ML20082G104
| ML20082G104 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek, Callaway, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1983 |
| From: | STANDARDIZED NUCLEAR UNIT POWER PLANT SYSTEM |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082G097 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 GL-82-33, PROC-831130, NUDOCS 8311300072 | |
| Download: ML20082G104 (33) | |
Text
. _ .. . - . _ - .
t 4 Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan For The Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System (SNUPPS)
Wolf Creek Plant ' Kansas Gas and Electric Co.
Docket No. STN 50-482 Callaway Plant - Union Electric Company Docket No. STN 50-483 In Response To:
NRC Generic Letter 82-33 Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737 Issued June 1983
~
Revised November 1983 8311300072 831128 DR ADOCK 05000482 PDR ~
t a OUTLINE PAGE 1.0 Summary 1-1 2.0 Review Plan 2-1 2.1 Elements of the DCRDR 2-1 2.1.1 Review Team 2-1 2.1.2 Review of Operating Experience 2-4 2.1.3 System Functions Review, Task Analysis 2-7 and Control Room Inventory 2.1.4 Control Room Survey 2-9 2.1. 5 Validation of Control Room Functions 2-10 2.1.6 Selection of Design Improvements 2-10 2.1. 7 Review of Selected Design Improvements 2-11 2.1.8 Coordination of Control Room Improvements 2-11 With Other Programs 2.2 DCRDR Open Itens 2-12 3.0 Review Process 3-1 3.1 Review of Operating Experience 3-1 3.2 Task Analysis and Control Room Inventory 3-1 3.3 Control Room Survey 3-2 3.3.1 SNUPPS Review 3-2 3.3.2 NRC HFSB Review 3-3 3.3.3 Environmental Measurement Procedures 3-3 3.3.3.1 Sound Survey Procedures 3-3 3.3.3.2 Lighting Survey Procedures 3-4 3.3.3.3 Humidity / Temperature Procedures 3-4 3.3.3.4 Air Velocity Survey Procedures 3-4 3.4 Validation of Control Room Functions and Tasks 3-4
OUTLINE Page Two PAGE 4.0 Assessment, Implementation, Documentation and 4-1 Summary Report 4.1 Assessment- 4-1 4.2 Implementation 4-1
.4.3 Documentation 4-1 4.4 Sunmary Report 4-3 5
5.0 References 5-1 Appendices A. Standard Forms Used in the SNUPPS PDA A-1 B. Standard Forms Used in the SNUPPS Validation of B-1 Control Room Functions
1.0
SUMMARY
Generic letter 82-33 " Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737" requires that all licensees submit a plan for satisfying the requirements for a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR). This required DCRDR program plan is contained herein. The SNUPPS DCRDR Program Plan was prepared by the SNUPPS Utili-ties (Kansas Gas and Electric Company, Kansas City Power & Light Company, and Union Electric Co.), with the assistance of the SNUPPS Staff organiza-tion and the Human Factors Technology Group, ARD Corporation of Columbia, Md.
The SNUPPS DCRDR began in September 1980 when Essex Corporation was engaged to perform a human factors engineering evaluation of the SNUPPS control room design in accordance with NUREG/CR-1580 " Human Engineering Guide to Control Room Evaluation".
Other elements of the SNUPPS DCRDR are based on work prograns undertaken by the Westinghouse Owners Group. These programs include development of generic emergency response guidelines (ERGS), a generic system review and task analysis (SRTA), and verification and validation of the generic procedures on a SNUPPS simulator. As a consequence of these efforts, the SNUPPS DCRDR is well underway.
NUREG-0700, " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews", specifies four major activities for the DCRDR process:
o Planning o Review o Assessment and Implementation o Reporting This report describes how the SNUPPS DCRDR has addressed these human engi-neering processes, as follows:
Planning - Section 2.0 " Review Plan" discusses the requirement for, and status of, DCRDR elements and the approach for completing outstanding items.
Review - Section 3.0 " Review Process" describes or makes reference to detailed procedures or guidelines for performing the elements of the DCRDR review.
Assessment and Implementation - Section 4.0 " Assessment, Implementation, Documentation and Summary Report" describes the method of assigning priority to findings and discusses the implementation o' approved resolutions.
Reporting - This Program Plan, its references, and the Summary Report, dis-cussed in section 4.0, constitute reports for the DCRDR.
The SNUPPS Utilities believe that this Program Flan is responsive to all of NRC's requirements with respect to a DCRDR.
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2.0 REVIEW PLAN A number of comprehensive Human Factors Engineering review activities have been conducted at the SNUPPS plants over the past three (3) years.
This Program Plan summarizes activities conducted prior to the issuance of Generic Letter 82-33, the human f actors review processes currently in progress, and those scheduled for completion. The approach, which integrates these efforts, is in keeping with the NRC policy of crediting the human f actors engineering activities conducted to date which meet the intent of a DCRDR and closely adheres to the guidelines established by the NRC.
A number of interrelated human factors engineering review activities have been performed which meet the intent and in many cases exceed the recom-mended guidelines for the conduct of a DCRDR. These activities made use of the SNUPPS simulators (located at the Westinghouse Training Center in Zion, Illinois and at the Callaway site), the partially completed Callaway and Wolf Creek control rooms, full-scale mock-ups of control board panels, the generic function and task analyses performed by the Westinghouse Owners Group, plant specific operating procedures, pl ant drawi ngs, system des-criptions, and numerous other design documents. The evaluation is appli-cable to both Callaway and Wolf Creek, since the control rooms are of a standardized design, except for the site-specific panels, which control the off-site power systems, the circulating water system and the service water systems. These aspects of both the Callaway and Wolf Creek panels have been reviewed on a plant specific basis. The following pages list requir,ed DCRDR elements and the approach taken by SNUPPS to satisfy these elements.
