ML20125B956
| ML20125B956 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/14/1981 |
| From: | Jamarl Cummings NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | Socolar M GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20125A606 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-415 NUDOCS 8506110618 | |
| Download: ML20125B956 (2) | |
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July 14, 1981
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l 'D:e lionorable ilton J. Socolar Actinr, Comptroller General
, of the United States t/achington, D. C. 20548
Dear !!r. Socolar:
On July 10, 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Cocnission's (MRC) Office of
- Inspector and Auditor (OIA) uns provided with an advance copy of the Ceneral Accounting Office's (CAO) report entitled "Improvenents liccded j in the NPC's Office of Inspector and Auditor." I have reviewed this report and take stront exception to the biased and unfair nanner in *
, which agency ecx.nents were both evaluated and/or onitted. ,
Cn parc 21 of the report, after sone discussion as to the derrec of concurrence that the Coonission extended to the detailed staff connents, 4 the GAO states that "Nonetheless, uc have carefully considered the OIA
- ccenents and included then in the body of the report, uhcre appropriate, alonr'vith our evaluation." ..."where appropriate" clearly was the very i rare exception rather than the long standine CAO rule that agency connents should be fairly presented in the digest and text of reports. Our ,
revicu showed that NRC's ccenents had not been " appropriately" recognized,'
i in that significant comments had been ignored, e:ttensive de. tailed rebuttals
! of CAO's facts were sumnarized in one or two sentences, and, in at least I onc . case, our comments were incorrcetly sucenarized. Such liberties serve neither the audit profession nor the CAO.
As. you are tell. avare this audit has not been without controversy, to wit, the ncnorandun and letters exchanged between our atencies while the audit ves still in progress.- For this reason and because I believo cbjectivity is enhanced when the public is not forced to rely solely on i CAO's discretion in characterizing or omitting agency connents, I request that the entire text of the detailed staff coiments, enclosed with liRC's l May 20, 1981, letter, be published in the Appendix to' the report.
Obviously, we are not requesting that you chance any part of your report, only that' our full comments be reported.
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2 July 14, 1981 ,
Milton J. Socolar Inamuch as the agency's "60-day" letter, for all practical purposes, receives the sene publicity and has the sanc effect as a page 17 retraction in the Saturday New York Titaen I would sincerely appreciate a frank and prc:npt response to this request.
Sincerely, James J. Cutnings Director Office of Inspector and Auditor ec: J. Pcxter Peach, Director .'
Encrny nnd Minerals Division <
U.S. Cencral Accounting Of fice bec: Conrnission (4)
Distribution 01A File 80A-36 .
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[ ,- fj NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COW.11SSION
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s gw . p' j l June 24, 1982 -
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MEMORANDU:1 FOR: Bert Davis '
Deputy Regional Administrator, RO III ,
FROM: James J. Cummings, Director b,f -l Office of Inspector and Auditor 0% '~',-
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SUBJECT:
ZIMiER NUCLEAR PLANT )
l When we met in Cincinnati, Ohio, on Itay 19, 1982, Jim Foster asked me if all interviews conducted by OIA regarding Zimmer had been provided to Region III. I assured Jim that that was the case.
Recently, in connection with an inquiry received from Henry Meyars and the Gannett News Service, I dete ed that althouch Region III had been' provided with OIA's interviews of
]you had not been furni hed with a copy of OIA's Interview of Terry Hanster. Harpster was interviewed by OIA in connection with our,
, inquiry entitled " Adequacy of IE Investigation 50-53S/80-09 at the William H. Zime.er Nuclear Power Station" (OIA File 81-13) while the other individuals mentioned above were interviewed by OIA in connection with our inquiry entitled "Zirrner Plant - Allegations Re Deficient Construction" (OIA File 81-39). When I reviewed the Harpster interview in August 1931 I detemined that although the interview was conducted as part of the investigation of case 81-18, it was in fact not relevant to
-that case but was in fact relevant to case 81-39. Accordingly, the Harpster interview was not made part of our report entitled " Adequacy of IE Investigation 50-358/80-09 at the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power y Station" but instead was placed in File 81-39.
