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AUG 121981 l
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert L. Tedesco. Assistant Director for Licensing.
Division of Licensing FRCM:
Paul 5. Check. Assistant Director for Plant Systems.
Division of Systems Integration
'YCT:
SUPPLEENT TO THE WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATIO!
UNIT 3 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT. FSAR SECTION 7 INSTRt#UTATION AM CONTROL SYSTEMS M ant Naee: Waterford Steam Electric Station
)cket No.: 50-382
' w sing Stage: OL
-15'a Branch: Licensing Branch 2
- Ma.w:ar:
- 5. Black sla Reviewer:
N. Kondic
': ah tion Date: August 19, 1981
.i enclosed supplemental Safety Evaluation Report was prepared by the
.astrumentation and Control Systems Branch. The rua6er of open items has oeen reduced from 9 to 4.
The four remaining open items are:
1.
Compliance with IE Bulletin 79-27: Safe Shutdown with the loss of single instrument bus.
2.
Monitoring Safe Shutdown: Auxiliary Control Panel Desig i.
3.
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Shaft Break Protection.
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TMI Action Plan Item II.F.2: Instrissentation for Detection of4CC j.,
The four closed itegs (one conditionally closed) are:
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Confermance with IE Su11stin 80-06.
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Direct Indication of Relief - and Safety Valve Positions, g-
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Item !!.D.3 TMI Actice Plan.
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C.
Cazeitsent to Perform a Control Systne Single Fa11urs Analysis.
7.
Duergency Feedwater Control (conditionally acceptable on a functional
'ists, to be confirmed by review of detailed design).
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.A Robert L. Tedesco Item C is to be incorporated These items a m discussed in our enclosed 55tR.
as a condition of the license.
l numbers To clarify the nemenclature and help the reade l t d with the previous numbers in the enclosed table.
. a saw as vw s. Cheek J Paul S. Check. Assistant Director for Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration Erclosures:
Open items Status Table 1.
2, SSER P. Check Distribution _
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D. Eisenhut Docket File F. Mir glia IC58 Reading File
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F. 'tosa Waterford Subject File
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WATERFORD 3 OPEM ITEMS STATUS TABLE:
SURVEY THROUGH ICSB SSER REVISI0ftS REVISION NUMBERS SHORT TITLE / ITEM DESCRIPTION RELEVANT SECTIONS OF CHAPTER 7 (AND ComENT)
1 2
Present Na!!fication of Containment 7.2. 7.3 1
Instrument Cabinet Heaters and Associated Controls rmtainment Isolation Actuation 7.3.3 2
inal Initiated b Lou Primary Prassure Energency Feedwater Isolation By 7.3 3
1 1
9 Main Stees Isolation Signal Emergency Feedse,ter Control 7.3 4
Conflermance wtth Regulatory Guide 7.5 5
2 1.47: Display of bpassed and Inoperele Equipment Status on Systes Level
- Confermance wfth IE Bulletta No.
7.2. 7.3. 7.5 6
79-21: SS S PIR tegel Indication g)Ospendent en Eartromment y / :.
i; Confbraence with IE Bulletin No.
7.4. 7.5. 7.7 7
3 2
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79-27: -Safte Shutdue Utth Less i
Of 5fagle Instrument Bus
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- i Transfer lie Spore ESF Pup 7.2. 7.3 8
CapitRusacewthEgelietinme.
7,3 9
4 3
4 e so-os: asset ene o werfde of i Energener Safety Features IMtering Seh Shutdema:
7.4 10 5
4 2
lAust11aryCentrolPenelDesfyeTo l
? Accoupifsk It l
Nactor Circuletten Pug (RCP) 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.5 11 6
5 3
'ift Break Protection cuinannt Vacuss Rolfef System 7.8. 3.8. 2.3 12 7
- 4nce with latory Guide 7.5 13
- tvision 2
t Accident F10g -
v: Failure of Control System 7.7 14 8
4 C
":acy
~ ration of the Reactor Protect -
7.3 15 Systea with One Channel in b-
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' ffer Qualification 7.1. 7.2. 7.3 16 S
(CONTINUED)
OPEN ITEMS STATUS TABLE:
idATERFORD 3 SURVEY THROUGH ICSB SSER REVISIONS REVISION NUMBERS' RELEVANT SECTIONS OF CHAPTER 7 0
1 2
SSER 3HORT TITLE / ITEM DESCRIPTION OR TMI ACTION ITEN NtM8ER (AND COM4ENT) 17 7.1. 7.2. 7.3 mformance with Regulatory Guide Periodic Testing Of 118:
- ctrical Power and Protection atens 13 7.2 re Protection Calculators 19 Mit Sect. ions' Referred TN!:
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. Cpen Items:
Direct 20.1 = II.D.3 y20 J 4
o Pertcin to IENIEG-0737:
ndication of Relief and Safety 20.2 = II.F.2 sl ulves Positions; Instrumentation 20.3 = II.E.1.2 or Detection Of ICC; Aust11ary hter 5 ten htic 1
Inttiction and Flem Indication i
Itaas A. 5, and C are closed M:
Itas O conditionally closed 4
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!1 l d d that the Based on information submitted by the applicant, we have conc t of July fellowing open items, identified in our Safety Evaluation Repor The first itas Itsted (D) is provisionally closed.
g.1g81, are resolved.
