Phillip was involved in investigating. 4 Vandel said that Phillip had explained the allegations to him (Vandel). I and he (Vandel) had arranged for Kavin Ward, an NRC Non-Destructive l Examination $pecialist (NCE) to accompany Phillip to the site and make an inspection of the alleged deficiencies. Vandel then stated that he had been involved with some of the initial or original planning of the investigation. He also stated that he had heard some of the progress as the investigation was conducted. Vandel explained that it was obvious that Xavin k*ard should go to the site. Vandel further explained that he ,, personally made the arrangements. - i i l 1 e *
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i . 1 30 Af ter the initial inspection or investiga:ica at the sitep ?hillip and Ward returned to Region III. at which time Vandel stated . hat he and ! ethers received a briefing cencerning infor=ation that ves discovered. One . area that Vandel recalled was the licensee was not clear in itsI.' 7 ir.structions when they requested .?M to exa=ine the piping %.ich'fe!!! ~ ' ' frc= the truck. According to Vandel,- FM exa:ined the entire p'ipe1"n' eluding prefabricated welding. It ves a result of the radiography that questions
- were raised concerning the pipe. The radiography, as Vandel recalled.
t caused some problems mainly because radiography ves ne: required for I exa=ination of certain velds.- Secondly, PM, had conducted radiograph . testing of welds which did not have the proper . configuration for .' radios' aphy
- a 1
readings
- particularly,-radiography..of velds 4.t the pipe. caps (jd : 1.-
i welds), Vandel, then stated that the licensee sougn: to resolve .:he issue i by bringing Full =an Power Products, the . pipe manu,f.acturer.f to :.ge , site.' ' j Sometime 'after it uns determined that only ultrasonic testing would be i the proper method cf testing. the pipe, Pullaan .did come to the site and , . . perforn ult:asonic esti'ng which established .that there were no def ects } in the velding. Vanf al recalled he ace ==panied Phillip to the s'ite for j a secend review of documentation pe::zining to the pipe spools. He 1 checked e:c:ds and datemined the resciution to be accurate. Vandel j then stated that he reviewed specific docu=ents; ., nencenfor=ance rep:::s, , ! FM test inspection repo :s and Pull =an exa=ina. i.cn:; which.were c:n, duct.ed . _ i by ultrasonic tes:ing. .- .. 1 j Vandel . explained that at the time he and Phillip were at the site they 4 checked !c. asteria! control procedures. This uns an area where the licenses received a notice of violation for releasing scue pipe spools i ftr installa ti:n. The ppecific citation involved the failing := fell:v a procedure for documenting noncenf ormance and properly resolving' the l not. conf or=ancs before the installation of th! equip =ent. Vandel stated l I that he was responsible for initially writing up the items (nonc=npliances). He recalled that he vecte two sep4:ste nonec=pliances which were subsequently cocbined into one notice of violatica by Chuck Norelius, Regi:n III. This wcs, according to vandel, an. enforcement or sanagement decisien to i ceabine the two nonecep11ance (infractions)* into one and use then as :ve
- l. exa=ples. of one violation. Vandel stated it was his belief that this , i
- troe of procedure us consistent 'with Region III enf orcement practices. I i
i
- j. Vandel added that he believed there were discussions among personnel !
involved in the investigation or persons reviewing the investigation, I I i- regarcing hou to handle the results. Vandel stated that 'this probably j irr olved himself, Norelius, Ward and Phillip. Vandel also believed tha: . i there ws one mejor meeting relating to the results of the investigation to determine what action was going to be taken. l According to Vandel, Applegate had made other allegations regarding j other activities at the Zimmer site. One of th'ese that he could recall i
- O *
. . 6
- I
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__ _ -. . .___e.__ 31 1:volved e=picyees re=ov1=g or stealing =4:e:1als belongi:g to C0&I fic: the si:e. Another allegation by Applegate involved the faorica:icn cf belt buckles froo s: eel materials located at .the site. 74= del also explaimed that he uns of the opi= ion that the nen-safety rela:ed allegatic:s were not goi:g to be addressed by NRC and tha: this was explained to O Applegate. !
. e 7andel then sta':sf that hi be'lieved that both Phillip aid' Jim Tests: had b the Zi==e si:e a d that se=e of the allegatiens had been the subject of previous II
~
l we:een fa=111ar with earlier allegations and inve stiga ticas. 7andel stated that during the 1973-74 ti=e period ther.e re allegations, fra: a for=er Kaiser QC 1:spector that a canuf acture; was supply 1:3 poorly or insufficiently i=spected =aterials. ~ Vand el ce'ntinued ty stating that-ha participated 1s ene area of the investiga:ica with Phillip and an'c:her
- inspector by the na=e of @ ue. wn a __ Ug--
I separate earlier allegatica. Ji= Tester i:ves:1 gated allega:1cns regarding j j deficia:cies with the cable ::ays at the Zi==e site. J va: del explained that he 'had ace ==panied Phillip on the second ::1p to the Zi=:e site to address the allegations of the pipe spcols because Phillip had returned f == the ini:ial investigatien at the site and believed there were areas that had co: been ec=pletely addressed. Af:e: discussi:3 the 'i nvestigation results with Phillip, Va: del agreed he should accocpany Phillip back to the si:e. As stated earlier, Vandel and ??.1111; vere particularly concerned vi h possible nonce =pliance is
' -he cate:121 centrol area. It was a result of the discussiens. vith Phillip that Vandel agreed that they should return to the site and =ake a more thorough investigation into the =at:#:. Vandel repeated 'ha: he and Phillip only addressed the artas related to the pipe spools ..td
=aterial con::al, vandel then stated that, during Phillip's first visi:
to the site, Kavin Ward had looked at the radisgraphy' and other nendastruc-tive examina:1ca areas which also included,the pipe spool welds. Vandel then centinued by stating that Vard did not look into the control procedures that persitted seme see:1ons of pipe to be installed without appropriate procedures. That was the sole purpose for Phillip and he to return to the site. Accordicg to Vandel, Ward's efforts to address Applegate's allegations i covered one level couctrning alleged velding deficiencies. The second trip and investigation at the site ves another level, or more closely scrutinized effort. Vandel stated that one particular procedure being checked ves the failure to kaep identified nonconforming material segregated from material that was ready to be installed. A second procedure that uns reviewed allowed the installation of material to be installed in a location as long as it ves " tagged" or had proper iden:ifi-cation. Regarding the specific issue of FM's perfor=ing radiographs of pipe, Vandel believed it uns appropriate for Kaiser to overrule FM's tests. Vandel explained that, if anything, he believed that FM should d
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p . ._ _ . _ . _ r3I [ have been "chastized" for not doing their job properly. Specifically, Vandel stated radiography Wich was cceducted by FM was an 1 proper technique for idtstifying possible deficiencie's in the velds ad . - :::'
. . - . . .' . . . . ..i..-.....:..... . .:. : . .. J
'Jhes responding to questions regarding the. II report of invas:1ga:1:n*
- and 7andel's invalve=ect is either revievi:g or vri:ing portiona of the report, Vandel stated that Phillip uns the author of the sectics of the repor: Wich incorporated the details. Va: del explained that mest of the 1:forna:1on and wrding in the " Details" see:ica is Phillip'sr"Va del then stated that he did have the opportunity to previde carts *-' a- 3 tion Wich uns sub_1:ted as.draf ts.' .One porties. Wich was already cautionei - i=volved the concomplia=ces regardi:3 the =aterials'.~ Vandel, upon revieving CIA's cepyjof the report of investigation, also stated that he believed same of th- input is the Y1:di:gs paragraph for allega-tion 3 (page 13) also cen:ai:ed his writi=g, va: del the: expla1:ed that the rest of his i=f ormation or involve =ent 1: the c=: piling of the -
, report vould have been only verbal exchanges with Phillip. ""* *
=
7andel ce::inued by stating that on a previcus visi: :o the si:e a General Mechanical Superintende:: for Kaiser had steved h1= pieces of f
=aterial that some 'of the e=ployees.had been usi:g to =anuf acture bel:
buckles a: the sita. Vandel believed the belt buckle =aterial was part of the material Wich ws used in the rotating screets at the intakes. Vandel then s:sted that he.did not pursue the bel: buckle manufacturi:g becaus
- he did not consider it saf ety-related. Vandel continued by statin ; that he vould have been concerned only if the caterial had been
- considered saf ety-related material which was not replaced.
Near the conclusion of the interkew Vandel velu :eered dat dur1=g the t1:e of the ASI.3 hearings Wich occurred app *:W=ately May-July 1979, NRC staff at:c ney Charles 3arth and he =e: vi:h Mrs. Maggie Irbe fro: Moscow, Chio, on a su=ber of concerns. One of the concerns was the manufacturing of belt buckles. Vandel had no additional involve =ent is the satter other than he heard that Barth'.subseque::17 vrote a letter back to Mrs. Erbe regarding the allegation. Vandel then ' stated that he at one time had a sample of the =aterial Wich uns being used to =anufacture the belt buckles.
- l Vandel stated that either prior to or during the investigation he seither met nor talked to Applegate. He stated he knew Applegate had come forverd or volunteered the information to the NRC. I: regards to 7hillip's contact with Applegate, Vandel understood that Phillip had inf or=ed i Applegate that the II ves not going to investigate other issues raised by Applegatet specifically, manufacture of belt buckles, c1== card padding and drinking'at the site. ,
Regarding the results of the II investigation, Vandel stated that, at some time near the conclusion Phillip described all of the allegations to a group at Region III; he believed everyone ksev Wat ite=s were going to be included in the investigation and report and W at issues c: allegations were not going to be addressed as being of concern to the -- NRC. O M
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- e 33 In response to se=e questi:cs related to procedures f or investigations at cetstruction sites Va: del explaised tha: the inspections :aci i:vesti-gations are. unannounced unless there .is a particular. rease: for advising.
the lice:see, e.g., to coordi:ste a schedule to view a particular phase , of work in progress. Vandel believed that it was the policy tha: investi- - l gators initially centact allegers or i=dividuals brisging infor=atics :o the attention of NRC by telephone to establish a time and schedule for a personal interview to discuss their cencerns.""7andel than' explained that this is usually do e by the investigators Wo r.aks an effort to contact individuals away f:cm the site. Vandel cencluded by stating g ggg,"5 there are _eertsi: occastess Wen the investigative staff requests an f inspec:ce with engineerisg backgreu=c :o accc=pany ne ca specidic ; -g/ cases when _ they believe_ the infor=ation vill be so technical to recuire (4
~
se=eece vits tee;ni 11_e;;p,gt;,u__to assist _1: the i=t erviev p - e ... alleter. Vandel concluded the interview by stating snat he could not. previae a y additional infe:=stion regariing the Applegate allegations or the investigation conducted at de - er site. Rei::erview of Gerald Phillic and K4 vin Vard yg Gerald Phillip and Kavis Ward wre reinterviewed on Jebr:a--r_M ' * * ' by Ja=e s Ct---* tzs a,--Sr Schgbel ee . David Ca=ble . and F-- ei-- S t _ OIA. .. Phillip dese:1 bed the review he and Ward. pr:for=ed of the 99 ulds is the core spray. systen. He said they. obtained fre= docu=ent cont:cl 4 personnel 99 envelopes Wich conta1:ed the pdiographs and " reader sheets" for the velds in this system. They did not review any of the veld packages dich contained the detailed veld history for.each of the velds. Phillip said they did not review all the radiographs either. He said they reviewed all the reader sheets and fcund two situations Were Kaiser accepted velds that FM had considered rejectable. Phillip said that Ward exa=1ned the radiegraphs for these two and agreed with Kaiser's determination. Phillip said they did not look at the radiographs for the others - including the "five to ten" that Kaiser rejected after FM had accepted - because their objective is conducting the reviev was to m deter =1:e (1) the degree of Kaiser's overruling and (2) whether Kaiser's , overrulings were legitimate. ' OIA then addressed page 6 of the II report With identifies " Allegation 1" as " Defective velds is safety-related systa=s have been accepted, a=eng
} them were velds CY-606, ER-42 (sic), and K-811." 3di_11p vac then asked i whether the alleger actually used the . wrd " accepted" and. if he did _
vnether he realiced that " acceptance" cooneted particular for=al acts by Kaiser 7__ Phillip responded that he believed the alleger said that they had " bought" bad welds t he did not recall the alleger's use of the word "accep ted ." Ward explained, by way of background, that acceptance of a veld is demonstrated by Kaiser's approval en the reader sheet. ., e M e #
- - ~~ . -
',o ' .
- - - - ~ - _ _ - - 4., __ _ , _ _ _ . . _ , .
1
34
-; Phillip said tha: they did not list t. e historf of each of the three i.edividual.. welds. in. question (page S of. the .!I'. report) because.-they . vere on1'y interested in the final version of each veld. Vard noted tha: the licensee is only, required to =ain:ain the final radiograph and reader sheet to de=enstrate ec=pliance with the code. Ward and Phillip believed they revieved the radiographs f or these.three velds. Card eted t '" -
a e'r --s -* -v ir$- # ^ e s e ndice 2rh s vd =- v" '-- * * ^ "" d ' '= - . it had dd e =Saaetes ed-h had vei to be resolved _--. - . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . .
,. ..- .. .. .. . .. .h - . :. t--
Phillip and Ward said they 'did not knew Wether"CT-606 vas a"s.afety- . related veld, although Ward 'said he was subsequently .inferned that it
- vas. Vaid said 'that just ,three weeks before this in:erview he learned fren the licensee tha: the " discrepancy" with CT-606 was that an i= proper
. technique was used when the veld was radiographed: no shims vere used under the penetrameter. Ward said that he also just learned that this veld is buried in concrete. Ward said that he is unable to independen:17 reviev a radiograph to deter =1ne a veld's acceptabili:f* een an i= proper radiographic technique was use'd. -- ' " - - - -----
~
.u Phillis va s th'en asked whv the II reeofNs'eutline ef 'CT-606 Mar,e,,,,1 l para. O *aij e,,d to _nentien that NES ' October 12, _ 1c70 - W a,,pa.: @ _
? "discrepanetes" followed_Ka_iser's Augus ~ 12_, 1976. aceaa? mage di t j eve- uledAeg*,q,q,a,plerf s Augus:C976. _findiqg that the veld was
{ r, e' e c t ab l e_. Phillip cla1=ed that they did not see the docu=ent containing g ' - this eve- uling. Phillip further stated that. 6ven i.f. they had learned
, c: the overruling, they would not have =ade a big point of it. He said that their review of the 99 velds in the cc e spray system was to provide an indication of the degree of the overruling; therefore, even if they had located this overruling which was in another system,1: vould no:
have altered their finding regarding over:uling. - Phillip and Ward recalled that, when they asked about veld K-811 they were infor=ed that 1: had been cut out and replaced by K-916' : hey said .
' that Kaiser furnished them vith,docu=entation to this effect, presumably.
the 1979 nonconfor=ance report (NR fE-2138R1) . , Phillip and Ward could not explain why a deficiency in a 1977 veld was not documented by a NR until 1979. Ward said that he learned jus: ~ three weeks before this interview that K-916 has not been radiographed because of water in the line. Vard also said that a Kaiser nendestructive examinatten suee vd e-_ has
- ed hd-- t ar K-916 is _a class C veld (i.e. . it is not saf etv-5 I'
- 0lA AOhsjfthM/, tic 54bh/G ~ ' _ f Ward said he was also informed just three uneks before this interview that veld RB-4 2_had been cut _out and reolaced by K-261 and K-2 62 1.QIA, s
di_so lave d to P' 911e *-t Vard contes of seldint r.ecords Wich documentee d-- l g Wat~fe'a.'o rk eTRR32 wa s beine conducted at the same we ene IE investigi- SC t.af,. O tion was underway._ Phillip expressed surprtse anc replied snat he was
/MS (t//6 not aware of tnis. Phillip and Ward said that when they reviewed the 3 y y/f/i g reader sheet for RS-42 during the period April 7-9, 1980, it reflected
/ that the wid was acceptable. They said the records contained no indica- ~
I tion that RH-42 had been, or vas going to be, cut out and replaced. [ Phillip said they did not inform the licensee in advance as to what
+"
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35 welds veuld be reviewed. Phillip noted :ha:, 1:as=uch as Amelee::e_ elai =ed_he brought these velds to Schweirs' attenti:n, the 1: ensee may have expec:ed .that .sc=ec a vould be revieving ;his veld. sc=eti=e. _..
. , **c.-- ' ' '
2 .- - - s" . u .;. . ~.1: . . . Inves: teat:rs' Note ,Afta: a,.,1u=ch,,, break the ,,1=:e.:,riev,vas c ::'.:ued y ,
,vi:t Phillip only. . -n -
- c- : - -
~
Phillip said he ks'ev f cm his first[v'isi: to Zi=er . hat the nota:ics c NRfE-1911, Kev. 2 - which was holdi:3 up insta11atics of the spool pieces - had been lined out; however, he did not establish who lined 1: out. Phillip said he also realizac en his retu= :o the Regional Cffice ~
' alter the f t:st 'visiIch'aI A'pp1' agita's allega:ica vas' tha: :he'. spool l 31eces vara bad at the fac' :cry - n'o: tha:'they Tiere da= aged when unicaded
* 'f::s the ciuck 'Phillif~said thIt he discussedlhe sa :sfiti:h" Nofelius and,,for these and other reascus. .th'ay decidad' tha: Phillip'should.de further i=ves:1gatics at Zi==ar. Phillip s' aid" that the Zi=ei'persossel
~
k=ev he was retur:1='s .- .
.because' .. .. ha so .'i=_'..o::ed
.. . Schwei:s.. a couple
..- . - -- - days .. .- ,
gg .. Phillip said he established :ha: Mr. Olt:. vd:h Kaiser's Docu=ent Cent :1
//r y
Uni:, was :he ene who lined ou: t W R ==ta: ion. ?hillip_.c=uld not , , recall C1::' excuse, but 01:: did, agree that his =ethed of; closing d e gy *, NR by lining it out was i=c'errac:~. ' ?h1111e said :he /vareheuse re . vhc released the secol efeces based on the _ali3 red N't inf e- ed ',1= tha: he was eresett whe L:hveirs diree *d C1:: :n line ou: the tocat h (gj s . pp Phillip said he did not pursue the atter af ter Schweirs danied i: +*v<. because the "betten li=e" was that there was so cover-up, as evidenced w. , - - - by the ether NR that remai=ed eyes en the :strar. Phillip suspected da: *ww.% this 1* ' g cut culy. occurred becausa the ti=.ar. persennel c:nsiderad i: to be only a " paper probles." Phillip saic that, i= fa :, the speci pieces passad ul::asonic tests 7ti and ?v112an-Kallegg' perf or=ed between their two visits. , I Investita:ers' Note - Tevard the end of the interviev. Ward returned to l advise CIA that he had just learned f :="les Wood of C:".&E that th2 three velds a:e all safety-related. He said Kl 916 is a class 3 veld and both K-252 and CT-606 are class 2 velds. C 5
- Changes incorporated pursuant to reinta:~iew cn 8/4/81.
Inte:Otev of Everett L. Williamsen, Jr." Everet 1. Wil11anson, Jr. , Invas:igator, Region II, I ., was interviewed at the Washingten National Airport, Washington, D.C. , on Ma--5 a go ni, by Investigators DavM_ Cm-h*
- _e- d M- ' ' a - h ' - m_ Williamson said he participated in an interview of themas Applegate which occurred someti=a around March 3,1980. _ Willia =sen said that about a week bef ore that date his suservisor 91niam Wars.} instructed him to meet Region III Investigator Gerald ?hiu1p in Cincznna:1. Chio, to assist Phillip in an investigation. Williamson said tha- 6 1:for:ed him tha: Applegate had called NRC; he believed the Headenar:ars Outy Office had received **
and recorded Applegate's call andUafd"' % called Applegate back. f Na;2 rsaid . l l
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i 36
.. Applegate,vas articulate and see ed to have, genu,ine concerns. h;said Applegate indicated he had' done so=e undercover d:rk'a: the' i==er Nuclear Power Station., IFare gave ' Willia = son. the i.a=e of, a F.r. Upchurch -
who us with the 73I's Cincinna:1 office. 'W1111a= son unders: cod I.is purpose was to observe and assist Phillip as a vitness; his 11=1:ed involvement was because Williamson had only been with the NRC for about two months.
. ; .. .:: . ~.:- - n ::. i n n t: --- - r - . , - - n .: - + - .--
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~
! Williamson said tha's he ia'11ed Upchurch and inf e'ried hi= that he vould "
- be in town soon and may want to talk to his.- He then contacted Phillip
~
regarding travel arrangements. He =et,Phillip at the Cincinnati airpor: on Monday . morning. ~,They took ,a, rental" car to Covington, Kentucky, where they called Applegate' from 'a restaurant. Willia = son did nor' icnev 5 ev - _ much previous contact Aoplegate and Phillip had had.fAppletate gave nam 2.a we pa m =g Act c: the Church of Chris: }' f them in ins :ucuons Covington. to meetApplegate described how he would 'be dressed so 'they eculd recognize hi:2. , , , , , , , , , Willia = son said th ySe A'pplegate ibou: ~ 1hCO p'n. U.5fe descFib'ed Ap'plegate as a big guy' and he was vaaring boots, a hat and a "P.arlboro jacke:." He said Applegate walked them several doors away to his house. When they got inside, Applegate took his jacket off and they observed he was vaaring a gun. m m Applegate then dese 1 bed his role at Zi==ar. Willia = son said ha did not i
' " ut.ders:and many of the technical things that Applegate was describing.
He said that Applegate and Phillip did most of the conversing, The taly thing Williamson recalled asking Applegate tas biographical data such as his name, address and phone nu=ber. Willia = son recalled tha: Applegate said he was hired as a private investigator to investigate' time card paddi:g at Zi==er.' Williamson recalled three specific issues that
- Applegate raised: 1) the manuf acture and sale of stainless steel bel '
buckles; 2) the sale of hand guns; and 3) an issue regarding safety-related pipe. Williamson described .he third issue as being a situation where pipe sus delivered to tha'Zimmer construction site at night and then dropped on the ground. Applegate claimed the pipe required 100 percent radiographic testing af ter being dropped. Williamson was sure there were other issues raised by Applegate but he could not recall them. Applegate's conversa:1oos -vere interspersed with some of his personal experiences, such as when he allegedly worked undercover to
- help the Drug Enforcement Administration. Williamson believed that Phillip was very meticulous. He said Phillip spent a lot of time with Applegate and listened to him very carefully. Willimeson recalled specifically feeling at the time that Phillip had taken a lot of notes and had paid a lot of attention to detail.
Williamson recalled listening to some tape recordings which Applegate i played. He said the recordings were garbled and therefore hard to understand. He said Applegate apparently were the recording device as a 1: ; I 1 i
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37 , bcdy recorder, although Wil11anson ,did not. helieve Jhe recorder was . - designed for ..th'at purpose. Applegate, dese: ped to yas, participating in
,each of .the ' rec'erded c'eb.Ver,satices and sa: was the subject matter of the conversation. Willia = son said that he aod ?hillip, ::1ed to listen to the recording's', but they could not unders:and the recordings dile the recorder ves sitting on the table. He.said that he and Phillip held the recorder up to their ears .in an atta=pt to u=derstand what was being said.., Willia = son said that inte=1::ently.they could . understand'some of the cenversation but the ,guality was still p.cor.
~
Williamson said Applegate had scue doc =ents regarding his work which he obtained, f om, Major Cox,.his epicyer. . yillia=sen saide he did no: :ake any notes or retain ecpies of any of these docu=ents. Williamson said he did get th's documents .cepied and he gave. hese..ceptes to Phillip. ' Willia = son said that, in order to get the docu=ents copied, Applegate
- called the T31's Covington office to ask if they uculd copy them. When they :urned Applegate dcun, they thcught the T3! Cincinns,ti office may be able to help. Williamson said he also figured that he could then - -
_ alk to Upchurch. I Williamson lef t Applegate's residence around 2:00 pm. He get to down:cvn Cincinnati sometime between 2:30 pm and 2:!.5 pm. He then vent into the I 1 Tederal Building to see Upchurch. Upchurch recalled having talked with. Applegate. Williamson said he was unable to copy Applegate's docu=ents
, at Upchurch's of fice because the T3I xerox =achine was not verk ing.
Williamson believed that he got a copy of an 73I l'atterhead me=orandu= l f t:= Upchurch, although W1111a= son could no: recall how Upchur:h made the copy because the zerox nachine was brokin. Willia = son said he talked to Upchurch for abou: 15 or 20 minutes; this conversation was mostly small talk and not so =uch about Applegate's allegat' ions. Williamson ceuld not recall whether Applegate had c==e to the 73I or whether someone else had referred Applesa:'e to the=.
