ML20205A211

Markups of Current & Improved TS Re TS Conversion Application

ML20205A211
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	03/25/1999
From:	WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20205A200	List: ML20205A196 ML20205A211
References
NUDOCS 9903300329
Download: ML20205A211 (80)

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{{#Wiki_filter:c: PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES-ACTIONS C.,,1 (continued) l Q2.32i] r e ove. operation with two required channels inoperable in a Function ~1s not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully . meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of bne inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the PAM @WI \\ Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident ' occur. Condition C is modified by a Note that excludes hydrogen monitor anaTyzer channels. IL1 Concition D applies when two hydrogen menfter analyzer channels are inoperable. Required Action D.1 requires restoring one hydrogen monster analyzer channel _ to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the fac c ility t t Accifeht S Sys to h nc entra for aluati of co dama a o pro ' inf tiot r ope 6or ions. so. i ely M 83-*d' ' that a LOCA (which would cause core damage) would occur during this time. El Condition E applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D are not met. Required Action E.1 requires entering the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.31 for the channel immediately. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition C or D, and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition E is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition. F.1 and F.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions C or D are not met and Table 3.3.31 directs entry into Condition F, the unit must be brought to a MODE where the ~ 9903300 29 990325 J DR ADOCK 050004 2 (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 8 3.3~150 5/15/97 I

f. PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.1 (continued) REQUIREHENTS or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying the instrimentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The high radiation instrimentation should be compared to similar unit instruments located throughout the unit. Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the sigel processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. If the channels are within the criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. As specified in the SR, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels that are normally energized. The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal but more frequent, checks of channels during nomal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. SR 3.3.3.2 glWu(bmiahA.) l Q3.3.0 -l [ A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every nths, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a couplete check of the instrument loop including tha sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measure parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. This SR is modified by a Note that excludes neutron detectors. "; ;;11brati;n.;tbd fer

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[Hf~ G 3.1-2D l fhe Frequency is based on operating experience and 1 -- __ _1 _, consistency with_the typical industry refueling cycle. knfainmen+ Radiabob Leve.1 (High RQ cHAuuEL. cALiaRATioW mq consM e,f iv., eleckoni c, on.bre_ tion of +he channA\\, mA Aciuda 4he. l et gec. tor,.for r& a e ca e a ahme iom/h-a+ d. a..n e. poia c.). r.tiew j y e.ck. 4 4he. cis.+ector ~ - Tcontinued)) ch be.lew lo n/h,- saHh,,. i A s+2tled or portab6

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Qsda3.3.isi] ~ WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 B 3.3 152 5/15/97 TR 3.5 004 i I

l, : INSERT B 3.3-152 TR 3.3-004 5 Whenever an RTD is replaced in Functions 2 or 3, the nex1 required CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the RTD's is accomplished by an inplace cross calibration that compares the other sensing elements with the recently in(talled sensing element. Whenever a core. exit thermocouple is replaced in Functior715, the next required CHANNEL CALIBRATION of.the core exit thermocouples is a ompi shed by an inplace cross calibration that compares the other sensing ele nts wi h the recently- . installed sensing element. b L'1; Id 3,S37.\\ 1 I 1 i l l I ) i

1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.3-32 APPLICABILITY: WC l REQUEST: Improved TS [] Table 3.3.6-1 is changed to be ennsistent with current TS [3.3.2 Functional Unit 3.c and current TS 3.9.9]. Subfunctions (b-d] of containment radiation are stricken since only the gaseous [] channels provide the actuation function [and the bracketed setpoint is changed to reflect plant-specific requirements). [The Actuation Logic was split to reflect the SSPS, with only MODE 1-4 Applicability, and BOP-ESFAS portions and associated SR requirements in the current TS.] Comment: {DC) New CTS Action 37 is proposed. It is not clear how the new Action 37 relates to the functions (including Action 18 that it modifies), that deletion of the requirement to close purge valves have been justified or how the new Action 37 relates to the ITS markup. {WC} The proposed setpoint show as footnote (c) to ITS T 3.3.6-1 is not an acceptable limit. Revise Function 2.a (T3.3.6-1) applicability to include footnote (a). {CW) The proposed setpoint show as footnote (c) to ITS T 3.3.6-1 sepresents a change to the CTS 'vhich is neither identified nor evaluated. Revise T3.3-6 to include particulate radiation monitors to be consistent with CTS. See 01-43A \\ {WC, CW} Explain the design justification for not including Table 3.3.6-1 Note "a" in the applicability for actuation logic and relays. Specified logic must support radiation isolation function in the table. If the logic supports Phase A Isolation (T3.3.6-1, FS) then it huld . not be listed in this table. A single listing of the logic in ESFAS table 3.3.2-1 is acceptable. {WC, CW} Add new SR for BOP ESFAS actuation logic test with note that continuity check may be excluded. {WC) Adopt ISTS for Required Action A.1 and Condition B trains / channels. "I.OG RESPONSE: (original) The first comment was accepted for DCPP at the 9/15/98 meeting, however, Table 3.3.6-1 has been corrected to include the single REQUIRED CHANNEL for MODE 6 and (a) applicabilities, and to delete the original inserted note (b). In response to the second comment, Wolf Creek has revised ITS Table 3.3.6-1 Trip Setpoint footnote for the Containment Purge isolation Function to include trip setpoint value from the CTS ### footnote. The details in the CTS footnote on the methodology for changing the sctpoint has been moved to the ITS SR Bases. I in response to the third comment, Callaway personnel explained during meetings with NRC staff on September 16,1998 that, unlike other FLOG utilities, the containment gaseous and particulate radiation monitors covered by CTS LCO 3.3.3.1 as listed in CTS Table 3.3-6 serve only an RC3 leakage detection function. These monitors have no containment l

purge isolation function. The containment purge exhaust gaseous i radiation monitors covered by ITS Table 3.3.6-1 are not covered in the Callaway CTS. Operability and surveillance requirements for these monitors are covered in FSAR Section 16.11.2.4 and Tables 16.11-5 and i 16.11-6. The setpoint for these monitors is established by FSAR Table 11.5-3, as noted in Enclosure 1 (sort by ITS page 23 of 27). The wording l of footnote (c) will be retained. Comment Number Q1-43 was resolved at the September meetings. The fourth comment was resolved during meetings with NRC staff on September 16,1998, as reflected in Reference 5. After further review of the fourth comment with plant personnel, ITS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table 3.3.7-1 are revised to reflect the BOP-ESFAS actuation logic and associated SR requirements in CTS Table 3.3-3 and 4.3-2. The l Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (Solid State Protection l System) Functions (2) are not required to be duplicated in ITS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table 3.3.7-1 since this function is redundant to the ESFAS Containment Phase "A" Isolation Function. The Surveillance .i Requirements (SR 3.3.6.3 and SR 3.3.7.4 for performance of a MASTER l RELAY TEST; SR 3.3.6.5 and SR 3.3.7.5 for performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST) associated with Function 2 in ITS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table ) 3.3.7-1 are deleted. JFD 3.3-39 has been revised to reflect this justification. DOC 2-57-A was initiated to reflect changes in CTS Table 3.3-3 to delete Functional Units 3.c.2) and 9.b since these functions are redundant to Functional Unit 3.c.4) and 9.d. In response to the fifth comment, footnote (b) to ITS Table 3.3.6-1 dealing with the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST has been added to SR 3.3.6.2 based on the changes to ITS Table 3.3.6-1 reflect only the BOP-ESFAS actuation logic and associated SRs. Corresponding Bases changes have been made. In response to the sixth comment, WCGS has revised !TS 3.3.6, Required j Action A.1 to reflect NUREG-1431. ITS 3.3.6, Condition b was revised in response to Comment Number O 3.3-30. FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As a supplemental response to the fourth comment, the Callaway and Wolf Creek ITS 3.3.6 and 3.3.7 Reference lists are revised to delete the references to SLNRC 84-0038, consistent with the previous changes to delete SR 3.3.6.5 and SR 3.3.7.5. Based on comments from the NRC reviewer, Required Action C.1 in LCO 3.3.2 of the Callaway is being revised to: " Declare associated containment purge isolation valve (s) inoperable." in addition, Required Action Q.1 in LCO 3.3.2 of the ITS is being revised to: " Declare associated auxiliary l feedwater pump (s) inoperable." The latter change is addressed for L WCGS under Comment Number Q 2-37. l As discussed with the NRC reviewer on February 17,1999 and March 4, 1999, Wolf Creek is maintaining the CTS requirement to only have one required radiation monitoring channel. ITS 3.3.2, Condition C, ITS 3.3.6,

Conditions and ITS Table 3.3.7-1 and associated Bases are revised to adopt the CTS Actions for containment purge isolation. The ITS 3.4.15 Bases are revised to direct the operator to LCO 3.3.6 for the loss of a required containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor. FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As discussed with the NRC reviewer on March 10,1999, ITS 3.3.2, Required Action C.1 and ITS 3.3.0, Required Action A.1 is being revised to state: " Place and maintain containment purge supply and exhaust valves in closed position," consistent with ITS 3.3.6 Required - Action B.1 and CTS. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment No. 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Encl.5A 3.3-26,3.3-58 Encl. 5B B 3.3-116

rf l ESFAS Instrumentation l 3.3.2 l l ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTIOl4 COMPLETION TIME C.' One train inoperable. NOTE g gg _ -One train may be bypassed , M for up to 4 hours for h13"Ib 01 ~~ ~ ~~ " ~ -- - ' ~ ~ s only Mu'rc4 W Fianctis" surveillance testing p 3 3.oa } ga..(2.S (s gegyroM.,_ 3 _ - provided the other train I l j ~ j" h Restore train to OPERABLE 6 hours @ #'* *31 l b '.]

status,

.so+ 1 e-I wt i at rta.t ieh. a C' A C.J.1 Be in H0DE 3. 12 hours j f ei at a v ee ^ 3 A MD-( )93,3 32\\ C.7 2 Be in H0DE 5. 42 hours f. h he inoperable channel D. One channel. --- NOTE- - p inoperable.

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gggg3!~ w e may be bypassed for up to (AS'If) Pba. uA.maihtsih T 4 hours for surveillance cent,ih ment p q c. testing of other 3, l channels. I sag xL ediaust - ~TT. Place channel in trip. 6 hours ---+- pihon in QR { Q3.S-Sl } D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours ~ 8lE D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours (continued) j. WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.3 3.3 26 S/15/97

Containment Purge er.d St.;;-t Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 wigpsy; e ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME n ........N0TE ---- --- .1 a e Immediately 1413-32_$ Only applicable in tin s u ed ~ MODE 1. 2, 3, or 4. io o LC 3. 3, ai n Is ati V rc ta t One or more Functions pur c".;;;' N with one or more ola on lv WarMstB ino rab b is iph (hettrat F6P(aMpuu!4@ tr nta io g3)3332gg trains inoperable. ~ pp m- / ' Pixe avd. Maintath T.;; er.er; redi; tier, fontaiwent N IT!3?32$ sug M o.haub _ m__2__ _u__,- I ir,egr:M;. vf.5 clo ed-. 7 }o3,332.] j e qse) = A 1 i to u-(continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.3 3.3 58 $/15/97

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS-B.1. B.2.1 and B.2.2 (continuad) i or both channels in one train renders the train inoperable. Condition B, therefore, encompasses both situations. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation train OPERABLE for each Function. and the low probability of an j event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be restored _ to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a H0DE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least H0DE 3 within an additional 6 hours (54 hours total time) and in H0DE 5 within an additional 30 hours (84 hours total time). The allowable Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. C.1. Q XmfdA 2 Condition C applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the following functions: SI: Containment Spray: Phase A Isolation: Phase B Isolation: and Automatic Switchover t poesERT B 3.3-iiO-[os,S32.] nt Sump,_ %is action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and the master and slave relays."fIf one train is inoperable, 6 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a H0DE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least H0DE 3 within an additional 6 hours (12 hours total time) and in H0DE 5 within an additional 30 hours (42 hours total time). The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 B 3.3 116 5/15/97

Thk at. Ken d5) add /weseske, cffeckaw con +a,inment p.my when Phsw A 6 @ Hods M m.pera A. i INSERT B 3.3-116 -~ h'i d 0 3.3-32 = y se A is the primary signal to ensure closing of the containment purge valves'.' I_t one_ Phase A train is inoperable, pperation may continue as long as _the i FRe r ctfens of LOV3.6A is get f4r e.eri va>+e n>atie xioperaope bypayrupge Aequired Action C.1 is modified by a Note that this Action is only a required if Containment Phase A Isolation (Function 3.a.(2)) is inoperable. m.a.g.a w,a r_ m -,a+ 4 e+ g cust vaMs vi their closed. psih.m A met. 1 l l 1 i \\

i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ) . ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.3-43 APPLICABILITY: WC REQUEST: Revise ITS 3.3.1 Condition R Notes 1 and 2 per traveler TSTF-168. The 2-hour AOT should not be limited to only UVTA/STA maintenance. Comment: TSTF Pending NRR review. Based on 8/14/98 meeting - TSTF rejected based on WCAP-14333 which prohibits " maintenance bypass." FLOG RESPONSE: (original) TSTF-168 has been approved by the NRC. Therefore, the FLOG continues to pursue the changes associated with JFD 3.3-43. FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As discussed with the NRC reviewer on March 17,1999, ) ITS 3.3.1, Condition R, Note 1, is being revised to delete the words "or j maintenance." This wording is not in the CTS. TSTF-168 is withdrawn and all changes to the Condition R Notes are based on the CTS. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment No. 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Encl. 2 3/4 3-6 Encl.3A 5 Encl. 3B 5 Encl. 4 29,30 Encl.5A Traveler Status page,3.3-9 Encl. SB B 3.3-53 Encl.6A 6,15 Encl. 6B 8,19 1 i l 1 l I

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TABLE 331 (Continued) ACTION STATEMENTS (ContLnued) ACTION 5 Jews 4e wayyjsgejgg,. p or W' the number ofI PERABLE channels one less dian the Menanum 1-43-Al i c. Requi har nelsp?Eit?' E r;rczr, restore the inoperable channel p34 to 0"ERABLE sammurtthuras tmorner urthe etmowntal.JiedMully insert > (all rods, and place the Rod Control System in a condition incapable of rod}) f l-55-LS, (_ _ ( (withdrawa5 pen t-P

= Tdp B:

=, =d r:;zf./! :;._2 : I xxM ;;:: ::-:_:^ tj :'; : "'- i: = ' in:. 1-38-R [ j b.. With no channels OPERABLE,(open the Reactor Trip Breakers), ~~ i4% ,: r;rf :!! :;. f : ' ;i':;;r'.: m:^ tj s neat hnr. '; : =f n 'fj :m;"---- it S: E""^WW MARGIN " ' ~1. ' l-38-R

