ML20112G819

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Forwards Revised Power Sys Branch Mechanical Responses Previously Submitted Informally & Discussed in 850325 Telcon.Fsar Changes Will Be Incorporated in Upcoming Amend. Discussion of Lighting & Communication Included
ML20112G819
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 03/27/1985
From: Carey J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To: Knighton G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2NRC-5-056, 2NRC-5-56, NUDOCS 8504020015
Download: ML20112G819 (25)


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'AFN Duquesne Udit RMg,os6

2) 923-1960 Nuclear Construction Division Robinson Plaza, Building 2, Suite 210 elecon W 2) 787-2629 Pittsburgh, PA 15205 March 27, 1985 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch 3 Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 PSB Mechanical Responses Gentlemen:

This letter forwards revised PSB Mechanical res pons es which were previously provided informally and subsequently discussed in a telephone conversation on March 25, 1985. FSAR changes described in these revised responses will be incorporated in an upcoming amendment. The following responses are attached: 430.53, 430.58, 430.74, 430.79, 430.116, 430.119, 430.124, 430.127, 430.138, 430.144, a general discussion of lighting and communication, and a general response on the air dryer issue.

DUQUESNE LIG COMPANY By Ji J Carey Vic President GH0/wjs Attachment cc: Mr. R. DeYoung, Director (3) (w/a)

Mr. B. K. Singh, Project Manager (w/a)

Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a)

INPO Records Center (w/a)

NRC Document Control Desk (w/a) 1 1 %

SUBSCRIBED A EWORN TO FORE ME THIS g /, DAY OF M/r , 1985.

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4 h* Notary Public 412 5HillA N. FATTORE. NOTARY PUBLIC PDR $HIPPINGPORT JORO. SEAVER COUNTY 4 NY Commis5104 iXPIRf 5 SEPT.16,1985 N'h. Pennsylvania Association of Netnie-

E Unitcd Stctss Nuclacr R gulctcry Commission Mr. G:crga W. Knighton, Chicf PSB Mechanical Responses Page 2 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )

) SS:

COUNTY OF BEAVER )

On this j // M day of {td) ,

/ 9((, before me, a Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, personally appeared J. J. Carey, who being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

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Notarv Public SHEllA N. FATTORE, NOTARYPuttlC

$HIPPl#GPORT BOR0.SEAVER COUNTY NT CONNIS$ ION EXPIRES SEPT.16,1985 Member. Pennsylvania Association of Notaries I

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NRC 1.etter: September 19, 1983 question 430.53 (Section 8.3)

Proy1de a detail. discussion (or pla'n) of the level of trainsnq -

proposed for your operators, maintenance crew, quality assurance, and supervisory personnel responsible for the operation of the emergency diesel generators.

Identify the number and type of personnel that

. will be dedicated to the operations and maintenance of the emergency from diesel generators and the number and type that will be assigned i

your general plant operations and maintenance groups to assist when l

needed.

In your discussion identifT the amount and kind of training of that will ongoing be received by each of the above categories and the type training progran pt -W to assure optimum availability of the emergency generators.

Also discuss. the level of education and minimum experience -

maintenance requirements for the various categories of operation and personnel associated with the emergenoy diesel generators (5RF 8.3.1, I Parts.II and.II).

Response

') The. training program 19er Dr.c maintemense per'sennel whe:DLC om.the emergensT diesel.generstnre is provided # the Department in. a, trainias medale titled.

Personnel fee maintensame verte em Diesel tagine the emergensT perform work Training Maintenance.

diesel gaaerators be ~4 M free the Otc Maintenasse Department or constructiori crafts, in menors and skills, auM4e4=== to perform the scope of will Maintenasse personnel ineelved, will innind. 9 -4 eat.

work. required, and electrical, and instrumentatism Le ,. #=, as dedicaciasm of' spesial perseasel to emergency diesel generator-Comples work and-nota *- is not necessesy or required.

inspostiam en, the emergensT diesel  :: '

generatses. will be performed in 7; under the direction of a asserdamse with,=4: 2 Vender FinLd Empresentative.