, l W1111anscri then tried to get the'docu=ents copied at the US Attorney's office; however, their xerox rachine was also broken. Finally, after about 15 minutes of searching, Williamson found someone in the State . Tax Assessor's Of fice do allowed his to copy the documents. By this time it ves 4:30 pa and, when Williamson returned to his car, he discovered that his car had been impounded due to a snow emergencAliamson
~).saidhegot the car back wuum.u around..5:00 pm andfe:urnec to Applegate's
.. y m .ined in Applegate's house fer residence 'oy 6:00 pm.
about five or 10 minutes because ?hillip was ready to leave. Williamson did not recall Phillip's bringing any tape recordings with him. Williamson did not know Wether Phillip' gave Applegate any breakdown of either the issues he perceived or NRC's jurisdictional limitations. Wil11anson said that h_e and Phillip then vent to dinner and returned _ taj
~
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i their notel .fTilliamson said F.m ap anc ne :ainec aoout -T..n ' jurisdiction was on the issues Applegate raised. Williamson said he 3 e
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- 3B ques icned Phillip as to whether rnC had jurisdiction over =atters such as 1) sanagement ' problems, 2) thef: of =aterials frem the si:e, c 3)
Gesph7.s Eo1Tii5a's~(whTch Willia =sen understood to be vi:hin :he juris-
' dic fon of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Tirearms). Willia =sen recalled Phillip's saying that this was something he had to look over in order to sort out Applegate's concerns.. Willia = son did..not recall ... .
j Phillip's singling cut any issues as to which vere or were not- rac - concerns. W1111a= son said that af ter dinner at about 8:00 pm ,he and Phillip went their separate ways. at the motel. . . . ne nex: morning Phillip called Applegate and asked himthe a few addi:icnal me:e1 during questions.:e.Williamson said, he was in_ the same roem:,at 10 pr Phillip's telephone call....Williamson said the . call lasted about 13 fnutes. Williamson could. not recall the substance of the call because =uch of the technical aspects were foreign to him at the ti=e. Willia = son did recall Phillip's going through some of the docu=ents with Applegate. Willia = son said tha: Phillip had rev1Sved the docu=ents the night before and =ade so=a notes concerning the=. Willia = son said , Phillip lef: Cincinnati abou: 10:00 that sceni=g and he (Williamsen) laf: a f ew hours later. Williamson recalled talking withw eWu pon his return to Headquarters. He uid he told'OeFif that the culy allegation he saw that t.as within
- NRC's jurisdiction was the issue about the piping being d:cpped vo or threa off the
* - t:tek. Williac: son said this ceuversation only lasted - ,.
abou:
=inutes. .
e Willia = son guessed that his nex: contact vi:5 7hillip was same:ime in. the nex: two or three weeks. Williamson said he later (in May) received ' Le newscaster a call from a newscaster fr== Channel 9 is Cincinnati. j had a copy of Phillip's letter to Applegate describing the issues to be i investigated. Williamson recalled speaking with Phillip s==etime after being contacted by the newscaster. Villiamson said he had no more contact with anyone regarding this investigation until the material came out from the Government Accountability Project. Williamson said he was not involved with the writing of the Region III report of investigation. He did not feel that he had to write anything nor did he ever feel tha:
' he would have any input into the report..
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' 39
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Review of .Teldine Records .."- .. .. .: ch . ..' ~~ :h. : =. : :f :. : "::111:. " r .d-===a-a- a*_ l Ca'Tebrua-v_19 031. _0IA rettestedp *I's t_ ese51or f th e eresident g==e-- . W -*e'._ m --_.$ d e -- g.pJ e -- a,L ;;# mgee f-r wel ds C"I-606 sa_4; .m r_s?' OIA reviewed these p'ackages and de:er=ined. a=ong other things, that e'a'ch of 'these velds - s': ' ~ one or =cr e' 'ti:ieV ' ~~ l l 7 had been accepted bv Kaiser. Additionallv , sub se:u e-t te acces:ance :-Je
- 3D, .- -
of the 1.alds in cuestion were cut out a-d replaced . - >-- r
- . . . - w-o . . . .... ....
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The II report dese:1 bed the history of veld RE-42 and indicate'd its .. current .statur. .as being. included is as, ongoing radiograph review. .. ,, i CIA, learned from the available veld docu=en:atien that - ~ f h./ M N / on C6ntra:-r21.to1981 v arch this\ Kaiser' effietals er' ered veld ?S 4 2 -"-_ere d m-#bv verkine I Ae ri' 14 1980 lihe ueld t.as re=oved ard Kaiser This rework occurred during the period of the II eerser-*1 .
- en its reolacie.ent.
' investiga.:en (the 1:ves:1gators were on si:e April 7-9 and April 30-May 2.198p. . _
?
c The :I report s:ated tha[ veld K-811 was velded on Neve=ber 9,19, e . CIA discovered tha: this date related to ano:her veld (K-516) and tha: j' veld K-all was actually velded on January 30, 1979. The II repor:
)I[,916) correctly is accordance s:ated with thethat veld K-811 disposition specified was i: NK #I-2133 cut out R1 and replaced by l 1 (Revision 1); however, CIA ccupared the original of this NR sta= ped . h i "70D" vith Ravision 1 and found three ite=s of note. -
I t . .. First, although' the original NR ide' n tified that both velds (K-811 a:id K-l 516) had " hold points" scheduled for inspec:1on by the Authori:ed Nucles ' Inspector (ANI), Revision 1 of the NR deleted any ref erence to veld K-CIA subsequently reviewed the vel'd package for veld _K-ili which l
;316.
disclosed tha: the inspection documentation (KI-l for= #A-16922) con:ained . a "vaiver" of the hold soint by the ,UC dated Nove=ber 8 1977. The !
"*= '="^"'"'=">'=*""====*"'>'='*"'*=- -!
M/c 'that NR E-2138 may have mistak_enly identified the veldJ.s having a _
=issed_ held poi.nt. However,!1nterview c: sne inseeetor assigned :Q f pg [p
'*N E-eview doct :ent sidisclosed that he oe11 evac tne inf or:ation contained on
'the original NR dated October 11, 1979, was accurate. The inspector f
also could no explais why the information relating to veld K-516 was
@ffd deletad f:om Revision 1 and advised that he had not written (typed) the l
.i revision of the NK. #
0 - Second. the ortrinal NR carries a dispos _ition of " accept as is" whiq$L pgg tontradicts Revision 1 s disposition of " cut out and reulace weld." ~
}C W . . .
Third. Revision 1 uns not v;1tten by the same inspector as indicated above, yet the inspectors' name and original date are contained on the 2 6 ; s .'
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't rev:sien. This n verified bv :he f ecer suee- riser of ':e- - -- Cc .:rel_ \
a who advised CIA tha: :he procacures, f or:erly utili:ed bv K.aise: QA, had 1 been :s ":ype" :he revised n vish all cf the sa=e inf:=a:icn . (including { i ) na:e of :he original inspec:: ) thi"h c:=ple:dC the t:p and-*ef: hand " i l I/ side of the f o=, Revisien 1, theref ore, was writ en sene:i=e af ter the j' l da:e of the original and presu= ably af ter the date of the " voiding" yg# g [' (Decenber 11,, 1979). The result of this acti n, hevever, 1. wri:e gives the - l the revision, - i N - - _areearanet that not only did the original inspec:c out veld K-611 was =ade on Oc:ober 11, 1979 , {l bu: also tha: the decisi:n to cu: the site, when, in f ae:. the veidint '$ prior :o Applegate's e=picy=ent at -ef -- --a za ' 4 d's - - ,, pg f t h e 'f' a-.d the aerual re= oval and reelacenen-Acelega:e nad been hired and b cuch: inf erna:1en of g- occur u til af:e pe:ential veld def ec s in seecif:.c vales _:e :ne(atten::.:n of CF,&I ef fic3._ .s.s i.3 4 g N M-I 6-tes of n I2139 and n I2138 R1 are fun:.snec as A::ac..=en:s 9 anc
~ ~ - -- ,sD/& dd ocL6iir%-* - adegen cetec:ive Ngf # 83 3elev is a b:lef dese:1p:1cn 'o: cne s:a us a " --"ee j FCO @e velds and available inde=ation'documen:ed during the c:urse of both :he N.
' II and the OIA investiga:icns. J- - .. gig ]s ,,, A
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"kagarding veld No. CY-606, a review cf recc:ds shewed this veld was firs: radiegraphed en July ,15,1976, and f eu=d to have inc= plate fusien and penetra:1cn in the areas of 0-13 and 13-16. The areas
vere repaired and the veld ra adiographed on June 5,1977, and
- f cu=d to be acceptabla. A reviev was ade of the radi: graphs f :
veld quali:7, techniques and.repon a.^.uracy by as T/.S level !!! radiographer en oc::bar 12, 1979, as a resul: of the EC inspec:ica condue:ed in 1973. The 1.avel I!! fcund se=a discrepancies whi:h 1 have not been resolved and the veld has no received final acceptance." 1 OIA Review of Welding Docu=enca:icn A " reconstructed" veld data sheet for this veld was located and bore the notation " original card los: recens::ucted by RT data." QA sta=ps fo: ins::ve:Lons 1, 2, 3 and 7 - i.e. , proper precedure, bevels, fit up and final pass - were missing: in place of the QA stamp was a reference to the above-quoted notatien. This veld was originally dene in id-1976. The package dese:1bes the history of this veld as follevs: 9 g . *
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1 . 41 . s i-r 7/16/76 Radi graphic Repc;: indi: stas .raj ec:ier. f e; hc= plate Fusies, Undarcu 0-13, 13-26 7/16/76 Reverk ordered 7/il/76 Additional rework orf arad
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7/27/76 Radiographic Raper:1. .a -> indica:as refectics 'f or- -Inc=ple:e - - - -- Fusien, 0-u; 12- 1s , - - l .
, . . -. ." ;. . . ., _: .. . . . . : : c. . s . ..a. . :-. . . a u. :. 4 : : ;T
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7/27/76 - Rework E?.~ared
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' 8/2/76~ "iNDI Ra6$s' -W"RiT."Gii5d Outic: !=f.o=at::: D:.;/" -fIC._ -
;,---,~-I' indicates. redact o 8/2/76 ' * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8/4/76 NDE Requesi"ifo',"P.T. Repai: Arai :s 'Lacata"Oafect Tes, sd' hy"2 :. R.T." . J
'].~8 /.4 /7 6 - pens: rah: *! sfuti = -daipert i=dicatas no: ac:apted because cf Crack ,1: Idge of '.Teld
.,.. . . . ...,. .,.._g.; y._.w 8/9/76 Radiographic Rape:: i=dicates rej ec: ice f e Cracks, Sc=plete Tusion 12
~
8/10/76 Rework, ordered . l
, 8/11/76 '. Radiographic Ra' pert ini:ially indicated rej ec:icn for cracks l
' / 3 O 07 MM' 8%}d. KZZ :a=d i=ce= plats p fusion is a:aas C 12; subsequently o
< l 'l? $. and 6433 eccap:ed.
OUC -_ pp' 5 4337 V7 -m *
.a 2/15/77 Revork ordered A ~
i M e6/8/77 Radiographic Repert indicates acceptance. jo 4. r)9 NCC At?Dit --Ho .sHtm uncGQENNy , NOTE: II. Report indicated 10/12/79 NIS findir.g of " discrepancies." This NES. findiss was not in the veld package when reviewed by
*1^-
bio trMy GEf CA f.EfueTf"f7NS.7. . . I The veld packaga f or vald CT-606 is included. as A::achmen: 5. Mt.- 5/72. 10 5 go t@.v/so Me satum asp WM# I t78o Sc'AMR # "ggsmsm-,# .orf . p yT.n . i I
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IE'Investiration Reco t .
. . . ,.- .. e. . .. . . :
"Regarding veld No; RE-42; . reed:ds i=dicated this , veld"vas '!1:st
radiographed on Augv.s: 9,1976, a=d found to have unacceptable . . porosity and . slag in :he areas of 36 48: ' The areas were repaired ~ and a raradio' graph perfo:# sed on August 10,1976; ,found i: to be ., ic=eptable A inviev %as =ade o!' the ridiographs'! : self ' quality , t echnieu es . and report accuracy by'an KI5 ' laver II radiographer c: 23.1980_ _las part of the above centicced re-review initiated [.Jamua -v after the 1978-79 NRO i=spections. The NES Level II radiographer D found so:ne' discrepancies which have not bee: resolved, and the veld has so: Been give: final accepta:ce." . CIA Review of Teldine Doe ==entatien CIA's review of the veld package revealed -J.a: during the peried h ch to May 1980 veld 72-42 was cut out a:d replaced by veld 72-K-262. The veld package dese:1bes the his:: 7 of .his vitid as fellows: .
. 8/6/76 Isitial veld fi:-up, es:. , inspected.
s . 8/9/76 Ladiograph revealed unacceptable por:sity i=d slag' in
- the ' area of 3 6-48. ,
g,7 8/10/76 Reverk ordered. h*/~dy311/76 Reverk accer:ed Sv KII based ^* pe August 10. 1976 r
' a,a -rux e-ass burre m='e:Ir cm = Mu>eradiegraph. .
.; = M 70..
w .~ ! /21/80 Weld pH-42 ordered cut out. V///, C C-f ..- 5 -c - - W
?- /d/U.// C/Yfff e iesc.s . . , I i ,4 21/ 0 Revork to reprepara veld area ordered. ma-e-4/23/80 QA verification of proper bevels, et=. . for the is process
- veld based upon Ap
- 11*14,1980,1.iquid Pene:: ant Test Raport.
. ~ 4 4/30/80 QA rejection of proper bevels, etc.
- 5/1/80 .qA reverifica ica of p;cper b'evels, etc.
5/7/80 Radiographic Report and Weld Data 'Sh'et: indicate KIl app;cval. l i The veld package for veld M 42 is included as Attach =ent 6. . JiybuG~HttrFM af BMtRtv
~
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- 43
~ ';IL3 WR-K-ill II Investfration Recor:
. "Regarding veld No. K-811, a review of records shewed it was velded on Nove=ber 9, 1977, but because an Authori:ed Nuclea; Inspecto: .
hold point uns missed a: the fitup, the veld was cut out tedand replaced by Non-by veld No. K-916. ne =issed hold pois: vez doc __e confo:=ance Report (NR) No. I-2138R1. Bis NR indicates tha: the disposition us to cut out a=d replace the weld." ' OIA Review of Welding Docu=entation
- "he veld package describes the history of this veld as fellows :
1/29/79 Ini:ial veld, f t:.p, etc. 10/11/79 Handwri::en Nc= enf e:=ance Report dated 10/11/79, No. I-2138. Describes that established ANI hold point ws missed. Dispositien - Perform RT - Accept ou basis of K". NR stamped "VOD" dated Dece=ber 14,1979 (i=cluded as A::ach=en: 9) . No /N % SN g&Lqn@ MCg at W649 }cf27...
,f !f,f,2$O f
' ' 10/11/79 Iyped No confo:=ance Report dated 10/11/79, No. I-2138 R.1.
Describes that established ANI hold point uns 1ssed.
' veld.M s esi:1en signed o=
Disposi:1on - cut out and : ' ? f 511EEN * ' ' W* ' 1/ /80.ggy-1/15/80 Weld No. K-916 inideWW to replace weld ,K-811. A i ' 1/24/80 ri=al pass of K-916. ne veld packag for veld K-811 -is included as Attachcen: 7. j .p,sm, tw istm JS to W 18f.Wa.C D o NE. . . j - s 0
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, UNITED STATES
- $ ', j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
; REGION ll!
- ghj.- '"A l c 799 AOOSEVELT AoAD 4 O t' GLEN ELLYN. 8LLINCL5 80137
*...a Septenber 8, 1981 MDiORANDUM FOR: James B. McCarten, Investigator i
FRO.w.: J. F. Streeter, Acting Director, Enf orcement and Investi-gation Staff SUBJICT: 1978 II.ECTRICAI. ALI.ECATIONS - ZDCER Please =ake sure we adequately cover during the ongoing Zi=ner investi-gation a=y loose ends that =ay be in J. Foster's August 11., 1981, =enerandun to you and me on this subject including the attach =ent to that nencrandu=. r - __
-w .e _
l J. F. Streeter, Acting Director
- Enforcement and Investigation Staff e
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- f. 46* ** Cm'e, UNITED STATE 5
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% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I REGION Ill e, [ 799 ROOSEVELT meAo I
- oLEN ELLYN ILLINOIS Go137
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Augus: li., 1951 - MEMORAhTUM FOR: J. F. Streeter,' Acting Director, Enforcement and Investigation Staff J. B. McCarten, Investigator FROM: James Foster, Investigator
SUBJECT:
1978 ELECTRICAL ALLEGATIONS - ZI.P R On October.12, 1973, I received a telephone call from Mr. Dennis Ledford of the U. S. Testing Company (UST). Ledford was employed at the Zimer site as an electrical QC inspector and had been there for approximately three months. UST was being replaced as the lead electrical inspection group, and Kaiser was performing most electrical inspections. Ledford indicated he was going to be dismissed, and that he was concerned regarding several aspects of the electrical QC program at Zimer. He recounted concerns relative to cable pulling,' cable storage, Nonconformance
- Reports (which were either not being processed or were voided), and design
! changes which he felt relaxed the original plant specifications.
He stated that UST personnel had formerly reported to Mr. Stu Tulk, but he had been promoted, and they now reported to Mr. Mike Kopp. He stated that ! Tulk was not to blame for the conditions which concerned him. He named three other inspectors who were involved with electrical QC inspections: (1) Gray Clark (sp?), (2) Jerry Grover, and( 3) Dave Cordy (sp?). - The central concern he discussed involved Design Document Change (DDC) E-3710, modifying specification H-2173 by deleting paragraph 202.22(b) which dealt with electrical cable installation. The DDC indicated that Sargent & Lundy would identify any cable tray overfill and direct the contractor to take corrective action. On the basis of the DDC, Noncon-formance Reports dealing with cable tray overfill had been voided with the notation "see DDC-I-3710". Nonconformance Report (NR) numbers - provided as examples of such voiding were 2393, 2394, 2395, and 2396, all dated September 8,1978 (apparently, many " hold" tags had been applied on that date). , y,fendd - . p p . w e cs s o
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J. T. Streeter - 2- Augus: 14, 1951 On October 16, 1978, Gray Clark (spt) and Ledford telephoned RIII. Ihey indicated that Jerry Grover and Ledford had been let go fro: 'JST for lack of work, and Clark was afraid that he would be terminated shortly. They also stated that several of the Kaiser. electrical QC personnel had concerns is the electrical area, but were afraid to talk to the NRC for fear of re-pression. During this conversation, we again discussed the previously expressed concerns, and concerns relative to temporary wiring, temporary cable tray supports, conduit inspection, and grounding deficiencies. NR E-1270 relative to a conduit inspection deficiency was mentioned. From the discussion, Ledford had discussed his concerns with site personnel including Turner, Zhas, and Schweirs, without gaining any satisfaction. He stated that he was preparing a letter to Cincinnati Gas & Electric, Kaiser, and the local newspapers detailing his concerns, but had not decided whether to send it. He indicated his decision might be affected by a meeting with Turner and Culver, scheduled for later that day. On October 17, 1978, Ledford again telephoned me. He stated that UST had offered him a job in their New Jersey home office, and he had accepted this' position. He had decided.not to send his letter, and did not wish to continue to discuss his concerns with RIII personnel. He inquired as to whether NRC had any open positions, and indicated that he would call me from New Jersey sometime in the future.
- 4 I was never re-contacted by Ledford or contacted by the others named. I referred the information I~ had been provided to electrical inspectors. in
- the Reactor Construction Branch (T. Vandel, G. Maxwell, J. Hughes). They
- inspected the Zimmer site on October 24-26, 1978, and reviewed the infor=a-l tion I had provided. Their inspection is documented in II Inspection Report ;
No. 50-358/78-25. No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were ' i observed during the inspection. Attached are my notes of the telephooe conversations, the inspection report, and a note to T. Vandel (then the Zimmer Project Inspector) from F. Jablonski regarding similarities of the concerns to earlier NRC observed deficiencies. Also attached is C. Norelius' semo documenting his acre recent telephone conversation with Mr. Gerald Grover. l
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M D D R.L T . IV 1: lagion III Tile TsoM: Charlas E. 5cralins, Assim tant to the Director I st5Jy::T: m MON RECARDI:iG TEZ : DOE 1 FACIIITT on January 14, 1981, I received a talephone call from Mr. Ceald Crover. 301-863-3801. Em had formally been a QC inspector at the *N =f plar.t. Specifically, he had workmi for a jobber, C11bert, during the su:mer of 1978. Bis job was to do QC inspections in the electrical area. Be stated that be wrots many nonconformancas w'-M related prinarily to the pulli.ng and laying of electrical cables. En stated that u.a=y vers returned as be.ing invalid. He said that his sepcvisor, who ha ceuld e ly rMer as "Stu", would advise him that he was writi=g too mas no6conforna=ces and 1.nplying that he should not be doi.=g th.is. Finally he .au ted that ha was relieved from his job. , While othar raa.sc..a were of ficially givun, . he stated it was his view that be was rali.aved from hi.s job bec.ause he was reporti=g all the details of his findings. Es stated that ha could not remember in detail tho' individual's name for whom he worked nor could ha reme.ber the sp.ecific name of a=y other inspectors, wbon he said he had had a similar experie=ca. Es volunteered that he had worked in the past with Jack Bushes, the current NEC Resident ,
- I.nspector at Parry. Es asked for Jack Enghes' talaphone nu=be.r which i was provided for him. Ha said that ha thought Jack knew of the other QC inspector whom he referenced, and possibly* the supervisor, and he was going to call and talk to him about it. .
I rafarred the above information to Jim McCarten who on January 14, 1911, was involved in an investigation at the Ziznar plant 1.svolving allegations similar to those provided by Craver. These matters vill be considered as part of the current investigation. l O
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- Charlas E. Notalius e Assistant to the Director cc: T. Daniels, 11
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.. Beyond my centacts with Ledford and Clark, =y caly participatic:.vas :: relay the co:cer:s they expressed to RIII reactor cc:struerien branct pers:: el.
I did not accompany them to the site nor review their inspecti:: report (due to sy involvese i: priority i=vestigatic:) c::i1 after it was fi:alized. { . 7A James I. Icster ! Investigato: l l Attachments
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Docket No. 50-358 /~I Cincinnati Cas and Electric Company ATTN: Mr. Earl A. Borgmann Vice President Engineering 139 East 4th Street
. Cincinnati, OH 45201
~ Gentlemen: N This refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. T. E. Vandel.
G. F. Maxwell and J. Hughes of this of fice on 0;tober 24-26,1975, i of activities at W. H. jZi--* Nuclear Power Plant au'thorized by NRC Construction Per=1t No. CP?R-SS and to the discussion of our findings with Messrs. 3. Culver, W. V. Schwiers and others at
.the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection" report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Vithin these areas..the inspection consisted of a selective exanination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel. No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection. In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2. Title 10, Cod'e of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report vill l be place,d in the NRC's Public Document Room, except as follows. If this report contains information that you or your contractors 4 believe to be proprietary, you must apply in writing to this l office, within twenty days of your receipt of this letter. to f withhold such *information from public disclosure. The ] application mustMticlude a full statusent. of the reasons for which the information is considered proprietary, and should be
. prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is contained in an. enclosure to the application.
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1 - DEC 0 : .: / o Ciocinnati Cas and Electric Company We will gladly discuss scy questions you have concerning this
- inspection. .
Sincerely. R. 7. Beishman. Chief Reactor Construction and Regineering Support Branch
Enclosure:
IE Inspection Report Fo. 50-358/78-25
. e ce v/ encl:
Mr. J. R. Schott, Plant Superintendant Central Pilas
- ' Reproduction Unit NRC 2Cb FDR .
T.ecal PDR - NSIC TIC l U. Young Park, Power Siting Comission l
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U.S. NUC' EAR RICl" ATCTY CO?.;ssiCS
,. OTTICE CT INSTT.CTICS A:3 ESTCRCD'.I':7 RICICN III l . Report No. 50-358/78-25 Docket No. 50-358 License No. CPPR-85 i Licensee: Cincinnati Cas and Electric Cc=pany i 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 Tacility Name: E=. H. Zimer Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Zi mer Site, Moscow, OH Inspection Conducted: October 24-26, 1975 c ?<<.b-Inspectors: T. E. Vandel - *
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Approved By: . n. H a y e s',' ef Projects Section Inspection Su=arv , Inspection on October 24-26, 1978 (Report No. 50-358/78-25) Areas Inspected: Special Inspection of the installation of electrical cables and c,paponents and review of related quality records.
. Re sul t s< No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAII.S e Persons Contacted Cincinnati Cas and Electric Coeeanv (C0&E)
*B. K. Culver, Manager of Construction
*R. P. Ehas, QA&S Engineer
*W. W. Schwiers, Principal QA&S Engineer Kaiser Engineers Incerporated (KII)
*R. Marshall, Project Manager
*R. E. Turner, QA Manager
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
l The inspectors also contacted other e=ployees and craf ts=en during the inspection, including represent..tives of CO&I, XII, Foothill Electric Cocpany (Toothill), and Reactor Controls, Inc., (RCI). Functional or Program Areas Inseected Purpose of Insoection l
- On October 12 and 16, 1978, the RIII office received infor=ation i by telephone from an individual who had concerns about certain electrual construction activities at the Zi==er site. Hevever, on October 17, 1978, the RIII office was notified by this indivi-dual that he no longer had these concerns and that he would not discuss this matter with the NRC any further.
Following an evaluation of the aforementioned events by RI!! manage-sent, the decision was made to perfor= a .special inspection at the Zimmer ' site to make independent observations of electrical constructien activities which involved those areas of concern that had been reported to Region III. Thefesuit of those independent observations are docu=ented as fo11cvs.
- 1. Cable Tray Syste=s -
- a. The'EIII inspector observed that cable tray riser sections RK1153. R1154 and R1155 located in the Reactor Building at elevation 525' have 3/8" holes drilled in the back of the risers. In res,ponse to questioning, the licensee presented the inspector.with Design Document Change (DDC-E-3665) dated September 22, 1978. The purpose of e
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thin design change was due to certain riser configurati:n (5- typ e) and -loading (overfill), which allows installation of cable ties to hold cables within the cable tray pan.
- b. The RIII inspector observed that side rail extensions were being installed on existing esble trays in various areas throughout the plant. Turther review in this area established snat when side rail extensions are required to increase the capacity of the tray syste=, due to overfill of cables, they are to be installed in accordance with an approved drawing. S&L drawing E-13-2, revision T, dated May 8, 19783 incorporated design document change DDC-I-2599 regarding the side rail installation details, was being used.
The inspector also observed that KII is draf ting an inspection procedure for the inspection of the installed side rail extensions.
- c. The inspectors observed that cables, not properly supported, have been identified as a - generi.: condition. Exa:ples of this condition being addressed are docu=ented in non-confermance reports nu=bered NR2450 and NR2481. It was noted that several nonconformance reports addressing l similar nonconfor=ing conditions have been " voided;"
the'inspecter was infor=ed that in each case, inspection personnel were infor=ed as to why the reports vere " voided."