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' :=; ? 2 h== ahoreaAen ACTION 6 - ' With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tesal Mxtr fMhannels, STARTUP rad /or POWER OPERATION ~ 143-AQ " may proceed provided the fo!!owing conditions are satisfied:

1-15-A

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition 1-11-LS-Si. . within 6 hours; and b. S.: ?f ' r '"----i CPSit?'_E r;wenwns-e met; however, 104.LcT i the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 h@ours-La-4 ""~ l fg. surveillance testing of other channelsg (c._ S W m ( Lt"Tjor 1 19-LS Reduce Thermal Power to < P-7 within 12 hoursD ACTION 7 - With the number of OPEP.ABLE Channels one less than theM ^ 1~~ I7 ..~43db I Minanum.Channe's OPEi^.BLE :; -

^. restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within gqg

. the next 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypesed for up to 4 hours for /[.u.ts-surveillance testing {jor figlicificancK 4#HI provided the other channel is operabic7 ACTION 8 - With less than the !f '- r Nxt :dteamire@ Channels "I!43!A~ OPERABLE, with_in I hour determirie5y opservapertorjar asjeciapd Jb# M[ fpepsf'ssive #= Wor wjntfowls6 mat me mueriocx is m us required state 8-BZM]a-for the existing plant condition, or~ ;;!- !;:-!Pr-- 2.0.2. Se in at least j Hot Standby within 7h ACTION 8.1 . With less than the stequired Channels OPERABLE, within I hour a determinehy ^:.;--vor tae)ssocanteamecensam assumentor t,.3c. 3,3.oo j Ms6rjdprRat the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant I condition, or be la at least MODE 2 witUn "I hours. [ g,i.3 g ACTION 9 - Wittube number of UrtKABLE Reactor Trip Breakers one lessihan 1-43-A - % W the$lequireihif ' n Channels OPEit9LE ::; _..x^. {estore th3 (looperable breaker to OPERABLE status in I hour ob in at least HOT --g g pq p3,3.g STANDBY within 6f7Jhours; however, one breaker may be bypassed for ' e s-w up to 2 hours farl '- ^'t6r11sBsurveillance testing 5 r"C-:WYMkD provided the other breaker is OPERABLE. rfah h_4h @ l'j 'g J'" 43-A g r 1 ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels onp less than the (Requirs[) Channels,^PEitBLE r;i: r,' restore the in .able channel 1-55:LS-39,i to OPERABLE status 6mittier481lodrn or :;= i: P r^r -- ;"ully insert all . [ rods and place the Rod Control System in a condition incapable of rod Lwithdrawalbreakers within the next hour. ACTION I1 - TVith the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number Not Used ~" of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placalin the tripped condition within 6 hours. WOLFCREEK-UNITI JN 3-6 . Amendment No. !2,25,13,32,96 Mark-rp ofCTS3M. J 5/15/97

] CHANGE NUMER MSBC DESCRIPTION since all 4 channels are required to trip the reactor: the bypass allowance is needed when 2 channels satisfy ) the trip logic. There is no associited action if the l inoperable channel (s) are not placed in trip within 6 hours: therefore. LCO 3.0.3 would be invoked. [New] ACTIONStatement_$1allowscontinuedoperationwithp3,3,gg,\\ one or more inoperable channels as long as they are placed in trip within 6 hours or THERMAL POWER is ) reduced below P 9 within 10 hours. [See~ also CN 115 A] { These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431, Rev. 1. j 1 12 H New ACTION Statement [8.1] is created to differentiate between those RTS interlocks required to be operable in MODE 1 only,.and those interlocks required to be operable in H00E 1 AE 2. If the interlock function is required to be operable in MODE 1 only and the LCO and ACTION requirements are not met, then new ACTION j Statement [8.1] requires that the unit be taken to MODE 2 within 7 hours. In addition, current ACTION Statement [8] is revised for those interlocks required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 and 2. If one channel is inoperable, the interlock j must be determined to be in its required state or the plant must be in at least HOT STANDBY within 7 hours. ) The changes to current ACTION Statement [8] and the addition of new ACTION Statement [8.1] are more restrictive, consistent with NUREG 1431, Rev.1. Current ACTION Statement [8] will continue to apply to Functional Units [18.a and 18.e.] Revised ACTION Statement [8] and new ACTION Statement (8.11 provide one less hour to exit Applicability, i.e. 7 hours, than the current ACTION Statement [8] which has the 1 hour interlock state verification or entry into LCO 3.0.3 which allows an additional 1 hour plus 6 hours to exit i Applicability, for a total of 8 hours. (Q3.3-43{ 1 13 LS 6 Stat 1eme [9] rev1 4d no t.t t J r re or bre er ypas al a for [ r r veil e te n can 1o us for i s ti act adint nce. his c [P,Sa ese 2 e.1/ co usio of 10 nce re is ch t the ypa ti . __ hi s Lcha is co st wi tra ler 68 g ACTION i Statement [9] is [@ revised to require restoration of an inoperable RTB within 1 hour or the plant must be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1. This is less restrictive since WCGS-Description ofchanges to CTS 3M.3 S/1587

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IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 6 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICt.TIONS @CT St n 9] rev to te t tt 2 ho [] r ctor rip e[aker T ss owa fo ] br ker veil nce ti can o sed 1 en e. j his an s ti et t conc sion f 1 1 P A. Sup ement 2. R v.1 j QL et re i no c to byrdIss t M ACTION Statement 9 is [@] revised to l require restoration of an inoperable Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) within 1 hour or the plant must be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. This is less restrictive than the current TS since an additional hour is provided for the transition to MODE 3. 1 The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards considera:. ion. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below: "The Coninission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a propose;Vbmendnent to an operating license for a facility licensed under SQ2f(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no signifIcant hazards consideration, if operation of the fac11ity in accordance with the proposed amendnent would not: 1. Involve a signifIcant increase in the probabi1ity or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety." The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. As noted in the Bases of NUREG 1431 Rev.1, the completion time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach H00E 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour completion times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions. The proposed shutdown requirement completion time change would result in an additional hour to achieve MODE 3. By allowing a shutdown time based on operating experience this change would reduce the chances of an operator error or challenge to plant systems that could result from the WCGS-NSHCs - CTS 3/4.2 29' S/15M7

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 6 (continued) m:re essi.rictive requirement in the current TS. The probability that an accident would occur during the I hour extension allowed by the proposed change is extremely hiL43 \\ small. Ss'e~ f 2 r rea r tr b ker a all ar. for ain an wiff t the nav abi ies sed o rm co d ge ue s /1 71 P A. uppl nt. Re 1 e, b ss ime low e is t Lex e MThe proposed change will not affect any of the analysis assumptions for any of the accidents previously. evaluated. The proposed change will not affect the ' probability of any event initiators nor will the proposed change affect the ability of any safety related equipment to perform its intended function. There will be no degradation in the performance of nor an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? 1here are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the method by which any safety related plant system performs its safety function. The change will not affect the normal method of plant operation. Only the duration of operation in the action statement is affected. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this change. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? ~ The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed event. There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant systes necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions. There will be no impact on any margin of safety. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERNINATION Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS 6" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c): and accordingly, a no significant hazard.s consideration findirg is justified. WCGS-NSHCs - CTS 3H.2 30 S/lin7

INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.3 TRAVELER # S'i A IS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS CN5Fh TSTF-19, Rev)1 @ Incorporated N/A a ro h-dHCM grpo;stett' M.3,34-] fa 3.3-34 I J TSTF-37, Rev.1 Not I.uorporated NA ITS 5.6.8 still addresses PAM reports. Sections after ITS 5.6.7 were not renumbered. TSTF-51 Not Incorporated NA Requires plant-specific remnalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. Qs5F5&l' [ )Whetfgejwil NW o' a j b 8 3-8FI vol an ed t/ge t re in ~ e TSTF-111 RevhIncorporated NA [e i-os ] TSTF-13 %) 33-41,h ray ris b~ ad h Incorporated 3 3-93 in etur ho dh ebee 3 3-95 eve sep te vele _g .rg 3.1-m 33-1 4 Pfoens f the vel that $l42- ,signi nt ' al

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bili req me 5jl1~-( e b a inc ed. TSTF-161@E.1) Incorporated 3 3-79 @{hAq #"* TSTF-168 ( IncorporEted A$:43MA Q g g4Ar. 1435-41 [per.dg g g [r m -og l TSTF-169 , Incorporated 33-42 (WOSM ~ Ncorporated 33-49 le 18-413 ro s' Incorporated 33-107 NAetbJtetiU45) eg to2.3-iou Qsw-an inmepowt i.A-g (TR.s S-m r \\ 5/15/97

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME sw. 'O k R. One RTB train S.............. inoperable. 1. 0 @ may be bypass for up to @W47 2 hours for surveillance testing 6P5EfiEei5iiilb provided the other train is OPERABLE. 2. One RTB may be bypassed only' for the, time ^ required f;r r,, t 2 bar:; for performing, {MY maintenance on the undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms per Condition.U. ' provided the other train is OPERABLE. EI323?ll7f R.1 Restore train to OPERABLE 1 hour status. OR ( R.2 ee in MODE 3. 7 hours S. One oc more required S.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour required state for 4323f44 channel (s). existing unit conditions. inoperable. 08 S.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours l (continued) WCGS-Mark.up ofNUREG-1431-IIT '3 3.3 9 5/lS/97 J

r3 - l RTS instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ~_ n=3mb A u t he, c amg H. ACTICNS R.1 and R.2 (continued) RTs.-trw,, e mee.< A. based on operating experience, to reach H00E 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete lossy of RTS Func_tio_n. Placing the unit in H0DE 3(Fencves-t397 fegutFemenffne-this ScticWEunctiotr) 433g \\ N The Reauired Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows one*;h;.an;l @ to be bypassed for up to 2 hours for ga a.2 -43. ] g,c/gW surveillance testing, provided the other train channel is OPERABLE. Note 2 allows one RTB to be bypassed for up t; 2 h;ur; f6rythe time required for maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms up to the limit of' time.alluwed.in the Completion Time of' Condition U provided 4f the other RTB train is OPERABLE. Oc 2 hour ti;;;; li;;;it dec;; ret elter t4 r;;; ired Ce,,1;tien ";;;; ftr :.n irep;r;;bi; tr;in end i:; ja;tified in R;ferenc; 7. S.1 and S.2 Condition S applies to the P 6 and P 10 interlocks. With one or i more raquired channel (s) inoperable; for era cut of tw; er tWe cut of four ;;inqid;;; 1;;ic, the associated interlock must g be verifiedjby. observation of the associated: permissive) (annunciator windowfto be in its required state for the existing unit condition within 1 hour or the unit must be placed in H0DE 3 within the next 6 hours. Verifying the interlock status manually e.g. accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach H0DE 3 frori. full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour Completior Times are equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 for shutdown a cions in the event of a complete loss of RTS Function. T.1 and T.2 Condition T applies to the P 7. P 3. P 9, and P 13 interlocks. With one or more channel (s) or train inoperable, for ^ cre cut-of two er tw; cut of-four ;;ircidenc; logic, the l l (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 B 3.3 53 5/15/97 J

CHANGE NUPBER JUSTIFICATION .3.3 41 'ITS 3.3.1 Condition _ L is cMeted to match the plant specific design EnWcarrtprJ8)for the Source Range Neutron Flux lCA 3 5-** Function in Modes 3. 4. and 5 with the Rod Control System incapable of rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted.- Under - these conditions, the scurce range instrumentation does not provide a Reactor Trip System function. The source range channels provide only indication [] when in this Applicability. Requirements related to the source range neutron flux channels in Modes 3. 4, and 5 when all rods are fully inserted and are not capable of being withdrawn have therefore been [ relocated outside of technical specifications]. This change is consistent with 1 traveler TSTF - 135. ] 3.3 42 This change deletes ITS 3.3.1 Condition N per traveler TSTF 169. I Condition M is appropriate for Function 10.a to prevent sequential entry into Condition N followed by M and exceeding the evaluated Completion Time in WCAP 10271-P-A Supplement 2. Rev. 1. With this change, there is no need to list separate Functions 10.a and 10.b and combining the Functions eliminates Applicability questions similar. to the Condition H vs. N concern i above. i I 2 pe [Q3.3-43 } C " [Thi fevise TS 3. 1 Condi on R e 3.3 43-- t veler F1. The - ur A0 should t lim ed to y rM Ag) A/ A mai nance This i onsist t with he curr t TS 4, w pcreek,.see i ccepta e bec e the s ific ntena activ y whic c,g G94 uirey dhat a eactor t p break be b ssed _s not f (%W.(Enae.s')j Mner'rphfqt-etTrpdpVTSJaWie 3G-r the ja6act of iavina t breaker ypas 3.3-44 This change revises ITS 3.3.1 Conditions S and T and ITS 3.3.2 Condition a 11 tynumbeVof SequiredJh8nnen irTakhesl CLZ1-a .3. .fto reflect current TS ACTI_0N5 [8 and 20].103.3-44 The Conditions apply to one or more channelsGer-Tsafus-esi WJon-T AppMFsAcTecats51ve11-7Dbecause the safety function is served with the interlock in the appropriate state b;s.3-44] for existing plant conditions jfhe ye tttipptlanJ des @e3#6f g4 Mfor th6se f.1terloelfs t ]E.) o 3.3-45 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.3 46 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). WCGS-Differencesfrom NUREG-1431-ITS 3.3 6 $/1587

[ CHANGE NL9BER JUSTIFICATION .3.3 114 Not Used.' 3.3 115 Not Used. f 3.3 116 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table ] (Enclosure 68). Ms2 G3.5 43 L 13.3 117-This change to ITS 3.3.1 Condition R ref ects current TS Table [3.3 1, ACTION Statement 12] which was based on NRC Generic < Letter 85 09. 3.3 118 This change is for consistency with ITS 3.7.10 Condition [D and E]. 1 3.3-119 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). Ac as-v20 \\ 3.3 120 S 3.. ecf ITr 3R 3 E 4.2' 3.3 121 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table -(Enclosure 68). 3,3 122 ITS 3.3.1 Applicability Note (b) for Functions 1, 5, 19 21 and Conditions C and K are revised to replace Actions requiring the RTBs to be opened with actions that ensure subcriticality is g.mg Mak maintained (i.e., bffully insert @all rods and ensuring the rw.s.s-oot. Y*f Rod Control System is incapable of rod withdrawal) yet do not initiate a feedwater isolation (P 4 and low T ) in MODE 3, m consistent with traveler TSTF-135. =3.3 123 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.3-124 Consistent with the current TS Table 4.3-1, Note [17), the notes for ITS SR 3.3.1.4 and Table 3.3.11. Function 20 are modified to clarify that the SR is required for the reactor trip bypass breaker local manual shunt trip only. The Bases for SR 3.3.1.14 clearly state that SR includes the automatic undervoltage trip of the reactor trip bypass breakers. The Note (k) added to Table 3.3.11. Function 20 clarifies the Applicability of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms to include tl.se functions of the reactor trip bypass breakers when in use. WCGS-DifferencesfromNUREG H31-ITS3.3 15 S/2SM7