1 OIA has never issued a report in connection with File 81-39 in the first instance because of a request from the Department of Justice to temporarily suspend the investigation and more recently because of the Commission's decision that the Office of Investigations should conduct such investigations.
In view of the above, Harpster's interview is attached as potential input for any forthcoming investigative report.
I am sorry to provide you with this interview at this late date. However, i
absent the inquiry frorn Dr. Meyers and Gannett News Service I am afraid
. we would have overlooked providing this information to Region III. For
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. Bert Davis 2
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your infomation it is my understanding that Gannett News Service brought this matter to NRC's attention after an anonymous source furnished Gannett with a copy of an early draft of OIA report " Adequacy of IE Investigation 50-358/80-09 at the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station."
This draf t evidently includes the Harpster interview.
Attachment:
Harpster intery cc: J. Foster, RO III w/att J. Fitzgerald, 01, w/att F. Combs, CA*
E. Abbott, OCM' l ~
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Interview of Terry Rarnster 4 Terry Harpster, Reactor Preoperations Specialist. IE, on detail asand a
( Special Investigator to the Subco==ittee on Energy. Invireneent, Natural Re~ sources, Government Operations Co==1ttee, U.S. Nouse of Representatives, was interviewed on March 6,1951, by Investigators David Ca=ble and John Sinclair, CIA.
He Harpster said he worked in Region III of NRC fro = 1974 through 1979.
said he was a technical support inspector initially for all plants in, Region III. He later became a project manager for particular plants:
first for DC Cook Unit 2 then Menticello, then both Zimmer and Monticello at the same time. Earpster said he began his inspection activities at Zi=cer in October 19.77 as a preoperations start-up inspector. He said he was assigned to this positisu until he left Region III in Septe=ber 1979; however, he had no real involve =ent with Zi= er af ter the Three ;
Mile Island (TMI) accident in March 1979. Earpster said that a pre-operatiens inspector picks up a plant when construction is far enough along. i.e., about 60 percent ce=pleted, to review certain progra=s, j Ea rps t er e.g., the quality control progra= f or preoperational verk.
said that Tc= Tandel was his counterpart as the Icad censtructicn inspector. ,
Vandel had inspected Zi==er prior to Earpster's arrival but there was a period of overlap when they both worked there. Earpster said John Menning worked with him as a preoperatiens ir.spector who he vas training.
( E.-rpster said that Menning "tcok one look" and left the Ni..* because the progra= vas so bad. He related that one of Menning's reasons f or leaving was that he saw how little support the inspectors got on the job.
Harpster understood that Menning lef t to attend the University of Aricona .
l where he is verking on his Ph.D. in =etallurgy.
Earpster said that 95en he picked up Zi==er the licensee (Cincinnati Cas f and Electric Cc pany) had little appreciation for the a=ount of resources needed for the plant. He said they barely net ANSI Standard 18.1 which i
i is the criteria for staffing. P.arpster explained that even this st:ndard :
is a locse one Vhich has since been upgraded. Harpster said that one of
! his jobs was to show tha plant management what was required to get the plant off the ground. He said that his inspections documented a nu=ber of problems at Zimmer. Rarpster said that, for example, the c=ployee who ves being placed in charse of the start up operation only had about i three months of actual experience in the plant. He explained that the licensee counted as nuclear experience the a=ount of time operations employees were onsite during the construction of Zinmer. Another example vas his Lauression that the plant personnel felt that, once the parts
' were bough't for the plant, they did not need any support from their corporate of fices. He also believed that many plant personnel felt a nuclear plant was si=ilar to the operation of a fossil fuel plant.
Rarpster said that he tried to resolve some of these problems inforeally; including going up through the If eensee =snagement chain to Vice Tre.<idynt ,
s Earl lors= ann, *out with no luck. .
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Earpster said he was successful in getting a meeting set up in Bethesda l to discu.ss. apparent weaknesses with licensee's organi:ation and staffing.
He said this meeting was held on July 13, 1978, only after he " screamed" at licensing officials in Bethesda, particularly Irv Peltier who was then project manager in NRR responsible for issuing the, safety evaluation report (SER). Rarpster said that he presented his concerns at that meeting and the utility agreed to upgrade their program. He recalled that the specific response was to " buy" an engineer fro = ceneral Electric to assist them.
