ML20114F593
| ML20114F593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Waterford |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1981 |
| From: | Rosenthal J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Black S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082170562 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-143 NUDOCS 8105120513 | |
| Download: ML20114F593 (11) | |
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,d APR 2 8 i%1 MEMORANDUM FOR:
S. Black, Project Manager, !!aterford D:i t THRU:
M. Srinivasan, Section B Leader, Ins tre en iti.r 5
Control Systets Branch, DS!
FROM:
J. Rosenthal, Ins trumentation & Control Syste.:s Braw
SUBJECT:
MEETING SUMPARY A meeting with repmsentatives of Louisiana Power and Light, LEASCO, Corbustion Engineering, and ICSB was conducted on April (14 and 15,19P1, (attendance list attached).
The purpose of the meeting l) was to cc at a drawing review of Waterford 3 and discuss responses to ques tions.b)._t During the sunwary session of the meeting open items sem discussed ( Am These open items will be included in our forthcoming SER. 0;:en i ter..a i l be discussed during our site visit / meeting nontentatively scheduled for the week of May 18, 1981. Many of these open items may be closed out (depending on applicant resolution) in our July SSER.
The list of open items should be sent to LP&L, EBASCO and CE.
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/ J. Rosenthal Instrunentation & Control Systers Brancn Division of f.ystems Integration
Attachment:
Appendix A cc:
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F. hsa Docket File );t* ~
M. Srinivasan ICSB Reading' File e,,
Waterford Subject File
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qg5129513 4 IJ. E. Rosenthal, " Agenda - Meetina and Drawing Review for 'ater'c
- Memorandum March 18, 1981.
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~ APR 2 81981 PEPORANDUM FOR:
S. Black, Project Manager, Waterford Unit 3 THRU:
M. Srinivasan, Section B Leader, Instrumentation &
Control Systems Branch OSI.
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J. Rosenthal, Inst:usentation & Control Systens Branch. 051 j.y
SUBJECT:
IEETING SLMMARY
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- e A meeting with representatives of Louisiana Power and Light EBASCO, P
Costustion Engineering, and ICSS was conducted on April (J and 15, 1981, il (attendance list attached). The purpose of the neeting 4 was to c a draring review of Waterford 3 and discuss responses to questions.guct ig P,
e During the suumary session of the nn:eting open itens wers discussed (Appendix A).
f i These open items will be included in our forthcoming SER. Open items will
!B be discussed during our site visit / meeting nontentatively scheduled for the week of MRy 18, 1981. Many of these open items may be closed out 1
(depending on applicant resolution) in our July SSER.
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The list of open items should be sent to LP&L, ESASCO and CE.
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s Instrumentation & Control Systens Branch 7
Division of Systems Integration
Attachment:
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ATTENDANCE NAE AFFILIATION Jack Rosenthal NRC/ICSB John Elsbergas Argonne/NRC/ NAP Paul L. Yanosy Comustion Engineering /ISCE Thomas Barry Codustion Engineering /! ACE Joseph G. Rick Combustion Engineering /! ACE Robert T. Lewis Coeustion Engineering /ISCE Phil Fredricks EBASCO/I&C Bruce Tessaan Comustion Engineering /! ACE Harry Mulliken Coeustion Engineering / Project Gerald Wood LP&L/ Nuclear Pmject Group Rasen Vidal EBASC0/ Electrical Engineering Roy Prados LP&L Vitaly Boynowsky EBASC0/!&C Engineering Angelo DoMagistris EBASCO/I&C Engineering Robert Stevens NRC/ICSB Dale F. Thatcher NRC/!CSB William Majerovsky EBASC0/!aC Tom Dunning NRC/ICSB Mike Horm11 EBASC0/ Licensing Chu-yu Liang NRC/RSB
C.
WATERFORD 3 - SER OPEN ITEMS 1.
Qualification of in containment instrument cabinet heaters and associa*ed :mrc Electrical transmitters which provide reactor coolant system pressure senst for the reactor protective system are located in insulated cabinets inside containment. Igulse lines connect these pressure transmitters to the pressarteet Nonqualified heaters and associated controls have been installed in these cabinets to control tageratum and humidity. Credit for these heaters is not taken in the safety analysis. The concem was raised that failure of the heater controls, such that the cabinet heaters were in continuous operation could potentially degrade the pmssure transducers and inturn invalidate the sar'ety analyses.
