ML20114G092
| ML20114G092 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Palo Verde |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1983 |
| From: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082170562 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-143 NUDOCS 8310050434 | |
| Download: ML20114G092 (3) | |
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- f*81 POR: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR FRENE:
J. 2. Martin, Administrator, Region V SUMECT:
REGION V IMPUT TO TIE ACRS REQUEST ON PALO VERDE NUCLEAR ENERATING STATION Your memorandum dated October 13, 1982, requested Region V evaluate (a) the significant construction deficiencies and (b) the effectiveness of the construction phase of the quality assurance program at Palo Verde by June 30, 1983.
The scope of this evaluation was defined in our memorandum (Crews to Eisenhut) dated March 1, 1983, and revised per telecon (Sternberg to Licitra) em June 16, 1983.
9 The Regies V staff's evaluation is enclosed as Attachment.1.
A J. B. Martin Regional Administrator Sec1*eere:
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F.nclosure Reaies V Staff Realuation Renardian Significant Construction Deficiency Resorta and the Effeettveness of the Quality Assurance Proaram at Palo Verde Nuclear Generatian Station h enhject evaluaties by the Region V is presented below:
A.
Sinaificaat Construction Deliciencies Data The constructies deficiency reports applicable ta Unit 1 issued by Arizona Public Service are tahalated in Table 1.
h applicaat submita potentially reportable items which may or may not be finally determined to be reportable in accordance with the reportability criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e). The items which were determined to be met reportable are not listed. N items for which final detamination of reportability have not been made are listed as potentially reportable (P/R).
h format of Table 1 is as follows:
1.
MR No.
The Deficiency Realuation Report (DER) number is the control ammber assissed by the applicant.
2.
M Rither REPWTARI2 or P/R (potentially reportable -
final determinaties met made as of Juue 15, 1983).
3.
Fellear-us Resort # If esamined ay the NRC the follow-up.eport samher is listed.
4.
Statua "C" indicates the NRC follow-up is complete. No entry (a blaak) indicates the item is open.
5.
Description A brief explanation of the subject of the report.
h states of all constructies deficiency reports in Table 1 are as of June 15, 1983.
Aeolicants Threshold of Resortability The applicant has utilised the reportability mechanisms of 10 CFR 50.SS(e) significantly more of ten than other applicants. The regies has attributed this to a low threshold of reportability utilined by the applicaat. Since 1978, the applicaat has internally evaluated 239 potentially reportable items and has detetuined 73 to be reportable for all three units.
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NRC twelmaties of Diesesittoos Each of the potentially reportable and reportable items, including those deteeniaod to be met reportable, are esamined by the resident inspector te verify the applicant's evaluations were t1orough and that satisfactory corrective actise had been completed or<had bein arranged. In some cases furthee acties was requested but in general the applicants actions were comeistently found to be' thorough.
i t.s Stace all reportable items are, by the definition of to CTR 50:55(e),
significant to safety the following esamples are provided which deal with the more significant items.
Desian Deficiency is the Mesa Steam Support Structure East Wall, l
IIR 80-17 l
The deficiency, discovered during final design review, dealt with not having need the proper dynamic loading factor in the coecrete valls of the mais steam support structure to accommodate movement of the main feedseter line in the event of a pesculated line break. The applicants actions required adding a supported steel beam under the wall in Unit I and design changes to add seinfordy steel to Unita 2 and 3.
Cable Tror Suseerts Not Noetian Drawina Reevirements. IER S0-39 The deficiency, identified as a tesul't ob a quality assurance finding, dealt with Class 1E cable tray supports at.t meeting drawing requirements.
Specifically, transverse braces were tastalled at improper sa6es or were emitted. The cea41tions were attributed to drawing complexities, changes in field engineerta6: Perseenel, and met requiring a rpacific inspection for esch individual support. The applicant's action taclude, revision of drawings for clarit* and taspecties of a sample of completed iastallattees. This la turn resulted ta ether identified discrepancies ar.d the applicant commenced a 1001 reinspecties of all Class 1E cable tray supports.