- d. The inspectors observed that protective sof teners are being installed on the edges of cable trays (where sharp edges may damage the cable jackets). Additionally, it was observed that inspection of cable trays for sharp edges is one of the required installation inspection checkpoints which have not yet been completed for all cable tray installations. CC&E.and Kaiser quality assurance personnel informed the -inspectors that the protection of cables f, rom sharp edges is an on-going surveillance type of inspection activity.
'e. ' The inspectors observed that design document changes DDC 3602 and 3603 vere written about the unsatisf actory
- insty11stToh supports of "nonsafety" cable trays.
installed above annunciator panels IPA 04JA and-e 9 3 8
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IPA 04J3. The inspec tor was inf or=ed, by Kaiser nA
'------ to personnel, that S&L is designing ceb1:
correctly suoport those cable trays identif f-d in tr.e above listed DDC's.
- f.
The inspectors observed that a nonconf ormanee report and require NR No. N-638 has been written to document k--a damaged repair of " associated" cables which ht" by being walked on. NOTE: Associated cables are "non-a saf ety" non " Class 11" electrical cables which have been. associated with " Class II" cables during their installation.- For example, if a non Class II cable is routed through any portion of a Class 1E race-vay system, the cable vill be identified as an associated cable for that particular electrical division. 3 The inspectors spot-checked various areas of the plant and observed that there are cases where cables ju=p cable trays without being routed through conduit. However, in each instance (where the inspectors made 4 these observations) the Kaiser quality assurance personnel had previously identified the non,confernance. The inspector noted that this is an onseing inspection function which the assigned Kaiser cable installation inspectors are required to perfor=. ' h. The RIII inspector reviewed Design Document Change t00-E-3710 dated October 3, 1978 which addresses overfill cenditions of the cable tray system. It was also learned that the site engineers are continuously evaluating cable tray overfill and are.taking necessary corrective action to prevent further overfill of tray systems.
- 1. Concerning Class-1E cables stored on reels and electrical switchgear stored inside per=anent buildings, the inspectors observed: .
- At least 15 cable' reels were stored in a controlled area located in the Turbine Building. The cables had
* ** their ends sealed with tape and were stored in revs
- such as not to allow the sides of the reels to over-lap adjacent ree,1s. ,
- The internals of at least 15 Class II electrical The .
pahels were inspected for cleanliness. I e 6 0 e
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__ _ _ u - -- - - - - - - - - inspectors observed that evo of the panels containct metal filings on the floor. The evo panels (IPL10JB and IPL10JC) had been identified by Kaiser quality assurance personnel in nonconf or=ance report numbered NR2149, which has not been closed. During the exit interview, the inspectors were informed that these two panels were being cleaned at the time of the exit interview and that the 57 would be closed before the end of the day.
- 2. Conduit Installations
- a. The inspector observed that the conduit and cables identified in nonconformance report E1270 had been removed. The inspector was inf ormed that the conduit and cables will be replaced such that the cables, contained within the conduit, will not exceed their
. sinimum bend radius.
- b. The inspector observed that the ground cables for all conduit sleeves have not yet been installed and
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inspected. The inspector was infor=ed that the entire raceway grounding system vill be inspected on an area basis in accordance with a grounding inspection procedure which is in draft for=. It was established that the grounding procedure vill be ready fer implementation by November 27, 1978.
- 3. Records -
- a. ' A review of the surveillance reports log and copies of selected separate reports.vas made. It was learned that earlier in the year, prior to July 1978, some surveillance reports had not been converted to nonconformance reports (NR's) after the' thirty day limitation as required by the procedure (G-14 revision 1).* In response to questioning, the inspector was informed that this failure had been identified by KEI personnel and that a systenatic review of all surveillance reports was undertaken to review all
*re*p orts and closeout or convert to NR's if necessary.
This task is currently in progress and appeared to the inspector to be approximately.75% complete. The inspecter ingyired**ht to the status of surveillance report SR-1236 regarding grounding of electrical rystem and learned that althoulh this report is still open, it is being addressed F 9 e 2 s . S '#*' * ** W ".= g m s e ye. e agan. _
- . - __ _ __ _ _ _ . i 4 .
by DDC SLE-7A7 regarding grounding standards, and by a draf t Cou truction Inspection Plan (CIP) being prepared It was specifically f or the grounding syste= inspection. added that although the electrical grounding syste= is not considered to be safety related, the licensee has difer*ad 'het the CIP be prepared and perfor=ed. All
- b. The NR control ' log was -reviewed by the inspector.
NR's issued receive control nu=bers (CN's) while ess'ential (safety related) FR's are additionally "I". To date, sequentially numbered preceeded by the letter a total of 2631 NR's have been issued with 1411 I category NR's. As of this date in excess of 600 NR's (CN's) are currently in an open status. In response to questioning it was learned that a weekly tabulation of open NR's is issued ! weekly to all managers with those NR's available to be verked on highlighted. In addition, a monthly co=puter A nu=ber of NR's
- run is issued f or f urther inf or=ation.
were reviewed that had been voided, NR> s 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396 all vere voided on October 10, 1978. These all vere relative to cable placing in the trays and all vere voided with the notation "see DDC 3710." No example uns observed by the inspector
- of voided NR's without a justification. The inspector did learn that at one ti=e a few voided NR's were not maintained as records, however, a new revision is being
~
issued to QAP 16 (Rev. 3) that vill require voided NR's to be
. saintained as a record.
- c. The inspectors reviewed the training records for assigned site electrical inspection personnel. The records indicated that personnel are being f a=iliati=ed with the applicable requirements before being assigned to conduit inspection ~
functions. The inspector noted that an internal audit-of Kaiser (Audit report nu=bar 345) identified some j concerns. Also, that action is being taken to resolve those concerns. Exit Interviev , 3, .. The inspectors 'att with licensee representatives - (denoted in the Persons Contacted paragraph) 'at the conclusion of the inspection on October 26, 1978. The ~ inspectors ' outlined the scope of the inspection and presented the results of inspection for each' In conclu'sion,'the inspectors indicated identified concern.
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identified as a resultthey had no f urther ques that 4 9 9 4 g .g f 8 e ee@ O
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MEMCRANDUM .FOR: Chai man Pallacino ' Cc::T.issioner Gilinsky Cemissicner Bradferd Cemissioner Ahearne Comissione'r Roberts - FRCM: g. James J. Cu=ings, Directort,,,p V dbh ' Office of Inspec:Or anc Auci: r 1 SUBJEC : ACEOUACY OF IE INVESTIGATION 50-355/30-0g AT THE WILLIAM H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR PCWER STATION
, f Attache ::1 ease 'ind our re: rt enti-led. "Adecuacy'of IE Inves:ica-i:r.
"i ,.jj % ,,,,, 50-253/10-29 a: the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power 5:1-icn" ca ai 088yg, <C r - .. '--J Th's intui y was c:ncu::e: ::ursuan :: a Cec a-- = - *:::.
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S., k : lear : -e- 5 a-i n. f r'. Q,, / CI 's :ve-f.1 finding is tha: the IE investicati:n e' A::le;a s's (.(D? f.'.e;a-i:ns, IE Te : 352/EC-Cc, was unsitisfac : y. base: :n :.e f:liowing % r fin:1 5 <s
- f. The investigatieng, ai'.ed ta precerly decumer.: -he esults of investiga:icn be:n as c intarviews and ma erial revia.e:.
- j. The inves-igati:n failed to detemine tne : rre : sta us and history cf several wel:s.
3 The overall investiga-ive effer: was neither viger:us ner su#ffcier.Cy breac in s:::e. Q. The finding of "n0: sucstantiated" with regard :: the allega-d:-
- na :efective welds in safety-related sys: ems hac been ac:s: a: is no censistent with the facts.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the IE investigation in this instar.ce OIA mace a conscicus eff:rt :: te :e- cur evaluatien crecess with ths ,
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very c:vicus fac: tha: few investigations can suc:esitus sy wl:hstand the
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CAUTION g f/jgr},,,,, The tached d::ument is furnished f:r:ffi:ial . pur;cs s.Inf:rrr.s:i:n ::ntained herein sh:uld ' he dis:! sad :nly12 N30 pers:nnelv,h:s Outits tequitt 2::sts :nd sh:uid n:t be further 5:sernir.:::d un!sts :thtrxisc indi:ated.
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. . criticism of a P0ncay morning cuarterback; unf:rtunately, we still concluce that the everali investigative effer: in this instance was unsatisfac:Ory. In our opinien res:cnsibility for :nis situation must be shared nc only by the incividuals whc were specifically assignec ::
the case but also by recional officials wne failed to properly su;ervise the case. gay yg y,p flo s ecific corrective recer=endatiens are be4ne : ade by C la = * " d e . .3;=:.cecause we are nesttan; w ccnciuce tnat ne Overaii IE investiga-tive program is ceficient based en this instance. A mere extemdva
. review of the IE investicative crecram is clannea '- --= -n - '"- -a a f-=- w a -- a will ce e .1ne it c c c-e"- " = -="- --= i ia s a re wa rrant ec.
d Attach ea.t: As Sta ec cc: 'd. Dir:ks, w/a ach V. Stelic, w/at acn J. <e: ler, w/ attach h 4 l a l l l i 0FFICIAL USE ONLY ,
l SMm . . In Ce:e:bar 1930, the Gover.:en: A:: us:abili:y ?:ojec: (GA?) ade allega:1:ns en behalf ef Mr. The as App *ega:e to the effec: tha: (a) pote::ially f aulty censtrue:ica existed a: the Zi==e Nuclear pcvar Stati:n, Mosceu, Chio, and (b) the NRC failed to properly 1:vestiga:e the f aul:7 cons: rue:1cn allega:icns when they were firs: b cugh: :: :he NRC's a::entics in E=h-~n-v 'o** by Mr. Applegate. The Office of Inspe:::: and Audi:ct (CIA) was direc:ed to investigate GA?'s la :e: allegatien, i.e., whether the Office of Inspection and Inforce=en: (II), Regien ::: adequa:ely investigated Mr. Applega:e's February 1980 allega:1ces. ~ne scope of this repc : ex: ends nei:her to the evaluation of other Regi:n III ac:icus relati=g : ;i==e: nor to the questi:n of alleged'.y faul:7 cens: u::1cn at Zi==er. During :he period Dece:bar 1980 threugh .reernary 195 Q partinen: cur es: and fo=e: Region !!! perscnnel were :.n=e:itavec :o icentify what was 4E dene as a resul: of the ini:ia; allega:1:ns =ade by Applaga:e. M /W available_dec" ati-. r=*t '-- : !? reei: a.1 1-ves:1:a-ive :::ceft ar NJM;:- /--9 f and c: pies of 1:specti:n and investiga:1:n reper:s pertaining :: :he Ci==e si:e were reviewed. Reviev of :he za:erial fu=ished by GA? in Oece:bar 1930 dis:1: sed :ha: only a 'i=1:ed nu:be: ef the GA? allega:icns had been b : ugh: :: :he at:en:1:n of the Region III !I invas: iga:ive staff by Applega:a in ,, Februar/ 19eC. /4's/ Iased : in:e: tiews c:ndu::ad a Reci:n 1:1, C A _de emised. :ha: :he 1:i:04" i:vestiga:ive effer: cendu::ed by Regi:n I;; hac assessed :he al'.eg::i:ns, had received avai'able za:eri*., and had ini:iated an invas:1;a:1:n ist: these allegatiens :ha Regien !!! deter ined :: he ui:h.= :.e purview of the F.C. Regi:nal personnel adviJed :ha: :he invas:1;a:17e eff::: vas cendue:ed in a ::: dance with :I ;;ccadures and tha: they believed tha the repc:: h:::ughly docu=en:ed dise:ve:ies surf aced during the invas: iga:1:n. -- g I gg g yg / CIA review cf I ' = 1-~es:::st-"=F ' -I disclesed inadteuate decu=en:a-1: .. yo: exa:ple,E e inves:17a:ree snieJ:en:ains ne ce: ailed cocu=en:atien reflec:ing thetresui:s c: In:e: nev[vi:h Aeole:ste c principal vitnesses_
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by :he investiga: cts with retard to the specific welds allager. :: e defective. CIA reviev cf Zi==e veldi:g re:::ds revealed that of the three allegef-7 1 defective velds specifically i:entified by Applegate in his firs: allega:i:n, two had been._:eca_ ired or racia:ed. ene (K-8111 sher:1v befere and the p: hor e ni-m bi inc 9. M --- es:1ct :ve ef f ert a: the fuciliev. The
;E investigative reper did ne: identify the dates on which the veldi:3 rework. was conducted on veld _K-Sil er tha: a nenconfe=ance recor: (h"R) en K-811 that had initis11v bea- c ' s e d .-' -5 e e c 2- n "a::so: as is" van 'i-=- iciaed and ree _e-ed :- erde- 9. e' d e" cu - The invas::gaci:n also filled to de e m ine tha- veld F" ".2 had bena
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d. after :he ini:iation of the !,I invas:1gatien. In:e:tievs cf :he invas: iga:::s discicsed :ha: they had ne kncviedge that velding repair e . 3"-C had
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KM fpla.:,Ag Applegate's seccnd original anegation conce=in'g the installation cf d safety-related prefabrica:ed pipe con:aining allegedly def ective velds was partially substantiated by the II investigatien. This anega: en, as it related to i= properly " closing ou:" as NR and ins:alling the pipe , resulted is the region identifying one 1:e= of non-c:=pliance and issuing the licensee a: "infractien." Hevever, _the 'I invas: ira:ien dg p ne3 t:her case. fu'.ly investi sted s accuratelv racer:ec en : s2 as:e:: Dur nr :: e inves:1:a: .:n c: : . .s a n ses .:n. t zr -.tvas_
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goW f N- -' " " e a '_ t e r* - :n o f t h e ?- - v- i -- Teleasee ---> i- ei tietes //M l.,Mf? 'er i- -".s tilm-'--* - eir ??fered 5v * - '--t-d '" a s ?.d Ele:: 1: C a .* (CC4I' Ouality ?ssurt :e ( 9 v.- -=- -"h e ? r e - a - e--; r . _i:e-_:-i:ed :his indiv :ual as "a C 4I cffi:ial' - :hus Ob s urter fr--
--e rene- :.a: in:.st:1:ars. .: t was c:. e::e: :y :ta .:.:ensee 's sent::
etficia; respensib'e . ::: :ne :. pi -=.ntan:n =f :he OA :::gra a . i=e r.
*: addi:1: := n:: .wperting thi= f a:: . f.I did --- 'ull- inva -te t a the cire s: nces su- :m.d -- - e OA Mzr u e 's :: tarm ygg? gb.:;11ENYUM J'l77 ***
01.C s -aviev ~# -=,,;; ,.,a ... in:erviews -f eri: s eerse ne"_did n:: . develcp any addi:i::a1 inf:=a:: " ::gariin; :ne thir: aRega-i:n - inadequate pipe flusbi:g p::cadures - that was n::. ide::ified i . :he I invas: iga:i: repert. One cf Ap;1ega:e's :ai.. enegations was ": hat def ectite velds in saf e:7-rala:ed sys:c:a have beer accepted, a= ng :s s: ve ' ds C'.* 6C 6 , '.-7. C 's t : ; s :..
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/"".icansee) 5ased u:en :hese inspecti::s, Re ten --
to re:eites radi: graphs and reports of 41; vel:s vai:n had been accep ed
- e.1--d :he li: ens e. ,,,- "gggo Q, ,,. y f or turncver prier :c cperatics; this review s:arted in Oc::bar 1C79 and '
portions of :his reviev a e still being studied by Regi:n Z:. Nene:he'ess, the Rt.gic- I I reper: f:und : hat Applega:e's allega:1:n in this regard va: "not subs:an:ia:ed" because the Valds had act yo: :::tived " final a c t e; t an c e. '.: fact, Applege e was co::ac: 1: sayin; tha: i ferei"e velds i- rafe: -related '- *-* had been accev:ed. To say tha: Applega:e's a negen:n was no: substancia:ed appears to be i c'.estien ef se:an-i s - and isj.'et censistent with :ne T~ acts.' Lt su =arv the Retien -- 1.ves-1:2:1*? e e , , , , . m - .. . = , . . . . , . . , .. . . . . . . . , o , ! w e cr.eeeme , in out f use - e.,e -- e,1 e ,-s w . 1 . e . .. . . e d e c.=- c . . k Nw g wflo puso aw@n.n:WK~dd@ED By tH' LK&V.s12 Mmu wr Wa2 y . . _ _
3 r B A CK ORC'.-';D In early Dece=ber 1980, NRC receised a copy of a peti:i:n filed vi:h :he Office of the Special Counsel of the Merit Systa=s ? o:ec:icn Board by I the GAP of _ the Institute for Policy Studies (not a Gover =en:a; agency) I on behalf of The as k'. Applegate. Based upon the allega icus in this I re-4 rien, f er er NRC Chai:=an John Ahearne requested by ===crandu da:ed I Eece=rer 15, 1980](At:ach=en: 1), "...that the CIA c ndue: an investiga:ie: ! into whe:. er iise Of fice of Inspection and Inforce=en: c ndue:ed an adequa:e investiga:1cn cf the allega:icns presen:ed to 1: by -"ac=as 7 Applegate regart.ing activi:iss a: the Willia: H. Zi==e Nucles: ?:ver Station." *he Chair =an further direc:ed that II investigate :he safe:y issues raised by :.he GA? pe:i:1:n. CIA '---211v received t', C O te:itte-bv a tran=-ittal lett e- d e ed ce-*- e- 2o. 1C 607 f r-- : e --* -' --- Siecial Cet-sel / M at'--=-- D. O!A =e: vi:h GA? re:re se- stives en /Januar- 9. 1CS!.]a .d :n several ec:as _ :ns : e:esi:s:, :: discuss :ne a._eca::.: .s a: whi:h :izes addi:i:nal d::u=e.:a: :n was ;;:vided af:e: NRO agreed : raspec: :he ::nfidentia.1:7 cf G;J's scur:es. Eacause the ad:i:1::.al d::=en:ati:n reiz:ed :: safety issues, G A pr:vided i: :: !I fer i:s invas:igati:n. Ou;ing these :ee:ings GO e---isi ed tha- -' se- allees-1 .s sh:: d nt- '= - -- e -- : = d 3 s re -e c- * --cm-' ?~ ,1: 11- - s + - :' e <- > e - . = '-- - et e ':c j di: ne: er::er' . ediress the alles_a:iens.
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p ( d',.C lW Reviev ef 013 Ma arial b During the peri =d 'acenter 30 'C8' t'reuch Mar:h a. 1C51. 0 : -*~'a =' th e o r t ' - - = - ' - ' -- * '-- ' - - 4 '- - c : = c c-e '--- e -- ;-=-'- n-*+- hel nee-d--- e' '- m - r e e-n '"** '-' ----'- 4 e "-t- ti '--"-
-e =-'-- (in:1 ding nc:arized sta:e=en:s and tape rece dings) related to issues iden:.fied in the original petiti:n. In addi: ice, c:he l # docu=enta-ic . ts pr:vided which appeared :o per:ain to separate allega:ier.s l y d G er( 9 af construe:1:n irregulari:1es at the Zi==e: site. --"-' 8 '= ' ' - - - - - he'd #
l u furnished after the initial CIA / CAP nee:ing on:ained sta:e en:s and '
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[ inte tievs -' *-d'viduals which occur:ed at :eints in eine 'e'i vd-- - l Re n i en -- - -- -' -s e -a a' the Ac?lecate allers?' -=. As a resui: i l of the de:::en: review ir van m**ected and la:ers en: 1- e m. .a: :.any ef , l the allecati:.e described in the Jeti ice were, in rac . ne: 5-- --- -- l the attent::- -f - e se: ten I;I eersonnel a: the time e' the initia*__ 1 i 1 . t l \ . .. i i .
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__ . .1__.-__._,. _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ , _ t. 1 vesti;sti-a O.e r d ' r- 10:01 D.e CA? petiti:n listing the a.*legati::s (pages 12 and 1 ) unich vere presented as ::: being appropriately investigsted is included, with enclosures, as Attac..=e:: 3. Meetine with Recion III Personnel 0: Jacus-i 13. 1031 Dav'd R. Mle . Jo- R . Sinclair. a-d Areur 2 E6-eeelea. Office of Inspec:c: and Auditor, =et with the f=11ce. 3 e=ployees of II, Region III, at the regional office, Glen Illyn Illineis: Ja=es G. Keppler, Diree: :, Regien III A. Bert Davis, Deputy Director Charles I. Norelius, Assis:an: to :he Oiree:c Gerald A. Phillip, Semic: ::vestiga::: Gast: Ti:relli, Cc.ief, Rea ::: Ocastrue:1:n and I:gineering Supper: 3:anch Kavin D. '~ard, React::
- spect::, Ingineering Sup;c :
Sectic 80, React:: C stru::icn' and Ingineering Suppo:: 1:snch Le =ee:ing was held a: the request cf 0*.A :: inf::= these Re;i: ::: persenne: Of the purpose of the 0*.A investiga:i:n being 1:1:ia:ed. nese e:;*cyees were inf:=ed tha: the investiga:ic vas diree:ed by the Chai::a= in res;cese to 3c:as A:plegate's allegatices as deserf:ed in the CA? peti:icn to the Special Counsel cf the .% :1: Syste=s ?:::ee:ic: Board. Su ve re 1.f er ed -$:at OIA as invaa-ienti : t'e '.*RC's ba-d!! e - of Acelessie e cr- *-* a_1. e e e c i- vere -et C 'a -- --- t- 1-c '"f e - v eeri:1- al .e eatie .s add-assed bv NRC and ste ner Regien -;;;'s investigatice Y acequateay cealt with the allega: ens that vere addressed. At this pois: P.:. Phillip inquired whether the investigation was act actually an invas:1ga:icn of his co:due:. '4e dis = layed a : py :f a draf t of CA?'s peti:1cn veich he said made nu=er:us allega:1c:s agains: hi= by na=e. P.r. Kepple: then inquired as to ste:her he should be ; obtaining lawyers to represent each of his e=ployees. CIA confir:ed that Phillip's na=e was s1=il'a 17 used in the " final version" ef OA?'s ) pe:1:icn. CIA indicated to all e:ployees presen: tha: they had an i absolute right to have a lavyer present -ten they were interviewed but i that CIA could not advise them whether lawyers were necessary. CIA did briefly recount that CAP had verbally advised O*A : hat : hey c: sidered
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5 their allegations to be =cre aest s the 'm than individual e ployees. y-=-* " -*a- v-" ecacea--"e a-p hev 01A '- repeated a-e k dthat, sir.ilarly.
* +4 -h e _a t e -. - O
- N d6G In response to a question about OIA's ability to investigate a =atter which also alleges that the Director of CIA did not act quickly enough g!g on the earlier allegations, the group was advised that t a m .. 5 . s. , e asece: of the case. N h
Chat--an uns y-A Y The epig:% present raised no additional substantive questions. OIA asked each to locate any documentation of their activities such as notes which they night have so they could be reviewed during their in:e: views. Phillip pointed out that he had destroved his -ce+s _p ric: to having heard of GA? 's pe tition.
!nter riev ef Gerald A. Ph*1112 Mr. Gerald A. ?hillip Senior Investigator, Region I!!, II, NRC, was
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intervieved en _-"- by Svid c' -
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and A--M:: S c 5" ei a'. e a O~.A. at the EC Regional Of fice, Glen Illyn, I111nois. g /A Mggjg Mr. Phillip began the interview by explaining that his firs k.culedge M D '*"A of the hecas Applegate allegations occurred approxi=atel + Pehruary 25, 1930. Phillip recalled : hat he was contacted by M A ?.xacu:1ve q /ydr. j g g /* Cffice for Operation Suppo;; (7J:CS). II, during vn:.:.: -a::. re.a:ed : a: he had received inf or=ation fres one of the Cc= issioner's offices vnich Wg g - i had been centacted by Aeplegate. - 5 ----d
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- f"O"'") the inf or=a tion
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related to the Zisme: Nuclear Plant site and th'e :.natial dete--1.ation was that there may be some significance to the inf or:ation. L-4;;f also related that Applegate alleged tha: there was a possible conspiracy ) between the site contractor and utility to cover up def ective velding. I halso stated that apparently Applegate had =ade previous contacts i vita the EC and felt that he was "getting the run-around" because he did not see NRC taking any action. Phillip stated that he contacted Applegate the sa=a day and obtained some of the general infor=ation concerning Applegate's claims. ?hillip also stated that at:ange=ents were made to meet and interview A:-legate f or more details. Phillip recalled that af ter talking ini:1al'.y to Applegate, he (Phillip) believed that there was infor:ation st.ich appeared to be casting a shadow on URC inspectors. Phillip contacted Q at NRC Headquarters in Bethesda and notified his of this fact. @ . en inf ormed Phillip that no inspectors should be brought in on the initial phase of the inquiry and if additional personnel were required then @ vould make someone available from Headquarters. Phillip then stated that within the next few days arrange:ents were made to have another investigator from Headquarters =ee: Phillip in Ci=cinnati to assist on the interview of Applegate. @ advised Phillip that he would have : W
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, Len Willia =se: =ee: Phillip in Cincinna:1 :o hel, with the in:e:riev. Phillip explained that the initial plans to interview Applegata vere complicated by the fae: that Applega:a was very cau:icus in his ins::uc-tions and guidelines for the see:1:g. As he recalled Applegate veuld no: provide his address or the address of a neutral meeti=g place. Applegata had advised Phillip that when he or tha NRC invas:1gators at:1ved in ! Cincinnati they should call a specific telephone number for addi:1cnal instructions. Phillip stated that en March 3 af:er arriving 1
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. he contacted Applegate at which c1=e Applagate instrue:ed the NRC invas: iga:::s to meet him at an address which.tur:6d out to be a church pa:ki=g lot. l Phillip explained that he and Willia =aen at:ived early and even:ua!.ly were appr ached by an individual who identified hi=self as Applega:e. t After the initial meeting the three of the= van: to a roc =ing house :ha: 1 vas located approx 1=a:ely one-half bicck away. Applegate advised Phillip i and Willia = son tha: he had received threats as had the landlady a: :he roomi:3 hcuse. 7::= Phillip's observa:icus it appeared that App
- ega:e rented a rec = is a hcuse which was evnad by a police =an and his vite.
l Shortly af:e arriving at the h use Applega:e cock,cff his jackat rev es'.ing 4 that he was wearing a firea =. App *egate began bv pr:viding sc=e inf:::a:1:. l pertaining :: his backs; und. Applegata cold Phillip tha: he had been
, a=pl yed by a security fi:= vhich did uc k in diver:e i=vestigaci::s.