ETPS-2 will meet the requirements of Training AMEZ.13.1 - lS71 in salaattag and. hiring personnel.

progress alas asist for qualier centrol, operating operations, and supervisory personnel receive ,

personnel. Lirsmeed.and tr=4-4-~ non-licensed and. requalificacian trainiaq on electrical "

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detailed syst s 'T RA lp ir4 and emergency diesel generator system operacian. ft LTdov6t/

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O Amendment. 4 Q430.53-1 December 1983 J

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430.58 Description of interplant (plant-to-offsite) comunication system (9.5.2) inacequate.

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Description inadecuata. of interplant (plant-to-offsite) connunication systara is -

(Seqtion 9.5.2.2) (0 pen: Category 3a) '

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3,.i The applicant isas requested to provide a detailed descrip' tion for each Qw

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$,, . interplant communicatfort system listed in Section 9.5.2.2 'of..'the'.(,SAR. s u.<

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Theket'ailehgde[cription.was to include an identification

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'eih desebption of' escit%:^r a p-ar :::. c, a descript1on'of sabs,l . ,' ~ . $ .,

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.n 7 .y 3 components (headsetsihandsets,. switchboards,ampliffers,J

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  • .a hsystam** ,

O  ; & 4.- - -e .

' consoles? handheld. radios,. etc.) location of major components. (powe'r

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\ sources consoles, etc.) and interfaces between the various. systems. ,The. ,

applicant hIs nodprovided this information for the g@rowere!_oraystani g gpe.toge,honems,st.m+ .

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    • ' '* cotmassuceriods n ervsire u $.,5

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+ ub vie c rk w m % ;c f N AE- 9@ THE f E.5/#e A.) S E 70 Q 4 E S r io d W M d E rac.use opeanog re,.racaa cvsrza ue .

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%. ao oTu/t meana componce rs.

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' 160 n1224106srashg 07/12/S4 BUPS-2 ESAR indicates that the emergency preparedness licensing branch shouldl4.8 their as part of review plant-to-offsite communication responsibility under SKP 13.3. No acceptance criteria or review 4.9 procedures applicable to plant-to-offsite ecmmunications systems are : 4.10 provided in SRP 9.5.2' and conclusions presented in the " Evaluation Findings" section of SRP 9.5.2 pertain only to the areas of review I 4.11 c

already performed under SRP 13.3.

4.12 .

The plant-to-offsite ecmmunications consist of the following separate and diverse systems: commercial telephone land-line system, plant- 4.15 to-offsite radio ' system. microwave system, system operator telephone lI 4.17 system. and PAX telephone system.

4.19 Conumercial Telephone Land-Line System Selected locations in the plant are provide

  • with , commercial 4.21 Components 4.25 telephone company voice circuits and telephone handsets.

of this system are the handsets and their cabling system throughout the plant. The main control roomr. Shift Supervisor's office. plant 4.26 offices, and security office are also served by the Bell Telephone 4.27 .,

system. The Bell system cables are in separate manholes and are 4.23 The talk circuit and ringer 4.30 independent. of the DLC telephone system.

power for single lines is from- the Bell system's central office. 4.31 4.32 Power for lights. and ringer on key set telephones is from the- BVPS-2.

essential bus.

4.34-Plant-to-Offsite Radio System The main _ components of the systest are described in Section 4.35 -

9. $ . Z. %.Z. Z. z .

This radio system is. powered. froar the 48 V de dedicated conununication 4.37

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4.38 battery / charger system. .

Y 4.40 Microwave- Systear microwave system is a shared facility with BVP5-1. It is 4.42 The- 4.44 comprised of microwave- radios (located. at the switchyard relay house) and their affiliated circuits.

The microwave radios are powered from a BVPS-1 48 V de dedicated 4.45 switchyard battery / charger system. }4.46 4.48 a System Operator Telephone Systme The system operator telephone is located on the communication console- 4.49 ~

)roterawave in the main control raalo,] to theroom. It is a direct Itlink.

