ML20115A032
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NGV 3 1983 3 7.yp MMORAIOM FOR:
E. Enighton. Chief. Licensing Branch #3 Dietsien of Licensing FAM:
Faust Rosa. Chief. Instrumentation & Centro 1 Syst ms Branch Divisten of Systems Integratten SWJECT:
tlATERFORD 3 - DERGENCY FEEDelATER SYSTEM plant Name: teaterford Steam Electric Statten. Unit #3 Decket Hs.: 50-382 Licenstag States: SL D C IcrA "- e- ~ ~ "
Respenstble trench: LP #3 project Meneger:
J. Iflisen Certmed y /d[
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f Review States: Incamplete For Eseffency Feedmeter4ystem Design 1he purpose of this menorendum is te describe warteus design concerns which have evolved as a result of the teaterford 3 emergency feedwater system (EFS) lastrumentatten and centrol review and to formord requests for additional in.
forestlan.
Section 7.3 of Supplement 10s. I to the teaterford 3 Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-4787) states that the US centrol and shut-ef f valves are to be oper-eted by an autenatic level centrol system. The staff accepted this design concept het requested the appitcast to provide taformation to confirm com-pliance with regelred acceptance artteria. The Instrumentatten and Centrol Systems trench (IC58) est with the appitcast to discess the subject design as it portales to FSM Chapter 7.0 design criteria. During discussions and thres@ review of US design tafermetten supplied to date, the ICS8 has iden.
tified a ammber of potential conceres e tch are based on staff design cri.
tarta esed eartog recent' plant revices. A list of the varleus ICSR concerns and requests fer taferustten are enclosed and will provide a basis for fur.
therdisconsten(s)withtheappitcant.
A special emoting to discuss the tieterford 3 EFS will be coordinated with the appitcast and will most likely be held in Bethesda. This will allow fell staff porticipetten by those review branches involved. Durir.g the meetteg. the appitcast should be prepared to discoss the degree of com.
pitance of the Waterford 3 design with each item in the enclosure. This will elles the staff to entain a better understanding of the Waterford 3 l
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EFS since the present inforration supplied to the staff does not suffi.
ciently address present staff concerns.
Please forward the enclosure to the Waterford 3 applicant.
'Origintti Sit-2cd By:
Faust Itoca' Faust Rosa Chief Instrumentation f. Centrol Systen Rranch P171 sten of Systems Integration
Enclosure:
As st y DISTRI8UTION:
Docket File cca R. Metteen ICS8 R/F R. L Neusten R. Stevens (PF)(2)
F. Assa t, Capre J. Wtisen Waterford S/F C. Rossi i
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OFFICIAL RECORD _ COPY j._' ' * " " " _ " * * " " " ' " " "
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Enclosure idATERFORD 3 EMERGENCY FEEDWATEe SYSTEM (STAFF com.t.RR5 AND REQUE5T5 PUR ADDITIDNAL INFORMATION)
BACKNOUNO Recent plant reviews have included a number of considerations which assure the ese of the emergency feedwater system (EFS) as an effective post trip decay heat removal system. These considerations include the following protective function 1
requirements for the EFS:
1.
Independent automatic and manual initiation capabilities.
2.
The capability to supply energency feedwater to the intact steam generator following a pipe break when required.
3.
The capability to control steam generator level j
(flow control), and 4.
The capability to isolate a faulted steam genera-ter if necessary.
Dr.sIG:ia. a of.Icc:AI, POTENTIAL C0ggang Certified Py M
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Duringthestaff'sreviewofinformationsuppliedto/
u date and through discussions in a meeting with the applicant, a number of potential concerns have been identified pertaining to the Ideterford 3 emergency feedwater system design.
The potential de-sign concerns are described below and are associated particularly with the implemen-tation of the emergency feedwater automatic level control system.
1.
It appears that a single failure may prevent the automatic protective function related to feeding of the intact steam generator (s) upon a steamline rupture, 2.
It appears that a single failure within the automatic cir-cuits could defeat the manual initiation capabilities of the EF5 4
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The use of autenatic reset of the energency f.eedwater actuation signals upon receiving a main steam isola-tion signal (MSIS) and upon high steam generator i
level.
4.
The capability to isolate a faulted steam generator assuming a single failure, and 5.
The negatten of manual initiation capabilities upon automatic actuation of the EF5 without a single failure.
1 itEG.E5ii FOR ADDITIONAL INFONNAT10N As a basis for further meeting; and to help the staff to better understand the Waterford 3 EFS. the applicant is requested to address each of the following de-sign criteria which'have been used by the staff during recent EFS reviews.
The applicant should evaluate the Waterford 3 design taking into account the above staff concerns and should provide additional information to verify that the EFS
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is in compliance with each of the_ design criteria.
If there are any exceptions, please identify and provide justificatten.
I.
The energency feedseter automatic initiation system including the associated automatic level control portion shall -
a.
De designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the automatic initiation of the required protective functions and b.
Se implemented se that a single failure will not result in the loss of manual capability to perform the required protective functions-from j
the control room.
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j For both cases, the staff's intention is to confirm that a single failure within one actuetten division will not prevent protective actions by a redundant division.
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II.
The manaal initiation portion of the amergency feedwater system should -
a.
De capable of performing the required protective functions on the system level assuming a single failure and b.
Se implemented so that a single failure will not result in the loss of the automatic capability to perform the required pro-tactive functions.
For both cases, the staff's intention is to confirm that a single failure within i
l one actuation division will not prevent protective actions by a redundant inde-
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pendent division.
I III. The ESF protective functions described above should not rely on the use of non-safety related equipment nor local operation (outside the control room) t of equipment following any design basis event.
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