Initially ha (Applegate) had been assigned an investiga:10 involving a "pipefi::er" a: :ha li==e sita who had been suspec:ed of " playing ) around" by his wife. Af ter the diverte-type investigation had been j started. Applegata began :: dise:ver 1:f or=a: ice of "ti=e card paddi:g" i . by individuals e= ployed a: the Zi e: si:a. Applegate tsfer=ed Phillip
; that his supe:visc:, Major Cox, centacted the u:111:7 cespany, Cinci::ati
! Cas a:d Elect:1: (CC&I), to advise the= cf the discovery. Subsequen: := the centac: the utili:y centrac:ed vich the security ft:= fer the , services of A;plegate, pr:vided h1= vi:h a false identi:y, and ins ::::ad j hi= to lock further into the ti=e ca:d padding. Af ter Applega:e began the assig.=en: ha began to provide the u:ility with weekly :aperts whi:h
- j. confi =ed the : =e card padding and disclosed a degree of collusi:n between cs :ain pipefitters and secu 1:7 persensel at the si:e. Applega:e i explained to Phillip and provided Phillip the opportuni:7 to review Iaccu:1:v reee--n _-which described security guarda'. permitting pipetit:ers to leave de si:e during verking hours without " clocking out." Applegate 4
also explained that during the sa=e time frame (Decenbar 1979-January 1980) informa: ion began to be develeped ides:1fying the illegal sale of firear=s at the sita. Philli; a.lso indicated that Applegate had surfa:ed*
* ~
- inf or=ation disclosing that the site supervisor, Mr. Marshall, utill:ed '
site materials and personnel to perf orm work on his private reside:ce. According to Phillip, Applegate stated tha: Marshall's acts were dishenes , however, when he (Applegate) brought the information to the attenti: cf CG&E the company refused to take ac:fon against Marshall. Accordi:g to Applegate the condoning of these type of acts was scing to have a ajor .
. impact on CC&E and, in eff ect, put. them out of business. .'""*' " * '
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- i. Applegate continued by explaining s==e cf his concerns to Phillip abcut potentially f aulty velding. Phillip explained that Applegate stated tha:
. PF was radiographing velds which were questionable. Applegate did not i appear to know who ves responsible for their instructions: COLE or Kaiser. - However, scoeone had directed PM to go back and "re-exa=ine *
- i. velds." ' Applegate informed Phillip that aither CG&E or Kaiser innered 7Mf 4f =Id Fw's radiceranha of the velds because such examinations no =alle e-1v y/ gyp J Bo constituted a visual inssectwn ar.c sat a racacerann, This accordint_to n
p---
- Apolesate was done at the directien of W. Mars'all vno instructed ?M to l " =*-ine" but not radio e r =e - Phillip stated that he believed Applegate M ..... *
! vas referr:mg to a specific shiyment of pipe that had been delivered to j the site in the f all of 1979 and improperly unloaded (dropped off the i truck) without a quality control inspection. Applegate informed Phillip
! that this incident took place around the ti=e of an NEC hearing on Zi=cer. Anplegate said that much controversy vas generated at the hearing regarding fuel rods that were allegedly dropped; but i= fact it was 1 these pipes - not fuel rods - that were dr:pped.
I f ! As background. Phillip then provided a brief desc;1ptica et the supplier, Pull =an-Kellogg and the delivery. Phillip stated tha: Pull =an-Kallogg ; vas the supplier (vender) and therefore was responsible for the Quali:y j Assurance (QA) and Quali:y Control (QC) verk related to the vc?d and the structure of the pipe. As a nor=al procedure QC inspections are w:
- done at the site for adequacy of the equipeen: or tha velds. Phillip
- further stated that the equipment is inspected only f
- : da: age in transi:
I and inventory purposes during a " receipt inspection" which does no: include either visual or radiography exa=ina:*ons of welds. i Zhillic sa*d Aceleeste reevided hf= with 9? . e-e- au - 'me -3 [ -=) vei s eat
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( _f ' do anythine te cerrs , , ! Another area related by Phillip pertained to Applegate's disclosure : hat l there were " problems" with a pipe flushing operations. Apparenti:, i saceone had informed Applegate that as a result of bangir.g pices du-ing l the flushing procedure deleterious substances cate ou: of the pipes and
- the " flushing" failed the test.. the individual who observed this proble=
i attempted to resolve it by raisina the issue with his supe:.*isor. } Applegate claimed that the individual subsequently quit because there
- was no action taken. . As the discussion continued Applegate also stated
- - to yhillip that another individual at the site had been neeping a noteboek j or log on his observations at the site. Applegate did act identify the 1 - individual and could not furnish specific infor=ation, such an the
} content of the log or why the individual was keeping it. Phillip aise recalled that Applegate mentioned having been trapped by a fire down in one area of.the plant. , i .1 J 4 .
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_ _ _ . .. _ _ _ .._. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _n I 1 NO lNic.Gl $ W a N t/ 4 28SWeT . Applegate then identified an individual by the na=e of 2turray who vas e= ployed by CC&I. F'illip stated that according to Applegate, l'urray was "all right" eeaning that he would cooperate vi:h ? AC. Applega:e then proceeded to tell Phillip that he (Acelecate) had erev'ded " - av .-> i I
"_ Schwiers. and tne 0A Sure-wd ser. inf et ormation accur *a tne e..e al1
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seecific locatt:=s the veies , Jw.11113 i M ADM eeste saic ina- 5c nv-_ e - s ne ene veld *e. =8 d-- J 4 .s. 2 . s . . .. . t/7/ E and then related that tne veld ueuld he ***.3 g , _ _ Phillip then stated tha: Applegate centinued the inte: riev by cla1=ing that infor=ation was developed pertaining to the t1=e card padding. Phillip further stated that Applegate infor=ed hi= that CC&E notified the Kaiser Corporation "eadquarters in California of the :1:e card cheating. Subsequent to this noti'ication representatives f := Kaiser ca=e to the Zi= mar site and were infor ed that evidence was obtained . that confi=ed the ti=e card paddisg. Applegate also advised Phillip that CC&E told Kaiser tha: they had an individual working u: der::ver. Applegate then stated that shortly after this meeti:g the under::ver cperatien was te=inated because of two facters: (1) Kaiser was n:u aware that sc_ecce was under::ve; for CC&I; and (1) the wif e of :. e subject of the original diver:e investigation had =ade vist:s :: the si:e and .Applegate feared that, if he 'tre - observed by her, she =ight reveal his true identity. Applegate related to Phillip, that he had been ::ying :o bring the inf:r:a-tion to .the attentien cf lGC because although the :1:e card pechle: var being addressed no acti:n was being take: about the CC issues. A: leta:a told Phillip that he origitally contacted U.S. Senator John Clenn's ' office := apprise his of the inf or=ation and ebtain assistance. Se:at: Cien.'s office provided hi: vi:h the na::e of S--, 6 -- d - s . N -.er-- e: v-- Phillip then explained tha: Applegate cla1=ed he conta::ec Ca:=ints bv telephone and related the info =ation cence=ing the problems at ihe ' Zimmer site. Applegate .siso related to Phillip that he (Applegate) became frustrated with Cu =ings as a result of sev.r*1 te' -w--. ---... .. tiens with Cu- d-n which culminated with Cu=:ings' requesting sta: Applega te provide "something in writing" compiling the allegatices. Phillip stated that Applegate thought about the request over a weekend and became angry. According to Phillip, Applegate stated that he was upset about the :eques: because he (Applegate) had been incurrine personal expenditures to bring the infor ation to sc=eene's attention and =v he was requested to do more. Applegate said he then called Chai=an Ahearne's office who apparently referred the matter to II. Phillip stated that Ampiegate stated that he provided the same information to the Cincinnati office of the Federal 3ureau of Investigation (73!). Phillip explained to Applegate that the type of allegatiens brought to the attention of the T3I were items not within the jurisdiction of h*RC and would not be addressed during an NRC investigation. Phillip also
, advised Applegate that allegations of criminal activity at the site -m.m., e w eegsgemme = *
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would have to be handled by the appropriate agency. Phillip said he I explained that the cost of construe:1on (i.e., cost everruns) also was not a matter within NRC jurisdiction. Phillip explained that Applegate was not happy with his (Fhillip's) explanation regarding the NRC's pcsition but Applegate did not challenge the response. Phillip stated that the only other re= arks =ade by Applegate related to a variety of pechless which allegedly indicated that there was mis-management and collusion between pipefitters and security personnel. Applegate stated this de=onstrated that there was not a proper coc=1:=ent to building a nuclear plant. Applegate also stated that as a result of gg his atte:pting to bring infor=ation to officials of CC&I as well as W gf others (NRC, 73I), he had been threatened, run off the road and his 1andlady had ba*n harrassed and threata=ed over the telephone. Applegate fod " pr=vided addi- nal inf or=ation to Phillip in the for= of excerpts f::: audio tapes, ording to Applegate the inf or=ati:n ca the tapes indicated cellusion b high level =anagers of the p;cjee:. Applegate played portions of t.... for Phillip which he (Applegate) believed c::::horated his allega: ices. Philiip said Applegate cont clied the racerder and only played selected seg=ents for Phillip - describing the centax: in which each one occurred. Phillip explained that Applegate vould nct release the tapes because he considered the= to be " insurance." Phillip said that sany of the tapes we're difficul te understand; in these instances, Applegate interpreted wha: uns being said. Phillip stated that, based en what he heard on the : apes he did not hea: any inf:::ati:n which indica:ed there was sece type cf ecliusion c: :over up going en a: the Zi==e site. Phillip said that, after Asplegate had skipped at:und on the tapes Applegate confir:ed that he had played all the i=pertan parts. 'dovever, Phillip did state there was se=e infor:atice on the tapes that identified three specific welds which was detailed enough to check into during an investiga:icn. Phillip stated that in his opini:n com=ents like 20 to 30 percent of the welds at the plant are defective were too general and needed more support before they could be investigated. !. Additional infor=ation which Applegate furnished to Phillip related :s the manuf,acture and sale of belt buckles by personnel at the site. Phillip stated that he advised Applegate that, although seme of the material used in the manuf acturing of belt buckles =ay be required fer construction purposes, it was a proble: which should be addressed by CC&E, the Licensee, and uns not within NRC's jurisdictienal responsibilities. Applegate also provided information about people being fired for t1== card padding or cheating. As Phillip recalled, hovaver, Applegate did not state that any of the individuals fired as a result of his investiga-tion into time card cheating were in fact the same individuals who had attempted to raise safety issues. Phillip advised that the only docu-mentation furnished by Applegate during the initial interview were reports submitted by the security fir = (Confidential Service) who a= ployed Applegate and were under contract to CC&Z. Phillip said Williamson left l the interviev to photocopy these reports at the Federal 3u11 ding la
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10 Cincinna:1. He said Willia =so: spcke vi:h a: 73 agent and eb:ained a ecpy of a yebruary 1.'.,1950, T31 letterhead =e=orandu= vhich ::nfined that A;;1ega:e had spcken vi:h the T32. ~he 1e::erhead e==:andu= also refle :ed : hat an Assistas: United States A::c cey had daelined prosecutien on the sat:er. Phillip recalled that he had a subsequent telephone conversa:1:n with Applegate en March 4,1980, during which they discussed :ve peis:s: (1) what would be the best approach in trying to centact the i=dividual who quit over the flushing operati:n and, (2) to confirm deca 11s about an individual Applegate men:icned previously by the name of Sellers (phene:1c) . Apparently Sellers was still e= ployed at the si:e and had been keepi g a list of defective velds rejected by PM bu: approved by Kaiser. Phillip said that he asked Applega:e whether Sellers ever shared this lis: vi:h him as Sellers said he would; Applegate responded negatively. Phillip said he alsb cct:i=ed which of the Sellers brothers at PM was the ene Applegate was ref1::1:3 to. Phillip then sta:ed ,tha:, af:er returning to the Regic.. II: effica and reviewing se:e of the aterial fu=1shed by Applegate, he (?hillip) had a discussi:n vi:h Chuck Screlius, his supe: riser, regarding :he allega-tiens. Phi'.11; exp*.ained tha: the = eating was held to es:ablish wha: issues were g:ing :: be 1:ves:1 gated by NRC. Phillip aise explai:ed that he had already =ade an initial assessment of the inic=ati:n and had inf ==ed Applega:e, is gene ral ta=s ,* of which allega:10:s were within NRC's dur.isdict.i:n. PEilli:7'. hen sta. ted~that 'he :e'.ied :n n:.s' unexperience vi:h the C: ass:.::.and his pr:f es,si:nal expertence in, 3421pg. wha: issues were get g to be investiga:ed. Phillip ::::1 ed by stating tha there were addi:icnal discussions with regi:n persenne'. after : hey cete =ined that the velding allega:10:s were g:i:g :: be investiga:ed. Phillip statad that Kav1: 74;d, an inspec: r, '..ad been assigned := assis: hi: in the investiga:icn. Phillip said tha:lkili vaM ~! Hea:!eua- a 0 contacted ?hillip on
~
March 13 to apprise hl= that Applegate nac centacted *I F.eadquarters and informed the= that the PM trailer had been broken into and sc e rece:ds were allegedly stolen. Phillip then called Applegate c the sa=a day to i obtain specific infor=ation regarding the incident. Phillip recalled that Applega:e cculd not provide any inf o=atica rela:ed te specific documentatice which ay have been taken f::s the PM trailer. The interview centinued with Phillip's explaining tha: the issues were "scoped" but initially they were probably somewhat general 1 nature and not very specific. Phillip also stated that the early briefing of Norelius was general, hcvever, he (Phillip) recalled providing all available documents fu=ished by Applegate for review by Neralius. Phillip then stated there were subsequent telephone conversations vi:h Applegate af ter Regien III sent the ' letter describing the allega:icus (issues) and scope of the upcomi=g Region II~.1:vestiga:1cn. Applegate i never indicated during these conversations that he was not satisfied or ; that NRC was "11:1:i:g" or "too narrowly investigating" the allegations. s.. l l I i l l
~ . ~ . - . -
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. Pertaining to questiens abou: regional precedures and discussien of the initial allega:1ons, Phillip responded by stating there were several discussi =s with diff erent regional persennel. Phillip stated he had ;
conversations with Messrs. Nore11us, Kavis Ward, 7andel (?;oject Inspect: ) . Danielson (Kavin tierd% supe: visor), and perhaps. Tiere111 and Knop. As Phillip recalled the discussions were general in nature and not too ! d etailed. Phillip stated that he did not recall discussing the =a::e with James Kappler, the Regional Director. Phillip did state that Len Williamson's (assigned from II Headquarters) involvement was very limited and as a result he was not requested to write or document any infor=atien obtained during the initial Applegate interview, t Phillip explained that he did not believe that there was ..ny advanced notification made to the 21=mer site and was about 95 percent certain that 1: vas a "special unannounced i=vestigation." Phillip stated there was ne fixed policy on an==uncing investiga:10cs, however, pt:bably ::s are unannounced. Phillip indicated that he did ::: believe that a licensee ceuld al:e "poer perfc:=tece" rapidly e: ugh to affect invas:1-gations. Phillip centinued by stating that he and Kavin 'Jard ini:ia*.ly went to the 11==er site and had an estrance inte-tiev vith Schvis s, the site CA Managgr. Phillip was not sure hev specifically they identified the allegations to Schweirs; they probably identified them as QA/QC
- proble=s witheu
- ,specifying the area of welding. After eeeting vi:5 Schwiers they interrieved Alan Sellers QC Supe:tiser for PM vho stated that he ves unaware of any lis: illus :ating velds rejected by PM -t.1:h were subsequently accepted by Kaiser. As a resul: Phillip and Ward decided to inspect a representative "systa= of welds" in order :: deter-ine whether or no: there was a p chlem with velds. Phillip recalled tha-Ward was f amiliar with velding at the Zi=e site and therefere asked ?M to pull radiegraphs and " reader sheets" to de:er=ine hov =any PM radi:gra:h
! " rejects" were everruled by Kaiser and subsequen:1y appreved. P5.1111; stated approximately 99 veld radiographs were checked and only two were overruled. Phillip explained that in both cases Kavin Ward eencurred with Kaiser's interpretation of'the radiograph. Concerning the three specific welds alleged to be defective, Phillip , stated the radiographs were reviewed by Ward who discovered that problems with the radiographs and/or documents:1on existed but had been identified in a comprehensive review cf ?M radiographs conducted by another fir =, NES. Phillip advised tha: Ward could better answer specific questions regarding the velds. 1 Phillip then stated that he did not check into the " break in" of the FM trailer and, in fact, did not *mov if the trailer was broken into or if documents were taken. Phillip noted tha: the licensee is responsible for maintaining the record copies of all documents, so PM's copies were not the official oness
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1 J 12 i . ~. Phillip stated that at that ti=e he also attenpted to address the allega-tien involving alleged probless in the " pipe flushing" procedures. Phillip advised that the allegation arose f c= the ini:ial allegations made by Applegate; however, af ter contacting the individual who had knowledge of the problem (Tyner), he (Phillip) was unable to obtain any specific information. The individual did inform Phillip, however, tha:
- the " hydro test" was run and the system was modified af ter the tes
- thus invalidating the test. This statement resulted in an inspection which dis:losed that the circumstances, as described by the individual, vere factual. Phillip then stated that the " hydro test" was going to be rerum with an inspector present.
1 Phillip explained that the next allegation which was addressed had to do ' vi:h the handling of five " spool pieces" (pipe). According to Phillip, at the time that he and Ward arrived on site these pieces of pipe were in a " hold status," however, they were not " tagged" as such. The spools
- vere shipeed by the vender, Pu11 san-Kellogg, and were " unloaded" at the si
- e by "d:cpping them off the truck onto the ground." Phillip stated l the pipe was app;cx1=ately 12 inches in dia=eter and over a half-inch in l
vall thi:kness. Regarding the radiographing of the pipe, Philli; explained l 1 that the pipe .as radiographed by PM for "in.for=ation purposes" and nc: as part of a regulatory requirenent or appropriate tes: procedure.
- Phillip s
- ated that c: &E and/or Kaiser vere therefore c~- d t:ing to L
radiographs and documents:1on as it related to the condition of the pi;e ! when a visual inspec:Lon seuld have been sufficient. Phillip noted tha: ' FM found " rejectable indications;" they did not actually reject the pipe because only Kaiser cculd accept or reject. Subsequently, an NR was issued and ul:imately an NR ves i= proper.*y written which resulted in i se=e of the pipe being released from the varshouse and installed. However, one is:aining' NR uns written which still kept the proble=s with i the pipe as an epen ite. of noncenfer:ance. Therefore, Phillip did no: believe there uns any type of cover-up; he said that Kaiser, by installing the pipe at this point, was assuming the risk that the pipe might late , be found to be unacceptable. Phillip then stated that none of the individuals interviewed believed, that there was a " hardware problem," i only a " paperwork problem." Phillis continued by statine that asen e--1v l l the CA Suce: visor. Schwiers told someone to "line throuch" and void en N7..
~
N /I rnillin_ stated _he interviewed Schwiers regardine the alleged ins: uction f/tcW at wich time Schwiers denied givine anvene instructions to line threuta Iwu eaua..n ec on an NR_. ?*illin eencluded this portion of --a E - o -- w pgga. U numa ru- *e ae not ~take any avorn statements or write rescrts c' _ [ ffW g - j m ervieve and did see believe it was nacennarv. g pg,,,, i Phillip continued by explaining that, even after he left the Zimmer site he thought that seybe all the work had not been done - although he had told C::&E that there ves one ites of noncompliance. Af ter returning to Region III Phillip discussed the results of the investigation with Noreliue and also told Norelius that he had some concerns and believed 4 ,.,v.,,. .- .- -----n.--- * . - - - ~ --
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13 7' that more w:k was going to have to be done. Phillip then stated tha: he returned to the site several weeks la:er with another NEC 1: spec:or. Tom 7andel, to make further inquiries regarding the spools. 7hillip stated that the pipe was checked and they concentrated en the "paperverk probles." ! Phillip recalled that he received a call during the first day or so cf j the investigation f:ca another investigator in Region I!!, Ji= Foster, who advised that Applegate had called the Region and explained that he ] (Applegate) was contemplating going to the PM people and possibly the !
- newspapers. This occurred about April 7,1980, according to Phillip.
- Phillip then stated that he contacted App' legate and told his that he was j f ree to go to the press, however, it eliminated any chance of Applega
- e's maintaining his confidentiality. Phillip believed that Applega:a did j then go to the press, probably the Chicago Sun Times.
e 1 In response to a question regarding procedures for identifying individuals ; lI , contacted and reported in IE investigations, Phd'id- etsted tha: :$e N orte ; N*- -u-ereeedures de call for =aking an identification kev. stated that the e uns e 1:een::.ca::.on av for his inves:122:1: . =, g g/ f'k Phillip said that he =ade ene atte=pt to contact an individual naned
. "Johan" -t.o Aoplegate cla1=ed *.us keeping scue type of 'ou=a* . . Phillip
- said Resident Inspector Daniels unsuccessfully. tried to locate Johan through the 7.1=mer switchboard. Phillip said he did not pursue the na
- a further because Applegate did act supply any specifics of wha .
the journal contained. - Phillip continued' by explaining that sher:13 after Applegate " vent ! public" a reporter fran Channel 9 Cincinnati, centacted hi= to ehtain infor atien about the investigation. "he reporter asked if he : uld I interriev Phillip en the site or at the gate. Phillip had a discussi:n < vith Schwiers. CA Manager, CC&Z, vno s:sted that they veuld per:i: j Channel 9 to co.e en the ?'-aer site fer an interview in Resident :: spec:::, 4 Daniels office. Scmetime later, Mr. Altenuehle, CC&E public relatices j officer, asked Phillip if he would attend a press conf erence devntevn. This apparently uns done to provide the other representatives of the ! media an opportunity to learn about the results of the investigation at I the site and not just provide a story for one station (Channe' 9) . Phillip then explained he went to the Resident Inspector's ::ailer and l vas interviewed by Channel 9. 1ater the same. day he (?h1111p) vent te downtown Cincinnati to attend the press conference. Approxima:ely 20-25 4 reporters were in attendance and the two main points of interest were . the welds on the pipe spool pieces which he stated were "CK" and that
- the licensee was going to be cited for an ites of noncompliance relating j to records and violating " hold" procedt.res. As Phillip recalled, one reporter asked about drugs and alcohol on the site and the fact that workers were coming to wrk drunk or intoxicated. Phillip replied to
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the questi:n by explaining he did nc- kn:v cf tha allega:ica, as s:ated.
'.then asked whether E C was cc=ce::ed abcu: this, Phillip replied tha: 1:
vas the e=picyer's concer because, even if a dru=k velder =ade a bad veld, the licensee's QC inspection p gras was designed :o catch faul:y wo r'c.an s hip . Phillip s:a:ed that Mr. 3 erg = ann, 7.P. cf T.sgineering, CC&E, and Mr. Altezuehle were also present* is the press ctdurance. Phillip explained that on May 7 1990, he had several differen: telephens 1 conversati:ns with Applegate.Dm =ar: G I. F.eac:ua ;. y and Ri:a Ciardano (reporter for the Cincin=att Inqu:.:a:1 appa:en:.y app.egate had nev infor=atico (capes) which he clai=ed indicated that CC&E had lied c: NRC and tha: .there was a cri=inal conspiracy. Accordi:3 :o Phillip he centac:ed Applegate who explained that he had evidence in the fer: of taped c:nversati::s with individuals which shewed there was a conspiracy on the par: cf the licensee and Kaiser to prevent ?M f:c= disclesing def ective velding a: the plane. ?hillip sta:ed that he decided tha: if Applegate, in fact, had this type of inf:::stica 1: vould be be::e to is: :itev A:elega:e at an 73I cffice. B is ap:aren:17 was c:::urred in bv W ._ -af13and Norelius. Phillip exp.ance; ;..a: .. nen :a.Aa. v::: . ;= 'enahua, Regie: 1**'s Chief of Safeguards and requested :ha: he ake a::ange=en:s fcr an inte: ties date. Denahue then c:ntac:ed Special Agen: ?.:b er: 3uckley, Age:1: Energy Desk, Chicago Tield Office, y3*. Phillip sta:ed :ha: the in:e:riev took place 1: the Dirckse: Tedera*. 3uildi:3 1: devn:cun Chicago at which ti=a Applegate presented the " tapes" and =ade his allega:1:ns. Ad:e lis:ening :a :he tapes Buckley advisad App *. agate :ha: he did :: hear any:hing which cens:itu:ed a vic12:1:n of the Federal cri:1:a1 s:a:utes. '"he : aped conversaticas vers =4Q. by A;plega:e of : aleph::e c:nversa:1:ns he had with re;; eses:a:1ves cf ?M, inc;; ding the preside:: of the cc:pany, Mr. Aldredge.