Rarpster said that the overall problem was that NRC's licensing process was rolling cuch f aster than he could " ratchet" improvements at theHe plant end. Harpster said that NRC's require =ents were a " joke."
said that NRR was about to issue the SER and they set up a meeting of the Advisory Co=mittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) to which he was not invited. .
Earpster said he vent up the Region III canagement chain and presented He recalled his concerns. He said he attended the ACRS ceeting anyvay.
that when licensee of ficials were questioned by ACES Chair =an Bender, they said several things that were not t ru e . Earpster noted that not only did he feel they were not true, but Panning also believed they were not true. Harpster said he presented this conflict to his boss, Robert Varnick, when he returned to the regional office. He said that he and Henning later talked with one of the licensee officials who had testified to the I. ACRS (Jim Schott who was the plant canager of Zic=er). During their conversation, Harpster had Warnick read Schott's .testL=eny to Schott over the phone. He said that Schott then agreed that the testimony did not convey the correct impression. Although Schott assured Harpster and Manning that he vould clarify this at the next ACRS ceeting, he did not.
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Harpster believed that Schott's subsequent testimony even aggravated his earlier statenents.
Earpster said he briefed his manage =ent on this catter. He recalled that his Regional Director, Ja=es Keppler, sent a letter to the 'ACKS informing then of the situation. Harpster understood that this letter was later fewarded to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB).
Earpster explained that, af ter the ACRS meeting, he also informed Peltier .
(in Menning's presence) of his concerns. He said that Peltier later claimed that he did not recall Harpster's expressing his concerns to him. Harpster explained that Peltier is a " pro-nuclear" " pro-11 censing" employe e. He also explained that during a start-up of a nuclear plant, NRK is on a very tight schedule; the IE inspector is often viewed by NRR as an adversary when he uncovers deficiencies which NRR has already "bl e s s e d . "
Peltier told Harpster that he hadinformed the If eensee about an IE :
investigation underway on the subject of the Ifeensee's testimony before i the ACRS. Peltier also inf orced Earpster that Charles Earth (attorney with the Of fice of the Executive Legal Director) had called Jancs Yore (Chairman of the ASLB Panel) and told Tore to throw away Keppler's letter describing the discrepancies. Harpster pointed out that these latter two catters were the subject of a recent investigation by 01A. Harpster said in h1R su =ary that this was a situation where the system broke down:
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Harpster said that Borgmann was also putting the heat on the him b exa=ple, sending a letter to Keppler.
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Osainnan.of the licenses sent a letter to President Carter a Harpster said that it was about this time A principal that th ,
i Narpster one was that, said that, when he left, Zinner still had problems He said that all ZLn=er had was ,one person assigned d to this functio >
that person could not possibly do all that the jcb require .
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Rarpster said that realistically the II modular inspection program d not deal with the things you have to focus on early in a plant's life.
He said that an inspector must deal with the problems he knows areEarpster sa important and then deal with other proble=s in addition. Zimmer. He that he had to deal with the construction people thissome '
everything was controlled by its contractor. He said that I
Zinne r:
is a problem because, after the plant is built and the contractor He said leaves !
the licensee would not have any expertise to handle the plant. ff for l that for example there was no one on the licensee's Harpster corporate felt that sta this l reactor instrumentation and control syste=s.
i licensee was "in over its head."
Harpster said that people of ten bring natters to an inspector's atten He said that an inspector can deal with some of these matters, but .there are some which he cannot. Harpster said that sometimes so nany "Zim=er things
( are wrong that a plant is out of control. Earpster concluded that Harpster ' explained that a licensee's (by,-ability to e.g. , the was out of control."
get money for the construction of a nuclear power pla'nt sale of bonds) is based upon the percentage of co=pletion of the plant. -
He said that this results in a situation where the constructionHarpster personnel (
attempt to turn things over as completed before the He said when the licensee finds prepared or trained to handle them. them properly. L' hat they things that are wrong, they cannot fix or test must do is give the problems back to construction to be remedied.