2.1 Elements of the DCRDR The elements of a DCRDR as required by generic letter 82-33 and recommended by NUREG 0700 include the following tasks:
o Establishment of a Multidisciplinary Review Team o Review of Operating Experience
- o System Functions Review and Task Analysis j
o Control Room Inventory o Control Room Survey o Control Room Validation as an Integrated System l o Assessment of Findings and implementation of Resolutions I
2.1.1 Review Team From the beginning of the SNUPPS DCRDR process in September 1980, SNUPPS has maintained a base group of individuals to follow and review human factors concerns. This base group of utility personnel r
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has been supplemented by Human Factors consultants, the lead A/E and SNUPPS Staff as necessary.
The control room review activities were implemented by experienced engineering and operating personnel from the SNUPPS organization, Westinghouse, Bechtel, and haan f actors consultants. These per-sonnel performed the control room review with input from other studies and analyses involving human factors engineering con-siderations discussed in NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements".
The SNUPPS DCRDR has been coordinated by the SNUPPS Staff organiza-tion, which is the central organization established by the SNUPPS Utilities to manage the design and licensing of the SNUPPS plants.
The Human Factors Plant Review Group (HFPRG), which has been con-tinuously involved in the DCRDR, consists of a group of professionals from the operations and engineering departments of the SNUPPS Utilities. This core group of professionals was supplemented by the following participants in one or more of the interrelated programs of the DCRDR: Westinghouse Electric Corporation (engi-neering and operator training personnel), the Procedures Subcom-mittee of the Westinghouse Owners Group (engineering and operations personnel from several utilities with Westinghouse plants), Essex Corporation (the Human Factors Engineering consultant), and Bechtel (the architect / engineer). Essex Corporation was highly qualified as the HFE consultant due to their extensive experience in develop-ment and application of methods, measures, and criteria for test and evaluation activities in the areas of human f actors engineering and training.
The HFPRG members reviewed and became familiar with the methods and content of relevant NRC reports and general huan f actors engineering objectives and methodology. The HFPRG members are familiar with the design and operational aspects of the SNUPPS plants. Several members had training on the SNUPPS simulator at Zion and were able to apply that training directly in the review.
The organizational structure of the DCRDR Team is shown in Figure 2.1.1. The team is headed by the SNUPPS Technical Director, who serves as Project Manager. The Project Manager is responsible to the SNUPPS Technical Comittee, which is constituted of the Nuclear Engineering Managers of the three SNUPPS Utilities. The Tech-nical Committee, throughout the SNUPPS project represented the SNUPPS Utilities and has the responsibility for design decisions.
The SNUPPS Operations Committee, which consists of the Plant Superintendants at Callaway and Wolf Creek, has also provided over-view of the DCRDR and has provided input regarding design decisions to the Technical Committee.
A Project Leader, functioning as Deputy Project Manager, provides the day-to-day coordination of the activities of the DCRDR.
Other major participants in the DCRDR are Human Engineering Con-sultants, Utility engineering and operations personnel, SNUPPS 2-2
o Utility Utility Technical -------------- Operations Committee Committee ,
DCRDR PROJECT TEAM if U
SNUPPS Technical Dir.
(Proj. Mgr.)
SNUPPS SNUPPS Proj. Leader ------------- Staff (Dep.Proj Mgr) Engineers Human Uti'ity uti ity Architect Engrg. Engrg. Operations Engineer Consultants (Bechtel)
NSSS Other Vendor Vendors W
i DJK/5b17 l
Figure 2.1.1 Organizational Structure 2-3
Staf f engineers and representatives of the architect / engineer, Bechtel. Three Human Engineering Consultant firms are utilized in order to benefit from speci al expertise offered by each.
Essex Corporation was selected to perfonn the initial Control Room survey because it had authored NUREG/CR-1580. ARD Corporation was selected to assist in the preparation of DCRDR Program Plan because it had authored several other program plans. ARD was also used as the Human Engineering Consultant by the group of utilities that cooperatively developed the SPDS. NUS Corporation was selected for the plant specific review of video tapes of walk-throughs of the emergency procedures on the Callaway simulator, because of the qualifications of NUS personnel.
The experience, qualifications and approximate time spent on the project for each of the core professionals of the HFPRG and SNUPPS Staff is given in Table 2.1.1. In addition to these people, there were many other engineers from Bechtel and Westinghouse whom were involved in the implementation of design changes.
The manner in which the members of the DCRDR Team participate in the various tasks of the Program Plan is summarized in Table 2.1.2.
2.1.2 Review of Operating Experience Due to the SNUPPS plants being under construction at the time of the DCRDR, operating experience is f actored into the DCRDR by (1) feedback provided by prospective operators from the Wolf Creek and Callaway plants who had training on the SNUPPS simulators, and (2) utilizing documents that are based on industry experience obtained through involvement of SNUPPS personnel in Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) activities.
A SNUPPS Operating Personnel Survey was conducted by Essex Corpor-ation as part of its review done in 1980. Prospective operators from the Wolf Creek and Callaway plants who had training on the
- SNUPPS simulators were given questionnaires and interviewed regard-ing their evaluations of control room design features which they had experienced and/or observed in the course of preparing for l
operations. Results of these reviews prompted findings to be gen-erated. Details of the questionnaires may be found in Section 3.1.