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c: l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET L ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.3-99 APPLICABILITY: WC REQUEST: ITS 3.3.5 Condition B is revised to allow 12 hours for one bus to restore the instrument function to the capability of continued operation in Condition A. The 12 hour allowance is based on the ITS 3.8.1.F allowance for an inoperable sequencer. [A new Condition C is added to ITS 3.3.5 to cover multiple channel inoperability on both ESF buses. The Completion Time of 1 hour is provided to restore the functional capability of Condition B.] A new Condition [D] is also added to the Actions of ITS LCO 3.3.5. The new Condition provides the appropriate shutdown actions if Conditions [A, B, or C] are not satisfied when in Modes 1-4. Condition [D] is consistent with the actions required by the AC Sources ITS 3.8.1 for Modes 1-4. Condition C of NUREG-1431 Rev.1 is revised to be Condition [E]. Condition [E] provides the appropriate default Condition for failure to satisfy Conditions [A, B, or C) when the loss of power instrumentation is required operable to support the diesel generator required operable in ITS LCO 3.8.2. 1 Comment: Reject - Beyond Scope issue - - Adoot ISTS for loss of redundancy and loss of function for inoperable LOP actuation channels. The staff notes that the proposed 12 hour repair time for a second, third or fourth inoperable channel which ir change to the CTS that is neither identified nor discussed in the CTS markup and it's justifications. There is sufficient operational flexibility in the ISTS LOP conditions if channel cannot be repaired since LCO 3.3.5 requires the supported DG to be declared inoperable. Other problems with the proposed ITS are the actions related to offsite circuits. The offsite circuits are not supported by the DG LOP instrumentation, rather i offsite circuits are alternate sources of power and operability is treated in ITS LCO 3.8.1. The one hour repair AOT (Condition B) is an allowance provided by the staff to trouble shoot equipment problems. This time period represents an equivalent to the first hour of LCO 3.0.3. At the end of the hour the supported system is declared inoperable. l FLOG RESPONSE: (original) As discussed during meetings with NRC staff on September 15 and 16,1998, ITS 3.3.5 Required Action B.1 has been revised to immediately declare the associated load shedder and emergency load j sequencer (LSELS) inoperable. To support this change to Required l Action B.1, the shutdown portion of one LSELS was added to the ITS 3.8.2 LCO as was a new Condition C. See also the response to Comment Number Q 2-18 for revisions to that DOC and LS-31 that further support this change. j For Wolf Creek, the CTS has no requirements for the LSELS in MODES 5 and 6. The equivalent ITS 3.8.2 changes are incorporated into CTS l 3.8.1.2 using DOC 1-70-M. In addition, reverting Condition A back to the STS wording was also discussed during the September meeting. However, further discussions with our Operations personnelindicate that the STS wording presents confusion. Condition A shall be entered at the time one channel on one i

bus becomes inoperable. However, the STS wording "per bus" is literally l read to mean Condition A is not entered until"one channel per bus", i.e., one channel on the A bus and one channel on the B bus, are inoperable. This is incorrect. The proposed wording, approved for Vogtle, is superior l and eliminates operator confusion, FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) In order to address NRC comments on ITS 3.3.5 and the responses to Comment Numbers Q 2-18 and O 3.3-99, the attached pages include revisions to CTS Table 3.3-3 ACTION 19, DOC 2-18-LS-31, NSHC LS-31, ITS 3.3.5 and Bases, and JFD 3.3-99. FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As discussed with the NRC reviewers on March 11,1999, l the ITS 3.3.5,3.8.1 and 3.8.2 Bases are being modified to provide clarification that the EDGs receive a start signal from the Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer upon a loss of voltage or degraded voltage condition. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment No. 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Encl. SB B 3.3-160, B 3.3-163, B 3.3-162, B 3.3-166 Attachment No.14, CTS 3/4.8 - ITS 3.8 Encl. 5B B 3.8-2, B 3.8-4, B 3.8-15, B 3.8-38, B 3.8-40, l l l l.

w LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation -BASES BACKGROUND. The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsito power is - either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation M rvolt prot ction 11 gener te an LOP start if l4814 fa lo of tage degra vol cond on occ in / N# s chya T e are LOP' art si Is, o or e M 3 ~ M S-Q S ) vit;L kV ystem us. x-- g, ' com_asociated tiineasg Fourb undervoltage relays withh#st,M10-$apactensucs are provided & each 4100 Ch;; 1 iratru-...t @Kr class It m_ Q . system bus for detecting 4 acittathed-degraded'voltalje condifto]n @a loss of bus voltage. The tetrps)are combined in a M two out of threefour logic to generate an LOP signal if the voltage is below approy.imately 70% 754 form C4;4Ehbr i

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SM ] (Q3.3 m Trio Setooints and Allowable Values on(fy,M,g The Trip _ Setpoints used in the relays are based fwtTie-1liiatyttchD l seco d nara.nal (jpgrs,cresented offllFSARh 15-tRet -ED The selection of d:\\*9 D**"'* D these Trip Setpoints is.such that adequate protection is provided ~ gr**"b "'".S when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into d** '

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account. -h n.iint yn AA""*T P * "_' _ The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the relays is d normally still more conservative than that required by the Allowable Value. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE. Setpoints adjusted in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providhged the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and that the equipment functions as designed. Allowable Values and/or Trip Setpcints are specified for each Function in th; LCO. SR 3.3.5.3. Nem bel Trip R tp; int; or; C h;

t. st,.t; re.mera. sWthr=S u t

(continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 B 3.3 160 5/15l97

l INSERT B 3.3-160a 0 3.3-99 ond)<iogocp(rsA JAfejK1)Pk)PESF' dsef -9 o s a) Trip the 4.16 kV preferred normal and alternate bus feeder breakers to remove the deficient power source to protect Class 1E equipment from damage; b) Shed all loads frr,m the bus except the Class 1E 480 Vac load centers and i centrifugal charging pumps to prepare the buses for re-energization by the load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS): and c) Generate an LOP OG start signal _. f s MagenAaA voltage.] _) / There are two set of undervoltage protection circuits, one for each 4.16 kV NB system bus. Each set consists of a loss of voltage and degraded voltage function. d o s e un ae t o (circuits are described in USAR Section 8.3.1.1.3 (Ref.1). (74.pdeAvettay. INSERT B 3.3-160b _ 0 3.3-99 D @p,w&l bndemarz Fowles med to) /our degraded voltage bistables with associated time delays &ce pf-esde4 for each 4.16 kV Class 1E system bus for detecting a sustained degraded voltage condition. n t el 1 g m knce the bistable has actuated, a timer in the LSELS circuitry provides an 8 second 3 time delay to avoid false actue* ion on large motor starts other than an RCP. There are four of these 8-second time.cs per bus, one for each degraded voltage channel, l The bistable outputs are then combined in a two-out-of-four logic to generate a degraded voltage signal if the voltage is below approximately 90%. Once the two-out-of four logic is satisfied, contacts in the bus feeder breaker trip circuits close to arm the tripping circuitry. If a safety injection signal (SIS) were to occur concurrently with or af ter the arming of the tripping circuitry, the bus feeder breaker would open immediately, a bus undervoltage would be sensed, and a LOP signal would be generated. Should the degraded voltage condition occur in a non-accident condition (no SIS present), an additional 111 second time delay is provided. These time delays are specific to the feeder breakers (2 per bus). If the degraded voltage is not alleviated in the overall 119 seconds (nominal delay).] Qhe bus feeder breaker is tripped. Ok//k((/ofLSELSisaddressedinLC03.8.1,"ACSources-Operating,"andLC0 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." { fUpondetectionofadegradedvoltagecondition,LSELSinitiatesalogicsignalwhich'd serves only to trip the 4.16 kV ESF bus normal and alternate feeder breakers. The l undervolage relays detect an undervoltage condition and the same initiaton signals g described above are actuated. L.IUpon recognition of a loss of voltage at the 4.16 kV ESF buses, a logic signal (generated by LSELS initiates the following: o

l LOP DG Start Instrumentation l B 3.3.5 BASES ases A3.3.g APPLICABLE appropriate sequencing delay, if applicable. eThe respons,e times SAFETY ANALYSES forESFASactuatedequipmentinfl.C0 (continued) (FeAtorfAttuatjerr Systfim.4ESEAD .3. . "Er [i N 4afet B include the appropriate DG loading and sequencing delay. The LOP DG start instrumentation channels satisfy Criterion 3 of t.'.e CC I;1 icy Stet .,U103fR150Xfc7J2L(1,11 L LCO The LCO for LOP DG start instrumentation requires that fog IQ15-Pi \\ channels perMWsyst~en bus of both the loss of voltage and degraded voltage Functions shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when the LOP DG start instrumentation supports safety systems associated with the ESFAS. InMODES5and6,thefgg 4&ddorywHcalh channels must be OPERABLE whenever the associated DG is required g g4 g 9,x A to be OPERABLE to ensure that the automatic start of the DG is g ge, r.P'm k.tuhe available when needed. Loss of the LOP DG Start Instrtmentation de y h L.co.cl Function could result in the delay of safety systems initiation s ader, Emer3q when required. This could lead to unacceptable consequences during accidents. During the loss of offsite power the DG powers y p the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumpf. Failure of these (ta.u-Q3 ) pumps to start would leave ti,Le;;r.13 er.; turbine driven ptmp, as well as an increased potential for a loss of decay heat al thrwwei the aw andary syda=. h+rtad-h hh EE,FAS di/ec.h c9,a n rec.etpi'M.a lou. et a ' ve4 a.ge 4,ip2 fn:,- h. LonA.% A h ergenc3 d. (Sequ ene.er ouet puT. re. lags; m y APPLICABILITY The LOP DG Start Instrumentation Functions are required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because ESF Functions are designed to provide protection in these MODES. Actuation in MODE 5 or 6 is required whenever the required DG aust be OPERABLE so that it can perform its function on an LOP or degraded power to the vital bus. ACTIONS In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nonconservative witt respect to the Allowable Value, or the channel is found fe arable, thm the function that channel provides must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition entered for the particular protection function affected. Because the rojuired channels are specified on a per bus basis, the Condition may be ( entered separately for each bus as appropriate. OPERABIUtTT of +he. Load Shedder wd. Emen3cneg Lead. 5equman. 6 aAdtussed. A Lc0 3 84 Ac..frources.-opev4W " and. Lco 3.e. 2,a Ac. Scrarcas -Shu.hn."- S ~ ~ (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 8 3.3 162 5/15197 i i

i LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES I ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application (continued) of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each function listed in the LCO. I The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function. n. Condition applies to the LOP DG start Function with one loss cf h5 voltage or degraded voltage channel @er'jmOe1lpe-o@ rinoperable. If one channel is inoperable. Required Action A.1 requires th t i channel to be placed in trip within 6 hours. With a channel i b trip, the LOP DG start instrumentation channels are configured to provide a one out of three logi_c to initiate a trip of the 5 , shed. E5F incoming offsite poweg genente, sn. LOP D&sbrt sign A.[ bas % ds, & \\ A Note is added to allow bypassing an inoperable channel for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels. This allowance is made where bypassing the channel does not cause an actuation and where at least two other channels are monitoring that parameter. The specified Completion Time and time allowed for bypassing one channel are reasonable ransidering the Function remains fully OPERABLE on every bus and the low probability of an event occurring during these intervals. M p en-Condition B applies when more than one_ loss of voltage or more SA4 ) than one dearaded voltage channel ([ war bus is inoperable. pe, s.3 - u.s3 _requiresiestding ail 4(t on(chtifinel (o3 r A o .m st u [The MCompletion Ti should allow ample hYN J time to repair most failureg,and takes into ccount t-4 the low probability of an event requiring an LOP start occurring during this interval. gg g ggg 3.a.53a. A Lc.O 3.8.}, " AC. Swou WA*J (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 8 3.3-163 5/15197

E I INSERT B 3.3-163 0 3.3-99 j M [pr[1 e. t n[or sAlit [t d / d h or t a ow e or feny 3EIS/ ngper__ l @VRAMDHD F s//~0nce in this Condition the affected Tnstrument function (loss of voltage g r degraded voltage) may no longer be single f ailure proof or may no longer be functional for the affected bus. In this case, operation in the MODE of Applicability must be limited. Condition B requires that the associated load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS) be immediately declared inoperable. This action is appropriate because the affected instrument channels (loss of voltage @ r degraded voltage) are inputs to the LSELS.fnd ly Ldt circu st r orm h ir r 1 red actu 1on. 5 ~ nce thir % tu t I ca act ati la for lo ower ' stru en (bo tu in dri e AF ump dies g er sta ) ar a i tegra pa f e E ,a ncy able LS S may 1 pr ent h lo of wer in rume s from @er mi th inte ed fun tions. [LanLS reip on 4hese. shpia cdc.tute. 40 %m NS requind achutiths( tiabAv. dr* t ev - d ri h A F W p g a, s%ut. Vis Oe. Li SEQ >iwnp Mart viin. Ebc9-ESFASM 4 edet ejenevA'ev vb.w, tse.t.5). AS INSERT B 3.3-163a 0 3.3-99 When the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, the Completion Time of Required Action C.1 in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt action. / Eed. Iced shedder ind. M si,er $e.ng le>>d. seq , The moc. I (Lasts) mot 64. eke tav ea A opv>A iA-chteJg wh : O.. IYlove. bm orut loss c4 witaqt or more. 4hm ena dgracled volty-c.hmru_A. pu-bu.o a A ope"*% or / 3. 'The. Regw.ha. Ac.:hsn oma. amisoc.'inted C-pt.a_b b' Time of Coraib A th not ema.t. f ~ l

LOP DG Start Instrtmentation B 3.3.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.3 (continued) A ue b m M M 3 3 4 b REQUIREMENTS re The Frequency of huonths is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industr refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an nth calibration interval in the determination of the magnit of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. (due. (bmMcA)lq3.341\\ REFERENCES 1. R)SAR, Section 8.3. [WC 3.3-626(i[ 2. RISAR, Chapter 15. pg g -. g . _e,, ho ogy._j,thei_ _ _ _ 1 i 7, * *". 2.. / wJ s l 4235s 4 t;s he pbmanco, d ihe. requded. responsa. 6R 3.3.5.4 / +de verihcahon eveg 16 months en a sr4ceserca msr Req vvsa.~TirAs Verificats ac@mui criteri> are: I "R* A 5 55. g i bb 8 rneasures, id**TidG 55(rWAL.Mo puuc:now Re.sause Tme h %, tat repsa-t,,,3,p pu,e O l

a.. Akv Ste unde <vtAbp -

A.14 ss cands, umcian.valiaf. fcigs, I g,p y, teefc careditetwr+43or d l

b. 4k.v Bar, Lindervel4*p -

f,144 suonds smc..j t GrtA DysAeA b\\tys. $Ach vuibcattw shall Made., al lost enc 4r$n such 4M bek fras' s are veriEed o.t teeu t o,nca. per % menh. n WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 8 3.3 166 5/15/97