Defective Structural Bolti==. ***a 81-14. 41a29. 33-15. and 33-30 The deficiencies, diseeested by belt failures during normal handling, dealt with defective ancher r.tuds and bolts f ree the harathon Steel Campany, a supplier who in tars uses several subtier s9ppliers as sources.
s The first deficiency, IER 81-14, dealt eith ASTM A 354 Grade BD anchor l
stads. The stads showed satisfactory chemical end physical properties i
het asterial hardness values were far estside the acceptable range. The cJese was attributed to inadegente heat treatment control by various amenfecturces.
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Corrective actions included audits and re-audits of subtier supplie:s.
Additionally all Quality Class ASTM A 354 Grade BD bolttog material was tested for hardness and an acceptance criteria was applied which was i
coupled with a design capacity downgrading based on hardness. The engineering study was perfogued by Bechtel and Teledyne and independenth
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reviewed by Battelle. All installed accessible embedded fasteners were tested and design calculations were rechecked. All studs with hardness readings outside the revised hardness values were removed or specially I
tagged.
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In t'he seceed deficiency, DER 41-29, discovered during assembly, f
i ASTM A 490 bolta and ASTM A 325 bolts supplied by Marathon Steel failed l
to reach required torque. The bolts were supplied to Marathon by differest sabtier suppliers than were lavolved in the A-354 bolts. The a
j applicaat replaced the defective bolts and implemented a-inspection L
j program ta, verify the tensies in the high strength bolts in accordance with AISC criteria, In the third deficiency, M R 83-15, discovered during verification of the
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1 installation torque of an ASTM A 354 Grade RD stud, the stud broke in the
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i threaded sortion. The applicant performed a failure analysis on the stud j
and determined the studs chemical, physical, and hardness properties were
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proper and that the stud had been overtorqued. The applicant's final report and corrective actions are not complete at this time.
la the fourth deficiency, MR 83-30, ASTN A 354 Grade BD anchor bolt h
failed to achieve required torque and subsequently failed. The
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applicaat's evaluaties and corrective actions are not complete at this w
i time.
The M C's review of this series of deficiencies is not complete at this time.
FamLtv Electrical Terstmal Lua Crimoina. DER's 82-36, 82-41, 82-43, and h;
The first deficiency, MR-82-36, discovered during site work on the k
Cooper Energy Systems Diesel Generator control cabinets, involved a loose 4
wire which had been terminated by Cooper. The applicants corrective action required rework of the affected control cabinets in Units 1, 2, 3:
and 3.
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The seceed deficiency, M R 82-41, discovered during testing of Class 1E kf j
E owitchgear, involved loose wires which had been terminated by GE.
The 1
1 applicants corrective action required reinspection of all Class 1E 4
terminations ubich utilised the type of crisp connection in GE switchgear 1
i for !!aits ~ 1, 2, and 3.
y Seheequest to the above findings, the applicant initisted inspections of, k,
j ether vesder crimping in which he identified and corrected additional f
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crimping problems with Main Control Panels by Consip, Inc. (DER 82-43),
440 volt load centers by Brown Boveri (DER 82-44) and water cht11er control panels by Carrier (DER 82-78).
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Effectiveness of the Construction Quality Assurance Program The effectiveness of the applicant's Construction Quality Assurance program has been esamined ever the course of the construction program through routiae and special NRC QA inspections and more recently through the periodic Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program.
Eighlights of those inspections and their results are presented below with other perspectives which reflect on the effectiveness of the constructies quality assurance program.
1974 Staff Testimony to ASLR 1
I In response to na ASLB question regarding the staff's assessment of the division of responsibility for gus11ty assurance between the applicant, combustion Engineering, and Bechtel, and the staf f assessment of the policies and procedures to be used, the staff stated that the ultimate responsibility for quality assurance vae that of the applicant, that the policy had been well defined and was being carried out by the applicant's QA Naamgement and that the quality assurance procedures were adequate.
1980 Midterm Quality Assurance Inspection Inspection Report 50-528/80-01 described the results of a mid-tera quality assurance program inspection. Areas enseined included changes to the QA/QC organisaties, site design control. document control, procuremsat costrel, the audit program, the 10 C# 50.55(e) reportability review program, and pSAR ceamitment change control. All areas were found to be satisfactory, with the encepties of items of norcompliance found in the area of drowing control and weld rod control. AdJitionally, the absence of a fosasi program for review of 10 CTR 50.'s5(e) reportability was identified.
These astters were subsequeatly satisfactory resolsed.
