ML20070T555
| ML20070T555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1981 |
| From: | Devine T GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| To: | Mccarten J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070T530 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-206 NUDOCS 8302090023 | |
| Download: ML20070T555 (314) | |
Text
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\ ' GOVEPolyt'.ENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT Irutito:e f o: Pohn Studies 1901 Oue Street. N.W., Washington. D.C. 20009 (202)264 9382 '
March 15, 1981 Mr. James McCarten United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Dear Mr. McCarten:
Please excuse my delay in getting back to you after our February 26, 1981 meeting. I have been tied up on several other cases. At the meeting I promised to check with journalist Mark Hertzgaard Mbout sharing his work notes, since he spoke at
, length with several key witnesses. For example, he interviewed
,Mr. James Tyner,' who mixed general reassurances about Zimmer'with scathing, highly-insightful criticisms of specific practices.
Mr. Hertzgaard spoke with the witness who reported a 39% rejection rate on field welds, as opposed to prefabricated welds. Mr. Hertzgaard would like to speak with you but cannot release his work notes. He suggested that you call him at home, where he is writing a book. He will discuss the issues freely. His number is ! If you call during the day, let the phone ring once, hang up,'and call again. Mr. Keppler informed me that some witnesses might tell a dif ferent story ,to the NRC than they provided to GAP,'Mr. Applegate, o journalists. In that event, he inquired whether I would be agreeable to conducting a joint interview to resolve the contra-dictions. I appreciated this approach and agreed immediately. Please contact me if there are apparent inconsistencies. This time around I hope that we can clear up any misunderstandings before the NRC report is released, so that Mr. Applegate and GAP can respond with public praise instead of public rebuttal. Sincerely, Thomas Devine Associate Director cc: Mr. Thomas Applegate Mr. James Keppler 8302090023 830104 PDR FOIA DEVINE82-206 PDR
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(.STATUSOFRII 5 [NVESTIGATIONh kPALLEGATION)
- ALLEGATION NO. 1 KEI knowingly installed and ripped out unsuitable main steam relief piping at at estimated labor cost of $320,000.
FINDINGS This allegation was substaatiated but there were no uncontrolled nuclear safety concerns. BASIS FOR FINDINGS Discussions with the CG8E Principal Mechanical Engineer confirmed that
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(MSR) Main Steam Relief piping was installed with ' foresight that part of the piping would later be replaced. The MSR piping was already being installed I for the second time in order to replace the rams head discharge devices l with quenchers. This second design resulted after discovery of new discharge l loads at a plant in Germany in 1975. The NRC has been aware of the design l modification as indicated by the Zimmer Mark II Design Assessment Report i and NUREG-0487. \ i CG&E decided to start the modification in 1975 knowing that approximately 5% of the piping would have to be replaced. The design modification
e o S ar-s pas incomplete and changes would be continuing. To date, the design modi-fication in 1975 was an economic one, based on not delaying the c(nstruction
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schedule. The total Labor cost to date is $1,183,690.00. , l The. RIII inspector reviewed all revisions to the applicable isometric drawing for the MSR piping. All revisions indicated changes based on the above design modi fi cat ion. Therefore, there have been no other activities pertaining to the MSR piping of the monetary magnitude that was alleged. The RIII inspector reviewed the QC documentation for 12 welds in the piping and interpreted the radiographs for six welds in the piping. The records indicate the design modification has been properly controlled.
- ALLEGATION NO. 2 Two thousand pound fittings were installed in 1979 on residue head valves, although 5,000 pound fittings are required.
FINDINGS This allegation was substantiated but there were no uncontrolled nuclear safety concerns. _ BASIS FOR FINDINGS The RIII investigators' discussions with the alleger's source for this al-Legation revealed that components involved were not residue head valves but O
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$-K-1I rather the actuators for the hydraulic control lines to the flow control valves at the discharge of the recirculation pumps. ',
The RIII inspector verified that, though the flow control valves serve as a safety related pressure boundary, the hydraulic actuator has no safety related function. A design document change written on 8/23/78 and approved by the designer (Sargent & Lundy) indicated that 3,000 pound fittings were approved for use on the actuators in place of 6,000 pound fittings. The RIII Senior Resident Inspector at Zimmer said that based on his reviews of the plant systems, there are no other actuators, like the ones addressed above, used anywhere else in the plant. In addition, the RIII inspectors interviewed approximately 16 pipefitters (the alleger's source was a pipefitier) who stated that they had no knowledge
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which would support this allegation. _* ALLEGATION NO. 3 A -radioactive waste drain is clogged with concrete which carelessly was poured into the drain. FINDINGS This allegation was substantiated, and there were no uncontrolled nuclear
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4 BA' SIS FOR FINDINGS The RIII investigators discussions with the alleger's source for this allega-tion revealed that the drains were clogged in 1976 and 1977. The RIII Senior Resident Insp2ctor at Zimmer stated that, based on his reviews of the plant systems, the alleged drains are non-safety related. Further, the resident inspector's interviews with the personnel responsible for flusing the drains indicated that some drains were at one time plugged with debris. However, the personnel interviewed and the flushing records commen-cing in 1979, indicate that the drains have been cleaned out and flow has been verified. The RIII Resident Inspector also verified that all accessible Rad Waste Building and Auxiliary Building Ventilation Room drains were not visually plugged at the ports. l
- ALLEGATION NO. 4 l
A residue heat valve broke when a pipefitter bumpted into it, raising new questions about the quality of metal used for valves. FINDINGS This allegation was not substantiated and there were no uncontrolled nuclear safety concerns. l l l
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Th'e RIII investigators discussions with the alleger's source for this allegation revealed that the component involved was not a residue heat valve but rather an actuator for the hydraulic control ines to a flow control valve at the discharge of a recirculation pump. The RIII inspector verified that though the flow control valve serves as a safety related pressure boundary, the hydraulic actuator has no safety related function. The RIII inspector researched the applicable General Electric records for the flow control valves and questioned the G.E. Control and Instrument Engineer responsible for these valves. The RIII inspector did not find evidence that indicated that the valves, the actuator, or fittings had been broken. The RIII inspector inspected the valves, the hyoraulic lines to the actuators, the actuators, and the recirculation pumps. All of these components were intact and appeared satisfactory. The hydraulics of the system had been satisfactorily storked. In addition, the RIII inspectors interviewed approximately 16 pipefitters (the alleger's source was a pipefitter) who stated that they had no,know- ! ledge that would support this allegation. 1
- ALLEGATION NO. 5 Sensitive parts on welding rods are possibly damaged through storage at improper temperatures and possibly lost through f ailure to follow proper l gaper work and labeling requirements.
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(t) The first part of this allegation (improper temperature) has been sub- l stantiated and had nuclear safety concerns. (2) The second part of this allegation (failure to follow proper paperwork and labeling requirements) was not substantiated and has no uncontrolled nuclear safety concerns. BASIS FOR FINDINGS (1) The licensee has been cited on numerous occasions (nine IE reports) by the NRC for inadequate control of weld rods which require temperature control. Currently, the licensee's corrective actions to the citations and program to control rod temperatures appears adequate. (2) Discussions with the alleger's source for this allegation revealed that this concern was that during September.and October 1979 there was no pipefitter assigned to the weld rod shack during the evening shift to account fo weld rods. Thus, the alleger's source did not know if the weld rod was being properly returned and accounted for on
. KEI-2 forms.
The RIII inspector reviewed weld rod issue slips, KEI-2 forms. .The KEI form is a construction form which indicates weld rod capability. - The form requires the welder's foreman and the weld rod issuer's signature. The
, forms require no QC signatures. Approximately 15 KEI-2 forms for the
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. September - October 1979 period and approximately 20 additional KEI-2 forms dated in 1978 were reviewed. All of the records indicated that the respective welding rods had been properly acounted for.
It should be noted that since the KEI-2 form requires no QC signature the form is not a credible QC record. It should be noted that while weld rod verification by QC is not alleged, the RIII inspectors have identified programmatic problems concerning weld rod verification. These problems were identified while pursuing a spinoff allegation. The specific problem is that the inspection requirement for QC is verified the use of proper filters (weld rod) was improperly deleted for the period between July 1980 and February 1981. The deletion is contrary to the Code requirements. This will be an item of noncompliance.
- ALLEGATION NO. 6 Argon gas valves for flushing oxygen from pipes routinely are lef t open by the day crew, causing the night crew to be overcome by gas, a problem about which CGSE Safety Director Cummings expressed disinterest. In addition, on February 24, 1981, GAP representatives in a meeting with Region III stated that John Bedinghouse's son James, former Security Of ficer, was almost overcome by argon gas while making his rounds in the containment building. In addition, in an af fidavit supplied by' states that day shift workers at Zimmer critnped and wired argon hoses (rather than close the gas valves at the source) resulting in argon gas leaks which caused the night workers to suf fer f rom dizziness. -
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. FINDINGS s
This allegation has been partially substantiated; however, it is still under investigation. l l l BASIS FOR FINDINGS A KEI safety inspector confirmed that there had been instances where he had discovered argon gas hoses crimped and wired closed, although he stated to his knowledge there were never any instances of workers being overcome by argon gas. On instance was reported where a former security officer experienced illness as a result of map gas inhalation. John Bedinghouse was interviewed and stated that he was never overcome by argon gas and knew of no one who was. In addition, inspectors from the Occupational Safety and Health Admini-stration inspected the area where the alleged argon gas accumulations affected worker safety and found no instances of argon gas settlement. OSHA did state, however, that the containment suppression pool area in its opinion fits the definition of a confined space as spelled out in' dNS 2117.1-1977, Safety Require-ments for Working In Tanks In Confined Spaces. OSHA stated that with the number of welding, cutting, and grinding operations that are being performed l there, there is definitely a lack of natural ventitation and this can create safety problems. OSHA recommends "that Kaiser supply and implement the use of portable exhaust fans when welding / cutting in galvanized or stainless steel in order to insure that air is circulating continuously."'.
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- ALLEGATION NO.
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# ALLEGATION NO. 7 Prefabricated piping, received in 1977 wea defective welds, but construction supervisors told crews not to repair them because the welds were made offsite.
FINDINGS This allegation was not substantiated. BASIS FOR FINDINGS The RIII investigator's discussions with the alleger's source for this allegation revealed that the piping involved was five spool pieces delivered f rom Kellog Company to the site. Upon arrival at the site on July 3,1979, the pieces were dropped off the delivery truck. The RIII inspectors reviewed the QC documentation relevant to the pieces being dropped. The documentation indicated that rad'iographs of the welds on the pipe pieces were taken to identify any defects that would have resulted when the pieces were dropped. The documentaiton indicated that, when indica-tions were identified on three of the five pieces, instructions were given b'y Kaiser personnel to disregard radiographs. Later documentations indicate that ultrasonic and visual examinitions were made of the welds on the three questionable pieces. The UT and visual examination records indicate that the welds were
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b All five pieces were instatted in the main steam relief system. During this section, the RIII inspector made visual examination of the welds on the spool pieces. He idc.itified no unacceptable indications. He also godL concluded that space on the thickness and configuration of all the pieces, radiography would not be a credible volumetric technique of examination. The RIII inspector stated that ultrasonic and visual examinations were the propar NDE techniques for these pieces. The RIII inspector reviewed and stated that the UT results appeared proper and were acceptable.
- ALLEGATION NO. 8 At least three sources contacted by Mr. Applegate confirmed that an estimated 20% of the plant's prefabricated welds are defective.
, FINDINGS This allega* ,cn ,;s tot substantiated.
,gAkISF0kFINDINGt Duri.ig the RIII inspector's discussion with one of the alleger's sources for this allegation, the source :ta: )d that the 20% estimate was based on:
f1) the sources firsthand knowledge of four occasions in which radiographs,
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& ,pc. h w . taken in 1976 of filled welds in the residual heat removat system, overlapped vendor welds. The source stated that he had no additional knowledge concerning the fourth occasion.
(2) The radiographs of the three spool pieces that were dropped off the truck on July 3,1979. (3) An af firmative acknowledgement given by the KEI project manager was the source stated that 20% of the prefabricated pipe welds were defective. (4) A conversation the souret had with an ex-employee of a pref abricated pipe supplier. No additional information was provided f rom any of the other sources. The RIII inspector reviewed approximately 200 radiographs taken in 1976 of field welds in the residual heat removal system. No overlaps with vendor welds were identified. Radiography was not a credible NDE technique for the three spool pieces that were Jropped of f the truck. The RIII inspectors also interpreted over 600 radiographs involving over 200 pref abricated pipe welds. The inspectors identified radiographic technique problems with about 25% of the radiographs. Of the remaining 75%, the welds appeared very good. 9.o
h :- W fR h Y & J-2c-9 PALLEGATION NO. 9 s Engineering " designs" routinely are drawn after the fact to conform with piping that already had been installed. FINDINGS This attegation was not substantiated. BASIS FOR FINDINGS The RIII inspector selec:ed and reviewed the isometric drawings for piping design in the (1) main steam release system, (2) tow pressure core spray system, (3) feedwater system, and (4) reactor isolation system. The review of drawings, includes design date, and installation date indicated that the piping in all four of the above systems designed were drawn before the installation of respective piping. The first three designs identified above were large bore (two inch and over) systems. The fourth design was a smatt bore system.
- ALLEGATION NO.10 i
Shock absorbing electrical usually found unsatisfactory are stilt unsafe l due to faulty welds and electrical cable trays remain dangerously futt. I FINDINGS a0_ -
hWl- ghl s-sc- e Jhis allegation is unresolved. b BASIS FOR FINDINGS (1) Faulty Welds The RIII inspector inspected both vendor and filled welds on tray hangers in three dif ferent locations in the plant. The locations were the blue switchgear room, the cable spreading room, and an unidentified re area. The inspector included more than 25 hangers with four to ten welds per hanger. Since the welds were already painted, the inspection was incon-clusive. Only one weld by a cross member of a hanger in the cable spreading room appeared unacceptable. The RIII inspector discussed the defective vendor welds reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e). Discussions revealed that these vendor welds and numerous other field welds had been accepted based on visual examination of painted welds. This is contrary to the AWS Code. Based on these noncredible inspections performed by the licensee, the RIII inspectors could not determine if there were additional unacceptable welds. (2) pangerously Full Cable Trays (Cable Tray Loading)
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(a) The designer (S&L) has deviated from the FSAR.
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(b) Measures were not established to verify the tray loading design
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. for the dead weight and cable loading of our cable sleeve.
(c) At least 30 identified and controlled trays exceed the FSAR limit of 50% fill. (d) Calculations have not been performed to verify whether or not trays have been overloaded. (Both thermally and dead wei;5t). (e) Cabte selection must be reevaluated because of inc eased cable depths. There are two noncompliances and four unresolved items identified regarding cable tray loading.
- ALLEGATION NO.11 Sand and nud choke the feedwater pump and intake flues carrying make ups for water to the cooling tower, because of a flaw in the plant design. Pumps used to rectify the flaw quickly burn out.
FINDINGS This allegation was substantiated, but there were no uncontrolled nuclear safety concerns. BASIS FOR F T N n t NEA e b I Ab^d HEW hwaby a d hW 4 bG kW kaag 4kr pwt aWG46k kW 4W 3\ e ( .
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.This allegation was substantiated, but there were no uncontrolled nuclear safety concerns.
BASIS FOR FINDINGS This item was previously reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e). The report is still open and the item is still unresolved.
- ALLEGATION NO. 12 The design flaw in the heat exchanger control panel permitted an operator to mistakenly force 1200 pounds of pressure through pipes only meant to handle 300 pounds, ripping the pipe and soaking electricians with a hard spray of eater that would have been radioactive had the plant been in operation.
FINDINGS This allegation was substantiated, but there were no uncontrolled nuclear safety concerns. BASIS FOR FINDINGS The RIII inspector reviewed the sequence of events before and held a discussion with the operations quality engineer concerning the alleged deterrent. The review and discussion substantiated deterrent, but indicates a dif ferent cause.
,The cause appeared to be a breakdown in communication. Twu valves connecting Y/ __
hWf~ & M J - W -g/ the low pressure core spray system to the high pressure core spray system, were incorrectly lef t open d ring the start of the flushing activities of the HPCS. The pre-flushing checklist was signed incorrectly, verifying valve line-up. On the subsequent day the HPCS pump was started with 1200 psig pressure in the discharge piping. Af ter approximately three minutes, a water ha.nmer occurred which cracked the water box on the steam jet air ejector and allowed water to spry all over the immediate area. The incident was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e). The fotLowing corrective actions were taken: (1) A swing check valve was added downstream, to minimize the effect of the two isolation valves, connecting the LPCS to the HPCS, being inadvertently left open. (2) The valve line-up verification now requires two signatures instead of one. (3) A stress analysis and pipe minimum wall thickness measurement (ultrasonic test) were made which indicate that there was no damage to the valve and piping hangers in the HPCS, LPCS, and CD (non-safety related) systems.
*dLLEGATIONNO.13 There have been periods where there were no security suveillance cameras during nuclear fuel deliveries to the site and perimeter security consisted for an extended period of only a four foot chicken wire fence.
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/INDINGS s
BASIS FOR FINDINGS Part 1 - Security Surveillance Cameras The RIII inspector serviced to an interview with the site plant protection analyst, representing the Physical Security Licensing Branch of NMSS and a review of the following documents that the Licensee does not require to provide CCPV surveillance during either delivery or storage of unirradiated fuel at the Zimmer site. (a) NRC Materials License SNM-1823, dated June 26, 1978. (b) 10 CFR 73.67(f) (c) Station administrative directives, interim access control - new fuel storage area, Procedure No. SE SAD.03, Revision 1, dated August 10 1979. (d) Appendix F - Interim access controls - new fuel storage area, Revision 10, dated July 3,1980. Appendix F became ef fective November 14, 1980. 9 Y1
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. July 3,1980. Appendix F became effective November 14, 1980.
The RIII inspector also determined from reviewing two Region III security inspection reports that the licensee is not utilizing CCTV to provide surveil-Lance to the new fuel storage area; but is utilizing watchmen and barriers to detect unauthorized penetration. Part 2 - Perimeter Security FINDINGS This allegation was not substantiated. BASIS FOR FINDINGS The RIII Resident Inspector at Zimmer determined that f rom approximately December 3, 1979, to the present, the Licensee has utilized an eight foot plywood barrier on the floor elevation containing the new fuel storage area. This utilization was also' verified during two separate security inspections. (Seg 'embe r 25, 1979 and January 22-23, 1981) by RIII personnel. An' interview with the plant protection analyst representing the Physical Security Licensing Branch of NMSS stated that the utilization of a four foot chicken wire fence to control access to the new fuel temporary s$ rage area would not conflictwiththerequiremen+sstatedin10CFR73.67(f5and Part 2, Section 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 5.55, dated January 1980, if moni-toring of the area was also conducted. D,
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AdY s .;s. vat 1 The monitoring is conducted by a watchman who is continuously stationed at the access point to the new fuel storage area.
- ALLEGATION NO.13 There have been periods when there were no security surveillance cameras during nuclear fuel deliveries to the site, and perimeter security consisted for an extended period of only a four foot chicken wire fence.
FINDINGS This atLegation is substantiated; however, it is not contrary to any regulatory requirement. BASIS FOR FINDINGS Interviews of Licensee security representatives indicated that there were no
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surveillance cameras during nuclear fuel deliveri~es to the site and that for a short period of time the building where the fuel was stored had a four foot fence around it. The licensee advised they are committed only to posting a watchman to guard the fuel twenty-four hours a day. RIII Safeguards Section, DETI, advise this program has been implemented and is acceptable. Therefore, the concerns expressed by GAP may have occurred but are not contrary to any
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regulatory requirement.
- ALLEGATION NO. 14
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tcr violence. FINDINGS This allegation is unsubstantiated. BASIS FOR FINDINGS Forty-five Quality Control Inspectors, seven former security officers, and ten craf t personnel were interviewed regarding the use of alcolhol and drugs on the site. In almost every inr.tance these personnel commented that they had observed evidence of drirding (discarded beer cans and Liquor bottles) on the site and had seen evidence of some marijuana use (discovery of mari-juana cigarette butts). However, in each instance the GO Inscectors and craf t personnel contacted said they did not observe individuals intoxicated on the job, or instances where drug or alechot intoxicated personnel were woriing on a specific system in the plant. The security officers questioned on this issue said they reported the apparent presence of alcohol and drug abuse to CG&E security management. The security of ficers stated however, they di.d not characterize the problem as a major security problem onsite and none substantiated that the licensee had a " Lax attitude" regarding drug or alcohol abuse onsite. In regards to the GAP comment regarding the routine hiring of temporary employees prone to violence, the security officers interviewed reported no patter of significant acts of violence (fights, shootins, stabbings, etc.) among employees onsite.
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- ALLEGATION NO. 15
. 1 Employees fired for time cheating nad been cheating with express approval of management. The only tjme-cheaters fired were vocal and knowledgeable critics of plant QA and safety.
FINDINGS This allegation is unsubstantiated. BASIS FOR FINDINGS On March 12, 1981, Willi .n Murray, Employee Relations, CGSE was interviewed and stated in December 1975 Mr. Thomas Applegate was hired by CGSE as an under-cover security of ficer, ostensibly to uncover instances of employee time card cheating at the plant. Mcrray stated Mr. Applegate's investigation conducted between December 10, 1979, and January 3,1980, resulted in the dismissal cf three Kaiser employees for time card cheating. Murray stated one of these em-ployees was later reinstated.. One of these employees was interviewed and stated that he was fired from the site for time card cheating and not for any comments he made about safety problems at the plant. We intend to inter-view the remaining two employees during the upcoming week.
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- ALLEGATION NO.16 -
CG&E had warned Peabody Magnaflux management to silence the radiographers pt Zimmer who were criticizing CGEE's consistent approval of welds rejected , I
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,by Peabody Magnaflux. In addition, on February 26, 1981, GAP representativeh in furtherance of this comment stated four local police of ficials[in the Cin-cinnati area had information regarding a burglary of the Peabody Magnaflux trailer onsite and the thef t of records criticizing CGEE's consistent approval of welds rejected by Peabody Magnaflux were stolen during this alleged breakin.
The NRC icopectors ic ic.cd 250 redi;;resh ceoJu. shss is fci '? .stJ . ...s of the -+esdce 05:::: ',dicated c;ccptan;c by XCI af tc r rc a c ct i on L , Is m' _ , Magnaftww. FINDINGS This allegation is currently under investigation. However, the ste' .aent abcut the burglary of the Peabody Magnaflux trailer onsite and the thef t of records is unsubstantiated. BASIS FOR FINDINGS Five out of nine Peabody Magnaflux employees have been interviewed regarding this allegation. They have denied any intimication by Peabody Magnaflux regarding their weld determinations at Zimmer. Three of the five employees interviewed are radiographers who denied CGEE was consistently overriding their decision on the acceptability of welds. NRC inspectors have reviewed Reports of Radiographic Examination and have not identified any pattern of CGEE over-riding Peabody Magnaflux's findings; in fact the contrary is true. Frequently Peabody Magnaflux approved welds which CG&E later said were not acceptable. The NRC inspectors reviewed 250 radiograph reader sheets for 49 welds. None of the reader sheets indicated acceptance by KEI af ter rejection by Peabody
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C h-y hAb . 3-At-p flagna flux. s It should be noted that GAP has taped conversations with two Peabody Magna-flux employees regarding this allegation. We plan to review these tapes and interview these individuals to resolve any discrepancies or inconsistencies in any statements they have made to GAP of the NRC. Regarding the alleged breaking and entering of the Peabody Magnaflux trailer and the theft of records from this trailer, six local police officers, including four named by GAP representatives as having information regarding this breakin were contacted and denied having any knowledge of a breaking or entering or the theft of records from the Peabody Magnaflux trailer at the Zimmer site in January 1780.
- ALLEG ATION NO.17 Union pipefitters and Peabody Magnaflux employees have been intimidated by fear of utility and industry-wide reprisals shcUtd they complain about the QA practice.
JINDINGS Thiw allegation is unsubstantiated. O BASIS FOR FINDINGS-The Peabody Magnaflux employees and the union pipefitters who GAP states were
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Jntimidated by fear of utility and industry wide reprisals were interviewed and stated they had not been intimidated for any cirticisms of QA practices at the Zimmer site. In the case of the fired union pipefitter he state that he was fired for time card cheating and not for complaining of Quality Assurance problems at the site. The Peabody Magnaflux employees interviewed stated they were asked to leave the site due to production problems and readily admitted that the quantity and quality of work generated just before their dismissal was of poor quality. They attributed this to problems with their film processing and film developing machine onsite which frequently malfunctioned, necessitating reshootings of many radiographs which affected production. They also stated the antiquated machine affected the quality of their final product, and adiographs were unacceptable due to poor film quality when submitted to other Level III reviewers for examination.
- ALLEGATION NO.18 A Kaiser employee has kept a detailed journal of safety hazards and incidents at Zimmer.
l l FINDINGS i ( This allegation is unsubstantiated. l l BASIS FOR FINDINGS On March 5, 1981, Yohan Reiter, former Radiation Chemistry Technician, was c,ontacted via telephone in Ankara, Brazil. Reiter stated he recalled having
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&b-W$/ N-Gusd 2 .us l e conversation with Thomas Applegate in December 1979 in which Reiter refer-red to his field notebook as his " paper brain". Reiter denied sta', ting to Applegate that the notebook was a detailed journal of safety problems as characterized by the Government Accountability Project affidavit presented to the Special Counsel Merit Systems Protection Board. Reiter stated the notebook contained his field inspection notes, which insured deficiencies he identified during his preoperational inspecitons of the radwaste system, s non safety related system in the plant were repaired. Reiter stated in each instance the problems he identified were corrected by Kaiser. Reiter added he had no concerns with the safe operation of the plant and added he would have reported these concerns to the NAL if had them.
- ALLEGATION NO.19 A common " joke" among pipefitters at Zimmer is that they will be hundreds of miles away when the plant goes on line, due to their predictions of a disastrous accident.
FINDINGS This allegation has not substantiated. BASIS FOR FINDINGS
~
The RIII inspectors interviewed approximately 16 pipefitters. None of them had knowledge of any specific hardware problems. O
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3 Kepple r j Could I again ask that we do that af ter we get to the ot'* r subject? Devine Yes. I think that our first priority should be for Tom t . Let down to business here and start showing his information. Applegate Right. As you note probably, if you gentlemen reviewed t ,e material in m) affidavit and I discussed in my affidavit and in other pa rtinent infor=ation that was provided you, I discussed an allegation with reg.syds to the independent h
$ Jj .k radiographers, Peabody Magnaflux, being in one way or ar.:: ,er coerced to leave 4 '
the site at the Zic:mer nuclear power station. It has c:_e to my attention that R4) there may be further evidence with regards to their bei E coerced to leave the \g gI I site. As you might be aware we provided a taped conversa:f.:m between myself and Mr. A1dredce where I think it is at least clear to us tha: 5.r. A1 dredge. . . and possibly we should get into a discussion of Mr. Aldgedge's conversation with myself... _De vine Maybe a good way to get through this all quickly would '.>e :; go down witness by witness with whatever new information you've got. Applegate Okay, right. There are certain law enforcement officers fJ:. the greater Cincinnati area who have indicated to me that they belfave they ha., s. cme highly suspicious people that were involved in the breakin at the Zic=ier r.e. ear power facility in the weekend approximately January 10, 1980, approximate 1; 1*.ain I say. This was
,, the weekend af ter I was fired from the site. There was a. Allegation made that someone had pilfered data from PeaboJv Marnaflux that e.i t tend to corroborate 3* our allegations of faulty workmanship on pipinglin the 21: nr nuclear power facility. The namts or these individuals have been give: "l' ', me as suspects, and I.4mphasize that only because a certain amount of circu=:,,<.tial evidence takes you up to a suspect and then a certain ac)ount of fact ga: . 'ing confirms or denys their guilt in relationship to an incident. This is typf t,a0 investigative procedure. You go through stages in investigation. I v ,.;'".d say if you include the four stages of investigation... where you go specula-; *. rumor, po sibility, probability and fact... that this is probably in the Roisj . 11ty categvry and could be placed into the probability category with the ir -sieving af certain 9
e
e witnesses that I have their names. And I would like for the Nuclear Regulatory Cocaission to pursue that with the idea that this may provide further information with regards to Peabody Magnaflux leaving the site either by coercion and force on the The gentlemen who are
/ pa,rt of utility and the contractor or by any other means. highly suspected of breaking into th
,, N again you'll have to excuse me cause I take note in a fashion much like any I
g other investigators, but a)br. Pat Brennan>hnd a kr. Mike Brennan$both brothers. ~ g[j- Mr. . Pat Brennan was apparently a union steward at the Zimmer f acility for some- , time and Mr.7 Mike Brennan X vas apparently a supervisor or some capacity of I f supervision with the Quality Control section of Kaiser. This is the information J that I have at the present time. We are again pursuing this as quickly as possible because I feel that this evidence could lead to a finding as to whether or not Peabody Magnaflux was actually burgled or not the weekend after I was I have discussed these... fired. a Kepple r , Were records of Peabody Magnaflux taken at that time? Applegate Yes, According to the President of Peabody Magnaflux in a taped conversation that I provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, I asked him does Peabody Magnaflux have a continuous string of data that they can report should this come to a point of hearing either with the Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission or in Washington with the Senate Subco==dttee or anything else, and he indicated that 8 no, that they do not. That because of this apparent pilferage of data to quote
- Mr. A1 dredge, "because of the apparent pilferage of data there may be some holes in their continuous string of information with regards to safety related quality controls inspection of the pipes at Zimmer." So it hinges on the fact that this burglary might have put some holes in Peabody Magnaflux's ability to continue on
[ and say that they had evidence of the fact that there were problems with that lead _of piping that they inspected, okay. That was, of course, what we had , j r centered on. ( , Devine What Mr. Aldredge stated was their records were taken when they were dismissed I from the job. They normally would have some of their own. So we don't have negatives. We have hopefully some of our inspection reports but these have t holes in that now that we have had some possible pilferage of our material. And frankly, I don't know now if we have a particularly documented and distinct... '
^
So there's. . . . e e e e
\
4 Applegate
.g 4
Documented string of evidence as I recall the conversation. Devin-Yeah. He's made some references to that. A lot of Mr. Applegate's work has been trying to pin down what that reference was referring to in terms of pilferage and a breakin and there has been conflicting information about it and as the NRC investigation continues the witnesses seem to be more of a consensus that there was a breakin there and more people are willing to talk about it. When we first started asking questions about this there were some people denying that anything like that had even occurred. Now the trend seems to be that folks are willing to open up about it. Barrett When you address a load of pipe do you have specifics of kinds... fLl M Applegate PY es, we are talking about the load of pipe that was delivered from Kellogg on { July 3,1979, that was dropped off at the truck and was exa=ined by Peabody Magna flux. And their original examination they found, or at least they reported to me that they found, some inconsistencies or some discrepane.ies or actual i faults in some of the prefabricated welds of that pipe. That this was , prefabricated piping that had come in fron Kellogg of Pennsylvania and that in checking for damage they had inadvertently found some inaccurate or possible discrepancies in the piping and that in trying to pursue this they were hushed up i==ediately. I was given a statement which is on tape, again, I don't know, p4/7 , I think all these tapes have been provided the Nuclear Regulatory Consission ihaven't they? It's very indistinct, but at a great cost to me I have had these dkg g tapes audiolyzed and Mr. Sellers who was a supervisor for Peabody Magnaflux at the site at that time made a statement that Peabody Magnaflux was told by Kaiser and Cincinnati Cas & Electric quote "we will do what we are told to do when we Iaretoldtodoit." And that was his in-quote statement that out of fear of
~
losing the contract. out ot tear or reprisal of losing the contract with f-I/r7 Cincinnati cas & tiectric, they would do what they are to1d to when they are told to do it and _that in this_particular instance when_they brought up the iepressions of faulty welding done on prefabricated welding that was coming into the plant that they were told to keep quiet. Barrett Do you feel that this is the docu=entation relative to the pipe that was dropped off the truck that was stolen from the trailer? i
Devine i 4 Well, we're not really sure how much docu=entation is missing. We think this is an area of question that you all could probably clear up fairly quickly by going to PM and finding out what kind of records they have there. And if they have everything that they are supposed to then we vill know the people who are co= plaining may be mistaken about it or else there has been a co=plete identification of a new record system for years of work. And if they don' t have it then. . . Applegate Because that was also indicated on the tape when I asked Mr> Aldred 3 e-I said is it impossible to doctor these X-ravs or make the reports look like they were something they are not and Mr._ A1 dredge indicated - oh. certainly it is possible and highly pr*bable. He indicated that when the intent to deceive and defraud was there originally that there is very little that you can do - that's the president of the ' company talking. Barrett
<b# So I understand then that you don't know specifically what documents, if any, were taken from thq , trailer?
p ** Apple gate We do not know what documents, if any, were taken from that trailer. I'believe
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' that the people at Peabody Magnaflux do know. And that under pressure because as Mr. Aldredge indicated, that their company position was we have taken the position that to go in and defend this matter would cost us in the long run, taking the position that Peabody Magnaflux was blowing the whistle on a sister utility and just maybe we shouldn't be considered for any further work and he was under, I believe Peabody Magnaflux was under, the fear that they would be banned from the nuclear industry entirely if they go in and try to defend this
\ matter as I felt that they should have. As i y e g en to safetv oroblems in the plan t , safety related matters with regards to that particular piece of piping, ~
it could have a ve ry_ seri nne im art, es_pecially given the placement of that pipe {,Ig fix in the main steam reitef system2 but in any case as I understand it that's a very critical system - but in any case and I have a lot of names to discuss as far as where that information came in. . I
, . v i
McCarten
}
JA 'I* That's what I want to talk to you about. Who is the police agency involved ' gi , coming up with this ,information on the Peabody Magnaflux trailer breakin? A2 plegate j Well, a lot of these people are former Yoh Security people. McCarten Do you have any names so we could go and talk to these people? Applegate .! 3 Yes, we do. McCarten Do you have them now? i Applegate Yeah. Tom, do you want to go into the specific names? I can give you the names and phone numbers and a quick sunnary. Again I want to emphasize before we go into this - Mr. Keppler, this is something that we discussed in your office - that a lot - you can't just go out and approach some of these witnesses, you P have to understand there have been threats and you can't just go out and approach 3 these witnesses - they get very nervous about how you approach them. If we are , giving a list of witnesses this morning, we must understand that these people are people who have a lot to lose with regards to the present jobs that they hold. The intimidation that Cincinnati Cas and Electric has thrown on these individuals is - we don't care if you formerly worked for us, we don't care who you work for _, now, we can still cause you trouble and these people are afraid of that type of sit uation. So you have to understand that we are giving these lists of witnesses but please understand they - the type of situation these gentlemen are in - they have voluntarily talked to me and I think it's with a great deal of courage that
.they have voluntarily talked to me. -
* ~
Keppler . 4 Do you have any suggestions as to how we should go about contacting them?
. . ~ . _ . . . . -.
/ /
o
/
,dout this breakin and we vill contact them because this Peab6dy Magnaflux issue is not closed. We are actively investigating it. 3 o
l . Devine I I would be glad to Eet this in the records right nov. _Mr. Ron Wricht, he is former security of ficer there with Yoh and is now atrthe Felicity, Ohio',' police department. His phone number at home is ! ' l Applecate And let me indicate that that is a party line you may have dif,ficulty in reaching him, you might have to reach him through the Felicity police ' de pa r t me nt . . Barrett Will you have addresses for these people? , Mc Carten Yes, we vill get that. He is a police offic2r. He is not going to vorry if you call him. Devine
- r p# L Mr. Jim Bedinghouse, he is the former. police chief in Moscow, Ohio, and a ,
gg," security guard at the plant. His phone number, home nu=ber, is . I believe these other three individuals you haven't spoken with diEEDOGC-Applegate No I have not sptL-n directly. I have not had time. Devine p . g, ' Mr. Wri ght referred three other witnesses - Dave Simpson _vho is now a sergeant in the Felicity police Department, Mr. Tim Creighton who lives in,the Telicity y/,e area, and Mr. Jim Brice who works with the New Richmond, Ohio, $olice. Applegate
- They as well may have more witnesses.
