ML20114F743

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Forwards Instrumentation & Control Sys Branch Safety Evaluation Re Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room
ML20114F743
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Waterford
Issue date: 03/02/1982
From: Speis T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Tedesco R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML082170562 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-84-143 NUDOCS 8203180003
Download: ML20114F743 (7)
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g I M IIANDtpl FOR: Robert L. Tedesco. Assistant Director for Licensing Olvisten of Licessfag FNNI:

1heets P. Spets. Assistant Director for floactor Safety Dtvision of Systems Integration MATERFOIID 3 - ICSS $$ER IIMIT 011 SAFE SHUTD0lM ANALYSIS

SUBJECT:

i Pl o t Ilsme: MaterfW d 3 Decket Its.: 50-332 Lissasing Stotas: OL Responsible Brend: LB #3 j

Project Manager:

S. Black haview Branch: ICSS

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heview Status: Incesplete (1 Open Itan)

In a ummerends (Paul Chad to Ashort Tedesco) dated May 27,1981, the Instresustation and Centrol Systems Branch (ICSB) descrfbed an open item J

pertaining to monitoring safts siwtdeum from outside the control ross for

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the listerford 3 plant. The ICSS voguested additional inferention and the applicent responded by provfdfag a safe eutdeum analysis (L.V. Maurfn to R. L. Teduses) dated Desenhor 21,1981. The ICSB review and evolustion of safe sIwtdeum free outside the esattel reen is enciesed.

Resed en our tuview of the f5AR and safe shutdeus analysis, and pendte, the applicant's satisfactory esafituation discussed wf thin the enciesed evolustles, un esnelede that the Materford design provfdes sufffcient redendsat safety grade centrols and instrumentation to allow safe plant shutesun from setside the control room. IIsurser, our review did reveal that the ashject design does not fully cesply with our position on dis-abling of the outematic eestasered safety features (ESF) functions spon This is further manue1 transfIse of contpel to the remote lacetten.

discussed in the enclosed evaluatten, and the resolution of this matter wfl1 he reported en in a sepplement to this report.

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m R. Tedesco If them are any questions please contact R. Stevens of ICSB.

. :b smv.w Themis P. Speis. Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Integration DISTRIBUTION:

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R. Mattsen ICSB Reading File R. Stevens (PF)

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0. Parr T. Speis Waterford Subject File R. Capro S. Black F. M1mglia J. Rosenthal C. Rossi R. Stevens

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OFFICI AL RECO~40 COPY

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.e l'CSB SSER INPUT ON SAFE SHUT 30m.

ANALYSIS FOR WATERFORD 3 BACKGROUND In a memorandum (Paul Check to Robert Tedesco) dated May 27, 1991, the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) described an open itert pertaining to monitoring safe shutdown for the Waterford 3 plant.

The ICSB requested additional information related to safe shutdown instrumentation and controls on the local control panel (LCP-43).*

The applicant has provided a safe shutdown analysis (L.V. Maurin to R. L. Tedesco) dated December 21, 1981. This analysis describes equip-ment required for safe plant shutdown and provides 'a list of instrumentation and contmis needed for shutdown from outside the control room.

Our evaluation of the FSAR and safe shutdown analysis is discussed below.

DISCUSSION It is the staff's position that in order to meet General Design Criterien (GDC) 19 and SRP Section 7.4. the design should provide redundant safety-grade capability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown from a location

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or locations remote from the control room, assuming no fire damage to any required systems and equipment and assuming no accident has occurred.

Also, the design should provide redundant safety-grade capability for attain-ing subsequent cold shutdown through the use of suitable procedures.

  • The applica..t also uses the following terminoloay for LCP-43: Auxiliary Control Panel and Remote Shutdown Panel.

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-7 Section 7.4.1.5 of the Waterford FSAR and the above mentioned saf e. hut-down analysis describes the local control panel (LCP-43) design and capability.

The design objective of the LCP-43 is to provide a central point to monitor plant shutdown and provide certain control functions in the event of an evacuation of the control room. The LCP-43 contains redundant safety-grade controls and instrumentation to enable the operator to achieve and maintain the plant in the hot standby condition. For cooldown f rom hot standby (cold shutdown) there are redundant controls and instrumentation on the local control panel (LCP-43) and associated suitable prosedures.

The procedures stress operator verification that all support equipment are functioning and, if not, then directs the operator to start equippent via LCP-43 or from separ-ate local panels.

The controls and instrumentation for redundant equipment are mounted in separate sections of the local control _ panel so that no single failure can prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. All safety and non-safety related channels within the local control panel are physically and electrically separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75.

The Waterford 3 safe shutdown analysis assumes that offsite power is unavailable. Therefore, the additional equipment available with offsite power is not relied upon. This approach ensures that the more conservative

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analysis envelopes the more realistic (offsite power available) case.

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  • Various inconsistencies exist between the FSt.R and safe shut down ane'"

tables which list the instrumentation and controls required for se'e shutdown from outside the control room.

Through discussions, the applicar.-

has agreed to update the subject tables in future FSAR and safe shutdown analysis revisions to make them consistent. We find this acceptable.

Also, during our review, it was revealed that the hot leg reactor coolant temperature indication was not listed as being on the local control panel. The applicant verified through discussion that this indication does exist and will be added to the appropriate safe shutdovm tables in a future revision. We find this acceptable.

A concern was developed during our review pertaining to the negation of automatic actuation of engineered safety features (ESF) functions. We requested the applicant to describe compliance to the staff's position which says that the design should be such that the manual transfer of control to the remote location (s) should not disable any autoratic actuatien of ESF functions while the plant is attaining or maintained in hot shutdown, other than where ESF features are manually placed in service to achieve or paintain hot shutdown. The applicant responded through discussions stating that the Waterford design does not fully comply with the staf f's position. This matter is still under review by the staff and the resolution will be reported in a supplement to this report.

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4-CONCLUSION Based on our review of the FSAR and safe shutdown analysis and pending the applicant's satisfactory resolution of the confirmatory item dis-cussed below, we conclude that the Waterford design provides sufficient redundant safety-grade controls and instrumentation on the local control panel (LCP-43) to allow the operator to achieve and naintain hot standby. Also, there is sufficient redundant safety-grade capability for obtaining cold shutdown through the use of suitable procedures.

This neets cur GDC 19 requirewents as interpreted by SRP Section 7.4.

The applicant must provide formal documentation to satisfy the confirmatory item discuss-ed below.

Also, based on our review, it was revealed that the Waterford desion does not fully comply with our position on the negation of automatic ESF functions as discussed above. Therefore, this remains an open item, and the resolution will be reported on in a supplement to this report.

Ot.FIRMATORY ITEM The applicant has committed to revise the FSAR and safe shutdown analysis to correct the inconsistencies which exist. Also, the applicant has agreed to update the FSAR and safe shutdown analysis to include redundant safety-orade reactor coolant system hot leg temperature indication on the local con-l trol panel (LCP-43).

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7 5-OPEN ITEM The applicant has stated through discussions that the Waterford design does not fully comply with the staff's position on disablino the l

automatic ESF function as described above.

The applicant has aoreed to either modify the design to meet our position or provide additional information to justify the existing design. The resolution of this item will be addressed in a supplement to this report.

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