Rarpster not work.
said this is indicative of a construction QO pro ;
He said that one example of this was that the licensee tries to head off. According to Harpster the time required had not ordered any spara parts.
to obtain additional or replacement equipment is so long it causes a 4
major probles to licensees trying to resupply or obtain back-up equipm s l
Harpster said that sometimes plant management puts so He nuch pressure said that on their personnel that the personnel cannot get things done. h the same l '
these things:
personnel then sometimes use NRC inspectors
, f ound the deficiency rather than the plant personnel. Harpster the construction said pregram that, from what he could see, it appeared that t .
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had defects and he was about to inherit them. Harpster explained that 1
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- he was not directly f amiliar with ~the construction activities but he sae the results - including the'QA proble=s. Harpster said that inspector Tred Maura has documented much of these problems f rom the operations i
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1 Rarpster said that both the site construction canager Mr. Gear (phonetic) and the site QA manager Mr. Schweirs were friends of Vice President Borg= ann. ,
Harpster believed that Schweirs was assigned by the IIcensee to keep the plant manager (Schott) under control. Rarpster said Schweirs even called the regional of fice to try to get so=e of the II inspection reports changed. Harpster said Schweirs also asked him to send IE inspection reports to him (Schweirs) so he could decide which matters would be sent on to Schot1.
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Harpster said part of the problem was that NRC does not have explicit regulations to inspect against. He said. that the preoperations inspector is f aced with the task of trying to get control of the site and helping the li* cense a to solve its proble=s. He said that the inspector only docu-cents a r=ril percentage of this " helping work." Harpster said the licensee hai no people involved with preoperations and test acceptance.
4 He said that everything was bought under contract so the contractor was able to do whatever it wanted. Rarpster said the licensee then had no one who knew how to handle the proble=s that were " built-in."
. Marpster said he tried to get the plant managers out to take tours of the plant. He said that one assistant plant canager said he was scared
- to tour the plant because of the convicted felons working out there.
{' Harpster said that sometimes the licensee's own security force could not handle disturbances and they had to call the local sherif f's office.
Harpster explained that there is some drinking of alcohol on all nuclear
} construction sites. However, the licensee at Zimmer did not have cuch control of things. Earpster said there were a lot of " tough guys" working at the plant and the situation got worse when they were drinking.
Earpster said that there are many allegations at any nuclear power plant; however, usually only a certain number are true. Harpster said that one could tell that there were a large number of proble=s at Zimmer because so many allegations were coming up.
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l Rarpster said there was a lot of pressure on individus! IE inspectors i
because of the momentum generated by the NRC licensing process. Rarpster said that pressure is also created on construction personnel by the contractor's veld production schedules. . He explained that the construction manager has to have a certain number of welds completed to keep the piping installation on schedule. He said that proble=s arise when the construction personnel are pushed. Rarpster said that for a QC inspector
- to stop construction for any deficiencies, he would have to hold up many i - phases of the construction of a $1 billion plant; so the QC inspectors
, nornally do Vhat they are told. y ,
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Harpster said that nuclear power plants e= ploy personnel specifically ~
designated to serve as their liaison with URO. He said that this is
/ helpful because it overcomes the proble= IE inspectors face in trying to
- find their way through the great amount of paperwork at the plant. ~
Harpster said, however, this liaison person also " steers" the inspectors' a ctivi ties. . Harpster said that dealing with this liaison person does l
allow the inspector to get through NRC's modular inspection program very vell. Harpster noted that there is no real internal audit of the NRC's inspection program.
Harpster described the " helping activities" that an IE preoperations inspector engages in as a process of getting all the procedures and controls in place. He said that this activity constitutes only about evo lines in the IE procedures, but it is the largest part of a preoperations inspector's time.
Harpster esti=ated that the interest cost alone in holding up construction of a nuclear power plant for one day would be several hundred thousand dollars. He observed that, with the increased pressure on NRC to license power. plants, he vould expect even more pressure to be placed on II ins pect ors. He said that pressures on the licensee personnel to cake exceptions to the acceptance criteria in the preoperations tests are very real. He said it is difficult for an IE inspector to tell whether He the licensee's exceptions are based on valid engineering analyses.
i said. that all inspectors cannot possibly be experts in all areas.