D ,
Devine g 4 These men all worked for Yoh Security and the primary focus is on the security issues, the access to the fuel, etc. Some of them do have some spillover into safety related issues. McCarten What about the BME ,which ones have information on this burglary and Pd breakin? Ron Wright? - i Devine Ron Wright, well.
. Applegate D d 1 would say you ought to talk to Jim Bedinchou_se and_Ron Wright and Dave Sin sen bgesd primarily. Dave Simpson has apparently kept a lot of documents and a lot of ye* records. I think he is the man. There is also other things that these people have talked about besides the breakin. They have obviously talked about the security m:tters that we are going to relate to safety here in a minute, but they have all talked about other matters and they backup affidavits given by
,Jef f Hyde and Steve Harris. This is all the Yoh Escurity group - these are what I believe to be stand-up law enforcement type people - they were all com=issioned officers in the State of Ohio at the time they were with the Yoh Security and these are the people that 1 feel are your most expert witnesses in discussing a lot of these allegations.
McCarten Have any one of these people given you these two names oEggike and Pat Brennap(,- they have direct evidence that these two people. . . _Applegate
.Those names were given to me by those people.
McCarten ,, j . Which one has the direct evidence regarding their involvement? 0
Applegate 2 3 I as not certain - again these people - you know, you have to understand a police officer. A lot of times he wants to talk to the feds - he doesn't want
' to talk to Tom Applegate - he doesn't want to tell me what he knows directly -
j because again, Mr. Keppler as we were discussing, this comes into the standpoint - this comes into the issue of what do these people want to say a to Tes Applegate and at the same time what do they want to say to the NRC. g,.i They say give me part of the story and they may give you all of the story. So, with regards to th __at Brennan and Mike Brenna>c a ituation, I don't feel Y,3, ,/, they have given me all the infor=ation 'that they know and they have mentioned
- p. them casually and mentioned the fact that it was co= mon knowledge that these j individuals might have been the ones responsible for the breakin. Now whether or not that is proven up in fact is a matter for the NRC to look in - I know l
that that relates to the Aldredce tape and relates to the A1 dredge conversa-l tion with regards to the fact that Peabody Magnaflux was_inef eidated to leave
- pj g7 the si,te. I believe that they were intimidated through corporate pressure. I b~elieve that they were intimidated from the standpoint of how they were issued off the site. Mr. A1 dredge indicated that there was a man standing and waiting at their trailer when they went to pull it off the site stating that you will hand over the documents. And I said you mean it was a situation of almost hand over the documents or get shot? And he said, well let's put it this way, it was one of the fastest transferring of datas ,that I can recall in 20 years. And then I went on to ask him if this has ever happened at any other nuclear site that Peabody Magnaflux might be associated with and he indicated to me that they were associated with approximately 20 other sites and that this had never happened previously.
Devine .
. .- s
, It might help Mr. McCarten to su=marize whatever explanation _Mr. Wright and Mr. Bedinghouse did give for identifying the Brennan brothers as the people in this breakin. 5"C- -)
j I might be able to be helpful a bit on that. _ - said the day.that V,j% alleges that there ,vas liquor kept in the control room. And that would
~~
V'7 perhaps permit an inference on your part as a very sensitive job people f- y might not be at their best in that some intoxicants are so disabling that 7-i you don't want to have, a person working in the plant at all if they have taken that. ,also alleged that employees consumed angel dust at the plant on the job. This is the kind of thing that if anyone consuned that in the privacy of their home I would think they are crazy, let alone l constructing a nuclear power plant. I think it makes it easier for you if you find out the extent of the alcohol use or the drug use or whatever, if it's enough, if it is happening in large enough quantities that you can make l an inference that almost certainly it is going to be turning up in some sensitive spots as well as just maybe just working on paperwork that af ter-l i noon or that type of thing. It is really necessary as to identify what parts Tof the plant it was being used at, when it was being used,what intoxicants specifically. .
.1 l Applegate As I indicated, I made the analogy that a pipefitter was derelict in his duties of being a pipefitter because he was out raf fling guns. Similarly there were pipefitters that, according to.- _
affidavit, were drunk e . e
on the job and you have got to measure that a man's capability is_ insofar as perforning his task as a welder or pipefitter when he's intoxicated on either moonshine liquor, regular liquor of any sort, or drugs of any sort. The whole point is that the highway safety committee says don't operate an automobile. We are talking about individuals who are constructing nuclear power plants. The whole point of what I am trying to say is that it was easy for a car to fall off a scaffolding maybe but it was just as easy while he is welding to sit there and look at that one beam of light and you know you wonder about his veld. And I think that was what , had to say was that there were individuals that he knew of that right in the presence of authority, in the presence of supervision, were sitting there drinking out of a bottle. And all that supervision had to say was get rid of it and the guy would sit there and instead of throwing it away he would chug down what was in the rest of the bottle and then throw the bottle away. And the supervision said well, that took care of the problem, didn't it? This is the same instance when we have supervision saying, well, you know you are padding your time cards, just don' t get caught. So what I am saying is the supervision took the responsibility and took .an active part - Mr. Lautenlager, and some of the superviscrs thatl , were talking about took an active part in condoning this activity over a period of years. Keppler and have Let me tell you that we will be going back to interview further discussions but I gather that he is the prime sou'rce oi UW-infor=ation we are talking about. , Applegate He is a prime source. Keppler Let me ask this question first, vill he give us freely the same information that you have discussed here? Devine Of course we can't speak for , but I do have reason to believe that he told te that his goal was to be able to talk to the NRC - to ' people that he would trust and share all this information. j *
- s. 3
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. r Keppler -
3. Okay we can get a lot of that then from him. You mentioned that he is a prime so;rce, do you have others that you can refer us to? Devine Well, we have given you Mr. Hyde, Mr. ... Keppler I mean on this subject. p Applegate n'
' On this subject, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Harris, again the recent list- of witnesses '
k,\ ' that we gave you this morning, Mr. . Mr. Bob T fner, all of these
.. Individuals - Victor Griffin. All of them knod about 'the drihking and the drugs and so forth that was done on the site.
Devine
- I have yet to speak with anyone who has denied that.
Applegate Who was unaware of it. Keppler So we vill be pursuing that with them. You mentioned a Mr. Lautenslager, he is the Cincinnati Cas and Electric security guy? Applegate
,Te s .
Keppler *
^
l. J You mentioned that people talked to him vent to him?
. .. - - - - - - , ,n.
Applegate I Continuously, these Yoh Security men. Keppler Do we have those things too? Devine - Yes, these and the security guards who have provided affidavits or that Tom has spoken with. Keppler We have that material? l Devine l Yes. Applegate Let me also indicate that ytr. Dave Simpson_apparently represents these security fjfd
. guards in a federal action by the National Labor Relations Board with regards to these security guards being kicked off the site as well and they feel that they were kicked off the site for two reasons. Nu=ber one, because they tried to unionize, which is not against the law, and they are trying to show in their 8 suit to the National Labor Relations Board that this was one reason that CC&E Y' just did not want a unionized guard service in there. gumber two, ad most g.#
importantly,because these guardc were bringing up allegations or criminal j# activity that occurred at the site while they were,there and they tried to get these allegations that these guards are being put down as sour grapes and employees who have been dismissed and in actuality they are employees who have strong concern wfth regards to the safety of the Zimmer Nuclear Power facility
~
because the'y~ssii iTorof"thi~ construction personnel walking around smoking
. _ dope, dr' ink'ing moonshine liquor, getting drunk and playing with their guns.
~ - _ .... _
i i l ! j -l~ Barrett 1 i p -
- e. 4
- Jim, do we have names of security guards?
t t l , McCarten ( 'l
.j , Yes. ,
I i - -- .. . _ - - - -
. 9 Devine b 4
Just to tie in your earlier query about how can we relate this to the problems
,that we have jurisdic. tion over, Mr. Hyde said today that for example describes that their lead man for the Yoh team who was in charge of security guards had a se riou s drinking problem and af ter awhile he was not good to anyone because he came to work "shitfaced" all the time, in Mr. Hiatt's J1 vords. _You don't want to have someone intoxicated in charge of security for nuclear fuel. So I think that with more investigation you can tie in where the problems existed if that makes it easier for you to do your job.
Applegate And I think that that is something else too with regard to the safety of the i fuel as it exists. Mr. Wright brought up to me that the fuel actually sits f k g3 in an unsafe area as it stands today. Keppler What do you mean an unsafe area? Applegate Well, the valls around the 7th floor containment area where the fuel is stored are apparently what are called blow-out valls. and that they were instructed by Mr. Lautenslarer and by everyone in charge that should a tornado warning come up or should high wind velocities be experienced at the Zimmer Nuclear Power facility they were to secure the 7th floor as much as possible and abandon the fuel, leave it alone. And that if the tornado actually did rip through - amd you have to understar.c we are in the tornado alley. If anyone doesn't know that, look at Xenia, Ohio and look at what happened to Cincinnati in 1973- you have to understand if a tornando did ever hit and those valls were blevn out, along with that voald be 40 million dollars of nuclear fuel spread out over how many areas. Kepple r Are you talking about economic considerations? 1 4-
s Now if it was not safe for the security officers to sit up therfp, we would have some concerns whether it was safe for keeping the uranium there and presumably the 7th floor is going to be there for the life of the plant the way it is constructed now. Keppler It seems to me that this point is not an issue that we need to talk to witnesses on. Either the storage of the fuel is acceptable or it is not. O Devine You go out and find out whether or not those are blev-out valls or not. Keppler We could pursue that and we vill. Applegate Well this is.. . you asked me to come with new information. Keppler Absolutely, and we appreciate it. Applegate And here I a=. Keppler Now, do we have all the information? And let me say that the issue of drug abuse and alcohol obviously is a very sensitive issue to us all, and as I s,ee it I don't know of any shortcut for this solution other than to go ahead and talk to people and try to get a handle for what parts'of the plant vbre involved, the extent of it, this may lead us to decide that maybe we vill have to do some independent checking. I don't know, but thd only way to solve it is through a brute force technique of interviewing people.
l Devine 4
\Q The only other thing that I am aware of, Tom, if I have missed something is
~ raised on
\ that Mr. Bedinghouse confirmed one of the problems that the jiaks of argo]5((as from the crimping gaps in the containment area. S(\ Apparently Mr. Bedinghouse's son worked for W&W Security. His son John had become sick due to the crimping of hoses in the containment area when he was on duty there. He has also rentioned another fire in December 1980 in the containrent vessel and he did not seem to think that that had been reported to the NRC. But since it had come out in the papers in Cincinnati I don't see how it could have been avoided. That is one thing that you might want to double check on. To just maybe wrap this up, in your earlier inquiry about the criminal activities, you don't have the authority apparently to grant immunity and I sure understand that a lot of these people are nervous about it. If it is not pcssible to give someone immunity in an initial interview, maybe there could be some arrangement that their statements to you sould jus t be used for background and won't be held against them or could not be used as evidence against them until they can speak with someone and work out the details of what they are going to be held accountable for by the=selves. Kepple r Fine. We vill pursue that one. Devine . Okay. , Applegate That was so=ething that was very strongly indicated to me by Mr.,Erdinchnuca-that he was very concerned for his acn's safety because they were doing a fire watch in the containrent vessel af ter my fire that I was involved in and other that the crimping of the hoses again is a problem that has been reported at plants besides Zimmer and that it was a common practice. I_think _ had a lot to say about that, but Mr. Bedinghouse said that this practice is continuing and that as recently as this past fall and vinter his son was ve s s e'.. almost overcome by Argon gas while doing his rounds in the containment And again the containcent vessel you have to understand at Zimmer, I have, IIhave knowonly you guys have probably seen a heck of a lot more of them that seen one, but the one at Zimmer as far as I know has one hole that you can get out by the v'ay the scaffolding is set up, or at least the way i't was set up at the time. 4 0 e e
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1 Davis ' J We share that concern. If the utility is able to hide an existing defect so that we cannot find that defect we certainly share that concern. Keppler I would go further to say that if we find evidence that the utility is trying to cover up something from the NRC then we will take steps to deal with that point, but we have not thus far. . e Devine One of the allegations that we have received was that in the supression pool there was a problem thaQeloped because theyWas too thin and it had f ss to bedidn't pool reinstalled with thicker lining.ano in tne process the design supression conform with the actual construction of it. Some damage was done in g
? ) terms of drilline and kreaking through reinforcerent bars in the process and
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\X that that was something that was covered up before the NRC inspectors came out with knowledge that they were about to arrive.
It was more possible I guess when this happened because things were in a state of construction, but that might be one thing that you would want to check out. That was Dr. Tankhauser's summary memorandum. - Davis Do we have that? McCarten We have Dr. Fankhauser's name. Davis . He is your source for that allegation? Devine Yes. As a matter of fact, you probably... . e e
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Apple gate , 4 That is similar to the radwaste area where the drains are clogged with cement. All you have to do is pave over the floor and it is impossible to get to those I/ / y drains anymore and'_ ,_ _has stated in his af fidavit that he feels that there is a severe problem with the drains in the radwaste area. 7 Davis Okay, we have that in fo rmation. Do you have anything additional on that? Applegate Just the fact that the CG&E did not want the NRC to find out about those drains. Davis Well, we found out about them and we have that information. _Ap ple ta t e_ or... Did you find out about them through me ori Keppler ' That was one of the allegations that you gave us. Applegate Good, I am glad to see that I am doing something positive. Bringing at least some good people to your attention. l Keppler l While I don't want to get into a position of discussing an ongoing investigation of our where new information is coming incoepletely, as we are learning as part investigation I will tell you that the argon crieping Because that thing really is' is: a catter that occupational we have brought the OSRA people in on. censileration. or industrial safety consideration. rather than a nuclear safe l But we have corresponded with them and we vill be keeping in touch vit a thee l until the resolution of this catter. 6 e
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Applegate , Right, and you boys apparently wanted OSHA in and CG&E was not pripared to block OSHA out. But let's just say CG&E, look at their records, how they have blocked out regulatory agencies in the past, taken them to court, taken them to federal court and tied them up to the point where by the time OSHA got there there was nothing to see. Keppler Are there other new areas that should be focused on? Devine Unless I have missed something I believe that we have shared all the general issues that have been covered. We might go into a little bit more detail on them. Applegate j' Ihe only thing insofar, and before we begin talking in detail, my concern was (P f that a lot of this information bears on the A1 dredge problems with regards to e the security guards having information that might lead to finding who broke into that trailer and whether or not Peabody Magnaflux is missing something and that f j relates to safety. Keppler That has been very helpful and we appreciate that. I'a sorry Mr. Devine, did you say that you had additional information? I l Devine .
' think that is significant at this point, just that Mr. Wright I unguarded. People could not go to the ty confirmed that nuclear fuel had been lef tfor them because they are understaf fed.
fl bathroom without finding's replacement More details of confirmation as far as any new issues, I thin 4 we have shared I shat we have. Keppler . So it is fair to say at this point in time we know all of the issues that have
- been flushed up to you right now, as related to nuclear safety?
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i I Applegate . We have talked about the idea that there are some people who wan) to talk to you directly, such as I will give an example, Bill Ross, is a former security guard who is on our witness list who is currently the Chief Investigator for Claremont County Velfare Department. He is a man who cannot come to me and talk openly and cannot come to the Government Accountability Project and just spill his guts. What he wants desperately is for someone to come to him with a subpoena in their hand and say we need to talk to you. Okay, now be it the NRC or be it the Justice Department, Mr. Ross has some valuable information with regards to activities that might re, late to the safety aspects of the plant. New I know that the NRC has subpoena power. Please provide that for Mr. Ross because Mr. Ross needs one of those before he can leave his job and he is interested in protecting his job and protecting what he has done. I am sure that with a subpoena in his hand from the NRC he can say, hey, these guys want to talk to ne, this is something I did in my past. I have to be responsible for the law enforcement activities that I conducted before I came to this job. I am sure you understand, this is subpoena, it is just like the National Guard has said it's time for me to go to my weekend warrier situation. Davis Do we have Ross' name? McCarten Yes. . Davis And you are saying that the only way he will talk is if we do subpoena him? Devine Can you get a subpoena? Can you use one? Keppler jiehavethatauthority,yes. . N~ *
1 Applegate And I would say Mr. Harris, if you don't get any positive response from a simple letter you might have to subpoena Mr. Harris.
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What I would like to do now... Applegate s For all I know, you see t,his is a group of men, when I talk about Jeff Hyde, Steven Harris, Ron Wright, Jim Bedinghouse, Tim Creighton, these are all men who are involved in that NLRB suit. Okay, so they have their own egg to fry and they don't want to let out all they can. The way Ron Wright'put it to me is they have So they don't a can of beans here, okay, and they have a lot in that' can of beans. want to open up that can of beans or that can or worms or whatever, before they You have to understand how these good old boys talk. know they have But the whole point to fry it.is that he doesn't necessarily want to open it up to the NRC when it is going to be an NLRB matter. So you have to understand that they have reasons to protect the information that they sit on and you are going to have to guarantee these men. It may be that you would want to speak to them in groups, in mass, or contact their spokesman who is Dave Simpson, that might be important to know. Keppler I also like Mr. Devine's suggestion that we might talk to these people in the light of them giving us some information that won't be attributed to them directly but will be used to assist us in scoping this thing. What I would like to do now is we have, as I think you are aware, been forthspending a fair due to the amount ofthat information time on the these people additional points that were broughtwe are having a little bit of trouble with orovided us. Some of these areas because of the general nature of them and I would like to have Jim and Paul be able to bring up some questions. that they might have so you might help us a little bit more if that is okay. Devine Tom just inquired as to when you will find it convenient to break for lunch. Applegate We were thinking of caucusing. Wb have accomplished a lot in our new information session, and it is quarter to 12. I was thinking I would like to caucus with Tom Andove: I lunch and talk thout some things that we are going to be going through,etc.
- think these gentle =en before they get to this would probably like to have a little
. breather. It is quarter to 12, maybe a good time? .
Devine . We know you are pretty busy. We don't want to take up any more of your time than necessary. Kepplel' Okay we wil1 break now. e
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i r Keppler j Is it acceptable to you people if we proceed in the direction we were talking before? I'd like to go back to the first package that was submitted by GAP that raised the additional 19 plights over and above what was previously dealt with. I think we have been pursuing these for weeks now. We have had varying success on these things. Devine , A few of them were more anecdote than substantive. Keppler I understand this, but some of them were fairly general. and we have some areas that we would like to ask you about to sort of help us on. _A - Barrett The first allegation I'd like some information on has to du with the residual heat valve that was broken accidentally when a pipefitter bumped into it. And the correct question is how you know he knew it was good or bad. Can you give us the source that told you about this valve and along with the source? Can you give us any location, valve number, pipefitter name, date ... i Devine That would be l Barrett Do you have any other specifics? Devine I Believe that when I spoke with _L.yent over a list of everything { the gentlemen told me and got confirmation or asked him to point 'out anything l that is not accurate. That is my general procedure. But just to e;conomize on my own time I don't ask each and every witness,,that I speak with po ... l l l O w - - -
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4 Barrett In-your conversations did they indicate any specific locations of the valve, system the valve was in, the pipefitter's name, the date of the occurrence? This says residual heat, so that gives us some ... Devine The best that I could do is I could. .when I get back to D. C., go over my notes of the af fidavit with But I tried to be as inclusive as possible when I presented and he delved through the affidavits and he did discuss it with me. i Barrett Did Tyner provide ... r Devine I believe that his was mostly on the f3ushing and he did,' Mr. Tyner[did, and I did not speak with him. The investigative reporter that we were working with on the case spoke with_Mr. Tyne[ and he vent into some depth about the general proble=s of quality control at the plant and we have given some specific examples. Probably what would be helpful to you on further explanation-expansion on some of the things we have listed would be to talk to this reporter. I can give you his name and number. His name is Mark }brtsgaard and he is in D.C.
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His number is ; Schnebelen L'h a t is his position? Devine , He is just an investigative journalist. Barrett )
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)4 f The next allegation has to do with velding rod" control. Can you!give us your sources and who made that remark to you about velding rod control.
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h also. confirming that with me. If I am not mistaken made a point of Barrett i Did they that workers, give you any specifics such as the crafts involved, pipefitters, iron type of thing?
- Devine You see on page seven of the the welding instruments are kept. He, affidavit he observed this at the shed where I understand it, protested to some of the supervisors who worked there.
He also informed me that the ASNE was con-cerned about the problem so you might try and get in touch with some people at AS.ME and find out who it was who was making noise about this. ~ Barrett Did he address any type of specific paperwork which he thought was not being controlled properly? Devine f I bgligve it was signing in and signinc out and returning the veldine equip-mentmis ,unat he was referring-to. He said rods routinely were taken and kept away from the shack without the necessary paperwork. His concern was not Q only that there could be some damage to the equipment but some of it was y being diverted and being stolen. 1 Applegate 1 Welding rods, as he explained it to me, velding rods were being taken in and out of the shack without the proper paperwork, without the sign-in and sign-out and where the velding rods were being used apparently, or something like th}at. i ~
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l Did he give you any specific time frame that this was occurring?
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.7 Devine 4 He talked about 1979 v ere there was some paperwork done on it. He said 3
that he personally observed the problems in the late summer of 1979.m_ y _Mr. Grif fin _ talked to me about similar types of issues, but of course he was gone quite a few years earlier. So for your most tiecly evidence you wouldn't be able to get too much help from him. Applecate Except that Mr. Grif fin denotes a continuing pattern. Devine Mr. Grif fin notes a lot of problems which I think are structural in terms of how the utility is handling their quality control as well as identifying things which he protested some time ago which apparently still had not been In. terms of this specific issue, it is really.' and solved. w Barrett
,p/ The next one is the argon gas which was turned over to OSRA. Earlier you #D mentioned Mr. John Bedinghouse and Jim Bedinghouse. Do you have any specifics along the line of what time frame did this happen in? ,
Devine I have to defer to Tom on that. Applecate Yes, John Bedinghouse. This would have been late fall or early winter of 1980, If I got my information from Jim Bedint, house . correctly. John I believe. didn't speak with me directly about that, he said that he would refer me to his f ather and let his father explain what happened. Barrett k,
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As f ar as the location, did he say in the suppression pool area?
I Applegate i b In the suppression pool area. Apparently he came out extremely nauseated. He was very upset. Barrett The next one has to do with the pipe that fell off the truck. Who is Jf 'f your source for that? . Applerate ! That is a continuing ... . About three or four people are a source for that,. j One is John McClung, the security guard that was responsible for receiving g the pipe. He had contact witn someone at CG&E offices and they were the ones that instructed him to have the pipe brought in.on the truck and just simply unload it. So that was John McClung. ' ' was the man who helped the " man unload it. Devine t This when he was taking me out to the airport last summer expanded on that to some degree and identified individuals not included in this affidavit who was handling the immediate process after the problem was discovered So probably could give you a few more names than we provided in the af fidavit. Applegate I And then again Peabody Magnaflux employees, Alan Sellers, Steve Sellers and
,7 I all the people at Peabody Magnaflux that were responsible for X-raying that P ipe-Ba rret t The next one you indicate that you have three different sources which ex,timates that 20% of the plant's prefabricated wells are defective. Can
)(/g you give us those three sources and any others that you have? ,
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j' 4 Appl e ga te b One_ vould be - Devine hrough. That has come up several times so maybe I could go t Applecate spontaneously, I would I can answer that If you're looking to whetherand or not the Peahndv %mafluv neople. I believe I don't say It might have been Dave Hang. g itknow was- either Allen or Steve Sellers. one of the Peadbody Magnaflux people. Barrett_ n? Why not 15%, Do you have knowledge of what they based their estimate o why not 25%? Why did they say 20%? . Devine_ it was just that. It was an estimate. I think that { f . // App leRate the X-rays that they had been l
/,g '\ It was an estimate based on the f act that was the pipefitter on the 3rd
; q. You have to understand flux X-rays of pipe at the
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shif t responsible for overseeing Peadbody Magna hat they were shooting had t conce rned l Jk\ plant and they were estimating 20% of the wells tin hilethese there 20% tho fj problems in them.Now they took into consideration the f act of shooting w
\ about. estimate on the 20% figure , \f'}) vas etc.
water in the lines and shooting while i d of many tBut when they years. ' ex jyIl d was arrive from what they had shot over a per o i . l Barrett_ ' ') there? , They being Peabody Magnaflux with
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;]g Ri gh t. Peabody Magnuflux, and confirmed that. Tyner,
,e I believe, had some input into that.
-s Barrett This is of the shots that they made at the site?
Appleeate These were~ prefabricated wel.ds they were talking about. Devine ' This was just an prefabricated wells. estimate because they weren't as a routine checking the When they would check the ones that were done at Kaiser there would be overlaps in the radiographs and it would come. up in conversation that there seemed to be problems in the velds that are [g) coming intoboth questioned the plant as and well as.the velds that are being done here. _jl_ figure ano thev saia just based onabout what 's the basis for this 20% the occurrence of how frequently it cropped up that was kind of the partv line a one the ol ant employees and that they very well could have been off. It could hay,' been 12% or it coul'E nave been 30%. s_ _ Applegate I think the 20% figure was something pretty universal amongst the pipefitters. , Devine l Mr.rejections of Sellers, Steve lit velds Sellers. saiddone that was that there was an unusually high proportion at ZLmmer,
) frCust ry average, about three times the normal
{ ah hich was sometning that we found very significant in light
,I, of the records averige Mr. Phillip checked which found it was less than the industry f:) 4 an d , as a matter of fact, by Eoing after bad welds than Peabody Magnaflux.the utility was more aggressive
(,N significant to check out. So we think it is something Although I. caution you, that I have spoke,n eith -
( l i Mr. Seller since he talked with this investigative reporter ano he is much more cautious now. Not in terms of denying his previous statements but in terms of saying 1 don't know why everybody wants to keep going over old things we're not goin'g to be able to solve that now, it's too old. So it will probably require a little bit of encouragement on your part to open him up. Barrett On the rejection rate, did he indicate to you that the ones that were being rejected were not being properly .. 7 Lp.d N *
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Devine : That is a common theme. In fact, that seemed to be a major source of the conflict between Peabody Magnuflux and the utility. It was holding up construction because they were coming up with so many rejections. And there's no alternate explanations. One was that Peabody was just too slow, that they were inefficient and they were holding up construction. The other explanations - they were finding too much stuff wrong and that's what was holding up construction. As far as we can tell there was not direct pressure. A nu=ber of the' witnesses said there wasn't direct pressure to stop reporting that there were bad welds. The pressure was to stop complaining about being overruled on them. Applegate - I think it should be noted too, that and I'had a convernarinn that ff, ) aware that I was an investigator. f > j is on tape on the bodv recorder. 'Th'ai 'I have tape f rom him when he was_ not He discussed a lot about the welds on that tape. I think it should be noted that these gentlemen were totally unaware. They thought I was a cost accounting engineer. They were totally unaware and were not apprised of my fact or real position as an undercover investigator until CG6E made the fatal mistake of telling them. And boy, I'll tell you, that is one of the most fatal mistakes CG&E ever made. Barrett Is role in this explanation a confirmatory one or did he also ... [8 ,b
Devine k I believe that I provided you all with my memo of my conversation with him and it was primarily confirmatory but it is a three page memo because he did open up a little new ground. McCarten Are you sure.when they are talking 20% ' rejection rate, are you sure they're talking about prefabricated welds or are they talking about their velding program as a whole finding 20%? Devin e I was quile_inecific l in my questioning on that _ Jim and it was the 4 g gref abricatedM7at tney verr rETerring to. I think a partial explanation for it is that these folks are much more forthcoming about criticizing outside firms' quality than their own. It's kind of a common theme among the employees is that we were doing a good job but it 's just
- that these outside groups weren't. Mr. Sellers vould have been talking
. . about the velds that were done at ene plant as well.
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! 74 (ifb Applegate
# I think it might be worthy to note too, insof ar as reference material is i k "4.M
{8 conce rned, that Pullman-Kellog is the same company that provided welds
#( for the South Texas Project.
h Barrett From my understanding of our earlier discussion of this issue you were saying that the velds they were questioning were the ones they radiographed on site. Devine h b -
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l~ S Keppler 4 Let me feci:e on a point just for clarification. If the contention is that 20% of v.e prefabricated velds were faulty, it would seem that we ought to be ab'c to verify that completely by a check of the vendor shop. They are required to maintain the radiographs there by regulation and so ve ought to be able to do a review at that place. Correct? Barrett , Yes. Applegate p However, let me point out as is pointed out in my af fidavit that when 1 /g brought this up to Mr. Murrav- the accistant project engineer. that I was getting feedback from the pipefitters and the quality control radiographers that up to 20% of the prefabricated velds at Zimmer may be faulty, his patent response vas:look we have paper work from Pullman-Kellog to say that this stuff is all right: we don't really care whether or not the stuff, if it breaks down at that point, then it is Pullman-Kellog's responsibility because they gave us the paperwork and if the paperwork is faulty that is Pullman-Kellog's responsibility and not ours; we bought the stuff from them; if it breaks then we are going to be down on them.Eut the whole point is that was his patent response to that allegation of 20% faulty velds. He said that to go into that area and Icok, he made an example, he said look ve had a guy out here who was accidentally shooting in the wrong area. Peabody Magna, flux is doing the same thing that this other place did and that was that when they were X-raying in a certain area they found a faulty veld and it cost us a million and three quarters to go around and redo all those damn cable trays and we are not going to redo these pipes. He just sat there and he was just really adamant so what there is problems there, we don't want to hear about it, we don't want to hear about it because we have got the radiographs f rom . . . He was almost livid at that point. Whenever I vculd bring up the fact that there is a possibility that 20% of the velds down there were f aulty, Mr. Murray used to just go out in left field. Keppler Wh,bisMr. Hurray? .
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L Aepletate Mr. Murray is the assis. tant project engineer who was my direct contact. Mr. Keppler From Cincinnati? Applecate Ri ght , for Cincinnati Cas and Electric He was my direct contact as an undercover operative. Davis If we go back to Kellog where they keep on file radiographs for these welds, are you saying we cannot rely on those? Applegate A Acc rding Jgt Mr. A1 dredge he said that thnse ran be doctored and he said U
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certainly they can be doctored if the intent to defraud and deceive is , there orginally. And he talked about Pullman-Kellog. He said the Kellogs, the Bechtles, the Brauns, he said these prefabers they can really lay it to you. He said we get this stuff in here and it is a piece of crap and this - is what was in his conversation. I would refer to his conversation with regard to the pref abricators. With regards to the prefabricators, he named them all and he said ... you know what I as talking about ... he said these prefabricators can really lay it to you. What he was basically saying in essence there, I believe, was that he believed his men down at the site that they did a good job because we ree=phasized that twice on the tape, your men did the right job and Kaiser was trying to push you guys around so it looks - good for them. He said ' bell you are right" the first time. The second time he said 'you are correct." The uhole point was I hit him with that twice to make sure that he understood what I was saying, that Kaiser was trying to force them to say something that was contrary to what their men found doing a good and proper job. And what their men found doing a good and proper job was that these prefabricators were coming out with welds that won't hold up. 9 ,
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Barrett 2 This is Mr. A1 dredge? Apple gat e g Right. Ernest A1 dredge. Devine To add a little bit on this 20% figure it is not in affidavits but he refers anonymously to a supervisor there who agreed with him. That would g be Bob Marshall. As f ar as the question of whether or not to trust Pullman-V$ Kellog's radiographs, we sure understand that you can't go out and re-X-rav - suggested that what he a nuclear power plan _t. It is impre cucal. thought was necessary to clear up the suspicion was to select a relatively limited number of welds that could be recommended to you by plant employees, pipefitters, and check those out so you would be basically anJng an_ informed spot check._
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Davis We would be doing our own NDE. We know that as a way to do some of this. Applegate You see I have certain reservations with NES in the fact that they carne in i and supposedly did an independent check on Peabody Magnuflux's work. And my problem with NES is that I think they har' a vested interest obviously because they ended up with the contract. I think there is some question there. Plus the fact that NES came up with some unresolved welds and we still haven't heard the end of it. Davis Ha,s NES now replaced Peabody?
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Yes, they are the radiographers on site. O e e
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I had said earlier that it was Mr. Sellers,who gave the higher figure of 39* rejections, that is Mr. Steve Bennett who had given that figure to the investigative reporter on the 39% rejection rate based on his experience. I don't know if he is on the actual witness list or not. I could give you his phone number. If you would like, probably at least as much investigative work as we have done was done by Ahis reporter who shared his notes with us, I can ask his permission to ... . McCarten If he wants to talk to us we would be glad to talk to him. Devine -
.. . talk to you and to share all his notes with you.
Barrett The next one has to do with engineering designs that are routinely drawn after the fact. In other words you don't really ... We would like to have [g P your sources on that. n Devine I believe that was e Applegate and Mr. Tyner._ Jim Tyner' is a man who does a lot of that type of work himself and the ~whole process was that if it didn't fit
,, redesign it and design it to fit. Don't design it to be a necessity. _It vag_like, they were explaining to me that the water intakes down by the f / river were f acing the wrong way at one time or another. ~ind they-had to jlf redesign the way the water intakes were. And they still don't have that problem solved or apparently they had not resolved it when I was there because they were burning out feed water pumps at a rate of every' time you j safech ebe7 yn.j And I think that what wasalludingtoatjhat point tol .
'G~as wheninthey the put same in situation withthat the 8" pipe an 8" pipe this vers,us vasn't a 10" going to pipe-they'asn'd fit and w t people going f to work and it was going to have to be redone. And they went ahead and put g
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gh i ' in the 8" pipe anyway and then all that piping had to be torn ou and reinstalled as 10" piping just exactly as the men had said. If you had j f,ollowed the original, specifications you would have what belongs here but you have done so much redesigning and so much rework on a lot of j this stuff that nothing fits anymore. And that is when they came down tith the reason why a lot of ,this has slowed down according to an d - _and Mrt_Tyner was that they redesig'ned so many things : to fit conveniently for one reason or another that a lot of the original i stuff didn't fit anymore. Barrett I Do you have any other specific indications or inforcation regarding the pipe sizes other then what you just addressed? You know - piping systems. Applegate 4 I think that and Mr. Tyner' as well as the Peabody~ Magnuflux people had identified certain velds some of which I understand i were cleared up under the first investigation and apparently still stay resolved. I don't know what the situation is there. Some of which were part of a group that are still unresolved. Some of which were in a i questionable category. I don't know. If I read right in the first report
! y from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission there were three groups of pipes.
l During a subsequent inspection September 25 ano zu and December 11 and 12, 4f @6 1919, several more discrepancies were identified. CG6E then hired NES.. A d
. . Of__those 956_ pad report _,
g[)'Thereviewincluded2390radiographedwelds. That is the big question mark. 543 b=d enza *-chnical V .'f discrepancies. problems and 14 were held to be unacceptable. So apparently some of ,the-l [3 b* k ones we nave identitie3 UtrE-were some of the 14 and some were part of the 543 and seme of them were and Mr. Tyner jg and Tyner' vere saying was you have r part of the 958 but what these discrepancies and there's'y_ogr_201 and it is in that figure somewhere. What they are saying is a lot of ~these pipes are not right down there and
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l I that they are going to have to be either or. And in a lot of situations the utility according to Mr. Murray was in the position that we can't redo those pipes. There is no way we can redo those pipes. Because ve would have to tear out so much other stuff to get to those pipes. So the whole point is .... we plan to open up that big question mark hanging over them?
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l Barrett -
; other than the pipes that you described now and earlier, you don't have
, any more specifics as far as pipe sizes or anything like that to help us tie in information that ... design.... ?