?hillip the: stated tha: Applega:e was not satisfied eith the resul:s of the interview and the fact tha: :he 73; did not accep: his (Applegate's) clais that the tapes ve:e evidence of cri=1:ali:7 ? d* Cee < s-ad that Arelega e van ce=elainist of net having, aqy ,ei.,=ey ::_:mape-:a-1:r.
to the airper_t for his return flight :o Cincinna;i_and peques-=d "l*4 NRC transoort.atien. Phillip stated.Aeolegate's reques: vas denied. At t'he close of the interview Buckley advised Applegate :ha: the NRC veuli provide his with any addi:ional infor:ation obtained and a copy of the NRC report when the NRC investigatics was concluded. Phillip also told Applegate that he vould further review the taped c nversa:icns (whi:h Applegate provided) and interview A1 dredge. 1.ater the sa:e day Phillip explained he was called by a reporter, Rita Giordano, wanting to kncv what happened at the :eeting with the T31. Phillip stated he provided Gic:dano basically the same inic:=a:1cn described above. ?hillip went on to explain tha: he then cade a:ce: pts to contact Aldredge and eventually interrieved hi= cu May 20, 1980. Se next contact with Applegate came on June 7, 1?90, a: which 51:a Applegate stated to Phillip that he (Applegate) was "not sitting :111." Phillip 4
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15 advised Applegate that a report would be ce=ing out an d NP. vould provide him a cepy. In respohse to questicas about welding proble=s at the ?'- er site which were described in Applegate's " Confidential Report" cespiled during his contract assignment at the site Phillip provided the following responses. Phillip explained there were individuals named in Applegate's reports who may have had k=owledge of the welding problems; however, Phillip did , not believe tha: it would have been fruitful to " track people down to j obtain weld inforna:1en" because Region III was already aware of Qg //O f/ , difficulties and su=erous NRC inspections had been conducted. Phillip "- -- added that the specific welds in question could be checked by reviewing radiographs. Phillip also noted that individual welders would not be in , a position to k=ov vhat subsequent actions were er were not taken to correc: deficient velds. Phillip was then ;;:vided an epportunity to review the list of allegati:ns described in the petitien to the Special Counsel. Cpen reviewing the allegations Phillip provided a response to each allega:icn' identifying allega:icas hich had been previcusly addressed dur'ng either his investi-ga:1on or other Region III efforts and those which appeared to be new allegstions. Phillip said there was no explici: II poli./ en how to v ite the " details" see:1on 'ef investigative reports. He said the investigator uses his disc r e:1ct. :s prepare the repcrt in the way which best presents the infor:sti:n to the reader. Phillip said that although seneti=es th t report is a series of interviews, he of ten feels it is better to cr;ani:e the report by sub *ect =atter. Ra said that, when this is done, the:e are no docu=ents st.ich ec=prehensively su==arize wha: each vitness sta ed: the report presents what each vitness said (identifying this onl/ by title) on each issue. Phillip further stated that he believed that investigations of allegations,are best reported as follows: (1) state the allegation; (2) list details. previded by the allager; (2) ; state the find.ings; and (4) list details supporting the findings. 1 Phillip said he did not take any written statements in this case. He .~ said it is up to each investigator's discretion to decide when to have a witness or alleger sign a statement. Phillip recalled only one occastwn when he asked an alleger to sign a stateme=t containing his allegations. Phillip doubted that this approach would halp pin down the allegations or help the allegers be more accurate. R 1111p said that he generally does not obtain statesents from any witnesses unless he feels he vill be receiving cenflicting significant information. Phillip said the only time the thought even entered his mind was in connection with the circumstances of the notation being creased off the nonconfor=ance report which allowed _ the five e-eel efeces to be i stalled. Un14 6ap r.o ses c.sveve: L.na t tne l consensus, which he celieved also included Norelius' view, was that this crossing eff was not that significant because the proble= was still
. identified in the. system; therefore it turned out that statements were fnotneeded. .
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Phillip haid that having II :nvestigators ad=inister oaths to witnesses is a relatively new idea. He said that oaths are a useful tool, however they are not appropriate for use 1: every situation. Phillip said oaths i have been used only sparingly. Phillip noted that II investiga:::s do not have general authort:y to ad=inister oaths. He said that investigators must receive a written delegation of authority to administer oaths in each case from the Regional Director and the delegation sust receive the j advance concurrence of the Office of the Executive 1.egal Director in Headquarters . Phillip believed this vas a rather cumbersone approval
- i. process if it is really intended that they use oaths. Phillip also
. noted the practical problem that an investigator does not know what the
- situation is until he gets into the field, yet the authert
- y to administer i oaths must be requested in advance.
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i Phillip said that the II Inspectors F.anual is a .iraining toolffer nov
, personnel. F51111e said he vrete Chaeter ! which accresses nvestigations.
Phillie's a?-e=?de- rm s directed to carattach I ea tame 6 which states: Ivery ccuplaint or allegation :eceived, regardless of the sour:e or the avenue of coccunication involved, must be evaluated and docu-nented. There are instances wherein the c:: plaint or allegation obviously has no substance and it ece.es f := an inditidual suff ering f t:. . a =e nt al diso rde r . Even in those cases, at least a ce=o to the files should be prepared documenting the contact. the general content of any coc=unications and the basis for the conclusion that the natter need not be pursued ,further.
?hillip :ssponded that this6assar~Dneans that investigators canno:
dismiss entire contacts vi:heu: appropriately documenting it; however, ! it does not require ite=1:a:Lon of specific allegations and hov tach one would be handled. ' 3 Phillip said tha: people outside the nuclear field generally de :o: j :ealize the number of checks and balances that exist at nuclear power plants. He said that as an example it would require a lot of cellusien I to get all the required signatures on a false document such as an 57.. J Phillip stated that, although review of documentation is necessary, it j is not true that II inspectors limit their inspections to " paper reviews." ! He said it was more than common for inspectors to look at the hardware itself. Re also pointed out that, under the II modular inspection program, the.. licensees notify II of when certain tests and activities are to be perforned and II inspectors then witness them. Phillip said chat in this investigation Kavin Ward reviewed radiographs, which Phillip conside:ed to be "hard evidence." Phillip said that II does not have independent capability to perfotz its own radiographic testing to double-- i check the licensee's radiographs. Phillip did not consider this to be a
- probles because the licensee wuld not have had time to substitute radiographs af ter Ward and he had randon17 selected the system they intended to review.
achanges incorporated pursuant to reinterview or ,.. l i l
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Interview of Kavin D. Vard On Janua-v 2' e-d 2' 19S1, Mr. Kavin D. Ward, Inspector F.egien !!I, II, was interviewed by A-thur Sch ebele Special Assistant and Jd- U - 'ad-Investigator, CIA. Mr. Ward was advised that OIA was reviewing the II investigative effort which was conducted as a result of the allegati:ns raised by Thomas Applegate of c nstruction deficiencies at the Zi==e construction project. Ward stated that the investigation he did with Gerry Phillip regarding the Applegate allegations was on dif ferent sites during 1980. ~Va_ly ene_of $2 rdTecalled thattripshe thaihe_nade_tp._, was infor:ed cf the general allegTP. dis by Dda'nTDanielsen, Chief, Materials and P:: cess See:1o and told to discuss his (Vard's) participatien in the upe=ing i=vestigation with Phillip. Ward stated that most of the specific . infornation regariing the allega:icus were discussed en the plane ::1p and on the way to the 21==e: site in Meseca, Chio. Ward centinued by stating that he ceuld not recall any "real meeting" which =ay have taken place at the Regicnal Offic. f:: planning purposes and believed tha: he was involved in caly two areas of the invas:1gati n. 21s included the radiographs and testing techniques utilized to tes: velds at the si:e and inspecti:n cf five pieces cf pipe (spcols) which had been "d::pped" f::= a ::uck -ten they -tre delivered ts the si:e. As backg :und Ward ecplained that he had =ade nu=ercus inspections at the Zinner si:e and, in fact, had conducted a " pre-serrice inspec:1:n" which included an independent review cf velding. Ward stated that in 1973 he had locked into several "turncver velds" which had been accepted by the licensee. Ward further stated that velds that are " turned over" are censidered to be " accepted" velds. Ward stated that at that poin: 57.0 would inspect the veld decu=enta:1sn which presu=2bly would no lenger have any p chle_s and any discrepancy would have been resolved. Ward centinued that after checking and reviewing apprexi=ately 40 radi: graphs and related docu=entation he discovered 17 which exhibited a variety of discrepancies. As he recalled there was one ite= cf nonceepliance l identified which pertained to a violation of the A=arican Society of Mechanical E=gineers (ASME) Code, Section III. Ward s:ated that a fi:= I by the name of ?eabody had been contracted by Kaiser Engineering, Inc. (KEI) to do the radiography work. The proble= originally identified by Vard regarding the radiographs indicated there' =ay have been a problem with the quality of Peabody's radiography progra=. Eevever, Ward continued by explaining that on a recent inspectics at the site (January 1981) he discovered _a si=1lar ereblem with the radiogra:hy being =erfer=ed be a M l new fi =.__ NES.De inspection included the review cf 20 raciograpn packages that had been accepted, illustrating that velds were satisf actory. l Ward's inspection disclosed that four of the radiograph packages centained l discrepancies. Based en this he notified the licensee that discrepancies l still existed is the radiography progra=. l l .
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F--- , 18 yollowing a discussion on the inf or=ation describing three specific welds alleged to be defective by "homas Applegate, Ward stated that he believed the invas:1gation report preperly identified the work which was done to resolve the allegation.- Ward explained that the report was sufficiently detailed and probably contained nore infor=ation than an l Inspection Report would. He (Ward) thought Phillip had done a thorough job of reporting the. inf ormation. Ward stated that the language which
- indicates there were "so=e discrepancies" identified pertained to the radiograph review. / % d=et?hhe infor=a:1on in the report is a resul: of a review conducted by .NIS inspectors. Ward stated that he reviewed docu=ents and radiographs which had already identified " discrepancies."
He (Ward) did state that the report language does not address whether or not there were defective velds or i= proper radiograph techniques /precedures. Cencerning the one veld identified as K-811 Ward responded by stating that he did not ' cow the date that the dese 1 bed veld had been replaced (cut cut) by a new weld. Ward also indicated that he believed tha: it probably would have been better to identify, by date, when the veld was replaced in sider :: respond to the allegation. Ward then volunteered sene inf c na:1:n cencerning the pr:cedures and philoscphy cf the NRC inspection progra=. According to Ward t.en an inspector identifies a "proble=" during an inspecticn and is assured tha: the proble: is decc.=ented in the licensees syste= then II vi;l - l "va:ch 1:" until it is resolved. Ward stated the exceptien to this l policy would be if a piece of ecuip=ent was going to be installed in an j area no longer accessib*e if construe:1on continued, such as, placed d- I cencrete. Ward explained that "as long as the plant is not operating f and the p chle: has been identified, it is not our position (II) to te;; the= (licensee) how to resolve it." Ward was questioned as to whether se=a ti=e li=1t vould or ceuld 'Je placed en a licensee :: resolve " deficiencies." Ward stated that eener:11v no actien, in the fe n e' issui-- .<--e l nenec=eliance. is taxen "-~; te eer tracte er licensee nas aceeeted -- cert:fiec to NAC that all work. ins *>ecti " **d cocumentation, nas Oeen c =cleted and "signec ef f . .iard also stated in response to cues:Lons concerning lyio-m i velding that still has not been " signed of f" that II will continue to =enitor or track the deficiencies until they are resolved. When asked how long that effort (conitoring) would continue he (Ward) stated all the way to the hearings for the operating 1.icense_. / Ward stated that he could understand how the allege =ay have questions t abou: ite=s identified in the investigation report but he explained the report does indicate that the discrepancies which were identified in the report were coesidered unacceptable and would be checked in the future by the NRC inspection progran. f Ward explained that' the five pieces of pipe (spools) which had been ! "dr:pped" off the back of a truck unloading at the Zin=e site were very ! large pieces of pipe and unlikely to be damaged fro:s rolling off a ) l ::uch. According to Ward the pipe was about 12" in dia=eter 6 0 Y l l
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w- . _. 19 a:d ever a half-inch in vall thick =ess. Ward stated the difficul:y vi:h the pipe arose i= the instrue:1ons given by either Kaiser or CC&I to radiograph the ends of the pipe for possible da= age. Ward stated that, because of the type of " cap" which was velded to the ends of the pipe, it was not possible to determise the conditions of the selds through radiography. Ward then stated that ASMI procedures require that ultrasenic testing be conducted. The proper methods vould have been magnetic particle tests or dye pe etran: tests. Ward then explained why radio-graphy would not produce the required test ssults. Ward stated that he did not recall whether he had reviewed all decn=en:a:1:n related to the welds. Eard was reinter rieved eslJanua 2himtheeresenceefGe--v 5 1111e and again ahec ti tne vele cccu=entatica, inciucing ::e raciegrapns, had been reviewed. Ward could not state categorically that he had retieved the radiographs and reader sheets but, after cc:sulti:g vi:h Phillip, he (Wa rd) stated that he probably had reviewed the radi: graphs. Ward rei:erated that, because the "fical acceptance" had ==t bee: ade,
=c further ac:1cn had to be take by 20. Ward and Phillip both explained that it appeared worthwhile to inchde i=d:=a:1:n in thei: repor:
regarding previous inspections and kseviedge of EC about velding doc.:=enta:1:n probie=s at Zi .:ar. Ward stated tha: Full =an-Kellogg, the pipe =anuf acturer, had c:=e ta the Zi==e: site to cenduct ultrasenic testing en the stipulated pipe speels. As a result cf the :ests the welds were dete=ined :o be acceptable. h c:njuncti:n, Peabody cenducted ultrasenic tests and also sta:ed the velds vere acceptable. gG Ward also explained that he had no: intended toli'----/the pechle s f or the licensee. Acc rdi:g :: Ward that would be^ici:g the licensee's job. Ward also stated that he had been told by his superviser not to i de-- ' '5 --M m to CC&I and "not to get in th e -* m " du-tne :ht ~ _investiration. j gg, Interview of Charles Norelius Charles Norelius, Assistant to the O'_.ector, Region I!!, II, was interviewed on h v M 1081. hv A?^"- Scheebelen. 5 dd Ca ble. a n d John $ * - ' = d - of CIA. Norelius recalled that the allegations f ce Applegate ca=e to Region !!! via II Headquarters. Norelius could not recall exactly hev they ca=e in but he believed Applegate originally presented them to 0IA. Nerelius located a reference in the Region III wrking file on this investigation that the alle.gaticus were received c: Tebruary 28, 1980. Norelius c uld
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' not re=e=ber whether Region III received the allega:1ons by =e=:randu.
or by telephone. He said me=oranda are usually f:c= ei:her Victor Stello (Director, II) or Dudley Thempson (then Ixecutive Officer for Opera:1ogs Support, II Headouarters). Nore11us said telephone calls fr== II Readquar:ers were usually :o him. He said Thecpson usually =ade the calls, however, [u* ' " m-Vs-d3 / W ' " " ' - " = - = " - " - * - * * * - - * " - ' - " _ under Thompson) could have called directly. Norelnus said Gerald Phillip ves his senior invas:1 gator and he relied upon Phillip to assign cases to individual investigators. He said that, when he and Phillip discuss case assig:::ents, they usually reserve to Phillip and Ja=es Fes:er (the nes sest senior investigator) those cases that are nore complax or have the potential for nere visibility. Norelius could net recall at whs: pein: he and Phillip discussed Applegate's ellega tions. Nerelius said that. although he was "ha:y" en this point. se evhere along the line he go: the per:ep:1:n that :::utle was pessible in this case. He was sure he had this per:eption at least after ?hillip briefed hi about his inter-dev of Applegate. Norelius did recel1 ?hillip's dese:1ptier. cf hf s telephone call d.:n Applegata to set _up their inner.*iev. He rache=bered ?hillip's saying sc ething to the effect of "Here's a guy who clai=s that therc's some son of thing that sounds significant. He believed :here was a cover-up regarding these velds and he has tapes to
;reve it." Norelius recalled tha: Phillip's reaction was that, if Aoplegate really had una: he clained he had, it -sy be se=e:;.ing signifi:an:.
- Norelius said tha
- based . pen that assessment, they coved quickly on this case.
Nerelius said Invese.igator I.en Willia =sen (then with II Headcuarters) ace :panie:' Phillip for his interview of Applegate. He acknavledged that Headcuarters participation in investigations was unusual but it was dene in this came to encourage seme interchange between the Region and Headquarters for develep= ental purposes. Norelius said his file reflects tha: Phillip and Williamson interviewed
- A:plegate on harch 3, 1980. On his return Phillip informed Norelius that Applegate did not have cuerything he initially said he did. Phillip had narrowed the allegations to a few issues. NoTelius said that he and Ph1111; discussed all the allegations, but not at leng:h; he said that the voltee of work precludes his covering all the details so he relies heavily on his investigators - especially the senior invertigators like Phillip. Norelius particularly recalled fre= Phillip's briefing that Applega:e's allegations included itens such as the fabrication and sale of belt buckles and ti=e card cheating. Norelius did no: recall ever seeing Applegate's " confidential" reports.
Norelius i=agined that Phillip probably would have censulted with Regional censtruction personnel, such as Caston Fiore111, abou the allegations. *
!. Norelius said that he (Norelius) tost likely would have brought the p e . w.g. em.-o. e,e--+ . - e ow meemon ** 4,.mr ow - ea -+s. eee .- 4*- *- e*
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I 21 4 Nore11us . allegations to the attention of Regional Director James Keppler. said Keppler meets with Regional management at 8:00 every morning and one of the things he always =entions to Kappler are the i=portant allega-l tions, that have been received. Norelius said that the i=portance he attributed to the allegations can be ascertained f ce the promptness of their response in light of their heavy workload. Norelius further speculated that he probably similarly would have informed Kepple that i Phillip's interview of Applegata indicated that the, allegations may not
- be as serious as they originally thought.
- a Norelius said that, although he did not give' particular instrue:Lons to Phillip, their general procedure for the handling of allegations involves l-three parts: (1) inter-riev alleger to determine dat is alleged and what is the basis for the allegaticas; (2) review the allegations to get a clear understanding of what is to be investigated and *y (this analysis eliminates allegations that are (a) not safety-re;ated or (b) too general to permit investigation); and (3) conduct the subsequent investigation.
Norslius said there is no II policy requiring decu=entation of cencerns ' j that are raised by an alleger. He said that, because of their work 1 cad, they =eet with allegers to clearly define what vill er vill not be investigated. Norelius said that for exa=ple they reutinely infer = allegers that NRC is interested in safety-related its:s but because
+ nuclear power plants are run by privately-owned utilities, allegers ! should provide infe =atica on costs .(e.g., overruns) :c state regulatory agencies. Nore11us said that, although II sometimes investigates harassment
- . of individuals, they normally refer such allegations to the U.S. Depart =en
of 14ber. Norelius believed tha: Phillip would have i~.for..ed Applegate . of -t.ich cf his allegations were within NRC furisdict1:n to investigate. Nere11us said that in the last year Region I!I has been sending letters j eenfirming what veuld be investigated so there would be no misunderstanding. Norelius showed O!A a letter dated March 11, 1980, from Phillip :o-Applegate which described the three issues Ragion I;; intended to investigate. Norelius noted that they received no response f:c= Appingate indicating any. criticism of the intended scope. j Norelius said that when addressing allegations the Region normally locks at problems broadly to assure that they are addressed. He said, however, 4 that when a very general allegation is received, e.g., in this case regarding the welding, the Region cannot conduct an in-depth review of a plant's entire (welding) prog m. To cope vi:h the allegation, they i l usually try to pin down specific er.amples and t.Se decision to broaden the inquiry is basai upon what develops. Norelius noted that he discussed i the scope of the i=vestigation with Phillip after his first visit to the site and concluded that additional investigation was needed. i
! Norelius recalled that Tom Vandel, who he believed was the timee P oject
; Inspector, accarepenied Phillip on one visit and Kavin '.iard, one of the i Region III nondestructive examination personnel, accompanied him on a later visit. Norelius ramenbered their speaking of a noncompliance* for l the installing pipes that should have been "on hold." Norelius {
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w--- . .. - recalled discussing vi:h Phillip the significance of :his ite: and whether escala:ed enfor:e=ent ac:1cn was warranted (Nerelius explained that he was the Region !!! enforcenent coordina ::). Norelius concluded that this situation did not warrant s::enger enforce =ent action because the pipes were still identified in the plan 's syste as nonconfor=1ng ite.s. Norelius recalled an allegation by Applegate after the investigation was underway that there was a cover-up involving ?M. Norelius said tha: Phillip, James Donahue (also with Region III), and an F3I agen interviewed Applegate joi=:ly about this. He understood Applegate played a tape recording for the interviewers and they concluded there was not :uch of a case. Nore11us said he later listened to the sa=e tape and he did not read the same significance into the cenversation that Applegate did. He said that the tape was of conversations Applegate had with FM perscnnel; hevever, A plegate did nes of the talk.ing but attributed his s: ate ents to the FM perscnnel. Nerelius said that he only recalled Region !!! using NRC's subpcena au:hcrity on one oc:asi:n. He did net see any need f:: subpoenas in connection with II investigatiens. Norelius said - '-~estigati:ns are pri arily to dete=ine f acts regarding c=pliance with NRC's regulatory requirenants; he said the detec i:n of cri=inal viola:1:ns, for t.ich he believed subpoenas veuld be useful, is caly a by;;cduct of II investigatiens. Nerelius said the Regi . has taken signed unsvern sta:e=ents f t:= v.:nesses fer se e ti=e. He said this was done befera they ever had author *D to ad=inistar oaths and it is still done ncv even thcugh they can usa caths. Nerelius said the decisi r. as :: when to use signed, unsv:: state-en:s is left to the invas:1 gator's discre:i:n. He said that an sxa=ple of when they would be used veuld be when specif t: details, such as a ti=e seque.ce, are needed in a witness' cvn words.
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Norelius said oa:hs are a useful tool, but he would not advocate their use in all investigations. He said that, although caths have been used nere in the preceding six to eight months, Regien III's nor=al practice is to not administer oaths. Norelius believed that II investiga:::s should be skiTled in identifying the potential for criminality in their investigations, but he did not feel it was that necessary for II investigators
- to administer oaths because they do not conduct c 1=inal investiga:icns.
Norelius felt that oaths would be appropriate if II investigators were i receiving conflicting inf or=ation er were not receiving the whole story. Interview of Casten Tierelli on Januarv n toe' Casten Tierelli, Chief, Reac:ct Construction and Engineering Support 3 ranch, Regien III, II, was interviewed by A-eu- Maede .. l I l 1 i ._.._4 -. .... .. . . . - . . m-... .,. . . - . . - - - - --. .-. .. 7._.. j
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23 l - . .. Special Assistant and Investigators Da 'd ca 51- . d ' ' -- ei e'_.f , 0:A, Prior to any questioning Mr. Fiorelli was acvised that CIA was revievir.g
, the II investigs:1ve effort which was conducted as a result of the allega tions raised by Thomas Applegate concerning construe: ion deficiencies at the Zimmer construction project. Tierelli advised that he had so=e knowledge of the allegations brought by Applegate and was involved in some portion of the investigation to provide technical support. Tierelli recalled that Gerry Phillip of the investigative staff has been given the lead on the assig=nent. He, Tierelli had been contacted by the i=vestigative staff about providing technical support for Phillip. In this particular, investigation Kavin Ward was assigned to assis Phillip because there had been allegations concerning welding and Vard was the person most fa=111ar with velding problems at 7*--er. Tierelli explained that he could not recall specifically any dates on which briefings or meeting were cenducted regarding the allegations, however, he was sure that Phillip had provided his with information describing Applegate's role at the site. According to Tiere111. Phillip sta:ed that Aeplega:e had been hired by CC&Z to identify ti=e card falsification whic.k ulti=a:el*v led to identification of possible safety issues.
Fiorelli believed :ha: as the investigation continued a: the Zi==s: si:e Phillip had se=e private conversations and also a group neering vi:h regional personnel regarding the proble=s identified at the ri:e. Tierelli could not recall specifically who attended the =eetings, but he was sure that the Region III procedures required that a =eeting would have taken place. Tiere111 ru =ised that it probably would have been so=e tine af ter the i spectica (investigation) at the site was ce=pleted. + Tiere111 also stated that individua' * "5e were probably in attendance at regional meetings were Kavin Vard, Earrv "anielson, To: *?andel and Dick Knop. Tierelli advised that Knop was the section chief responsible for Zi==ar. gg-4 At the conclusion Tierelli stated tha: II investigations are considered a "very sacred activity" and the line g cups are very sensitive to avoid any interference with investigative matters. Interviev ef Duane H. Danielson on Januarv 23. 1991. . . Dunne M. 52 - d * ' = -_ Chief Materials and Itocess See:1on, Reg on Ili. II NRC, was interviewed by Arthur S-'nebelen Special Assistant, and labn *fnelm* a Investigator, CIA. Mr. Daniilson was advised that the purpose of the CIA investigation was to detar=ine the adequacy of an II investigation which was conducted in 1980 responding to allegatiana made by Thomas Applegate. Mr. Danielsen began the interview by arplaining that the regional organi-zation structure was such that different branches would provide assistance to the investigative staff during an investigation, depending on the specific area being looked into and what axpertise uns required. Danielson s then stated that during the particular investigation in question ene of O s * ..gs-., < a . -emi, meme~ e. ,== -= ..ama. , , , - . - . - - e.. w , , . o --.,n - w m-,- ,
e 21
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the se=5ers of the tea =, KaVi:' Ward, was f::= his uni:. Danielsen ' cen:1:ued :ha: 1: vas :rpical f:r Phi 1*ip to c: e directly :o hi= and request assis:ance. The si: a:ica or allega:ica generally di::a:ed whether or no: :here was a need to assign se=ecne to an invas:1ga:i:n. Danielsen then explai:ed that once sc=ecce is assigned to an inves:ig::1:n, there is 11::le further involve =ent f:c= a anage en standpoint unless the investiga:1:n devel:ps what is censidered :: be a major proble= :: fi= ding. In the casa cf additional proble=s 1: veuld be necessary to have core canage=en: =ee:ings a=eng regional pe:sonnel. Oanielsen fur:her explained that usually the investigations and reports are ce=ple:ed and a copy is sent to hi= for infor=a:1cn and review. Oasielsen stated :he final report does "ce=e ac: ss his desk, and i: is read is a fashic ."* Danialsen responded to a questien ecucerning direc:icns given :o inspec ::s who are assigned :o assis: investigators by stating that he ins: ue:s his persense "to not ge: is the =1ddle" and to culy assis: the investiga:::. THNY 0 d : uan: the i-s------ '*<ine a.r U ~anielsen
- seie-s.also sta:ed that he
- the case of the se:.pu.a:e II. .sves: iga::.: he Gan:.e's::)
7 veuld nave advised Ward n:- :: =ak e *-~ vrt' a:1:ns c:-en--d ; -Q vei and no: :c Off er any advice :: the lice see. Oasialsen : hen s:a:e: tha: he be*ieves :ha: F " sheui' --- ?'u ? e:s i ti t-- dur- - .
