ML20097H799

Amended Final Rept of Part 21/Const Deficiency 61 Re Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing Mfg by Sandvik Corp. Caused by Localized Overheating of Billet Matl Prior to Tube Hollow Extrusion.Tubing Tested Satisfactorily

ML20097H799
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	08/31/1984
From:	Gerrets T LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
REF-PT21-85-030-000 61, PT21-85-030-000, PT21-85-30, W3K84-2054, NUDOCS 8409200510
Download: ML20097H799 (4)

Text

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LOUISIANA P O W E R & LI G H YWaterford 3 SES/P. O. Box B/Killona, LA 70066 UEuS$sysS$

August 31, 1984 W3K84-2054 Q-3-A35.07.61 Mr. John T. Collins Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ]) g 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 ) l Arlington, Texas 76012 L SEP l 0 M !

REFERENCE:

LP&L letter W3183-0068 dated March 1, 14b j

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 61

" Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing" Amended Final Report In accordance with the requirement (of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Amended Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 61, " Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, L

h n T. F. Gerrets Corporate Quality Assurance Manager TFG:CNH:ESH Attachment cc: Director Office of inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 TD7 '

pgg188aJ888ljg S

'N Mr. : John. T. Collins

-August-31, 1984 W3K84-2054' Page 2 cc: ' Director Office of Management Information and Program Control.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. E.' L. Blake Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Mr. W. M. Stevenson

, Monroe & Lemann f'

1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339-f Mr. W. A. Cross 7910 Woodmont Avenue Suite 1200 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 l-l

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< AMENDED FINAL REPORT OF

SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 61R1

, 7 , , " LINEAR CRACK IN STAINLESS STEEL TUBING" .

. INTRODUCTION

.-This report is submitted' pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes def'ects in f 1/2" diameter stainless steel tubing SA213 Type 316. This tubing .has been

. installed in some instrumentation lines at Louisiana Power & Light Company  !

This. problem is' considered reportable under the requirements Waterford-No. 3.

of 10CFR50.55(e).-

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to 'the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION Mercury Company of Norwood Incorporated discovered a 1.1/4 inch long defect .

(crack) which exhibited several branches during attempts to pressurize the-line to instrument PT-RC-0173 for Hydrostatic Test M262 on the reactor vessel coolant instrument lines. This through wall defect was found in the 1/2"

' diameter stainless steel tubing material manufactured by Sandvik Corporation of Scranton, Pennsylvania.

The defective tube was sectioned and subjected to macroscopic and liquid penetrant examinations by Ebasco Services Incorporated. A second defect which did not penetrate the tube wall was found on the tube ID surface approximately 8 inches from the through wall defect. This defect and the through the wall ,

defect appeared to be manufacturing related and because of the safety classfof the material Sandvik's manufacturing personnel were informed of the problem.

- 1. The chemical analysis and metallurgical samples indicate' that the l material complies with the requirements of SA 213 Type 316 with respect to composition, ferrite content, nonmetallic inclusion content and

.i distribution. The analysis also indicates that no mixing of material heats occurred.

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2. The cause of the defects was localized overheating of the billet material

, prior. to extrusion of the tube hollow. This localized overheating

, resulted in partial melting and cracking of the billet material. During

. subsequent extrusion and cold forming operations the defective area was elongated resulting in the defects found in the material installed at j

the site.

3. Defects such as the two (2) found in the Waterford 3 Instrumentation n Tubing caused by hot metal tears usually are of sufficient depth and exhibit such characteristic abruptness and raggedness as to be detectable

, by eddy current testing. This through wall defect should have been detected during production by hydrostatic testing.

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Page 2-i DESCRIPTION

-(Continued)~

L 4." . The production documentation for Heat 466023 Work Order 41952, which containedL the defective ' tube showed no rejects for hydrostatic testing -

(2500 psi on 5/9/81) or eddy current testing (performed on 5/11/81). Due- .,

to these facts.the tube material:from the suspect heat and work order

~

_ . were not considered to have been adequately. tested for integrity.

SAFET IMPLICATIONS Tubing from Heat No. 466023 Work Order 41952 has been installed in the Reactor Coolant Safety Injection', Emergency Diesel Generator System and other Safety Related systems in which ASME Section III is applicable. These systems include _ Class'1E instrument installations. Failure of a tube from this heat of material installed in a Class IE instrument loop may result.in an inability of the: loop to perform its. safety function. Therefore, corrective action described herein is required-for safe operation and shut down of the plant.

CORRECTIVE' ACTION Sandvik's metallurgical analysis of the defective material concluded-that the defects were the result of a processing rather than a metallurgical composition problem and were localized in one (1) tube. An analysis and statistical review of the NDE failure rate at_Sandvik's facilities was

~

performed by Ebasco Quality Assurance and found to be acceptable.

A total of four thousand four hundred sixty one (4641) feet of tubing from heat number 466023 was received on site and issued to Mercury for use in safety related systems. Five hundred six (506) feet was hydrostatically tested to 1000 PSI or greater with no rejections. Mil Standard 105D " Sampling Procedure and Tables for Inspection by Attributes" was used as the basis for cnalysis of these results. Due to the application of the tubing in question, ,

Table II B " Single Sampling Plans for Tightened Inspection" was selected to ,

determine the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) achieved by the sample size. An AQL cf .040 was obtained.

An AQL of .040 provides a very high degree of confidence that the 1/2" stainless steel Sandvik tube from heat 466023, installed in safety class a" stems meets the technical requirements, and is therefore acceptable as currently employed in the plant. Additional confidence _is built by the fact that Sandvik tube in safety class systems not tested at 1000 PSI or greater,

was tested at the appropriate hydrostatic test pressures for its intended application without any defects being observed.

Nonconformance Report W3-3919 was initiated to track, document, and control the disposition for corrective action. Corrective action is completed and all documentation for Nonconformance Report W3-3919 have been reviewed, and closed.

This report is submitted as the Final Report.