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i Applegate No. I think you have the numbers on KAU - right? De~ vine f() _ On the de=f tns,it is not a size of pipes but architectural design. Dr. Fankhauser would be a person to talk with on this problem that they had in the suppression pool with the reenforcement bars not being where they were supposed to be in the blueprints. And that is going ~to require pretty good detective work on you* folks part. You see that was from a source that you can't locate anymore. I think that the accuracy of the criticisms can be confirmed fairly well just by checking the designs versus the locations of things. He does have some background on this indivi-dual because he talked to him for awhile ... in his home. He just hasn't been able to reach him again. McCarten A lot of these workers were fairly transient. Applegate The transiency of the workers was of great concern to all of the people that talked to me. The fact that there were a lot of boys there from New York and there were a lot of boys there from Pennsylvania and there were a lot of boys there from this and the other place that they had never been around and y a lot of them just came down there to party and there were gentlemer there . g who had other people _takine veldine tests for them and vere not qualified ,d g 1 velders and things like that. That was the whole point. You had a lot of transients coming in there that were flashing union cards that were of j questionable character. I e)-
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[ - Who specifically gave you the information regarding people cheating on their velding examinations? Is there somebody we can talk to that has specific knowledge about this? Devine - Mr. Hofstadter was the gu'y for Husky. I m rww
McCarten .. f That was a vendor though. k'ha t about at the site? y Applegate I think you would vant to talk to 'and im Tyner and again . Barrett , The next allegation has to do with electrical cable tray hangers and cable filling cable trays. Again, we would like to know your source for this. Devine o My direct source was Hofstadter although I know it has been confirmed in some of these notes from the reporter. As to which of these witnesses spoke on that I would have to do a little researching. Barrett You address two things in that allegation. One is faulty velds and the information I would like to know there is what type of welds are you talking about. Are they cable tray hangers or do you have any specifics on the velds that you are talking about? Devine . I believe you have the Hofstadter affidavit. Applegate You have the Hofstadter affidavit? Barrett Yes we do. I just wondered if you had any other infomation other than what you... again I am trying to exclude anything that you have already giveh us from any additional information you may have. ,, . e I 8 I .
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u Barrett .] So what I am hearing then you are actually addressing both of them. You say -they are too tightly packed which generates too much heat. So you are more concerned about the amperage then than breaking a hanger down? Applecate Well both. I would say both equally. , Barrett The next one has to do with the heat exchanger control panel that was mistakenly operated or operated improperly to 1200 lbs to pipe that was
. only designed to carry 300 lbs. What is your source for that?
Devine p That was and and I believe that you ought to be able to confirm that just by raising the topic routinely in your interviews 7 ( 7e because was not in the immediate area and heard it and said ..
! my God or something ... I would assume a number of employees witnessed that.
Barrett Do you have any more individuals? Devine None. Barrett s # Going back to the issue that you raised with the drinking. You also identified
,j a concern obout people that are prone to violence on the site. Again I ask for p' lL the : sources for that and also can 'you give us specifics other than what we talked about this morning?
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,i Devine Welb not other than what we talked about this morning and in a f.fidavit. .
e-_ " Applegate I would 'say everybody we talked about this morning. All of the security personnel vould verify that, as well as Every conversation it comes up there were these transient people that were coming in and out; a lot of them had prison records, a lot of them were very violent had theplus people the factthere potential whenforyou were doing things like PCP and Angle Dust you violence. I don't know if you have ever expedenced a situation where someone has laced a marijuana cigarette with PCP or if you have had an experience where I am not saying you yourself, but I have had experiences in my investigative career where I have had to deal with individuals and I think it is a rather well know fact in law enforcement circles that anyone who is on this type of drug or who is using this type of drug routinely as well as moonshine. I think that a lot of people who do the old shine get rather violent in nature because of the type of drug they are on. It is almost pure grain alcohol. The whole point is that there were a lot of fights and there was a lot of violence down there because of the excessive amounts of drugs and alcohcl. McCarten It is based on your obs,ervations then, this a llegation? Applegate I saw a couple of situations myself while I was there that could have literally exploded into deadly dueling fights. Plus, I would like to indicate that there were guns on the site which is strictly in violation of the law. Devine Maybe, Mr. ... could help you on that issue. I didn't speak with him but the reporter did and he was quite forthcoming and ... . . m a
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Davis Do you see a relationship between that violence and improper construction of any kind? Aeplegate Yes. I see a relationship and I think the people we have talked to see a relationship because when you have men that are involved in all these extracurricular activities they can't be very involved in their work. And a lot of times they had too many employees down there simply because they wanted to keep the unions happy or they wanted to keep somebody happy. They had all these guys down there partying while other people were trying to get their work done and they would interfere. Devine
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And also it is just a matter of common sense I think Mr. Davis. Like this fellow Mad Dog who was running the hot gun operation there packed with weapons. It was like a joke. He had so many knives on display. . Applegate Don't mess with Him as he walked in you could see that he was carrying many weapons. It is just like if I walked into this room and strapped under my coat was a large 44 magnum with a 7" barrel I think you gentlemen would agree that it might be intimidating to you all.
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Devine If nothing else it is a distraction. Applegate If nothing else it is a distraction to you sitting around at this table. Somebody is going to be sitting there saying I wonder if he is going to
# And the whole point is this Mad Dog and Jim Hardy jfJyf getand-madalland pop off me.
these people that were'= running around raf fling of f guns and raf fring off prostitutes and everything else they knew to be hardcore chard.cters and watch out and be aware, etc. and a guy might be.. sitting there doing a weld and everything at the same time he is looking over his shoulder to make sure somebody isn't coming af ter him with a Bowie knife. Because he offended his wife at the lunch hour or something like that. e .
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Devine I would be very surprised if we were able to get direct evidence1{on this. This thing was so well organized in terms of the criminal activities with books for the raffles for every different black market operation. They were i all printed up and stapled so you could pull out each ticket. It is a very well organized operation and I just want to know who is organizing this thing. This is well put together. It seems like there has to be some sort of tie-in with an effective organization whether or not it is the union or whether it is organized crime or whatever. You talk to people and you always ask that q ue s t ion . who is behind this? - do you know anything about the Mafia? -if there is a bookie operation that has outlets all across the country, shouldn't the Mafia be involved here? And the response I consistently got is I didn't want to know. I had enough common sense not to ask those kinds of questions. We are just concerned with something that is this well developed that organized crime might be connected with it. And I just think it is a matter of any kind of common sense, organized crime is not interested in safety issues. it is a business operation. And if it is that bad it almost terrifies me that those are the people who are making decisions on where to cut corners of having any type of influence over the employees that we are relying on here. Applegate That is the point. That leads right into what I want to bring up and that is here you have people of responsibility, supposedly responsible, when you have people like Bob Marshall and Bill Murrav and Fred Lautenslager etc. and the supervisqrs, DEith, etc., (the people that were in charge there for Kaiser and Cincinnati bas and Electrid turning their heads and telling the security people to turn their heads to this type of activity. The whole point is*was this condoned and if it was condoned for what reason was it condoned. Was Fred Lautenslager getting fat off of this or was somebody else making something off of this. We know Bob Marshall got a room added onto his house and we know he got his wife's car redone down there at the plant, etc. What were they getting... common sense would tell me. . . I can't understand how these practices flourished as much as they did and as long as they did without all these people... now I don't know if I votad put Bill Murray in that category because he was one of the strong people who wanted to hire me to find out about some of this activity. But i the whole point is they couldn't control it so instead chey condoned it and in condoning it weren't they in a sense becoming complicity. I think that is probably i a question for' DOJ. The whole point is in my estimation when you have Fred Lautenslager and he is sitting there looking at a handful of marijuana butts and the security guard says he found them in this area and I found them .in this area and I found them in this area and Fred Lautenslager knows darn good and well they are doing sensitive work in this area and they are sensitive voik in this area and they are doing sensitive work in this area and these employees that are doing this kind of stuff were doing sensitive work on the plant, why is Fred Lautenslager telling the security people not only do I want you to turn your heads but I want you to quit bringing this stuf f into me because I don't want it on my conscience. See what I am saying? j dL
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Devine Tom we vill probably get back to... Applegate I am just saying this is the follovup on your question. Barrett . Earlier this af ternoon you also addressed welds that were being rejected by PM Other than the information you gave can you give g ,g yL ~ and later accepted by Kaiser.us specifics as to what velds were rejected and later Devine . I would have to defer to Tom on any specific weld. I believe , ' talked about those and the source for those specif,ic welds would be the Peabody Magnaflux employees as well as McCarten When you talked to them you had a tape recorder on so that vill be on the tapes? Applegate . Not at all times. Only one conversation did I have with did he ever get into that type stuff. Devine Tom, who are the PM employees who wanted to set up a meeting for you to show you the evidence and you were called back... Applegate Allen Sellers. Menue Renning-end Dare Hant._ They wanted to set up a meeting these for kJ me to review the material that they said was going to be incricinating about velds. When I indicated to the utility th'at I was going to have"that meeting that is when the utility promptly fired me and decided I was of no uss to them anymore. that I was getting into an area they didn't vant me to get into and that was also the weekend that there was the breakin of the trailer.s gy f
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g Barrett . Does that include all the ones that have addressed this concern involving accepting af ter reject? In other words. the gentlemen you just spoke of. EM and Mr.... Applecate Right. Barrett One last question and I will be finished. The comment was made that a KE1 employee has a detailed journal of safety hazards and incidents at Zimmer. Can you specifically tell us who that individual was? Devine Sir I am not sure if I have his name tere but' is the initial source [g6 of that information. And I can also go back and check my notes on that if Jim for some reason does not remember anymore who is was that he referred to. Applegate
/ [6 I would indicate that as far as journals are concerned apparently . Dave Simpson of that new list that I gave you this morning kept a journal of problems.
Barrett When they were talking about these safety hazards do you know if they were of the nature of OSHA concerns or NRC concerns? Devine Wh'at was that again? , Barrett In this journal they are talking about... Devine . o Personal concerns. 9
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McCa rten I have one last question. . being Pi P intimidated efitters also. and we haveYou made a lot of statements ab f What is your source for that?a lot tosay work unionfrom that but youout PM you information about the intimidation of union pipIs that
- e fi who gave Applegate _ ttet h Right. .
McCarten What was he referring to
, his intimidation or...
Devine When'he was fired vent him on local level and then ap level to back off and concerns ththrough or word this union. a kind of evolution f if they pushed this too muchparently getting some at the plant vocid go to from thInitially backing e international So I think when talkisig to hinonunionized mw employees McCarten e can find out. Talking to him we could find out... clarify that. Barretc , Doas . address any specific pipefitters t o you? McCarten Himself... Ik Applegate
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I'm Staff Director Investigation Enforcement g-Ic Well let me thank you both for coming in to this meeting. Mr. Appleby, Mr. Devine, Kirk Davis met for a few minutes in my office and we have agreed to tape this meeting today. There are two tapes being run in parallel and a copy of one tape will be given to them at the conclusion of the meeting. In addition, we will make a transcript of our tape and provide them with a copy of that. And that's to go to you, Mr. Devine? We also agreed that the transcript of this meeting would not be made public while the ongoing investi-gation is taking place so as not to interfer with any investigation. What happens after the investigation is up to the parties involved. Let me in-troduce the NRC people here for you so you can know exactly who they are and what they are doing. I'm Jim Kepler, I'm Director of the Region Three office, on my immediate right here is Kirk Davis, the Deputy Director, Mr. John Streeter is the Acting Director of Enforcement and Investigation. He was recently put in this job about a month or so ago. We had a reorganization and he 5 that position for Region Three. Mr. Ted Gilpert is from the ID Headquarters Staff. He has been helping us on the interviews of some of the ex-workers.of Zimmer down at the ana facility and'I asked him to come out becuase ultimately this case will be documented through the Washington people and I thought he ought to have a first hand observation of this meeting. Mr. Art Sneplen, the Office of Inspector and Auditor, these people as you know are involved in the investigation of Region Three's earlier investigation Mr. Applegate's allegations and we invited Mr. Sneplen to this meeting also. Mr. Bob Warnick to his right is the Section Chief in the Resident and Project Division of our office and he is the supervisor responsible for the
2 inspection program, overall, at the Zimmer Station. To his right is Mr. Paul Barrett. Paul is the principal Inspector at Zimmer for the construction program. And next to you Mr. Devine, is Jim McCartney. He is our investigator on the allegations and additional information that was provided to the Merit Systems Production Board by GAP via Mr. Appleby. He is out of Region Three? Yes, he works on the Region Three staff. I guess I would just like to make a couple of introductory remarks here to kick this thing off. I want to say that I recognize that the GAP organization and Mr. Appleby have expressed some concerns with investigation of an earlier investigation con-ducted by Region Three into an allegation that you made and I guess I want to assure you up front and for the record that we are dedicated, committed to a total investigation of the matters that have been brought to us. Mr. Davis and myself are personally in directing and following the investigation into the materici provided by GAP. In the interim, NRC's office of Inspector and Auditor, of which Mr. Sneplen is a part of, are involved in an investigation into Region Three's earlier investigation of the allegations that were brought forth last March or April by Mr. Appleby. As I mentioned to you earlier, we had not planned to interview Mr. Applegate as part of our ongoing investigation because we largely thought that we had all the material that we had in connection with the investigation given to us through the GAP organization. However, when you contacted Mr. Davis in my absence last week and indicated that ycu had some new information that had not previously been given to NRC we moved promptly to interview you and we appreciate very much your willingness to meet at this time.
Mr. Kepler I would like to clarify not that Mr. Applegate was withholding information, he hadn't obtained it. Fine, whatever. We just assumed that we had all the information and quite frankly, we were aware that obviously that Mr. Applegate had felt we had not done our job properly the first time around and when you think you have all the information basically no reason why you go back and hear about all the thinkgs you did wrong previously. Well I think more than anything else, it's not so much a case of I didn't come up with all the information as it is that in the position that I'm in, I'm in a position where information is coming to me constantly ano it becomes a hard situation when you don't know what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is doing. They've been by press accounts in your town for two or three weeks and nobody has talked to you and you are getting all this information thrown at you from other sources: this person has this to say, this person has that to say and that person has that to say ...when I'm getting this information it becomes hard to relay that to cap and then in turn get it relayed to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission when you know that all you've have to do is reach out and say " Hey, Mr. NRC, I'm right here and you know, all you have to do is ask me." I've always been a person who with any federal agency that I have worked with and I've worked with several and said all you have te do is come up to the front door and show your identification and I'd be glad to sit down and talk to you. Information is coming to me almost constantly from sources within the Greater Cincinnati area with regards to the Zimmer situation, and it is getting to be a strain on this non-profit organization as well as on this non-profit individual to try and get this information to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC in town? An ideal ....now I wholeheartedly approve of your actions in having this meeting here in Chicago rather than
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4 in Cincinnati. I think that is a good move. So I have no objections to coming to Chicago any time you want, if you'd rather with me here than in Cincinnati. But I think you should understand that there are individuals who are going to - through one way or another - get ahold of me because my number is not public and my address is not public. They are going to get to me one way or another. They get through to me through grass roots organiza-tions that have their own problems with Zimmer. They get to me tiirough the press. I've had various members of the press who have said this individual wants to talk to you - he has valuable information to bring forward and so forth. He feels that you are the conduit to release this information because you are obviously by all accounts in communication with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. So I wanted to make sure that that communication was there. Well perhaps one thing that we might work out today is some kind of periodic contact while we are down there to see if you have any additional information. We can talk about that as we go on. I think I'd like to focus the meeting on at least - from our point of view on trying to get whatever new information you have to assist us in our ongoing investigation. And when we've completed that I'd like to allow the people doing the investigation to ask you some
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questions in areas that they are having trouble pursuing based on the docu-mentation received so far. If there are other areas you wish to pursue, we'll gladly do so afterwards but I'd really to focus - to help us on our ongoing investigation. Focus on the new information and clarifying some of the points of concern that we have. Is that acceptable to you? Okay, con-sistent with a point you raised with us Mr. Applegate earlier, I guess I'd like to before we start this I'd like to take your statements under oath if that's acceptable to you. 1
That's perfectly acceptable. Will you raise your right hand? Do you swear that the statement you are giving 3 day is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God? I do. Mr. Devine, how do you feel about . Mr. Devine, do you swear that the statements you are giving today are the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God? Thank you very much. Well I think I'd like to start with asking you to provide us with information that has not been provided to us through the previous packages that have been given with the original GAP's Merit Systems Projection Board or ! the subsequent enclosures that have come afterward. Let me clarify with you the enclosures that you see thus far. It is my understanding that we received the original package that was provided to the Merit Systems Projection Board
- we subsequently received a very small volume of material which contained some affidavits of some additional - people who provided information to Mr.
Applegate and then thirdly, there was another package that came in that con-tained the material that largely related to concerns of Mr. Hoffstadter and Mr. Griffin and then I think there is a fourth that I haven't seen yet that was ( i t - - , - . . _
given to you people right away when you went down to the site. And what does that consist of? It just consists of some persons to contact, information. Okay, let's start out with the assumption that we have that information. You've received a witness list. Yes. At this point, rather than having myself start out, I'll have my lawyer explain where we are coming from and start us off. Let me say also if anytime you want to take a break or whatever, just nod and...I'd like to keep everything reasonably comfortable here. We appreciate your . The coffee's great. Basically what we are interested in doing is certainly providing all Mr. Applegate's new in-formation and I was interested in taking advantage of the opportunity to be breifed on the scheduled itinerary for the rest of your work. And also to clear up a few of the questions that we' e had as an out-side organization on trying to understand the methodology and operating pro-cedures of your oversight of nuclear plants and how you interpret the , so that some of the issues that we may have criticized prematurely could be resolved and we would understand your approach a little bit better. Could I again ask that we do that after we get the other ...
Yes, I think that our first priority should be - time to get down to business here and start showing his information. Right. As you note probably if you gentlemen reviewed the material in my affidavit and I discussed in my affidavit and other pertinent information that was pro-vided you, I duscussed an allegation with regards to the independent radio-graphers body magnaflux being in one way or another coerced to leave the site at the Zimmer nuclear power station. It has come to my attention that there may be further evidence with regards to they're being coerced to leave the site. As you might be aware we provided a taped conversation between myself and Mr. Aldrich where I think it is at least clear to us that Mr. Aldrich and possibly we should get into a discussion of Mr. Aldrich's con-versation with myself.. Maybe a good way to get through this all quickly would be to go down witness by witness with whatever new information you've got. Okay, okay. There are certain law enforcement officers in the greater Cin-cinnati area who have indicated to me that they believe they have some highly i i suspicious people that were involved in the breakin at the Zinner nuclear power facility in the weekend approximately January 10, 1980, approximately, again I say this was the weekend after I was fired from the site. Ttere was an allegation made that someone had pilfered data from Peabody Magnaflux that might tend to corroborate our allegations of faulty workmanship on piping in the Zimmer nuclear po..er facility. The names of these individuals have been given to me as suspects and I emphasize that only because a certain amount of
circumstancial evidence takes you up to a suspect and then a certain amount of fact gathering confirms or denys their guilt in relationship to an inci-dent. This is typical investigative procedure. You go through stages in investigation. I would say that if you include the four stages of investi-gation, speculative rumor, possibility, probability and fact, that this is probably in the possibility category and could be placed into the probability category with the interviewing of certain witnesses that I have their names and I would like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to pursue that with the idea that this may provide further information with regards to Peabody l-tagna-flux - leaving the site either by coercion and force on the part of utility and the contractor or by any other means. The gentlemen who are highly suspected of breaking into that trailer according to my witnesses and again you'll have to excuse me cause I take notes in a fashion much like any other investigators but...a Mr. Pat Brennan and a.Mr. Mike Brennan t
- brothers. Mr.
Pat Brennan was apparently a union steward at the Zimmer facility for some time and Mr. flike BrennaE was apparently a supervisory or some capacity of supervision with the Quality Control section of Kaiser. This is the informa-tion that I have at the present time. We are again pursuing this as quickly as possible because I feel that this evidence could lead to a finding as to whether or not Peabody Magnaflux was actually burgled or not the weekend after I was fired. I have discussed these... Were records of Peabody Magnaflux taken at that time? Yes. According to the president of Peabody Magnaflux in a taped convereation that I provided to the fluclear Regulatory Commission as he indicated, I asked him does Peabody Magnaflux have a continuous string of data that they can report should this come to a point of hearing either with the fluclear Regulatory
9-- Commission or in Washington with the Senate Sub-committee or anything else, and he indicated that no, that they do not. That because of this apparent pilferage of data to quote Mr. Aldrich, "because of the apparent pilferage of . data there may be some holes in their continuous string of information with regards to safety related quality controls sections of the pipes at Zimmer." So it hinges on the fact that this burglary might have put some holes in Peabody Magnaflux's ability to continue on and say that they had evidence of the fact that there were problems with that load of piping that they in-spected, okay. That was, of course, what we had centered on. What Mr. Aldrich stated was that their records were taken when they were dis-missed from the job. They normally would have some of their own. So we don't have negatives. We have hopefully some of our inspector reports but these now that we have had some possible pilferage of our material, frankly, I don't know now if we have a particularly docu-nented So there's... Documented string of evidence as I recall the conversation. Yeah. He's made some references to that. A lot of Mr. Applegate's work has been trying to pin down what that reference was referring to in terms of pilferage and a break-in and there has been conflicting information about it and as the NRC investigation continues the witnesses seem to be more of a consensus that there was a break-in and more people are willing to talk about it. When we first started asking questions about this, there were some people denying that anything like that had even occurred. Now the trend seems to be that folks are willing to open up about it. 1
(Question - too distant to make out) Yes, we are taiking about the load of pipe that was delivered from Kellogg on July 3,1979 that was dropped off at the truck and was examined by Peabody Magnaflux. And their original examination, they found or at least they reported to me that they found some inconsistencies or some discrepancies or actually faults in some of the prefabricated welds of that pipe. That this was prefabricated piping that had come in from Kellogg of Pennsylvania and that in checking for damage, they had inadvertently found some inaccurate or possible discrepancies in the piping and that in trying to pursue this they were hushed up immediately. I was given a statement, on tape, again, I don't knot , I think all these tapes have been provided the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It's very indistinct but at a great cost to me, I have had these tapes audiolyzed and Mr. Sellers who was a supervisor for Peabody Magnaflux at the site at that time made a statement that Peabody Magnaflux was told by Kaiser and Cincinnati Gas & Electric "we will do what we are told to do when we are told to do it." And that was his in quote statement that out of fear of losing the contract, out of fear of reprisal of losing the contract with Cincinnati Gas & Electric, they would do what they are told to when they are told to do it and that in this particular instance when they brought up the impressions of faulty welding done on prefabricated welding that was coming into the plant that they were told to keep quiet You feel documentation relative to the pipe that was dropped off the truck stolen from . Well, we're not really sure...
......how much documentation is missing and we think this is an area of
11 question that you will probably consider up- very quickly by going to PM and find out what kind of records they have done-that they have everything that they are supposed to- then we will know the people who a,re complaining - maybe I'm mistaken about it or else there has been a complete identification of a new record system for years of work and if they don't have it-
-because that was also indicated on the tape when I asked tir.
Aldrich - I said is it impossible to doctor these X-rays or make the reports look like they were something they are not and Mr. Aldrich indicated - oh certainly it is possible and highly probable - he indicated that when the intent to deceive and defraud was there originally that there is very little that you can do- that's the president of the company talking-so I gather you don't know what documents if any were taken i from the trailer. ,
!!o, no. We do not know what documents if any were taken from that trailer. I believe that the people at Peabody flagnaflux do know.
And that under pressure because as fir. Aldrich indicated, that their company position was we have taken the position that to go in and defend this matter would cost us in the long run, taking the position that Peabody !!agnaflux was going to list a lot of and maybe we shouldn't be considered for any further work and he was under I believe, Peabody Itagnaflux was under the fear that they would be banned from the nuclear industry entirely if they go in
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12 and try to defend this matter as I felt that they should have. As it relates to safety problems in the plant, safety related matters in regards to that particular piece of piping, it could have a very serious impact, especially' given the placement of that pipe fix and main steam release system, but in any case as I understand it that is a very critical system - but in any case and I have a lot of names to discuss as far as where that information came in - Who is the p61 ice agency involved coming up with this information on the - Well, a lot of these people are former Yo Security people. Do you have any names so we could go and talk to these people? Yes, we do - flay we have them now? 1 Yeah - Tom, do you want to go into the specific names? I can give you the names and phones numbers and a quick summary -
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13 AGain I want to emphasize before we go into this - Mr. Kepler, this is something that we discussed in your office - that a lot - you can't just go out and approach some of these witnesses, you have to under-stand there have been thre'ats, and you can't just go out and approach these witnesses - they get very nervous about how you approach them. If we are giving a list of witnesses this morning, we understand that these people are people who have a lot to lose with regards to the present jobs that they hold. The intimidation that Cincinnati Gas and Electric has thrown on these individuais is - we don't care if you formerly worked for us, we don't care who you ,<ork for now, we can still cause you trouble and these people are afraid of that type of situation so you have to understand that we are giving these lists of witnesses but please understand they - the type of situation these
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gentlemen are in - they have voluntarily talked to me and I think it is with a great deal of courage that they have voluntarily talked to , me. Do you have any stgge 'tions as to how we should go about contacting them'? I would make a suggestion that when you get in touch with these folks that you contact them at home originally and discuss it with them there wher'e they are the most comfortable about getting their interviews and perhtps even some of them by letter - please don't just call then and say I am from the NRC - some of them are so highly nervous that
14 they would rather get a letter in the n! ail. They might want that to confirm if they have any questions about - I know from our own monitoring of this investigation that one fellow who was not concerned about beirg called at work and got i permission from his boss to be called at work, changed his mind at some time, he was very nervous and upset that happened and preferred that he be called at home. i Yes, you mentioned that and I think the reason was that I had sat notified him that he was going to be contacted - of course I had no way of kn owing that he was going to be contacted because the NRC does not tell me .what they are going to do and I am not expecting you to - all I am saying is that maybe ,ve should have indicated to you before we gave you these lists of witnesses that some of these men are in fear of their lives. Are these fellows are on our lists 'of witnesses? Some of them are - if we have known them before you have gotten them beforahand - rather than tie up this metting and all of these men, maybe at the end of the meeting. .we can give a list of witnesses who gave information on this break-in and we will contact them because this Peabody llag. issue is not closed - we are actively investigating it.
15 I would be glad to get this in the records right now. Mr. Ron Wright'- he is former security officer there with Yo
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and is now at the Felicity, Ohio,I police department. His phone number at home is ' and let me indicate that that is a party and if you have any trouble in reaching him, you may have to reach him through the Felicity police department. Do you have addresse: for these people - Yes, we,will get that - he is a police officer, he is not going to worry if you call him. Mr. Jim Bddinghouse - he is the former p'olice chief in Moscow, Ohio, and a security guard at the plant. His phone number, home humber, i s ., I believe these other three individuals you haven't spoken with directly - No I have not spoken directly - I have not had time.
'Mr. Wright referred three other witnesses - Dave Simpson who is now a sergeant in the Felicity police department - Mr. Tim Creighton who lives in the Felicity area - and Mr. Jim Brice who works with the New Richmond, Ohio, police.
16 They as well may have more witnesses. These men all worked for Yo Security and the primary focus is on the security issues, the access to the etc. Some of them have some spillover of safety related issues. What about the BftE - which ones have information? Ron Wright - well, I would say you ought to talk to Jim Bedinghouse and Ron Wrighk' and Dave Simpson primarily. Dave Si.mpson has apparently kept a lot of documents and a lot of records - I think he is the man
- there is also other things that these people have talked about besides the breakin - they have obviously talked about the security matters that we are going to relate to safety here in a minute.
But they have all talked about other matters and they back -up affidavits given by Jeff High and Steve Harris. This is all the Yo Security group - these are what I believe,to be stand-up law enforcement type people - t. hey were all commissioned officers in the State of Ohio and they were with Yo Security and these are the people that I feel are your most expert witnesses in discussing a lot of these allegations. Have any one of these people given you these two names of Mike and Pat Brennan" - direct evidence that these two people - Those names were given to me by those people.
l 17 llhich one has the direct evidence regarding their involvement? I am not certain - these people - you know you have to understand a police officer - a lot of times he wants to talk to the feds - he doesn't want to talk to Tom Appleby - he doesn't want to tell me what he knows directly - because again, Mr. Kepler as we were discussing, this comes into the standpoint - this comes into the issue of what do these people want to say to Tom Appleby and at the same time what do they want to say to the NRC - they may give me part of the story and they may give you all of the story. So, with regards to the Pat Brennan and Mike Brennan situation, I don't feel they have given me all the information that they know and they have mentioned casually and mentioned the fact that it was conman - knowledge that these individuals might have been the ones responsible for the break-in. Now whether that is proven.up in fact is a matter for the NRC to look in - I know that that relates to the Aldrich tape and relates to the Aldrich conversation with regards to the fact that Peabody Magnaflux was intimidated to leave the site. I believe that they were intimidated from corporate pressure, I believe that they were intimidated from the standpcint of how they were issued off the site - Mr. Aldrich indicated shat there was a man stan, ding and waiting at their trailer - when they went to pull it off the site, stating that you will hand over the documents and I sa id you mean it was a situation of almost hand over the documents or get shot - and he said, well let's put it this way, it was one of. the fastest transferring of datas that I can recall in 20 years and then I went on
18 l to ask him if this has ever happened at any other nuclear' site that Peabody Magnaflux might be associated with and he indicated to me that they were associated with approximately 20 other sites and that this had never happened previously. It might help to summarize whatever explanation Mr. Wright and Mr. Bedinghouse did give for identifying the burn products (?) as break-in. As security officers they were privy to talking to a lot of employees in the piperfitters union and the boilermakers and so forth - employees that were walking around - they became friends and sociable with a lot of these individuals and in talking to these individuals they gained a lot of evidence in so far as statements made with regards to who might have been responsible for the break-in so I believe that that was probably how they came across their information - they probably were talking to someone who had loose lips and mentioned to them that Pat Brennan and Mike Br.ennan were the ones involved. So I think they could probably firm it up or at least put you on the trail a little hotter than I can. And I believe that these witnesses
-now there is another entire aspect to what they have to say - that we are going to get into as soon as you get the other information.
One other question - do you have these conversations with the sellers in the Riverview Bar - and hang you hat on site - you were wearing a body recorder. Is that right?
19 Yes I was. Do you have these tapes enhanced to get the background noise out? Yes I have them. Y6u asked him a question a while ago - did he provide us tapes - and I would have to clarify that, the only tapes that we received that I know of are tapes of the phone conversation that I believe you had with fir. Aldrich - Nothing else was ever given We still need those five tapes - those body tapes - or copies of them - Okay, this is the thing you have to understand - these body tapes are that big, by that big, okay, they included a lot of incriminating evidence, for example, when I bought my belt buckle I taped that and it's good for holding up my pants, I don't know what it is good for that other than that, but in any case when the belt buckle was i bought I was wearing a body recorder at that point and the security guards that sold it to me and indicated that this belt buckle came from the pipefitters at Zimmer nuclear power plant and that this was made out of materials at the Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant, that recording is on tape. I have a - what we call a DVX coded master copy of the auioized version of this tapes - it is not very well done l
'20 because I could not afford a great deal of - you know, I think if you took the originals and had them audioized yourselves -
that is the point I am getting at - what kind of body recorder were you wearing? I was wearing a Pearl Corder D120 which is one of the tops - You have not had them enhanced by lab? I have not had them enhanced by a lab. I had them enhanced by a audio 1 man - who does a lot of work with bands and audioizing, mixing, etc. and getting background noise out of the instruments, etc. Do you still have the originals? The originals are in the safe deposit box in Washington. Okay - if you want to get those, we will discuss how we will do it, but we can contact the program and we could have them in hand and we could get transcrips of those so we could have something to work with. It takes a very close trained ear - you might have to have me on another head set saying this is what was being said because when you are in the Riverview Lounge, first of all we had a lot of construction boys in the background whooping it up and then we had a juke box that was
~21 going probably about 40 feet from me - and you know, so the.whole situation is -
Did anyone else want to see this belt buckle - while I have it off my pants? It is beautiful work, if'the plant were constructed as well as that belt buckle, I think you could probably deregulate. There were at one time 20 pipefitters that were fired who were sitting out in the pipefitters' and the reason they were fired was because the top boss got caught adding a room to his house so he said well, if I am going to get caught and called on the carpet for stealing materials, so is someone else. Excuse me, men, I think we had better hold it to one conversation at a time or this tape is' really going to be messed up. One conversation at a time or this tape will' be useless, okay? Body tapes ? I purchased two of these at one time - To clarify, we discussed arrangements for getting the tapes enhanced in the hands of those tapes - Mr. agreed that we would
. - . .. -- -= .
i . 22 get those enhanced and we could work on them. However, I would state with regards to belt buckles I did buy two, one was turned over to the utility - what they have done with that, I don't know. But maybe they gave it to Mr. D , I have no idea, someone pant's had to be held up I suppose. In any case there are literally thousands of these belt buckles around the greater j Cincinnati area - I had .it related to me from a completely independent i j source that one man financed a van that he bought by selling belt buckles - I had it related to me by security personnel and pipefitters l at the plant that they financed a hunting trip to Minnesota by selling belt buckles at the hunting lodge. T tese belt buckles got far and wide -from the plant, so and this is all thefted materials and taken in quantity over a 7 year period, you know, one belt l buckle certainly did not hurt the Zimmer plant but how much nickle grade, nickle stainless steel alloy grade -nuclear grade stainless steel was used in making belt buckles and how much was used in putting in the pipe? I assume you - that i; information that you are giving to the Bureau? Yes- , I
- Are, there any other individuals that you have not mentioned regarding this break-in to the PM trailer?
1
23 There are other subjects that these people have information on so we might get into the next subject. These individuals talked and verified allegations that were made in affidavits given by two other security guards in the Yo force, one being Mr. Jeffrey High and in which he indicated that there were problems with leaving the fuel unattended, problems with leaving the fuel completely alone, with nobody guarding it whatsoever, problems with having either a security guard or sometimes having to call a control room operator to come up and sit on the floor and watch the nuclear fuel while the guard went out and took care of his business, simply because the security people were totally understaffed so there was the issue of the nuclear fuel. T.hsre was also the issue of the criminal activity that was rampant through-out the plant and in their estimation-I have one of these men,[Mr. Ron Wrigh 'said that he would collect roaches with the butt end of marf juana cigarettes and he would collect roaches and take'them into fir. Lotslinger and say, see in this area there are smoking dope - and in this area they are smoking dope and in this area they are smoking dope and we are finding it when we do our rounds and he would take this information into Mr. Lotinslager who is the vice president in charge of security, for CJ&E at the site and Mr. Lotinslager got to the point where he not only told them to turn their heads and refused' to let them do a law enforcement job of correcting this problem of using drugs on the site but he refused to let them bring
~24 in the evidence of this activity being conducted and the whole point is that how we see this as relating to safety related aspects of the plant, etc. is that hew does a man weld pipes -
now does a man doing electrical work, be a boiler maker, be a carpenter or be whatever he does, how does he do that job safely if he is stoned, drunk and worrying about the girl that he is going to be messing with when he gets out of work? And these individuals have a great deal of information to bring forward with regard to that. I am sure that you will all agree of the safety implications of that - when I came into the airport, I saw the headline in yesterday's Sun Times about the drug use at the Zion plant and they it increased the number of inspectors that are going to crack down on that type of problem. Apparently this was a rampant policy that was common knowledge to th'e point where the security personnel were totally overwhelmed and totally inhibite'd insofar as their ability to find the proper channel and I think this gets back to why did Tom Applegate do this all in the first place? And that is that I was told by my contact at CJ&E that I could not get this information from the proper authorities, get anything done about it, that I was just a mouse compared to their fueling power and that that was the anology that this individual used and who the hell did I think that I was to get the NRC involved?
. - - ,-4.