%'- a '- s and sheuld :: p::Vice :. r.: .::::.:n :: ::e .1:ensee. ;anda1s::
cc ::.=ue: :y s:a:1:3 as 1:ng as S"R0 is avare tha: there is a pr:ble: and the lies.see has bee: apprised of the def t:iency then S*RO shou -- * -- the licensees eff::: un:11 the p;eble= is resolved. != respense :: ques:10:1:g, Danielsen sta:ed there is :o :i=a fra=e f:: aking a li:e:see perfo:= c:::ee:ive v :k. Oasielses.sta:ed i: : uld be 30 days to several years. Danie'scr. sta:ed :ha: i:ess dis::vered :: be una::e;:ab*e . are usually kept as an " Ope: 1:e=" by the inspec:::. Ca:1e'.scu ::::*.uted by s:ating tha: he could no: furnish any addi:i: 4* inf o:..a tic regarding . the dese:1 bed inves:igati:n.
- Cha:ges ine=rporated pursuan: :: reis:e:-tev en 3/3/31.
Interriev ef Richard C. Knee On Januarv M . 1081, Richard C. Knop, Chief, Projec: Se::10:, Regien :1:, II, NRC, was inte:tieved by , Arthur Schnebelen. Soecial As?is ta- tJ fehn Si-e?*'- 5"e ed t m. 03. ::or to :ne :nterv:ev .".:. KOp vas advised tha: the CIA investiga:1:n was initiated to deter ine whether c: not an II investigation conducted by Ragion Ill.a: the Oi=e: Nuclear Station had sufficiently addressed the allegations b:: ugh: by Themas Applaga:e during early 1980. Mr. Knop stated that he did not helieve tha: he had any inv 1ve:en: in the planning sessions cencarning the investigation at Zi=ar. Knep then stated that the investigators and the i=vestiga:1ve 3 cup have the lead in maki=g decisiona regardi:g investigaticas. Investiga:1ve effer:s, according to Knop, say teuch on or add:sss areas which have been inspec:ed or looked into in the past by II; therefore, it is necessa:/ := have investiga:1cns take the lead and p;cvide = ore independence. Knep recalled , e-a +emam em - gwe, me p ueyev a 4- e,e - ..-amm.+- e e se ..w... *,=es--- .-~,+=-w.-e,eg,m.
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that Phillip inic::ed hi= (Knop) tha: Applegate had =ade several allega:i:ns ) and the investiga:ive effer: vas going to f'ocus on three of :hese= allega:icns. ' According to Kncy this see:ed c:nsis:en: vith infor=ation that had been received by Phillip. Knop stated that he believed there was an allegati:n about three defec:1ve velds and another allegation concerning five pieces of pipe which were delivered ts the Zi=ner site and d: pped f::= the back of a truck. Knop could not recall the third area which was to be investigated. Knop explained that the =ain concern of the inspec:1:n effort was to identify velds or radiog:aphs that are questi:nable and deter =ine if there is a system to " track" the deficiencies. Knop also explained that once the deficiencies vara identified thera vould have been no need to pursue the =at:er further. Knop could not furnish any other infor=atica regarding the investigati:n conducted by Regi:n In.
- Changes incorporated pursuant to reinterriev on S/2/81.
!nte-rtev ef Janes 7. Senahue Ja:es T. :enahue, Chief, Seca:1:7 Sectics, Safeguards Branch, II, Regi:n in, was inte:-rieved :n 't--+- . 18:' % *-" -d-
- -+ Nvid :. 04:ble ae.d Jeh- L c'--isi- ':
Denahue said his cely c:ntact vi:h either "ac=as App *eFa:e er Gerald Phil.ip's investiga:icn of Applegata's allega icns was in cennection vi:h 4':ce:1:; Denahus set up a:eng himself, Phillip, Applegate, and Rcher: Sucklay (head of the A:::1c hergy Oesk of the 731's Chicago offi:a;. Oc.shus believed that Applegate had requested the j: int see:ing vir.h the ~31 based upen certain ::* ' al acts unich A;plegate believed had bee . c:==1t:ed by individuals at the 1==ar Nuclear Fever Sta:1:n. Oona .ue said he was the one who set up :he =eeting because he was Regi:n in's prize contac: vi h the 731. Denahua said he ac:: panied ?hini;. :: the
=ee:ing enly to introduce eve:/ene and then c: ob s e:-te.
Donahue could not recall all the substance of what Applegate rela:ed a: the meeting. Se did recall that Applegate played a tape en a siniature tape recorder - explaining who each speaker was and what :ney ve:e saying. Donahue said Applegate felt these recordings of con *re sa:f=ns that he had had with others pr:vided evidence of une cri inal ar.:s. Donahue said Applegate's portica of the convereations struck his as consisting of leading questicas. Donahus said tuckley achtsed tha:, if there were any Cavern =ent subs: fies involved - either state or Tederal, Applegate shculd pursue his al'.egations under the previsions of the
" White Collar Crimes Act;" ctharvise he did not see any T31 ju:isdictier..
Donahue recalled that Buckley further informed Applegate that he did net feel the tapes provided sufficient evidence to support his allaga:1:n of a criminal conspiracy. Donahue believed that Buckley vos a ht: "niffad" at NRC for bringing Applegate there; Denahua knew that the nesting drew Buckley away f cm sc e impor: ant work on terroris: activi:iss. Denahua also understood that Buckley had centacted the T31's Cincinnati office and heard of their earlier contact with Applegate. ,.. 4.. a 9 ,,_,,..mem-. mi teessege 6*w ear ** .m a+=p s esem 9 P M 1sep hW ate * ~ * * * * * ' ' *M"'8* * * * * * * * * ~
- W" M MM
- 26 Donahue said Applegate questi:ned why Phillip had not talked to = ore a individuals in his investiga:1cp. Applega:e na=ed several individuals .
but Donahue could not recall their na=es. Oenahue recalled tha: Phillip responded tha: 1: was unnecessary because he had rescived the issues. Denahus said i: vas als: clear tha: Applegate had a hard :1=e ac:epting the difference he veen what h7C was responsible for and what he fel: 52 0 should be looking at. Desahus believed that Applegate feh that II investigsters shculd be criminal invas:igaters who looked at all cri=inal violatiens fres petty thef:s through false docu=ents. Denahus said Phillip explained to Applegate that SpC had no jurisdiction on atters such as time clock violations and industrial proper y protection. Dona'hua said Phillip had to repeat this explanation several ti=es a=d it vaa clear f:ca the discussion that thia was not the first time Phillip had told Applegate this. - Donahue said Applegate f eu the Gover==en: should have been " beholden :o his for providi g a great serrica." He said that, for exa=ple, Applegate thought the Cover ==ent sheuld have paid for his ::1p fre= Cinci a:1 to Chicago and the 731 shculd have ::ansported hi= to the airpo::. Donahue said he has k:cu.. Phillip a icag ti=e. their careers haviss dovetailed. Oenahua had caly r!c hi;hca: praise f:: Phillip's ;ud;=en: aad inven: gative atill:1es. Inte:.iev ef Ja=es Ie ele: Cn Jam s--r 20 1891. Mr. Ja=es Kaspier,' Directer, Regi: 111, II, was in te r tievec by A---u- f eM-e e ' er_ . Seacial s a eista-t a-d W M eht?. S....-^ --- 6 >_ Mr. Kapp;e vas app :.sec c: : e sa:v.re of ::.e :.svestigati: and requested :o fu::ish infer:a:1:n regsri.sg'his role or invo*vemen: in the invas:igatica ccedu::ed by Gera3 Phillip a: the 11:=:e Nuclea:
? cue 5:a: ion duri:g 1981.
Mr. Kappler explained that his recollecti:n of :he initial invas: iga:i:n was 11:1:ed. Ac:ording :o Kapple: he did not actively participa:e in the decision-=aking process as :o what informa:1cn provided by the alleger, The=as Applega:e, was going to be investigated. Keppler stated that the regional procedures would not normally require a =eeting with the investigative staff to determine what allegations would or would not be addressed. Routinely there is a weekly see:1ng 1:volving manage est and periodically meetings with* Personnel involved in varicus specialized activities, includ1:3 investigations, during which he veuld receive reports on the sta:us of a par:1::.14: activit/. Kappler centinued by explaining that the decision-making ;;;:sss per:aining :o allegatices received by the investigative staff would or ally only require decisions to be made within the investigative usi: a=d their i= mediate supe:tisi:n. (, A
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17 Kapple: added tha: :he particular investigation in questi:n and resul:ing
- s. ..
investigative report is f ai,rly , ypical of how all allegations are investiga:ed . and docueenced by the regi:n. Keppler alsc stated tha: he was not sure that allegati:ns or reports veuld be handled any differe::17 is the
, future.
Keppler then stated that investigations concerning allegations at c::- struction si:ee are different than those relating to facilities which have operating reactors. The distinction is that construe:1on projects have so many more people involved in various phases of constructics at the sites. A probles arises in deciding how much investigative vo;k is required to resolve the allegation and whether the investigative effort is properly scoped. In the investigation in question, Kappler recalled that there was an allegation of constructica or craf t personnel reporting to work drunk and drinking on the job. According to Kappler this particular ites or allegation was not addressed because it was a general-type allegation and not supported by much in the way of specific infor=ation. Kappler then stated that he was not certain that a general ' allegation such as this would be taken and investigated or investiga:ad in-depth. A probla= such as work =en drinking at the si:e* 1s basically a li:stsee
=anag e:e:: pr:blem with NRC's 13:erest being in whether er no: there was a health and safety i= pac: rela:ad to the work. Kappler explained tha:
the purpose cf the QA p;: gram is to ensure that any una::eptabla vc;k d:es no: rs=ain un:or:seted. NR inspecta agains the OA p;;gra: :s detsr=ine if the verk is being dcne cer:ectly. ! Kapple also stated that he believed Region 12: i=vestigative precedures-required that an al! age he 1:!cr=ed of what allega:icns c issues were vi:hin :he jurisdi::1ca of NRC a:d were going to be invas:13ated. Kapple added :ha: 1: vas also a regicnal Sc11:y :: rec ::ac: the alleger at :he cenclust:n of the investigative eff zes to provide him with an explanatica of what had been ide :1fied or resolvec. la some cases repoc s of i:vestigati:n were see: to the allagers af a: the c::ple:1cn of the verk. Mr. keppler was questioned as to why the 'invas:1ga:1ve tea = did not identify the dates of veld repal s or report descripticas of discrepancies identified in the radiography review. Kappler responded by stating that he was not aware that the velding allegations had not been thoroughly addressed and reported. CIA explained that one of the sain issues which the II investigation was actively pursuing had to do with alleged defective velds being initially accepted by Kaiser. In order to support tha: allegatiet AFplegate provided the identification of three specific welds K811 KH 11. and CT. 606. The II " findings" replied to the stipulated allegati:n by stating that one of the velds had been replaced, without sentioning when the corTective work had taken place, and therefore did not pursue whether or not a defective veld may have been accepted. In addressing the two remaining velds II explained that "some discrepancies" were identified in the radios:aphy review but decided not to undertake j any additional investigative effort.
... s
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28
,** ,'- Keppler explained that he was unaware of the specific allega: ion as described, hevever, he would acnep: CIA's descriptien of the events. ~
Kepple then sta:ed that if the investiga: ion had not given any more ' response than that described, by CIA.* then the allega:icn was not i thoroughly addressed. Kepplar also sta:ed . hat he could unders:and why Applegate or anyone nak1:3 an allegation would be upset with the results of the investigation and would f eel that the issues or concerns were no: appropriately addressed. Kappler was advised that 1: was the lack of documentation which produced questions regarding the adequacy of the investigation. In this particular instance the lack of te#---m-d an in the reaar c--kd-ed vteh 11-fe.d suecort;ag cocu=enta:Len _does not per:::~ anyone reading the report to uncerscanc vnat invescagative effer actually took place. Kappler stated that it appeared the report required additicnal, or at least nere specific, information to address the allagation. Keppler concluded by explaining it was his per:sprion that the obvi:us weakness identified as a r.sult of ths CIA affer: relateed to the entire Regien 11 investigative program, rather than the perfornance of indiriduals. Kapple: then s:sted :ha: apparently he and the regional canagenent had not been reviewing the resul:s of the investigative p :gra: to ensure that there were clear and ce=plete respenses : :he 411ega:1cns in the investiga:1en reports.* Folleving :his state =en: Ka;;1er suggested :he possibili:7 of additi:nal review of future investigative reperts t: see if the language clearly answered the questi n(s) :aised. Kappier then stated that ene alternative would be to furnish the repor :s the Public j Af fairs Of fi:e who could reviev :he sa:erial f :s a acn-techni:a1 perspectite and see if the language clearly explains what was done. Kapple; believed
- nis veuld increase the region's ability :: pr:vida c:npleta and unders:andable responses :s allegattens. *
- Changes incorperated pursuan: to reinterviav en 5/3/8*. .
Interview of Thenas !. Vaedel Mr. The:as E. Vandel, Resident Inspector, Wolf Creek Nuclear Si:e, Wolf Creek, Kansas, was interviewed on Feb-e*-- '* 'o*' Airport, Kanses City, Missouri, hv Sm"d d cm-%1a a-o fe"-atfd- the'.*-. Kansas Ci:7 Investigators, CIA. Mr. Vandel was advised that the purpose of the investigation and interview was to determine what kncvledge he had pertaining to allegations raised by Thomas Applegate regarding deficiencies in construction at the Willias H. Zinmar Nuclear Site, Mosceu, Chim. Kr. Vandel began the interview by explaining that he had been involved with the Zi=ner nuclear construction site for approx 1:4:aly.five years...
~ -
**~Vande171sii s'tated that il v~aTTbe'ulual policy for a P;ej'ect Inspecter (PI) to be assigned to a particular facility for only apprexina:ely three years. The purpose is to prevent familiarity between FRC inspect' ors and the licensee and enable a rotation of inspectors. Vandel stated
1
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; 29
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that the reason he had been extended for two addi:1onal years was the , request of two supervisors, from Region III. P.r. D. W. Hayes and Mr. Di:k Knop. Vandel also stated that during the period he was FI 4: Zisuser he had been involved with as many as seven nuclear utilities and inspections at ' those f acilities. Vwo of the facilities for which he was also the F: was the Midland Nuclear Site and the Clinton Nuclear Site. Vandel centinued by stating that he did not believe that even at this time there uns an NRC resident inspector at the Zimmer site do was responsible for or experienced solely in construe:1on. Vaa stated i j that the first NRC inapector to be assigned at 21=mer was "env w '- who was responsible for preoperational inspection at the f acility. fdd Vandel also stated that the facility is so close to completien that Daniels would be an appropriate inspector to be at the site den they st. art preoperational testing.
- - - ... . .. . . _ . . . . . - ~ ~ ~ ._
+ vandel explained that as he recalled there were E0 hearings regarding i other allegations at which he testified ever a year ago. The hearings l dealt with questions regarding the licensing of the project. Also j invcivec in doing se=e research about allegations. .1-h were raised by intervenor groups, was NRR. Vandel explained there vere several issues ! he could recall which were being addressed by the 202 (1) cable trays j and welding regarding the cable trayst (2) installatica of water tight ! doors and alleged deficiencies; and, (3) water intake structures in :he
! plant and rotating screena to bring in river water. Vandel further I stated he believed the allegations were a result of intervencrs challenging these particular areas and the Atomic Safe!" and Licensing Board had requested the staff, both EP. and II to it.vIstigate and report back to j the board.
- Vandel stated that he remembered the Applegate allegattens and briefly I
could recall wha: Applegate's role had been at the plant. According to , Vandel, Applegate had been an undercover investigator amployed by the 7 licensee, CC&E at the Zimmer Nuclear Site. Sometime after Applegate l 1ef t the site and was no longer aployed by CG&E, Vandel believes Applegats called the Region III office and made allegations regarding the Zi:mer j ~ site. Vandel stated that he could not remember dat the specific allegaticas vere, however, Vandel stated there was one specific area that he was personally involved in regarding the delivery of pipe spools at the site , and their subsequent " dropping off a truck." This was the sarticular i area, or one of the areas that Carry Phillip was involved is investigating. ! Vandet said that Phillip had esplained the allegations to him (Vandel) and he (Vandel) had arranged for Kavin Ward, an NRC Non-Der. rue:1ve Esamination Specialist (NDE) to accompany Phillip to the site and make an inspection of the alleged deficiencies. Vandel then stated that he had been involved with some of the initial or original planning of the investigation. He also stated that he had heard some of the progress as 3 the investigation us conducted. . Vandel explained that it ves obvins that Kavin Ward should so to the site. Vandel further explained that he
- ; personally unde the arrangements. .
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l , , . , . j . . l l 30 i i '- 7- Af ter the initial inspection ar . investigation at the sit ?hillip and
'Jard returned to Region III at dich tirse Vandel statedyhat t he and others received a briefing concerning information that was discovered.
One area that Vandel recalled was the licensee was not clear in its instructions een they requested FM to examine the piping Wich fell , from the truck. According to Vandel, FM exa=&ned the entire pipe including f prefabricated widing. It us a result of the radiography that questions F were raised concerning the pipe. The radiography, as Vandel recalled, caused same problema mainly because radiography was not required for ' esamination of certain welds. Secondly. FM had conducted radiograph testing of welds which did set have the proper configuration for radiography , readings, particularly, radiography of welds at the pipe caps (but: ! welds), Vandel then stated that the licensee sought to resolve the issue l by bringing Pullaan Power Products, the pipe manuf acturer, to the site. : Sometime after it was determined that only ultrasonic testing would be the proper :eethod of testing the pipe Pu11aan did come to the site ed [ perform ultrasonic testing With established that there were no defects i in the welding. Vandel recalled he accompanied Phillip to the si:e for i a second re 1ew of documentation pertaining to the pipe spools. He . checked records and determined the resolution to be accuraee. Vandal l then stated that he reviewed specific docu=ents: nonconfor=ance repc :s. ' FM test inspection reports and Fullaan exa=1:stions Wich were cenducted r by ultrasonic tes:ing. Vandel explained that at the time he and Phillip were at the si:e they checkad for material. control procedures. "his a s an area W ere the ; licensee received a nottee of violatica for releasing sc.e pipe spe:Is i for installation. The specific ci:ation involved the f ai'ing to fel*:v ! a procedure for documenting nonconformanca a j nonconf cenance bef re the installation of th;d pre;erly esolving e equipment. Vandel sta:edthe that he as responsible for initially writing up the ite=s (none:r.plian:es . : He recalled that he wrote two separate noncompliances which were subsequen-17 l combined into one notice of violation by Chuck Norelius, Regica 111. ' This was, at:ording to Vandel, an enforcement or management decision te l combine the two noncompliance (infractions) into one and use them as tvc i emaaples of one violation. Vandel stated it was his belief that this l type of precedure us consistent 'with Region III enforcement practices. , I Vandel added that he believed there were discussions among personnel i
.. imelved in the investigation ar persons reviewing the investigatien. !
regarding how to handle the results. Vandel stated that this probably ' inolved himself, Morelius. Verd and Phillip. Vandel also believed that ; there we one major meeting relating to the results of the investigati:n ! to determine W a action was seing to be taken. l According to Vandel, Applegate had ande other allegations regarding i ether activities at the Zimmer site. One of these that he could recall i t e1 l 1 s I r
,-__-__m . . -
s ' i 31 i involved esployees removing or stealing materials belonging to C0&Z fro = the site. Another allegation by Applegate involved the fabrication of
. belt buckles frun steel :nsterials located at the site. Vandel aise emplained that he ins of the opinion that the non-safety related allegations
, were not going to be addressed by NRC and that this ses explained to Applegate.
i Vandel then stated that he believed that both Phillip and Jim Toster had i been familiar with earlier allegations and activities at the Zimmer site i ~ and that some of the allegations had been the subject of previous II investigations . Vandel stated that during the 1973-74 time period there ! were allegations free a former Kaiser QC inspector that a manuf acturer
! was supplytes poorly or insufficiently inspected asterials. Vandel j continued by stating that he participated in one area of the investigation with Phillip and another inspector by the name of qq,gp we. ma _ g j
separate earlier allegation, Jim Toster investigated allegations regarding l deficiencias with the cable trays at the Zimmer site. i
- j i
vandel explained that he had acesapanied Phillip on the second trip to the Zinner site to address the allegations of the pipe s;cols because f Phillip had returned fret the initial investigation at the site and I believed there wre areas that had not been completely addressed. After
! discussing the investigation results with Phillip. Vandel agreed he !
j should accompany Phillip back to the site. As stated earlier. Vandel and Phillip were particularly cencerned with possible noncempliance in
- i j
- the natorial centrol area. 'It was a rest.1: of the discussions with Phillip that Vandel agreed that they should return to the site and make
! a more thernugh i..vestigation ints the sattte. Vandel repeated that he , and Phi!!1p only addressed the areas related to the pipe spools and } zatorial centrol. Vandel then stated that during Phillip's first visit , to tne site, Kevin Ward had looked at the radiegraphy and other nondestrue-
! tive examination areas which also included the pipe spool welds. Vandel j
' then centinued by stating that Ward did not look into the control procedures that permitted scoe sections of pipe to be installed without appropriate
- precedures, t' hat ws the sole purpose for Phillip and he to return to i the site.
t According to vandel, Ward's efforts to address Applegate's allegations . t covered one level concerning alleged welding deficionales. The second
' trip and investigation at the site una another level, er more closely )
scrut4-**ed effort. Vandel stated that one particular procedure being ' j shocked ses the failure te keep idestified sensenforming asterial ! segregatad from asterial that tes ready to be Lasta11ed. A second ' precedure that was reviewed allowed the installation of asterial to be installed is a locaties as less as it was " tagged" er had proper identifi-eaties. Regarding the speatfia lasue of FM's performing radiographs of pipe. Tandel believed it tes appropriate for Raiser to everrule PM's tests. Vandel explatsed that, if asything, he believed that FM should i j e
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- g. ... ...- . .. . . . . . .. .
32 have been " chastised" for n'ot'd'oing their' job properly. Specifically, Vandel stated radiography dich uns cenducted by PM vas an i= proper ttchnique for identifying possible deficiencies in the wlds. When responding to questions regarding the IE report of investigation and Vandel's involvement in either reviewing or writing portions of the report, vandel stated that Phillip we the author of the section of the report sich incorporated the details. Vandel explained that most of the information and uording in the " Details" section is Phillip's. 7andel then stated that he did have the opportunity to provide certain informa-tion wich was submitted as drafts. One portion - which was already sentioned - involved the noncompliances regarding the materials. 7andel, 4 upon reviewing OIA's copy lof the report of investigation, also stated that he believed same of the input in the findings paragraph for allega-tion 3 (page 13) also contained his writing. 7andel then explained that the rest of his information or involvement in the compiling of the - report would have been only verbal exchanges with Phillip.
. Vandel continued by stating that on a previous visit to the site a General Mechanical Superintendent for Kaiser had showed him pieces of naterial that sc=a of the eployees had been using to manuf acture belt buckles at the site. Vandel believed the belt buckle material ves part of the asterial which was used in the rotating screens at the intakes.
Vandel then stated that he did not pursue the belt buckle manuf acturing because he did not consider it safety-related. Vandel continued by stating that he would have been concerned only if the saterial had been censidered safety-related material Wich was not replaced. Near the conclusion of the interriew Vandel volunteered that during the time of the AS.3 hearings which occurred ap;*rox1=ately May-July 1977, 1 NRC staff attorney Charles 3arth and he met with Mrs. Maggie Erbe from Moscow, Ohio, on a number of concerns. One of the concerns was the manuf acturing of belt buckles. Vandel had no additional involvement in the metter other than he heard that 3arth. subsequently,vrote a letter back to Mrs. Erbe regarding the allegation. Vandel then stated that he at one time had a sample of the , material dich use being used to manufacture the belt buckles. ----- i Vandel stated that either prior to or during the investigation he neither met nor talked to Applegate. He stated he knew Applegate had come forward or volunteered the information to the NRC. In regards to Phillip's contact with Applegate, YanJe1 understood that Phillip had informed ! Applegate that the IE we not going to investigate 'other issues raised by Applegate: specifically, annuf acture of belt buckles, time card padding and drinking at the site. Regarding the results of the II invnetigation, 7andel stated that, at some time near the conclusion Phillip described all of the allegations to a group at Region III: he believed everyone knev dat items wre going to be included in the investigation and report and what issues or allegations wre not going to be addressed as being of concern to the ,:* NRC. O O V
.. . .*4_.--- _ . , . ,.4. .