1981 Special Ceestruction Assessment Team Inspectica laspecties Report 50-528/81-02 describes the results of a special construction assessnest team inspection of quality :.surance, design controls procurement controls, construction cont.ols, and project managesset. This laspection was an experimental program, a precursor to the Constructies Assesseest Team (CAT) inspec'. ions. The scope of the inspecties was broad and esamined both the aJequacy of the applicant's progree procedares and the program's implenestation. The ground rules of the team taspection were different than those of the routine inspection program in that they allowed inspectors to reach qualitative conclusions and identify these conclusions as " perceive 6 strengths and weaknesses."
The report did not identify any items of none wpliance. Perceived strengths that were identified included (1) ma.ssgement visibility, (2) management caemusication with staff workers (3) strong QA/QC project insgo (staff workers appear to be working towards a common goal for a quality product) and (4) strong construction management.
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Porteised menheesses included (1) performance of receiving inspection, (2) eestrol of special handling er taspection requirements for ausgements, and (3) storage and asistamasce of equipment.
M he first SALP report for the applicaat eevered the period from !!ay 1979 thesegh Rep 1908. The report fasad the applicasta performance generally satisfactory. The report identified three functional areas in seestreeties esquirtas further effort; (1) component storage and antatemesse. (3) hengers aed espports, and (3) eestatement done liner testa 11stica. Se report alae identified too functional areas where setened MC tampacties effort uns serrested due to good performance; (1) enhetruetare fesadettees and (2) eescreta.
M The neceed SALP report for the an11esat coeered the period free Jane 1900 to June 1981. The report states the applicant's performance was ahese average. Applicant performance in the areas of quality asserence, safety-related structure., corrective actions and reporting, and trainias displayed unusual coupe ames. The report aise stated that further taprovements in the areas of.aterage, handling and maintenance of agaipment, and the quality of vender agplied ognipsest could be made.
M The third SALP report for the applicant coeered the period from July 1981 i
to February 1983. The format of the SALp methodelegy had been changed to eategoriae the applicant's performance as a Catergery 1, 2 er 3;-
Catagery I heing the highest reting. The applicant osa judged to be Category 1 La fear of the eight functiemal areas in constructies, and Category 2 in the remaimias four. The Category 1 functiemal areas were:
(1) soils and femadations, (2) eestatement and other safety related.
streeteres, (3) safety.related cesponesta, and (4) licensing activities.
The Catagery 2 fumettemel areas were: (1) pipiar, systems and supports, (2) support syetans, (3) electrical power supply and distribution, and (4) lastrumentaties and centrols. There were se Category 3 ratings applied to the applicant.
Allenstions These had been relatively few allegatiosa made regarding the applicant's gestity asserseee program antil the 1932 time frame. Allegations were received ta 1982 ta the areas of containment prestressing tendons, post weld host treataast, electrical installettens, pipe welding and supports, see heettag ventilating and airceeditientag (NVAC). Although some of the allegatises were substantiated, and same led directly or indirectly to ilmes of asecespliance, some of the allegations has raised a major safety i
esacers. We additteesl allegations have been received to date in 1983.
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I I$.3,y h eoge11e ma The seaber cad asture of nencompliances identified in the routine No taspecties ',regram are largely smaarized in the three SALP reports.
secarring,e msjer safety issues have been identified in the routine program *.,e date. h applicasit has semerally been considered effective la r*A lving identified problem areas. The number of inspection hours pet item of amacsepliance identified has increased over the duration of cecetructies.
M f. casts One of Outside Assistance the applicent has, en occasies, engaged outside assistance. For example, I
in 1977 the applicant identified a "conditica adverse to quality" dealing
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with Bechtel specifications set meeting PSAR ceamitments. The applicant sagesed General Physics Corporaties to independently review the specifications and the PSAR. In 1982, the applicant had an engineering study performed by Bechtal and Teledyne en the effect of the hardness deviations of their A31H A 354 Grade 3D bolts. The applicant also engaged Bette11e to perform an independent review of the study. In 1982, the applicant engaged Torrey Pines Technology to perform an independent quality assurance evaluaties in the areas of organization, management, quality assurance, design and constructies activities.
The use of independent entside help suggests the applicant is open as well as aggressive in the resolution of problems.
guemary The review of'the measures of constructies quality assurance effectiveness discussed above leads to a conclusies that applicant's program has been effective.
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