I l 25 l l Now this was a system project engineer at the Zimmer site who indicated to me that you guys really don't have any clout as far as they are concerned. They can step right all over you. . And you know, again I go back to the idea of the common joke was the inspector on the site could not find the red phone if he had to. That's how far it got, now I think that that was an impression that was left with the low-ranking personnel by the " higher personnel the management personnel in the plant, the construction superintendent, the assistant construct. superintendent, the project engineer, the asst. project engineer, etc. that was the impression that was left by them because their impression is that the NRC does not have the pcwer to come in and solve any of our problems or take care of any of our problems because we just frankly won't let them. He won't let them find out about the drug use, we won't let them find out about the alcohol, we won't let them find out about the raffling of prostitutes, we won't let them find out about the raffling of guns, we won't let them find out about any of this stuff. We will keep our boys happy and by keeping our boys happy, they won't go to the NRC and they won't go to the proper law enforcement agency to get anything done. Let me ask you a question - do you or any of your people have any evidence of any kind of people who perhaps were drunk or doped to the point that they could not do work and they were doing work, or is all this just in the form of cigarette butts or beer cans e
=
26 left around? i Yes, in fact, at the lir. complained that he was not so much concerned that maybe an occasional drink was being taken, he was concerned about people who were drunk on the job. I believe !1r. Hyde discussed with me - folks were drinking in the parking lots before they would come into work - and then they would be drinking again during the lunch hour, people were frequently intoxicated - just to go into the extent of this, Mr. Hyde described that there was moonshine being sold at the plant, to take criminal activity a step further, it was being sold in jugs and you could
- it was very powerful stuff, now I don't koow if there is a still in the Zimmer plant or not, but even just in terms of security problems the coordination of getting a series of jugs into a nuclear power plant - you would think that maybe they would be checked and questioned to why they are bringing the jugs in and what is in them not being manufactured there. So it is not that we are really I
complaining about an occasional beer for yot r lunch, the people were engaging in this pretty heavily. Right and to take that a step further, there was an individual who has talked to the government accountability project that indicated that he was fired because he was doing work for an individual who was out raffling guns. Now the whole point is that a pipefitter who was supposed te be pipefitting, that was supposed to be doing
27 welding and was supposed to be concerned with his construction job was more concerned with raffle tickets on stolen guns. Okay and we have to assume that these guns are stolen because No.1, it is strictly against the law to raffle any type of gun, whether it be handgun, shotgun, rifle or anything else - it is strictly against the law and on firearms, I am sure well tell you gentlemen that it is strictly against the law to raffle guns anywhere and the whole point is - here was an individual who was supposed to be a pipefitter and was supposed to be doing that job and at that time that he was supposed to be doing his jeb, men were having to make up work for him- he was out raffling guns. Let me go back and focus on the drug and alcohol aspect - because that is something that I can see that ties into - I have trouble with the tying the gun selling - And the prostitutes - yes. But let 'me focus on one aspect of it. fir. Davis raised the question
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of whether or not people were in a state that they could not do their job properly. One of the things when you try to pursue an issue like this - the use of alcohol or the use of drugs - you ask questions of workers at the site related to this type of thing. And obviously people are very concerned about any incrimination of themselves,
28 in '.he way they are going to answer it and it is very hard to come vp with people giving you a lead as to something that we might be able to track down that is meaningful to us. When you say drugs were not controlled at this site, I don't know what to do with that piece of information. It is very hard to take a project that is this far along and equate any drug use to improper construction or design of the plant - that is what I have to try to do. One thing that I would like to indicate to you is that I am very sorry that this information was provided a year ago and actua' 'y these men are taiking about a period of time that goes back to 1978 so we are talking about - you are saying the plant is 90% constructed today - what was it in 1978? Well, even it was 50% - the point is how do you transfer drugs into adequate construction or not? I think the way to translate that - We would all agree, I think, that use of drugs is something that shouldn't be tolerated - excepting that fact, the point is how do I how do we begin , the flRC, go ,in and try to assess the impact of that drug usage. I might be able to be helpful a bit on that. said today
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29 that alleges that there was liquor kept in the control room and that would come in on your part as a very sensitive job; people might not be at their best. In some intoxicants - are so disabling that you don't have a person working in the plant at all if they have taken that. It is also alleged that our employees consumed angel dust at the plant on the job - now this is the kind of thing that if anyone consumed that in the privacy of their home, I think they are crazy, let alone constructing a nuclear power plant - I think it makes it easier for you if you find out the extent of the alcohol use or the drug use or whatever, if it's enough, if it is happening in large enough' quantities that you can make an inference that almost certainly it is going to be turning up in some sensitive spots as well as just maybe just working on paperwork that afternoon, that type of thing. It is interesting - , The thing is to identify what parts of the plant it was being used in, when it Uas being used, what intoxicants specifically - As I indicated I made the anology that a' pipefitter sas derelict in his duties of being a pipefitter because he was out raffling guns. Similarly there were pipefitters who according to[ affidavit were drunk on the job and you have to measure what a nun's capability is insofar as performing his task as a welder or pipe-fitter when he's intoxicated on either moonshine liquor, regular liquor of any sort, or drugs of any sort, the whole point is that .
30 the highway safety committee says don't operate an automobile we are talking about individuals who are constructing nuclear power plants. The whole point of what I am trying to say is 'that it was easy for a man to fall off a scaffolding maybe but it was just as easy while he is welding to sit 'there and look at one beam of light and you know you wonder about his weld and I think that was what had to say was that there were individuals that he knew of that right in the presence of authority, in the presence of supervision were sitting there drinking out of a bottle and all that supervision had to say was get rid of it and the guy would sit there and instead of throwing it away he would chug down what was in the rest of the bottle and then throw the bottle away and the supervision said well, that took care of the problem, didn't it? This is the same instance when we have supervision saying, well, we know you are padding your time cards, just don't get caught. So what I am saying is the supervision took the responsibility and took an active par.t - Mr. Lotinslager-and some of the supervisors that' were talking about took an active part in condoninn this activity over a period of years. 1 i l l r I gs .. - , % - ---n -m p, - -y -
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Original Tape N3. 1 2/26/81 Side 2 31 Let me suggest - first of all, let me tell you that we will be going back to the interview with. .'and have further discussions but I gather -that he is the prime source of the information we are talking about. He is a prime source. Let me ask this question, first - will he give us freely the same information that you have discussed here? Of course, we can't speak for, but I do have reason to believe that he told me that his goal was to be able to talk to the NRC - to people that he would trust and share this information. Okay we can get a lot of that then frcm him. You mentioned that he is a prime source - do you have others that you can refer us to? tiell, we have given you Mr. Hyde , Mr. - l I mean on this subject. On this subject Mr. Hyde, Mr. Harris, again the list that we i gave you this morning - Mr., , Mr. Bob Tinert all of these ! individuals - Vic Griffin - all of them know about the drinking and the drugs and so forth that was done on the site. I have yet to speak l
32 with anyone who has denied that -
- who was unaware of it.
So we will be pursuing th.at with thent. Yo'u mentioned a Mr. Lotinslager-he is the Cincinnati Gas and Electric security guy? Yes. You mentioned that people talked to him, went to him - Continuously - Do we have those things too? Yes, these are the security guards' provided affidavits that Tom has spoken with. We have that material? ' Yes. Let me also indicate that Mr. Dave Simpson apparently represents i these security guards in a federal action by the national labor j relations board with regards to these security guards being kicked off the site as well and they feel that they were kicked off the l l site for two reasons. No.1, because they tried to unionize which is not against the law and they are trying to show in their suit
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to the National Labor Relations Board that this was one reason that ! CPSE just did not want to unionize guard service in there and No. 2 . L
33 most importardly because these guards were bringing up allegations of criminal activity that occurred at the s'ite while they were there and they tried to get these allegations that these guards are being put down as sour grapes and employees who have been dismissed and in actuality they are employees who have strong concern with regards to the safety of the .Zimmer Nuclear Power facility because they saw a lot of construction personnel walking around smoking dope, drinking moonshine liquor, getting drunk and playing with their guns. Do we have names of security guards - Yes Just to tie in your earlier query about how can we relate this to the problems that we have jurisdiction over - fir. Hiatt said today that for example - describes that their lead man for the 'Yo. was in charge of security guards, had a ser'ious drinking pr0blem and after awhile he was not good to anyone because he came to work all the time, in Mr. Hiatt's words. You don't want to have someone intoxicated in charge of security for nuclear fuel, so I think that with more investigation you can tie in where the problems existed if that makes it easier for you to do your job. And I think that that is something else too with regard to the safety of the fuel as it exists. ,'Mr. Wright brought up to me that the,
34 fuel actually sits in an unsafe area as it stands today. What do you mean an unsafe area? Well, the walls around the 7th floor contain an area where the fuel'is stored are apparently what are called blow-out walls and that they were instructed by Mr. Lotinslager and by everyone in charge that should a tornado warning come up or should high wind velocities be experienced at the Zimmer Nuclear Power facility they were to secure the 7th floor as much as possible and abandon the fuel- leave it alone, and that if the tornado actually did rip through and you have to understand we are in the tornado alley, if anyone doesn't know that, look at Ohio and look at what happened to Cincinnati in 1973, you have to understand if a tornado did ever hit and those walls were blown out along with that would be 40 million dollars of nuclear fuel spread out over how many areas - You are talking about economic considerations. Well, economic considerations but also a tornado picks up a house or a high wind picks up a house and leaves it 6 blocks away - now if you have nuclear fuel sitting in an area where it could be picked up and sucked out and thrown over a 3 or 4 mile area you are going to have a lot of nuclear fuel to pick up and you are going to have a lot of exposure to the public insofar as a health and safety factor is concerned with regards to this enriched uranium. l l l l l
35 The unradiated fuel does not pose a signifi ant health and safety consideration. The only concern would be if you could take this fuel and assemble it in such a fashion that if it had water mass - Right - there are groups within this country that know what to do with enriched uranium. I think there are groups that know This is low enriched uranium. I an not an expert. All I am saying is that I don't think that this is naterial that you want kids to be playing with. Obviously you want to store it under proper conditions. lie are concerned about the structur'al aspects of this even for the
'o' future when there is highly enriched uranium or wastes - ,Mr. Wright, if I am summarizing correctly, in your conversation with him, described that on three occasions th'ere were tornado warnings and the security off.icers were ordered to leave the 7th floor and go down to the 6th floor where they could be safe. Now if it was not safe for the security officers to sit up there, we would have some concerns whether it was safe for keeping the uranium there and presumably the 7th floor
-36 is going to be there for the life of the plant, the way it is constructed now.
It seems te me that this ' point is not an issue that we need to talk to witnesses on - either the storage of the fuel is acceptable or it is not.
- go cut and find out whether or not those are blow-out walls or not.
We could pursue that and we will. Well this is - you asked me to come with new information - Absolutely - And here I am. Now, do we have all the information and let me say that the issue of drug abuse and alcohol obviously is a .very sensitive issue to us all and as I see it. I don't know of any shortcut for this solution other than to do ahead and talk to people and try to get a handle for, what parts of the plant were involved, the dxtent of it, this may lead us to decide that maybe we will have to do some independent checking, I don't know - but the only way to solve it is through
,a force technique of interviewing. .
37 Maybe you could explain that on your own authority - you mentioned that sometimes it is difficult to get folks to discuss these issues because there could be incriminating against them and I certainly understand that - do you have the authority to grant any immunity to someone for in' formation in a statement they have given, do you have the power to grant use immunity? I don't think so. Only the Justice Department - Okay, now we have brought up a subject that I think is probably in the next most likely topic. And that is the interfacing that the DOJ- the Department of Justice on this problem. We have brcught up serious problems we feel - criminal activity that occurred in the Zimmer Nuclear Power facility - I indicated from the outset back in March, actually back in February, if you want to include my calls to fir. Cummings, but I indicated from the very outset that this was one of my primary concerns and we have gone a whole year now and we still have not seen Justice Dept. interfacing with regards to these allegations of criminal activities in the plant. Now I realize that it's going to be a very difficult problem for the D. bf Justice to go and look at prostitution running, gun running, hooch running, drug running, etc. that was done in the past. They are more geared toward present and future, but it is not an impossible task, for the Dept. of Justice and I don't think that they would deny
~ 38 that task, should they be asked to intervene or to come into - now as we understand it, or as at least Tom has explained to me and other
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people have explained to me, there are three agencies who are responsible for law enforcement at a nuclear power facility, that being the NRC, the Dept. of Justice or the FBI and the Environmental Protection Agency. That is the way I Lnderstand the responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Act, please correct me if I am wrong. But as I under-stand it, we can have federal authorities check out these problems. Well, it is my understanding that you have submitted a package to the Department of Justice. Yes, - with all the information and everything. They have not received it yet. They have to decide what they are going to do with that. We don't have any authority in the areas of the Dept. of Justice has authority. They have to decide what they are going to do and it is my under-standing that you have sent them a package, they will have to respond to your people and decide what they are going to do. I think it is something that Mr.. is talking about now. As I understand it, at a nuclear power facility, at that site, there is federal jurisdiction. Now whether or not that jurisdiction extends because of the state's rights, etc. and again let me indicate to you
1 39 that I have also brought this information to the attention of the Parma County Prosecutor's office, the plant being in the site of Parma County Prosecutor's office and the Parma Cty. Prosecutor's office is working with al.1 due haste to attend to these problems. His name, by the way, is George Pattison. But as I understand it, the recommendation from his chief criminal prosecutor that I was interviewed by, Mr. Robert Linder, the recommendation from Mr. Linder and I talked to him just before I came to this meeting, the recommendation from him was that the Claremont County Prosecutor call in the appropriate investigative authorities that being the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation & Identification on behalf of the Attorney General State of Ohio and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Well, okay but they will still need Justice:I think because Mr. Everett's talking with you would still like to see some interfacing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission insofar as what they know about this and what you are finding out from our witnesses about that. He will cooperate fully with DOJ in anything they want to get from us. Okay. It is my personal impression that because of a lot of this 1 l I
40 criminal activity as I indicated to you and I want to give you one more name, gentlemen, and as I give you this name, please understand this man has been indicted for murder - Mr. James Hardy was indicted for murder in Hamilton County in October of 1980, was a pipefitter at the Zimmer Nuclear power facility and I have it on reliable information that Itr. Hardy was involved with the raffling of guns at the Zimmer Nuclear Power Facility - now it should be indicated to you that these pipefitters that you are talking to and these security guards that you are talking to and all these quality control people that you are talking to are well aware that there brothers of theirs - brothers in the union spirit or brothers in the workman spirit.that were walking around raffling off guns. And that these guys meant business when they said shut-up and don't talk about it and I think that they have that reinforced that these guys meant business and would not hesitate to commit acts of violence against them because here is one of them, Mr. Hardy, there he was one guy who was out. there raffling guns; now he has been indicted for murder, so the whole point there is there is an individual, James Hardy, that you the Dept. of Justice.might have an extreme hammer over; they might say, okay you have been indicted for murder, I am just speaking from the standpoint of a professional investigator, how I would handle a witness, but I am saying you have a guy like James Hardy who has been indicted for murder and you say, hey, James Hardy, you have been indicted for murder, buddy, and we got these other problems that you were involved in .we want i i
41 to know about them - if you want us to help you out with this situation or you want any consideration whatsoever in your murder indictment, then we want to know about what happened in Zimmer Nuclear Power Facility - we want to know about the guns you raffled off out there, we want to know about the prostitutes that were raffled out there, we want to know about the booze and who was in charge of all of this s 'uff and the bookie operation that was being run off the 7th floor security phone. Have you given this information to the FBI? I have attempted to. Is this part of the packe:e that you have submitted to - Y0u see the FBI is rather skeptical in the sense that they are waiting for the NRC to say - We think maybe some of the confusion -
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There is some confusion between NRC and FBI and it is not just that we have sent this to !!r. Everett, but from our reading of the law and the FBI, NRC memorandum of understanding it is your responsibility to do the immediate preliminary review and then contact the FBI and coordinate that so you all can lay the groundwork for them , and invite them it and they take it from there and we are interested in reassurance that you will be taking the' initiative on that.
42 Y0u are going to have a lot more information than we can possibly gather. You see the whole point is, back in February I wanted to go back for just one moment - I contacted not only the NRC but the US
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Attorney, James Sisal and Mr. Bernard Gilde, of the Cincianati office about this in, formation. I went jointly - I have always gone jointly to the NRC and the Dept. of Justice because I have always strongly felt that there are aspects that the D0J rieeds to investigate that have related to the work that the NRC needs to investigate and that co- by the same token, the NRC is coming up with information that actually relates to information that the FBI and the D0J needs to investigate for their own reasons, so the whole point is that I see a very strong parallel and I see a very strong link here in a lot of the information that I am bringing up having to do with two regulatory agencies, the NRC and the Dept. of Justice, that is one reason why I was very concerned'about the D0J spokesman being in. But as you explained to me, Mr. Everett has his reasons and you have a group of inspection and audit people here that are responsible for interfacing with Dept. of Justice so 'I am perfectly willing to accept that, bu't I think it should be noted and I want it on the record that threats have been made according to attempts have been made on people's lives and that a lot of the witnesses that I _have brought forward are acting under a great deal of reservation due to the fact that therc are idiots like James Hardy out there killing people.
43 I am going to have to rely on inspector and audit people to focus on this point. I guess I would just want to clarify - have you sent the information rclative to Mr. Hardy to the FBI? No, Mr. Hardy is something that has just come to me within the pact two or three days. Could I ask that you do that? It will be done. We are waiting for contact with the Justice Dept. Itaybe we could get some help from you all as to who to send it to at the FBI - you can't just approach an agency to reach the right people - !!r. Everett seems to be the one taking the lead -
- send it to Everett -
Yes - well that is a problem - you see, Everett is not the local jur ,sdiction; he i in Cleveland but he does have responsibility for the entire state of Ohio, so it's_. kind of a jealousy thing or whatever but in other words I went to the Dept. of Justice originally in Cincinnati, I have gone back to them, and I have provided them with more information. Again. I indicate to you gentlemen that things are coming to me on a daily basis about these people and that I get this information and it is only so quick that I can run over and believe me when I say rus over, I have to take two buses from my home, because I was run off the road, my car is
~44 destroyed. I don't own a car anymore. It's with a great deal of handicap that I am leavir,; my home and going to the Dept. of Justice because I can't get an FBI agent to come to my house.
It was with a great deal of difficulty that I got here - Mr. Warnick, you are aware of the fact that you had.to bring me money. So, the whole point is that I have been out of work for a year, gentlemen and if you need my cooperation, it is there, my body and soul are at your beck and call. The point that you are trying to inake about the interface between D0J and NRC tied to the fact that it is very hard in your view for some of the witnesses to come forth as long as there is the other kind of threat - The intimidation - Okay, we are going to have to pursue that and let me say that I will try to explore that with our own people a little bit afterward. I don't know what our posture can be. We got an indication from one witness just to give you an example and you want to talk about Steve Harris - we got an indication from one witness for example that is so on edge and so worried about losing his present job situation and so concerned eb99t any-body from Justice or NRC contacting him that at this point he doesn't want anybody except by letter to contact him. He doesn't
45 want anybody showing up at his house, he doesn't want anybody showing up at his job, he doesn't want anyone calling him at his house, he doesn't want anyone calling him at his job and this is the man who gave us an affidavit. This is a man who gave us a sworn statement with regards to knowing about criminal activity and has an extremely good background with regards to knowing what he is talking about. So you know these guys are not whimps by any means and scare of somebody that is going to blow them off the face of the earth, they just know the capabilities of the individuals that are involved in criminal activities at the Zimmer site. I understand the concern you are coming from. I don't have an answer for you right now and maybe we can caucus on this point afterward out I think it is in your best interests and let me urge you to do so to get any information that ties to the criminal aspects - criminal concerns, get that information to the Dept. of Justice. And' I think Mr. Everett i~s the proper one. As far as we know, rverett is the person. And if there is someone different we will send it to you. I know Everett is in contact with Gilbay in Cincinnati because he mentioned his name to me yesterday, but Everett is over Ohio and Indiana I think you say.
4 46 One thing they are concerned about is the economics and I know you gentlemen don't want to get into a discussion of economics, but - We have no control over that aspect - Right, but one thing that they are concerned about is that all of this criminal activity - you know you are looking at a plant, as I said, this morning, Mr. Davis, that originally cost 250 million dollars and now it cost 750 million more than that or a billion and it is likely to cost a great deal more than a billion so the whole point is how much of that is cost ov trride and how much of that is because of lot of criminal activity was going on and they had to rip out these pipes that were put in improperly in the first place. Could we refocus again on the safety issues? The only thing that I am aware of, Tom, if I missed something is that Mr. Bedinghouse confirmed one of the problems that Mr. Hewell raised on from the crimping belts in the containment area. Apparently Mr. Bedinghouse's son worked for W&W Security-son John, and became sick due to the crimping of hoses in the containment area when he was on duty there.
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He also mentioned another fire in December .980 in the containment
47 vessel and he did not seem to think that that had been reported to the NRC but since it had come out in the papers in Cincinnati I don't see how it could have been avoided. That is one thing -that you might want to check on. To just maybe wrap this up, in your earlier inquiry about the criminal activities, I - you don't have the authority apparently to grant any immunity and I sure understand that a lot of these people are nervous about it. If it is not possible to give someone immunity in an initial interview, maybe there could be some arrangement that their statements to you would just be used for' background and won't be held against them or would not be used as evidence against them until they can speak with someone and work out-the details of what they are going to be held accountable for by themsel ves . Fine. We will pursue that one. Okay. That was something that was very strongly indicated to me by Mr. Bedinghouse that he was very concerned for his son's safety because they were doing a fire watch in the containment vessel after my fire that I was involved in and that the crimping of the hoses again is a problem that has been reported at other plants besides Zimmer and that it was a common practice - I think Mr. Hewell had a lot to say about that, but !!r. Bedinghouse said that this practice is continuing and that as recently as this past fall and winter, his son
48 was almost overcome by Argon gas while doing his rounds in the containment vessel and again the containment vessel you have to , understand at Zimmer - I know you guys have probably seen a heck of a lot more of them than I have - I have only seen one - but the one at Zimmer as far as I know has one hole that you can get out by the way the scaffolding is set up, - that is not the correct type. That is not correct. That has changed apparently since I was there. Okay, there has always been more t!an one, okay I am talking about for humans getting in and out. That is what we are talking about. Okay, as far as I kraw there is only one way in and out of the bottom floor of the supression pool - if you wanted to get to the bottom floor you crawled through a pipe that was approximately 3 feet in diameter and then you went down approximately - Yes, we crawled through that pipe within the last couple of weeks - So what I am saying is that supression poul where the fires have occurred and where the argon gas leak apparently overcame Jont Bedinghouse's son and where when I crawled in that one night just by myself there was smoke all over the area and I had no way of getting anybody there. Apparently that has changed, but again this is how I comment about CG&E being abl~ to one step ahead of you
49 Apparently they have changed that situation, apparently there is a way now from the supression pool that you can get help, if you have to pick up the phone, I don't know what is in there. Didn't you indicate to me, no, it was not you, it was another investigator, Mr. Warnick, when they came down to the house the other day, he indicated to me that I would be surprised if I walked in there now. That there is a fire alarm and a phone system and all kinds of ways to get things done. That is the kind of cosmetic superficial way of taking care of things that I am talking about. I would not call that cosmetic - it solved the problem that you were concerned about. Yes, that solved the problem but you see what did I have to do to get CG&E to solve that problem and how many lives could it have cost in the meantime - there was a second fire in mid-December and there were electrical workers working in. that area at tha time and the whole point of what I am talking about is that - we are looking at a situation at CG&E at the Zimmer facility where CG&E and Kaiser again from my witnesses' standpoint they have the upper hand, they have the hand that is dealing all the cards and there is no feeling on the part of my witnesses or the people who have come forward to me that the NRC is doing what is necessary because at this point l
50 in their mind's eye the NRC has not stopped the construction and Let's talk a minute about your - Wait a minute, this is important from the standpoint of what I am trying to say to my witnesses are saying that as far as they are concerned they don't see the NRC has control of the situation because CGSE and Kaiser people can walk around be fore and after you, check what you have checked and have that problem fixed by the time you come back to recheck or by the time you get there and so it is causing in my estimation - again, I say, just as an investigator I would not want to be working under the handicap of having the chief suspects around on my shoulder, whether they are within walking distance or not, is another matter, but what I am saying is they have eyes and ears and they have obviously their eyes and ears in the plant and I feel very strongly - I feel very, very strongly that the continuation of construction at the Zimmer facility right now is a hinderance to the. current investigation. I think if it goes on much longer and I mean much longer - by that I mean tomorrow, and the day after and Hondayof next week, if it goes on much longer I am going to have serious concerns as to whether or not the, NRC was able to find a lot of what we are talking about because we are sitting there looking at a situation where CG&E and Kaiser have a vested interest, you state it where the NRC has no vested interest and I accept that premise, I accept it entirely
51 but I do not accept the premise that CG&E and Kaiser don't have a vested interest, they have a billion dollars at stake and with a tillion dollars at stake, I think that if I were the man who had a billion dollars at stake, I would make sure that this man here and this man here and this man here and these men here could not find out what I didn't want them to find out and I would go what-ever extent possible to make sure that that was done, so I speak to that issue of the construction permit being lifted and I think it needs to be addressed. . If we were to stop construction down there right now, we would be w'orking on the premise of guilty until proven innocent and I think that is not the way the system works. Any individual and I think you can appreciate it, Mr. Appleby, any individual co'uld therefore come forth with allegations and say he has all this kind of infor-mat, ion and why shouldn't I stop every nuclear plant until all of these thingsstre. checked. . But again I go back to the situation of the plumber and the lady. Okay. Certainly CG&E is innocent until proven guilty and certainly Kaiser is innocent until proven guilty but the whole point is that as an investigator as the lady who is coming down to check on that, I am going to feel intimidated 'by the presence cf the plumber. Do you understand what I am saying? I am going to feel intimidated by the presence of Cincinnati Gas & Electric and the presence of Kaiser.
52 Who is going to feel intimidated? Your witnesses? I am sure -that NRC people are going to feel intimidated - they are a pretty tough bunch. We are though concerned that there is an ongoing opportunity for the utility to - even if we have constructive results - to get one step ahead of you on taking care of these things before you can find them and of course we all want the problems to be solved but we also want to determine the extent - We share that concern- if the utility is able to hide an existing defect so that we cannot find that defect, we certainly share that concern. I would go further to say that if we find evidence that the utility is trying to cover up something from the NRC then we will take steps to deal with that point, but we have not thus far.. One of the allegations that we have received was that in the supression pool, there was a problem that developed because the lining was too thin and it had to be reinstalled with thicker lining and in the pro, cess the design supression pool didn't conform with the actual construction of it, some damage was done in terms of drilling and breaking through reinforcement bars in the process and that that was something that was covered up before the NRC inspectors came out 1
- - - - - - . - - - - ,- - - - - - - - - --,. --wg , - -
53 with knowledge that they were about to arrive. It was more possible I guess when this happened because things were in a state of construction, but that might be one thing that you wouTd want to check out. That was Dr. Frank Hauser's (?) summary memorandum. Do we have that. We have Dr. Frank Hauser's name. He is your source for that allegation? Yes. As a matter of fact, you probably - That is similar to the rad waste area where the drains are clogged with cement. All you have to do is to the floor and it is impossible to get to those drains anymore and has stated in his affidavit that he feels that there is a severe problem with the drains and the rad waste area. Okay, we have that information. Do you have anything additional on that? Just the fact that the CG&E did not want the NRC to find out about those drains. Well, we found out about them and we have that information.
/ \
Did,you find out about them through me or or -
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That was one of the allegations that you gave us. Good. I am glad to see that I am doing something positive.
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. > 54 Bringing at least some good people to your attention.
While I don't want to get into a position of discussing an ongoing investigation where new information is coming in completely.- as we are learning as part of our investigation, I will tell you that the Argon crimping thing is a matter that we have brought the OSHA people in on. Because that really is an occupational or industrial safety sort of thing - rather than a nuclear safety consideration. But we have corresponded with them and we will be keeping in touch with them until the resolution of this matter. Was OSHA also related in the fire safety related problem?
!!hich fire rel3ted safety problem?
Well, I was caught down there without a way to get anybody's atten-tion and the alarm systems in December. Yes, that also was turned.over to OSHA. IN other words you see OSHA has been forbidden in the past to get into Cincinnati Gas and Electric pla'nt - I don't understand - The Federal government has a right to inspect - 1
, , - n - - - - -- - . - - - ,
55 There has been quite a bit of litigation, right. OSHA tried to get into the Miami Ford Power Plant to try to find out about an, accident and CG&E locked and blocked the doors and said no and then OSHA went to the federal court and got a restraining order and they locked and blocked the doors again and said no - do not come in and this is typical of the utility that you are up against. They are going to lock and block the doors whenever they get a chance and the whole point is that OSHA did have problems in another area - in another plant getting in - now maybe this time they have not had as many problems because of the sensitivity of Zimmer, but - J Plus the NRC has tremendous - Right - and you boys apparently wanted OSHA in and CG&E was not prepared to block OSHA out but let's just say - CG&E look at their record - how they have blocked out regulatory agencies in the past, taken them to court, taken them to federal court and tied them up to the point where by the time OSHA got there there was nothing to see- there was nothing to see. Are there other areas that should be. focused on? Unless I have missed something I believe that we have shared all the general issues - have been covered. We might go into a little bit more detail on them.
i 56 The only thing insofar - we are talking detail - my concern was that a lot of this information bears on the Aldrich problem with regards to the security guards having information that might lead to finding who broke into that trailer and whether or not Magnaflux is missing something and that relates to safety. That has been very helpful and we appreciate that. Did you say that you had additional information I, wouldn't,- I think that is significant at this point, just that me -s
' Mr. Wright confirmr.d titat nuclear fuel has been left unguarded -
people could not go to the bathroom without finding a replacement for them because they are understaffed - details of confirmation, as far as any new issues, I think we have share what we have. So it is fair to say at this point in time we know all of the
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issues that have been flushed up to you right now as related to nuclear safety. As far is conce J have any more aces up your sleeve? He tells me that occasionally - flo, no - and I am not making light, please don't misunderstand me. My sleeves are bare. Believe me when I say that no - no absolutely f s
i l 57 no more aces - when I come to this meeting I come with the full realiza-tion that you know everything that I know. Now, I can't say that , might be the same on tionday. I accept that and I think what I would like to do is to - as I see this investigation.at least continuing for some time, it is 'hard for me to put it, since we are still collecting information, it is very hard for me to put a bound on when I see this thing ending, but I guess I would like to leave it that our people will contact you each week that they are down there to obtai' anything new that you may have. We may also want to contact you -
- you realize I may say nothing new to report. Nobody has come to me today.
I accept that. It is just so that we will not be in a position of at a later time when we think - it may help us close out at that point with an ~ individual or get a different perspective to it. And I think you have alreadyalluded to the fact and we are finding that out because it is a very complex investigation - it is not simple.
- by any stretch of the imagination.
We 'may also find that as we contact some of these people although this has not been an issue so far - we may find that some people are reluctant to talk to us and we ray want to talk further to you
~* ~58 We have talked about the idea that there are some people who want to talk to you directly such as I will give an example, Bill Ross, is a former security guard who is on our witness list who is currently the chief investigator for Claremont County Welfare - he is a man who cannot come to me and talk openly and cannot come to the Government Accountability Project and just spill his guts -
what he wants desperately is for someone to come to him with a subpoena in their hand and say - we need to talk to you. Okay - ~ now be it the NRC or be it the Justice Dept. - Mr. Ross has some valuable information with regards to activities that might relate to the safety aspects of the plant - now I know that the NRC has subpoena power - please provide that for Mr. Ross because 11r. Ross needs one of those before he can leave his job and he is interested in protecting his job and protecting you know what he has done - I am sure that with a subpoena in his hand from the NRC he can say, hey, these guys was to talk to me - about something 1 did in my past,. I have to be responsible for the law enforcement activities that I conducted before I came to this job - I am sure you understand, this is subpoena, it is just like the National Guard has said it's time for me to go to my weekend warrior situation. Do we have Ross' name? Yes And you are saying that the only way he will talk is if we do subpoena him?
59 Can you get a subpoena? Can you use one? lie have that authority, yes - right - . And I would say Mr. Harri.s. if you don't get any positive response from a simple letter, you might have to subpoena Mr. Harris. Is he on our list? Yes. But he is very edgy - you call him on the phone and he is going to deny that he even exists - let alone you. I don't know if we have Mr. Harris' address - maybe it would be helpful for me to have that. I had it at one time - I think he can be found through Mr. Hyde - but again Mr. Hyde is very nervous the way he was.. contacted the first time he was very upset. That was no fault of the NP,C - No - You have to understand these guys are edgey - they don't like talking about guys that go around blowing people's heads off. I am sorry, I have to go back one step. I already asked you about what some guy's name was - you said we may have to subpoena.
60 Steven Harris.
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What I would like to do now - All I know - you see this is a group of men - when I talk about Y .;' Jeff Hyde, Steven Harris, Ron Wright, Jim Bedinghouse, Tim Creighton, these are all men who are involved in that flLRB suit - okay, so they have their own egg to fry and they don't want to let out all they can - the way'Ron Wrigh put it to me is they have a can of beans here - okay, and they have a lot in that can of beans, so they don't want to open up that can of beans or that can of worms or whatever, before they know they have to fry it - you have to understand how these good old boys talk. But the whole point is that he doesn't necessarily want to open it up to the flRC when it is going to be an NLRB matter so you have to understand that they have reasons to protect the information that they sit on and you are going to have to guarantee these men - it may be that you would .want to spea_k to them in groups. in - mass, or contact their spokesman who is Dave Simpson - their spokesman is Dave Simpson, that might be important to know. I also like Mr. 's suggesti0n that we might talk to these people in the light of them giving us some information that won't be attributed to them directly but will be used to assist us in scoping this thing. What I would like to do now is we have - as I think you are aware been spending a fair amount of time on the additional points that information that these people provided us - some
61 of these areas - we are having a little bit of trouble witii - because of the general nature of them and I would like to have Jim and Paul be able to bring up some questions that they might have so you might help us a little bit more if that is okay. Tom just inquired as to when you will find it convenient to break for lunch. We were thinking of caucusing - we have accomplished a lot in our new information section and it is quarter to 12 - I was thinking I would like to caucus with Tom over lunch and talk about some things that we are going to be going through, etc. The next section. And I think these gentlemen before they get to this would probably like to have a little breather - it is quarter to twelve - maybe a good time. We know you are pretty busy - we don't want to take' up any more of ~ your time than necessary. Okay we will break now.
A-So TAPE'2 - Side 1 Do you have any other ? I believe that when I spoke with fir. he went over a list of and got confirmation or ask him to point out anythino that is not accurate. - In your conversations did they indicate any specific locations of the valve, , the pipefitter's name, the date of the occurrence. The best I could do is when I get back I could go over my notes of the day. I tried to be as inclusive as possible. And when I presented the affidavits and he discusses it. I believe his is mostly on the and he wanted to send the general problems of quality controls and they had given some specific examples. It probably would be helpful to you on further exclamation expansion on some of the things we have listed. I could give you the kid's name and number. His s-name is Mark Hertsgaard and he is in BC. His number is i What is his position? He is just an investigative journalist. The next allegation has to do with robbing the garage control. Can you give us your sources and who made that remark to you about. control. That was Mr. Kelo also. If I am not mistakent made a point of
' "'y the t Wi th4, Did th;y giv e you any specifics workers adn tha t ' type such as the of It thing. involved takes seven to like the the robbing instrum to some of ents affidavitn a d he were kept.
the supervisors n observes this ASME was workedAs I u dersta dat shed where who n of the peopleconcerned about there. He it he protested the problem it at ASME and so you also infor might find out who med me that Did security sug was get in touch with making noises some gest any type ouii of there. I believ e it was . equipment signing in is what he was e and signing out and
- away from the only that shack withoutr ferring to.returning the there c the nec robbing w
being c ould be essary take som ere taken onverted. over. and kept e damage to the' eqHis conc ern wasnot As he uipment'but som explained e of it to it was without the me sign in welding rods and the sign were being in u Did he give you and o t of the out and where rods the shack any specific time f were being used . rame? He talked about 1 he personally 979 wherewas there talked to me about similar s of typeproblems right summ er done and he said in thesome pap issu of 79 that es but of course e Mr. Griffin h was gone
. 3 quite a few years earlier so you wouldn't be able to get too much help from him. Mr. Griffin knows a lot _ of problems which I think 'are structural in terms of how the utilities are handled in quality control as well.as identifying things which he protested some time ago which are not solved in terms of this specific issue.
L The next one is the argon gas that was turned over to OSHA. Do you have any specifics along the line of what time frame this happened in. This would have been late fall or early winter of 1980. If I got my information from Jim Bedinghouse correctly. John didn't speak with me directly about that but he said that his father explained what happened. Apparently he came out extremeiy nauseated and was very upset. The next one has to do with the pipe that feel off the truck. What is your source for that. About 3 or 4 people are a so'urce for that. One is John McClung the security guard that was responsible for receiving the pipe. He had contact with someone at offices and they were the ones who instructed him to have the pipe brought in on the truck and simply unload it. So
, s .
that*wasJohnficClung.( was the man who helped the man unload it.
- This[ when he was taking me out to the airport last summer expanded on that to some degree. He identified individuals not including this affidavit
. - - - . , _ _ _ - . . . _._ .._ _ _ . . , . .m... __. . ,,, . . - _ - . _ , , , ,
. 4 who was handling the immediate process after the problem was discovered so g ; ; ,could probably g'ive you a few more names when they provide the affidavit.