Together with other utilities having Westinghouse plants in operaticn or under construction, SNUPPS has participated in the fonnation and functioning of a Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG). A key element of the WOG, comprising approximately half of the total activity l
l of the WOG, is the Procedures Subcommittee. This subcommittee
- consists of senior operating personnel, many who hold or have held l SR0 licenses, from approximately 20 utilities. This subcommittee was therefore able to bring direct operating experience, from many years of operations and several emergency events, to the development of improved Emergency Response Guidelines and the Systems Review and Task Analysis.
l l
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Human Factors / Time Spent on Title Person License Held Education (Degree) Nuclear Exp. (witn) HFPRG Technical Director F. Schwoerer (S) - MS Marine E 26 yrs. 3 yrs.
(Project Manager)
Project Leader J. Klein (5) -
BSME 6 yrs. 3 yrs.
< (Deputy Proj.Mgr.)
SNUPPS Staff Engr. J. Riley (S) - BSAeroE,MBA 7 yrs. 1 yr.
! SNUPPS Staff Engr. J. Cermak (S) - ,
Phd Nuc Engr 23 yrs. 2 yrs.
Human Engr. Consultant L. Avery (E) - MA ind.Psyc. 5 yrs. 3/4 yr.
Human Engr. Consultant S. Fleger (E) - MA Ind.Psyc. 4 yrs. 3/4 yr.
Human Engr. Consultant R. Kane (E) - MA Exp.Psyt. 6 yrs. 3/4 yr.
, Human Engr. Consultant C. Krick (E) - BA Poly. Sci. 3 yrs. 3/4 yr.
1 Human Engr. Consultant C. Baker (E) - BS Psyc. 6 yrs. 3/4 yr.
Human Engr. Consultant P. Thurmond (N) - Ed.D. ,Res.& Stat. 4 yrs. 2 mos.
Human Engr. Consultant J. Gagnon (N) - MA Psyc. 5 yrs. 2 mos.
- Human Engr. Consultant E. Silverman (A) - Phd.H.F.Psyc.& MSHE 15 yrs. 2 mos.
- Human Engr. Consultant R.Kirshner(A) - MA H.F.Psyc. 9 yrs. 2 mos.
y UtilityEngr.(I&C) D. Kern (K) -
BSEE 3 yrs. 3 yrs.
) & 9 yrs. 3 yrs.
- Utility Engr M. Hellman (U) - BSEE
! Utility Engr. S. Fu (K) -
MSEE 4 yrs. 1/2 yr.
! Utility Operations D. Heinlein (U) SR0 certified BSME 4 yrs. 3 yrs.
I Utility Operations J. McKinstray (K) SRO certified BSAeroE 8 yrs. 3 yrs.
Utility Operations M. Taylor (U) SR0 certified BSME 11 yrs. 1/2 yr.
l 1/2 yr.
i Utility Operations S. Putthoff (U) SR0 certified - 9 yrs.
{ Architect / Engr. (I&C) D. Grove (B) - MSME 7 yrs. 3 yrs.
j Architect / Engr. (I&C) J. Harrison (B) - BSME 2-1/2 yrs. 2 yrs.
3 Architect / Engr. (I&C) R. Wu (B) - MSEng.Elec 13 yrs. 3 yrs.
j S = SNUPPS Staff i U = Union Electric Company i K = Kansas Gas and Electric Company
- N = NUS Corporation i E = Essex Corporation i A = ARD Corporation
- B = Bechtel Power Corporation DJK/dck/5b18 i
4 Table 2.1.1 l -A !
SNUPPS Human Proj. Dep. Proj. St af f Engrg. Utility Utility Arch /
TASK Mgr. Mgr. Engr. Consult. Engr. Oper. Engr. y
- 1. Program Definition 0 0 0 0 0 X(1)
- 2. Master Schedule Preparation 0 0 0 0 X(1) 0 0 e
, 3. Sub-schedule preparation X i
e
! 4. Schedule Maintenance X i 5. Periodic update reports X 0 0 0 0
- 6. Define DCRDR technical X(1) 0 requirements 0 X 0 e l7.DefineDCRDRhumanfactors i requirements i
X j 8. Authorize changes in #2 and #3
- 9. Detail schedule for plant- X 0 0 0 ,
specific review (DCRDR) 0 I
'10. Conduct plant-specific 0 0 X 0 0 review (DCRDR); prepare l HEFs.
0 0 0 0 0 0 j X(1)
- 11. Evaluate recommended changes (HEFs)
- 12. Implement Ch'anges 0 0 0 X l
- 13. Program assessment 0 0 0 0 X(1)
- 14. Corrective action sign-off 8 9 X(1)
- 15. Final report preparation 8 X 0 0 0 1 0 0
- 16. Final report review X 4 0 0 0 ; O ;
- 17. Final report approval 0 0 X( I ,:
- 18. Final report delivery 0 l
X = Primary Responsibility (1) Utility Technical Committee 0 = Support Responsibility Approval Authority 0 = Approval Authority Table 2.1.2 DCRDR Task Responsibility Chart for Project Management 2-6 a
2.1.3 System Functions Review, Task Analysis and Control Room Inventory The general procedure for the systems review and task analysis is illustrated in Figure 2.1.2. The starting point is an emergency
-plant event or condition. The tenn "pl nt event" is applied to transients or accidents that have been postulated by the plant designers and are recognized by th, operators from instrumentation
. available to them. The term " plant condition" applies to transients or accidents that may not have been postulated or are not recognized by the operators.