I Harpster said the inspectors must rely on the licensee's people to review the exceptions. Harpster said that this represents a flaw in the
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NRC's system because the licensee's reviewers are under the same pressure to approve exceptions. Harpster pointed out that the licensee, because l
it is a utility company, cannot pass on the amorti:ation costs to the ratepayers until the plant reaches the point of co=pletion, i.e., the stage of com=ercial operations.
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questioned Phillip as to whether NRC had jurisdiction over matters euch as 1) management problems, 2) theft of naterials from the site, or 3) l weapona violations (which Willia =aon understood to be within the juris , '
- diction of the breau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearma). V1111anson ,
recalled Phillip's saying that this was s'omething he had to look over in i .
urder to sort out Applegate's concerns. Williamson did not recall .
- Phillip's singling out any issues as to which were or were not NRC 4
c onc err.s. W1111musou said that after dinner. at about 8:00 pa ha and -
Phillip unnt their separate ways at tha notel.
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The next morning Phillip called Applegata and askad hiza a fav' additional 4
qu es tions. W1111a=sc+n* said !fe vam f,n tthe same room st~the mofel during ,-
Phillip's telephone call. Williamson said the es11 lasted about 10 or '
15 minutca. U1111anson could *not recall thos substance of the call .h, --
i ' because much of the tuchnical aspecta vera foreign to hian at the time.
villia= son did reca).1 Phillip's going through some of the documents with Applegate. Williamson said that Phill:1p had reviewed the documents tha i
night before and cada some notes cencerning them. Williamson said 9 '
Phillip left Cincinnati about.10:00 that, torning and he (Villiamson) W] -Q 1 eft a few houra 1 star. >
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(' W1111== son recalled talking with Ward upon his returnMo Headquarters. ' !.
Ne said he told Ward that the only allegation he saw that was within -l ~~
l NRC's jurisdiction was tha issua about the piping heing dropped off the t'
- truck. Williamson said this scaversation only lasted about two or thras minctes.. .
V1111cson guesced that his naxt contact with Phillip was sometime in the next two or three weeks. Willia = son said he later (in Ray) received ;
a call frcu a newscaster f ro.:. Channel '9 in Cincinnati. The newscastar - -
had a. copy of Phillip.ts letter tc, Applegate. deberibing the issues to ha 5 investiga ted. .Williamson recalled' cpeakidg with Phillip, sometime af ter . ...
being contacted by the nevacastar. Williamson said he had no more "
- l. contact with anyone regarding this investigation until the material" came
- , out frem the Covernment Accountability Project. Williamson said he was -
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not involved with the writing of the Ragion III report of investigation, I Be did not feel .that he had to write anything nor did hg ever feel that.f. ;
he would have any input into the repurs. . y d$. y*L' Interview of Tc.rry Marpstec :..
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Terry Narpster, Reaster Preoperations Spcel.111st, II, enf6 dotail .k ' a Natural P.esources. Covernr. ant Operations Committee. U.S. House of 6 ,3
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t Representatives, vaa intervisued on March 6,1981, by 2nsestigators. : .t.
David Camble and John SA:.- clair. O!A. '
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Narpster said he workad in Regica III of NRC from 1974 thrcugh 1979, ta sa14 ha was a technical support inspector initially for sil pisate ia
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Region III.
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firs t for DC Cook Re la tet became a project manager for particular plants:
" Unit 2, then .Honticello.. then both Zinmar and Manticeli
.a t the sxse time. Harpstar. said ha began his inspection activitica et 4 Zimmer in October 1977 sa a preoperations start-up inspector. He said
'* he was assigned to this position until he 3eit hcion 111 in September
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- 1979; howver, he had no real involvement with Zireer after the Three 4 l
- Mile Island UMI) acc'ident in March .1979. hryster said that a pre-operations inspector picks up a plant when construction is far enough along, i.e.
- about 60 percent completed, tp review certain prograns.
e.g., the quality control prograan for.preoperational work.