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 -BASES BACKGROUND The onsite standby power source for each 4.16 kV ESF bus is a (continued) dedicated DG. DGs 11 ;.-d 122Atand.B are dedicated to ESF buses it end-4BB012andlNB02, respectivelyIAThe DG starts automatically on a

• dim, e -

safety injection (SI) signai (i.;. 1;; er;;;uri;;r ;;r;;;er; er_ high gg Q

t;i;

/.,;r;;;;;r; ;ig al

Qr on ~an ESF bus undervoltage signDN-'l fMtrre ff p CO

.3 'Wss pr FjoeerAC0fy!MetePtionfrat@4DraDt'heta r io 4 Atdegraded.voltsgersignalyproduces :an underyoltagescondition. by, opening timenormal;and; alternate:1eeder breakers;tortheibus(esFexperiencing,degradedtvoltage6 After the DG nas started it will automatically tie to its respective bus after r offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or degraded voltage independent of or coincident with an SI signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESF bus on an SI signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, a Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer (LSELS) strips rer.,ar..;ra..:.cnon-essential loads from the ESF bus. When the DG is tied to the ESF bus, essential; loads are then sequentially wmcted to its respective ESF bus by t" " " load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application. In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automat'ically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloadirig the DG in the process. Within 1 minute after the initiating signal is received, all loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service. Ratings for Train A and Train B DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating nf each DG is-7999 6201 kW with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours in any 24 hour period. The ESF loads that are powered from the 4.16 kV ESF buses are listed in Reference 2. [Qas-qq] h.4 si nals h.re t$th* tect Gom he. la2d. Shedder mL Emeygerw3 ead a l ' Sequencev- (L5E.LS). OPGERAB L t.LT7 a{ the. umdceVolt3tjf Twd dedfadtd voltagc. fumc.2 tim 5 afc. addrutneA.6 LC.O 3.3.5," Lowe4 her (t.4@ Dicest ernerMtys (DG) Start instruanentA2.t Ah." L-iAshmenta.bh (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 - Bases 3.8 B 3.8 2 5/158 7

E AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES l we.3Emb I LCO One sit circ M co sts Safer rd; T-afer..a. 0,a (continued) 34 3 '. 8 ' tr former ich suppl fr he east:345 kV itc rd B, a i; f " J.re # feeds-rough / manual nnep. br d - 52 3 d rir-o the - F tran former X 1 Nich,j dis turjr,powerdhe SF bu throu its no 1 feede brea r. Ano r o0 site cuit consis of t tartup ansfo r, / ich i normel fed f the .t 345,,jhritc_..dBu,aitcy.h.d Bue, i.c.d i-f-d f ing thr gh bre er PA 02, to 2717. ^,.; ESF nsfo XlB0

which, turn, rs t

'2 ESF us t ugh i normal eeder eaker. _ _an_ alt rna_te_t, he 34 13.8. _ tr former._the_di nnect; ..belpos..oned; _;. s y m.a d.y l Oto . ratei.f .the,th. 345J ines Jyj . he... .d,! to p ide off te powe o ESF nsff 1750' a. 67/ .8 3V t nsfonner. When 01 is ngfedA rom t 69 kV ource,,ofMite 9 kV 1 t con. ed to t 345 kV 4. ystem_ NsEAT rh 3.6-4 n Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage. and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltag#. This will be accomplished within-4912' seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode. Upon failute oLeither_the DGJubo. oil quacket water keepJarip i e4 gis__s met, systemat_he DG tamai.gsJperable:iuntil. the_applicabl,e low temperature t efqud ed alarm _Leondition it achieved. Gropersequencingof ds, Snclud5gthiof nonessential loads, arO [Q3.3Mj is a required function or DG OPERABILITY. _It addJtion,_the ASELS Automatic _T,est_ Indicator (ATI):,is;an;Lnstalled; testing _aidianfis,not requiredito beLOPERABLE to support the: sequencer: function. Absence of a functioning ATI does not render 6iEMMt.1c3eeg seguepeer) nopert.hle. ( Inihhhn3 om ED/.r stat up a. de.tec.ted umdevvo% or degraded-l voR%e.c.vnd'dtom / ~ l (continued) 1 WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 - Bases 3.8 B 3.8-4 S/15/97

1 Q5.3-49 g Q y g g_g 7, g g % AC Sources-Operating inaMWy,F %. EOCr to start p a B 3.8.1 BASES lossc4 esF Wu,vottqc.or degrad.s.d, vehge. ccmdifton. A AdittWnauf t set s. + vips twa. E5F bus no enW and. ACTIONS { E;l aHernaTc. feeder supplies ornd Waps, non-ewentdd

g.,

(continued) Required Action F[1 provides. assurance.that,the appropriate Action is entered for..the affected~DG and.offsite circuit-if its associated Load. Shedder:andLEmergency Load Sequencer..(LSELS)abecomes inoperable. W A sequencer; failure results1 n the, inability,.to start al1~ or.part of 1 t.he: safety 1oads; powered from the associated"ESF bus and thus when andsLSELS:is inoperable it71s ' appropriate to;1mmediately enter the c Conditions;for an11noperable DG and;offsit6 circuit. Because an inoperable lLSELS"affects all or part of the. safety loads, an imediate Completion Time 1s appropriate. F-4F.2 The Load Shedder.& Emergency. Load SeequencerW (LSELS) is an essential support systam to both:the offsitetcircuit and the _DG l associated with a given ESF bus. Furthermore,Lthe sequencer 1s on the. primary 1 success path for most_ major AC;el_ectrically powered safety: systems; powered from-the associated:ESF bus. Therefore, loss of an ESF:busLsequencer affects every major ESF system in the division. The 12; hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem comensurate with the importance of maintaining sequencer OPERABILITY. This time period also ensures that the I probability of an accident (requiring sequencer OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when the sequencer is inoperable is minimal. Thi; Cenditim i; pr;;2d by ; %t; trat ;ll;w-tra Cenditi; te b; il;ted if th; unit i;ign i- =h trat my xqxx;r f;ilur; si Will enly ;ff;;t th; ;bility of th; ; ;;;i;ted OC te p;n-it; l PespeeF:: nf;t3 ici mir.n3 xaditiera. !;;;plicit in thi-Lt; i th; sax pt trat tt; O s diti n t b; r;t;1 x d if my x qu x ;r I f;ilur; si cxult; in tre ixbility t; -tert ;11 er p;-t of tre l

efety le;d Wh;n 7; quired, 7;;;rdi;;;; Of pri r ;V;il;stility, er result; in earleeding tFa eff;it; peur circuit te ; ;;f;ty bu-1.

2 -. --..._ - a a ........ as. .2,... ,,.., _, 2.a s s- -u. wwt 3ITy usu bubssb u s ygg b s vb 5 b a#g wwudbd Ibd BM3 5 us b o s 14 eFV 5 TWy 5 3b5b 5g5 b1Tb l %tc. i; thet th; CG/.ition i Tet ;ppliGbi; t; eny tr^in tret de;; ret hn; ; aqu x;r. G.1 and G.2 If the inoperable AC electric power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-lul - Ba:es 3.8 8 3.B 15 5/158 7

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES (Er.s.s.cor. I I ' rov ..o. sit to ._tr _. fo r_ 31 two3 _13A. kp LCO to (continued) _ans _.,_ n _ Olis. _ ;f m 6 V1 _.; j ffsfte Q 1xnot,wrewted t 5' sys / The DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished withirH e -12 seconds. The DG must be capable of accepting required loads [G3.3 49 } within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These (In'ihatiA capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial 3 MuP conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in { o dataduL umdervoltat-standby at ambient conditions. 'oeeneya6cA VoH3%"~ ~ (cna:tt% roper sequencing of loads, Cinc%d'%Thripping of nonessential loads ed] is a' required function for DG OPERABELITY. OnJLt_he.. shut @gg) sequencer Anlhe_ train upported'by;.the)0PERABLE'DG istf44DTPed_ to be OPERABLE'_in_ MODES 5 a

6. -

@ tsELs a rgui=A]. In 7.dditi;n. i,regr ;;;;; eer egretic,a i; en int;;r:1 grt ;f eff;it; circuit 0":"#!L "' ; ire; it; ir.egrebility ig;;t; r,n th; etility te : tert ;r.d nint;;in crar;i;;d ler.d; r;;uir;d CWJ2LC by L:::.:.::. It is acceptable for trains to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, allowing a single offsite power circuit to supply all required trains. APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in H0 DES 5 and 6 and durin; =n.xc.; cf irri.di;ted fuci e;;;.-Liic:; provide assurance that: a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core: b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available: h334'lk i ln natih4n, +ke 1 SELL Aukemahtc.'Ted hecdov (ATL) to W ~ i Astatted. tes tVn3 cud. M t o nst. rgtxudd.to L24 OPE 52.A%E te su9 pat.*. the sequencm fumcb'crw. Aboamu ed a h.itrn l \\ doe s neh vencter L.SELS Mope a trEn. l (continued) i WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 - Bases 3.8 B 3.8 38 5/]S/97

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES -(continued) ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. B.1. B.2. B.3. and B.4 (continued) Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated eventsj kt is further required to inmediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to pravide the necessary AC power to the unit safety systems. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety syctems may be without sufficient power. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6. the Distribution System's ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de energization. Therefore. the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to anythe required ESF bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit, whether or not a train is de energized. LCO 3.8.10 would provide the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de energized train. M (TwaracT23.e-+o) Q3.5 99 ' v v 1 18 (LocA porMh qs.o.2 o4wt SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that a necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in oth r than MODES 1, 2,

3. and 4.

Z 0.0.1.0 i; ret r;;; ired t; M x 1 ; ire; caly era eff;it; ;ir;;it is required t; k OrtrJ,0Lt. =:.0.1.17 i; re: na.ind t:, M a M;;; tb ra;ind ^"'~"Z =;; i;.;; r;;uired t; ur.dcrF, p;ried; cf kin; ;y al,,erim: t; t k eff;it;

ir;;it. SR'3.8.1.12,1SR 3;8

1;13,1SR:3.8 m 4 @ SR 3.8.1:19 are Qefr Wrenigter.se armen because;the; capability;to; respond 1tola, fety injection signal,is not required tof.be,demonstratedli.n M00E15 or;6.

g 7 SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not equired =% l_ _ with the DGH) that is not required t be operable. t N SR 3.4.l. ten M SR,3.8.1.2),q h.,.tiow 7 sg g,,p g g-wWchte6 ths. Load shedh M Emergeac Lond.Se.qu.amcm. (LSEt.5) e requded A Mo0E haAb. es.s.z o4 ac.1J ~ (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 - Bases 3.8 8 3.8 40 SAS/97

m- - INSERT B 3.8-40 0 3.3-99 he shutdown. portion of the Co M eddtrr antrhr6ncMMm#nnr ELS s ~ - an essential support system to both the offsite circuit and the DG associated with a given ESF bus. Furthermore, the sequencer is on the primary success path { for most AC electrically powered safety systems powered from the associated ESF bus. With the required LSELS (shutdown portion) inoperable, immediately declare the affectea DG and offsite circuit inoperable and take the Required Actions of Conditions A and B. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. _ _~ 4 R*qu.hA Act s',w c. \\ p,,y,'a s a.s.urswu.ht the. opp 7 aia. i AcA s6. A et4reA. b ha. a.ffecteoL 00 wA. *Nsite. circu4 shtdoe yb d %. Leg %eh >~L Emereg if t ese. 1 Load. Sequm.m ( LSELs) 6.c.om 3 c.p,4,.0,,,, i t

l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: WC 3.3-021 APPLICABILITY: WC REQUEST: (original) ITS Tables 3.3.6-1 and 3.3.7-1 (formatting only) as well as several ITS 3.3 Bases are revised in response to NRC reviewer comments on the CPSES Bases that are generic to Wolf Creek. REQUEST: (supplement) As discussed with the NRC reviewer on March 12,1999, additional changes to the ITS 3.3.3 Bases are made to address reviewer comments. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment No. 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Encl. 5B B 3.3-147, B 3.3-148 l I l l l I 'f i i l l l

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES dhnrefilsohle/ mea 5,1@imrig L .10. 17, 10 (c_o_ntinued.)- M;; iintified tM tMc;-;-:;-g1; pirir6; tMt xti;fy [Q33-2.f! tM x r;;;ir at;. Two sets of two thermocouples ensure a single failure will not disable the ability to determine i the radial temperature gradient. le Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate l G3.3-2.t } AFW Flow Rate is a Category:2 variable provided to moni_ tor _ I operation of decay heat removal via the SGs. pre,ps.g - ~ Qacs.s o2c(4 1 i The AFW Flow to each SG is determined from a differential l pressure measurement calibrated for a range of 0 gpm to 1999 400 gpm. Rede dst a atterirs ;;p tility i; presi id by ta irsq-;atat treia; cf instre;at;tica fer ;;;h 00. Each differential pressure transmitter provides an input to a control room indicator and the unit computer. Sirice the primary indication used by the operator during an accident is the control room indicator, the PAM specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel. AFW flow is used three ways: to verify delivery of AFW flow to the SGs: e to determine whether to terminate SI if still in e progress, in conjunction with SG water level (narrow range); and to regulate AFW flow so that the SG tubes remain e covered. At na unit;. A"J flew i; ; Tg; A ;;riebl; k;;ax egreter ection i; required to thretti; flew irir; er. 02 n;id;at t; pr;a..t tM A"J R; fre epri.tir; in rur.;;t cec.ditia;. AFW flow is also used by the operator to verify that the AFW System is delivering the correct flow to each SG. However, the primary indication used by the operator to ensure an adequate inventory is SG 1evel. (continued) WCGS.4iark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 8 3.3 147 5/15l97

1 a - INSERT B 3.3-147 WC 3.3-020(2) 'The AFW flow rate. indicator for each SG is located in the main control room. .Each of the four flow-indicators is powered by a different separation group. Since only two of. four SGs are required to establish a heat sink for the RCS. i ' flow indication to at least two intact SGs is as d even if a single failure is assumed. AFW flow rate indication is not a Typ / riable nor is it Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 1. (Reference 9). I l-