And then again Peabody Steve Sellers and all the people at Peabody that were responsible for X-raying that pipe. The next one is that you indicate you have 3 different sources which estimates that 20% of that plant's prefabricated wells are defective. Can you give us those 3 sources or any others that you have. One would be,/ This has come up several times so
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maybe I could go through . The Peabody Manuflux people. I belive it was either Allen or Steve Sellers. It might have been Dave Hang, one of the Peabody . Do you have knowledge of what they base their estimate on. I think it was just an estimate based on the fact that the X-rays have been seen and then came Mr. Hughes who was the pipefitter on the 3rd shift responsible for overseeing Peabody's X-rays and they were estimating 20% of the wells that they were shooting had problems. In these 20% those were the ones they were most concerned about. Now they took into con-sideration the fact of shooting while there was water in the lines and shooting while there was other problems that were overlapping etc. But t when they explained this to me their best estimate on the 20% figure l uas arrived from what they had shot over a period of many years. I i
They being Peabody Manuflux. Yes Peabody Manuflux,;/- ' confirmed that. Bob Tanger has some input into that. This is some of the shots that they made at the site. They were prefabricated wells they were talking about. 4 This was just an estimate because they weren't as a routine checking the prefabricated wells. When they would check the ones that were done at Kaiser there would be overlaps in the graphs and it would come up in conversation that there seemed to be problems in the wells that were coming into the plant as well as the ones that were being done here. I
, s questioned'
. .. about the basis of this 20% figure and they would say the occurrence or how frequently it cracked up and that was kind of the party line from the plant employees and that could have very well been off. It could be 12% or even 30%. .
I think the 20% figure was something pretty universal. Steve Sellers said that wasn't an unusually high proportion of rejections , of wells it was done at, about 3 times the normal industry average which was something we found very significant. The records Mr. Phillips has found it was less than the industry average and in fact the utility was more aggressive . We think that is something significant to check out. . I have spoken with !!r. Sellers since and he talked with this investigative
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6 l reporter and he is much more cautious now. Not in terms of denying those previous statements but in terms saying I don't know why everybody wants to keep going over things when I can solve that. It probably will re-quire a little bit of encouragement on your part. On the rejection rate did they indicate to you that the ones that were being rejected were not being properly . That is a common theme. That seemed to be a major sourcc of conflict between Peabody Manuflux and the utilities because it was holding up construction because they were coming up with so many rejections. There are alternate explanations. One was that Peabody was just too slow. The other one is that Ron Investment was holding up construction. As' far as we can tell there was not direct pressure. A number of the witnesses said there wasn't direct pressure to stop reporting. The pressure was set from being over-ruled on it. - I think it should be noted to'o that and I.had a conversation that i is on tape on the body recorder. He was not aware that curs were investigated. He discussed a lot about the , wells on that tape. I think it should be noted that these gentlemen were ' totally, unaware. They thought I was a cost , accounting engineer. They were totally unaware and were not apprised of , Hartack or my real position as an undercover investigator, until made the fatal mistake of telling them. That is one of the most fatal mistakes he will ever make.
.. 7 Is role in this explanation a confirmatory one?
I believe that I provided you all with my conversation with him and it was primarily confirmatory'but it was a 3 page memo because he did open up . Are you sure that when they are talking 20% are they prefabricated wells. Or are they talking about their welding program as a whole. I was quite specific about my questioning on that. It was the prefabricated wells that they were referring to. I think the proper explanation for that is these folks are much more forthcoming about criticising outside firms about the quality than their own. The common theme among the employees is that we were doing a good job but these outside groups weren't. Mr. Sellers was talking about the wells that were done at the plant as well. I think it would be noteworthy as far as ' reference material is concerned that Kellog is the'same company that provided . From my understanding earlier you were saying that the wells they were questioning were the ones they' cn site. Let me focus on a point just for clarification. If the contention is that 20~ of the prefabricated wells were faulty, it would seem that we ought to be able to verify that completely by a check of the vendor shop. They are required to maintain the radiographs there by regulation and so we
. 8 ought to be able to do a review at that place. Correct?
However let me point out as is pointed out in my affidavit that when I brought thi; up to Mr. Murray, the assistant project engineer, that I was getting feedback from the pipefitters and the quality control radio-graphers that up to 20% of the prefabricated wells were maybe faulty. Pullman His response was that look we have paper work from / Kellog to say that stuff is all right. We don't really care whether or not the stuff Pullman breaks down at that point, that it is / Kellog's responsibility because they gave us the paperwork and if the paperwork is faulty that is Pullman Kellog's responsibility and not ours. We bought the stuff from them. If it breaks we will be down on them but the whole point is that that was his response to that allegation of 20% faulty wells. He said that to go into that area and look, he mada an example, he said we had a guy out here who was accidentally shooting in that area, Peabody Manuflux is doing the same thing. This other place did and that was when they were X-raying in a certai~n area and they .found a . faulty well and it cost us
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a million and three quarters to go around and redo all those damn cable and we are not going to redo all these pipes. He was just really adamant. So what there is problems there, we con't want to hear.about' it. He was almost livid at that point. Whenever I would bring up the fact that there is a possibility that 20% of the wells down there were faulty, Mr. tiurray would just go out in left field. Mr. Murray is the assistant project engineer and was my direct contact, for Cincinnati Gas and Electric. He was my direct contact as an undercover operator. If we go back to Kellog where they keep on file radiographs for each well
e 9 are you saying we cannot rely on those? According to !!r. Aldridge he says that those can be doctored and he said certainly they can be doctored if the intent to defraud and deceive is there originally. And he talked about Pullman Kellog. He said the Kellogs, the Bectals, the Brauns, as prefabers they can really lay it to you. He said we get this stuff in here and it is a piece of crap and this is what was in his conversation. I would refer to his conversation with regard to the prefabricators. He named them all and you know what I am talking about. He said they can really lay it to you. What he was basically saying there, I believe, was that he believed his men down at the site did a good job because we reemphasized that twice on the tape, your men did the~ right job and Kaiser was trying to push you guys around so it looks good for them. He said well you are right the first time. The second time he said you are correct. The whole point was I hit him with that twice to make sure he understood what I was saying. That Kaiser
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was trying to force tilem to say somet.hing that was contrary to what their men found, doing a good and proper job. And what their men found doing a good job was these prefabricators were coming out with wells that would not hold up. To add a little bit on this~20% figure it it, not . As far as the question as to whether or not to trust Pullman Kellog's radiographs, we should understand that we can't go out and re-X-ray a nuclear power pla nt. It is impractical. suggested that what he thought'was necessary to clear up the suspicion was to select a limited number of wells that could be recommended to you by plant employees, pipefitters so you
'10 could be doing a spot check.
We would be doing our own MVE. We know:that as a way to do some s. of thi You see I have certain reservations with MES
, in the fact that they ct in and supposedly did an independent check e And my problem with MES is that I think th on Peabody 'lanuflux' ey had because they ended up with the contract obviously there.
Because the fact that MES came up withI think there some unresolved wells and we still haven't heard the end of that. Has ties now replaced Peabody? Yes. I said earlier that ifr. Sellers who gave th rejection e higher figure of 39% investigative reporter on the 39%urerejectionMr. to the S I don't know if he is on the actual witness lirate based on his ex you his phone number. st or not. I could give done and this reporter who shared his n tat least as e permission or if he wants to talk to youo es with us, I can ask his' The next one has to do with engin ering d after the fact. esigns that are routinely drawn In other words you don't really know . I believe that was Mr. and; andhir. Tyncr.g. v \' (Jim Tyner' is a man who does a lot of that type ofe work hims lf - and the whole process was that if it didn't fit redesign it and d esign it to fit. Don't design
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1 t . it to be a necessity. They werc . .v:a ,..ing the water intakes down by the . river were facing the wrong way at one time or another. And they had to redesign the way the water intakes were. And they still do not have that problem solved or not when I was there because they were burning out the feed water pipes at a rate ef .. eiy time you switch them off. And I think that what was leadi.dj io at that point was in the same situation with an 8" pipe vere : 1 tir' pipe they told people when they pt'c in the 8" pipe that this wasn't' going to fit or work and it was going to have to be redone. They went a'n' d cad put in the 8" pipe anyway and 1 then all that piping had to ha ! , o 4t md reinstalled at 10" piping exactly as the men had said. If yyr S.1d fnllowed the original specifications you would have what belongs bore f.ut you Nye done so much redesigning and
.: so much rework on a lot of this stuff it dmsn't fit anymore. And that is when they came down with ilo .eacca why a lot of this has slowed down accordingto( ,
u.is that they redesigned so many things to fit conven.ien'tly .Nr .;ae rmson or another that a lot of the original stuff didn't fit enymuce. Do you have any other spex'iic . W.4n; or information regarding the , pipe sizes or piping systems. .
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I think that! ' m ..lg iir Tyner' as well as the Peabody Itanuflux people had idee.Li. -' corh:n wells some of which I understand were cicared under the tii '
.ccee9 ':ai lua and apparently still stay
, resolved. I don't knou ,- t. h " 4. hn is there. Some of which were part of a group that .. - ' . . 9!.ed. Some of which were in a
12 questionable category. If I read right in the first report from the fluclear Regulatory Com:.iission there were 3 groups of pipes. During a subsequent inspection September 18 and 20 and December 11 and 12,1979 several more discrepancies were identified so then hired NES. The review included 2,390 wells and of those 958 had report discrepancies. That is the big question mark. 543 had some technical problems and 14 were held to be unacceptable so apparently some of the ones we have identified with and[lir. Tyner were some of the 14 and some were part of the 543 and some part of the 958 but what' ; and 3 and,Tyner were saying was you have these discrepancies and this is , your 20". and it is in that figure somewhere. What they are saying is , a lot of these pipes are not right down there and in a lot of situations the utility according to ifr. !!urray was .in the position that we can't redo those pipes. There is no way we can redo those pipes. Because we would , have to tear out so much other stuff to get to those pipes. Other than the pipes' that you. described now and earlier, you don't have any more specifics as to pipe sizes or anything like that. On the design that is not the size of the pipes but a manufactural design like your tank housing
. . And that is going to be required. It was pretty good detective work on you folks part. That is from a source that you can't locate anymore. I think that the accuracy of the criticisms can be concurrent daily the designs versus the locations of things. He does have some background of this individual because l
'13 he talked to him for awhile. He just hasn't been able to reach him again.
The transiency of the workers was of great concern to all the people that talked to me. The fact that there were a lot of boys there from New York and Pennsylvania and this and that place. A lot of them just came down there to party and there were gentlemen there who had other people taking welding tests for them and were not qualified welders. That was the whole point. You had a lot of transients coming in there that were flashing union cards that were of questionable character. Who specifically is giving you the information regarding people cheating ,. on the welding examination. Is there somebody we can talk to that has specific knowledge about this. Mr. Hoffsteder was the guy .. That was a vendor bu't what about at the site?
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I think you would want to talk to{ and' Jim Tyner. u. The next allegation estimate is what we call cable and cable trays. Again we would like to know your source for this. My direct source was although now it has been confirmed in some of these notes from the reporter to which of these witnesses . There are two things in that allegation. One is faulty wells and the
, 14 information I would like to know there is what type of wells are you talking about. Cable tray hangers or do you have any specifics on the wells that ,
you are talking about. I just want to ki.ow if you have any other information and I am trying to exclude anything that you have already given us but any additional information you may have. j The main additional information that I can provide to you says that in come cases an affidavit might have been referred to anonymously. I can supply the name they were talking about and also the reporter's notes on this which I am going to get permission for. Other than that we kind of work like reporters. We get 2 or 3 people who will talk about some-thing and we are willing to write it up and request that it be looked into further but we really haven't held back on anything other than we might'
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not have said which individual confirmed which particular charge. In the cable tray being dangerous Describe why these things are dangerous In . ..
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On that I couldn't give you an answer, right now. I would have to go back and talk to a researcher who was working on that directly. Is the crux of it whether it is amperage or the load. Regard to physical load rather than amperage. They were too closely packed. Too tightly packed. the space where a
15 they were being held within the tray. So what I am hearing is you say they are too tightly packed and it is too much heat. They are more c'oncerned about the amperage than breaking a hanger down. . I would say both equally. The next one has to do with the heat exchanger control panel that was mistakenly operated or operated 1200 lbs. to 300 lbs. That was, I believe you ought to be able to confirm that just by raising the topic in the interview because was not in the immediate area. Do you have any more individuals.
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flone. 4 Going back to the issue that you raised that was drinking. You also identified a concern about people who are prone to violence on the site and a' gain ask for the sources for that and also can you give us specifics other than what we talked about this morning. What we talked about this morning and in affidavit. I would say everybody we talked about this morning. 'All of the security
.16 personnel would verify that, as well as . In every conversation that comes up there were these transient people that were coming in and out; a lot of them had prison records, a lot of them were very violent people plus the fact that when you were doing things like PCV and Angel Dust you have the potential there for violence. I don't know if you have ever experienced a situation where someone has laced a flarijuna cigarette with PCV or if you have had an experience where, not you yourself, but I have had experiences in my investigative career where I have had to deal with individuals and I think it is a rather well known fact in law enforcement circles that anyone that is on this type of drug or who is using this type of drug routinely as well as I think that a lot of people who do the.old get rather violent in nature because of the type of drug they are on. It.is almost pure grain alcohol . The whole point is there were a lot of fights and there was a lot of violence down there because of the excessive amounts of drugs.
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It is based on observations. I saw a coupid of situations myself while I was there that could have literally exploded into fights. Plus I would like to indicate that there were guns on the site which is strictly in violation. Do you see a relationship tetueen that violence and improper construction of any kind. Yes I see a relationship and I think the people we have talked to see a relationship because when you have men that are involved in all these
17 extracurricular activities they can't be very involved in their work. A lot of times they had too many employees down there simply because they wanted to keep the unions happy or they wanted to keep somebody happy. They had all these guys down there partying while other peeple were trying to get their work done and they would interfere. It is just a matter of common sense. Like this fellow flad Dog who is running the gun operation there. It was packed with weapons. It was like a joke. He had so many knives on display. Dori't mess with him because as he walked in you could see that he was carrying many weapons. It is just like if I walked into this room and strapped under my coat was a large 44 magnum with a 7" barrel I think you gentlemen would agree that it might be intimidating to you all. If nothing else it would be a distraction.
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If nothing else it is a distraction to you sitting around at' this table. Somebody is going to be sitting there saying I woi.jer if he is going to get mad and pop off me. And the whole point is this mad dog and Jim Hardy and all these people that were running around raffling off guns and everything else they knew to be hardcore ' characters and watch out and be aware etc. and a guy night be sitting there doing a weld and at the same time looking over his shoulder to make sure somebody isn't coming after him with a Bouie knife. l.et's face it we don't have direct evidence on this. This thing was so well organized in terms of the criminal activities with books for the raffles
18 for every different black market operation. They were all printed up and stapled so you could pull out each ticket. It is a very well organized operation. I just want to know who is organizing this thing. It is well put together. It seems like there has to be some sort of tie in with an.e'ffective organization whether it is the union or organized crime or whatever. You talk to people and you always ask that question. Who is behind this. Do you know anything about the moffia. There is a bookie operation that has outlets all across the country. Shouldn't the moffia be involved here. The response I consistently got is that I didn't want to know. I had enough common sense not to ask those kinds of questions. We are just concerned with something that is this well developed. Because organized crime n'ight be connected with it. I just think it is a matter of any kind of common sense ,-organized crime is not interested in safety, it is just a business operation. And if it is that bad it almost terrifies me that those are the people who are making decisions on where to cut corners or having any tupe of influence over the employees that we are relying on here. - - That is the point that leads right into what I want to bring up an'd that is you have people of responsibility, supposed responsibility, when you have people like Bob 11arshall and Bill Murray and Fred Lautenslater etc. and the supervisors C. K. Smith etc. The people who were in charge there for Kaiser and Cincinnati Gas and Electric turning their heads and telling the security people to turn their heads to this type of activity, the whole point is was this condoned and if it was condoned for what reason was it condoned. Was Fred Lautenslater getting fat off of this or was somebody else making something off of this. He know Bob Marshall got a
. 19 room added onto his house and we know he got his wife's car redone. What were they getting... common sense would tell me I can't underst,and how practices flourish as much as they did and as long as they did. I don't know if I would put Bi1 '1urray in that category because he was one of the strong people who wanted to hire me to find out about some of this activity. But the whole point is they couldn't control it so instead they condoned it and in condoning it weren't they in a sense becoming complicity. In my estimation when you have Fred and he is sitting there looking at a whole Land full of Ma'rijuna butts and the security guard says he found them in this area and in this area and Fred knows darn good and well they are doing sensitive work in this area and in this area. And these employees that are doing this kind of stuff were doing sensitive work on the plant. Why is Fred telling the security people not only do I want you to turn your heads but I want you to quit bringing this stuff into me because I don't want it on my conscience. That is the follow up..on your question.
Earlier this afternoon you also addressed wells that were being rejected by and accepted by Kaiser. 'Can'you give us specifics of what well were rejected and later accepted? talked about those and the source for those specific I believe (' , . wells would be Peabody flanuflux as well as . When you talked to them you had a tape recorder on so that will be on the tape.
. 20 flot at all times. Only one conversation did I have with did he ever get into that type stuff. .
Who:are the Til employees who want to set up a meeting for you to show you the evidence. Allen Sellers, Jim Benning and Dave . They wanted to set up a meeting for me to review the material they said was going to be in-criminating about these wells. When I indicated to the utility that I was going to have that meeting that is when the utility promptly fired me. They decided I was of no use to them anymore, that I was getting into an area they didn't want me to and that was also the weekend there was the breakin at the trailer. Does that include all the ones that have been accepted after being rejected. One last question. The comment was made that a KEI employee had a detailed journal of safety hazards'and incidents ~ . was the initial source'of this information. I can also go back and check my notes on that., I would indicate that as far as journals are concerned apparently Dave Simpson kept a journal of problems. When they were talking about these safety hazards do you know . Personal concerns that are related in the jurisdiction of the ilRC.
21 Ikybe you can explain the distinction. Is it an industrial hazard or a nuclear hazard. I believe it was a nuclear haztrd. I have one last question. You made a lot of statements about Til employees being intimidated and we have a lot to work from that but you say union pipefitters also. Unat is your source for that? Is it Right. What was he referring to - his intimidation.
.When he was fired went through a kind of evolution for this union. Initially
, im on a local level. . 50.1 think when talking to him we can find o'u t .
Does ' address any specif'ic pipefitters to you. He didn't address names. , He was the total source for the union pipefitter intimidation problem. tie also investig'ated before I talked to a number of union officials in revealing his notes they were just not forthcoming at all.
- 22-Did they want to discuss those safety issues or the firing as a result of misapplication or investigation. .
I beileve it was more deciding as a result of investigation. I think we have accomplished what we want to get out of this. You indicated there were some things you wanted to talk about. Before we do could I and I think it might be beneficial if I just go through and reiterated the commitments we made here this morning and this afternoon so if there are others that are a question in their mind can focus on them right now. fir. Davis has marked down what he heard me commit to and maybe it would be good to run through these if this is satisfactory to you.
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TAPE 2 - Side 2 As we went through today and Mr. Kipler made some commitments I tried to write them down. The first 'one was t.~ . we would interview ' Hyde, Harris and .
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and,Tyner and Griffin and of course anybody else we need to interview based on the information that they gave to us. I think there was Mr. Wright and we discussed some new people. We haven't talked about all the possible witnesses at this meeting for all the different issues. Mr. Hoffsteder we felt was a very credible witness from my own discussions with him, fir. Martin passed on his affidavit he never really got an opportunity to tell his story accurately. Just about anybo'dy we put.on the witness list we hoped you would get in contact with at least over telephone or by letter and make some inquiries to them. I think the intent here was to document what we discussed with those witnesses who could help us with the new things that we brought up this morning. We have' discussed everything we have submitte'd to you. I Certainly the inforraation you have given us before, we are perceiving to talk to those witnesses. The next item I have down here was that we would look at the concern with
2 l l respect to the blow out walls in the area where the fuel is stored and make a determination as to whether or not that is stored adequately. The third one I have is that we would cooperate with the Department of and , Justice in providing them information but that also we recognize passed on to you that the Department of Justice is relying on you to provide information to them and we passed onto you that they would appreciate receiving documented other evidence as it comes up, in the area of criminality not associated with the nuclear safety. Do I understand correctly that you will be requesting and inviting par-ticipation by justice in this? We talked about this at lunch time and we can make D0J aware of your interests in this but we ha've no control over the Department of Justice to require them to do certain things. Not to require them to but to invite ,the'ir assistance or request it. You can't order around somebody 'from another agency. But we can say we need , your help on this, somebody that is outside of our jurisdiction both for the purpose of getting peopl,e to talk freely and to be able to follow-through on issues that effect safety. not I think the key point is again we have encountered thusfar any reluctance . of people to talk to us so I couldn't very well go to 00J and ..... Excuse me but would you include lir. Hyde in that. t
3 We haven't mentioned everyone yet. Was there any reluctance. We haven't talked to fir. Hyde yet. We talked to Hyde and we talked to him while he was at work and . But his concern was keeping himself away from the job. I think that if we encounter difficulty in having people ccanunicate with us that is one issue but I am not aware of it and want to close that door yet. I think secondly we invited D0J to this meeting, we will certainly provide D0J with all of our investigation things and will answer any questions they have but I sense the differences. You feel that we have an obligation to require D0J to do.their job and I guess I have trouble , relating to that. I do understand you have difficulty relating to that. What we are referring to is that we are painfully. aware of the limits of your authority to follow through on some of these issues and we think it would be helpful for you if you are investigating these things and it is obvious to a good investigator where things can start to lead and all of a sudden you are up against a legal barrier for persuing them. If you ask the Department of Justice to assist on these and take it farthe'r than you have the authority to and perhaps even share some of your theories on what the possibilities are that you are just hampered legally from following through
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4 to the end. It would be more difficult for them to ignor it or not act aggressively on it then if you sever '.those possibilities.' This is what we have so far and this could be leading into significant areas. Here are are theories on it. But of course we cannot pursue it any farther and it falls into your court now. I think you have the legal authority to share in your suspicions or concerns about where some of this evidence might lead to. And we would appreciate your taking that - initiative. I think we would be willing to do that with respect to if we sense not only willing but we would be obligated and interested in doing it.if we sense the relationship to nuclear safety. If we sense no relationship to nuclear safety now you have to puty' ourself in our shoes. Zimmer is not our only responsibility. We have a lot of other nuclear power plants and we have t.o jealously guard our limited manpower and put it where we think it is right to put it. And we don't think it is right to put it in an area that is D0J's and develop their cas~es for them.' We have the mechanics and manpower that we need to put' other places. I wouldn't want to debate you at all on that statement. Of course it doesn't require any additional manpower to share on your concerns by the people who are already work'ing on an issue where you can only go so far. That is all we are asking about. I don't really sense any particular conflict in terms of asking you to do more than you could or would do with your resources. I would like to just 'qcestion you a little bit on it. You asked us if we thought that it was related to safety. _a4_.,
5 That there might be drug problems, various organized crime elements etc. What is your feeling about that, what is the commission perspective on whether or not intensive criminal activities can effect the safety of the nuclear power plant. - I don't know if I am ready to answer that yet. That is a tough one. However I guess I would say that if we were to come to the conclusion that it did or could we wouldn't necessarily have to pursue it to try to get somebody arrested . We might have to go take a radiograph of the well that these guys made. So you go down a different path depend' ng i upon whether you want to solve our problem or their problem. That is the issue - the disposition of the matter and I sort of sense that you are trying to ask us to put on a D0J hat while we are doing a job and I am not sure we have that kind of expertise to put on a 00J hat.
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We are more interested that you ask D0J to come in and be a partner on this because as you pointed out and quite' reasonably you might see it was a lot of criminal activities in this could lead to a safety problem. You can go after the way it is manifested itself in the plant and it has to be justice that goes after the activity per se. Let justice find out to what extent this occurs and to what extent that volume of information that D0J must come up with effects the safety related aspects. As fir. Davis pointed out here you might have to go and take ~a well of , the guy who is sitting there while he was out moonshining. So you might have to go into the safety related aspect from the standpoint that
6 these men may have not been totally capable while they were doing the job. And if D0J comes up with a conclusion that they were people down there messing around then I think it would be reasonable to assume that these men were just like drunk d' riving. Building a nuclear power plant while they were involved in criminal activity. The two don't mix. Alcohol and driving doesn't mix. Alcohol and drugs, prostitution and guns, bookie operations etc. don't mix when you are building a nuclear power plant. We would hope there would be a very close partnership between your work and Justice's work in order to be able to do the type of follow up that is appropriate for you all. If the full extent in identity of individuals who were drunk on the job is determined that allows you to isolate which parts of the plant you should be doing the spot check. And it may be Justice's job to find out who all the people were that were engaging in this type of conduct. That they share the information back to you and then you can go out and do the checks on the results on those individuals. Sunpose we go to the Department of Justice and say hey we have some information on some individuals that there is moonshine being used, drugs being used, beer being used at the Zimmer site while people were working down there building the plant. Pe would like you fellows to look into this. What are they likely to say to us. Yes we will jump right on it and we think it is illegal and something has to be done about it or will they say go stick your head in the sand, we don't care. I don't think they will quite say those words. I think they are more apt
. 7 to say can you furnish us any hard documentary evidence which will support this. But not only that will that evidence be in direct violation of a federal statut,e. You have to be careful with the 00J in that they are not about to go out and expend their resources for theft of property.
Federal property or are different. A pover plant that is being built is not federal property, therefore if somebcdy is stealing pipe, bricks, wood, water, sand, the FBI in essence does not worry about that. Now the state people might, the county, the city; the state people might say go and indite him. D0J might have an interest from an economic standpoint, the et.onomic crime unit of which he is a part is very interested from the standpoint that if there was a large amount of facilities misused and abused and stolen from the site then this would have an economic impact on the rate pairs thereby the citizens of the utility who paid for it. So what I think Mr. Everett is trying to say is if all this criminal element had such a deleterious effect on the plant as to cost it $300,000,000 or a $100,000,000. worth of crime then we are interested from the standpoint. for the U.S. taxpayers and the U.S.. government funds went into building this plant. And we are interested from'the standpoint that some of those funds were abused and misuse'd and possibly stolen. I can't speak for Mr. Everett but that is the impression I get. He is going to have to review'that and 00J is going to have to review that and that is not clear how that interfaces with us. I think basically in terms of just asking to be able to share information as much as possible. I don't know how closely you routinely work with
8 Justice on a case of this type but that is the reason I asked . This may be a precedent sqtting matter but of course this whole thing has been a precedent setting matter. They are doing their law enforcement investigation and it might help you on your safety investigations. I guess I yield to the OIE people here but I personally wouldn't have any quarrel with callihg up the D0J and making them aware of what we are doing and if they want to accompany us they are more than welcome but I don't think I would try to push people into doing something that I don't have any control over their area. I think with lir. Everett you are not going to have to push him. Well I invited him to this meeting. We didn't push him. No he said do you think we ought to come and I said that is up to you. I think it was a stand ,off point of do you think we ought to come and I think now maybe you are coming into the realization well maybe they should have come. I don't know that I exactly have an opinion.
9 , Just from the standpoint of clarifying the position the DOJ interfaces with iMC however I think also in Mr. Everett's decision making process and again I am not speaking for Mr. Everett but we have only spoken to Mr. Everett in the recent past and he has not had a chance to review our material. Now when he gets a chance to review our material he may just call this whole meeting all over again and say we might go over this matter again with you or we would like to at least go over this matter with you. Because we have this information and we are interested and it will all depend on how they feet. Maybe we ought to make Mr. Everett aware of the tape of this meeting. I promise to call Mr. Everett and tell him the result of the meeting but I think we will give him a copy of the tape. He have no objections at all to that. I do have a question here on the It is a matter of debate I guess as to how much interest
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jurisdiction. Justice has or should have.in property crimes.' And we have done legal research on your obligations to coordinate with the FBI. What is meant of practices here and coordination procedure with local law enforcement authorities. The FBI isn't interested in the pipes or copper being stolen but the local or state police might be. I think if you recall back we had a problem down at the . The plant doun in Virginia. I think there were tuo employees that purposely damaged some fuel rods just to show the lack of security. Believe it or not there were no federal statutes which . However there was a stste statute therefore they were actually prosecuted by the state
10 1 . l of Virginia. I think you would find the Attorney General of the state of Ohio extremely cooperative. And I think if that is your recourse then keep in mind that the Claremont County prosecutor has at least indicated to me that the Attorney General's office will be apprised and invited in to this situation. So it could be that fiRC w~ill want to talk to the Attorney General's office aiid share information with them rather than DOJ but again let me indicate that is the determination Mr. Everett would want to make as far as 00J is concerned since he has become keenly aware of this and since he has become keenly interested in it. And then as far as the Attorney General's office is concerned in the state of Ohio just being a resident of the state of'0hio can last 29 years and knowing Billiger and Brown like I do I think you are going to get his interest if you say we have a problem down here but he has to be called in by
- somebody and he has to be called in usually by local jurisdiction, which is the Claremont County Prosecutor's office. 'So I think wh'at we are going to have to see is the Claremont County Prosecutor's office make a recommendation to the Attorney General's office to examine the criminal activities in the Zimmer plant. 'I have talked to them, right and they have indicated that that is probably is cjoing to be their course of action.
Again this has only been within the last couple of weeks. Have we covered thermajor avenue of your concern for the criminal element diverted to the right direction.. Other than 00J from the standpoint that you have to understand that I believe
11 a lot of these are federal crimes. Interstate prostitution and things like that are federal crimes. I have dealt with federal crimes in the past and I am just saying I believe that and I believe that maybe the NRC should have some interfacing with the Department of Justice and I expressed that to fir. Everett and I think fir. Everett has expressed some . Let me see if I can summarize 4 points that I think I would be willing to comit to right here. No.1 is ftr. Everett will be made aware of this meeting from our perspective and we will gladly provide him with a copy of the tape. Secondly, we will tell fir. Everett that if the FBI is interested in accompanying us in any of our inspections, we will keep him abreast of these things and we will gladly cooperate with him such they want to accompany us. As far as dealing with state and local law enforcement agencies I think certainly I would say that we would be cooperative wit.h .those agencies that they wanted to get information from us and talk to us about our investigation efforts.~ And I guess as far as whether or not we viould go out' and invite state and local law enforcement agencies to go with us or, inspection, I g'uess I would like to consult out lawyers first on that point. I: ce don't blame you about that last point. I am sure you have sur-mised by this point that fir. Applegate works very actively on this issue. What might be helpful is that if you do come across any dead ends with Justice saying we just don't have juri diction in our opinion to these particular criminal activities. If we could be kept informed e
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, 12 of any roadblocks that have been created on the federal level quite legitimately and Tom wculd be able to get in touch with some of his state and local contacts and ask for your assistance because so often it happens here we are mor'e than willing to cooperate with the state, and local official and the state and local official doesn't call you up and ask for it because nobody in Justice has called that person up and said I can't go any farther on this but I thought you would like to. Tom would be glad to play that type of liaison role. I don't think you would find a roadblock between us in Justice. It is just a matter of interpretation as to whether there is a federal . That is the big problem, not a roadblock. Wouldn't D0J if they conclude it isn't wouldn't they say so? Oh yes. So you back knowing that atl least from their perspective you are going to have to pursue it with the law. See I have already reported it to some areas from fire arms is already apprised of some of this stuff. I can understand 00J is an umbrella underneath which sits FBI, DEA and ATF. ATF is treasury. But fou have DEA and FBI and then you have TF out under treasury so the whole point is we are getting back to this thing of how
-13 many agencies and are we going to have cooperation, a guy from NRC and a guy from AFT and a guy from FDI and a guy from DEA and a guy from 00J sit down and say all right guys let's share information here. We have one common problem. Is Zimmer a power facility. Are we going to share
, with each other that common problem or are we going to just wait until we all make our formal , and now I realize that it is like DEA and FBI and trying to get them to sit down and talk to each other and that is difficult. But the whole point is that this has been a difficult matter from the outset and maybe it will be the NRC hopefully and in my estimation at least we hope NRC will take the lead in bringing together these agencies and say we have a common problem. If not only from the standpoint that some of these common problems have affected your nuclear safety. Correct me if I am wront about tfiis, I think the four specifics that ifr. Kempler outlii.ed are very constructive and reasonable and I am quite satisfied with thaf. He should let Mr. Davis.go on with his lesson.
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We will make Mr. Everett aware of the meeting, we will provide him a copy of the transcript, we will tell him that if the FBI wants to accompany us on these things re would encourage and welcome that. With j respect to cooperation with. state'and local governments we said that we would consult our lawyers before inviting them to go with us on any part of the investigation. We would be responsive to them if they contacted us. He will share with Mr. Applegate any legal limitations that Justice
4 n , ~ . . - - - . 14 informs . Are you saying we are going to encourage the FBI involvement or simply inform them of the situation. Encourage it from the standpoint that if it concluded federal issue, we would encourage them to go along with us. . I think that is the key element as to whether or not they consider it a federal issue. OK going on with the list. You said we would explore how we can protect 4 witnesses so they will feel free to talk to us. You said we would pursue methods of assuring ~ people that we would provide information that they gave to us as background information if they are afraid to have us attribute the information directly to them. We agreed we would keep OSHA informed of any industrial safety type findings and we would continue to coordinate the follow up'in those that we have already brought to their attention. We agreed that our people will or our investigator will contact 11r. Applegate each week whenever they are in the Cincinnati area to see if there are any new bits of information he has obtained that are "needed to continue investigation. If we have problems interviewing and talking to people and it appeart rir. Applegate could assist us in that then we would request that assistance. As much as my limitations are being a shut-in.
15 We also said that we would subpoena tir. Ross because he apparently needs that in order to talk to us. I am not sure we need that. We will do it if we have to. Because we have talked to him. So we will say we will subpoena Mr. Ross if necessary. I already had down that we may have to subpoena tir. Harris. And those are the ones that I wrote down. Before we all came together as a group I appreciate your observation, fir. Kepler, about the need to be taking statements under oath particularly with utility executives such as Mr. !!arshall and others we have criticized in their disclosure for unsworn statements in the investigation. P'erhaps you could outline what your procedure is going to be on having statements under oath. We kind of went through the other extreme where peoplh were afraid to talk with you at all who might be favorable witnesset that you will take it as backgro0nd but we are 'also concerned about uhe'n a utility official denies it they'might be more hesitant to deny a problem if they know they can be held accountable for it. He have been interviewing people at the flRC office on site and when we tape a statement of the interview it is usually attended by 2 people and when we take a statement it is witnessed and they are sworn to it. It
16 I is a true statement. He provide them with a copy of that statement and we retain the original, i You haven't done that 100% though have you? On this case 100% I think. I gave everybody a copy of their statement. Did they all swear to it? Yes all these statements are sworn. To clarify their were interviews that were conducted that statements were not taken. In the significant interviews we have sworn everybody to their statement. Your break .is a definition' of what you' are calling a significant' interview? Yes. Can you lend anything to w' hat is a significant interview? Anything related to the gap allegations we consider significant and any-body with new information regarding a new allegation or he gives us specific information we take an allegation. He have talked to some people that are characterized as inspector trainees that have been here
. 17 for 2 months and we talked to them for 15 minutes and they said .I am sure you are aware of this as a lawyer and they don't know anything.
They don't know any better. Those people we have not taken statements from. But peopla that provide us significant information either derogatory or favorable we liave taken a statement from. 4 So anything that is concerned with the disclosure of any new allegations that ycu think are serious enough to pursue. Right. previous to tir. ficCartney joining us in this investigation Mr. Daniels and I talked with individuals who gave us what we consider significant information and we aren't saying it is bad or good and those individuals we have not taken statements from. He have documented our interviews. I think if they relate to the issues at hand that we.have discussed, I would like to go back and get their statements. The ones that are separate ^ from this have not yet. Does that answer your question? Yes it does, sir. Is that all that is on the list. The only other thing we dcn't have a
'18 any dispute about is you know have these tapes enhanced, and we want you to make copies.