- .* Harpster said that Tom Vandel was his counterpart as the lead construction inspect Vandel had inspected Zimmar prior to Rarpster's aprivaQut, there vas a
';- period of oveflap when theT hoth~uorked' thera.' Marpster said .fohn Mennin;
- worked with him as a preoperations inspect'op who he was training.
Barpster said tha t Manning ."took. one look" sod lef t the liRC because the hl ;
program was so bad. He related that 'one of Menning's reasons for 1 caving ..
,i was that he .saw how little support the inspectors got on the job,
.- Harpster understood that Hanning Icft to attend the University of Ari:ent where he is aorking. on his yh.D. in 'tastallurgy.
Marpster said that when ha pickad 'up 21 veer the licansee (Cincinnati Cas' '
- and needed Electr2c for the company) plant. He had little appreciation for, the amount of resources .
is the criteria for st'affing.said they barely met ANSI Standard 18.1 which f
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Harpster explained that even this standard 1s a loose one which has since been upgraded. Earpster said that one of
> planthis jobs was to show the plant. management what was required to get the off the ground. He said that his inspections doeur.ented a nu=ber i
of probicas at Zimmer.
Harpstar said that, for exanple, the a:sployee who was being placed, in charpe of the start up operation only had 'about three conths of actual experience in the plant. He explained that ths licensee counted as nuclear exparience the amount of time operations '
- employees were instte during the constructica of Zinner. Ano'ther exan was his bers inpression bought for the thatplant, the plant personnel falt that once the parts'ple corporate offices.
they did not need any support from their *
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- He also believed that many plant personnel felt a suelaar Marpster maid plant was similar to the operation of a fossil fuel plant.' *
- including going up through thethat he tried to resolve soma of these probicas info Earl Borgmann, but with no luck.liccusee management ' chain to Vice Framident
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- Barpster said'he was succoesful in getting a meeti
- g set up in Bethesda to discuss apparent wenknesses, with licensee's organf ration an'd staffina.
Se said this r.aeting was held on July -13.1978 only af ter he "screanad" e at licensing officials in Bethesda, particularly Irv Feltier who was *i
- .then reportproject (SER). manager in NRR responsible for issuing the safety eval'uetion Maryster said that he presented his concerns at that l 4 poeting that and the utility agreed to upgrade their pres,ran. He recalled
- the specific responses was to '* buy!' on ar.giacer frc. Ceceral Elsettu to assist them. . *
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- bryster said that Borgnann was also putting th's heat on him by, for '
example. sending a letter to Reppler. bryster also undcratood that ,the Chairnan hryster of that said the licensee it. was about sent a latter to President Carter and others. .
! He said he was assigned to TMI and he has not been back to Zinmer l
Lrpster said that, when he left. Zicuoar still had problems. A principal .
one was that,'as*a practical matter.. there was no qA program for operations.
De thatsaid thatcould person all Zimmar not had was one person assigned to this function and l
possibly do al,1 that the job required. .
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Harpater said that * /. .
realistically the ZE modular, inspection prograra does
- 1e said that an inspector must' deal"vitfi the problems he knova ' s
.inportant and then deal wi th other 'piobicas 'in addition. . brpster said
- that he had to deal with the construction people socevhat at Zimmer.' He .
l said that 21moers the licensee everything had sdnitsal involvement with the construction at
- i is a problem because,was controlled by its contractor. He said that this after the plant the licenses would not. have any expertiaa to handle the plant.is He saidbuilt .and t i that for' example' there was no one on the licenssa's corporate staff for reactor instrumentation and control ayatema. Harpater felt that this licenses was "in over its head." 'e "
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i i Narpster said that people often bring mattera to an inspactor's attention. i Re said that anhe inspector cannot. can deal with same of these natters, but there ,
. are some which Narpster said that sometimes so many things are wrong that a plant is ,out of control was out of control." Harpeter explained bryster cencluded that "Zimmer -
that a licensea's ability to get reney for the construction of a nuclear. power plant (by. e.g. , the sale of bonds) is based upon the percentage of co=pletion of the plant.
Re said that this resgits in a situation whers the construction personnel attempt to turn things over as completed before they are ready. Harpatar' -
said prepared that what or trained then to happens handle is that the 11cansea staff is n'ot properly thee.