OLC dispatcher. via hardwire is. separated from all@4.53.52.

4.54 other telephone systems and powered by two dedicated No. 6 dry cells.

Ieptemcer M24 Amendment 3 420.53-5 g @ $t-TW6 coemme,triog censon.r.

BVPS-2 FSAR The radio transceivers are located in the radio building, sdjacent to the site, with remote control consoles in the main control room and with a remote handset provided at the ESP. These rad..o stations,

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h provide links to the OLC maintenance and cperation vehicles in the area. In addition, two mobile radio transceivers are provided in the plant. The system is designed to provide reliable radio .

communications.

9.5.2.2.2.3 Microwave System The system consists of a multiplexed microwave network and is used f for relay protection, telemetering, load program control, and voice functions. The microwave system is an expansion of the existing system at BVPS-1 to include BVPS-2.

9.5.2.2.2.4 System Operator Telephone.

A system operator telephone is provided on the main communicatio console. The telephone is a direct link, connected via hardwire  ;

micenuava rarH o3 to the DLC dispatcher. It is independent of all other telephone systems and powered uy two dedicated Number 6 dry cells.

9.5.2.3 Design Evaluation t,

-A failure of one communication system does not affect the operation g of the other types of communications systems since they are of W, V

diverse types and are independent of one another.

9.5.2.3.1 Intra-plant Communications A loss of electric power does r.ot cause a common mode failure of intra-plant communications. The PPS and PAX systems are powered from separate reliable power supplies that ultimately derive power from the station or from communication batteries. The portable radio system is battery powered and independent of plant electric power-except for recharging of batteries. The calibration jack, PPS, and PAX systems generally de not share common raceways.

9.5.2.3.2 Plant-to-Offsste Communications j The plant-to-offsite ccmmunications systems provided use a diverse 7 mix of the major types of approaches which are available (commercial 7 telephone, microwave, radio, and system operator telephone) to ensure that under the most adverse circumstances, communications will be '

maintained. .

9.5.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The design of the communications systems permits routine testing and inspection without disrupting normal communications. Degradation of m any systems which are in daily use can be identified and corrected. O b

9.5-44

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Draft Response to R.G. 1.26 Backfit Issue (Q430.74)

In conversations with the diesel generator vendor in February and March, 1985, the vendor confirmed that non-ASME piping on the BVPS-2 diesel generators is manufactured to the sane quality standards and is of the sane materials and schedules as similar diesels already accepted by the NRC. This would include such plants as Millstone 3, Hope Creek, and Seabrook. ASME piping is shown on FSAR Figures 9.5-7 through 9.5-12.

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. BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 d

Question 430.79 (Section 9.5.4)

Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of a diesel generator for a prolonged period that would require replenishment of fuel oil without interrupting operation of the diesel generator.

What provision will be made in the design of the fuel oil storage fill systems to minimize the creation of turbulence of the sediment in the bottom of the storage tank? Stirring of this sediment during addition of new fuel has the potential of causing the overall quality of the fuel to become unacceptable and could potentially lead to the degradation or failure of the diesel generator (SRP 9.5.4, Parts I, II, and III).

Response

Revised Section 9.5.4, Amendment 4, discusses design features which minimize stirring of sediment. Additionally, should stirred sediment be a problem, it would not affect diesel operation. As shown on Figure 9.5-7, strainers will prevent significant amounts of sediment from being transferred to the day tank while a duplex filter protects the engine from particles transferred from the day tank.

Alarms are provided for high differential pressure on the strainers.