The applicant is to address this concern.
2.
CIAS on low primary pressure.
The curmnt design of the Engineemd Safety Feature System (ESFS) as described in Chapter 7 of the FSAR will msult in generation of a containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS) on detection of high containment pressure. The applicant has coeuritted to modify the design such that a CIAS would be generated upon detection of high containment pressurt or low pressurizer pressum.
Design of the modified system has not been cogleted.
The applicant is to coglete the design of this featum and submit the final j
design for ICS8 review.
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3.
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The curmnt design of the ESFS as described in Chapter 7 (Amendment 8, February j1 1980) of the FSAR will result in isolation of Emergency Feedwater (EFW) upon ll generation of a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MS!S). MSIS is generated on f'
detection of low steam generator prissure. The Emergency feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) is generated on detection of low steam generator level augumented by steam generator differtntial pressure to feed only good generator logic.
l These systems as currently designed serve cross purposes. The system is to be f
modified to delete EFW isolation by a MSIS (and analyze system response for *. hts j
configuration), or modify the design such that EFAS overrides MSIS conter1
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'N EFW isolation valves.
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. J The applicant is to cosplete' design of these engineemd safety features and submit the final desip for ICS8 review.
4.
EFW Control.
The current desip of the ESFS as described in Chaoter 7 of the FSAR will result q
in generation of an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) on detection g
i of las steam generator level. EFAS does not " seal in".
When the steam generator lowl rises aben the low steam generator level setpoint (due to EFW actuation) the EFAS " drops out".
Subsequent steaming in the SG will once again drop the j
water lowl reinstating EFAS. The concern was raised that the EFW isolation g
valves weeld be commended to oscillate from a full open to full closed position y
until such tie that the operator over rode the EFAS and took control (and ff adulation) of the EFW system. The applicant stated that the control system
- Q was being redesiped to adulate EFW flow.
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The applicant is to cosplete desip of the EFW control system and submit the final desip for IC58 review.
i 5.
Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.47.
The intent of Regulatory Guide 1.47 is to display bypassed and inoperable y
status of equipment on a systess lowl. The applicant has designed the hardware h
for this system. The software is yet to be written.
l The applicant is to provide the criteria to be used in the selection of equipent to be sanitored, and provide the criteria to be esployed in the display of inter-relationships and dependences on the equipsont, subsystem and system level.
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$wporting systess such as motive power and cosponent cooling are to be considered as well as fundesental engineered safety features.
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It is hted 'that the plant' computer at Waterford has expansive surveillance and'fegical'ectsterr capabf1f trimr war De uftd ttrperfenrtMit function. -
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6.
IE Sulletin No. 79-21.
Concerns related to pressurizer and steam generator level measurement accuract due to reference leg envimnnental exposure were raised in IE Bulletin 79-2' Responses to this concern were provided by the applicant in response to Questions 30.5 and 30.12. These responses addrwss information to the operat:r.
and, vis a vis operator information are adequate.
At our seeting the concern was raised that the steam generator low level l
setpoint may be 'used to initiate the EFAS and in turn EFW for an extended period of tism following a high energy line break in containment.
During that time period the containment temerature and pressure and hence the steam generator level reference leg environment will change with time. Hence, s team generator level calibration will be tien variant.
4 The applicant is to provide the SG 1evel setpoint selection criteria.
The I
setpoint is to be conservatively selected to encospass the above concern.
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7.
IE Sulletin No. 79-27.
f The applicant response to this bulletin addresses hardwart susceptability.
l The esphasis of the bulletin is procedural. Specifically, plant procedures l
should be adequate to permit achievement of safe shutdown, given loss of single instrument bus.
The applicant will identify equipment requimd for safe shutdown as part of
-j the Appendix R (fire protection) review. The applicant will address IEB 79-27 follaming this review and sesrit related procedural criteria.
ICSB conclusions C
4 related to the IES 79-27 review and procedural criteria will be incorporated f
in a swplement to the SEA.
IC58 will not review the actual procedures, y
h 8.
Transfor to Spare E5F Puse.
g Waterfted 3'il equipped with a spare high pressure safety injection pum, HPS! AB.
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Installation of HPS! AS is not a regulatory requirement.
