ML20093K593

Forwards Responses to Draft SER Issues 46 & 74 Re Loose Parts Monitoring Sys & Primary Component Cooling Water Isolation from Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barriers, Respectively

ML20093K593
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	10/12/1984
From:	Woolever E DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2NRC-4-167, NUDOCS 8410180065
Download: ML20093K593 (6)

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2hVL 7T Ab Duquesne U@t 2g g Nuclear Constn.ct;on Division 2) 923-1960 s"

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'" OctobYr l$,lY84 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch 3 Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Response to DSER Open Items Gentlemen:

This letter forwards responses to the issues listed below. The following items are attached: : Response to Outstanding Issue 46 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report : Response to Outstanding Issue 74 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report DUQUliSNE LIGHT COMPANY By

• E. f . Woolever Vice President KAT/wjs Attachments cc: Mr. H. E. Denton, Director.NRR (w/a)

Mr. D. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing (w/a)

Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a)

Mr. E. A. Licitra, Project Manager (w/a)

Ms. M. Ley, Project Manager (w/a)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWO T B FORE ME THIS

/Mi DAY OF G

, 1984.

Notary Public 8410180065 841012 ANITA ELAINE REITER, NOTARY PUBLIC PDR ADOCK 05000412 ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, Allfe,qqqv coilNTY E PDR MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20,1986 Booi I fi .

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~ 'kbitIdEStctaa Nuclecr Regulctory Conunission

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Mr.LGe:rgt W. Knighten,.Chisf.-

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA.~)

-). SS:

~ COUNTY.OF ALLEGHENY )

On this ~ day:of , [ [ , before me,.a i Notary Public ~ in and for - said. Commonwenith and County,, personally appeared

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-E.'J. ~ Wo$ lever, ; who be ing ' iluly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and . file

, the' foregoing ~ Submittal ~ on behalf of said _ Company, and (3) the statements set for'th' in the Submittal are true and correct to the best.. of his knowledge.

Notary Public ANITA ELAINE REITER, NOTARY PUBLIC ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLEGHEl '/ COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20,1986 9

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N ATTACHMENT 1 s  %- 4 Response to Outstanding Issue 46 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit.No. 2 Draft Safety " valuation Report

- Draft SERTSection 4.4.4: Loose Parts Monitoring System (excerpt)

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1 InL order to complete our ' review, we will . require the following additional information from the applicant:

..-(1) Aidescription of the mnitoring equipment including sensor type and

. location, ' data acquisition, recording, and calibration equipment.

Response to~(1):

LThe monitoring equipment . consists. of piezoelectric transducers located at the ten locations lis ted - below. The accelerometers input

. through . a pre-amplifier to a loose parts nonitor. This monitor iu a modular,- selid state, = laboratory - grade , data acquisition instrument

designed to operate with : the remote preamplifiers. The unit is a Unholtz-Dickie model P22MHA-2. Data recording is - accomplished by a Hewlett-Packard model 3964A direct recording, - four channel, reel-to -

reel ' tape recorder. Calibration will be accomplished with a Babcock

' and Vilcox Type 1557 vibration calibrator (or equivalent).

The LPMS continuously monitor's the sensor signals.- If a signal indicative of

-a loose -part - is detect x1, _ this is alarmed (both audibly and visually) and the tape recorder is automatically activated. Thus, an analog tape of'the signals-is available for later detailed analysis, e Channel- Sensor No. (2RCS-LPM) Location 1 410 R.V. Bottom Incore Guide Tube 9 2 411 R.V. Bottom Incore Guide Tube

+- ~3 412' R.V. Top Head Stud

-4 413 R.V. Top Head S tud 5 408A Steam Generator "A" Inlet

-6' 409A Steam Generator "A" Inlet 7 408B' Steam Generator "B" Inlet 8 -409B- Stema Generator "B" Inlet

n. . 9 408C Steam Generator "C" Inlet

'10 409C .Steen Generator "C" Inlet -

(2) A description of how alert - levels will be determined, including s'ources of internal 'and external noise, diagnostic procedures used to confirm the ' presence of ~ a loose part,- and precautions to ensure acquisitions of quality data.

Response to (2):

Alert levels will be set in accordance with the vendor's instruct ion manual- to conform to ' the sens itivity limits of Reg. Guide 1.133.

" Internal ~ and external noise is accounted for in the extensive pre-P 1

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?[- ,x operationali(SOV) test - program'. Based on previous experience, _ it is.

ianticipated ; that? Jalert levels _ will be' .substantially higher than

background J noise ' levels ' attributable ' to' L both internal and . external

'#' inoise isources such that _ background noise _ levels -will not af feet the Jdetermination'of alert level set points.