7.0 inaisi
-TATION AS CGImIDL 7J Boeineered Safety Features System
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n.* Emerenner Feedmater (EF) Isolation 8v Main Sienal'and EF Centrol,_
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tion signal (EFA5) is employed to start lbh?,.c..-
jt n. [jj?jilbe emergency feeduster actua EFAS. including " feed-only good gen-Nh. 'sN, 4.,[I eneh,.feekster (EFW) pumps.
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The EFW control
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' i -:, d. 'i and Mesk valves are to be operated by a suppl d in Amendment 19 1he functies of this centrol system has been describe f.
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Betailed engineering dhewings (electrical schematics) f the plac.t's sitted to date. The EFW valve control systen is to be part o i h criteria protective system and is to be. designed in compliance w itcable to enamorated to Section 7.1 of the unterford Unit 3 FSAR, app The staff will cor-Seergency Safety Feature Actuation signals (E5FAS).
fire compliance with these criteria upon receipt of the dr
- ftamenclature (A,8.C.0) pertains to the transmittal letter.
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j A M11ab111ty study of the EFW system has been performed by the applicant 5
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and submitted as Appendix 10.4.98. Amendment 13. November 1980. This study i
did not include reliability analysis of the supplemental EFW valve control system. A sehsequent reliability study, which considers this contml system.
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stedy. This m11ah111ty study should demonstrate that the added complex-c
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.ity of the EFW valve.contal system does not reduce overall system reli-i ability.
2 A mata steem isolatten sipal' (N515) will, by desip, cause closure of the EFU control and block valves. This feature is to be overriden by the EFW P
velve cont al systes, shes1d the unter level in the steam generator fall be-i
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low a pr6 value. ; The staff util confirm the acceptability of g.
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7.0 II51MfemlTION AM C0lmet.
q 7.3 heinsered hfety Festems Systes
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arateserveseletten of this item is based on the appitcant's re-s v; f.
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'Mme 12.1931. Encept as discussed below.
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$j Mpl wH1 (My% w design such'that all ESF components will t
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.@'esde fle11eutag ESFAS reset.
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[*9E # "I. $ o%;ts. Gale seergeney?
Confirestion that te bj m,4.,
ftstore tegenents de set change stete following a systems e en k dhW.Q~ l eel a@;. m a
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soflety festem estmation signal, will be accomplished by f
.:S:h.u Weties, seish util be ineerporated as part of the pre-operational test m ww.. ~. * ~
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fyddy;. ;;.a e$' Ostpres. The jestificaties for the exceptions is as follo cn%
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L Evaluation of hintainino SIAS Asset Scheme for Following famanangts Volume Control Tank (VCT) Discharge Valve. Boric r
Acid Puuss AaB. and Cheroine Pumps A.8 & A8.
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The position of the VCT discharge valve is controlled automatically by the level in the VCT during normal operations. An SIAS signal closes the valve. $1AS reset will return the valve to automatic control, but only if the initiating conditions no longer exist, i.e.. asamured signals am within limits of setpoints.
1he Boric acid pumps A and B are normally in the automatic mode during operation. I'n this mode, a preset blended boric acid solution is automatically 1stredeced into the VCT via the Soric Acid Pumps upon m W.e dussed from the VCT'1evel controller (See FSAR Subsection 9.3.4. 2.1. 2 ).
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.,':h,trc. j %jA.Yi misgarDehesitag' peep sustien, SIAS meet 'will retum the pu
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G..,;.: @iNDI aben if the initiatim signal no longer exists.
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The letdown g
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flie egetsel vales,
egetmiled to maintain a balance between letdom 2.%%M%Wn. m x
- C sett ples:veester eselant peep bleedeff rete and charging flow rate.
rd73.tt.g.WJg:3,v Miet the t(g w r charging pumps and the letdom control valve v
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.385 et11.eemse papa A,and g to start.