4 PAM Instrumentation r B-3.3.3 BASES' LCO N-tuc 23-ou T (continued) fie ~. Refueling Water Storaae Tank (RWST) Level varfablelforidetermining5switchogsfjontai._,_._ Refuelingyag StoragelTanKJ.everi slaTM A~ 3' ^ tdithje %1nenntMrtplationi$umpsiJThisR_ indicatlorEfs;providedifor theingatgitoJassi.stfin m km2q monitoringEamilensuringsniadequateIslippl{y 6f safetydnjection.andicentainmentisprayl -gas.s-Mg APPLICABILITY' The PAM instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2 and 3. These variables are related to the diagnosis and pre planned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are 'i asstmed to occur in MODES 1. 2 and 3. In MODES 4. 5 and 6. unit conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is low; therefore, the PAM instrtmentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. ACTIONS Note 1 has been added in the ACTIONS to exclude the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the 1 applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually required unit shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the passive function of the instrueents, the operator's ability to respond to an accident using alternate instruments and methods, and the low probability of an event requiring these instruments. Note 2 has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.31. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function. When the Required'ChannelsTin1 Tab]e 3~3!3 Care specifTedTon a'gid drilefhlthenithe l6S-2O C Condition ney'be^

separatelydorzeachisa;sptsRGiiilipiiiilb bask (continued)

. WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 8 3.3 148 5/15/97

-] 'l i INSERT BL3.3-148 WC 3.3-021 Table ~ 2Lof Reference 2 requires all plant-specific Type A variables to meet Category 1 design and qualification criteria: however, RWST Level is specifically identified in that same table as a Type D Category 2 variable. In this specific ~ case. as'dise"ssed in Sections-7.A.3.1 and 7A.3.6 of Reference 1, the -{ requirement. af ' Category 1 are met. 1 l 1 -3 4 j

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: WC 3.3-023 ' APPLICABILITY: WC l REQUEST: (original) By letters dated February 4,1998 (letter ET 98-0002) and October 20, 1998 (letter ET 98-0072) Wolf Creek submitted a license amendment request which proposed to revise Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Functional Unit 6.f, Loss of Offsite Power-Start Turbine-Driven Pump, in TS Tables 3.3-3,3.3-4, and 4.3-2 to create separate Functional Units for the analog and digital portions of the ESFAS function associated with starting the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump on a loss of offsite power. Additionally, the request proposed to revise ESFAS Functional Unit 8.a,4 kV Undervoltage - Grid Degraded Voltage, in Technical Specification Table 4.3-2 to add a table notation to clarify that the testing of the time delay relays is performed as part of the CHANNEL CAllBRATION. As discussed with the NRC Project Manager for Wolf. Creek, this proposed change will be issued as a license amendment prior to issuance of the conversion amendment. Therefore, the conversion license amendment application is being revised to reflect the approval of the proposed change. The CTS markups from the October 20,1998 letter are included for information. New JFD 3.3-146 has been initiated to reflect incorporation of CTS into the ITS. REQUEST: (supplement) As discussed with the NRC reviewer on March 10,1999, to more accurately reflect the incorporation of the proposed amendment request, additional changes are made to ITS SR 3.2.2.7, Table 3.3.2-1 and SR 3.3.5.2. For SR 3.2.2.7, the Note is reinstated since the LOP start circuits are tested under ITS 3.3.5 and there are no relay setpoints for the LSELS output relays and BOP ESFAS separation groups logic associated with the turbine driven AFW pump. With the reinstatement of this Note, JFD 3.3-136 is no longer applicable to Wolf Creek. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment No. 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Encl. 5A 3.3-32,3.3-42, 3.3-55 Encl. SB B 3.3-129, B 3.3-165 Encl.6A 16 Encl. 68 23 l l l r

i ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 + m R o 3 ' SURVEILLANCE REWIREMENTS E ]1 i u [Q 3.L5C } ........................................N0TE- ' Refer to Table 3.3.2 1 to determine which SRs" apply for each ESFAS Function. yh i SURVEILLANCE FRE@ENCY SR 3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR'3.3.2.2 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.2.3 NOTE -- -- The continuity check may be excluded. l Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days on a j i STAGGERED TEST i BASIS SR 3.3.2.4 Perform HASTER RELAY TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST l BASIS j ~ (... um------ Nat agl'acatrta b slow re goa.,uso,w.ssa.,naq%.,g*aso, 92 days SR 3.3.2.5 Perform COT. l /WT%.M.5 ' i l y IQ s.3 l'Q ( 3.3 -19 j m SR 3.3.2.6 Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST. 92 days , ggBh ' l l l 1 I M.', remo* \\ tx 3.3-N.3 } SR 3.3.2.7' NOTE - smu+h% n b ^ Perform TAD 0T. a,mng ( 3_ r m- [ _I B v" A N ) (3.3-t40.\\ i ~ (continued [tW 3.3 023] l WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS3.3 3.3 32 5/15/97 l J

ESFAS InStrimentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.21 (page 8 of 11) Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Inst: unentation. APPLICARLE MODES N OTER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE Mia FUNCTION COM)ITIONS CHANELS COWITIONS REQUIREENTS VALUE" SliUGWP* 6. Auxiliary ree&sater - (contim ed) Ws3?3j08F _ldpt.3r] afety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Sofety Injection) for all kWC3 3~0"O \\ initiation functions ano requirements. y,3, g4g, l42 'D.] fs. ' Loss of Offsite Power 1.2.3 2 trains / SR .3,P.u //

[52) "

[r7 ] "

7 p nG itt ; 0.0 .itt ; 0.0 f @A see-t+ee see-ene 3.3 -5T de+ey N4 de+ey NA 4 a.3-5s ] (continued) (a) P,xi;; * ; P;^;. "-it g;;i'i; igi_..; tic; xy _..'ai, =1; "" "1; ";la i;lr.; ; C..mirt C'dy ^._r.;;y _xt ry tt; mit The AllowableJalue defines thetimiting_ Safety, System Settint.Wthe seses;folr the; Trip setpoints.- J WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.3 3.3 C S/15/97

I l-g gdorA Acts amA, LOP DG Start Instrumentation a.uoclaicA Comp \\etidnTime- &. bLi 3.3.5 = .f Ginsibin A n*t m *L. %Ixe. moaa g'3,q sheMer ><d emer58" \\ load.m.qu m % ( M ACTIONS (continued) d" F# b- ~ COM)ITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1 ~ B. One or more Functions B.1 e l o l (J21iedbs with two or more b, F,4b $$31599i' 5 n t E E Db channels @s ( inoperable. p3.3.qq g A [G3f l.' p / i Kp M __ _ ons._:.. .1 in. AJ.' hours n aC ilon $s3?)@93j ___C#iit _ E 13L ._2 .'2 in-- . NODE'S' 36' .-s \\WM] / 1ately l Eg. equir Actio and .1 Ente appli le / I as iated C letion Co ition and R red $]$$31991$ I /{ T not when_!t tion ( for the l associ _ l.DG;is associ ed DG _offsite/ ci_ _ tlande perablp/ f b OP DG art instr tation. { SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1 Not used] m 12 h; n psyggg -P Ac. s.s oa @Perforsinuul.---ELM 1 M H.P i:.W +i~L) L% SR 3.3.5.2 31 days yp ggy ggj l (continued) or ore. im 6 C R

e. ant #

m \\Wh A er ore n s F im

• W b.se m'
• ta 4e op E bM(

i i WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.3 3.3 55 S/15M7

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE-SR 3.3.2.6 (continued) REQUIREMENTS y7sg ;. iFregdpe&safet.y sunctio3nThe Frequency is adequate, based on industry operating experience, considering gq3,3 gg} instrument reliability and operating history data. A fThe SR iimodiEsd 19 a klote, ht windes, slaw relap Kte2., (Km, Ka,2.2, 92+, KG30, K T40, a.wL MMi W,ch are, N f*mb 'SR 3.3.2.7 TdisWDadb$ SR 3.3.2.63 aad SR 3.3.2.14. "*1 NM-gs -.nmc _ _ _ _ _0R' day 9. This[ tac,3 } ix..s.3 -azoN] SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a TADOT everyfat:: test is a check of the Loss of Offsite Power fhnetionSDe"Wip actilat1Vifdiiff~rkrtestedTrithinDiscopiFof"SR13IZFaHi?thn = - - se hon m 9'8T g J' "r;;;r; L a Turatier.;. T at, Tureti;; i; t uted up te. ;r. Mb th M ma-i xluding. tre = ;t;r tr;r.;fu r:1;y wil;. m et., e vt. Y ctrtwm AFtd putmP pm an ass M umdervettage mien] M* ra tat== i=:;da trip z.1;u trat==id; atati= M

f_er;l; dirst?y t; tt.c OS"Sj?; S", i;.;ediff;d__t

^ ; Ot; t3 F='

g,g g.sM J a]i. -- '9=ti;r Of :.t wint; fer 7:l=:.#Repy js tpo F 1r ya chat 11Wndaffe4erfMed4ur = 1 L.EALI T ./theFrequency1sadequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability exrd.ts covestenk iMb and operating history datd +ha.+ ypidai refue.lin3 cydc.. l % t1anut sdat3.ij.h rAoctrsk.it edepencien41 3 g,gg 1 Theid n M MD &Vds, ' Verify cPenASu. cry e,f +he. hMdSdttch LWdef*I. E t fe.sried hAve. re MSOC. lated SR 3.3.2.8i and, sbl -tvir contacts fier ben +he. Rexbn r igo g,u,, ,.,,,g, p,,,,w. n.i ' '8/Pu* D"** k [ s:tpht, yeit e3he cowhaets fe>raakt syechen uw'"*b_ey F *d f SR 3.3.2.8 is the perfonnance of a TADOT. This test is a check ~ of the Manual Actuation Functions (SSPSP)and AFW pump start on %(pd 41.0 ip of all MFW plaps BOPLESHIS. It is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and )Q31(5-il including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.). The Frequency is adequate, based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT for manual initiation Functions. The manual initiation Functions have no associated setpoints. (continued) WCGS-Mark-ap ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 8 3.3129 5115197

LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES !gr;;;;nt critari; erc d;tccr. ired by the unit st;ff. based on ; ce..bination of th; denral instru;ent urecrtaintics. including indi;; tion ;nd rcadobility. If ; chancel is outsidc the criterie, it rey bc or, indication thet th; s;n;;r or th; signal preccasin; equip;;nt has drift;d cutsid; its li;;;it. loc 2 3-o d N The l rcqur.ncy is based on ep;reting cxperica;; th;t d;;eastrates The SR,i* md'f'd dearel failure is rarc. ";; C".'f5L CllCCX supol;;;nts icas b a g.k t6.d-forsel. but ser; fri;;;nt. d i d s of d ;nnel; durins norsal 1 bI' Cres,+m3 4 +he. +4 detag <et>p e. yvf-mun.] e cluAes vedfioEm / I N 07 0 i I "~r-- , % g,p,j (a pxt of the. cH Aucet. c.AL t es.A t 100 (SR S.3.5.3) i 3g SR 3.3 3.2 reAIAa. (brachded.h.143 3 C5 -I } SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a TAD 0T. This test is performed every 31 days The test checks trip devices that provide actuation signals directly, bypassing the analog process control equipment, For these tests, the relay _ Trip Setpoints are verified and 6djusted as necessary. fThe Frequency is based on the known reliability of the relays and controls and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be able through operating experience.fif +be me>sarecL'hc,3,3,eoj acc setpoint, dog.s.not e<mA_ the. Allou.wbRs Vatw. h -trip cts.vtea.15 ccmsMuu.d. OPER.A8tf. SR 3.3.5.3 SR 3.3.5.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. m~ - - = _ Ica.3.3.ED) The s int s well the re nse to oss offtage a d aded tage t . shall clude a ngle ht erif tion t the tri occurs in t equired imedday.) e'; snown in "cf;reme ~ g,g g A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months. or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured pa,ameter within the necessary range and accuracy. (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-Bases 3.3 B 3.3 165 5115197

l 1: CHANGE IDBER JUSTIFICATION l 3.3 125 . ITS SR ?.3.1.11 is modified by a Note that requires verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values. { The addition of this Note is consistent with SR 3.3.1.10 and is required because SR 3.3.1.11 is used for the Power Range Neutron l Flux High Positive Rate [] trip function which has a time l constant actociated with its calibration. 3.3 126 . Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). l 3.3 127 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table l (Enclosure 68). 3.3 128 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.3 129 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). l 3.3 130 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table l (Enclosure 68). j 3.3-131 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table l (Enclosure 68). 3.3 132 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.3 133 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparise: T ble t (Enclosure 6B). Iwc 3 3-otD 3.3 134 The in it Ko TS 3 .2 ha is onsi entl 1-w curr TS able .3 ion [ for ncti 7b l .a.-4 .d. 43 pro 'de 4 urs f the add ona ha to bedced byp for rveil nce t ting ot cha gn l tusesRT 6A-w e f i 3.3 135 A MODE change restriction has been added to ITS 3.3.1 Condition C l per the matrix discussed in CN 102 LS 1 of the 3.0 package. (See the LS 1 NSHC in the CTS Section 3/4.0, ITS Section 3.0 package). 3.3 136 u rI ..7 nc e ca es TS 3 M Lised. [IMsMLT 6A-ILl - W .\\w.nstsl WCGS-Dufferencesfrom NUREG-1431-ITS 3.3 16 5/15A97 - J45 l AJ5GtT GA -IGhpc 3 3~#'ll y,n p..:r a - w> --va. u -c>m

3 7 2 l F 3 a A f 8 a_ 1 z S o o E 3 3 3 / 2 3 g s S s g e Y N c C g A A a a W e{ 0 F P A e s L L A s s o e e C N Y Y 1 34 1 K [ G EE E R R Y C y U T F I N L L s s /e O e e I B W Y Y 6 M A /\\ C O I R L K ~ S P A T F P E S I A P 'o S d E E pJ H I C CN N A E M f* s O f o 0 e R C N k 3 Y j E l F M {l-F N 3 O I D3 Y A'- a N RN A w C OO O 3' FI L 3N- ~ T B EC A Vo s I 3 e L E D N Y Jf o B S A e n ] T nl g ib f nr \\

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i di c t o ad 3 ci.. [t O t d e ncd C E cn n f ns 3i see 3 i e al o es G ft a eu R m 3 N N i s n bc S sa ssu S A ci o s t es i si S n T O H pn n t ad Tie e I C so o s h I o h +- b I c i e x pt e k t ni rt l S C e2 or eee4 3' 3 b R E e it d sr a r3 n t a n at 2 2 T P C a _ cm uy E S 3 a i ad f r l re dl e n V l S o l th eet 8, B> o H oT f st mrs i_ N C WI rre oft s e r e i c 6 r E N s O T O sf r eg f o 2 a i o epa ~ g T p r I s g k enn5 C T eK nCc poi t T m E o g i r a a i e3 r P nn t o h np Ttb m e C I ao co Oa 3 R hi e i0 D cs u n ct d Et Ai eR C N n i