And you will work out the details together - We will work out the details next week. I wonder if this is an appropriate time then to - probably to just get out of the way - we are interested in learning - Before we start that, ma~y we get down and get travel worked up We are breaking at this time. (break) I think the first thing that is on our agenda is - to get out of the way is to get some idea of your upcoming itinerary on the investigation. How much longer do you pla'n to be doing field' work. 'when you will be going back, etc. lie got in touch with some of the witnesses, we have contacted and referred to, I guess about 11 of them, in the day or two between receiving notices of this meeting and arriving. And two of those 11 said t' hey had been contacted so far and I just wanted to get some idea of the - what the future pace of the investigation is going to be. I don't know that I can answer specifically because each path we go
19 down takes us down another path and it - so to imply that we can see an end in sight to this thing would be misleading. We have been focusing our primary attention on dealing with the 19 specific allegations which were brought to our attention in the first GAP (?) package. And then pursuing the additional spin-off areas that these take us down and we have been talking to a number of employees at the plant, we have been talking to ex-employees, all layers throughout the plant. Then you got to go and you have to get in and start checking out some of these points and correlating the inputs from the various points and we are at that stage where we are trying to weave 'some of this materibl together and get uut and verify some of these things, so I can't tell you other than to say I still see several weeks of work involved. It may be several months of work involved, I just can't tell at this stage. We have right now a large group of people assigned to this effort, we are prepared to add more people depending upon the
- whether or not it will help us progress; there is a. lot of a
detail that has to be dealt with here. Perhaps you could fill me in on that a little bit by how many people are working on the case, how many folks you all have inter-viewed so far, that type of thing. When I asked for an itinerary I did not mean just in terms of time table but what your investi-gative plan was. I think to just to scope it we have probably talked about to 40 or 50
20 people thus far, we have looked up some records, we have looked up some work in progress, completed work, we have to go back and talk to new people that are coming up, we have to - based on today's meeting. I am sure that we will be talking to some people that we have already talked to again, as far as the people that we have working on it, Mr. Warnick, for example, who is the supervisor of Zimmer and a number of other projects is right now personally super-vising the effort down there. Mr. McCarten is in as an investigator, Mr. Barrett has been down there almost ongoing, we are using the two resident inspectors down there, I am sorry, one of the two. We have been -we have had some construction specialists going along with our inspectors in some specialized areas - how many have you been using there, three? That sort of gives you a feel and then as I told you earlier a couple of weeks ago Mr. Davis and I started sitting down Monday and regrouping with the people where .voe stand, going through and seeing what we have, where we are headed, trying to steer the investigation.from this end. , , Do I unde'rstand correctly that you will be contacting all the people that are on these witness lists that we have provided? Yes. Yes, Mr. Young is now in Brazil - so I would not expect you to - Don't be surprised. We may send him to Brazil. I must learn how to
21 be an investigator - Maybe we could come along and help I would not rule out that we may have to talk to him - Especially fir. Yohans, in the sense that he was one of the ones that indicated - as a mat.er of fact - I am sorry - You are saying you are setting it up now? I was telling Jim we have already taken steps to set it up - Because Yohans was one of the ones indicated who had kept logs. We are not leaving any stone untdrned in this'invdstigation. Analogous to that separate point that - on the idea'on how far to
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go in tnis, what are your plans on doing independent verifications? That was one of our primary criticisms before the paperwork reviews. I can't answer yet, but a lot will depend on what we actually find in terms of the . quality of work, or perhaps what we can't confirm that good quality of work is there, if there is a question either way, then obviously some added confidence is going to have to be
~22 brought into the project and how we proceed on that I am not prepared to say at this time.
It depends on what you are calling independent verification. That is where you get into problems. We are already doing independent verifications in that we are looking at welds, we 'are measuring welds, we are counting cables and cable Ans, we are reading radio-graphs, but what we have not done so far is do our own ultrasonic . tes:ing or make our own radiographs. Let me give you an example, if in fact, one can't have confidence in the radiographs, and one can't ascertain that the welds clearly are sound, then one might have to do independent radiography or detesting, but we are not- there yet and we - and until we get to that point of seeing and evaluating what we have, we can't reallf tell you, but I would not rule out the fact that we may have to do some independent issuances'. In furthe~ ring that question, I assume that by what we talked about this morning, that there has been some - we have left an impression-that there is a possibility.that there may not have been quality work done because of some of this other activity that we discussed. That will be taken into consideration? I am not sure -
r -1
;23 l l
You said you have to determine whether or not quality wurk was done in some areas. Whether or not quality work was done might be born upon or there might be a bearing on that from whether or not there Were quality people working on it, in other words, were the people up to full strength or were they not. The information that you provided will have to be checked and - pursued and certainly it is an area that has to be pursued, yes. That will have a bearing, okay, that is my concern. - Maybe, you could define for me Mr. Kepler what it means to decide that you don't have enough confidence in the radiographs that your sight checking or the welds that you are just looking at C before you go out and do independent tests - do your own X-rays on them. What type of circumstances would make you suspicious so that you would go out and double check it and - - If in fact we do uncover, I am not saying we have or have any knowicdge of, uncover radiographs which should be documentsd in their packages and we get to that package and that radiograph is not there, then there would be a good possibility that we would go back and make the radiograph ourselves. In other words, if the records showed that that package was complete and should contain a radiograph, and
- , , _ - w .- e .- w -- gg w ,- -.-
1 24 l l in fact we do not have that radiograph there, then that might be a place where we would go back and make our own. What if you came on a situation of where a specific weTd was identified as being one where a witness asserted that he had seen that there were flaws in it and the radiograph says there is nothing the matter with it, in that case would you be considering doing an independent check on it? We would have to evaluate the entire circumstances on it. I would not just coldly say yes, we would have to further around that weld. I think you tend to make your judgments like anything else on what tFe preponderance of evidence tells you. Speaking of the preponderance - l Let me ju,st make that clearer - you know one person says hey, that weld is not any good and I know that weld is not any good and there is nothing else to go along with that, then in the system that you have looked at in terms of other welds you have some confidence, then you would be probably inclisted to say, I can't go ahead and just redo the work of every worker that comes up and raises a question. On the other hand, if the evidence that is before us suggests that you really don't have confidence in the system, and this and other
3
.: 25 l perhaps other welds might not be good, then you might - and you can't get a better handle on it, maybe the one way to get some added confidsnce is to go in and make some independent tests, but I think you have to put yourself in the circumstances of making your decisions once you see what your evidence is and I have a little bit of a problem trying to judge ahead of' time how I will react until I see what the preponderance of evidence is My question is more_ basing your past experience when you come up against a situation like this - ,
Let me give you an example of one that is I think bears on the question and that is the concrete patchwork at Marble Hill. There we had really questions about the controls there and about all the patches that were made. So - and about the soundness of the concrete in general - s'owe required a statistical sampling program of independent measpr'ement covering all types of concrete placement, difficult. joints, concrete. in the. middle of rebar, areas by which one could get a statistically meaningful confidence factor. 95% confidence, 95% assurance. That things were okay, lie did the same with cadwelds that were rejected down there - we did a sampling program - some they destructively tested to show they were l sound; others they v'isually inspected, it was a program that was , agreed upon by some consultants. We might even have to bring some l l consultants in on a case like this; I don't know. But there.are ways to do this. l l yy-py-w.w y. . ----e-y---,-s-.e-. y6--,e , -ag--ry y,- . g.- m y-- - qwy----,- - . , .my.,a%,-- --r w- ew-.- - --- -- -- - - - e+u--e -m--a v -
i g -26 Okay, I can give you the reason why I am pressing on this is that the initial NRC reports indicate that the records show very low rates of rejection and so many witnesses are telling us that there was a much higher rate of rejection initially, it seems we are back again to a swearing contest and under those circum-stances we think it just might be a good idea to take of . i suggestion that - not just from him but from a concensus of witnesses we talked to - that you identify some certain number of welds that ought to be checked and try to pin down factually who is speaking the truth.
- Well, you indicated earlier that there were some specific welds that you might steer us to, that the people'might steer us to.
And that may well be a solution to the problem. I don't know yat. But I have not ruled out at this stage any alternatives. Pardon me - jus't a s'e cond '- let me swikch these tapes.
Original Tape #3 2/26/81 - we are back on track - I want to address one thing - you were talking about and leading to that and so forth. I wanted to bring up No.1, this point about - Ed Hofstetter - you had asked before, Paul, about did we have any more information with regards to cable trays being heavily loaded for one reason, etc. - there was an affidavit given by Mr. Donald Blanch , and I think you have a copy of that affidavit but I think Mr. Blanch should be one of the people you talk to about that problem of overloading on cable trays. Mr. Hofstetter felt very strongly about that and also again going back to the Aldrich case, I want to emphasize that with regards to quality assurance radiographs - you were talking about looking at radiographs and looking at paperwork, etc. - I asked him ekay, I said, I know that the pipes are numbered and anytime you X-ray it, it is supposed to show you on the - to show the number on it and I have heard that it is not that hard to take an X-ray that looks like it is a picture of one pipe and have it actually be a picture of another. He responded by saying, oh, it is true you know if someone is going to lie and cheat, it is very hard to go against the grain - especially if the intent to defraud is there originally. I think Mr. Aldrich is stating that there that he at that time some reservations as to whetheror not a lot of the X-rays that you are going to be looking at - whether they are accurate and so I think you'know when you come down to a point of looking at the welds, etc. you are going to have to take it with a
2
- grain of salt, either that or they are going to have to find out from Mr. Aldrich and pin him down - don't just let him brush aside the conversation - as well, he did not understand what I meant - I mean it is understandable - I think anyone who listens to that tape and again I will stand - anything you need in the way of verification on that tape, Tom - what are we hearing here, I can't exactly hear it - or something like that - get them audioized and then if you have any questions, I would be glad to sit down and listen to the tape with you - there is a sound studio in Cincinnati that will listen to these tapes, etc. and I have my copy of the tapes - not a very good audiozation of them but there is a sound studio in Cincinnati that can do that - it is rather expensive, but the whole point is that I think Mr. Aldrich's conversation has to be looked at-quite seriously with the idea that there was something about the waytheyweredoingqualityassuranceradiographsandthenata later time, they were asked to leave because they were rejecting too much - and slowing down production. This was what imparted to me by Steve Benney ?, Ron Sellers, and Dave Haig, was that every time they reject something, you see, they were slowing down produc-tion and anytime they slowed down production, that caused them a problem from the quality control people. Then they had Kaiser quality control on their backs and CG&E on their backs - don't slow up production, go ahead and accept it, etc. And that was the major problem that they seemed to be having - was that when they.
would reject something, rather than having it go through the normal
. 3 channels of rejection ar.d getting fixed or getting finally accepted that CG&E and quality control in Kaiser & construction people in Kaiser were more concerned about the slowdown of production, so I think that aspect needs to be looked at when you are talking to Aldrich for what it is worth. .
We need to clarify what you said there, because it doesn't specifically say that they are doing that - makes comments along that line. Certainly intimates towards it-He dcesn't say it specifically - and we will talk to him about it. And that is important because you asked me that sa:.le question, I would tell you the same thing. It certainly is possible - you can fake In thinking about that conversation Mr. Appleby is certainly doing most of the talking, and Mr. Aldrich was more agreeing in general, i l but if there some problems found he wondered why he did not correct them - his impressions at the time. I We have to look at the whole picture. In the Aldrich conversation. -
4 It certainly makes you stop and think, what he assumed was a confidential conversation - he did not feel there was anything ongo'ng that he did not' tell Tom, we don't have any complaints about this, I don't know why you do. But he was careful about his wording. He was careful but I would go to another one where I made the comment - about why they got kicked off the site and you said you worded it exactly quote, unquote almost - and then said I yes, wasn't there any feeling within your group that there was something more to this than just asking you to leave? And his comment was, well yes, there is - our situation has been dictated by Stamford corporate people and their position is that they are on a lot of utilities and a lot of power plants, not only in testing but in building precipitators, scrubbers, environmental controls in other areas. And we have been told basically that to try to go in and defend this issue, might have an adverse effect on the other utilities taking the position that Peabody is going after a sister utility here and maybe we should not be considering them for any further work. No I don't think he was making any inferences there. I think he was coming right out and saying that if they went in and tried to defend this matter, you know, he said it later on in a little bit more detail, he would be off every hour to request for quote bid list within 30 days, every major fabricator, within 30 days - 600 million dollar company flush. And I think he has ,
5 I adequately stated it there and that is the whole point of what I am trying to get from the Aldrich thing, is hey, look, there were other reasons than the fact that you weren't performing which is the reason that was supposedly given for their dismissal, was that they were not performing, there were other reasons, what are those other reasons and who the hell was putting pressure on them. Tom, I would like to get into some of the other issues that we just had questions about with investigators' methodology in general because we made strong criticisms in the initial disclosure and we tried to base these criticisms on research from other govern-mental agencies who oversee the NRC as well as the complaints of the witnesses we have talked to, their impressions of what should have been done and I just want to make sure that we are not misunderstanding some things because of course this is going to be going for awhile and currently we are trying to work in partnership ' but if we are not satisfied, I would sure not want to be because it
- - was based on a misunderstanding so maybe I could make some queries l
on your approaches. The first thing, we have been checking NRC j public documents room of the previous inspection report of Zimmer for the last few years - just in translating the repurts we have some questions. The first one is what is the distinction between an item of noncompliance and something which is just a safety problem, what other criteria for making a formal finding of noncompliance. I
6 Noncompliance is a violation of a regulatory requirement. I just noticed in a few of the reports, there would be interior statements that this was not done in accord with something CFR something but it would not be included as an item of r.oncompliance in the summary, in the official findings, rather. Is there an oversight or was there some further distinction that I am not aware of? No, if it is an item of noncompliance - if there is a violation of a regulatory requirement, it is handled as an item of non-compliance. If there is perhaps a regulatory guide or a standard or some other system that's defined which is not incorporated as a regulatory requirement, then that migh just be just an observation made by the inspector. What would be the enforceability on a violation of the FASR which of tentimes is a much more detailed than the regulations could go into? A violation of the FASR has no - in a plant under construction - has no enforcement status.
- the FASR by amendment -
They could turn around in the FASR don't do it.
7 If I understand correctly the regulatory guide said the way your regulations are interpreted, flushed out, and the plant has - the utility has its option to follow them literally or provide a substitute for the FASR, is that correct? What we have taken with the licensing position is that which is described in any particular reg. guide, then yes, they have to meet that or give something that is an acceptable alterr. ate for that. So what is the value of an FASR if it is not enforceable a lot of times on a construction? Well, the FASR is to reflect the as-built condition. So once it is actually in operation it would be held to that standard. No, the FASR basically is to provide the substance by which the licensing people review the plant, to determine whether an operating license can be issued. It defines the plant siting, the design of the plant, the safety systems, etc. Now, if during the construction of the plant, or the period of time which it takes to construct the plant, the utility either decides to change something bec ause three years later there might be a better
8 way of doing it, something, obviously you don't want to preclude the right to make the plant better, but by the time the plant ultimately gets licensed, then the FSAR as revised is consummate with the final design of the plant, for all intents and purposes. What happens is once the commission has decided that that plant design is safe and meets the safety objectives of operation, once the Commission has concluded that the plant has been built properly, once the Commission has concluded that the plant has been tested properly, and once the Commission concludes that the utility is capable of running the plant safely, only then does an operating license be issued. It is a formal finding made by the Commission there is a safety evaluation report put out by the licensing people, and there is an inspection finding made by the I&E people - when that is all done and meshed, then an operating license can be issued. With that operating license goes what we call a set of technical specifications; those are the Ten Commandments so to speak by which the utility can operate. They must comply with technical specifications and any other regulations that are incorporated l through the-license. Does that help? l t I think so, I just want to be sure that I understand what the legal l significance is and when - when a FASR on paper doesn't reflect the conditions in reality. And as I understand your explanation it j would be a part of the licensing process to get an operating license is when that would be relevant. l i
. '9 Yes, let me take the ultimate extreme with you. Let's say that the Zimmer plant says that we are going to build a boiling water reactor. I am going to be a little bit facetious in the way this is done, but theoretically they could build a pressurized water resctor - there is nothing that precludes that so to speak in the construction permit itself. Now obviously that would be a ridiculous extreme to go to and we would not want to go that far, but if some-one says, if some licensee says, we are going to add a valve or take a valve out of the system, they don't need to come to the Commission with that change that is made and say can we do this ahead of time. They go ahead and do it and ultimately sometime before the license is granted, this document - all these changes are made, usually on an ongoing basis, and sometimes they are called to the attention of licensing by us, sometimes the utility brings it to the attention, but there is - those points are reflected in the final review of the plant.
Now would that be - I am skipping ahead of myself with this, but if you find out that an FASR is not being complied with, IBli training is one of the things that has come up in this plant, the FASR says we will do it in this fashion and they are not - what significance is that for you now - is that something that you would take into consideration - on a decision to suspend the construction ^ permit, could you do anything with that information other than file it-in 1982 report the thing?
10 If it said that welders were being trained under a certain program and let's take the extreme that there was no training . at all, I think obviously we would want to do something about it; we would not wait until 1982 to do something about tnat - on the other hand, if the NFC inspectors made a determination that a training program of another type was comparably good, then they probably not do anything about it. So this is really a guideline for your exercise of discretion? Is that what you are telling me? Well basically what we focus on in the inspection process is the principles of the quality assurance criteria,10C, Part 50. Appendix B - that serves as the guideline by which we inspect against, not so much the FASR and if design changes are made or other substitutions that are consistent with the IOC, Part 50, Appendix B criteria in that, that usually suffices to us. Now if there is something in the FASR that is very critical in terms of how something is done, thbn that can be brought into play. We may focus on it - The testing of loaders - the training of loaders - .Well it depends - there are many ways to test loaders - there is not only way to test loaders. We found that out.
11 Do you understand. Tom, the difference between the PSAR and a FSAR? Yes. I think that is very helpful to me. I think that you are going to have to talk about specifics that way but I think I sort of laid it out for you how we would handle some-thing like that particular item. Next question I have is your side of the story which we criticized about, receive an explanation; we had criticized the initial report for having conclusions that were too narrowly drawn and I just would want to get an explanation as to how you decide how broad your issues should be drawn and to provide a specific example for you. On the item of noncompliance that Mr. Phillips found, he said there was a violation in not having a hold tag on One of these pipes. In his summary also went on to describe how one of the employees was working on that pipe and was ! told by another employee, a supervisor, to lay off on it and we were critical that the report did not investigate further then j and find out what was the responsibility of the supervisor who i said not to put a hold tag on it - what was his motives, what is-i their explanation for that, how are they going to be held account-able for this. So maybe just in the context of that particular i l
12 example, you could describe to me your criteria for how broad to draw the issues. Let me say that with OYA doing an investigation of Mr. Phillips' report and the specific investigation that he did - I would not want to comment on this point in time. On the specifics of that case. I would comment in general as to how we would go about it. I think basically the approach that is used is to try to not be narrow with the allegation
- Ate the allegation and to obviously look at it itself to try te factor in the generic implications of it if you could - does it apply to one weld, does it apply to other welds, is it a system problem or is it a specific problem - I don't think we try to look at it as an isolated case with blinders on it in the general comment. We do - we are interested in looking at the broader application of it. A lot of times I thirk communications is an essential element in this too. Generally speaking when you are talking about allegations and you are talking with people who may not be directly in the business, I think sometimes we : a't always communicate as well as we should and I am not implying that this did or did not take place in this case, but I do think that we tend to think of things in the fact that we are in this business 24 hours a day - 7 days weekly. so to speak, and we are dealing with people who either bring up an issue through hearsay or through contacts of other people and I am not sure that we fully communicate all the time. I think we try to reinterpret the problem our way
. 13 and then w( proceed to go at it our way. I think also that we also try to put ourselves if you will into a gosition of documenting the allegation in the terms that we understand it best and I guess I am inserting a little bit of my ob:ervations in the earlier case but I feel we try to look at the thing broadly, we try to docament it as though it is going to be read by the public and not try to look at it in an isolated fashion. I appreciate your requesting that we look at this on a more general level rather than our specific criticisms - I guess in some ways what I am questioning is your standards for your staff in the Region and in light of that with this kind of discussion we - you say that the problem is brought to your atter. tion and that you would not just limit yourself to just looking at the effect of that problem, but in most general terms you would try to find the cause of why that had occurred. I think so. I think there is one thing that we have to acknowledge and that is we do an inspection program at these plants during the phases of construction and when we are doing an investigation we don't necessarily repeat everything that has been done in the inspectior. I program. If the investigation were to leed us into an area that ' has been inspected in the past with no problems found, that might I i
' 14 in some cases be enough to say hey, we don't have to go there.
Our inspection staff has already looked at that. That is a judg-ment call a lot of times. I think that was the point I was trying to make - our standards are for us to unc..rstand fully the problem and whether or not we think we have addressed the problem based on the information we have and I think in my own mind - at least a point I am interested in very much in terms of how other people view our efforts - is how well we report what we actually do. Well, there I don't think we really had any criticisms but we were able to critique it because it was very straightforward on what was done and what was not done and there was no intent to distort or in any way try to hide or claim that more was done than actually was. I appreciate that. The next questionthat I had was what is the formal follow-up procedure on unresolved issues, we have been coming across in our review of inspection reports just a real pattern of" inspections which were done and a few items of noncompliance and large numbers of issues that were reported as unresolved. And we are interested in what type of procedure you have to resolve those issues, to clear them up, how long do you give for those things to be cleared up or how much you double check the utility reports that they solved the problem and how do you deal with the unresolved issues that are disclosed in your reports?
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. 15 Well, a lot of unresolved issues are issues that are tracked to make a determination of whether there is involved enforcement -
action or whether they are involved in an issue that has to be corrected. As far as the time element goes, for a plant under construction, there is no time element. other than the fact that the plant does not get an operating license until that issue has been resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC. Now the only time there . night be a time element involved is if the work or the issue in question is something that will be covered up by subsequent work. Whereby you won't be able to resolve it later on, so then we might put a hold on a point until we allow work to go ahead in that particular area, but my reaction from a regulator's standpoint is I don't care if it takes 20 years to build a power plant or two years. I was just wondering because I think that some of these things could pile up over the years. We have a tracking system by our inspectors to satisfy thes0. And the lead inspector has the responsibility to follow up on them. And each item of noncompliance has to be contacted and closed up formally.
I 16 Who is the lead inspector at the Zimmer? Mr. Barrett. On this - see we have just gone through an organization change. Paul has been the leading inspector on construction and Tom Daniels our senior resident has been the lead inspector in the operations- preoperations testing area and now we have combined our prcject section into one and Tom Daniels has the lead at that plant. Paul still has the lead, we have not made the complete turnover on the construction items and of course Paul has the lead in this investigation. One question that I have that had come up in my discussions with Mr. Griffin is on the quality control system. The core of his complaint is that there was no independent quality control program for vendors other than GE which had its own. And that in the defense industries that he had worked in this normally had been a procedure going out to the vendors manufacturing operation and checking to see if their work was be,ing done well . And his complaint at Zimmer was that they were just taking the vendor's word for it which seemed consistent with the constructions that we have complained about to PM on the prefabricated piping. Mr. Griffin told me that he was informed several years ago that all of his criticisms were accurate but that they didn't violate any regulations. Is that correct, that there is no requirement in the law or your own regulations to do more than get a certification from a vendor
17 l l l that - I remember when this issue came up, I don't recall off the top of l i my head what the resolution was but maybe you could address it. Paul. l In response in general to your questicn, the licensee has responsibility to verify the suppliers and their material - they cannot be later designated as material, they must go in and assure that that vendor has a QA program that is comparable to their own. On the part that they supply, if you only do welding, then they must have a QA program commensurate with your welding activities - you don't have to full blown program. CG&E for example would have to go to Kellogg and run audits or whatever and review their 0A program to be sure that their program was applied to good quality products to be used in a nuclear plant. . 9 So they would not be able to just accept a certification? One thing you might be interested in Region IV has a vendor inspection program where they go out to various suppliers who nuclear power plants and make their own determination too. The NRC does that themselves? Yes.
18 As I recall, and you can help me here, the issue that Mr. Griffin raised was that GE appears apart from somebody else. GE does - a vendor inspection of that part, then does Cincinnati have to do a vendor inspection of that part. Not necessarily.
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And I think that was the point in question. Well, that was an example - as I understood that was more of an illustration of his concern. Rcally the core, as he summarized it to me was that Kaiser control people were told that we would have
; to put our trust in the manufacturers and that as far as they needed to go was to obtain certific6tions and to get telephone references from other utilities that these vendors had done acceptable work ~
in the past and that was really his structural criticism - was that it is really little more than - like hiring someone for a job where you go out and contact their previous employers - you get a certification from them that they will work hard and I think he was talking about GE as an illustration of what he thought was a very high quality program - not so much the specific standard that would be a violation of law. And they have to substantiate that their certifications have quality ir the field. There are times when you can tei.e i
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19 an item and as a standard industry grade item and use it for a nuclear application. . But that was another issue that he raised was that the quality contr01 program doesn't relate to everything - it relates to central components much more strictly than noncentral components. One of his criticisms was that plants were being delivered as
- nonessential components and upgraded to critical status after t5ey were there - what type of tracks do you have available on that type of ti.ing?
7 Anytime that someone wants to do something like tisat they have to prove to us that that component can perform in safety and service as indicated. They either go back and recut the component or go back and some way prove that that component has met the same requirements as any other safety grade item. So the licensee has an obligation to prove to the NRC - they have to satisfy you all if they want to upgrade a component. Yes. They really have to satisfy themselves too. Under their QA plan. We audit and determine that they do that. 4
20 Like he was saying that the Kaiser QA plan had been satisfied that
- saying that they did that as a routine. He was in effect was saying that Kaiser was consenting to just going through the motions on upgrading things and I am very encouraged by the explanation that they also have to satisfy you all, not just themselves.
I don't think we should mislead you, they have to satisfy us on < an audit basis. We are not 100% auditor of a power plant. It is our job to determine that a licensee is building it properly in accordance with its QA plan but we are not 100% receipt inspector or 100% audit controller or quality controller. So in other words some of this responsibility will fall back to Kaiser in their quality assurance program and whether or not that quality assurance program is of a standard and CG&E - you have the whole gambit - you have the vendor - Right, and some of our basic criticisms then do fall into this area of quality assura ce program at Kaiser and CG&E - again, we go back to the allegations - and whenever we have something like that what we have to do is like we are doing - we have to take a bigger sample and we have to in some way determine that the plant is adequately designed and built or not.
. 21 So Kaiser would have to at least justify to you their decision to upgrade components - you may not go in there and be looking right ,
over their shoulder and doing a site inspection but they would have to provide some basis other than just saying that it was upgraded. Yes, it would be in their quality assurance plan. Maybe not every time they make a move such as you are talking about, and say we are now operating this system I mean using this piece of material, again, they might standardize materials in some case; which meet standard industry grade and then when they find - they are going into a non-safety or safety system, that they are allowed to dedicate some of those components if they do meet standard industry grades to safety systems. They will not come and say, hey, we are now upgrading this piece of material to go into it. They are required to assure themselves that that material does meet the grade that it is required to
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meet. When do they have to report to you on - say, they have made a change in a component? - If they change a system - an entire system, something that goes against the FASR as it stands now then they will let us know that
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22 they are changing the FASR. So really all the QA program has to do is say that this was
- these materials were received consistent with standard industry quality.
Now, I was just giving you an exception to the rule - we have certain items that fall into that category. If you Part 21 and read that you will get a better feel for what type of items we are talking about. I did not want to give you the idea that they could go out and buy everything nonsafety related and put it all in there and all of sudden dedicate it as safety related. I guess this ties in quite a bit with my next question. In 10CFR, Appendix B, quality control is described as needing to be referenced. Maybe I can even get the specific quotation. But I was concerned that that meant that there doesn't need to be anything more than a certification, as referenced is such a general term. l Can you elaborate on that, I don't understand what your question is. Maybe I will just look for that after the meeting. The next thing that I wanted to ask was on the NRC Dept. of Justice memorandum of understanding on criminal activities - theft of nuclear materials, etc. i l
23 When I first talked with Mr. Cummings after we had turned in our disclosure, he informed me that I was mistaken that this memorandum applied at the Zimmer plant because there was no nuclear fuel there. And of course there is some nuclear fuel there, but not radiated I did not catch that distinction though from reading the memorandum of understanding - when does your responsibility to coordinate with the FBI or Dept. of Ju'.tice start? - with your legal obligations. Well, possible theft , criminal activities. List of criminal activities. I think the same example I gave you with Missouri, there was destruction in your interpretation, yet there was nothing that the Dept. of Justice could do on that. Therefore if they could not do it in that case, I don't think it would fall in the purvue of our memorandum of understanding with 00J - So if D0J 'does not have authority, then we don't have to coordinate. If DOJ does have authority, then you -
- go to DOJ, you have to statute - there has to be some public law involved.
I am not from the Dept. of Justice but I have prosecuted in an 8 state prostitution ring. I was on the investigative end of one of the k
, .- - . _ , , - e.-- - ,
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- p largest prostitution raid in this country when it was broken.
I know that to take a girl across the state line and put her up for raffle, like the Zimmer nuclear power plant is against federal regulations. I know that to raffle firearms in any way, shape, or manner is against federal regulations. I know that the sale of moonshine liquor is against federal regulations; I know that the sale of illicit drugs - marijuana, PCP, quaaluds, speed, downs, etc. etc. is against federal regulations. Now we have brought what we feel is a preponderance of evidence to the effect that there has been this type of activity conducted at the Zimmer Nuclear Power plant when the NRC under of its memorandum of understanding -then make a recommendation to the Dept. of Justice to examine these matters , and make a determination as to whether or not there has been a violation of federal regulations and again, I think what Tom is saying about with the presence of nuclear fuel on the site, that puts into force the FBI's requirements for investigating crime at the site. You are backing in, you are adding up of numbers, but what you are backing into is the concept of a memorandum of understanding utilizing all these federal stat'utes that are being broken by employees of a private concern with the - with the cooperation, etc. of management.
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' 25 But that is still not a government employee - it is not a government employee - you are saying federal law has to be violat2d before this law takes effect.
This is basically a NRC - it is just the Atomic Energy - FBI also - Atomic Energy refers to it - or the DA - that was your responsibility to report - you have done that, that is the point that we keep making to you. What we are saying is what happened is in January of 1980 I reported this to the utility and there is something in federal statutes that requires pcople to report evidences of federal crimes. The utility did not do that and as a matter of fact they threatened me not to open my mouth about it. I was told that I could not get anywhere I was told that I was a mouse compared to their cooling tower and that I would not get anywhere with the NRC and that no one was going to listen to me and bla, bla, bla, but the whole point of what I am trying to say is that these things were done with the cooperation.and assistance of management - now when and who does anyone take responsibility - for these yahoos down here conducting one heck o' a party. That is what I think we are trying to get some clarity on insofar as the memorandum of understanding - correct me if I am wrong Tom. But I think insofar as memorandum of understanding is concerned we are trying to get some clarification if - when does it become the DOJ's responsibility to enter into these matters or when does it become the responsibility of the Nuclear 6
26 Regula*ory Commission to refer to 00J and say under our memorandum of understanding we have evidences of criminal activity at one of our power sites and under our memorandum of understanding we would encourage you to come - We have covered this issue about four times today so far and we have reached an agreement - we are going to do that, we are going to pursue it. It is going in accordance with our agreement. Do you understand that that is the first time that has been said to me since January 19807 Well, it is the fourth time today. 9 Well, okay, maybe I need to hear it four times because I have heard about six times that my head is . going to get blown off for telling you all. So maybe I need to hear it four times- maybe I need to hear it five times - maybe I need a man from 00J to sit in this empty chair and say we are going to look into it. I don't have any further question on that. This memorandum of understanding thing - I just wanted to reemphasize and I am reemphasize one other thing and that is about the construction
,-,,-v - - - , , - - - , - - , -----e,. , ,,n ,
27 permit, but I just wanted to reemphasize the fact that these activities took place, that it was burden on the people of the' State of Ohio, that it was burden on the people of Claremont County that it was a burden on the United States taxpayer because there were federal funds went into building this plant. I think the one point I make again that was brought up that is very real - the memorandum of understanding relates to the Atomic Energy Act.
- criminal matters that - that is the key'to this
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memorandum. That and the Energy Preorganization Act which I guess just carried it over. Yes, that is correct. I think that I probably have the answer to my next question but that was on what' the relevance of drunkeness at the plant is and I assume from our discussions already that it becomes relevant if it.can be some causal relationship to safety problems. I treat the significance of drunkeness in the same boat as I treat the significance of drugs. Let's say that drugs is a criminal activity and drunkeness - personal.
l l l 28 l But from a health and safety point of view, it concerns the same. I just have really two questions left here to wrap this up. The~next one was on the standard operating procedures for inspections. I have been I don't know what the proper term for it is, but very impressed with the distinctions in the approach to the first inspection that Tom was the catalyst for and approach to this inspection investigation. I have been very impressed with how thoroughly you have done in following through all these leads and of course have heavily criticized some of the initial efforts on it. What is the approach? I know you have very limited resources and thousands of things that you could constructively look into in depth. When a complaint comes in, do you routinely use your normal procedures to investigate and intecview the line employees as well as the management? What is your normal procedure for resolving contradictions when a complainant says one thing and provides some evidence and management denies it? What are the instructions that you folks follow for resolving contradictions for who to talk to in'these inspections? Let me first of all correct a statement you made earlier. I think you said I was critical of our earlier investigation. I said we were - You were critical of it. That is correct and I acknowledge that and I guess I will wait to see the report from our OIA people as to how critical I am when they discuss their findings with us. That investigation is ongoing. Let me distinguish first - just to get a little background -
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let me distinguish between inspections and investigations. We have an
. 29 ins,pection program that is say what they call a defined pre-planned like program at which we look at certain activities during the course of the construction of a new nuclear power plant. We try to sample all safety related construction systems by observing work in progress, we look at records and we talk to people. Sort of a combination of all of tnose things. We also have on our staff 5 investigators and these people are largely tied to looking at allegations that are t'rought to our attention independent of the inspection program either by plant employees or by members of the public. At other times we may use investigators to follow up on an incident that may occur at a power plant where the determination or precise determination of sequence of events or how people reacted, the aspects of which may become very important.- The reason we do this is the background of our inspectors is largely a technical background in a precise area of nuclear safety or construction etc. The background of our investigators is an investigative type background and I think a very key difference or at least one key difference I might distinguish is that generally speaking inspectors go after things looking for the logical explanation,of what happened. I think it is fair to say they are in-terested primarily in the technical aspects of a job and there is an element of some trust between the licensee and the way he does business.
l The investigator is I think a more inquisitive type of person. He asks questions from a little more distrusting point of view and he tries to check his facts a little better. He goes after things by maybe asking l the same question five different ways. He has five different viewpoints. So when we get allegations they are usually handled by an investigator or sometimes if there is a technical element to the investigation we send in
30 an inspector, one or more inspectors, along with an investigator.' That sort of describes the program. As far as the techniques go I guess , maybe talking to an investigator might give you a better idea but my understanding of the techniques of an investigator is that he tries to pursue first the understanding of an allegation that is made, what the person is trying to tell us. They talk to as many sources of people as they need to to try to draw some conclusion as to the actualness or significance of the allegation. There are no holes barred as to who they talk to from the president of the company on down to the lowest individual at the site. In fact th'ey often have talked to people who are not at the site. There are no bounds as to who they talk to. It is a judgmental thing as to how far they take it and how well they determine what they feel they need to determine. I guest to scope just a second for you our policy has been and I continue to believe it is the right policy is that we investigate all matters that have potential nuclear safety sifnificance. Our policy has been that we do not investigate matters that do not relate to safety and that is a matter of contention between your group and us. Which I guess we have to wait for further decisions on but that has been our policy. ' It has largely been our policy because that is our background. We don't know anything for example about going out and involving ourselves in criminal aspects. And to try and tell basically the risk of over-kill. For us to go out and tell DOJ how to do their job or some other government
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agency in law enforcement it just boggles my mind that that is what we ought to be doing. And we haven't been. We have been focusing on what we have expertise in. That is nuclear safety. I t I want to clarify one thing. I have never suggested that the Nuclear I l .