The systems / subsystems analysis referred to in Figure 2.1.2 has been performedL on a generic basis for all Westinghouse plants by Westinghouse and the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG). Plant events postulated include all combinations of initiating seauences and single or multiple equipment faigures with calculated probabilities of occurrence greater than 10- per reactor year and many with probabilities lower than that. For these postulated plant events the systems and broad functional requirements to mitigate each event have been defined. This portion of the systems analysis is the basis for
" event related" function analysis. Plant conditions (events not postulated or not recognized by the operators) have been addressed by ids ntifying critical safety functions (CSFs) necessary to preclude or limit fuel damage and/or release of radiation. A set of generic CSF status trees and broad functional requirements to restore any compromised CSFs have been developed. This portion of the systems analysis is the basis for " symptom related" function analyses.
The function analysis consists of developing in detail generic event-related and symptom-related emergency procedures. This wo k has been done by experienced Westinghouse and utility operations personnel, under the sponsorship of the WOG. Collectively these procedures are termed Emergency Response Guidelines. Extensive background documen-tation has been developed for the ERGS. The background information includes calculations of emergency events, which serve to identify the ranges over which plant. parameters are expected to vary and to identify parameter values at which operator actions should be taken.
The background analysis has also considered which parameters are the most effective indicators to an operator of the plant condition and progress of events. This includes consideration of which instruments and controls are safety-grade and qualified for post-accident condi-tions and which are not. This bears on the accuracy with which an instrument indicates the true parameter value. The plant-specific emergency operating procedures for the Callaway and Wolf Creek plants are based on and closely follow the ERGS.
'It should be recognized that systems and functional analyses were performed during the evolution of the standard Westinghouse plant design (RESAR-3), which was the basis for the SNUPPS design. This standard design evolved on the basis of many years of licensing and operation of Westinghouse-designed reactors. Most of the decisions on when the' response to a functional requirement should be automatic (machine) and when manual (man) were made during that evolutionary design process. In only a limited number of cases have changes in the allocation of tasks between man and machine been indicated to be 2-7
J o
. .. o .
P I
' Plant Event
.or Condition
. I.
~
->y I
l Systems / Subsystems l
Analysis l
l L_______________y i
V I
l Function
! Analysis i
Iterations based on Verification and MAN MACHINE Validation.
1 l
! . Task Systems / Equipment Description Design l
l 1
i V
l Task
'l Analysis
- g i 1 i.
I- _I I-Figure 2.1.2 - System Review / Task Analysis Procedure 2-8
2 desirable. by more recent; reactor and simulator operating experience.
T'ask descriptions have als'o been developed on 'a generic basis by Westinghouse and the WOG. This program was begun in late 1981 to address the recommendatian in Section 3.4 of NUREG-0700. -It has
! consisted of a methodical review of the ERGS and identification of every - monitoring - task (instrumentation) and operational task
'(control) identified by each step of- each event-related and each symptom-related procedure. These various tasks, most of which are required by more than one procedure, have been combined into one
. comprehensive set of tasks. Since the SNUPPS emergency operating procedures closely follow the ERGS, this system review and task analyses (SRTA) program conducted by- Westinghouse is directly applicable to the identification of task descriptions for the SNUPPS control room.
The task analysis function is perfomed by the SNUPPS DCRDR Team on a SNUPPS-specific basis. This is done in conjunction with perfomance of a control room inventory. The methods utilized for this analysis are described in Section 3.2 of this report.
A very important feature of the system review, task analysis and control room . inventory is the iteration process shown schematically in Figure 2.1.2. At several times during the systems, function and task analyses, emergency procedures have been perfomed on simulators of the same design as the control boards and the ability for the operators to perform the necessary functions and tasks with the procedures, controls, and instrumentation provided has been veri-fled. Methods of quantifying the abilities of the operators to perform these functions and tasks are described in Section 3.4 of this report.
In summary, all of the elements of a conventional Human Engineering system' review and functional and task analysis are included in the SNUPPS DCRDR program. What the program may lack in adherence to a c ,nventionally structured review, which might be practical if starting from scratch, is more than compensated for by repeated testing of the control room design and procedures on simulators having close fidelity to the SNUPPS control rooms.
2.1.4 Control Room Survey One of the initial elements of the DCRDR consisted of a control room survey performed by Essex Corporation during their review of the SNUPPS control room.
The human engineering review was perf med using the guidelines of NUREG-CR/1580 and incorporated rt cognized human engineering principles and practices to identify and analyze the man-machine interaction of the control room systems and their components.
The ' control room survey evaluated controls and displays located on the Callaway control room and a SNUPPS simulator, and led to the study of special areas, e.g., annunci ator prioritization, safety status monitoring, and control / display enhancement.
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Section 3.3 describes the processes that Essex utilized (e.g., check-lists) in performing the control room survey.
Subsequent to the hunan engineering control room design review con-ducted for the SNUPPS plants, the NRC (HFSB) performed a review in July 1981 using the human engineering design criteria identified in the NUREG-0700 checklist. A thorough audit was conducted and Find-ings were identified. Results were documented in the form of cor-respondence and the subsequent Technical Evaluation Report (TER).
Actions taken by SNUPPS in direct response to these reviews have been documented in a series of letters, dated from June 1981 to April 1982 (references 2 through 6). Given the stage of the control room construction, some areas normally addressed by the survey (ambient noise, lighting, communications) were not performed. These items are included in the SNUPPS TER and are discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.