3. i Di3 f cS i

o S sd a Od ii i n 3 p Mne rvS s E h o y oh eeT r D TC1 g ( v ACt vdI e f i n 5 oC R E 4 5 6 4 1 B 1 1 1 S-3 3 3 1 U 3 3 3 3 3 G M C N 3 3 3 W

r o l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FO: ' Q' 3.6.3-26 APPLICABILITY: WC l REQUEST: DOC 11-05 ' ".s-14 l JFD 3.6-4 JFD 3.6-22 ~JFD 3.6-23 STS 3.6.3 Condition J. and B Note i STS 3.6.3 Action C The CTS markup for CPSES and DCPP adds a new condition to cover the case where one containment isolation valve is inoperable in a penetration flow path of the type configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system (GDC 57). This new condition is STS 3.6.3 ACTION C. The CTS /ITS markup for Callaway and 4 WCGS does not add this new condition but deletes it based on the justification that these i plants do not have GDC 57 valves. In addition, the Note associated with STS 3.6.3 l Condition A and B is deleted for the same reason. Based on the rejection of the change described in Comment Number 3.6.3-10, the staff position is that the valves listed in that change are 10 CFR 50 Appendix A GDC 57 type valves and STS 3.6.3 Adon C and the Note to STS 3.6.3 Conditions A and B are applicable.- i Comment: Revise the CTS /ITS markup to add STS 3.6.3 ACTION C and the Note to STS 3.6.3 Conditions A and B, and provide the appropriate discussions and justifications. FLOG RESPONSE: (original) No changes required. The containment isolation system design bases are documented in Section 6.2.4 of the Callaway FSAR and the Wolf Creek USAR. As noted in Section 6.2.4.3., Safety Evaluation Seven and in Figure 6.2.4-1, none of the containment isolation valve arrangements are covered by GDC-57. All applicable containment penetrations for Callaway and Wolf Creek fall under either GDC-55 or GDC-56. This information was reviewed and incorporated into the licensing basis for Callaway and Wolf Creek during the initial plant licensing. Also, see response to Comment Number 3.6.3-10. FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As discussed with the NRC on March 18,1999, Condition C of ISTS 3.6.3 will be incorporated into the ITS. This condition also applies to GDC-55 and 56 type penetration valves that meet the alternate containment isolation provisions specified in SRP 6.2.4. As discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the containment isolation provisions for the RHR System suction lines and Containment Spray System suction lines from the containment recirculation sumps and the RHR System shutdown lines are considered to be the normally closed containment isolation valve (s) and the closed, ESF-grade systems outside containment serves as the second isolation barrier. Licensee identified item WC 3.6-005 is deleted with the reinstatement of the Note to Condition B. L

ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment No.12, CTS 3/4.6 - ITS 3.6 Encl. 2 3/4 6-16 (INSERT 3/4 6-16) Encl. 3A 11 Encl. 3B 9 Encl. 4 1, INSERT 4-d Encl. 5A Traveler Status page, 3.6-9, 3.6-11, 3.6-12, 3.6-13, 3.6.e. 4 Encl. 58 B 3.6-20, B 3.6-21, B 3.6-22, B 3.3-23, B 3.6-24, B 3.6-30 Encl. 6A 2, 4 Encl. 6B 1, 4 1 1 J 1

CJMTAINMENT SYSTEMS / --07-4; [43.6,0-1/ 3/4 8 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3f 3hntainment isolabon valve shall be OPERABLE. {q a6.$-10 { TCO r #- f.^ 3 a to .. - y*J oystvesgnS s v F la ,and os ric ist - f. Q"*~g a ^ APPLICABILITY. MODES 1,2,3, and 4. ACTION 6 Wlth one or morepenetration flow paths with onBe64he containment isolatior. Elf-12~ff valve inoperable)xcept for containment purge valve leakage not within limit.) "'d~-' maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and: ---- tM b :; :TE ri:(:)'^ OPEP.^"' E -'-' ;.h,In 4 hours, f.ilil6M] eq w n~-~.- -b, Isolate each affected penetraborfflow F4.;O;" '- ' her by use of at least $i$i$ M T@ one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolabon position, or NNhh* -?. :":r:d ;:nn :-..:^^.:c ' 5:= by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flance. oJr tihock valve with now ] ["]I1!!2WD '*'"~~""~~d 1hrough the valvo neured AND vertfy the affected penetration flow path is isolated <. > per 31 days **

• for isolation devices outside ggg^3 containment anc, or to entering Mode 4 from Mode 5 if not performed t?
• dg g'j 4

Lwithin the previour./2 days for isolation devices inside containment, ory

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

$$3?zmmue l2TAS13 e, ^ ;::?:'::: ':;::":::. ? ^ ' de t - ;,. $na NEW. With one or more penetratiors flow paths with two isolation valves) inoperable for any reason other than leakage, isolate the affected EW04;f^'^ '^ "" " " '") penetration flow path within 1 hour by use of at least one clor and deactivated automatic valve closed manual valve or blind flangs otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours. ) r INSERT (see next page)

• • loolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified

['l.06-LS 19 ^ by administrative means.

• * - + " ^ ^ ~ + " * ' '

U 144-L$11 ' ~ + loolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of { adeninistrative means. ' j R- ~"""~ *f SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS h5EQ% ' * ?

• c--b p wsu>pa4 f1 un___

f OPE ^ LE pt: t::-^rr'n; Se ri:i ;;-i: ".:: r!n' rence, @U?6sNT!ff 5:, ' ^ n;'-- ..:n' et !: ;;i.r.:d en te vi: 7 t !- ::-'ed i', MNM8d J

_ _ _

^' ;::::: drit by ;;i-x::: Of : rjd:n; !!:1,2nd. ::': :. Of asolaben4ime, WOLF CREEK-UNIT 1 3/4 6-16 Amendment No. 33,89 Mark up ofCTS3N.6 SMS/97 i

F ) l \\ INSERT 3/4 6-16 Q 3.6.3-26 os-Lsas. l (New) With one or more penetration flow paths of the type configured with only one containment isolation valve I and a closed system with one containment isolation valve inoperable, isolate the affected penetration flow path within 72 hours by use of at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in cot.D SHUTDOWN within tne following . 30 hours. l l I l l ) I l

CHANGE i Nl#EER MitlC ~ DESCRIPTION knjsate 11 02 A wi L 1431. a te o the i i Val s ra conditi entr or e pe tio f p note vide uida a arif1 ion for of T) nd is nside a istrati e in Qf ] $ 3A-HA 7- ~F j Q 3.(. 3-(. 11 03 A This note is added to the Actions to enter applicable j Conditions and Required Actions for systems inoperable by containment isolation valves. se.AT SA- = t.-l 4s.64-3 11 04 A NUREG 1431 adds a new condition to the current Containmen; j Isolation Valve TS to cover the case where two containment isolation valves in a penetration flow path are inoperable. The current TS addresses only the condition of one valve inoperable in a penetration flow path. If two valves were inoperable on the same penetration, LCO 3.0.3 would be entered. Consistent with NUREG 1431 a-completion time of I hour is provided to isolate the penetration flowpath. This is the same amount of time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 before a power reduction action is specified and is administratively similar to the existing requirements. ,g g 1 n - 11 05 LS 14 Not n on< isoffTe 11 06 TR 3 Consistent with NUREG 1431, the current TS surveillance requirement to demonstrate the operability of each containment isolation valve by performance of a cycling and isolation time test prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit has been deleted. Any time repairs, maintenance or modifications have affected the operability of a system or component, post maintenance testing is required to demonstrate operability of the system or component. Particular surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate operability of the' system must be evaluated for each maintenance or modification performed. Explicit post-maintenance TS surveillance requirements have been deleted because these requirements are adequately addressed by administrative post maintenance testing programs. 11 07 LG Consistant with the NUREG 1431 level of detail, the descriptive material regarding the required containment isolation valve actuation signals in the current TS surveillance requirement is moved to the revised expanded bases. This is acceptable as the requirement to verify actuation of the valves is retained in the Technical - WCGS-Description of Changes to CTS 3N.6 11 S/2S/97

y INSERT 3A-11b 0 3.6.3-26 l'l-05 ' LS-14~ A new condition is added to the current Containment Isolation Valve TS to cover the case where one containment isolation valves is inoperable in a penetration flow path of the type configured with L only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. General l - Design Criteria 57 allows the use of a closed system in combination with a containment isolation valve to provide the two containment barriers against the release of radioactive material following an accident. [This condition also applies to GDC 55 and 56 type penetration valves that meet the alternate containment isolaton provisions ~specified in SRP 6.2.4. As discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report ~(NUREG-0830), the Containment Spray System and RHR System suction lines from the containment recirculation sumps must be opened af ter a LOCA.to satisy their postaccident functional requirement. For these lines, a single isolation valve located outside containment is provided because system reliability is greater with only one isolation valve in the line and because it is not practical to locate a second valve inside containment where it would be submerged after a LOCA. The Containment Spray System and the ECCS, which are closed ESF-grade systems outside containment, serve as the second containment isolation barrier. Additionally, each of the RHR System shutdown lines contains two normally closed, motor-operated valves in series inside containment. The containment isolation provisions for these lines are considered to be the normally closed system isolation valve closest to the containment and the closed ESF-grade ECCS to which they connect outside containment serves as the second containment isolation l barrier.] Traveler TSTF-30 provides the bases for extending the completion time for this condition to allows 72 hours to isolate an inoperable isolation valve associated with a closed system. The current TS LCO 3.6.3 does not allow the use of a closed system to isolate a failed containment isolation valve even though the closed system is subjected to a Type A containment leakage test, is missile protected, and is seismic category I piping. Also, a L closed system typically has flow through it during normal operation i such that any loss of integrity could be observed through leakage detection systems within containment and system walkdowns for closed systems outside containment. As such, the use of a closed l system is equivalent to isolating a failed containment isolation l valve by use of a single valve as specified in NUREG-1431 Required l Action A.1. The 72 hours provides the necessary time to perform repairs on a failed containment isolation valve when relying on an intact closed system. A completion time of 72 hours is considered appropriate given the reliability of the closed system and that 72 l. hours'is typically provided for losing one train of redundancy throughout-the NUREGs. If the closed system and associated containment isolation valve were both inoperable [and an isolation barrier not provided), the plant [may] be in LC0 3.0.3 since there is no specific Condition specified. l l L

M 7 a 1 A W 2 Y L W l e E / f A a< 3 S f*t - 4 o L 9 L s s s s s s A o1 e f e e e e e N pa e C Y v Y Y Y Y Y ga P s C i D h kt G e K rv ee E E C C a h R f C l t Y ov oo n Wn T F a I L v - se L s s s s s et O r y e e e e ooo e e I W Y _ N 5 Y 6 A Y Y Y Ndn B C 4 I / L K 3 P A N P E S A P T E T H 3 C N N E A 3-M s s s s s s s R O e e e e e e e C Y Y Y Y Y Y Y R U C N o t O n Y se E N et A oo L C dN B P s O Pi A L Ch Dt B T A h oe s s s s s s v I N D Y Y Y Y Y Y n Nh e e e e e e a e O m S e r t t t r t n e o n .h. a I n a nh or h o e h R e eti o t t rr m a et t m h matf e io n s h n n t npa l e rat i e s t e t A i a i l eb t opa a s ha mh n n a p awoma a i eu t a t enc o o P t tt osir r rrt n5B il ti a i i t e t yp c oT wl eae c s n w nnl M , a c d e l t n o o eof p sb n t e t e t w enf e Col mc t no. wf n nnonm oescd dnd n d oo d t O tt i eoeiie mvene een es c e x o n t e n n animt t el t at rra t a. t "d i s C rri n ail ay veei. i rp s o eeo t ot nens d a na uux il n r l ret oerap s o mt cd qce sao det e a N uha n e t ninoe e nni et a v C6tt enotd oti st ree ogt sac p r cwr 6 t t nocae ti ase hh cia iri o e O eee nMec l s nt nmal ett su vef t M y n h sn e p eoo eao e h d t epi I t ae re eh sl ml i rsd t no el c ror i. 3 S E o ua o rsati n g iu cp rsanti c eot et i t saa e td srv@ se S R G t ea ccn oa iil f e nsd vt y ie we et A N h iyot u oare i l e ecf eor t e E A nt n ee l s h qt s ob dav rai C cpi l o i hh enl st enie rno r V H i s ttl oAri re ces agm sne n u ee C t ss b uw mdi va gi iav ahq. md i ee orah o ennvl h ess l a r "e ce i e N t s l d rv t ert. hd

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NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) CONTENTS I. Organi zati on........................................ 3 II. Description of NSHC Evaluations..................... 4 III. Generic No Significant Hazards Considerations "A" Admi ni strative Changes......................... 6 "R" Relocated Technical Speci fications............. 8 "LG" - Less Restrictive (Moving Information Out of the Technical Speci fications h.................. 11 "M" - More Restrictive Requirements.................. 13 h IV. Specific No ',ignificant Hazards Considerations "LS" j LS 1................................................ 16 LS. 2................................................c4TE@-% s LS 3................................................ 20 LS 4................................................ 22 LS 5................................................ 24 LS 6................................................ 26 LS 7................................................ 28 osas-2.i LS. 9................................ N. e.b..ff.t r.aM... 30 ( 4,g,,ge, ( LS 8................................. LS 10.......................................... NQMN#d I NSE Kf 4 t-LS.11.................... .......................... 35 LS 12.................................... Not Appl i cabl e g,g,q L LS 13............................................... 37 l LS 14....................................)ief##ffedrre ' Q~0 5 LS 15.................................... Not Appl i cabl e LS 16.................................... Not Appl i cabl e LS 17............................................... 39 LS 18............................................... 42 LS 19............................................... 44 LS 20..........................................Not Used LS 21..........................................Not Used LS 22.................................... Not Appl i cabl e LS 23............................................... 46 LS 24.......................................... Not U sed LS 25............................................... 48 LS N lo3.G,.?>-4j 7 fog l ts-2.7 N Apphchte. l l LS-29 (o 3,c.3-o j r WCGS-NSHCs - CTS 3M.6 1 5/15M7

f i L lNSERT'4-d 0 3.6.3-26 IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-14 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION i FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l A new Condition and Required Actions consistent with NUREG-1431 and modified in accordance with TSTF-30, is added to the current Containment Isolation Valve TS to cover the case where one containment isolation valves is inoperable in a penetration flow path of the type configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. General Design Criteria 57 allows the use of a closed system in combination with a containment isolation valve to provide the two ) containment barriers against the release of radioactive material following an accident. The current TS LC0 3.6.3 does not allow the use of a closed system to isolate a failed containment isolation valve even though.the closed system is t i l subjected to a Type A containment leakage test, is missile protected, and is seismic category I piping. A closed system also typically has flow through it during normal operation such that any loss of integrity could be continually observed through leakage detection systems within containment and system walkdowns for closed systems outside containment. [This condition also applies to GDC 55 and 56 type penetration valves that meet the alternate containment isolaton l provisions specifieo in SRP 6.2.4. As discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report l (NUREG 0830), the Containment Spray System and RHR System suction lines from the l containment recirculation sumps must be opened after a LOCA to satisfy their postaccident functional requirement. For these lines, a single isolation valve located outside containment is provided because system reliability is greater with only one isolation valve in the line and because it is not practical to locate a second valve inside containment where it would be submerged after a LOCA. The ' Containment Spray System and the ECCS, which are closed ESF-grade systems outside l containment, serve as the second containment isolation barrier. Additionally, ~each of the RHR System shutdown lines contains two normally closed, motor-operated valves in series inside containment. The containment isolation provisions for l these lines are considered to be the normally closed system isolation valve closest to the containment and the closed ESF-grade ECCS to which they connect L outside containment serves as the second containment isolation barrier.] As such, the use of a closed system is no different from isolating a failed l containment isolation valve by use of a single valve as specified in NUREG-1431 Required Action A.1. Therefore, in accordance with NUREG-1431 and traveler TSTF-30,_the required action for this cond4 lows 72 hours to isolate a failed valve associated with a closed syst' !2 hours provides the necessary time to perform repairs on a f ailed containment isolation valve when relying on an intact closed system. [A completion time of 72 hours is considered appropriate j given the reliability of the closed system and that 72 hours is typically provided i for losing one train of redundancy throughout the NUREGs.] If the closed system and. associated containment isolation valve were both inoperable [and an isolation j barrier not provided), the plant [may] be in LCO 3.0.3 since there is no specific Condition specified. 1 j