The pum is installed h
to avoid administrative shutdowns associated with operability of redundant HPS!
trains. HPS! A8 may be aligned to function in HPS! Train A or B in lieu of tne dedicated HPS! A or 8 should HPS! A or 8 be removed from service for maintenance.
HP$! A8 takes power from 4.16 kv bus 3A83-S which inturn may be connected *..:
N Ied i diesel backed buses 3A3-$ or 383-5. HPS! AB is conmended to start by SI AS A p h
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A single sede switch and several relays and miay contacts am erria e to:
initiate HPSI A8, disable HPSI A or 8, and insum HPSI valve lineup consistent with use of HPSI AB.
ICS8 will require (by plant Technical Specification) an integrated system le el test of the high pressure ECCS system (pugs, power, control, valve lineup) when the HPS! A8 pug is placed in service and when it is removed from service.
We will review drawings and physical separation of the HPSI A8 initiating circuits during our forthcoming site visit. We are concerned that the use of a spart pump as described above may cogromise redundant train separation.
Results of our riview will be included in a supplement to the SER.
9.
IE Sulletin No. 80-06.
IES 80-06 addresses reset and override of engineemd safety features.
The applicants response to the staff request to address this bulletin is incomiete.
The bulletin and rispense were discussed during our April 15 meeting.
The applicant agreed to submit additional information.
- 10. Monitoring Safe Shutdown.
r ICS8 has requested information related to safe shutdown instrumentation in the j
control room and onthe auxiliary control panel (LCp-43).
The applicant has provided responses to our specific questions, h
4 A Safe Shutdown Analysis is to be conducted in accordance with 10 CFP Part 50 Appendix R.
This analysis will identify equipment needed to obtain and maintain cold shutdown after a firt and identify instrumentation and control needed for
'l shutdown from outside the control room.
4 ij ICS8 has suspended ruview of shutdown instrumentation and control pending
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cospletion of the applicant's Safe Shutdown Analysis.
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. 11. RCP Shaft Smak.
The app 1tcant has been ruc.uested to perform an analysis of a nyecthesize:
reactor coolant pug shaft break (Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2. *ci-15-1,3.4).
The applicant will propose modifications to the plant proteca."
system (to initiate an earlier mactor trip than would occur without tne design modifications) in order to reduce the predicted severity of this even*
The applicant has been advised to perform analyses of this event with and without design modifications and submit proposed design modifications based an results of the analyses.
- 12. Containment Vacuus Relief System.
The applicant has been twquested to describe the Containnent Vacuum Relief System instrumentation (Q 30.28). The applicants response (Anwndment 17, May 1981) is insufficient. At our meeting of Anril 15, 1981, the applicant agreed to provide a revised, complete response.
- 13. Confonunce with Regulatory Guide 1.97. Revision 2.
The applicant has been requested to comit to cogly with Regulatory Guide 1.97. Revision 2..... Post Accident Monitoring..... on the iglementation schedule of Section D. Iglenentation, of the guide (Q 30.33).
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To date (Amendment 17. May 1981) the applicant has not responded to this request.
At our neeting of April 15. 1981, the app 1tcant agreed to submit a response, stating that the applicant would comit to the intent of the guide.
- 14. Single Failure of Control System Study.
The applicant has been mquested to perforin a study of single failures of the control system to ascertain t f such single failures and subsequent consequential failures will lead to event sequences more severe than analyzed in chapter 15 of the FSAR.
The applicant is to comit to perform the study and provide a scnedule for tnu effort.
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- 15. Operation of the Reactor Protective System With One Channel In Bypass.
The applicant has proposed to operate the reactor protective system witn one c-four channels in bypass.
The system would then function as a 2 of 3 channel protective system.
(With one channel tripped, the system would function as a 1 of 3 channel protective system). The proposal is based on asserted four channel independence. To demonstrate independence the applicant must cemonstrate separation of power supplies, logic and sensors. Waterford 3 has been designed as a two battery system, that is, the four protective channels obtain power from four separete vital AC instrument buses, which inturn obtain power from two AC/DC power divisions. Hence, the demonstration of 4 channel independence is, a priorf, incoselete.
Separation of pressum sensors to RPS channels was discussed at length during a drawing myiew of April 14, 1981. The applicant showed separation of pressum sensors using schematics and physical layout drawings. We will review physical separation of sensors and logic during our forthcoming site visit.