No said when the licensea finds -
things that are wrong, they cannot fix or tant then properly. -
must do is give the problems back to construction to be renadied.What they
.Maryster said this is indicative of a construction QC program that does mot seek.
tries to head He off.
said this is a situation thich an HRC preoperations inspector He said that one example of this was that the licensee had not ordered any spare parts.
to obtain additional or replacementAccording to Harpeter the time required squipment in so 1s,ng'it causes a .
major probles tot licensees trying to resupply or obtain back .ap equipment. '
I Barpaler said that airsetimes p1, ant management puts -
their personnel that the personnel cannot get things done.so much pressure He said on that "
these hings: personnel then sometimes use NRC inspec, tors 'to accomplish the sama Q.
thatound the deficiency rather than the plant perwr. net. brptc. sa from s. hat he could saa, it appest ed that the ernstructiun program -
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- . I kryster explained that had defects and he was he was not directly familiar with the construction about to inherit tbom activities but he saw , l the results - including the QA probicas. .Harpstar said that Inspector Trad Maura has documsnted much of .thess . problems from the operations -
sid a. -
(phonetic) e Rarpster asid that both the site construct 1on nanager. Mr. G Rarpster believed that Schweirs,was assigne& Rarpstarby said theSchweira licensee evento kacy the
- plant nar.ager (Schott) under control. soms of the IE inspection
- called the regional offica to try' to get report changed. Rarpater amid Schwairs also Aalsd.h,in to seni,IE
- inspection reports to hin (Schweira) so ha could dacida dich matters ,
- would be sene on to Schott.
Barpster said part of the problaa vsa that NRC does not have explicit l
regulations to inspect against. He said that the preoperationsd inspector helping
.is faced with the task of trying to get coatsol of the sita an the licensee to solve its problans. Ee. said that the inspector does not doctament but a sisall parcentage of thia '" helping work." Harpster said the licenses had nr. people involved with preoperations and test acceptance.
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E. said that everything was bought under contract so the contractor vsa i
able to do whatever it wanted. Harpster said the lia'ensee then had no
- l one who knew how to handle 16e problems that wera " built-in."
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Ha.ryster said ha tried to get the plant. managars out to take tours of the plant.
He said that one assistant plant manager said he was scared to tour the plant because of the ' convicted thlons working out there.
Barpstar said that sometimes the licensee's own security force could not handla disturbances and they had to call the local sheriff's. of fice.
1 Harpster amplained that thera is sessa idrinking of alcohol on all nuelser ,
construction sites." Bovover, the licansas at Zimmer did not have.nuch
( control of things. Earpeter said thera.,wure a lot of "truch guys"*
working at, the plant and the situation got worse when they were drinking.
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Rarpstar said that there are nany allegations at any nuclear power Harpster said plaats howvar, usually only a cartain number are true.
that one could tall that th'ere were a larga number of problems at Zimmer because so many allegations were coming up.
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Barpstar saids there was a lot of pressure on'individusi la inspectors Harpater because of the nonentum generated by the NRC licensing process.
said that pressura is also. created on construction personnel by the
- codtractor's wald production scheduise. He amplained that the constructiot '
assager has to have a certain number of welds ca.mpleted to keep the 3 piping installation on schedule. Da saide that problems arise when the
( construction personnel are pushed.. Rarpetar said that for a.Q inspector -
- to stop concuruction for any defielancies, he would have to hold up many phases of the construction of a $1 billi,os plant; so the QC inspe-tors ..
- ==enally de d at they are tald.
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Harpater said that
! the overall problem was that NRC's licensing process ,
was rolling auch faster than he could "ratchat" impra' vements at the '
plant end.
i Harpster said that NRC's reg'uirements were a "joks." He said that NRR was about tn issue the SER and, they set up a meeting of ,
the Advisory Committaa on Reactor Safeguards (ACES) to which he was not invitad.