INSERT 4-d 0 3.6.3-26 IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-14 (continued) This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below: "The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91. that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility { licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in i accordance with the proposed amendment would not: 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. " The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or ) consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Consistent with NUREG-1431 as modified in accordance with industry traveler TSTF-

30. the proposed change adds a new Condition and Required Actions to the Containment Isolation Valves specification for the case where one containment isolation valves is inoperable in a penetration flow path of the type configured

.with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. [As discussed in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the containment isolation provisions for the RHR System suction lines and Containment Spray System Suction lines frm, the containment recirculation sumps and the RHR System shutdown lines are considered to be the normally closed containment isolation valve. The closed ESF-grade systems outside containment serve as the second isolation barrier. The valves in these penetrations are normally closed. Containment isolation valves .are not considered as initiators ~of any analyzed event. Therefore changing the . Completion Time does not impact the probability of an analyzed accident. The consequences of a previously analyzed event are dependent on the initial conditions assumed for the analysis, and the availability and successful functioning of the equipment assumed to operate in response to the

n l l INSERT 4-d 0 3.6.3-26 i L l IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-14 (continued) . analyzed event, and the setpoints at which these actions are initiated. Therefore, extending the allowable out of service time for the CIVs in a closed l system does not impact the initial. conditions assumed in the analysis. This i l - change does not affect the performance of any credited equipment.] This change does not result in any hardware changes or alter the plant's ability to detect and mitigate events. - The use of a closed system is no.different from isolating a failed containment isolation valve by use of a single valve. [ Changing the Completion Time to 72 hours to isolate these penetrations is acceptable based on

1) the reliability of the closed system to perform as a second isolation barrier,

2) the Completion Time is consistent with the time allowed for the system to be l

out of service by other Specifications and 3) and the low probability of a Design l Basis Event occuring during the 72 hours.] l [ Based on the above discussion.] this change will not involve a significant increase in-the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? i The proposed change does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters i governing normal plant operation, and does not impose any new safety analyses i limits. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? i The proposed change adds a new Condition and Required Actions to the Containment Isolation Valves specification to be consistent with the Westinghouse Standard ITS (NUREG-1431) and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed chang 1 has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the ' consequence of a design basis event and the reasonable time to perform repairs on a failed containment isolation valve when relying on an intact closed system. [The margin of safety is established through equipment design, operating parameters, and the setpoints at which l automatic actions are initiated. Sufficient equipment remains available for l mitigation of an analyzed event. The proposed change extends the allowed out of l service time for inoperable CIVs in closed systems. This change is considered l appropriate given that the closed system remains intact. There is no detrimental impact on any equipment design parameter, and the plant will still be required to i operate within prescribed limits. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.]

E ~ l l NO SIGNIFICANT. HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above evaluation, it.is concluded thdt the activities associated with NSHC "LS-14".resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the j - no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c): and j l-accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding' is -justified. I l l 1 l 1

l Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.6 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS hKC sypre h wc. TSTF-17, Rev.1 Incorporated 3.6-2 u. 1 TSTF-30,Re # ) Incorporated 3.6-4 f6 nr*W h wcseonil TSTF-45, Rev.1 Incorporated 3.6-5 TSTF-46, Rev.1 Incorporated 3.6 7 I unc.9prw.d.( y b.k a k :; "le h. TSTF-51 Incorporated NA Not.^-p *hS1N8 h,",'* $, ' [ gf d # j TSTF-52 Incorporated 3.6-1 pg.g g 'NGG ^1-Incorporated 3.6-11 (TJ sc Q,w.A ) i 4 1r. 2-t q Q 3.6.3 tI h _a ww c r,, a a.u u. S/lS/97

1 i t Containment Isolati:n Valvas 'At ;ph;ric. Sub;tc.;;ph;ric. I;; C;r.d;n;;r. ;r.d Ou;l) $$!PSidd 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME { cps.G.3-2Q A. 1" l A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours ^ l Only ;pplic; tic t; penetration flow path (O?$ p;r.;tretien !";w p;th; p AD by use of at least one ~ with tw; ;;;;toirai.; N closed and de-activated i;;1;ticr.v;17;;. SON automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind s One or more penetration flange, or check valve flow paths with one with flow through the containment isolation valve secured. valve inoperable eicist for pjargeitvalveiee eg!

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$i"s8hPSid 1sakagriot'Mthin lfiMt. (continued) l l l I WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-ITS3.6 3.6 9 S/1587 t

l Containment Isolation Valves (At ;pheric, ,, -.~.,r,~.... -,_.~,, ,~ wuu.s, ggyggg e..L_ ,__a_____ __2 .s.._, l 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued) l l COWITION REQUIRED ACTION CCMPLETION TIME B. 9 (Q34.3-2G 1 .~ 0,1y ;pplic;bic t; B.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour "N gratr tier.  ; paths I det petration flow path M'd \\m., by use of at least one . 2 mL

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i,;l; tier, v;17;.;. pq w closed and de activated automatic valve, closed s manual valve, or blind One or more penetration flange. flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable e25ept for containment:@c:rge ti y,)m s _r_T.r vr 1, L _ _ NaEPSm? r , {vi .7g y a w s %s wu s 5 %s a u Iy withinimft. @M .3.r, _4 s. 4 - _1. u 6_ u. 2. - L _ A. ~.-.,a LW%'Vf* P 4 LL_ _2 A YW A _ .~.- ..~ b b,~ b.% IL_1.. ---12__L1_ L_ _ -- _ L u k 2 _._ 21 -. -_LL wi s a J uyyuawwwaw bw yws sw b e u b s vi a asww yu be a e .m t__A2__ s1_. __AL_ L.. _s _A 1_ _ _ A h5 Ub b3 u & 5 Vg g B g WTW y%g bi 5 5 wg udh V3 ub a bu.F b %FT Ub ..JAL __1. g, g, _1___J __J J_ __AJ.. A_J vu s bu s vs v a g vers TJ w u w.rw%s ua vga ww uw b a r u bwss ---1_J__1 2_ 1_A2_ _..A - _ 1 A J - .1.._ _1-__J h hvgab.s5a m uyb ..1.._ r3 _.r.s -5.ww a u b r wt[I - uw bu.ssu b s b yuqy%e b a verw%a ___..1 .. 1.. _. _ L1 J.4 T U s y Es yg y s .pp s %ui 3%su 5 wu5 vb. v3 wI E E 5%4 .,, m. A gg Y 0,o er r.;r; p.,etr. tier, pA i m. w ,,_.__m<_ .,. m L, r,, 4, .. - r.s b. ~ b v.m ,~_...___2._ tof 2.._~_1.u_ L a.._._. .s _ _1. u_ s a.._._. __t.2--x J m i.bu . -..b b .~ b 2______t,_ u _u __J,_a_ yuswh I5rwy%suw5b. s s 5 yv g i u%sau bIWla un wu p --..L_ .._ _2 m2 J L.. svuuJ wb Twi sa g wns wJ u 7% _2 _1 1 1_ L _ _ A 2... V5 u%suus 5 5 s a.5 kg EsbIWE ( meem-3,c,. i t 2,. Isehen de. vias. M i,__2,.. iL_ m_J m__ J_.._ Mk N WW sDJ bisE ut a bh bWw vi svg yvs ei,6 wug.y e d u. sa.c w w.d gr.;tr;ti;r. ;w pth (_ a%a e a w.W ver,T@ A h i-i,el;ted I

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(continued) I I l l WCGS-Mark sy ofNUREG-1431-ITS3.6 3.6 11 $/1587

Contairment Isolation Valves 'h;pMric. EdL;pkric. I;; O;r. der.;;r ;r.d M1) gggggggg 3.6.3 i i ACTIONS (continued) l l COM)ITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLETION TINE l 7 l D. "1 ";;ter; 1;; M ;; withir. 4 Mur; Shicid Mildir.; bp;;; 44mtt-N 1;;b;; r.st within li;it. .L ~ O p (Q s.c.3-2r. } l Eey h or more E;S'.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours pgjg).g-penetration flow penetration flow path paths with one or by use of at least one more containment closedjandijtlefactivatid g' g g purge valves not automatigsMahegglosed within pur g v;1v; manualivaljefs6@]1nd 1eakage limits. fla_nge. 8El (continued) i i l l 1 l l l i 1 i f I WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-1431-ITS3.6 3.6 12 S/158 7

E; j Containment Isolation Valv2s (r _ gte.-ic. "M L 4taric. Icc "~ri,.i.xr..r4 i,1) gggg; 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued) COBOITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME . continued) p h $43' 3*N l 9 ER:2 NOTE --- --- ~ ,gg*' y.*g bO Isolation devices in { qs.c.2-2.c. j high radiation areas may be verified by use of a &inistrative means. 2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or , dMed otherwise secured may / be verified by asinistrative means. 1 Verify the affected Once per penetration flow path 31 days for - ~ - - l 1s isolated. 1 solation

NNO, 3

devices outside containment g l Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the l previous i 92 days for isolation devices inside containment l Perform SR'316:3^6 or Once per

NME, SR 3.6.3.7 for the" 92 days l

resilient seal purge l valves closed to comply NNIEN! I with R 1 red .ggg Actio = Te353 ze 3 (continued) WCGS-Mark-np ofNUREG-1431-ITS3.6 3.6 13 5/1587 e

Containment Isolation Valves (N ;pt.cric. S iet.e:pt.cric, I;; Cerder;;r, ;rd

1+ ypgysegg 3.6.3 i

ACTIONS (continued) C0lOITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME (Q 34.3-%) FJr. Required Action and @.1 Be in H00E 3. 6 hours associated Completion gLg g g; Time not met. E 55 2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours WCGS-hfark-up ofNUREG-1431-ITS3.6 3.6 14 5/158 7

Containment Isolation Valves 'At ;pteric, Cit ;prerk, k; Ori;.ce;r. ;.74 i.", B 3.6.3 BASES l l ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) period specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from H00E 5 if not perfonned within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering ) judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the 1 i inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other akinistrative l controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is I an unlikely possibility. @hS-%j 1 Cerditi s A tes t::7..edifkd b3 ;."et irdistir.; trat thu sket4 Ceditim t si) s.pplisbl; t; tbx Fretri. tic C;. Rtb '.'ith veM-g;g e s p ( I.f. M E N..,.'h "' N~' 55}iffL. _.'3. 2.. T f !N N 5 N d e M l l =re ai = : graie.; tu. r;pra u =ti a;. -

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. ~ -...... -... m - r.,. .m,, Required Action A.2 is modif1'ed by e tiicFNotesfi" Note 3 that applies to isolation devices located in high-radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of a sinistrative means. Allowing verification by akinistrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. NiteTjapp1Temf@itt'ljiEdititisiP34 tat ape 7.TMfgialgdiorytherwisWTm3tsthingliebpIgfs EURe3MLegUtHbe verified ( .. _... alutul# stratRys ~ ~ c eMi4TM3eritication!2j1E _ Wlits tx3t$fddHffi MLt!mtlinressince.WlW:ftasigmalm._pmTsoy l slleinsiellems!!tsys;toyensettigewiselengts' n'not s 19]ilNeBg_ IRE @eppsitionedG@erefore, the probability of i misalignment of these devices once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. IL1 l With two containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de activated auton.atic valve.__a closed _ manual _ valve Xthis includes _ power operated valves) ,,,a6 -(with power removeyd meu a D11ncfTlange. The 1 hour Completion pu.a-21 ilme is wmmm. with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. In the event the affectec penetration is isolated in accordance with Reo' ired Action B.1, tini ::ffeci.ed penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis per Required Action A.2, which remains in effect. This periodic verification is necessary to (continued) WCGS-Mark-agp ofNUREG-1431 - Bam 3.6 8 3.6 20 5/1587

== Containment Isolation Valvss '_'Jtrusu. ps,.s-2,

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---_ e.r, vw, .b ~,s. Ms. ru ww.s., B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS lL1 (continued) jpac s.zQ e assurekthht'nes1rof-fontainment, pard)that penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetrJtion flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are operated under achinistrative control l go, and the probability of their misalignment is low. @ r,. 3.uo j mew. m e 1 li e to r f1 s two nt _P t wd, Cana4* C r*d f ~n. My Q4+Nr P ,-J P, ~ ~~ [CP 3 4.S-2fd N5 frat B '5 fu ' Zen ^ - - 1 t.RA L L --- -, _ -- --- L-L2-_ X1_, - LL- .2 L L --- -- L,2--- L WW u bu I waub vi urum#s b yws tw bs u b 5 vt I ssww yu bu p ay sv u ba 3 wuub bVi Ib u 5 s weswa r b M h J-1_A2-- ..-1,- J----- L1-LL-J---L1- ..1..- 21 -., _ LL _..L s erw u em b s wi a yuevw a 5 -- -. '. s new I b e buUb g5WV#bswwIb vu5Yw I a WTW y1s D5 s guswer b g L, L-- J L-AAF*M a M t F* -L.L..- -. - L 22 L J ---L-LJ-21 -.. wb c b e bv5 w%s ww wt be v -- A d 4rw ww er vs b ub tu I 5 ww bb%s yier sw w u ts k u vr s u s wsu - LL _.L L, 1-1LJ TL-LL J 2 2-1 L2-- _.L 2

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INSERT B 3.6-21 0 3.6.3-26 C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable. the inoperable valve flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration flow path. Required. Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the relative stability of the . closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of maintaining containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference 5. The Containment Spray System and the ECCS are closed ESF-grade systems outside containment, which meet the requirements of Reference 5, and serve as the second co.itainment isolation barrier (Ref. 6). In the event the affected penetration . flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This periodic verification is necessary to assure that containment penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying that each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with only one containmen+ isolation valve and a closed system. This Note is necessary since this Condition is written specifically to address these penetration flow paths. For penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. Conditions A and B provide the a9propriate Required Actions. Required Action C.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to valves ar.d blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verificatiori by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically . restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the' probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be-in the proper position, is small. 1: L