If pump As was running Z
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d w. a 4 gypterie NAS, it stil sentiamo to ren. An $!AS reset will cause all charg-w e g s.,. c
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i ; fl. flpliculag meet of $848, a sintese of one che*ging pump will remain in
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Inadvertent reset will not obviate the safety analysis operation.
since reset will not occur if the initiation signal still exists.
If the charging pumps had restored reactor pressure above the low F
pressure trip setpoint, a subsequent reduction of reactor pressure below the setpoint following reset will reinitiate SIAS.
As described. $1AS will close the letdown line and start Charging Pumps A If the system is not reset, then, two or possibly three charging and 8.
peups will discharge into the itCS. with letdown isolated (until the sporetor mesma11y reopened).17.Lgr.fzt of pressurizer level control.
This useld yestly increase the" possibility of going solid in the pressur-taer and possibly lifting the safety valves on inadvertent SIAS initiation ig, s.:Arif my$ er Sur events which coeld ley to a rapid reco y
dfy: " 4 EM 'd.h. seest es the systes level (open SIAS reset) rrther than on the recovery t
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y,.y<5deignent lese) is considered acceptable for this system.
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A2. Evaluation of Maintainino SIAS Roset Schone for Control Room Associated (Habitat) Areas Exhaust Fan Bypass Dampers 0-18 (SA) and (SB).
These dampers are normally closed. A $!AS will open the dampers, which will trip the exhaust fans E-34 (SA and 58). By these actions, air will be meirculated and the communication with the outside atmosphere pavented. $!AS reset will cause the fan bypass dampers to change state from open to closed'.
The areas included in this ventilation :omplex will continue to be isolated fHe the outside environment until the operator (manually) restarts the fans.10ien conditions return to normal and thus allow the
. aparator t reset SIAS and he does so, he has only to start the fhas is order to restore the normal ventilation of the areas within this scheme. He can start these fans under the condition that both bypasses are closed. Neuever if any isolation signal is present, this will by desip prevent the reset. so the dampers could~ not be closed. Therefere. the present design for $!AS reset feature of the fan deepers staplifies the operator's steps in mstoring normal _
vest 11stien and does' not result in these areas not being isolated fNa enternal envimaments.
the this basis, the desip is acceptable.
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. Evaluetten of Control Room. Conference Room and Kitchen Exhaust Fan treass Demoer 0-19 ($A and $8).
Justification for Contrs1 Room. Conference Room and Kitchen Exhaust Fan I<
W Omger D-19 (SA and SB) is similar to Item A2. The associated fan is E-42.
7.5 Safety-aelated Display Instrumentation B.
1NI 4ction Plan Item II.D,3: Direct Indication of Relief and Se hty Valves %sitions Section 7.5.1.1.0. of the FSAR. Ausneuent 17. specifies the indicators provided, their flunction, qualification, indication / annunciation and
~ hechup methods. thterford-3 does not use p0RV's on the primary loop.
Safety valve position indication is provided utilizing the loose
' parts monitoring instrumentation. The existence of fluid flow on the discharge side of the safety valves is sensed by the ultrasonic vibration monitoring devices en the tailpiece of each safety valve. The devices are to be seismically gestified. An alans has been provided in the esserel rees. ~ 1he systes is powered by a static uninterruptible power i
supply. fWem a vital bus.
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~ M ft1tering r.e pin setting of the flow pi.ck-up signals reduce setse, tapact effects, cross talk disturbances, and provide an unambiguous l
l velve posittee indication.
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l Anctup indication of valve position is derived from independent on-line l
measurement of guench tank level and temperature.
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7.
'I e7.7 Control Systems Not Required for Safety C. $1nale Failure of Control Systems Study i
We have requested that the applicant (LPAL) address the following concern:
Common Doctrical Pouer Sources or Sensor Malfunctions May cause Multiple Centrol Systes Failures With regerit to the effects of control systen failures or malfunctions, the analyses reported in Chapter 15. of the Final Safety Analysis Report i
are intended to demonstrate the adequacy of safety' systems in af tigating anticipated operational occurrences and accidents, including those related to control systems. Based on the conservative assumptions made in defining these'"desip bases" events and on our detaflest reviou of the analyses, it is likely that these analyses adequately bound the consequences of single control system failures. To provide assurance that the Chapter 15. analyses adogmately teund events initiated by a single credible failure or mal-function. un require that a review be conducted to identify any power i
sources or sensors which provide power or signals to tuo or more contro1 systems, and to desenstrate that failures or malfunctions of these power sources er sensors will not result in consequences outside the bounds of 1
.the Chapter 15 analyses or beyond the capability of operations of safety i
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v, AreWfre.that the applicant resolve these concerns before startup following 4'
"ths' f' fret renseling. Accordingly, me will condition the operating license r
g to reflect this regeframent.
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