- . ot . " . - . . - - . . -
33 k- ~ In response to sc=e questices related to precedures for investigati:ns at constt-iction sites. Vandel explaised that the inspectiens and investi-gations are usannounced unless there is a particular ::ases for ad rising the licensee, e.g., to coordinate a schedule to view a particular phase of wrk in progress. Vandel bel'ieved that it vee the policy that investi-gators initially contact allegers or individuals bringing i=.for=ati:n to the attention of NRC by telephone to establish a time and schedule for a persosal intet riev to discues their concerns. Vandel then explained that this is usually done by the investigators do make an effort to contact individuals away from the site. Vandel concluded by stating 4 w. there are co-n in ecensieu
- ee the investigative staff recuests a-inspector with engineering backgrousc w ..ag ..a ;a spec ::c y
f cases when they believe the information vill be so technical ts recuire se=:eece vita te-- ' + et e--*** *e assist 1: *'e tste .'tev ~# --* i er, sancel concluded the intervtev ny stating snat he c:uld ::t q provide any additional inf or:ation regarding the Applegate allegati::s or the investigation c: ducted at the ?'- er site. Reinterview of terald 7$.11113 and Xavin Ward /g Cerald Phillip and K4 vin %ercl were reinter rieved en ?e5- *5 '"' b y .*a-s e C+ c * *--' - 'r' ='***- -* " S-M e . * - ' * - - - " - * ' * - 0:A. Phillip described the review he and %srd perfor=ed of the 99 wids in the : rs spray system. He said they obtained frem doct=ent c;nt;:1 personnel 99 envelopes which contained the ydicgraphs and " reader sheets" is; the velds in this systas. They tid not review any of the veld packages Wich centained the detailed wid history for each of the vel da. .'h1111; said they did not review all the radisgraphs either. Es said they rerieved all the reader sheets and found two situati:cs Were Kaiser accepted velds that FM had considered rejectable. Phillip said that Mard exanined the radiographs for these tvc and agreed with Kaiser's deternisation. Phillip said they did not look at the radiographs for the others - including the "five to ten" that Kaiser rejected af ter FM had accepted - because their objective in cenducting the reviev us to determine (1) the degree of Kaiser's overruling and (1) whether Kaiser's overtalings were legitimate. 0ZA then addressed page 6 of the :7. report Wich identifies " Allegation 1" as "tefective velds in safety-related systess have been accepted, among thee wre w1ds CT-606 RR-42 (sic), and K-811." Dillip vos :5e9 asked whether the allege,,gaggu, ally used the_wrd " ace,jpted" and. if hejik ~ vne taar he res_ ized that "acegptance' coomd particular f or:a1 act s bv Kaiser? Th1111p responded that he believed the alleger said that they Taf*Tu'sht" had wlds: he did not recall the alleger's use of the wrd "acetpted." Vard explained, by voy of background, that acceptance of a weld is demonstrated by Kaiser's approval en the reader sheet. b, *
~.. .
' ~
34 Phillip said that they did not list the history of each of the three individual welds in question (page 9 of the II report) because they were only interested in the final version of each veld. Ward noted that the licensee is only required to maintain the final radiograph and reader sheet to de=onstrate compliance with the code. Vard and Phillip believed they reviewed the radiographs for these three velds. va-d -eeed **=* me . -.a s --re-e an*% ** *baam ? tr8 d a e-sab e un e m *fr e d-.-- .A 4 . i. e.s..a .s,. ' el hsd Je er.Em= E* a d e s . A. d a h h ad ve
- to h_a *meelved Phillip and Ward said they did not know whether CT-6C6 was a safety- ^
related weld although Ward said he vos subsequently inforned that it
- vas. *'ard said that just three weeks before this inter riev he learned 4
fyou tr.e licensee that the " discrepancy" with CT-606 was that an inproper techni se was used when the weld vos radiographed! no shi.ms were used under un penetraneter. Vard said that he also just learned that this veld is buried in cencrete. Ward said that he is unable to independently review a radiograph to deteratne a weld's acceptability when an inproper radiographic technique uns used. Phillt? vee then asked why the IT e m et'. e...ti , .s ef. m r..,. e ura. o dnit ea t e - . - - -- - at 'itS' October ",0.
- W 3--- -- -* --
"tisc ees eine" fetieved 4 1ser's August i.. R saae--,- . ._a. 4 - 6 ev e -- : _ . - - - . - e < - - - r - - . . . , 4.m s . ;,, ;q, . . . . . . , 33 , , g g , y, g g ,, ,
re ac s* *1. Fhillip claimec ttat sney did not see tne cocuneat conta:.nin g g_ t.u s 2"e ??'J !!S t . Phillip further stated that, tven i' they had learned 1
. n the everruang. they would not have nade a big point of it. He said that their review of the 99 velda in the cr;e spray systen vos to provide an tr.dication of the degree of the overruling; therefers. even if thev "
had located this overruling which vos in another systaa.. it would not have altered their finding regarding overrulir.g.
. Phillip and Vard recalled that. when they asked about veld K-811 they l . vere informed that it had been cut out and replaced by T-916. They said that Kaiser furnished thus with, documentation to this effect. presunably ; the 1979 n6aconf ersance report (NR #E-2138R1) . Phillip and Verd could l not explain *y a deficiency in a 1977 veld was not documented by a j NR until 1979. Vard said that he learned just three weeks before this interview that K-916 has not been radiographed because of veter in the line. Vard mi ne said that a Fainer aendestructive etani-at d ee nues-vd e--
{ han 9 ~ ad Mm **me '-916 is e clase C weld (i.e.. it is not safetv-O t Ward said .he was also informed just three tasks before this interview f9 9 hbMO - ~ f 1.ba t wel_d M-4 2 h ad b e en cut _ eut and n' disslaved to FM t He aad Va?d -*
- s e reslaced -# = +4*-e b, r-291veem enesten a.ddee v-262.MN 6 (nat rewor4 on A.n-.4 van beine eenducted at 19e same a.
t iin e s un d e rvav . Fhiliap espressed surprise anc rep.ast Kna t ne was
;ne H avestiri- /EQ/ff 4
/WS (q##T' not avere of tnis. Phillip and Verd said that when they reviewed the g g'7 &j/
j ., reader sheet for U-42 during the period April 7-9, 1980 it reflected 4, that the veld vos acceptable. They said the records contained no indica. ] tion that M-42 had been or vos going to be, cut out and replaced. Phillip said they did not inform the licensee in advance as to what l
l
, . I I
35 4 b-.- velds.vould be reviewed. Phillip noted that, inasnuch as Acel m e ghe brought these velds to Schweirs' attention, the heenses .av " have expected that sc:ecne would be reviewing this veld secetime. Investirators' Note - Af ter a lunch break the intet riev was continued with Phillip only. Phillip said he kaav from his first visit to Zi=ner that the notation on ItR#E-1911, Rev. 2 - which was holding up installation of the spool pieces - had been lined out; however, he did not establish who lined i: out. Phillip said he also realized on his return to the Regional Office af ter the first visit that Applegate's allegation was that the spool l pieces were had at the factory - not that they were danaged 1. hen unl:aded from the truck. Phillip said that he discussed the natter with Noralius
- and, for these and other reasons, they decided that Phillip should do further investigation at Zi
- sner. Phillip said that the Zi==ar perscenel knew he was returning because he so infor=ed Schweirs a couple days i ahead o,f ti:e.
Phillip said he established that wir. 01:2 with Kaiser's Occu=ent Cun:r:1
- Unit, was the one who lined out taa .ia accation. Phillip c:uld not recall 01::' ex:sse, but Olt: did agree thst his nathed of closing the g"f'" T n by lining it out was incorrect. Philiin said thefearthruse n_ e.-
relarmed "a seeel Staean based en the n' a-sd 57. inf e- ad M*s tha- he vis eresent wha- Schvairs di?nered Olt: to 11 e out the aetaet-e. , Phillip said he did not pursue the =at:er after $caveirs denied it because the "botton line" was : hat there was no cover-up, as evidenced $*. by the other E that re=ained open on the mat:er. Phillip suspected : hat M7mq, this 11ains out only occurred becausa the Zi:=ar persennel considered 1: to be only a " paper pt:b;es." Phillip said that, in fact, the speel pieces passed ultrasent tests ??? and Pu11:1e.-Kallogg= perf ar:ed ':e:veen their two vist:s. Investitators' Nete *cvard the end of the in:erview. Ward re:urned :s advtse CIA that he had just learned f rom ten Wood of C",&E that the three velds are all safety-related. He said K-916 is a class 3 veld and both K-262 and CT-606 are class 2 velds. C B
- Changes incorporated pursuant to reinterriev en 8/6/81.
Interitev of Tvetet t. Williamson Jr. Everett L. W1111aseen, Jr., Investigator, Region 11, II, was interviewed at the Vashington National Airport, Washington, D.C. , -- w,-# e *ose by Investigators 9m"*4 -h' a ad 'Aa ******** * * ' _ _ Williamson saia he participated in an interview of Thomas Applegate which occurred sometime around March 3,1940. Utiliasson said that about a week before that date him muservisor.1-was .are a instructed hia :o nest Region Ill Investigatoif Gerald (nup la anst
. Chio, to assist Phillip in an investigation. W1111 asses said the inforued him that Applegate had called NRC he believed the Hj uarters Duty O!!1ter had eived and recorded Applegate's call and 4 -. siled Applegate back. -er said i
,g 1.
y .... . . . . . . r* - . . . . 36 , i Applegate was articulate and see=ed to have genuine concerns. h said Applegate indicated he done some undercover work at the Zi==er r Ziuclear Power Station. gave Williamson the name of a Mr. Upchurch vbo as with the F3I's Cine nati office. Williamson understood his purpose was to observe and assist Phillip as a witness: his limited involvement was because Willimson had only been with the NRC for about 4 two months. . Williamson said that he called Upchurch and informed him that he would be in town soon and may want to talk to him. He then contacted Phillip regarding travel arrangements. He cet Phillip at the Cincinnati airport on Monday morning. Bey took a tental car to Covington. Kentucky. vnere they called Applegate frem a restaurant. Williamson did not know how much previous contact Applegata and Phillip had had. . *A)pleirate ga'vP'-
"then 13structi3ns tom ~liim7n7ht~parki:rg'~ lot 7Y the Church of Christ
~
in Covington. Applegate described how he would be dressed so they could recognize him. Vt 11acson said they =et Applegate about 1:00 pm. He described Applegate as a big guy and he was waring boots, a hat and a "F.arlboro jacket." He said Applegate walked thee several doors away to his house. t.h en they got inside. Applegate took his jacket off and they observed he vair wearing a gun. Applegate then described his role at :t=mer. W1111assen said he did not understand many of the technical things that Applegate was describing. He said that Applegate and Phillip did most of the conversing. De only thing Williamson recalled asking Applegate *.as biograshical data such as his name address and phone number. Willia =sen recalled that Applegate said he was hired as a private investigator to investigate tine card padding at ti=ner. Villiamson recalled three specific issues that Applegate raised: 1) the annuf acture and sale of stainless steel belt buckles: 2) the sale of hand runs: and 3) an issue regarding safety-related pipe. Wil11 meson described the third issue as being a situation where pipe was delivered to the Zinser construction site at night and then dropped on the ground. Applegate claimed the pipe required 100 percent radiographic testing af ter being dropped. Williamson was sure there were other issues raised by Applegate but he could not recall them. Applegate's conversations were interspersed with some of his personal experiences, such as when he allegedly worked undercover to help the Drug Inforcement Administration. Williamson believed that Phillip was very meticulous. Se said Phillip spent a lot of time with Applegate and listened to him very carefally. Williamson recalled specifically feeling at the time that Phillip had taken a lot of notes and had paid a lat of attention to detail. V1111 mason recalled listening to some tape recordings which Applegate played. Me said the recordings were garbled and therefore hard to ) , unde rstand. He said Applegate apparently were the recording device as a .': ( .
?.
% g..i
- -- --- - - . ~ . - -- -
.c ... , , . - . . - .. .
1
. . 37 body recorder, although Villiamson did not believe the recorder was designed for that purpose. Applegate described who was participating in each of the recorded conversations and what was the subject matter of the conversation. Williamson said that he and Phillip tried to listen
~ 4 to the recordings, but they could not understand the recordings while the recorder ses sitting on the table. He said that he and Phillip held , the recorder up to their ears in an attempt to understand what was being said. Williamson said that intermittently they could understand 'some of the conversation but the quality was still poor. W1111mson said Applegate had scue documents regarding his work which he obtained from Major Cox, his employer. Williamson said he did not take any notes or retain copies of any of these documents. Williamson said he did get the documents copied and he gave these copies to Phillip. 4 W1111assen said that, in order to get the documents copied. Applegate called the MI's Covinston office to ask if they would copy them. *. ten i they tut :ed Applegate down, they thought the F3I Cincinnati office ay be able to help. W1111amson said he also figured that he could then talk to Upchurch. ..
- Williamson lef t Applegate's residence around 2:00 pn. He got to downtown ;
Cincinnati sometine between 1:30 pa and 2:45 pm. He then went into the Federal Su11 ding to see Upchur:h. Upchurch recalled having talked with Applegate. W1111anson said he was unable to copy Applegate's documents at Upchurch's office because the D1 xercx machine vos not working. i W1111asson believed that he got a copy of an T3I letterhead =emorandum f rom Upchurch, although Williamson could not recall how Upchurch sede the copy because the zerox nachine was brokJn. WL111a= son said he talked to Upchurch for about 13 or 20 minutest this conversation ws nestly small talk and not so much about Applegate's allegations. W1111asson could not recall whether Applegate had come to the T31 or 1 whether so=eone else had referred Applegate to them. ' Williamson then tried to get the documents copied at the US Attorney's ' ' offices however, their moros machine was also broken. Finally, after about 13 minutes of searching, Williamson found semeene in the State Tax Assesser's of fice who allowed him to copy the documents. By this time it ses 4:30 ps and, when W1111meon returned to his car, he discovere - that his car had been tapounded due to a enew emergency. 'V1111anson ,d..
, said he get the car back around 3:00 pa and 7e'tuTKe3 to Apriegate's
** "ree17ense by 6IOC ps.~Williamson only remained in Applegate's house for about five er 10 minutes because Phillip was ready to leeva. W1111aeson did not recall Phillip's bringing any tape recordings with hin. Williamson did set imow $4 tether Phillip gave Applegate any breakdown af either the
; isases he perceived er NRC's jurisdictional limitations.
' W1111anson said .that.he and Phillip then went to dinner and returned to
- j their ne tel .
- W1111ameo'n s' aid'Thillip *and 'he tal'aed ' about*who t 'IfRC'Y "
- l ju'r1Tdistion was en the issues Applegate raised. W1111assen said he ::
i __ , , _ . , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ., _ , _ _ , _ , . _ _ _ _ . . , . . , . - . _ . _ , _ _ ~ . - . _ _ . , . _
I
- p * *= ,, ! .
30 V . . .. . questioned Phillip as to whether NRC had jurisdiction over matters such i as 1) managenent problens 2) theft of materials from the site, or 3) weapons violations (which Villiamson understood to be within the juris-diction of the Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco and Firearzs). V1111amson recalled Phillip's saying that this was something he had to look over in order to sort out Applegate's concerns. Williamson did not recall j Phillip's singling out any issues as to which were or were not NRO l concerns. Williamson said that af ter dinner at about 8:00 pm .he and l Phillip went their separate ways at the motel. l 'The next morning Phillip called Applegate and asked him a few additional j questions. Williansen said he t.as in the secte room at the motel during
- Phillip's telephone call. Williamson said the call lasted about 10 or 15 minutes. Williamson could not recall the ' substance of the call because auch of the technical aspects were foreign to his at the tine.
Utilia= son did recall Phillip's going through some of the documents with Applegate. Williamson said that Phillip had reviewed the dccu=ents the night before and made sene notes concerning them. Vil11assen said i Ph:1117 lef t Cincinnati about 10:00 that :mrning and he (Villiamson) left a few heurs later. ! .Wilitamson reca 'ed alking with . . upon his return to Headquarters. l He said he told '. that the :n.y al.egition he saw that was within N?.0's jurisdiction was the issue about the piping being dropped off the l truck. Villianson said. this couversation only lasted about two or three minutes. Villiacson guessed that his nex. cent.act s.Ih Phillip ves sometime in the next two or three vceks. 41111:sson said he later (in May) received a call !;ce a novae. ester frem Channel 9 in Cincinnati. The newscaster ! had a copy of Phillip's letter to Applegate describing the issues to be l inves tig a ted . V1111menon recalled speaking with Phillip sometime af ter l being contacted by the newscaster. Vil11assen said he had no more i contact with anycte regarding this inveotigatica until the saterial case out from the Coverment Accountability Project. V1111anson said he ves l not involved with the writing of the Regien III report of investigat*.on. l Ha did not feel that he had to write anything nor did he aver feel that he would havs any input into the report. 1 l l
-y - . . -. - . . .. . , . . . . . . . .. .
39 d .. . Review of "eldine Records $f On de5-*2a t-r 1*- -- * *
- l G -m "t ed II's senior en d 'e-? *-"+---*t 74 1 - ....$, .- -.-.4a. - . . . of .% -*,...e -,.u .. s .
valds c"' ece- so c , ..; n OIA reviewed these packages and deter =ined. among other things, that each of these velds - at ena or mre t* e, - 7
$D. had been neeeeted be Kaiser. Additionallv, sub s e m e?_ ? te geeeStance evo of the wlds in cuestion wre cut out a-2 reelaced, na II report described the history of veld R2-42 and indicated its current status as being included in an ongoing radiograph review.
o Co n t r2--r "*t OIA learned from the available veld docu=entatien that y% v.s--- n . l o yO r.a t ser e f dicial s ord e red w ! d '#H-M c"- -"* Ibv ke f 3 re m ion T . wts ws re-ovee e e vaiser eere- ' >= - w r x i w hk./enon t s r ee l a c'e e n t ,_ nis rework occurred during the period of the 2 investiga n tiay 2.19h. (tne investigators wre en site April 7-9 and April 30-ne :: report stated that wid K-811 vas velded on licve=ber 9.1977. CIA discovered that this data related to another veld (K-316) and that veld K-811 ves actually velded en January 30, 1979. Se II report correctly stated that wid K-811 was cut out and replaced by wid (K-916) in accordance with the disposition specified in !;R 4E-2138 R1 (Revision 1); havever. CIA compared the original of this !m sta= ped
'70:::" with Revision 1 and found three itens of nota.
e Tirst. although the original ?m identified tnat both wlds (K-811 ar.d K-
$16) had " hold points" scheduled for inspection by the Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI). Revision 1 of the !m deleted any reference to wid K-
$ 16. CIA subsequently reviewed the veld package for wid J.-il.i.vhich disclosed that the inspection docu=ectation (KE-1 forn 8A-109; ) contained a "valver" of the hold ooint by _ the ANI dated November 9 107*. Se initials of the ANI and tne cisposttion of the missed held point indicate
( M/ that NR t-2138 ney have mistakenly identified the wid is havine a 7 missed hold point. However. lintervtew os t.a s insenetse seettned - I MN* Erriew Be"-e-* Hdisclosed that ns- Aed~ eves tne infernatton contained on W8M 'the ortginat NR dated October 11, 1979, vus accurate. ne inspector g gg , also could not explain why the information relating to wid X-316 was l deleted fres Revision 1 and advised that he had not written (typed) the revision of the NR. 1 0 gecond, the ertainal tfM carries e disposition of " accent as is" whith untri itti d Revteten l's disposition of " cut out and replace weld." gg
' X FAT.. .
nird. Ravision 1 vos not written by the same inspector as indicated
; above, yet the inspectors' name and original 'date are contained on the
!.., ' {u s ... ,
,s .e .
- Q)& th&h&
- g } nag /O
'u . revisi: . Sis v u vert #ied be
*e f:*te? s u e --ri s e r e f O e t u- e - ? *-tr*._
- I who advised O!A ::a: :te ;;;:ecures , ::=er.y u :,;;:e: :y T.a .a e ;A. ..a:
{L bee:
- ":ne" : e re rised :U. vi::. all :f ::.e sa:e 1:f:=a:::: : ::;u::,:;
sa:e of the ::1g1:41 1:spe::::) veich ::=p*e:ed : e ::; a:: 144: na:4
/sideofthef:r:. 14v1210 1. the:af::a, was vri::e: se:e::.=a af:e: :. . e g#gl \ ~ a(Oe:e:her date of the ::131:41 a=d ;;esu 4bly af ter the date f the "veidi:g" 14, 1979). Be :ssui: of this actics, h:vever, gives : .e
;:e a re et :ha: ::: caly did the original inspe:::: v:ite the revist::.
I but also tha: the decisi: := cs: cut veld K-511 was =ade :: Cc: ter 11, 1977, g prior to Applegate's e=pleytest a: the site, v'e9. in fact, t'e v?tfi-* f g _ f t' . ' 8 a-d ?he e- Mal re= eval a.d ***1 ate e=t -' - = 2a** d' ? --- Mg i
- e ur u-:11 s er e '.etzt e .ac seen hired anc treur .: i:f e :a:1er. -f e
eete::st ve;t t e! - s :- e e e:.f :.: ve.:s :: : .e6:: ent :-- r- u 8'
?- ';u :f t . t i . m k A /MF d..p-- t e s - f n I: . ? ' i- d .7 __ are furna...: as A:: :.- e- s i e:
-r-t 1
c , , C.,A le.:v :s a ::: ei ses : ;::,2 :: ::e sta .a .. . . . . ...... a..ege ce:e::1ve ,
%4 @e velds a:d availatie 1:f:: 4:::: d:: :asted duri:3 :ta ::::se =f h::: the M g. . '.
II a:d the 0 A 1:ves::,ga:1: s. f:P.,,, . i
;z. . ~. . s. e. s.
t
!! :nves tratie- te et:
"Regarding veld Nc. ~f-406, a reviev f re ::ds sh:ved tr.as ve'.d eas it::: rati:gra;hed : .uly L5, *)?6. and f:und :: s.sve 1:::::; ate fusics a:d ;enet:stic;. 1: the areas :f * *.3 at: 12 .*t. S e areas were re; aired a:4 the veld ra adieg a: .ed :. .* ate 1. ;)!7. 4:1 f:asd :: be a::e;:a:*a. A reviev was ata of the :st,:gra: s f:;
veld quali:7 to:r.atques and re:::: a?:ura:; by a: : ! *. eve; ::: ra: :g:a;ner :. *:::ter *:, *777, as a resu':. of the ::1: ::s t e::::
- 2::ed 1. ;}*3. S e
- ave' ::: f:.ed s::e 4:,s:re;a : es v.:,:t have est hee: ress;ved a:4 sta ve;d has :t re:sive: ft:4; a::e; as:4.'
O!A faviev ef *=*e;ft r Occu:=e?.tati:r. A "recanstructed" veld data sheet f : this veld was 13:sted a:4 bere the tota:::: " original card iss re ::structed by RT fa:a." "A sta=:s fe instructi s 1, . 3 and 7 - i.e.. ;;;;e ; scedure, tevels, fi: .: a:d final pass - were missi:gt 1: ;. ace of the ;A sta:p was a referen:e := the aheve-tutted estatics. Bis vet,d was originally 4::.e 1: 14-U76. 1 ne pe:kage describes the hastar/ of this veld as f:'.1:vs:
.$+
____________-1_
w d D- su w e. a
. o :. . ..
I e i t . :. . . .. - l . . I
. LIST OF AMAC! MEWS
- l. 1. Memo frce Ahearne to Cummings, dated 12/13/80.
l l 2. 14tter from Eastwood (Special Counsel) to Ahearne, dated 12/29/50. J. GAP Petition (Reguest for Investigation), undated.
- 4. Letter from Keppler to C &I, dated 7/2/80, transmitting II Report
#$0-338/80-09.
- 5. Veld Package for CT-606.
i
- 6. Veld Package for R2-4 /R2-K-:52.
- 7. Wald Package for f4-K-311/VR-K-916.
1 . l
- 8. Nonconfomance Report 4-2138 Revision 1 (typed versten) .
l 9. Nonconf omance Report 4-2138 (handwritten version). . l
- 10. II Inspectors Manual, chapter S. .
T l l l . I 4 e 5 i
- ER G e
0 W s Y
..e.1; ,, . _ 41 (. . . . . 7/16/76 Radiographi: Report indi:ates rejec:ien for neceplete Tusics, Under:ut 0-13, 12-26 7/16/76 Rework ordered 7/21/76 Additional rework ordered 7/27/76 Radiographic Repor: indicates rejection for Incomplete Tusien, 0-12, 12-24 7/27/76 Rework ordered 8/2/76 NDE Request to "R.T. Crind out for Infor atica Only" - Tors indicates reject on 8/2/76 8/4/76 NDE Request to "?.T. Repair Area to Locate Defect Teund by R.T." 8/4/76 Penetran: :nspec: ton Repcrt indi:stee act ac:epted because of Crack in Idge of " eld 8/9/76 Radiographic Report indicates rejection for Cracks, Ine: ple:e Tusica 12 - 8/10/76 Rework ordered 8/11/73 , Radi: graphic Repor: int: tally indicated rejection for cracks
! O N M $.W. and ine:nplete fusion in areas 0g128 subsequently overruled by kl ?' _
.e2/1 /77 Rework ordered - - -
~i '
M e6/8/77 Radiographic Report indicates acceptance.
-m .sm umpan
.to/a/, NOTE:e ucrindicated 11 Report soit 10/12/79 NES finding of " discrepancies."
This NES finding ves not in the veld package when reviewei by CIA' bio TME y dEf c4 Ad pud 3Y"174.5",7, . The veld package for veld CT-606 is included as Attachsent 3.
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42 kIL3 P.H-42 II Invest 1tation Report "Regarding veld No. RE-42, records ' indicated this wid was first radiographed on August 9,1976, and found to have unacceptable porosity and slag in the areas of 36-48. n e areas were re2 aired and a raradiograph perfor=ed on August 10, 1975, found it to be acceptable. A review ves made el the radiographs for veld quality, t echnieu es . and report accuracy by an 225 Lavel II radiographer en (Janua 25 1990._las part of the above nentioned re-review initiated
' alter the 1978-79 NRC inspections. The NES Level Il radiographer found some discrepancies which have not been resolved, and the veld has not been given final acceptancs."