Contairment Isolation Valvss '_'s'wsus.gi.ak, ,..L m __,,

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Containment Isolation Valvss (=,;part;. 0% ~p;T';. I;; C;-4;7;;r. 74 'b;" B 3.6.3 . ~f. loa.6.3 2.0 g 1 b D D i (ES.I.Ed.2.andrd.3 l (continued)_ ACTIONS Y p Gs R 3.e,.3 1, oc) 4 4 3 A> 3 - M I leakage requirements ofM 3.6.3.7. The specified Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed so that a gross breach of containment does not l exist. ,,3.q In accordanca. V.th Required Action , this penetration flow path must be orified to bd isolated on a periodic basis. The periodic verification is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event ud,.k.h. occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or "g" g' valve mani m1ation. Rather, it involves verificatioi,.. -,... 45.1,3 52]. m ^^;;;; e = Qthat those isolation devices outside containment b ch ma3 wicW*) capable of beyg mispositioned are in the correct position. For h % us. of local er the isolation devices inside containment, the time period gm.h. ihdic> tors,) specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative l l controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility. jqst.3.u,g 1gj g ' As.s,.2-M) For the Containment Purge valve with resili se al that is isolated in accordance with Required Action 1,SR 3.6.3.7 must l be performed at least once every 92 days. s assures that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the containment purge valve does not increase durina the time the penetration is isolated. The normal --" Frequency for*SR 3.6.3.7, 184 days, is based on an NRC b43*51 l _ initiative.Mtf;P11snt ActionX B 20 (Ref.fB). Since more -l434 3-?4 l renance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency _ of once per 92 days was chosen and has shown to be p 924.3-u.] C r Y.** acceptable based on operating experience.# ___ flied'Actfbr0E'2. s i modiffedibDuo2 otesCNotemapplies"t6AsoTaltiggjik(ifcas N M ~g lbcatedHJd!BR&adiationereas!and. tat 1]nis2hesegdtWOccisMM vin!ffTsaMM@yissemfJamnistrativiinaangAllaume verificatiert@Eadministratinneansgis' consghired..'accipitatge; sM4wsn3 2ttesefareasjsttypicallyirestgtted7316tti2 appliesMto]ation; devices ithatjareAocke dgseTaludM otherwise fsecGredjin @ositiont.and(aTowsjl!tisegli91ces%be MffidIclosed;by ussiofJadministrative anansMA1 Towing veriffcationiby administrative means,is: cons 14*.rediaN--Mle, (continued) WCGS-Mark-up ofNUJtEG-1431 - Bases 3.6 8 3.6 23 5/15M7

Containment Isolation Valv2s O'4;m, .~ _ _ _ _ ~.,..,, n._ u B 3.6.3 ThereforeAbe p6M\\itg of misali nrn,ygt oHhe,,, y,1,e3, h * - b w i D im AiN.propw yidig {Q3.43 F BASES ~ / p-p ba.<.3-u,3 ACTIONS Ef.1. ED.2. and E@.3 (continued) M3lIlii4WpnM3ccl#ggMeDingEWqiMur4332igjeggentisih Q1*n9t*MDBhaseTdevicesygebettmativempt2.131enom1 Mar: [and 4"4-** \\ 2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without cha11_enging plant _ systems._ _ Q3.b.3-S'll ,b 3Mnc.h ConVai%wiaM Shutdeu.m Ar3s d.A Eshmi va\\ve. thMdc containmenk met be verlfied scaled clNed av Md b t. I i Qhstained prior t9 enteri MoDEL 4 from MODE, S C - ^ ~ - le2.444s.f =f*"g, gjl] J"g* [,yA, 3,yt q 3,s.3.z,4 SURVEILLANCE SRFf*dsd REWIREIENTS tihm #1an,a in ' 4 i ! Each 5 inch pontainment Stju_dinin Burge a vaivw a L reauired to be verified sealed closed t 31 day intervals.* This Surveillance is designed ensure hat a gross breach of containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a pontainment Shiitxgliin? urge valve. Detailed analysis of tra in.,. tjilife valves failed to conclusively demonstrate their ability to close during a LOCA in time to limit offsite hJ doses. Therefore, these valves are required to be in the sealed Q.4 closed position c.~ - m -- aduring MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. A 0%n.a _ Oontainment SgijNejst3tJrge va' ve that is sealed closed must have 3, g,.3.w. motive power to the valve operator removed. This can be accomplished by de energizing the source of electric power or by removing the air supply to the valve operator. In this i application, the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak j tightness. The Frequency is a result of an istC initiative. QS.b.3-5'll l ,;c~ %-~ m legggeMETion:NolB 24 (Ref.4t-9, related to contai i purge valve Ase aur1ng plant operations. In the event valve leakage requires entry into Condition 7the Surveillance pensits ,,,,, q opening one purge valve in a penetra on flow path to perform repairs. 4 tec.S.6-ED} j y SR~ E 2 D [G3.6.3-26. ] This SR ensures that the minipurge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. (continued) WCGS-Mark-ap ofNUREG 1431 - Baser 3.6 B 3.6-24 5/1.W7 l

Containment Isolation ValvGs '_',tessugs'r;ri;, .L__2_ ,-_a_-__ ,s..,, fu rwa 5 %,, aww wws wwws seywa, us ugs wwwsp B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEII. LANCE - "" ' ~... ~. a www.^s.'s _- '.', s --.1 .1.., -_ L12_J E1---- Tm ALJ-AL-1- L_-- -A-f susussuu s yusvw ws y a s a rgs e a us ryw. &5a ha s s e neudw, bssw a wtanwyw a u kw wu A. L. J --1 A J L.---- 1-L--- - AL J- -.-J A-L AL. A.. 1 hstw sdvsubww wgyudJ s wussugw yu be a s op u 7.ptuesswis bv f bssw uwbuuu LL..-. 1-L--- LL-- .L LL-2- 1 L2-J-.2-- 42 L LL 2-1 L2-_ ytsbeswug a weenugw bs su.-. g- : bstw 5ervuubuvis wwy5ww. As w w brs aerw su4,avi5 ..1..-- 2. LL-t_ L2-_ 1-- J LL-L. 1 1-L- -L-2- Tuavwe 5ss besw mrw s sw b s u b a vs a us s wswwww, besw uwbuus avunuyw a u bw ed AL-1 - .rw- _ 1-- _A-s AL-A, m .1..-- TL2-AL ; s besw aww s awusuyw a u bw ws bsrw b ysw vvsvude s a u u =a susw bs sww wa 122.2__ --2__ -LL..-. 1,uL--- 2- -_l.. L-L, ..- J 2-- L L. 2 - ngwus r b a s y s a sy susun a susuuss yu be swuy ag esuyw s op wu u u y erw ww w erw ss u wu be s a d Fn r2 - A--- A2.. 1 --.2__ L L..... 1-L.-- 1.t 2L. L-L, en ga.w., ys su u n v enensuvunu yu bu rsvuy awunuys a s en s i.e us w bv ww t a s2 J 2_ 2---- . 2 aL A-- Je~ 1% =rk, e--- 2- %guus s b e a s wws ssa wwwwu uus www w abua gyws sgs n wr. assw e a wq=sws swg se - - -. 2 L.. in r=en en A___;2~ 1 -- - J2 sa J L.. -_-_-..J s wigu a s su vg av wa vs ww, a 9,yws m a n v, we wwww s s s ww wy uyysvwww 12-_- f - _.s AL-. s __ AL. r___..__. -.1-_ 2-_ s en e a m wn= s us = bu swa w s vs w. burs ea wigwssewy sn bwu se s vue we wn w. u. s. .--..=sy b u vue -t L. ---12 Jr 1--- LL. x-L2_ 2- -_ A -- - 2 2. 1

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t J 1 1 wuiwe, sysg.ssswua y wnw=uybwag.; REFERENCES 1. FUSAR, Section 15. 2. RSAR, (SedGn-M-Aguc. 6.2 A O 3.6.3-41,l 3. 2 ric I-x " 2^ Hulti: Plant [ActTonjWAiB020. " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration." 4. 0;rr;s-ic I;;x " 20 MultiiR1adtjAction3W_A!B_024Menting and'1!urgjng T,ontainments!Mh1TeintTD]TJ!atierdand"EffteLT"pf IM.I 5 (AS AR, Sectis 6. 2 +, M Q3fo.b& } { Q%S 2(,) ~ ~ t4%ECc-0881,"s24q EvMu>him Repet Wed % g, % opusd M WoWCreek (semerk Shb O Go.1.,' L.dia 6.2.3, ApAl \\">e.2 l WCGS-Mark-up ofNUREG-H31 - Baset 3.6 B 3.6 30 S/1527 { ) I 1

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l 3.6 5 This change is in accordance with TSTF 45 and revises SR 3.6.3.3 l and SR 3.6.3.4 to specify that only containment isolation valves that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured are required to be verified closed. The position of the locked, sealed or secured valves was verified before the valves were locked, sealed or secured. l-3.6 6 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). A nk.3-6 [ 3.6 7 This change is in accordance w.h TSTF 46 and revises SR 3.6.3.5 I to delete the reference to veri fying the isolation time of "each power operated" containment iso lation valve and only require verific.atioa of each " automatic' isolation valve." Valves credited as containment isolation valves which are power operated (i.e. can be remotely operated) that do not receive a containment j 1 solation signal do not have an. isolation time as assumed in the l accidentjnalyses since they require operator action. Therefore. l delet.ing reference to power operated isolation valve time testing reduos the potential for misinterpreting the requirements of this SR while maintaining the assumptions of the accident analysis. 3.6 8 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.6 9 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 1 3.6 10 Not Applicable to Wolf Creek. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). j r-Q=sr? -us) l o s.s,.s-al 3.6 11 A new Note is added to I' 'S 3.6.3 Condition A.2 [and C.2] in accordance with travelefM. The additional note applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be closed by use of administrative means. It is sufficient to assume that initial l establishment of component status (e.g., isolation valves closed) was performed correctly. Subsequently, verification is intended j to ensure the component has not been inadvertently repositioned. Given that the function of locking, sealing or securing components is to ensure tha same avoidance of inadvertent WCGS-Differencesfrom NUREG-1431-ITS 3.6 2 5/15197 J

INSERT 6A-2 0 3.6.3-26 3.6-4 Consistent with TSTF-30, this change takes credit for a closed system for isolating a failed containment isolation valve. The change would extend the Completion Time for a closed system flow path with an inoperable isolation valve to 72 hours. General Design Criteria (GDC) 57 allows the use of a closed system in combination with a containment isolation valve to provide the two containment barriers against the release of radioactive material 'following an accident. [This condition also applies to GDC 55 and 56 type penetration valves that meet the alternate containment isolaton provisions specified in SRP 6.2.4. As discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the containment isolation provisions for the RHR System suction lines and Containment Spray System suction lines from the containment recirculation sumps and the RHR System shutdown lines are considered to be the normally closed containment isolation valve and the closed. ESF-grade systems outside containment serves as the second containment isolation barrier.] Currently, LC0 3.6.3 does not allow the use of a closed system to isolate a failed containment isolation valve even though the closed system is subjected to a Type A containment leakage test, is missile protected, and is seismic category I piping. A -losed system also typically has flow through it during normal operation such that any loss of integrity could be observed through leakage detection systems within containment and during routine system walkdowns for closed systems outside containment. As such, the use of a closed system is no different from isolating a failed containment isolation valve by use of a single valve as specified in Required Action A.1. Therefore, LCO 3.6.3, Required Action C.1 is revised '7 allow 72 hours to isolate a failed valve associated with a closed system. This 72 hours period provides the necessary time to perform repairs on a failed containment isolation valve when relying on an intact closed system. [A completion time of 72 hours is considered appropriate given_the reliability of the closed system and that 72 hours is typically provided for losing one train of redundancy throughout the NUREGs.] If the closed system and associated containment isolation valve were both inoperable [and an isoldtion barrier not provided], the plant [may] be in LCO 3.0.3 since there is no specific Condition specified. t l L_

f CHANGE NUPEER JUSTIFICATION pyy(,ve}yepp }q1c..s.tt_] 3.6 19 (Cjo sist wi CT .6.1 .4, SR J.3.7 revis f to k te l Aes 1-p val s in orda with C an j g ka ate stin rogra fter ning r tes' e_ ach thevd;ng/The leak (1 ays with 92_d aft _ openi rate test acceptance criterion for containment ist i tion valves s with resilient seals does not directly tie to saft.y but l indicates degradation of the resilient seals. 1 ~ 3.6 20 Not used. 1 3.6 21 Consistent with CTS 4.6.2.3.b SR 3.6.6.3 is being deleted and included as part of SR 3.6.6.7. The current licensing basis only requires for the flow rate to be tested as part of the actuation test every 18 months not the 31 days frequency required in ITS SR 3.6.6.3. LQ36.3 2.Q l 3.6 22 This deletes Note to 3.6.3 1 ony # y FB. a I ~ ange is sistent Chan .6 23 sirice l ndition s not a cable to, f Cr We bra. ~ [qs.6.3 24 f (TJhs'c del s ITS. 3 Co on is nd o 3.6 23 rio pply e Wol reek not e y tr io aths w re this onditio is appl ca e. M.+ uuA. 4, m iTs sn 3.G.3.7 6 men 6ed 4o spu@ ue. capaibenbd*"'t Mt - l valu.s amcL shddown pu.<3e valvts con sistM wMk c.rs ' 4.c.t.7. 2. cw.4 4. c. L.7 4. A note is mAA.A t,In A edate tM l iTs sr2. 3.6.3. 7 ik ong requtred to be per6rmed. 6< N., I c en+2ihment.s6tdoe Pey-Vd!" 5 A h ^* 5*' '*Yed b W 6f-ep avc M sw'O LTSSR343#"%"A" le a k. age. rate:tes k w M h m oc' M M 4 EMM ne. in oV>\\ \\cA.. Lesk ap reskq ok k sk+^^m pu^4 "% g assoc'i.-h. bludA fby 2. on a.24 hon +h fr'eF7 g,,{ g w H h c_ i.s 4.c.l.~7.2 f WCGS-Differencesfrom NUREG-1431-ITS 3.6 4 S/15/97 i' l

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f Attachm:nt 1 to ET 99-0015 Page 1 of 1 l LIST OF COMMITMENTS The following table identifies those actions committed to by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. Michael J. Angus, Manager Licensing and Corrective Action at Wolf Creek Generating Station, (316) 364-4077. COMMITMENT Due Date/ Event None l l l I l l l t t l i l i i i l 1 u

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