The sys' tem /testf provides .for taking . reference-' data for the following

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. planticonditions:

a) ' Quiet background levels . just prior to startup prior to Hot Functional-. Test-f.b)'During single pumpiinitial start

?c)=During1 single pump steady-state operation-W ,

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d)IDuring..two pump. steady-state operation Je) During three-pump' steady-state operation

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f)LIn Mode'S p - .g) In Mode 3' Jh) In Mode 2--

i) At 25 percent power j)lAt 50-percent power.

lk)'At 75-percent power l1)~At 100 percent power ,

7 is)'During control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) motion s.

~ In_ addition' '. collecting 'a large asount - of data in the test program -

wil'l provide -a significantl data-base ' for reference should an alarm be

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• . received during operation. Quality of data will be - ensured through normally scheduled ' system maintenance and training of personnel.

(3) A description of 'the operation program, including signature analysis during startup,~ normal containment environment-op_eration, the seismic

' ' design, Land system' sensitivity.

. Response-to (3):-

,;During7 operation, the system will. be operated in an alert mode such

-t :that.-if"an alarm is indicated, the tape recorder will start to record y . _.

the noise" activity. Operating procedures will provide the operating

• - personnel directions on actions to be taken in the event of an alarm.

< Per L thef response to.(2) above, the initial system testing will

. include : the . recording f of system signatures in a variety of plant I

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states' for j use - in referring to normal containment noise levels when assessing ' an alarm state. As indicated by FSAR Table 1. 8 -1, the system is not seismically designed. System sensitivity is discussed

'in FSAR.Section 4.4.6.5.

~(4) A' detailed discussion of the operatar training program for operation of::the. LPMS, p1anned operating procedures, and . record keeping procedures.

Response to (4)i The ' licensed operator . training program for Unit 2 includes a lesson

. plan ~ on the design and operation of the Loose Parts Monitoring

. System. The basis for the training ~ material is contained in the Operating Manual for this system. The OM provides a detailed descrip-tion of the function, major components, ins trumentat ion, precaut ions .

and setpoints, operating procedures, and detailed drawings for the system. This ' manual, along with the alarm response procedure guide-lines,. i s. maintained in the control room for operator. use and reference at all times.

The operating procedures direct' the operator in step-by-step sequence

.through component . startup, normal operation, shutdown, and response to abnormal alarms and conditions. Recorded data will be periodi-cally reviewed and trended for long-term vibration t. racking.

(5) A ~ report . from the ' applicant. which contains an evaluation of the system for conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.133.

Response to (5):

The statement of system . conformity with Regulatory Guide 1.133 is contained in FSAR Table 1.8-1.

(6) A commitment. from the applicant to supply, prior to power operation, a report describing operation of' the system hardware and impleme nta-tion of the loose part detection program.

Response to (6):

Operation of the system hardware has been described in the FSAR, in the 0peration . Manual, and in the res pons e to this open item. The

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loose parts monitor will be ' . ut ilized to nonitor for loose parts

-during plant operation.

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-a - ATTACHMENT 2

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• Response (to Outstanding Issue 74 of the

. Beaver . Valley Power Station Unit No. 2

' Draft Safety Evaluation Report '

Draf t SER Section 7.6.2.3: Primary Component Cooling Water Isolation from Reactor. Coolant Pump Thermal Barriers

- ' FSAR = Section 9.2'.2 describes ' the -isolation of the RCP thermal barriers 4 from the ; primary component cooling water n system. . A check valve is

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installed ' in ' each inlet cooling' water line to the thermal barrier

. . c ooling coil, and an air-operated - isolation valve is installed in each outlet .line. .Each isolation. valve closes on signals developed from a lcorresponding line's pressure or - flow sensor. Because the FSAR does not provide ~ the E design basis for this isolation the staf f -is concerned ,

about its isafety significance. Therefore, the staf f requests that - the

, ' applicant. provide information about the design basis for this system and

_.a . discussion on the consequences . of either the check valve or the air-operated -isolation valve failing to close under conditions related to r ~ the ' de; ign basis. - This-is an open item..

Response:

The -isolation valves in the primary component cooling water (CCW) line t.o the reactor - coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchanger (TBHX) are

, provided ; to allow the isolation of that section of pipe should the TBHX f ail and "RCS fluid ' enter the component cooling water system. -As recom-

- ' mended by: Branch Technical Position 3, the design provides for two barriers in this high pres sure (RCS) to low pressure (CCW) boundary.

Thus, the first barrier is provided by the TBHX and the second barrier is : provided by the check and . isolation valves. Therefore, an analysis of,the consequence of failure is not required.

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