C*.A Revtev of 'Jelding Oce'. entati:n CIA's review of the veld package revealed that duri'tg the period ".arth to May 1980 veld RS-42 was cut cut and replaced by veld TJi.K-261. The veld package describes the history of this veld as fc12cus 8/6/76 Initial unld fit-up, etc., inspected.
$/9/76 Radiograph revealed unacceptable porosity and slag in the area of 36-48. ,
p p 9/10/76 Revork ordered. l h Y Y 'h '$ Y
/21/80 'Jeld RH-42 ordered cut out. Mg%
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,7 ES N
t//?*f/tC NM// CMS /fd" 4/21/80 kevork to reprepare weld area orderad. g 4/2J/30 CA verification of proper bevels, etc., for the in crocese veld based upon April 14. 1980 Liquid Penetrant Test Raport. 4/30/80 RA rejection of proper bevels, etc. S/1/80 QA reverification of proper bevels, etc. , 3/7/80 Radiographic Report and L'e14 Data Sheet indicate CI approval. The veld package for wild 15-42 is included as Attachment 6.
\
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43
*E.D VR-r-311 II Investigation Report "Regarding veld No. E-811. a review of records showed it was velded
- en November 9.1977. but because an Authorized Nuclear 1:spector ,
hold point as missed at the fitup, the veld was cut cut and replaced by veld No. K-916. ne missed hold point was docu=ected by Neu-conf or=ance Report (NR) No. E-2135Kl. his NR indicates tha: the dispositien as to cut out and replace the weld." CIA Revice of Velding Occ.:=entatien ne veld package describes the history of this veld as f 11:vs: 1/19/79 1 itial veld, fitup, et:. 10/11/79 Handwritten Nc:centcr:acca Raport dated 10/11/79., No. I-1133.
- Describes that established ANI hold poi:t us =1ssed.
Disposition - 7erf ors R7 - Accept en basis of XI. NR stamped "7013" dated Oecac h er 1..1979 (included as A::ach=ent 9) . Ne /MM M A&LtfabA'G< at. @ /ct27 ... . ./ NLoy60 10/11/79 Ty;ed :*onconf or=ance Report dated 10/11/79. No. I-1133 R.1. escribes that established AN! hold point ws tissed. 01spositics - cut out and reslace .ild. stositi-- signed := a/$y~;';wsaae-7llQ*y"*~* - ; to replace wid K-811. 1/13/30 Ve l d No . K- 916 _ - _ . - . A 1/24/50 Final pass of I-916. De veld package for wid K-811 is included as Attachment 7 D o N E ... O
. m , .. .a s . ee ... . s . . . . ...+m- .. .....n .
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-. OIA REPORT CRRONOt.OGY OY !OW M%'MA /E v.:r et,4 /w&my,+:~/rf ff;qm, 12/15/80 Meno to OIA requesting investigation.
12/29/80 Receipt of GAP petition. 12/30/80 start review of GAP material (continues until 3/04/81). S k[ O//05ft/ Pl&1k3 t:wimIt&S -M. AS A//14MM6dt:ftW].,. I y yp i. jj c; c 01 3/81 h $h&hhfC#rNhiY W /fMVBTid#r7W'MM Meeting with RIII personnel to explain investigation. Interview of G. Phillip.
? ~j gs jf*g 01/14/81 -
01/15/81 Interview of J. Donahue. j / @ ///z67/4 f#/M/d//jJ
,$f'Sc 01/23/81 Interview of R. Knop.
ot/:.4fg Arpa u.6dardts;r Garn:ENf3 &V ?>t/ /NA N MWMW It c 01/27/81 Intereiew of K. Ward. , g () )Wil. GWM'I ff.3C 01/28/81 Interview of D. Dani j gg;ffj7./S fD f4 -G'
$1.ScI 01/29/S1 b2Je1/r/
Interview of J. Keppler mm6, N Mesaty re O.SAMst.Er *6/FM d6**EMSfj h, .T 01,Ac, r. Ant.ervia or I. VaaceD2/fj{/ e70/7.:E.Ma d " # # '@ A.
.,y,, [,,02/19/81 Interview of G. Phillip and K. Ward, display of kH-42 veld records.
/
02/19/817 Request for veld packages from Resident Inspector (per CIA report). 03/04/81 End of OIA review of GAP =aterial. hdi j 03/05/81 Interview of E. I.. Willia = son. _
%$4%C (04/08/81) (Draft GAO report to NRC for comment).
1 (05/01/81) (Request for extension to reply to GAO draft report).
~
l (05/20/81) (NRC comments on draft GAO report). 06/10/81 In'terview of QC inspectorM at ?.esident Inspector's trailer, ti==er.
~
$/fd 44// 5 f* _L 7_
~
(07/09/81) (CAO report issued in final). j 07/30/81 Date of CIA repcrt as origionally dated (from transmittal letter). 08/03/81 Reinterview of D. Danielson, R. Knop, J. Keppler. M 08/04/81 Reinterview of G. Phillip, K. Ward. [ / &# Ly/,n** LC l 08/ 6 Presentation of CIA findings to RIII personnel. C f y / W 0 /0 _81
/NC'Y OIA W 'date, report W O$ date$ A9V of transm & Coex::ission.
ittal to f/Y /
&Q q
/ ^y1pt's s
- T OIA report disclosed 6 ro coa u cc.c. ~@/wygg / MstD 9l/J I g w j j
- rw / /, .._ .12/15/80.to 08/07/8_1 = 235 days = 7.833 months _ _ , ,i . _ _
'n %%
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# 7;15/76 CY606 Radiographed, areas 0-13, 13-16 inave incomplete fusion, rejected.
08/08/76 HR42 radiographed areas W TA rejected. ,
%-. ll '1. Y, .:.r d.x*.T LEsb* :',<f>.JM C-,~
# 6/08/77 CY606 repaired and re-radiographed. ,. ' 2 H{'-
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~
d 11/9/77 veld K516 velded. Cl.4 4.T "C " Acf N W
- a 1/30/79 K811 velded, missed ANI hold point on fit-up inspection.
9/18-20/79 K. Ward inspection, radiograph deficiencies.
#s 0/79 NES review of radiographs in response to Ward inspection begins, a 10/11/79 NR 2138RO, missed ANI hold points on K516, K811, fit-ups. [C4M YF d 10/12/79 NES reviews veld 606 radioernobs... .ob. serves defici encies f/?M 8 /? 79 1r s 0 812/3/79 NR E-2260, radi graph of K811 shows conconsu=ed insert on adjacent K-EM.
12/09/79 Nes has reviewed 812 veld records, identified 509 discrepancies.
# 12/10/79 Applegate investigation begins (initial focus on ticecard cheating). , ef y 12/17/.79 E -J. /
EC'[M WSIM
- first Applegate daily report suggesting veld problems , no specifics.
s12/27/79 Steve (PM) tells Applegate thatg MSR pipe has " insert fault". 7.4 M - l 9C) gff/3 7 weld K811 replaced with veld K916. e12/28/79 Applegate briefs W. Murray on week's activities. AEZAshg. - f # 1/02/80 Jim HuweL says veldMacceptance i= proper./Nomu?E &E/MiEPV M*hN#M 1/04/80 Applegate investigation terminated (1/3/80 last daily report?). l 81/6/80 ? Applegate reports for 12/31/79-1/6/80 sent to CG&E. i i *1/14/80 W. Puckett disposition of NR E-2138RI, cut out and reweld. 1 / 15 /8 0 Applegatees11sOIA.[ DOM #'/#bI e jjyj gg FLOW 1A.M 0F AW/.MNd> As~MWAE. el/22/80 'NR E2135 RI closed.
*//.2.yyc j MQnt M $ [f2Q.57dNG W W ho NR E2260 Closed.
41/24/80 50%: i a1/25/80 NES reviews HR42 radiograph, observes discrepancies /29W/[E8/ff#l//V G2//2/90 4 E=Nd ON UNU ADsMCD ffs;% kid byQ& 2/28/80 NApplegate contacts Chairman Aherne. AhW-2Q
~*3/3/80 Interview of Applegate (g// 4"pfd8 //f,92 pgjy ggg ,
e tattD to KfH yK.rK. o ra w w q Cc:
$ .'+f*..
- . ~ . . . . . . . .
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, 7/15/76 CY606 Radiographed, areas 0-13, 13-16 have incomplete fusion, rejected.
'/09/76 HR42 radiographed, steas 36-38 rejected. -
{ 3/08/76 6/,08/77 CY606 repaired and re-radiographed. 11/9/77 weld K516 velded. (444T "c " war Nobsext.fr No&WW.MN DA
- 1/30/79 K811 welded, missed ANI hold point on fit-up inspection.
9/18-20/79 K. Ward inspection, radiograph deficiencies. 10/79 NES review of radiographs in response to Ward inspection begins. 10/11/79 NR 2138RO, missed-ANI hold points on K516, K811, fit-ups. (M" Y MM. 10/12/79 NES reviews weld CY606 radiographs, observes deficiencies. 12/? /79 weld K811 radiographed in response to NR 2138RO g o # @ 23 MC" N72
# 12/3/79 NR E-2260, radiograph f K811 shows nonconsumed insert on adjacent K-827, 12/09/79 Nes has reviewed 812 weld records, identified 509 discrepancies.
JP 12/10/79 Applegate investigation begins (initial focus on einecard chaating). 12/11-12/79 K. Ward insoection. Qfyn., w4 E 2/11Iec u*ce:') 4.r .- &/ ~, ( 2/ M g f), 12/17/79 first Applegate daily report suggesting weld problems , no specifics.
.2/27/79 Steve (PM) tells Applegate that K811, MSR pipe has " insert fault".
12/? /79 ? weld K811 replaced with weld K916. 12/28/79 Applegate briefs W. Murray on week's activities. 1/02/80 Jim Howel says weld CY606 acceptance improper./N on4 8E 24TMiiPV M
- M 1/04/S0 Applegate investigation terminated (1/3/80 last daily report?).
1/6/80 ?- Applegate reports for 12/31/79-1/6/80 sent to CC-6E. 1/14/80 W. Puckett disposition of NR E-2138RI, cut out and reweld. 1 / 15 / 8 0 Applegate calls OIA.
//2.1/ gg LGEMA.-MTeentk 0F /Y//.t;riNeD As~s44;C99C49W, 1/22/80 NR E2133 RI closed.
//.zy/pc gsQng.f6,edM 6C [t;29 5~/dNdb WMRAM.
1/24/80 NR E2260 Closed. 1/25/80 NES reviews ER42 radiograph, observes discrepancies. 2/28/80 Applegate contacts Chairman Aherne.
'/3/80
_ Interview of Applegate w..
, . - . ,, ~. ,. . - . , , , , . _. .
07/15/76 CY606 radiographed, areas 0-13, 13-16 in complete fusion, rejected. . .. 08/09/76 ER42 radiograph 2d, areas 36-48 rejected. 08/10/76 HR42 repaired and re-radiographed. 06/08/77 CY606 repaired and re-radiographed
//30!'/f K811 velied, issed ANI hold point on fit-up inspection.
Ofg/4 w&
" Koil replaced with veld K916 (K916 not yet accepted?) #M#M"-
09/18-20/79 K. Ward inspection, radiograph deficiencies. 10/79 NES review of radiographs in response to Ward inspection begins. Je/p/79 h4]/SS' A0, h7M RFL'f M2C/W AT. j 10/12/79 NES reviews CY606 radiographs, observes discrepancies. 11/28/79 Phone call, Major Cox and CG&E. j _} xy cf r// iHEz:fNm?-C HCA. 2/38 A.C. gl7'W 12/3/79 Letter, CG&E to Major Cox.
/
12/09/79 1 4 NES has reviewed 812 veld records, identified 309 discrepancies. h0/7h,' Applegate investigation begins (initial focus on ticecard f . cheating). if2/3/?f Ng E22So ggf pj . mm,u.::g2w, 12/11-12/7f K. Ward inspection. N g-r3.~/ w w wz, jQs/qq NA E .2./32'A0 kwCdD , g~ ~ gf e- - 12/17/79 ' First Applegate daily report suggesting velding proble:s, no specifics. 12/27/79 Steve (PM) tells Applegate KS11, MSR pipe, has " insert fault". 12/28/79 Applegate briefs Bill Murray on week's activities. 01/02/80 Jim Euwel says veld CY606 acceptance i proper. 01/03/80 Applegate buys two belt buckles. 04/80 Applegate inves'tigation ter=inated (01/03/80 last daily report?). 01/06/80? Applegate reports for period 12/31/79 - 01/06/80 sent to CG&E. of fiv/ro s.v As<Pra@ensm*' Wkt L130'RJ - ort m"' +4WLEL) Aso E z'2.4 o
/15/80 Applegate calls NRC OIA, Ja=es Cu==ings.
O! /2.3h*- Nt F1895/l;toflD - 1/2<ffgGNA [.2.240 Cm M, 01/25/80 NES reviews HR42 radiograph, observes discrepancies. 02/14/80 Applegate contacts FBI.
- affdtc 02/28/80 CIA. B' A!+
Applegate contacts Chair =an Aherne, I&E, RIII calls Applegati. 03/03/80 Interview of Applegate (Phillip, Willia = son).
~
_[. 2_[ __ _. . - - - - I . 6
\
03/11/80 Letter to Applegate detailing items to be investigated. 04/07/807 NES review of site radiographs completed, 14 " unacceptable" veld.. 04/07-09/80 G. Phillip on site. . 04/19-20/80 Media stories on Applegate appear. 04/30/80 C. Phillip on site. 05/01-02/80 C. Phillip 'n o site. 05/05-07/80 Applegate calls RIII, advises of new allegations regarding PM. 05/08/80 Applegate interviewed by Phillip & P3I in Chicago. 05/20/80 G. Phillip interview of A1 dredge (PM). 07/01/80 Devine (GAP) requests copy of investigation report. 07/02/80 Investigation report issued. ~ 07/09/80 Report sent to GAP. 07/10/80 M. Hertzgaard requests copy of r'eport. 08/04/80 CG&E response to item of noncompliance. i e
l
. l r
03/11/80 Letter to App 1 etailing ite=s to be investigated.
}&/$6 M 2 W "^^ }e ate ~W 04/07/807 NES review of site radiographs cempleted, 14 " unacceptable" welds.
y/Nlts 1-P ncst of MV2. m>wo Apr. 04/07-09/80 G. Phillip on site. . 04/19-20/80 Media stories on Applegate appear. 04/30/80 C. Phillip on site. 05/01-02/80 C. Phillip on site. 05/05-07/80 Applegate calls RIII W1/to AM-K~Kl.2 CAQM, advisep of new allegations regarding PM. M'f4 Aa,a773G 05/08/80 Applegate interviewed by Phillip & FBI in Chicago. 05/20/80 G. Phillip interview of A1 dredge (PM). 07/01/80 Devine (GAP) requests copy of investigation repert. 07/02/80 Investigation report issued. 07/09/80 Report sent to GAP. 07/10/80 M. Hert gaard requests ccpy of report. 08/04/80 CG&E response to item of noncompliance. s a e e i j a
\
I \
OIA REPORT CHRONOT OGY 12/15/80 Me=o to OIA requesting investigation. 12/29/80 Receipt of GAP petition. 12/30/80 Start review of GAP material (continues until 3/04/81,). 01/09/81 OIA meeting'with' GAP 01/13/81 , Meeting with RIII personnel to explain investigation. 01/14/81- Interview of G. Phillip. 01/15/81 Interview of J. Donahue. 01/23/81 Interview of R. Knop. 01/27/81 Interview of K. Ward. . 01/2S/81 Interview of D. Danielson. 01/29/81 Interview of J. Keppler 02/18/81 Interview of T. Vandel. 02/19/.31 Interview of G. Phillip and n. Ward, display of RR-42 weld records. 02/19/81? Request for veld packages from Resident Inspector (per CIA report). 03/04/81 End of OIA review of GAP material. 03/05/81 Interview of E. L. Williamson. (04/08/81) (Draft GAO report to NRC for comment). (05/01/81) (Request for extension to reply to GAO draf t report). . (05/20/81) (NRC comments on draft GAO report). 06/10/81 Interview of QC inspector Setlock at Resident Inspector's trailer, Zi ::er. (07/09/81) (GAO report issued in final). 07/30/81 Date of OIA report as origionally dated (from transmittal letter). 00/03/81 'Reinterview of D. Danielson, R. Knop, J. Keppler. 08/04/81 Reinterview of G. Phillip, K. *, lard. Presentation of OIA findings to RIII personnel. *: 08/04/81 s . 08/07/81 OIA report date, date of transmittal to Conunission. 1M l CM 539Vas' M W 70 U C/NC/MV47/. 0l/04f817 -01A report disc.osed via5.FOIA r %equest.
/
- _ . - _ _ _ . _ . _ _ __ _ _ 12/15/80..to.08/07/81.,=._235. days = 7.833 months _ _ _ _ __
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; OIA REPORT CHRONOLOGY 12/15/80 Memo to OIA requesting investigation.
12/29/80 Receipt of GAP petition. 12/30/80 Start review of GAP material (continues until 3/04/81). 01/09/81_ OIA meeting with GAP 01/13/81 Meeting with RIII personnel to explain investigation. 01/14/81 Interview of G. Phillip. 01/15/81 Inte rview of J. Donahue. 01/23/81 Interview of R. Knop. 01/27/81 Interview of K. Ward.
-01/28/81 Interview of D. Danielson.
01/29/81 Interview of J. Keppler 02/18/81 Interview of T. Vandel. 02/19/81 Interview of G. Phillip and K. Ward, display of RH-42 weld records. 02/19/817 Request for veld packages from Resident Inspector (per 01A report) . 03/04/81 End of OIA review of GAP material. 03/05/81 Interview of E. L. Williamson. (04/08/81) (Draft GAO report to NRC for comment). (05/01/81) (Request for extension to reply to GAO draft report). (05/20/81) (NRC comments on draft GAO report). 06/10/81 Interview of QC inspector Setlo'cka ' t Resident Inspector's trailer, Zim=er. (07/09/81) (GAO report issued in final). 07/30/81 Date of CIA report as origionally dated (from transmittal letter). 08/03/81 Reinterview of D. Danielson, R. Knop, J. Keppler. 08/04/81 Reinterview of G. Phillip, K. Ward. 08/04/81 Presentation of 01A findings to RIII personnel. .1 08/07/81 OIA report date, date of transmittal to Commission. 09/04/81? OIA report disclosed via FOIA request. - 12/ ___ __ . . - ..15/,40 to 08/07/81 = 235 days = 7.833 months
~ ", CIA REPORT CMRONOLOG 12/15/80 Memo to OLA requesting investigation.
12/29/80 Receipt of GAP petition. 12/30/80 Start review of GAP material (continues until 3/04/81,). 01/09/81 OIA mee, ting with GAP 01/13/81 Meeting with RIII personnel to explain investigation. 01/14/31 Interview of G. Phillip. 01/15/81 Interview of J. Donahue. 01/23/81 IntersieJ of R. Knop. 01/27/81 Interview of K. Ward. 01/28/81 Interview of D. Danielson. 01/29/81 Inters iew of J. Keppler 02/18/81 Interview of T. Vandel. 02/19/81 Interview of G. Phillip and K., Ward, display of RH-42 weld records. 02/19/817 Request for veld packages frem Resident Inspector (per CIA report). 03/04/81 End of CIA review of GAP material. 03/05/81 Interview of E. L. Willia = son. (04/08/81) (Draf t GAO report to NRC lor comment). (05/01/81) (Request for extension to reply to GAO draft report). (05/20/81) (NRC comments on draft GAO report). 06/10/81 Intarview of QC inspector Setlock at Resident Inspector's trailer, Zi==er. (07/09/81) ('GAO report issued in final). 07/30/81 Date of CIA report as origionally dated (from transmittal letter). 08/03/81 Reinterview of D. Danielson, R. Knop, J. Keppler. 08/04/81 Reinterview of C. Phillip, K. Ward. 08/04/81 Presentation of CIA findings to RIII personnel. .1
-- .08/07/81 OIA report date, date of transmittal to Commission.
09/04/817 OIA report disclosed via POIA request.
. _ __ ._12/15/80 to_08/07/81 = 235 dsys = 7.833 months __
n - + -
y-
- - - . - - - . - ~~. . . . . . . . - - . . . - - .
f ~. . . . 03/11/80 1.etter to Applegate detailing ite=s to be investigated. 04/07/807 NES review of site radiographs completed. 14 " unacceptable" welds. 04/07-09/80 G. Phillip on site. 04/19-20/80 Media stories on Applegate appear. 04/30/80 C. Phillip on site. 05/01-02/80 C. Phillip on site. 05/05-07/80 Applegate calls RIII, advises of new allegations regarding PM. 05/08/S0 Applegate interviewed by Phillip & FBI in Chicage. 05/20/80 C. Phillip interview of A1 dredge (FM). 07/01/80 Devine (CAP) requests copy of investigation report.
~
07/02/80 Investigation report issued. 07/09/80 Report sent to GAP. 07/10/80 M. Her:zgaard requests copy of report. 08/04/80 CG&E response to item of nonce =pliance. 4$- ;. -
4
- t. . . - , ' 01A REPORT CHRONOLOGY - . ~. , 12/15/80 Memo to OIA requesting investigation.
12/29/80 Receipt of GAP petition. 12/30/80 start review of GAP material (continues until 3/04/81,). 01709/81 OIA meeting with GAP . 01/13/81 Meeting with RIII personnel to explain investigation. , 01/14/81 Interview of G. Phillip. 01/15/81 Interview of J. Donahue. . 01/23/81 Interview of R. Knop. 01/27/81 Interview of K. Ward. 01/28/81 Interview of D. Danielson. 01/29/81 Interview of J. Keppler 02/18/81 Interview of T. Vandel. 02/19/81 Interview of G. Phillip and K. Ward, . display of RH-42 weld records. 02/19/817 Kequest, for weld packages from Resident Inspector (per 01A report). 03/04/81 End of OIA review of GAP material. 03/05/81 Interriev of E. L. Williamson. (06/08/81) (Draf t GAO report to NRC for comment). (05/01/81) (Request for extension to reply to GAC draf t report). . (05/20/31) (NRC comments on draft GA0 report). 06/10/81 Interview cf QC inspector Setlock at Resident Inspector's trailer, Zi==er (07/09/81) ('GA0 report issued in final). 07/30/81 Date of CIA report as origionally dated (from transmittal letter). 08/03/81 Rainterview of D. Danielson, R. Knop, J. Kappler. 08/04/81 Reinterviae of G. Phillip, K. Ward. 08/04/81 Presentation of CIA findings to RIII parsonnel.
- ' OIA report date, date of trancaittal to Commission.
08/07/81-09/04/817 OIA report disclosed via FOIA request.
. 12/15/80..ta 08/07/81_= 235 days = 7.833 months . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . . .
e
~
03/11/80 Letter to Applegate detailing items to be investigated. 04/07/807 NES review of site radiographs completed,14 " unacceptable" ve10.. 04/07-09/80 G. Phillip on site. . 04/19-20/80- Media stories on Applegate appea,r. 04/30/80 G. Phillip on site.
~
05/01-02/80 G. Phillip on site. r 05/05-07/80 Applegate calls RIII, advises of new allegations regarding PM. 05/08/80 Applegate interviewed by Phillip & TBI in Chicago. 05/20/80 C. Phillip interview of A1 dredge (PM). 07/01/80 Devine (GAP) requests copy of investigation report. 07/02/80 Investigation report issued.
, 07/09/80 ,
Report sent to GAP. 07/10/80 M. Hertzgaard requests copy of report. 08/04/80 CG&E response to item of noncompliance. , l i 9 4
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~ . - . _ - _.. . . . . . - . - - _ - -
s . Chronolorv of CIA Involve :en: in Zi--er Investication 1/12/81
- Start Investigation Onsite .
1/12-16/81 McCarten and Schapkar Onsite 1/13/81 Interviewed Gittings and Schwiers 1/14/81 Interviewed 01tz 1/15/81 Interviewed Marshall and Cittings 1/16/81 Interviewed Schwiers 1/26-30/81 McCarten to Marble Hill and Perry - Interview seven former QC inspectors Barrett at Zi==ar 2/3/31 Davis, Streeter. Warnick, McCarten, Barrett phone call with Bernard Gilday, Assistant U. S. Attorney in Cincinnati - Applegate allegation about Drunks, etc. and jurisdiction, interest by TBI and Attorney's Office. 2/9-13/81 Onsite investigation - Region III Team - 2/13/81 Discussion with Schwiers on NR improvenent 2/17-20/81 Onsite investigation - Region III Tea: 2/17/81 Cu=mings in Region III to talk about Applegate investigati:n 2/23-27/81 Onsite investigation - Region III Tean 2/25/81 Interviewed olta Telephone call - Lavis with Dave Everett on Applegate meeting of 26th. Pre-Applegate meeting with RIII staff and Art Schnablin. 2/26/81 Meeting in Region III with GAP /Applegate. Art Schneblin (01A), Gil'oert (HQ), Region III people. Informal discussions by McCarten with Schneblin about voided NRs and NR log. 3/3/81 Davis called David Everett, DOJ, giving him results of GAP /Applegate meeting. 3 g N*
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1 4 4 > 3/9-13/81 Onsite investigation - Region III Team 3/23/81 Discussion with Schwiers on NR inprovement l 3/23-27/81 Region III Tema Onsite i r 3/25/81 Gittings interviewed on QA staffing * [ t
- Week of 3/30/81 Sinclair and Gamble in Region III to discuss current .
i , investigation. They expressed concern to Kappler l that some of the taan members were not sufficiently sensitive to falsification of records. I McCarten believes 3/30/81 is the date he discussed
, parallel proceedings with Gamble and he was ;
- instructed to not interview Oltz, Schwiers, CittinFs,
- and Marshall. ,
i i 4/9/81 Sniezek, Lieberman, Henderson in Region III to be l briefed on investigation findings. 4
- 4/17/81 Brief David Upchurch (FBI - Cincinnati Office) on j
Applegate Issues. Told we are investigating falsification and}}