In the event a strainer is seriously restricting flow, a low level in the day tank will cause the backup transfer pump (with its own d,

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strainer) to start. Restriction of the duplex filter will result in an alarm, which would allow the valving in of the clean filter element, to replace the clogged one while the engine continues running. 10 9'liblT10 h 'rHE TE.c d osc y? t s PE C IFi c A re c tJS DQc t s?g 6 7 'b6 V WEL 6lC 60/ fly FOIA 600N h366/IL G E o E / M r o R . Tils g o g m g t 9/19C ricC of:- Ol2bE/2@6 Fugt OIL wHGO Tn 9k L rf v'E L 15 GMRoxlM GTrCLV

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.t! nd rv)d rse 7bnv t)gE6i' ceM)o 608[ d L.E L/ 6Ls) I b. 8 MTIE PSD IID To /S E l'/26cTicED h /2. p G P R.0 L CIO6 d3) \lESfEL 08E/2r) Tick E.06 d assufn,fgg, O kELM 19 MLIV 64-T bMOVSIE OF f 0 0/2_ 17.-0 #4D /CNb r T10 Al5 (scc THC REsrcosec To caGSTad Mc 'D j A Sf64for TA n r( LF UEL tt 43Sul24) TO MIMtm t 26 6T 1/24WC- oF S/DimEWTi '

Amendment 8 Q430.79-1 September 1984 )

BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 Question 430.116 (Section 9.5.7)

Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of a diesel e: generator for a prolonged period that would require replenishment of 4 lube nil without interrupting operation of the diesel generator.

Provide the following:

1. What provision will be made in the design of the lube oil system to add lube oil to the sump. These provisions shall include procedures or instructions available to the operator on the proper addition of lube oil to the diesel generator as follows:
a. How and where lube oil can be added while the equipment is in operation,
b. Particular assurance that the wrong kind of oil is not inadvertently added to the lubricating oil system, and
c. That the expected rise in level occurs and is verified for each unit of lube oil added.
2. Verification that these operating procedures or instructions will be posted locally in the diesel generator rooms. ,,

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3. Verification that personnel responsible for the operation and maintenance of the diesel are trained in the use of these procedures. Verification of the ability of the personnel on the use of the procedures shall be demonstrated during preoperational tests and during operator requalification.
4. Verification that the color-coded, or otherwise marked, lines associated with the diesel generator are correctly identified and that the line or point for adding lube oil (when the engine is on standby or in operation) has been clearly identified (SRP 9.5.7, Parts II and III).

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Response

Refer to revised Section 9.5.7, Amendment 4, which addresses the addition of lube oil, verifies the rise in oil level, and identifies the location for adding lube oil.

All maintenance lubrication on the diesel generators will be performed using approved maintenance procedures. These procedures are specific instructions that are prepared from the Technical Manual. The instructions are formatted to be consistent with the DLC Administrative Manual. Verification signatures are required for O

Amendment 4 Q430.116-1 December 1983 Y,,f

. BVPS-2 FSAR identifying proper oil type and appropriate QC inspection holdpoints are provided. These procedures are reviewed by the site safety 4 committee, and are approved by the Station Superintendent.

Appropriate maintenance personnel of: AuGE cit are trained beA6cG in STn thedb89 usage ep%of(these[Mr#M6cpc proceduresccu & FoA GhiiscQ(

b iscrJS OS AilT CF 6 9 CR-dosM6 Y-AW 8M6 BRogf2 g ,

At present, the Technical Manual issued by the vendor for the emergency diesel generator has two procedures for adding lubricating oil with the emergency diesel generator operating. These procedures +

have been used by other utilities successfully which negates the need for procedure verification and preoperational testing to demonstrate the procedures. One method involves direct addition to the sump.

Local posting of such a procedure is considered unnecessary and undesirable since sufficient time is available to obtain the procedure from controlled manuals at the site. Procedures for 4 woriting. on safety-related equipment are required and available 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.

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/ Amendment 4 Q430.116-2 December 1983 l

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BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 Questian 430.119 (SRP 9.S.7) and 9.5.7.5 of the FSAR you discuss the level i

In Sections 9.5.7.2 alarms associated with the lube oil system. You state that "the -

rocker arm lube oil reservoir level is monitored for high level and the level is maintained by a lever control valve." No mention is -

made of a reservoir low level alarm. A failure of the level control valve to maintain lube oil level in the rocker arm reservoir could result in inadequate or no lubricating oil for the rocker arms, leading to diesel generator unavailability and/or failure. This is an unacceptable condition. Provide a Icw level alarm for the rocker arm lube oil reservoir (SRP 9.5.7, Part III).