Should logic and sensor separation be demonstrated, we will require (by plant Technical Specification) that the RPS be used as a four channel system with bypass of a known defective channel for no nors than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, and require trip of a known defective. channel after 48 hourt
- 16. Buffer Qualification.
Isolation devices are esployed to isolate " safety" and "non-safety" electrical ci rcuits.
In response to questions at our neeting of April 15 the applicant agmed to pmvide the qualification criteria used in the selection procumment and installation of these isolation devices.
I The applicant is to pmvide the installation criteria enployed at Waterford 3 to assure that ne credible fault will msult in a potential at the output tensinals of the isolation device in excess of the qualification potential.
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- 17. Conformance with Angulatory Guide 1.118.
Regulatory Guide 1.118, Periodic Testing of Electrical Power and Protection Syste s.
i endorses IEEE 338-1977. The guide is appitcable to post June 1978 Construction
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Penett applicants. Waterford's CP pmdates the guide.
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, The applicant's previous response to staff mquest to address this guice (Q 32.6) is incoglete.
The applicant is to submit infonnation explaining specific 'conformance and non-conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.118.
Those aspects of the design which are not in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.118 should be shown to be in conformance with GDC 18 and GDC 21 of Appenaix A.
10 CFR Part 50, and Sections 4.8 and 4.9 of IEEE Standard 279-1971.
- 18. Core Protection Calculators.
The Core Protective Calculators (CPCs) were not reviewed per se at Waterford 3.
We have taken the operating experience of ANO-2, the previous review and acceptance of the ANO-2 CPCs, and the similarity of the Waterford 3 and
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AND-2 CPCs, into account in rwaching this decision.
1 The conclusions of the acceptability of the CPCs at Waterford 3 am based on i
the following:
(1) With the exception of Position 20 which addresses data links between the CPC and the plant computer, the applicant should provide a fonnal comit-i ment to seet the requimments on CPCs in Table 7.1 of NUREG-0308, " Safety
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4 Evaluation Report Arkansas Nuclear One. Unit 2".
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(2) The data links between the plant computer and the CPCs may be connected only if the plant Technical Specifications include provisions to assure that (a) plant procedures shall be in effect to control modifications
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to CPC addressable constants (b) these procedures are consistent with 11 ft methods described in the bases to the Technical Specifications (c) CPC 4
Addressable constants and their physically realistic allowed ranges g
(i.e.. upper and lower bounds) are identified in the Technical Specifications (d) values of Addressable Constan,ts outside the allowed range are not to be entered without approval of the Plant Safety Committee (e) An indepencent n
h verification shall be conducted to confirm that Addressable Constant Modifications have been made as approved by the Plant Safety Committee or 7
the Engineering Staff (whichever is applicable) (f) Modifications to the f
gl CPC Addressable Constants based on information obtained through the Plant Coguter Data Links shall not be made without approval of the Plant Safety y
Cosed ttee.
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. (3) CPC operating experience at ANO-2 and CPC envirznmental tests incica'e $
sensitivity of the CPCs to fluctuations and extremes in thennal environ.v-The Waterford 3 Technical Specifications should, therefore, require COC functional tests to confinn continued operability of each CPC cnannel w5enever the CPC cabinet thermal environnent exceeds allowable ranges.
The allowable ranges should be justified on the basis of environmental tests of the CPCs and CPC operational experience at ANO-2.
The implementation of the CPC design including both harevare and software will be confirmed during the CPC test program.
We will audit the test program to verify acceptable performance during these tests.
Subject to the acceptable implementation by the applicant of the three positions stated above and successful completion of the test program, we consider the CPC design to be acceptable.
- 19. Site Visit.
ICS8 is tentatively scheduled to conduct a site visit (Appendix 7-8, NUREG-75/087) during the week of May 18, 1981. Results of our site visit will be included in a supplement to the SER.
- 20. TMI Open Itess.
The applicants response to date to TMI Items II.D.3 II.F.) an<1 II.F.2 nmvides i na deg ua te,,, des,1,gn,,,dg tall,, The, app 1_i,can,t s ho ul d p ro vi de"s u f[ici e n't]d[e'ta i 1 50 _',
descostrate conformance with NUREG-0737. Clarification of TMI Action Plan Require-
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Resolution of SER open Items 3, 4, and 13 are required to adequately addmss N:
Items. II.E.1.2 and II.F.3.
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