2.1.5 Validation of Control Room Functions A verification and validation program for the ERGS was performed at the Callaway simulator (which is a duplicate of the Callaway control room) in June 1982. The program consisted of a " walk-through" of forty-one of the ERGS (essentially the entire set) and evaluating the guidelines. The operators for this program were operating personnel from the Callaway and Wolf Creek plants. Westinghouse engineering and training personnel observed the program. An NRC representative was present part of the time.
Though the verification and validation program was specifically focused on the ERGS, the program 7.lso served to verify that all necessary instruments and controls are available and conveniently located in the SNUPPS control room. As described in Section 3.4 of
! this report, a structured evaluation of these aspects of the SNUPPS control room design is to be done using video tapes made during the verification and validation program. The performance of this eval-
! uation, to be completed prior to fuel load, will validate the control room functions.
2.1.6 Selection of Design Improvements Selection of design improvements begins within the Human Factors Plant Review Group (HFPRG). Upon review of an HEF, the HFPRG first determines whether the finding is valid. Because the control room reviewer, Human Engineering Consultants or NRC reviewer, does not always fully understand the plant design, some of the HEFs are i determined to be not applicable. The HFPRG then takes the following f actors into account in developing recommended resolutions to HEFs:
o Priority, which indicates the importance of the HEF.
o Difficulty of backfitting changes, e.g., availability of space on control panels, Class IE separation requirements, etc.
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o Complexity of change, e.g., straightforward change vs.
significant redesign.
o Impact on schedules for construction. startup and operation.
High priority HEFs are considered first. In most cases the HEF includes a recommended change. If the HEF requires physical changes to the control boards or equipment mounted on the boards, the archi-tect engineer evaluates the impact of the changes and advises the HFPRG of any constraints that may exist, e.g., Class IE separation requirements, ability of equipment supplier to change his equipment, schedular considerations. If the change involves significant redesign, e.g., re-prioritization of annunciators, change of system status panels, rearrangement of instruments and controls, redesign of mimics, the HFPRG decides which organization, i.e. , architect engi-neer, Utilities or SNUPPS Staff will have lead responsibility to develop the . change. In a limited number of cases the HEF is deemed to be impractical to be impleinented and/or of low importance and the HFPRG recommends against making the indicated changes.
The actions recommended by the HFPRG are documented by the Deputy Project Manager and referred tt the Technical and Operations Com-mittees for their review and endorsement. Upon concurrence by these comittees, the actior.s necessary to implement the modifications are initiated by the Project Manager or Deputy Project Manager.
2.1.7 Review of Selected Design Improvements Prior to implementation of design-improvements, identified as described in 2.1.6, the- proposed redesign is reviewed by the DCRDR Team. The procedure for this review begins with an evaluation of the redesign against the HEF and recommended resolution (if provided).
Changes involving significant redesign are usually depicted in a full-scale mockup of the control board or full-scale drawings. The revised design is evaluated by Utility operations and engineering personnel and, in most cases, by the Human Engineering Consultant as well. Through these reviews it is determined that:
o The selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction, and l
l o The improvement does not introduce new HEFs.
j These conclusions are verified by walk-through of selected procedures on a full-scale mockup, the simulator or the control room after the changes have been made.
2.1.8 Coordination of Control Room Improvements with Other Programs An underlying concept of the control room design is that it must be possible to operate the plant if the plant computer and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) are inoperable. Therefore the primary review of the control room design assumes that the computer 2-11
systems were unavailable. The review provides assurance that instruments and controls, annunciators and status light panels on the control boards are adequate for perfonnance of normal procedures and emergency operating procedures.
The SPDS was reviewed separately from a Human Engineering stand-point. The SPDS was developed by a group of utilities and its basic design is generic to Westinghouse plants. A Human Engineering Consultant ( ARD) participated in the development of the SPDS. The locations of the CRTs and printers for the plant computer and SPDS have been selected by Utility Operations personnel in concert with the architect / engineer and Utility and Staff engineering personnel.
The SNUPPS Utilities have somewhat different philosophies regarding the roles of the senior operator and shift supervisor, which are reflected in the selection of different locations for the SPDS CRTs at Callaway and at Wolf Creek.
Because of the relatively advanced state of the SNUPPS design relative to operating PWRs, the modifications in response to Reg.
Guide 1.97 have been relatively minor. The instrumentation for post-accident monitoring is reviewed as part of the primary review of the control boards. This includcs controls and displays for post-TMI modifications.
Plant specific emergency procedures have been verified and validated on the Callaway simulator, which at the time closely approximated the final design of the control room. Each SNUPPS site has a simulator. These simulators are being updated to provide virtually complete fidelity to the control rooms. Operator training includes
- extensive training on the plant simulator.
2.2 DCRDR Open Items The following items are the remaining DCRDR elements yet to be com-pleted:
o Validation of Control Room Functions (discussed in section 2.1.5) o Control Room Inventory and Verification (discussed in section2.1.3) o TER Outstanding Items, as identified in appendices A, C and D of the TER, which include the following:
o Environmental Study and other elements associ-ated with control room workspace (discussed in Section3.3.3) o Review and evaluation of voice connunications and auditory signal systems 2-12
o Control Room survey of Controls and Displays not installed or otherwise unavailable at the time of the NRC site audit o Review and Evaluation of the Process computer display formats and effects of illumination unavailable at the time of the NRC site audit o Review and Evaluation of the Auxiliary Shutdown l Panel o Findings still under review at the time of the NRC review / audit and findings addressed as long term items o Survey of the Control Room using guidelines of NUREG 0700, Section 6 that were not included in the NUREG 1580 type review performed by Essex The review of all open items will be performed in accordance with accepted human engineering guidelines as provided in NUREG 0700.