Response

The- rocker arm low lube oil pressure alarm is provided to alert the operator of conditions such as low rocker arm lube oil reservoir i level. The level control valve is a float valve, which tends to be .

pushed cpen by inlet oil pressure. Valve opening is further assured by the length of the float rod and weight of the float which provide sufficient mechanical advantage ta force the valve open in a reliable manner when a low lube- oil. level condition exists.

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Amendment 6 Q430.119-1 April 1984

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BVPS-2 FSAR A

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, NRC Letter: September 19,1983g k

e OSb Question 430.124 (Section 9.5.8) } lg 2}W EP Show by analysis that a potential fire in the diesel generator 2yW building together with a single failure of the fire protectiong ~4y systems will not degrade the quality of the diesel combustion air so -

that the remaining diesel will be able to provide full rated 2gd F

(SRP 9.5.8, Parts II and III). power)g y $

Responses k %C 67 o 1-The emergency diesel generator sets are separated by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire A j {

barrier (FPER Section 1.6.9). Eachdieselgeneratorroomisequippedg with an automatic, double-slot, fixed-flooding CO 2 system (Sectionj , O M 9.5.1.8.9), qW e M

In the unlikely event of a fire in one of the diesel generator rooms,%? u h.

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the only vent p th for combustion products is the ventilat g 3 g ust Iy vent. The diesel generatoryugdjng ventilation fans r- <:t r operated'daripers are closed by4 C ategoTy I heat detectors n %jand mt tne event M l-(of a fire (Section 9.4.6Dr- u.ing A Test /62ATv4C OF is'o' 35 WMD The emergency diesel generator combustion air intake is located on the east side of the diesel generator building at approximately elevation 759 feet-0 inches. The diesel generator building ,

ventilation exhaust is located on the west side of the diesel ^

generator building and exhausts at elevation 774 feet-6 inches.

The effect of combustion products and CO 2 gas emitted from.the ventilation exhaust on the quality of the diesel combustion air has been evaluated using the diesel exhaust reci;culation analysis described in the response to Question 430.122, Amendment 7. Although the exhaust is emitted horizontally, it will be deflected upward by the service building a few feet away. Therefore, the recirculation analysis of Question 430.122 is also applicable to this question since the exhaust of combustion products and CO 2 will be effectively released from the western edge of the diesel building roof, not far from the diesel exhaust vent locat'ibn~.'

By assuming that all exhaust fans are running, a maximum exhaust rate of 150,000 cfm (71m3/sec) of combustion proeducts and CO 2 is used in the evaluation. It is also conservatively assumed that there is no oxygen contained in the exhaust although it is diluted with some fresh air. Using the methodology described in the response to Question 430.122, the combustion product and CO2 gas concentration (C) '

at the diesel air intake is calculated as:

C = 71m3/sec = 0.022 (10m/sec) (319m2)

?mendment 7 Q430.124-1 July 1984 s

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BVPS-2 FSAR

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, - or 2.2 . percent by volume. This concentration tran' slates to a 20.5 4

,, percent oxygen content of the intake air which is well above the minimum of 17.5 percent for proper' diesel operation.

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Amendment 7- Q430.124-2 July 1984 l 2 e

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1 440.127 Capabklity of 3/G to operate under extreme service conditions (9.5.8) and weather ditturbances - response 'nadequ;.ce. j l

17. Capability of 0/G to operate under extreme service conditions and .

weather disturbances - response is inadequate (Section 9.5.4.1)

(0 pen: Category 3a)

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The'-applicant has stated that each diesel generator unit is i

capable of operating at Its.rnaximuk rated output under the '

following outdoor service conditicas and for the durations i

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indicated during the following weather disturbances:

(1) Outdoor Servic.t Conditions i

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Ybbo l 2.~l (1.1) Ambient air intake: -17 to 102*F (1.2) Humidity: maximuin 100%

(2) Weather Disturbances (2.1) A tornado pressure transient causing an atmospheric pressure reduction of 3 psi in 3 s!conds followed by a dse to nont.a1 pressure in 3 seconds; a shorter transient (1.5 seconds) will not affect engine operation and output.