31 Regulatory Commission was responsible for going out and checking into and that type of thing. I think what I am trying to clarify in my mind is the Ziemer Nuclear Power Plant is no St. Peters facility. Where you can say mass anywhere you want. In the sense of the Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant it is not a sanctimonious piece of ground where criminal activity can be conducted without someone saying no and without someone having the primary responsibility to say you come in her0 and , slap their hands. Now because it did involve such multi-level pe5ple, we are talking about top level management, middle level management down to workers because it did involve all of these people and because all of ther,e people were involved in the process of building a nuclear power plant I think it is reasonable to assume at lea'st on my part that the primary regulatory agency there would have the responsibility of saying all right now we are going to have these people come in and smack your hands. Because while you were partying and doing whatever you were supposed to be building a nuclear power plant. Now we have to go in and investigate and find out whether or not you built it right. I understand your position. To finalize and sunmarize my position OK because what I am saying is let's not condone it. I am sure the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by no stretch of the imagination wants to but it is just that I need for somebody to clarify it for me. Who is going to be responsible for taking care of St. Peter's facility in Cincinnati. Zinner's private little swatcF of land
32 that they do whatever they darn well please to do. Let me say to you with respect to this particular investigation I have adjusted my own thinking to the point that because there is a credibilit.y issue in question on our part and so forth. I am trying to lean over backwards to do the most complete job we can in terms of answering the issues involved. I have told my people that it is not satisfactory to say that is an OSHA problem. I am telling my people I want follow up on the 0.H." nroblem. So we are trying to be as responsive as we can on this issue. That is my decision and I may be faulted for it later I don't know and I don't care. We have broadened intentionally the scope of things we are looking at this time. ' I would like to talk about your response and see if I interpret it i correctly. I inquired about what guidelines there are for investigators to resolve contradictions and whom to speak with and you responded if I interpreted it correctly it is a judgment matter but there are no holes barred. Is it coro.:-ct then it is up to the individual investigator's judgment as to whom he will talk with and how he will resolve those contradictions or is there some policy direction you impose. I think it is up to the inspector or investigators and his supervisor. There is no written policy in ti.a office if that is what you are asking for. The last thing I would like to go into is how you exercise your discretion
.33 or judgment on what counties to go af ter when you find some problems there. Decide there isn't a problem or say it is non-ccmpliance, and should be corrected. It is not compliance and it should be conf,ined.
'You can go further and say it is so serious that the construction permit should be suspended. I checked the standards on inspection of con-struction permits and they were very broad and you have the authority to do that almost at any time it seems like and obviously it is very severe stuff that wouldn't be taken. What does it take or what is the criteria for suspending a construc, tion permit as opposed to imposing a fine as opposed to not imposing a fine just recording a violation?
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I think it might be helpful if I gave you a copy of our enfercement criteria. Yes I would appreciate that. That pretty much gives you a feel for the way we escalate enforcement actions versus the kinds of actions that we have taken on the regional l evel . But,obviously the more severe enforcement sanctions are attached to the severity of the problem involved. You asked what it.would take I think there have been many to suspend a construction work at a site. cases where construction work has been stopped either in total or in part ' Marble Hill was a good and I would say most of it has been in part. example of where we stopped construction work on all safety related systems. That is really the catalyst of my question to you. I didn't hesitate to
34 l stop Marble Hill but I assume that is because they went over a certain line. l The line being that I thought there was a major breakdown across the board in the quality assurance program. I felt the basic work that was going on and the people didn't know what they were doing. There was no control over it and poor work was found. There was actually faulty con- , struction involved. There was clear evidences of programatic breakdowns - in the Q. A. system. We rece'ntly stopped work at the Byron Station in the area of electrical work. 'We stopped all sofcty r:Sted electrical work up there. Because the contractor involved and the utility involved didn't have adequate controls in place to preclude actual quality con-struction. That we stopped on a temporary basis until we felt that the program was in shape to pemit it. We have stopped work at Zimmer in certain areas. We stopped work on the RCI, manual work. - The only thing that I can say with regards to and again what I have stated before is that as an investigator I know I would find it extremely difficult if the people I was investigating were breathing down my neck or if they had the opportunity to be staking one step ahead of m'e and as I have indicated to you the utility as well as Raymond International, the owners of Kaiser, the construction people, have made attempts and we don't know how much of my infomation they have gotten, how much of the information that you are checking on they have gotten but we do have indications that they are trying to get ahold of every piece of it that they can. I think they would love nothing more than for me to drop my briefcase in their front lobby and to that extent we have had problems. My home has been broken into and there are people that call. Like I said there was
35 that one call when I was there that one afternoon where they tried to us with the secretary. She misrepresented herself. - She was obviously the secretary of a law firm and there was obviously .a lawyer standing right behind her. .And we found that out. The whole point is that they are trying to get ahold of this information in my estimation so they could cover themselves. Because it would be ridicuous to assume that they didn't have a vested interest and I am not saying I am out for blood with . I am out for blood for Kaiser. I don't want to get them or anything like that. That is not the case. That is just frankly, flatly not the case,. I am in favor of a complete and thorough and objective investigation of what I brought to the
, it is the problems of Zimmer. I think that can be best accomplished with a clean site and when I say a clean site I mean one where the construction permit has either oeen voluntarily revoked or turned in or mandatorially revoked.
I want to follow up just in fairness to explanation. For example would it be necessary if you were going to make a decision to suspend a construction permit on' the basis of questions about the wells and safety related systems through the plant. Would you have to have in-dependent X-rays on them .or could you do that on the basis of discreparcies you found in your own review of utility records. If you were going to
' be suspending a construction permit because there were some serious questions about the reliability of the wells would you have to'go out and do independent verification of those wells or could you do it on the basis of the discrepancies you found through site checks or through the
36 paperwork of the company or examining their own X-rays. Would you have to go and contract for ultra-sonic tests before you would feel com- ? fortable in taking a step like suspending a construction permit license. s . Not necessarily. I third it would depend upon what evidence there was to support that there was a real problem with the wells. If you are convinced that faulty cons'truction is taking place and the program for controlling construction is inadequate then I think you have no choice but to go out and stop the project. The problem that I have with f1r. Applegate's statement is that I could put myself on the other side of the c'oin and say that to require a stop work at the project when evidence clearly doesn't support that there is faulty construction, I think I would be accused of being out to get Cincinnati if I did that. So what I have to do is base whatever action we take on what the facts are of the matter, and we haven't determined yet what the facts are. I just wanted to clear up what internal requirements you have for exercising this discre, tion. It sounds like it is not a case of well before we take this step we have to have this particular type of evidence. It is more of a judgment. Well folks I don't have any further questions for you. Correct me if you
. are wrong but I think that is everything that is on your mind. I sure appreciate the time you havr taken. It is kind of you to sit here and listen to us and respond to our questions.
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~38 And then I get these calls from individuals saying this, that and the other thing and then on a regular basis of 2 or 3 times a day 11get ,
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- calls where people hang up. I guess it makes me a little antsy-and
, it makes me wonder why hasn't'NRC called A and B. What kind of shit are they stirring up that I am getting these calls again all of a sudden that I haven't gotten for sometime. I think there is rome reason to believe that there are some people down there that are very antsy about your being there. As somebody used to say if you can't do the and you can't stand the heat in the kitchen, get out but maybe some of 9
those people down there can't stand the heat in the kitchen. As far as I am concerned I get cold more often than I get hot so I think we had a very valuable dialogue here today and I appreciate your taking the time to fly me up here and sit down and talk with all of you. I appreciate ineeting all of you and I am sure that something is going to come of all' < f of this. I have no question in my mind that when I began all of this, it was for a specific reason of clearing my conscience to the effect that there were problems at Zimmer. Now I may have to go a few steps out of my way to do that but I have done it and I am confident that the on going investigation and what you people have told me today is going to happen and is going to happen. I will leave it in the hands of my lawyer to watch it. khank you very much for coming. . ) I I
.o *s GOVERNMENT ACCOUN[ ILilY PROJECT (.
} pk Institute for Porcy Studies 1901'Que Street. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009 3 h (202)234 9382 hh ,
Febrruary44, 1981 Memorandum To: Arthur Schnebelin and John Sinclair From: Tom Devine Re: Witness list from January 28-31 Cincinnati visit - The following list contains the individuals I spoke with - last week who requested interviews with upcoming NRC investi-qators. Following the.name and identifying intormation, there is a brief description of each witness' allegations. I have had varying degrees of centact with these individuals. Some gave me affidavits. Others are referrals whom I haven't spoken with. Several individuals conditioned their affidavits on the confidentiality protections you outlined at our January 9 meeting: Investigators will not release the witness' identity except by congressional subpoena or to law enforcement agencies for criminal investigation. One witness will speak with the NRC, but only under subpoena due to fears of job retaliation. These conditions are also noted. We expect to obtain additional evidence in the upcoming ,, weeks. ,I am also preparing memoranda on reveral conversations with former Zimmer employees since my return. We will share all our evidence as we receive it, with the wit, ness' consent.
- 1. Robert Anderson -- an ironworker for ten years who worked at ZiEmer Ior two years. Can be reached through Tom Martin, witness #10. He tested ten door units in reactor building and pumphouse which are required to be waterproof. All were defective. His affidavit is enclosed. I have not spoken with '
him personally.
- 2. Andy Dennisonyan--{ra-7J:2-6P00) attorney who can locate Charles Clendenon, a pipefitter who left Zimmer during.the spring of 1980 and wants to speak with NRC investigators.- 1 spoke with Mr.
Dennison only, who approached me on Mr. Clendenon's behalf.
. 3. Dr. David Fankhauser -- a geneticist at University of Cincinnati-clarement who spoke with b6ilermaker Donald O' Daniel. O' Daniel has disappeared. Before he dropped out of sight, he related to Fankhauser how the concrete and lining plate of the suppression pool are defective. The utility drilled holes throughout the concrete in a futile repair effort. The honeycombing has weakened
- the structure. In the same process, the utilityrepairs broke the reinforcement bar that provides strength for the concrete.
The new lining plates have fallen off on occasion and are bowed. O' Daniel described how the NRC inspec' tor missed the flaw when workers made cosmetic repairs and piled other materials around I
C C. _2-area where the plates had fallen out. Since O' Daniel is out of sight, Fankhauser is the only-detailed source for the allegation. His notes are enclosed. Fankhauser's address is.
, , , ,(W-Mon, Weds., Fri.)
- 4. Tawn Fichter and Lou Seilerv
> Husband and wife public interest law team. Have taken statements from numerous employees at the Zimmer plants who have voiced concerns, including Mr. Clyde Potter in the last week (witness fil). I spoke with Seiler.
u S. Leslie Freeman ,-~ .l An author doing a book on nuclear whistlebloweis. Has spbk'en with numerous employees at the Zimmer plant, including a woman electrician who has disclosed problems. I have not reached Ms. Freeman, who was referred to me. i
- 6. Vic Griffin
, A former quality control engineer who resigned in 1976. He" resigned after seeing damage ~to critical components which the utility refused to test subsequently. He disclosed his concerns to Gerry Phil* lips, who conducted a remarkably similar
" investigation" as in the Applegate case. Griffin then resigned, knowing his position at the plant would be untenable. He emphasizes that, due to a quality control system that ignores basic tenets of normal industry practice, the plant may be full of faulty critical components with the same flaws he observed in several cases. I spoke with him over the telephone,
, and a memorandum on the discussion will be forwarded to your office. , ,
s .
- 7. Steve Harris }606-581-2533(W); 606-581-2535 (W after 5:00)' A former secu'rity guard who resigned last fall. His allegations concern. mismanagement and understaffing of the security force, as well as vulnerability to theft of uranium fuel stored at the plant. He also disclosed numerous black market activities, including a bookie operation being ~
run out of the telephone at the desk for the security guards who watch over the uranium. His affidavit is enclosed. He insists upon strict confidentiality. -
- 8. Ed Hofstadter, He was in charge of quality control for a supplier of cable trays to the plant,and is a lifelong welder. He disclosed faulty welds at critical junctures of the cable tray system, but NRC inspectors looked at the wrong welds. While they found flaws in these less significant welds, they missed the ones Hofstadter had revealed. His affidavit is enclosed.
- 9. Jeff Hyde 513-872-2651 (W until 6:00) 513-872-2357(W after 6:00) A securit ' officer at Zimmer for fourteen months. Much
. more detailed version of issues raised by Harris, particularly a
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. C.
weapons black market and times when enriched uranium was sitting outside plant totally unguardec . Mllis af fidavit is enclosed. He insists upon strict confidentiality. *
- 10. Tom Martin, 1 A millwrightfor ten years who was laid off after reporting serious defects.,in c:r.trcl rods. HisMUffidavit is enclosed. I spoke'with him rance My return.
- A memorandum on the discussion is forthcoming.
- 11. Clyde Potter. Can be. ret.r@jjgi,r, rough Tawn Fichter. He
_, was fired from his job as a ;d.6r.fp.tter at Zimmer after an argument about his doing ' th c. .! set-for another employee named Mad Dog who was selling guns'at the plant. I have not spoken with Mr. Potter yet.
- 12. Gorman Reynolds -- a millwright for six years and a foreman at Zimmer who was laid off shortly after reporting metal shavings icose in the contn.tl rods. He is afraid they could clog critical systems durin'g 'an emergency. I have enclosed his earlier affidavit but not spoken with him personally.
He can be rezched through Tom Martin.
- 13. Bill Ross 513-722-7 24 9 (M)d. Ln festigative Supervisor, Claremont County Welfare Dep TNg,pt, c/0 Claremont County Service Center, St. Rte. 222, Batavia; Ohio 45103. Another former security officer who can amplify on charges made by Harris and Hyde. He wants to talk with NRC investigators -
but will only do so onder subpoena due to fears of retaliation on the job. I have not spoken with Mr. Ross. Mr. Applegate referred him and has had several conversations with him.
- 14. John Wolliver 513-732-2422(W),! An attorney with information on f&lse entries in t'he books at Zimmer.
Dr. Fankhauser suggested you centact Wolliver, whom I have not spoken with. . .
. A. .vl;v a un .
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i ( ( AFFIDAVIT My name is Jeffrey J. Hyde. From August 7, 1979 until October 1980 I was employed as a security officer at the 9.'1111am H. Zimrer nuclear power plant in Moscow, Chio. The plant is being constructed by Kaiser Engineering and'is owned by. Cincinnati, Cas and Electric. I worked for Yoh Security of 1616 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This affidavit concerns numerous serious problems I was aware existed at Zimmer, including. breaches of security for over $40 million dollars worth of nuclear fuels employees at the plant who were drunk during working hours and thriving black market businesses that included hot weapons, belt buckles, prostitution and a bookie operation. Before I came to Zimmer I had worked as a member of the 164th Military Police in Miesau, West Germany. My job was in physical security guarding classified items After receiving a medical discharge for arthritis I was hired in August 1979 by Yoh. I was the first security officer hired by Yoh for the Zimmer contract. My first experience with problems at the plant began around 1:35 A.M. in mid-August, after receipt of the first uranium dioxide 235 nuclear fuel shipment at Zimmer. I read the name of the fuel from the packing slip. It had been trucked in from General Electric's plant in Wilmington, North Carolina. I heard through the grapevine that CC&E had obtained permission to have the fuel delivered early, in order to avoid paying additional storage charges to General Electric. It arrived at night to avoid anti-nuclear demonstrators. When the fuel arrived Mr. Fred Lautenslager, CC&E's security supervisor for the site, called myself and the other of ficer on duty, John Ben' amin. He told us to have one person - go doenstairs to the Icading ares and watch the fuel, while the other man etayed at the seventh, or reactor. floor. Fred gave John a respon and told his to stand outside guarding the fuel until the morning shift arrived at 7:00, around five hours later. For around the next 20 days we received shipments. After the first shipment, the trucks arrived at all hours, including the afternoon. During that period the loading dock was full on s e
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about 12 occasions. In those instances, the truckers would just unload the fuel outside the railroad tracks rope off the crates, and put up warning signs. I thou6ht it was curious that the warning signs were radiation warnings, but the fuel just sat out in the o;en. Then the security officers would take turns Guarding the crates. . - The other security officers and I felt extremely uneasy about having just one. or at most three, officers guarding the fuel. The security equipment, such as cicsed-circuit TV and the E field on the fence designed to detect movement, were not yet functional. After having worked in Germany, I was familiar with terrorism. I knew that even the most sophisticated ' ystems s had been defeated by groups of nine to twelve people. But we were expected to guard these shipments by, to paraphrase the CG&E security manual, placing our bodies "between the adversary and the fuel." We were only armed with .38 caliber pistols that . carried five rounds at a time. As a result, in the event of an attack, even at full strength all thre'e potential guards would only have 15 rounds to defend the plant's fuel. Further, although we were carrying the weapons, none of us qualified to have .38's until a May 1980 test. The utility might respond that we had prior military experience, but I had never
- carried a .38 before in my life. In the Army I used other weapons.
One of the pr oblems that concerned me the most is that the fuel sometimes was totally unguarded. This occurred because no officer was required when maintenance moved the fuel to the , seventh floor. When their shift was over before fuel was all moved, maintenance would just quit and call up to the security officers. They had been working twelve hour shifts, and on at least two occasions that I was involved with, they left before I came down to watch the fuel. One one of those occasions the fuel was totally unguarded for around ten minutes. Since there was no window by the seventh floor access point, we couldn't even look outside to see if any ' intruders were approaching.
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3 At the time. I just cc..sidered these security breaches as another broken rule. In retrospect, I am upset and fearful about such a lax practics. I wonder just how widespread this type of sloppiness sti?.1 is. Under these conditions. I couldn't state that no fuel was ever diverted, although I am not personally aware of any thefts. Although the fuel was all delivered in 20 days, the security breaches did not stop at that point. There were numerous small incidents that irritated me. For example Mr. Lautenslager did not obey his own rules on proper identification before' gaining access to controlled areas where the reactor vessel was located. I was not used to this kind of game-playing in the Army. On one occasion during the late summer of 1990, our supervisor. at the time. Nick White, left his gun in the unlocked file cabinet'. at the security office. The office was locked but could be opened easily with a credit card, because the magnetic locking device was not yet in place. This was a direct b' reach of the rules, which called for automatic dismissal of all involved parties whenever an officer relinquished his weapon to other than authorized personnel. A file cabinet does not qualify as authorized personnel. I wrote up an incident r: port, but Lautenslager said not to worry about j it. Although practices like ,ismanagement and cost-cutting don't qualify as security breaches, they still endanger the security of the nuclear fuel. For example, we were all overworked. I routinely put in twelve hour days, sever. days per week. With an 84 hour week, you soon become a vegetable. You're physically l there but no good to anyone. I couldn't pass up the work, because I needed the money for my wife and two children. The paycheck was the only good thing about it. Once I even had to work a
?4 hour shift straight through, although we were authorized to take najs.
There were never more than'ter. guards, which left us badly l understaffed. f.~.any nights there were only two of us on duty. i Since frequently one of us would be out patrolling the perimeter, when any immediate problem a'rese the other man would have to break l
. ~ . . ( f~ 4 , the rules by leaving the seventh floor access point. We discussed how with only two officers on duty we would be caught in a dilemma of deserting our partner or our post, if the man on perimeter duty radioed in an emergency call for help. We only had direct supervision about 5% of the time. There
/ '. '
was a " lead man" named,' 'but he did paperwork rather than overseeing our work. He wasn't'/much good to anyone, because he had a drinking problem and came to work shit-faced after awhile. practice was not unique at Zimmer. The construction crews, including the foremen, frequently were drunk on the job. I would see them sitting out drinking in the parking lot at 7 A.M. Employees brought in six packs of beer in their lunch boxes and drank very powerful moonshine liquor at the plant. In fact, for $10 you could buy a mason jar filled with moonshine. The plant was full of illegal black market operations, including gambling and lotteries of all sorts. For instance, a . pyramid game similar to a chain letter,was quite popular. Employees paid $100 at a tice to join the game. ,I did not challenge the pyramid game or the other illegal schemes, because they were far too common. It was und erstood at the plant that anyone with sense would follow the strict "No Questions Asked" policy about these activities at Zimmer., All of the schemes were in existence throughout my employment at the plant. Perhaps the most chilling business involved the raffle of het guns. The prizes included handguns, shot-guns and'high-powered rifles. I personally saw .357 colt handguns, 12 gauge Remington shotguns, and 30-6 deer rifles. I am sure a person co'ld u buy any weapon desired. The deer rifles use 7 62 millimeter bullets, the same as the Army uses for machine guns. The pistols were so commonly raffled that it was routine. The weapons came complete with ammunition. To get a weapon a worker would buy a raffle ticket from other u7 identified employees. The prices ranged from $2 for a pistol ticket to $10 for a deer rifle ticket. There were up to 100 raffle tickets sold for each weapon.
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Another frequent activity involved placing ..orserac5ng bets over the telephone at the seventh floor security desk. t A Kaiser electr!:ian named , e mof Amerlia. Chio ran the bookie operation.; t"
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f
' nickname at the plant was "Shitsy."
We joked that Shitsy had to be connected with the Maria, because he bracged that he could place a bet at any track'in the country.
,.- ~,
During my entire time at Zimmer.! bookie business followed a similar pattern. He would use the seventh floor telephone in the morning to get the scratchen. Around seven or eight employees would come around lunch, each representing a section of the plant such as the Instrumentation and Control employees. Shitsy then would conclude his business in the after-noon, using the seventh flour phene again to place the bets and learn the race results. This really wasn't much of a secret at Zimmer. In fact. - the operation was so blatant that one day an employee wrote out $2 and $5 on paper and taped the signs on the table as a joke, analagous'to the betting windows at the track. I know ', hat management,was aware of the practice, because I told Lautenslager about it Ln September 1979 But nothing was done. Shitsy's foreman y411ed at him about the practice sometimes .j but didn't make him stop. .The practice made some of us sick, because Weber was receiving a $26 per hour salary to place bets. There were other black market operations at the plant. For example, the pipefitters made belt buckles that were so beautiful it was hard to believe. You could buy a belt buckle directly for about $25. or spend $1 on a raffle ticket. They sold 10 belt buckles daily throughout my time of employment.
- The only raffle operation I heard about but did not see directly involved prostitutes. Other employees told me that the winners would receive a Fifth of liquor and a whore for a whole Friday night session. .
During the sum.Ter of 1980 the security officers voted to , unionize. Apparently Yeh lost the security contract at Zimmer c,s a result. Lautenslager said that our union vote was a "r.ajor s
.- , r r and contributory" factor in CC&E's decision to change security firms. That fall I gave a statement to an investigator from ,,,
;s -
the National Labor Relations Board. Despite promises to the contrary, I never received a copy of my statement or heard from the NIIB again. I am providing this ' affidavit out of a sense of obligation to the public. Previously I was afraid of retaliation on' the job, so I waited until obtaining new employment on Decembsr 8 at Oood Samaritan hospital and my new supervisor's permission to speax out. After another former Zimmer security officer contacted Tom Applegcte, we saw an avenue for disclosure. After the initial contact Mr. Applegate was so persistent that I felt he deserved my cooperation by giving this statement to his representative from the Government Accountability Project. I swear that the above statement is true, accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. A'h ' "IS-yf& c16lde Y [{her 1- . asr, a w ,,p~,:s % c.n. bQ &4 s@r ~ i l i o
f ( *
. 9. *. "' . .
AITIDAVIT
,My nane is Stephen D. Harris. Fmn March 1,1980 until mid-Ocicber '
1980 I v2s a ployed by Yoh Security, Inc. of Philadelphia, Painsylvania as a security officer at the William H. Zincer nuclear power station in Mascow, Ohio. The plant is being cmstructed by the Kaiser Engineering Corporation.. and is owned by Cincinnati Cas and Electric ('Tr4E"). In October I quit my job in disgust, due to lack of cooperation and dishonesty by managaret on security problems. Soon after, Yoh lost the GCSE contract. 'Ihis affidavit concerns an illegal bookie business being .
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run cut of the seventh floor statim ' telephone,. the' access point for
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nuclear fuel at Zl.ner; other breaches of security that could lead to loss or theft of nuclear fuel; and a lottery of belt buckles and prostitutes. Yoh was hired under NRC stant'ards to protect the building perimeter
. and internal security. My own background included denolition teams on the 82nd Airborne in the U.S. Army. Although my paychecks came fmn Yoh, I was hired directly by CG&E. They took me because I knew how to use a weapon. I had a'1 ready told Fred lautenslager, the (IEE security .
site supervisor, that I had been busted for pot in the service. He was unconcemed. My dutics were to protect the physical security of the plant, along with nine other security officers. We were supposed to nonitor traffic, screer all visitors sho wanted access to restricted areas, secure the perireter and patrol the sections of the plant to insure that evm plant personnel stayed in the areas they were permitted. The technical description is that we were responsible for personnel and material accountability, and paysical security of the plant. This n: cans that anyone who wanted access to nuclear foel at Zimer had to get past our station on the seventh floor. Whm I arrived in March, I quickly saw that the security progran was understaffed, mis:mnaged and in general ineffective. For exa::ple, contrary to standard operating procedure,fwith ten people we had to desert our non al work whenever a real problen arose. Sometimes we worked frcru 24 48 hours straight. Understandably, we muld beccare gregry and hungry. For weeks at a time, we had to supervisor to oversee our sork. About a week after I started sork, I came actuss a Kaiser Engineering i a:ployee naned 'sho ws taking books on horse races. He placed the bets'5 rcra the# seventh floor telephone ori the s,ecurity desk. a phone only supposed to be used in energencies. nic i plant was '3hitsy." He generally took his bets during I'mch.p , at the
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f f~ garbling operation was comen kowledge at the plant. 11e continued his bookie scheme at 1 cast until the day I 1cft. From a half cbzen to a dozen caployees placed bets on a daily basis. I was especially concerned, because the people placirg bets were not authorized to be on the seventh floor. But there were jtst too many people involved to centrol. After about a nontn, I asked, if he was a bookie and he said yes. I told him I knew he couldn't say wiio Itis contacts were, but he said he was looked up with "all of the." I didn't go to the police irrediately, because it had been going on so long and I didn't want to get ny ass fried or shot off. ' The second issue I want to discuss concerns the perimeter security. There were only two, or occasionally three, security officers to patrol
^
66 acres. As a result, intruders could easily get past the perireter. The gate security guards frcxn W and W Security were supposed to be a secondary check. But that cocpany, shich was unlicensed at the time and run by a man named Knobby Ward, consisted of a bunch of clowns. I caught than sleeping on the turbine floor aid sus disgusted that they routinely let in pickup trucks filled with " trews" that may or way not have been authorized. Pcutinely, frera 5 UA to Midnight there was to one at the gate. After the plant received a bcrrb threat, things sure supposed
- to ti@ ten up. But it still sus hit or miss whether a guard would be on duty. People were walking in and out of clie plant uncontrolled.
On one occasion around August I carn across a fake plastic explosive apparently left in the plant as a joke. I 1carned fran other security officers atout similar " jokes." I wrote up the incident, but rothing was ever done. khm I told lautenslager about security breaches, he would,t, ell me to go to my lead supervisor when one existed, such as' _ tor later Nick khite. But cy supervisors replied that it'was CD5E's problem.
- They all just passed the buck. In all, I wrote up dozens of security l infracticns. I never received any response.
The third issue concerns lotteries at the plant. The " prize" that I sus propositioned for was belt buckles constructed out of stainless steel stolen frcn the plant. I also knew through the grapevine that sessicns with hookers were raffled off. The raffle tickets were sold i on the eierators at a dollar a thrcw by pipefitters and electricians. There were at least 50 tickets in each lottery bcok. Although I don't kncw tow many books were used up at a tire, the propositions occurred once a week. In Dece-ber I decided to come forward after I heard Tan /pplegate on a radio intervicn. I decided that if Applegate uould stick his neck out to cican up the mess at Zirecr, I wuld also. This was the first nuclear po.cr plant I had wrked ct. and it sus nothirq like shat I had expected or rc.'d about in trade esgazines. With the state of the security siystczn at the plant, it sus vulnerabic to theft frcrn boat, air or land. The l
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2 r micro..uve screen and creras thcoretically existirg in addition to a fcice still hadn't been hooked up een I Icft in October. All I la w is that for any poople vio s.unt to steal nuclear fuel, Zimrer is an easy target. I swear that the above statment is true, accurate and emplete to the best of my krewledge. W YdAMES Stephen D. Ihrris .
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*# = AFFIDAVIT STATE OF OHIO )
) SS:
COUNTY OF HA?!!LTON) Comes now Edwin P. Hofstadter, who, having been duly cautioned and sworn, deposes and says as follows: My name is Edwin P. Hofstadter. For 5 1/2 years, from 1973 - 1978, I was employed by Husky Products, Incorporated, as Manager of Industrial Enginecring. My responsibilities covered the , tooling / equipment and the processes used in the manufacture of cable trays for industrial applica-tions. I was dismissed from my position in August, 1978 afcer I dissented against our company's continued employment of untrained, unqualified welders to prepare cable trays at nuclear power plants. This Affidavit concerns the continued use of key cable trays at the Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant that are overloaded and compromised by faulty velds. I first went to the Zimmer Plant during the spring of 1978. Husky had built the cable trays that hold masses of electrical cables at the , plant. These cable trays carry all the control cables for the plant. The cables come from the control room and carry all the electricity for the plant, including the safety systems. The trays are essential to protect and isolate these cables. When I went to Zimmer I was instructed to develop a fire protection plan for the cable trays. Unbeknownst to me at the time, Zimmer had been directed by the NRC to construct a fire protection system. The cable trays were in stacks of three on top of each ctLer, the same as at the Brown's Terry plant in Alabama, where a nearly disastrous fire occurred. The NRC had told Cincinnati Cas and Electric, ("CC&E") the - utility which owns Zimmer, tolearn from the Brown's Ferry mistakes. CC&E failed to preparc an alternate design to avoid stacking, but the utility did request Husky to develop a fire protection system for the
" Brown's Ferry design" that was installed at Zimmer despite the NRC warning. Instead, CCLE had developed a plin to cover each tray with .
fire protection "blar.ket" constructed from the same material used to protect missile nose cones f rom heat on re-entry. When I arrived, I was surprised to find that the trays were loaded to the top with cables. Professional standards forbid trays from being i
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loaded to more than 60% of their depth. Otherwise, the heat generated 3 .% .
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. . r C by the cables could cause fires. I was appalled that all the trays in two rooms that I inspected were loaded to the top.
I was inspecting cabic spreading rooms, above the reactor contain-ment area. The cables traveled through openings in the wall down several flights into the containment area. They were resting on trays that switched from horizontal to vertical directions in order to travel throuth_the
- plant down to the containment area. The different trays were connected by vertical fittings produced in a three piece construction, using hand or manual velds to join the three pieces. I was suspicious that these welds may have been faulty, because I had previously codplained . that our Husky welders were inadequately trained. I also knew that even the trained welders were using the speeded-up " incentive system" for 4 commercial welds, rather than the slower, safer system required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers for nuclear plants. The speeded- i up incentive process produces welds with relatively poor fusion, resulting in lit??e strength. That's what happens when you go too f ast, you don't get a strong enough weld for a nuclear power plant. As a result,
- I was particularly worried at Zimmer when I'saw that the trays were
- overloaded. s The questionable manual welds are at a key juncture..because they
,_~_ _ - _
hold all the weight of the cables that trave 1 from the top of the plant , down into the containment area where they switch to a horizontal direction and spread the weight out again. In the event of a weld failure at a juncture, the cables would fall and possibly have their insulation cut off due to the sharp edges where the tray breaks. At a minimum, there would be an electrical short. More likely, the result would b'e man-made lightning -- an impressive, but disastrous fireball. With the primary and two backup systems stacked on top of each other as at Brown's Terry, any short could shut down the electrical circuits for the entire plant. I discussed my concerns with my supervisor at Husky, who agreed to set up a training program for our welders. I wanted to be sure that P these key manual welds would be reliable for all .our future jobs. But the company permitted employees to take their qualifications tests as many times as needed until they passed once. For example, one employee
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took the test 60 times before he passed and was " certified" by Husky as qualified. The normal procedure when a man is having trouble passing the test even once is to require additional trair.ing, practice and experience before attempting the test again. Husky ignored this prac-tical approach. I refused to quietly accept my conany's compromises in the certi-fication process. As a result, I was discharged from my position. On August 2. I had told a fellow employee that I was preparing to submit my concerns to the NRC. On August 4, I was discharged withcut warning after 5 1/2 years service. Although my record was unblemished and I had
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received steady raises the personnel director gave me 15 minutes to clean out my desk and leave. On August 18, 1978, I disclosed my criticisms in a letter to NRC Chairman Anders. (Attached as Exhibit 1). 1.ater, at NRC hearings in the sumer of 1979, I submitted an' affidavit describing the problem. (Attached as Exhibit 2). Significantly, similar criticisms to my own , e had been voiced as early as October 30, 1974 by Mr. 1.ee Spievack, President of Technichron, Inc. School of Welding. (Attached as Exhibit 3). Husky had requested Mr. Spievack's opinion as how to improve our persoanel qualifications. I have attached an overall chronological sumary of events as Exhibit 4). My allegations were also supported in a 1979 affidavit offered by Mr. Donald Blanch, an electrician at Zimmer. (Attached as Exhibit 5). Mr. Blanch later told local attorney Tawn . Fichter that CC&E threatened to blacklist him if he spoke out. As a - result, he stopped critizing the utility and publicly " changed his mind". In the early fall of 1978, NRC inspectors came to investigate my charges. Eventually, the Comission found several faulty welds in the I cable trays. The NRC report is attached as Exhibit 6. Unfortunately, the inspectors missed the point of my charges. Incredibly they looked , at the machine-made resistance velds on thQo,rizontal trays. These welds are not significant,_ because they carry very little weight. Their basic function is to keep the tray f rom spreading. My disclosure had euestioned the manual welds on the vertical trays, critical I
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f f because they support all the weight of the cables traveling downward through the plan. In other words, the inspectors found flaws in the insignificant welds but ignored the welds that art essential for safety 6 concerns. Second, the inspectors only looked at a few of the horizontal trays. Since they found faults in those limited instances, it only made sense to check the rest of the system for similar flaws. Trankly, I was at a loss to understand how the inspectors could make such fundamental mistakes. Later at the 1979 hearings, I leared a that the two NRC employees who conducted the investigation were almost - untrained themselves. Each man's experience was limited to two rela- ~ tively brief welding background seminars. The two seminars,com,bined l involved about ten days of general information on welding. The seminars did not train participants in how to inspect velding. I understood a better how the NRC had inspected the wrong welds when I realised that ; f the Consission had assigned two " green rookies", in ef fect toinvestigate'! - sy charges. Unfortunately the result is that the faulty manual welds on .i the vertical trays remain in place today, le'aving the plant vulnerable. The NRC report did not go into detail on the dangerously overfilled trays. But after an August 1979 Commission hearing, CC&E hired Husky to construct four inch side extensions to the six inch trays. The utility then could claim that instead of six inch trays loaded 100Z, there were ten inch trays loaded 60%. In fact, this cosmetic solution does nothing to correct the basic
!.41 problem. The patchwork ten inch tray simply is not equivalent to a j legitimate ten inch tray. A ten inch tray has considerably thicker *
[l' metal than the six inch version. The thickness has to be greater to
. )'e bgy support the added load. The " repair" at Zimmer only made the trays q\ P j .e talker. They remain too thin to support the weight of the cable load 3 g . I~ ,
for a ten inch tray. The significance is that the metal is inadequate j*,
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to safely absorb all the heat from the load in a ten inch tray. / *- The retaliation against roe did not end when I was fired. Since 1 began to speak nut 21/2 years ago, I suspect that my telephone has been tapped. Repeatedly, my wife and I heard clicks. Our mail began routinely to arrive late, scaled with scotch tape that the senders hadn't affixed. Some of my mail was diverted mysteriously and held at a post office boa. CC&EpeNonallysmearedmepubliclyasalaid-
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of f, disgruntled "nillwright", or janitor.
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l But I refuse to be intimidated into ignoring the obvious. I know l I that these dangerous shortcuts can be corrected. Since my di'smissal, I have done consulting work with about half a dozen firms that supply material for nuclear plants. Unlike Husky, every company produced e excellent velded parts under sound quality control systems. Similarly,
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I know the NRC could do better. At the Clinton Plant in Illinois, l-V
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_ ,e , the Comission refused to allow Husky cable trays in the containment - area, even though the trays at Clinton had a lower proportion of manual 1 / M * j' welds than at Zimer. I remain completely willing to speak with the f 4js
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new NRC investigators who are supposed to pursue Mr. Tom Apphgate's ~ _ charges about Zimer. This time I hope they do their job. N b JY . EDWIN P. HOFSTADTER f Sworn to and subscribed in my presence this 'd. '-s day of1 6 ......- , 4 ~ 1981.