The review and identification of any necessary actions will be completed prior to fuel load. Procedures for this activity will be similar to those described in Sections 4.1 and 2.1.6. Imple-mentation of any resulting control room modifications will be performed on a schedule to be discussed with the NRC.
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3.0 REVIEW PROCESS The objective of the SNUPPS DCRDR is to ensure that the control room provdes the operator with sufficient information and controls to safely perform required operator functions and task responsibilities in response to emer-gency situations. The DCRDR also ensures the human engineering suitability of the design of the instrumentation and equipment in the control room. This section describes the details of the processes used in performing DCRDR element reviews, or refers the reader to appropriate documentation.
3.1 Review of Operating Experience As discussed in Section 2.1.2, Essex distributed questionnaires to prospective SNUPPS operators. The questionnaire addressed the areas of: staffing and workload; workspace design; control / display inte-gration and pl acement; communications; annunciator / warning system; operator protective equipment; computers; procedures / documentation; and operation. The interview covered operator feedback as a result of the operators' initial training experiences on the SNUPPS simu-lator at Zion.
This survey technique provided the SNUPPS review team with feedback on specific problems with the control room design. Examples of these findings were: confusion ith the Engineered Safety Features Actu-ation System (ESFAS) status panel; difficulty in following the mimics on the Engineered Safeguard Features panel; difficulty in reading annunciator windows from the operating station; and poor positioning of annunciator acknowledge controls. These experiences reinforced the findings of Essex Corporation and were directly utilized in
~ developing improved designs for these aspects of the control room.
A copy of the questionnaire administered by Essex is kept in the SNUPPS Human Engineering Evaluation Report (HEER) files.
3.2 Task Analysis and Control Room Inventory As described in Section 2.1.3, all necessary tasks associated with emergency situations have been identified by the SRTA program spon-sored by the Westinghouse Owners Group. This effort has identified 141 monitoring tasks (instrumentation) and 119 operational tasks (controls).
The first step in the task analysis is to review the nature of each task description. Most of the tasks (all but 18 of the monitoring tasks and all but 20 of the operational tasks) are strictly " digital" in nature. That is, a typical monitoring task is to ascertain whether a component is operating or not, whether a valve or breaker is lined up one way or the other, or whether a flow meter is indi-cating other than zero flow. Or, in the case of controls, the typical task is to turn equipment 'on or off or to reposition a valve or breaker. Several of these " digital" operational tasks are manual backups to automatic actions. The task analysis for these digital tasks emphasizes two points: (1) is the control or instrument properly located within the control room and (2) is the design of the control or instrument in accordance with Human Engineering 3-1
l principles. Both of these points are addressed in the control room survey and, additionally, the acceptabilicy of the control or instrument location is evaluated during the validation and verifi-cation of procedures on the simulator.
Only a limited number of task descriptions (38, as noted above) require the operator to respond in other than a " digital" mode.
Eighteen monitoring tasks require the operator to take actions based on specific, non-zero values of plant parameters. For these tasks, the range of the instrument, the accuracy to which it must be read, its location, and its detailed design are of significance. The instrument range for the 15 most important of these tasks is recom-mended by Ragulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2. The SNUPPS design has been reviewed against those recommendations and is in substantial compliance. The accuracy with which the instrument must be read is usually less than the potential error that could result from post-accident environmental effects, which have been considered in estab-lishing operator action level setpoints. The instrument location and design are evaluated in the course of the control room survey and the verification and validation program.
inuty operational tasks require the operator to exercise some form of modulating control. The adequacy of each of these controls and its location are evaluated in the control room survey and in the verification and validation of emergency procedures, performed on the SNUPPS simulators.
The control room inventory consists of (1) verifying that all instru-ments and controls necessary for the defined tasks are in the control room, and (2) verifying that the ranges are consistent with the requirements of the task analysis.
The DCRDR Team is a standing review group that will maintain the control room inventory by reviewing all proposed control room modifications prior to implementation. This mini-review will help ensure that upgraded control panels are human engineered.
3.3 Control Room Survey The major portion of the control room survey is complete and docu-mented in the Essex report, transmitted by reference 2. A discussion of this report, the subsequent NRC audit and procedures for the environmental measures to be performed, is discussed in the ensuing subsections. The aspects still to be reviewed are identified in Section 2.2 of this report. A Human Engineering consultant will assist in this review and the guidelines of NUREG-0700 will be used as the basis for the review.
3.3.1 SNUPPS Review Two separate human engineering checklists were utilized by indepen-dent groups of reviewers to examine the SNUPPS control boards.
These checklists were designed to consider the extent to which components and the environment are designed to accommodate basic j 3-2 l
1
human characteristics such as physical size and perceptual / motor capabilities. A comparison of control features to these guidelines was conducted by Essex Corporation using, where necessary, the data from the Essex task analysis and from visual cbservatjon. The complete results of the control room Survey were transmitted by reference 2.
The initial checklist review utilized NUREG/CR-1580 where human factors speci alists, in concert with experienced SNUPPS personnel knowledgeable of plant systems, control room instruments and equip-ment, and plant operations, observed and measured control room features.