(2.2) A hurHeane or northeastern stonn pressure of 26 in, of mercury for a duration of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; the engine is capable of continued operation fcr up to 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> at 26 in of mercury with na effect on operation and. output.

- u t.

.In a. meeting. wit!r Colt Industries in Philadelphia on June g to 10,-

1982, the diesal engine manufacturer stated that no load and light.

\ load operation of the dieser engines at low ambient temperatures'is The an unacceptable operating condition for Colt engines.

manufacturer stated that, under these environmental conditions, the diesel engine would. fa1T to operate properly because there would be insufficient turbocharger preheating'of the combustion air and -

potential' fuel oil degradation. The diesel engine could fail within a. short period of time. ._

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Failure'under these environmental conditions could possibly prevent To diesel engine restart upon a subsequent loss of offsite power.

alleviate this condition, the manufacturer reconinends a minimum leading of the engine based on the outside ambient temperatures

1430 1 9 4

(e.g. at -10*F, the diesel would have to be Icaded to between 60%

to 66% of full load to prevent engine failure). This would require the paralleling of the onsite (diesel generator) power source with the offsite pcwer source for extended periods of time. This is unacceptable to the staff and would violate the independence requirement of GDC 17. In letters dated February 1 and 14,1983, Public Service of New Hampshire, which has similar diesel engines at its Seabrook Plant, stated that the diesel engine manufacturer

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  • had advised them that an air temperature of 50*F or greater at the turbocharger inlet would allow continuous no-load and light-load-

' operation- of the diesel generato'rs. Operation with inlet air temperatures below 50'F would require preheating of the combustion air ..

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, g Based- on preliminary infomation supplied by Beaver, Valley, the manufacturer now states that the diesel e'ngines carr operate at k.

no-load, light-load and rated-load conditions with no degradation

.of the- engine's operating characteristics or ability to accept and The carry Toad-when operated at stated ambient service conditions. ,

applicant has n'ot prodidad femal documentation to substantiate the _

manufacturer's new. statement nor has he- shown that the diesels can accept full load within the required accident load sequence '_

l following such operation as stated in Section 8.3.1 of this SER. -

We are pursuing this issue with the applicant. -

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    .h Kev: G11M/1.03534                Line: 1 STOWEEN BSN A CGLTFMPTS EELT BELO FEBRUARY 6. 1985                   16 PD             3:45~PM           BELOIT. WI ATTN ' LOREN MONTY STCNE AND WEBSTER. BOSTON. MA REFERENCE YOUR TELEX OCTOBER 23. 1984. THERE IS NO DEGRADING OF UNITS RATING UP TO -20 DEGREES F. THE LETTER TO STCNE AND WEBSTER DATED.. APRIL 28. 1983 AS TO THEIR RATING. ALSG AP3 LIES TO' BEAVER VALLEY UNITS.

REAGARDS. JAY. JOHNSON CCLT IND-FAIRBANKS MORSE STOW 5EN BSN A COLTFMPTS BELT-

      "ime: 13:59 02/06/85 ???