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Harpater said he went up the Reston III' management chain and presenited
' his concerna. He said he sttanded the ACRS meeting anyway. He recalled ,
that when licensee officials were questioned by AC15 Chairrsen Bender, they said acveral things that were not truer. Harpetar noted that not
- only did he ~ fee.1 they % era. net ttua; but Hanning also believed +they were not true.
when Marpsterto he returned said thehe presented regional office.this conflict to -his boss, Roberg flarnick, He said that he and Manning ,
, later talked ACRS (Jim Schott withdo one was ofthe theplant licensee managerofficials of Zimmer). who had testified to the During their '
conversation, over the phone.Harpster had L'arnick read Schost's testiraony to Schott A?
i not convey the correct He said that Schott then . agreed that the testimony did impression.
! Although Schott assured Narpstar and
- j )!anning that he muld clarify this at :the next' ACES meeting, he did not . -
Rarpstar believed that Schott's subsequent tastimony even aggravated his ear 11mr statements.
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karpster said ha briefed his management on this matter. Me recalled .
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that, his Regicnal Director, James Kappler, sent a letter to the ACAS .'
l informing them of the situation. Rarpster understood that this letter was 14 tar fowarded to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB). .
Harpater (in Hanning's explainud' presence) that,of afhis ter concarns.
the ACRE maating, ha slao informed Peltier claimed that he did not recall Harpster's expressing his concerna to h He said that Feltier later' '-
him.
employee. ,Harpster explained that Feltier is a " pro nuclear" '" pro-liccasing" .
, NRR is on a very tightHeschedula also explained that during a start-up of a nucts,ar plant. .
an an adversary blessed. Wen he uncovers; deficiencies which NRA has alr
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Feltier told Hanster that he informed the licenses about ;
sation underway on the subject of the licensas's testimony before thesa IE insesti.
- Executive Legal Director, called James Yora. Ossirrman
- told him to throw sway Xeppler's letter describing the dracrepancies . .. * .
Marpater recent investigation pointed odt by that 01A.these lasser' two anttars were the subject of a .
. . Baypoter. said in'ourwaary that this wue a A situation trying to hold up plant licensing, douns. NRR scre the system broke
viewed It as' the had guya
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l designated to serve as the liaison with' specifically NRC.Harpster ...
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- helpful becauce it overcomes the .probl N.e said that this is
{ . find their said, ho6 voy through the. great arsount of paper at them IE inspectors fa '
4ver, this liaison person also " steers" th e plant.. Harpstar Harpstertosaid inspector get that dealing with this liaison person de inspectors' activitie '.
j oes allow the hrpster noted that. thers is no real internal audit program. well. of ththro .
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. e NRC's inspection inspector engages in as a process of preepe' gettiMarpster rations des lines in the inspector's tina. .IE procedures, but it is the largestcontrols utes only about two i
, part of a preoperations . e i of a nuclear power plant for one day would , o ng up constructionbuthrpater e ,
dollars. 'He observed that with the increased preseveral hu'ndred thousa inspectors.
power plants, he would expect even more pressure to bssura on NRC to lic t l
exceptions to the acceptance ' criteria in nnelthe preopHe p very real. to maka whether the ' licensee's exceptions are based c or to onHe tell said it is Me said that all inspectors cannot possiblyvalid be engineer.ing anal Rarpstur review said the inspectors must rely on the liexperte in all areas. yses the exceptions. Rarpster said censee's people tb NRC's to approve exceptions.systen because the licensee's reviewersthat this representa a flaw i it is a utility cotspany, cannot pass on thethemoEarpstar . licensee, hesause pointed out stage of commercial operations.ratepayers e on,until i.e., the the plant reac
- Revtew of Welding Records
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During the . period of the CIA investigation , -
Weld Dara Sheets'to identify specific of weld rework and epair Data infwhich Sheets andincluded R . '
veld packages idgntifying all work en the th(2) e. whether Completeer set weld sere reviewed at which time it was disclosedree alleged defective welda condugted at the time the IE investigativ that rework was being 21ener site, however it related to one e effort was ongoing at the 2
Internation contained la IE eReport 42 and not welds pe 50 350/50 a ricated pipe (spools).
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the It rep (ort.e weld ' E-916).-09 cords describes (K-811) Wieha zeview disc of losed en As part af the CIA review the w1 ed lading recor n
~f s for veld h
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