Instrumentation, controls and other equipment items were examined for human engineering acceptability as components without reference to their specific uses in task performance. Discrepancies were based on design incompatibility with human perceptual, motor, psychological or size characteristics. Results of the SNUPPS review are listed in the Essex Report transmitted by reference 2. Sample checklists and actual Human Engineering Finding forms are kept in the SNUPPS HEER files..
3.3.2 NRC HFSB Review In addition to the above checklist review, the NRC HFSB conducted a human engineering audit of the SNUPPS control board using the NUREG-0700 Section 6 checklist. This review served as a check for adequacy of the initial review. Results are listed in the NRC TER on SNUPPS.
3.3.3 Environmental Measurement Procedures As ' discussed in .Section 2.2, the Environmental Study is required
- as part of the TER. The environmental measurements will be obtained when the control room is complete and considerations will be made for site unique characteristics. These results will be submitted to the NRC for review. The procedures for 'NUPPS environmental measurements will follow the guidance of NUREG-0700 Appendix E, and findings will be handled in a manner similar to the control room survey.
3.3.3.1 Sound Survey Procedures The locations for sound measurements will be noted on a control room
, layout drawing. The measurements will be taken at each operator position that requires verbal comunication and/or auditory dis-crimination of a signal.
Considerations during measurement will include ambient noise levels (where ambient noise is defined as background control room noise without the contribution of alarms, printers or communications equipment), annunciator alarm levels- (work station annunciator and any other annunci ators that must be heard at that work station) under both ambient and high noise level conditions (e.g., with printers, other alarms and signals), telephones and other comunica-tion equipment and evacuation signals and other alarms.
3-3
3.3.3.2 Lighting Survey Procedures The location for the illumination measurements will be noted on a control room layout drawing. Readings will be taken:
o In front of each front panel o In the center of the control room o In front of each back panel This study will include the various combinations of power supplies.
3.3.3.3 Humidity / Temperature Procedures Humidity and temperature will be measured by setting meters in an area where they will not be disturbed. Readings at floor level and at 6 ft. above floor level every hour for at least a 24-hour period will be taken.
3.3.3.4 Air Velocity Survey Procedures The locations for air velocity readings will be noted on a con-trol room layout drawing. Measurements will be taken at princi-pal operator work stations at an elevation of 6 f t, for standing positions, and at 4 ft. for sitting positions.
3.4 Validation of Control Room Functions and Tasks l The validation review determines if the operator tasks needed to implement the ERGS can be accomplished effectively within the structure of the established operating and emergency procedures and the design of the control room. This will ensure an accurate and complete human engineering review was conducted.
Validation efforts were conducted for the SNUPPS control room using a walk-through video-tape at the SNUPPS simulator at Zion. The following plant procedures were evaluated during the validation:
o Immediate Action and Diagnosis o Loss of Primary Reactor Coolant o Loss of Secondary Coolant o Steam Generator Tube Rupture o High Wind / Tornado Station Blackout o Reactor Trip o Turbine Trip o Loss of One Feedwater Pump 3-4
Each procedure was taped twice, once with a full complement of operators without any interruptions and once with an operator explaining each step. The videotapes were then used to analyze the operator actions for each of these procedures. Instances of poor control /displ ay relationships, lack of necessary information and inadequate presentation of information were identified from the analysis and identified as findings.
As stated in - Section 2.1.5, a verification and validation program directed to the Emergency Response Guidelines was ~ performed at the Callaway simulator in June 1982 and, though primarily directed to the ERGS themselves, confirmed that the Callaway control room is suitable for performance of the ERGS. In order to quantify this conclusion, a sampling of the ERG verification and validation video-tapes will be compared against criteria established to ascertain htsnan engineering considerations. Examples of these considerations include:
o The indications and annunciators should be refer-enced in the procedure (s).
o The units of measurement displayed should be appro-priate and consistent with the procedure (s).
o The operator actions expressed or implied by the procedure (s) should be within the capability of the operator (s).
Operators in conjunction with human f actors specialists will perform the analysis. In addition, using a unit floor diagram, work station -
flow will be recorded and the following issues addressed:
o Direction of movement o Sequence of movement o Frequency of the movement o Estimated time criticality of the movement o Real time estimate of the time that the operator (s) spends at each work station l
Results of the review will be included in the summary report and
! are expected to validate the locations of installed instrumentation
' and controls. Any deviations will be recorded as findings.
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4.0 ASSESSMENT, IMPLEMENTATION, DOCUMENTATION AND
SUMMARY
REPORT 4.1 Assessment The DCRDR review process described in this Program Plan has resulted in the _ identification of a number of Human Engineering Findings (HEFs). The HEFs were first evaluated by Essex to determine the extent to which they may affect the ability of the operators to perform their tasks and to determine how best to correct the find-ings deemed to have a potential effect on operator actions. A systematic method for evaluating both the significance of HEFs and the feasibility / viability of the recommended improvements or corrections for the HEFs was implemented with a priority ranking.
Subsequently, the NRC review team that perfonned the Callaway site audit developed a similar set of findings and confirmed or reassigned priority ratings.
4.2 Implementation Proposed resolutions were discussed with the NRC and agreements were documented by the NRC on February 16, 1982. Several changes have been made or are in the process of being made. Periodic updates have been sent to the NRC (references 5 and 6).
4.3 Documentation A data base library was established for the DCRDR process. This sub-section describes the documentation system (input / output documents) and documentation management / control library used to support the Detailed Control Room Design Reviews.