Connect Time : 103 seconds

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54 n1224106sra8bd 07/07/84 BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: September 19, 1983 1.10 1.14 Question 430.138 (Section 10.3.1) You state in Section 10.3.1 of the FSAR that the main steam system is 1.15 1 of NUREG-0138, and that 1.16 designed in accordance with Issue No. 3 credit is being taken for all valves downstream of the main steam 1.17 1.18 isolation valve (MSIV) to limit blowdown of a second steam generator in the event of a steam line break upstream of the MSIV. In order to 1.19 line break, confirm satisfactory performance following such a steam you provided a tabulation (Table 10.3-1) in the FSAR of all flow 1.20 the 1.21 paths that branch off the ma'in steam lines between the MSIVs and turbine stop valves. For each flow path originating at the main 1.22 1.23 steam lines, the following information was provided: . 1.29 a) System identification, 1.30 b) Maximum steam flow in pounds per hour, 1.31 c) Type of shut-off valve (s), 1.32 d) Size of valve (s), . 1.33 e) Quality of the valve (s), 1.34 ri

        ~

f) Design code of the valve (s), A. 1.25 g) Closure time of the valve (s), and (such as, solenoid- 1.36 h) Actuation mechanism of the valve (s) 1.37 operated, motor-operated, and air-operated diaphram valves). Sufficient descriptive info rmation was not provided in the FSAR to 1.39 confirm satisfactory performance following such a steam line break. 1.40 1.41 Provide the following: a) In the event of the postulate,d accident, termination of 1.43 1.44 steam flow from all systems identified in Table 10.3-1, except those that can be used for mitigation of the accident, is required to bring the reactor to a safe cold 1.45 1.46 shutdown. For these systems describe what design features have been incorporated to assure closure of the steam shut

  • 1.47 off valve (s). Describe what operator actions (if any) are 1.4S required. '

1.49 b) If the systems .that can be used for mitigation to of theuse 1.50 accident are not available or a decision is made other means to shut down the reactor, describe how these i.5: systems are secured to assure positive steam shut-off. 1.53 Describe what operator actions ( f any) are required. L i 430.13S-1 September 1964 Amendment 8 i I L

54 n1224106sra8bd 07/07/84 BVPS-2 FSAR c) Show that failure to isolate or secure these systems will 1.54 1.55 not result in a blowdown of more than one steam generator. 1.57 If any of the requested information is presently included in the FSAR found 1.58 text. provide only the references where the information may be (SRP 10.3. Parts II and III). 2.1

Response

2.2 ! Closure.of steam shutoff valves is not required for any of the branch 2.3 lines off the main steam lines. 2.4 Reheat steam flow to the tube side of the reheater will cease when 2.5 flow from the high pressure turbine exhaust to the shell side of the 2.6 reheater. is terminated by a turbine trip. . Turbine bypass steam flow to the main condenser is autematically the control 2.8 2.7 controlled. Following Ifa offsite loss of offsite power (LOOP), power remains available, the valves 2.9 valves will close. 2.10 vill modulate to control the cooldown of the reactor (Section 7.7). 2.11 The flow from all the remaining branch lines in combination is the so 2.12 small that it will have an insignificant effect compared to 2.13 effect of the postulated double-ended rupture of main steam line. 2.14 This flow is less than the flow which would passTherefore, through a main steam 2.15 postulation safety valve or power-operated relief valv4. (" of failure of a safety or relief valve as the single failure is more 2.16 ( restrictive than postulation of an MSIV failure. 2.17 As stated in Section 15.1.5.2. the most restrictive single failure is 2.18

           . assumed to occur in the safety injection system for the analysis of a main steam line break.

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              '0" CGIC ASS , Ey C LO'b I v3(, RE II(E AT STS AM FLbD A d b T U A OIIJ E NPAGS Flow Fo/2 RfE Aso"5 bisc u6 Sr:b A 6 dt//E, TI4E T074c 0F ALL LA/)pCH FL0usS C AD 6C. SCfM TO &E WS.s TIM!d DOMO f0DM/kg, 420.128-:                Septembu 6
  .          Amenddent a

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       *n12:4106sraSaf                    07/07/84
  • 31 FPS-2 FSAR l

NRC Letter September 19, 1983 19 1.13 l Question 430.*.44-(Section 10.4.4.4) and initial field 1.14 In Sectien. 10.4.4.4 you have discussed tests inspection but 1.15 inspection inspections at refueling, and iis-sereice not the frequency of in-service testing and inspection FSAR of .he turbine (SRP 10.4.4, 1.16 bypass system. Provide .his informatien in the Part I). 1.17