Input Documentation:
The following references were available and/or developed throughout the DCRDR program, o FSAR o System Lists o System Specification, Section 3-SNUPPS 80P Functional Description o Piping and Instrumentation Drawings o Control Room Floor Plan (Lighting, HVAC, Acoustice., etc.)
o Panel Layout Drawings o List of Acronyns, Abbreviations o Color Coding Conventions for CRT o 80P Computer System Displays 4-1
o Standardized Valve Nomenclature List o Procedures (Emergency, Abnormal and Operating) o Operational Procedure Preparation Guide o Preliminary Design Assessment Report o WOG Emergency Response Guidelines o WOG System Functions Review and Task Analysis Study o Full Scale Mockups of Control Panels o Other Human Factors / Control Room Studies Output Documentation:
While performing the SNUPPS PDA, Essex utilized standard forms to f acilitate systematizing and recording results of the review. Standard forms used included:
o Human Engineering Checklists o Human Engineering Finding Forms o HEF Priority Sheet o Operator Questionnaire Examples of a Human Engineering Finding Form and Priority Sheet may be found in Appendix A.
Ex amples of an Operating Sequence Diagran used during the Validation of Control Room Functions effort can be found in Appendix 8.
The SNUPPS files contain information on HEF's beginning with checklists from which they are generated, meetings that docunent their reviews and letters directing appropriate dispositions. The actual data collected to produce findings for the PDA is recorded on checklists that are kept within the Human Engineering Evaluation Report (HEER) File. Human Engineering Finding forms document discrepancies resulting from the data reduction process and priorities were assigned by completing a priority sheet for the finding.
A detailed explanation of data collection and reduction for the PDA may be found in the Essex report, transmitted by reference 2.
Although the general data and findings are not computerized, the information is distributed pool f ashion or is otherwise made available to all DCRDR team members to allow access and research by any team member as appropriate.
4-2
o .
A detailed explanation of data collection and reduction may be found in the Essex report, transmitted by reference 2.
Typical forms intended for the remainder of the DCRDR are listed below:
o Air Velocity Survey Record o Humidity / Temperature Rec'ord o Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record o Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record
'o Sound Survey Record DCRDR document control provides for traceability, retrievability and assur-ance of quality.
The Human Engineering Evaluation Report (HEER) generated by Essex during -
their review, is kept _on file at the SNUPPS offices in Rockville.
4.4 Summary Report A summary report will be submitted to the NRC which will reference previous submittals to the NRC and describe the results of those aspects of the DCRDR not previously reported. The summary report will be submitted on January- 31, 1984. All details of the DCRDR, I along with complete documentation, will be available for NRC evalu-ation and review.
Samples of control room inventory forms and forms used in the control room survey for unreviewed items will be contained in the appendices and a summary of the inventory process and survey procedures will be provided. All procedures used for verification of task perfor-mance capabilities and validation of control room functions will be summarized.
Findings of the DCRDR will be organized according to the human f actors engineering survey categories. Details of the assessment procedure used in this process will be summarized and supporting documentation provided as required. Design changes will be des-cribed.
4 4-3
5.0 REFERENCES
- 1. SLNRC 81-26,04/21/81
- 2. SLNRC- 81-51, 06/26/81
- 3. SLNRC 81-65, 08/12/81
- 4. SLNRC 82-04,01/19/82
'5. SLNRC 82-016, 03/16/82
! 6. SLNRC 82-020, 04/12/82
- 7. SLNRC 83-0019,04/15/83 k-(:
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APPENDIX A 9
Standard Forms Used in the SNUPPS PDA O
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APPENDIX Vilt ~
HUMAN ENGINEERING FINDING DATE:
PLANT UNIT: -
800: "
REVIEWER NAME: _
a) HEF TITLE: _
b) ITEMSINVOLVED:
LOCATION PHOTO NO.
NOMENCLATURE ITEMTYPE s) FINDING DESCRIPTION (GUIDELINES AT VARIANCE WITH):
d) SPEC',FIC OPERATOR ERROR (S)THAT COULD RESULT FROM HEF:
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E assEx afwsw NAME DATE MFE RESEARCHER WATA COLL. MOR. .
PROGRAM MGR-DATE:
HEF COMMITTEE REVIEW DISPOSITION:
DREFER 70 OPERATIONS DFURTHER REVIEW BY:
DUE DATE- DNO ACTION REQUIRED (EXPLANATION BELOW OR ATTACNED)
- O TO BE CORRECTED BY FCR DOTHER:
(FCR flDATE)
D TO BE CORRECTED BY MR (MRelDATE)
EVALUATION COMPLETED DATE: _
SNUPPS PROJECT DIRECTOR:
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$70LIST INDUCE THE OPERATOR ERROR:
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HEF PRIORITY SHEET l
MEF NO.
" A. Questions
- 1. N an error occune4, could plant safety by jeopardized or degraded?
l
- Yes enter a "1"in Question 1
- No enter a "O"in Question 1
- 3. N an error occurred, could plant rollability be reduoed?
- Yes enter a "1" in Question 2 -
- No enter a "0" in Question 2
- 8. Would the plant's response to the error both
- a. Provide the operator sufficient time to correct it and '
- b. Provide a positive woming (e.g. alarm) that the error has been committed?
- Yes enter a "0" in Question 3
- No enter a "1" in Question 8 S. Prioritization Formula 3 N W Type 1 2,,,,,,,
1 X 1 = 1.0 Safety Related 1 X 0 = 3.0 Safety Related 0 1 1 = S.0 Rollability Related 0 1 0 = 4.0 Rollability Related 0 0 1 = 5.0 Performance Proidem 1
- c. Priorsey Question 1 a a Priority e
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