Response

turbine bypass system- (TSS) is not included in the ASME 1.18 The Inspection Program. During preeperational 1.19 Section X: In-se r/ic e testing to Regulatory Guide 1.68, the TSS centrol valves and centrols The 1.21 will be inspected and tested as described in .Section 14.2.12. TES. piping is inspected and tested in accordance with Paragraphs 136 and 137 of ANSI B31.1. #MetecC TEST 196 #6 dot O EC E$$ /)/l/ . SmtC THE r65 - 15 u S Eb b /l:46 f t.4 tor 576/1T0# To Co pT(LOL ITITA/4 Ga t3 E/26mg p(k sso g , % pgg REcommEiholiops F0/l TEC,rtos gas ggag g

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l Septemcer 1924 i Amendment 8 Q4:0.144-1

Lighting and Consnunications The . general bases for the design of the BVPS-2 lighting and communica-tions systems follow the basic design criteria of the BVPS-1 lighting

                               - and communication systems.                                     The systems are designed to provide ef fec -

tive, reliable communications between the safe shutdown control stations and : other task areas of BVPS-2 during trans ient , fire, and accident conditions, including the loss of offsite power.

                               - The systes description for communications is < detailed in FSAR section 9.5.2.                      A listing of station areas and the types of communications systems available in the various areas is given in the response to FSAR
                               - question 430.56. A discussion of the power supplies is detailed further in the response to FSAR question 430.68. Additional information about
                               ' the communication systems is . given in the responses to FSAR questions 430.57, 430.58, 430.59, and 430.60.

The system description for lighting .is detailed - in FSAR section 9.5.3. A listing of station areas and the types of lighting systems available in the various areas is given in the responses to FSAR question 430.61. A discussion of ' r.e power supplies is detailed further in the response to FSAR questiona 430.63 and 430.66. A discussion of illumination levels is given in the response to FSAR question 430.65. Additional information is given in the responses to FSAR questions 430.62, 430.64, and 430.67. Defense in depth is provided at BVPS-2 by the various types of communi-

                               ' cation system powered by a number of sources which are detailed in FSAR section 9.5.2. Similarly, defense in depth is provided by the various types of lighting systems powered by a number of dif ferent sources, which are detailed in FSAR section 9.5.3.                                        The installation of these integrated lighting and communication systems ensures that BVPS-2 will l

have ef fective and reliable lighting and communications during tran- ! sients, fires, and accident conditions, including the loss of of fsite power. DLC letter 2NRC-5-024 (dated February 13 , 1985) provided additional l information relating to the non-s afe ty diesel which supplies backup I power to some of the lighting and communication systems. The non-safety diesel building conforms to applicable state, and national building codes. The power cables from this building to the BVPS-2 plant are routed underground. A 30,000 gallon (7 day supply), two fuel pumps, and a 270 gallon day tank provide fuel to the non-safety diesel. NUREG-0696 and NUREG-0737 requirements were factored into the design of the system. l Many of the attributes were factored into the design of the system. I Many of the attributes in Reg. Guide 1.137 are paralleled by ERF/TMI

                                -NUREGS.

Maintenance and testing of the non-safety diesel and batteries will be similar to that pe rformed on comparable safety related diesels and batteries. The multiple systems, described above and in the referenced documents, together with the diverse, multiple power sources, and the seismic mounting of many components provide a high degree of assurance that sufficient lighting and communications will be available to facilitate safe shutdown even in the unlikely event of a loss of of f-site power j concurrent with a design basis event. I I l

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e e Diesel Generator Air Dryer Backfit Issue DLC has requested further information from the diesel generator vendor with regard to this issue. It has been decided that if the requested information shows that the vendor strongly recommends the use of air dryers to obtain adequate reliability, the dryers will be installed at BVPS-2.

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