- b. . Ah- r c . .F KARIN D. NORTHCUTT
, Notary PvWc. $ tate of Ohio My temaJaic.n Egkcs Jan. 22. 1945 4
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(~ (~ AFFIDAVIT . OF . THOMAS DEAN MARTIN STATE OF 011I0 )
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COUNTY OF CLERMONT) l' I, Thomas Dean Martin, residing at , ,
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\ ' age 28, hereby state that from May 1978 to September 1978~I worked for Reactor Control Inc. as a Millwright, _
inspecting control rods on,the site of the Zimmer nuclear Power station at oscow; Ohio and that I am a member of. Local 1454 of the Brotherhood of M111 wrights and' Joiners and have barn employed as a Mi11 wright for six years and that I have ' - - Parson 51 knowledge as to the facts hereinafter related. My crew, consisting of 3 journeynan millwrights and a general foreman found that approximately 75% of the reacto'r control' rod
- blades exceeded the .280 ",(neo hundred and eighty thousandths of an inch) gauge specification. Because of this fact. we recrated
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these, defective rods to send them,back to the manufacturer, General Electric Company. Ilowever, af ter recrating the rods, my supervisor
' at* Reactor Control, Inc. ,Milliam Fowee, instructed us to put a
. clamp on the rods and reinspect them. We followed these inst. .ctions, i
l I and while the clamps were on the rods they met the .280" specification. After taking the clamp off, however, each rod returned to its original size. which did not meet the .200" specification. A number of the roda which I inspected measured .300" or more when the clamps had been removed. The control rods are made of thin gauge metal, with O e 7 < l l . e I
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numerous holes. When I expressed my concern about the defective control rods, Bud Crane, a supervisor at R.C.I. told me that when the control rods were put in the reactor vessel, clamping would not be necessary b'ecause water pressure would hold the rods to the proper specification. I asked him to explain how this would
, be possible when there were so many holes in the rods. I thought that the water would circulate both inside and outside of the rods, thus equalizing the water pressure, and not allowing the water pressure to push in the sides of the, rods. No one could give me -
an answer. i This was not the only problem which I encountered at t'he Zimmer f' *- * '
', site. We had inspected approximately half of the reactor control .. ..
rods before R.C.I. provided us with a rough surface gauge for in-apecti.ng the seals on the ends of the, control rods.Therefore, half cf the control rod seals were not inspected at all for roughness. ' , The gauge with which we inspected the remaining control. rod seals wxs made of metal with different degrees of roughnes's; I compared
- the roughness of the gauge with the roughness of the sealsj _ .
surfaces. Of the seals we inspected I.did not find any as smooth .. as the specifications called for. When I asked an R.C.I. inspector , about the discrepancy between the seals and the gauge, he asked me if I had a calibrated finger. I asked him,"If I'm just supposed to look at the seal instead of comparing it with the gauge, why hadn't they just given me a picture of tha seal, instead of the rough surface gauge. I got no answer. I then informed Scott Swain, a !
~ 8 C.C.4 E. engineer on the project about thc defective control rods and NP .
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scals. The next day my general foreman, William Fowee,got our crew together and told us, "Be quiet about the problems at the, plant." Within a week my entire crew with the exception of the general foreman was laid off, although our work was not complete, and there hsd been no complaints as to the quality of the crew's work. Afterwards, a new crew was hired to complete our. job. - .
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' f.s L 'L day of (./ r, Sworn to*and subscribed before mas this J2 Ji , 1979.
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Notary u.'.s M olic L... t~*# z.* SHIRLEY FAHRNBACM N ..y P btic. C'e-.at Te.at,. OM. M, Commi..:.. Empi,.e.Osi. 15,1979 t
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AFFIDAVIT OF - CORMAN L. REYNOLDS . STATE OF OHIO )
) SS
. COUNTY OF CLERMONT ) -
I, Gorman L. Reyaolds, aged 29, residing at} '
'hereby state that I am a ember of Millwright Local 1454: that I have been a journeyman Millwright for six years
,.t h at, I' worked, fer, Reactor, Co,ntrol Inc,. 'as M111 wright general foreman at .,
ths'Zimmernuclearpowerstation, Moscow,OhiofromOctober,k978to , , Fabruary, 1979: and that I have personal kdowledge'of the facts , hsreinaf;ter related . While working for Reactor Control Inc.(R.C.I.), my crew was required ' to clean metal shavings from control rod blades. These shavipgs were left by the manufacturer. We first took old cloths wrapped with a . hatvy gray tape and beat the sides of the blades to remove these shavings.
. Wa then ran a magnet along them followed by a machine shop vaccum cleaner ~
and finally wiped then down with an ' acetone solution. Quality control ' inspectors employed by R.C.I. then ran a spot check on the blade con-formity with a "go-no go gauge". Only abauf one third of the blades wero checked. . In February, R.C.I. required my crew to do grinding on all the centrol rods (at the bottom of the blades) to remove an oyer-sized weld. Sm211 metal fragments from the grinding went into the control rod blades f by way of small holes running the length of them. When I informed R.C.I.
. sngineers of this I was told that these fragments could clog the rods and to wipe them down with an acetone solution. I then told my super- '
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_r . . s e visers that wiping with acetone alone did not get the shavings out. (The proper procedure for removing shavings was the procedure we initially ursd to remove those left by the manufacturer.) They' inspected the rods end passed them anyway. , When we first started the cleaning after grinding H. I. Crane, project manager for R.C.I., told me the job would last two weeks it lasted two days. We were rushed through this job and it is to my knowledge that metal shavings still remain in the control rod blades. I s'tw them reported them and R.C.I. passed inspection on them anyway.
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-Gbrman L.'Rpfnolds The* foregoing affidavit was sworn to and subscribed before me by Gorman L. Reynolds this j/ day of M #a , 1979 '
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r r . s. . 4 . AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT ANDERSON STATE OF OHIO )~ ,
) ss COUNTY OF CLERMONT )
I I, Robert Anderson, aged 35, residing at, m, -
.' hereby state that I have been
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a journeyman Ironworker ('d.I.W.) for 10 (ten) years; that I am a member of Iron Workers Local 44; that I worked at the site of .the ::immer nuclear power station at Moscow, Ohio l for.approximately 2 years; ,that, I worked for t,he R. V. ,Ha[dy Co. as ,an ironworker installing and pressbre checking watertight doors and door' frames at the Zimmer site for the months of
,, February and March, 1978; and that I have personal knowledge of the facts hereinafter relatedt I hereby state that after installing 12 to 15 door frames and doors I personally pressure tested 10 of tlie' doors which' -
I installed at 20 p.s.i.. While none of the doors or door frames leaked, all 10 (ten) of the door units leaked between the concrete and'the steel angle which was imbedddd into the-concrete so,that,the door frame could be, hung. Therefore, none of these units would hold the test pressure of 20 p.s.i.. Five of the leaking units were located in the pump house at the plant, and the remaininiy five units were located
- in the reactor building beneath the reactor core.
l '/ ROBERT ANDERSON
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2. The foregoing affidavit was sworn to and subscribed before me by Robert Anderson this .f.2 day of g a,.y , 1979.
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*O' Daniel c oncluded that piant ~
should not be licensod, said his supervisor agreed. 25 January 1981 - Zi=mer Suppression Pool Problems. , e As reist. ed by Donald O' Daniel, Zima r boilerpaker(6 yr Navy - man, some nuct ear experience), to Dr.tankhauser. (4/17/80). GE Mark II, new untested design, Zimmer is lied plant. NRC and Mark II owners group have icngstanding dif ferneces g{ff- on adequaicy of Mark II design, per ticularly as related M t(d w iff to "dyacmic loads". SRSS vs AES method to cc=pute loads fMlAC. . Design changes
- in lining of suppression pool' (SP) vere ordered, orig nal plate beins about 3" thich, new plate being 2 - 3 " thick. Backing for plate is 4 ft thick oncrete wall, with reinforcing steel bar. 3trength and integ .
, rety of vail important to sqftey pf plant.
Extensive remodeling resulted, cutting out old piste, drilling holes in concrete to grout in studs, bolting i . new heavy plate up, welding in, using fille r plate long edges. Reinforcing pool bottom and strategic spots on vall. quilt like result. '" list problems drill pilot holes to insure no"rebar" accord-ing to blueprints. Kept hitting rebar, stop, drill lut/#ts:f in new location, hit rebaf again, several times. CG?.:E
///!ccupg( finally said to dril in original hole, go through .
rebar. Such holes vere 3-4" in dirmeter. The c ctn-g bination of pilot holes cnd stud holes through rebar . gGr,f calf produced honey-combed concrete wall, possibly com-4 promising integrity of containment. Total of shratal hund. holes M g/.fH d21 lied. Problecs tith welding of new stainless amour plate: Oc cr.ssional switching tetween valding rods 308 e.nd 309 (for use on inside vs outside of plate. Tools used on concrete used also on plate, contsinating piste, veakening welds. Contaa inction of SP floor due to heavy wrecking and c ons tructin. Tremendous heat build up due to welding - new heavy piste in piece. Filler plate up to 6' long used. Velding heat build-up caused crahking r.nd deterioration of underlying concreto, as shown in X-rays of velds. buty "Stop-work-orders" vent up oli F.3w plates, yellow, - white and red,accordin6 to severity of defects. Ecason for order written on labels: " concrete cracking behind plate." Tct al of about 130 new plates vere afed. - *'/I o Cns plete was cut out for inspection, high up on the vallk*!h[h }N
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of the UP. The 4 ' x 6 ' section fell out and to tha floor hcving pulled off the concrete wall a large piece of cencrete up to 4t inches thick. A clear demonstration of the deterioration in the concrete centain=ent structure. Attributed to intense heet from velding. Shortly af ter fall, NRC inspector toured SP. Vorkers hcstily piled air hoses, equipment on top of fallen section, chiseled edges of hole s: sooth to ampear as though the hole had been made purposefully. Inspector did not even notice. Visual inseection of SP liner currently shows bcuing of wall, indicit ing th2. the liner hLa pulled away from supporting wall. , F
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20 h;uills /g e.
* .h Floren:o, X:ntucky /,10/.2 f- V&*?
- 4 higust 18, 1973 M:-l gGDy\*5l*g7-
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. y Euclear Regulatory Co-ission * 'y Vashington, D. C. 20555 y .
J.ttentios: Id. W1.111a= 1. haers, Chair =sn ,.
Dear it. hiers:
v I a*a vriting this as a formarj:ployee of Rashy ?reducts Inc. of Florence, Kentucky to re;nrt c:riouS ama deliherato non-con.fo.rane: to 10 C ?. 50 Euclear R:7&:sents and Engineering Syselfications based on ths above requirenents. To maks it cvan verso they seri eut cotarized Certificates of Complia::s with th: fall k::uledy they a o falsa.
- i In Mxy of this year I ha? o::asion to visit th2 Zinza:r P.:: lear Csntainment area and to see ths various control areas and in particular to se: Eiskf E
cable trays 12 position anel =227 filled with th: cables.
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Since this ri=it I have been disturbed by two asp =:ts of Fas*#: non-co: for=ar:o, particulzzly as thsy rolets to the safa operation of.this plant after completica of construction. The== tua inport:nt espects are as fo11cus: .
- 1. Use of inferior and vask caterial co pletely cut of syneifications.
- 2. Trays veldea by incorpstest voldors with ev:ry type veld defect present in every tray.as=o:bly. ,
The fo11 cuing illustrates these two asp :t in more detail. They are e' relat:5 to tha Zi:r23r job spscifically which was ths original job with the 10 CE 50 rer;& ens =ts. On this job flagrant ani =erio3: non-conform-anee o::arred and with this as a patt:ra it has c: curred op all subsequent jcbs. . MCGIAL: 1.11 tray is design-d with n Iced capacity wh'ch include a cafety factor. The tensile S ongth of th: side rails largely deteraine#o t'.is capacity. Ca th2 Zi.r:er job th *-- M e strength cf the side rail = steri 1 vas to be in excess of 35,003 pcurds. Ez:hy received and testeJ rut,ri=1 as 1 v as
$8,00") pou:b and a considsrable snount in the r: p of 20 to 23,000 pous!s.
Saas ves rej.-eted, acne necepted on the basis it vsaid be t :d for fittings where strength is =ot na critical. , g
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. l' Page 2. l l In3tead the material was not kept separate and thus nany very weak ida rails voro nads up into 1o32 straight asse=blies. After finding out that cex2on c.111 stesi varied =* videly in t:nsile strength no nora testing I, I'
was done so that they could remain " unaware" of this condition. Incidentany ; seas testing of T-6 aluminum was also perforned aid a vids range of tensile ! strength vas' also found. This was also ignored as above. What this adds upts ; is that 6:ky has bunt tray that win not carry the rated load even with l cafety facte included. * . j W,DTUC: The Zinmsr job was the first job requiring the use of Certified velders in crder to in:ure gead volds. Esky centra:tsi vith Glaistene Laboratories of Cincinnati to set up a velder cortification prog aa. They did this a.nd then tested au ths volders. Without ex:sption they fs' lei the tests ni erably. Dsky then called in various velding hginsars and W. Spiovr.ch of Tech-nicron Scheel of Welding in Cincinnati who subsittei a written report of fi::iing:. A copy of his report is :ttachel. In general all ths veld Engineers concurred with &. Spievack.Ss repert. Ft. Spievack was ashed if he could er vould train ths veldes. E refused, stating that it is very difficult, ' if not nearly inpsssible to untrain pesple first, then t:7 to retrain, . than it is to start fresh with a person having no prior velding knowledge or crperience. Esl;r then proceeded to verk on their own in cra:h prog ase in which the veldors finally vsided one piece which unnld pass a bend t:st. This velder then became " Certified" by L:ky. Dvever., what is critically inportant i: that nothir. securred to th: quality of the production volds! In fact ' it renains to dats in the sane ::s state es W. Spievachts findings dated Octob:r 33,1974. Just a few voeks ago ons veldor was "teste3" over 60 times befors hs finally nade a test piece which ves only na gir. ally acceptable. New he is a Esky "Certifisa" veldor! Starting in July and continuing this sonth a new typs of ner.-confo =ance - 1: presently in process on the Clinton job. Fittings are b:ing .u.ig spot velded contrary to specific Engineering requirensnts. In addition Aluninum 3rcnzo filler red is being used with ntil knwleags that aluminus is not pernitted in the contaicannt area. hen vers, the psition of the spot is in much a n2nnor the veld is less than 35% effective! Substantiation of all those chars:s can be accomplished thru er.z.sination of Sshy docu2snts in relation to Eterial and to th: Welders 'c7 the record =, visual exaaination of ths volds and by r: testing the so called " Certified" veldors by a co ptent Veldi=g Engineer. Visual in:psetion of the Clinten fittings vill substantiate tbs charges cutliced.. l
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. \ l 1 Page23. What distur!.s =s even more than ths actual incidents describe.1 is the fact se many top =2cassment p:ople see nathir.: vrong in all these a:tions, S littln real concern is sheva to producing a truly quality product within the specifiestions. This should beco. es even mare partica.tlarly so when nuclear safety is directly imalved. Yours truly fehnN EN f WwM Iduin P.1.bfutedtcr Distribution as follows: Enginsering Cospanies that nay or =my not bs concer= 4. rosses United Egineers and Con.structor: , Bechtel Corp, Brown & Rsat I
-EE29d==d % % l Sergent & Lundy Stone & Vebster Black & Ventch -
This Nay nst b complete, hovover to the best of :q knowledge it is. . 1 Gover:sent 1;sn:les: l . Nuclear Regulatory Coraission Congressional Joint .itenic herEy Csuittee Privats Group: ! i Public Interest P. s2..ch Group I O I
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WillT .2 . 1, Fd sli . Io '.;ta.1 of ill! , H or. nen, <<: . , II . '. .1 :ri e 11o.s ng c .ts n.:1 a :tions ' sav n . 11 coms .s,;o of and uh! th e1.. is t.: t f t.o . of 20 , et
, U 2 7.1 en rr r.uclear .il int.
- u ty of I schr.ro n i, I et i ,
' y ars or n;n uith ovi - yer. s 'vp clor. n 1 1 '! iafac .ur n;
- In: rin; in -sanv ire 2.i e * $1 i afact irin;. l'or ov< - t of !.5r ac y.:ar., I u ..s 4 i var.ca c:favdc.ry lovcis r:<l 1 o ' th yeara I uso at *fai.e.a.. le i 1.
. ," i/; ever 11 yes s st Ba :.li:t uhar.' uo built Aircr f W 1 Cantrol ! at;.2, tral: liv; 1 .hjr.otion t3 p s, 4 Irrille l'aspa ind Sarvd-Peyot.on . 1 opa.t. ovo: 1 ye..ra at I. .r.'.::
hvd uhore wa !. :11t. iles.sa Pliubin: FittinJa 2nd Di sos rs.
":r.li:t and A:. rl :nn Sta :l ard I trocked vnry closely with ' co l tualit contr.1 prop: .
? I.eth vorhed from tha to,) d .in, rNery c aplo. .:e positti 0.y kne.s t1a t, t'. c. ; py : i,:
J'.01.*; to leavc the plant that uas not ri 7,ht in every r. >ac t, ii. L;..iic ir.c.:.!!. ; ite . i it.' olved. At tu rican Stan1 v.1 custosar eatiof: cti m to invo) el. '.: t. 'My all of their .nnlit r es.itrol offort' uns r vel ut riav dr.:.:. tie ; or, prov ::s t.'. t
.- c: 03 convinne our custo . ra un.1 thrt.r Eigin-2crr th at u ha.1 c . d..c l o1 ct. r .~cd ict
.ciU,y. In practica Husky ti ny ec;pli. .1 if it didn 't coat cny t.513 r,.it.h. i...c. . n <2 7.
'- .1 ni objectivo fro a the to.i ta to 113 any qn tlity inte our n :iuat . O r o.1j c.h t:2 . .c.
r . to hi.lld tha ps.Juet at thr' lo. cat p03cibic cost. .
. " a$ tion at Ihs! . for 5', years uas shnager o:' Ie in .ri ti it.n .in .ori . E v:s re:: m e:.11 c- !?.rufe.cturinr: k th Ja an3 1 ai or Stan3mlo, 's oo? in und :auip.s tat, tre' ulia. c. Leci. ren zi.3 p.eenecraant on . hint 2 nance of. a2w. -
' .1 Z3..;-cr job was 'laoh's first nuclear. Job anJ the 12.:ini. :.n ; ot' tha p5yr.tes i tality
. .';rcl pro.:rcm tut for all p ac t,tcal purp:'.:ce c :fot.'d o ily on p:.pa . U..a of ch t c'.Sc.vnta on.t,hc /.1n .cr jcb raa that hts uoldin ; un s to ba in coat's vms .::o t: S .eticri .'
.~ 'd.3 .U'!:s voldin: ranite A usin; certifica nellors.
I -33 f.rraa' c nent s t o hav e the uoldara t:sted by riad 't.orn I.sbontor as I.n cr. .'r to
/ :17. t!:2 cectir; :s s ,iona.1Ner. uc1!ar failed his to: 3 id::crabl . .: :n 90 ox si. d
* : rhr.ons for tt to:r failurca tro fo :n3 that nona ( f c r troldora 123 ver h J ny tz . tit.-
D 7 in th9 crea o; " 3:ality" ualdin;. '21:ey only kns u 5 s is p:s luca a cre. octi n up . t.!' t:011 in hir.h m 2ntity. ;bahy hau i n Inecutivo Fi ort i in3 ti u rc Jol a th u. l '. c., t.^1 in a ohr,rter t.iv, t.he core con: y thay u Wo. " he ec il probic 2 lu tha tha.c T..-t' elloile:h fa:: ion ind htve nny ot.har typ;:a of vol d. ;'cc ta.1.'. l'a ch t.1 e'.c 0: sio:: 12 . * . 7 *f . ; r$.h.
$y *. tic point, Ibni v ha l a certous probic a. They had t ia Zi:re order cal .inJ or .Tr:ll: e '
." <3 c.de bi cer ti".'.c ! uci fora. 4 :Ly di3 nob h2v.: cv. ona t elder t at e c. eld W e n ir f.Ity vold uuch Ic: a p.io: tha cort ification teret. In ..eder t o co.sp1 th vel or. 'r:45
- a. c.c to ha ret.rair ed an ! ;.'r:n ret cated an.1 tha uoll prt iso i .salf e" n'e. , th
- st .1.:cJ s e.Id travo to bc :ideer.1 cc tno t.,1 din; voall requiro re. re ti v. "ani, usull b.:0;. very
. t;;rsive, but it .sould be t.ha ri :ht uny.
l l ". .I~/ d': cided to 12rtin11y cr ich" train tha veldars cr. nocle l to pa7 : th.' cc- tif:'.cativ h A in sc 23 .:nnn 3. , bat t i cot tinu:. arith 'ths pr.>decti n uel t na IJ. I'. e th s 7.rs./05 l ::;v<! O y di fica];.. 'D.s en
- re ttit, uaa tha entivii Ziec- r jcb uc3 ue *cd "ith .213..'J
- ttf.3 to pa tho :cra ifica ton to.ito, hon inare 1crort it, t .a p.c ! tis ur 3 te RO
.. ni chan;c . Th en rean t. L :in ; that n111 Zirnor tre la t:r e .. ..I v t- ::r 5fiel -
U.'t.C r; orin the old : redt: :io i veld p:.:ars::. heso us la ci or 1. . y tit., l reir.o! ally 1 i tre t t 12-.: f roion, ubich is ;'s koy s.3 c t. n;r . .. :1 ; t:213. i
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'!Mn ;-61, h i .nce been o,po nde in , bat CCE has Scotly ove loaded th'sa esble tr ys 1,y f r.s ..alli : : reci . cid ro .hst . hey enn enrry rere esbles. I' nidition t,e trryn cr' r'.;-h I cre on top f the .sther 3 hl i.5. Ono trny entries th' nain control esbles, t'n c',h r 2 2,rr.i the es!'les i or th. back ip n3::temi. On the. Vertical Tittin's of the cable .roys
! r : . :si of . heir co: itruet'on, .he t aldo enrry the' cntiro weight of all of the enalca.
L.:no .tro t .e i. elds '. hat are vc y likoly to fail someday.
'ftar The E out 3 Tc. O- fi 3 wh?) e a simiinr 3 tier cyste, van in us , a relativel . ocall iN 0 oroy,1 11 ci ntrol of the plant. The 130 adviced CGE to avoid this possibility, 1 i'. CO *. di re; arde this sdvic'.
.'P, n; th! i Ir.Le d to thi IT.C 'ns ordered CG."E to cod fire protection to the Je t nys.
CW' p'.nr.s i,o use a 11'.hsock & l'ilco:t prodiret (k .2ucol) to accomplish this. Tha !3 ' _-cr-.'.a t a . cst th r. F.'bcock & 'lilco:c vido in an inprovinci setup using catural ;as for t* ? Cl--c. ny trat noite by the mennfai turer of his cvn pro:1uct under his par,'nt 'rs (;ca "at en ry each velidaty. Yet the 11C accepted it! This came msterial failed in 1.? 2 riter 1.-boraD3 ries tec:t which v e a fully legitin2t2 test using keronano a 3 the i t-- V lo m crit 1. I t this t st, I cro .e, "the hec ~ool burnt like the wick of g 1.~ ro cro 2 . ,. Ir.31 ent ally he !iiiC aid .tnil Laboratories of I'cw 'foxico to dr. vise the p2ra_etors
? r.1 tr bye ~fL onduet it.11 tbalia sab1' !
*it re in on- se siblo colutian to all af this.
1.1~ o tb 1 res it 3 tier ny' ten to ca: ry the enbles for backup oyste s nu nber 2. Pullin ; - cut the r <tts cabica whic i v1 L1 cre .tly reduco the load. -
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- nr.v vi'er and d op r tray syste.ns travoling ec,pletely different and orpre.t-1c ';?c f) om any ..ther. Th'.s i suld g ently nimp1.ify the fire protection probla, ned tbs oc] h voi ld bo. a equate for i iis gr st1.y red seed load. This would be expansive, but us h .- 7 to sk this question. p_ I 'IT' A 'ITilD i.'OT 'm?
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- heport of the I inding:. at l'osky Prodo. t Incorp iated ca Detoben 3t. 2*G4 .
Submit'ted by: Lee Spi.vack, Prruident. Ttchnichton Inc., school of Uciding It ves ninctally f.sund that the reason your company has bad difficulty in certif ying yuc veli! orc is d.ic to che inct that while sonc of your rien are c;Jali!!cd wc]ders, they suf f er f rom the 1110 of an employee . that is ef f ering an inc ntive p.cgr.na. In order for an c aployee of yout cecipany to meet his s eguir s d prod'uct ion level, ' plus ben efit by the in entive program it was found t hat the ir w 1 ding nachine- were set at ina iut:uin output allowabic, which !c just below tl.c
' point of blewing holcr. .n t he p.trent netal. Thin condit ion crt ites irr.t or .r v.-) ding rect hado, end int. Lead of cntablishing good i.elding, ycu have a situstii n of blan' ing .hc r.ict al together. These exts er. amperage set t tr.gs also real e it occc .aars to use t.igher gas flow in ordt r to control the
,,.' arc. Tl.ic 1:an to be c..t t er ely costly te your covrary.
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Lec.uce f the conditin c.s t hat .tx i r.t (velding machine :ctl ini s and gas iJows) 7: was obscr .d that im;iroper weld'nn,in a co u .n occurance at !!ush) Priducts. Th.: weids are not structurally sound. Alwninue Welding:
. ~
All the'scids have crat.rs and it was obt erved that twst of t hr.se
- craters she, the coir. mon conditian known as " crater cr..cking". It was further obse.ved that i hcr.. ver niny welds that had both cracking con.litions i i the wcld as well as t he crater. 'lhese condi tion:: are pri:nsrily ca ised by the extremely high amperones und gas c..sverage.
Your weldor:. are runn8ng extretaely hot ucids due to rpe.-d and thun *
. you have rap d coalin, conditions and cracking. The high gas flows (while cost 1,-) also causet rapid cooling and thus crackin:,. ,
Generally it 'was obset s.:d tl.st the weldors in your aluminum we.tdir.g arcas had go d weldin; ti.!nsigues however 1sek knowledge in setting up the prop. c wc! ding cond'tions before welding,. S
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These men lurked the * .ill eing knowledge: .
. 1. 5.*tting the elding suchtne -
- 2. Setting the topet gas flow
. 3. 11 111n;, the nnsten rather then
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pointinc,it ,
- ontt olling the. t eld to prevent es at cru 4.
- 5. :lt anin:: t h. pat. ut inctal before wcldjng .
. St .*1 tec1.11on: .
To.r nta tcre obsetved $i. the rit() welding arcos. One raan 'i ..I the ' F
- h i. wied. c of ptopes :n.ichi .e anc gas f 2ow settings heuever b. l at.ked L1 vel ling i e.l.n tipi. : . his i i:. uns one of your ti] dent weldot s. -
Th oth r thtte n.cn had s t y 3 t : lc knowled),e about ptoper not* ! igs an l one of the three lael d th proper uciding techniepict , t h i u sa.ea t s. : yoter nld st cigle ee .n your welding department. Ag ..in it w..
- dig i.it edt t h.a ; .11 condit i :ns e d at t d to turn out :n.u;ina... pr a . : 1. .. .
At long as*+.u have tbret cunditionr. you will iind thnt a;e L !' , i e.g we l.los at 1? noin;- to be t xt t emely :i t f .cul t. When ob etving com /.il i.! ti e t c .. compons run by yout welds s it was found that t.h i f o 11o 4 p g.6.v:..!!t ir a.:
.ctisted:
- 1. Cryst alli:: :; ions of tl.c weld -
- 2. l' ore :l ty
- 3. 1 enet t a tis.: that ex:ecded 100%
- .. 4. Undsrcut i
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. 5. Ucahin3. ut .atent ructal in the best , ,
. eficcLed z.ic All the cond' tons are c' r.it cJ dis eetly by runnf un too high of n:n; er. r.en,
,- too bich of : :n flow s, a .i dirty incial.
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e, Oct.cocr %o, 1W8 c ESKT-nQUncu OE EmTS ( l f)Gfgff7 ' All dates approximste, exoept termination and meeting with C. Damean. November 1977 - R. Wilson, &chy President, dici after a long drawn out but
, relentless bout with oaneer.
Jan. 5,1978 -D. Ring nov Enhy presidaat in talk to all orgleyees naneunced his intestion to talk to eamh esployee percesally for all the cutual benefita yessible fren such a talk. Note. In respense to Mr. Ring's pruine to talk to everyone I prepared dans suggestions to review with hin. I aloe ge.thored oc:te of the backup data on koky's weak QO ytegram and la prticular the velding fnroe. This is h:u I
~ had ccze backup material I sculd tahs with as when I was left go with about 10 minutes meties.
, Feb. 15, 1978 -. I. E. group temporarily ac:ved freu N. Wcag to F. Danta.
&reh 15, 1978 -. T:cycrary trasfer et I. 3. ando pr=ar.ont.
April 1,1978 - F. Danta etaited daily r.stning assetig with R. Fratt, DL, Dietrich and mycoif. b stated resscas fer sam being.
- 1. Se that ks vould 1 sow coopo of our work anA vsuld acquiro better unforstema of it.
- 2. Hs said, ari is up in years ant will net be with us lens ana we all nood te kasv as nuoh as psosiblo what we enn learn from Ed."
After this first meeting end to clarify rencon 2 above, I ached Ph6 about it. Es s' aid 15. Rins wants a young aggrescire team and that hs (P. Pata) had to give Ib. Ring a ticotablo plan when ha eculd mansgo the I. E. activity. Mc4 told ne ho veuld review this with ne later. b led as to believe it was fairly
, long rance and that I would renain in a censulting onpacity.
Msy 1,1978 - Acce=panied F. Banta sa trip ts Zin:or nuclear puet* ctatien. I saw maky cable trays completely filled with cables. (Trays usually are only
*, half to three feurths 11t11) Instead of a foeling of pride, I cculd think of enly 2 things. mahy cheated en these trays in 2 vays that can greatly affect thsir ea;acity to carry such a lead.
- 1. Uso of vaak, lov tensile natorial intented to be ucca for fittinga where stength La not critical. Thiu ratorial boeans uired with ths otraight materia 3, vbers strength is eritical, end sont eat this way.
. 2. Fittings made with bad welds when epesifioatiens salled for Prossare Vossel quality volds.
On our drive home I told this to F. Banta and told him in detail how and why the Laky veld situation was se . bad in se many ways. Hsy 15,1978 - F. Basta azzounsed new Weldcr Q.aalificatica Pra paa, which inoinded retssting of previously tested welders. To achna cy opinien and I said, ait loehs good en paper, but I doubt that it will be sanplsted.' 5: vaated to know why. I said everytime sessthing gets difficult, Zhsky tak .a the easy way out. En said this would not be the ease this time.
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, , Jane 15,1978 - Wold Testin; began. First two velders tested ht were eartified, failed thsir tost. Thio neant they 1 cat thsir certification. hn I reported this to F. Banta, he told as to hald u? en retuating other certified voldora. Inter,.be came back and told no to destroy the psporuark en these two failed tests. I told ,
him he would hnvo to doutroy this ppor ucrh hiccoif, I would not de it. I ha i addod ht "here we are on citothor certii'iontica fares." This really made F. Banta l angry.
- July 20, 1978 - In talkin,, with Alvin Lt y (tho' cutside velding instructor theky was unins) vhe van eettinuin3 teoting voz1 en the rensining necertified velders,
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he told ce L. French fM11y ps:cca his tect. I ached what be coant and hs said - that hs was tsoted ever 60 tican bafers hs pscsed. I lator inferned F. B:.nta of thic and ho saii thin 13 OK, tt.o can just neocod more prastice then some of the others. I told Fred this w:a ridienicus and again be beanas reany angry. . Aug.1,1978 - Shop etarted weldf.ng Clinten Fittin.3s dieror;arding spesial instructions. They unas a prohibited procono, utsntherised finer n:,terial ant iceorrect vald pacition. R. Pratt and nytelf got C. Danaan (Q,C Es:agor) out to got it otepp:d. Instead Ihnaan ocetasted F. Banta who ces en vecation and whs caid it va.s OC. I told Dancan sc:robedy should tell h MC abatt an this end get it strci;htonsa out. Aug. 4,1973 - Callos ts R. Parkers offien at 4:10 PM (Personnel }%ccer) e.nd told to gather ny stuff anG icavo in an start a tina as pessible. I was givou a chset thru Aug. 4 caly plus my vccation cheek. I ached if coverance alicuance was inoinded. Mr. Parher onid, "Us, va are calling this a inysff." I said, "than ycu 1 night can ce tach." Ta caid, "Ho, wo eclled it layoff so you can get une:gloy-ment benefito.*
, Aug.14,1970 - I caned C. Ihncan to sot up a lunahsen coeting. I told him ht for over 40 years I had alunya been Icyal to all of my superiors and to the ocnpanics I had usched fer. Au my previous expervisero and canpanico acted in a rosponoible cann:r so that thio le,yn1ty nevo:- wavered. I told his that prev-iously H. h g and n::sr F. Danta th.u their actions in Iraching me to de irapropsr l thinga against my bottor instinoto , h:d acu reached ths point vith the Clinten
. fittingo deoicion and as:t tbe "Inyoff" whers my Icyn1ty to than and Essky was -
eerplotoly torciinted. I told him I vas verhing on a lettor to the NRC with 3 principal anogations as fonount
- 1. Weld acrtificatien fiacco aid continual uso ef Zhnky quality velds in lieu of opecified Freasuro Veccol Qaality voldo. , ,
- 2. Material nirup probics on Zi=ner jcb.
- 3. Present non-cenplirut:o situation cn Clintoa job.
I ackod Dancan if ho ceuld think bf any other alternate notien. Ib thougt fer a long time and 1%m117 baid, arou had batter write the letter. " , Sept.1, or Sept. 8, - F. Dants caned ne nt' ha:2s and said, "Ht. Ring eants yzu in his effice at 3:30 PH tmlay." I aetod, "ht for?" F. Easta said, "11. Ring vants to diconos ycur lett::r to ths 130." I said,"I d:n't knot what there vould be for us to discuss at M.hls tics." F. Eanta than said, "If you don't ccze Mr. Ring is coing to turn this over ts 6 E2rn# LeCal Dep2rt: ent fer 1\tllest yescible legal acties against you. Ea v.mts to talk to you before doing this." I said,"I am met ec:mies" and hung up. .ticf) the bsuse and while I was gone W. Ring's secretary ealled. 34 vife answered and the ses/etary said, 7t. Ring vaats __ _ ,___ __E_:*.__ j __
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, , to talk with >P. rafets4ter. Nlr vite told her I van gene and this ended the conversation. .
Ootaber 25, 1978 - Pro's Aug. 4 to preecat ties all the rernmes and interviews I have had have produced no respuso whatacever at a ti::e vben eeepanies are nearly fightir.3 for peoplo vith my ke.ciegrourA. Ago is a fcoter in es:ss instances I an sure. Various Ency do ..rt= sat hendo vero very belittiing of zee in their nevsppor intervieva relativo ts the relence of the hTtC lotter. I knew this has had same affoot. Upn reflectien, I fool that I was neheduled fer esp. ration coestirs this year for eco, hat thio una cocolcrated by r:y ccustant griping and cotcylaiming of Iheky's pear voldins in particular. En thic reached a oli-de on the Clinton job, ths axe quichly foll. .
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\. N1 J ! sWlT ( EMoBIT 9'r OY 1yYP.1.9 It!R:01 r~ '
I,11nald P.lanch, aged 40, residing at l
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----.s hereby stat < that. 3 am writing t hin .Iff i(1. vit .ci' a :st at e. ent of :: .r.0 obliq..t.iui, -
and that. I have firsuan1 lamic dge an to 1]c follo.eing: I have Is.s n a union einetrici.ui for over 20 yearn, aivl a m ah i of F.le t.r: . .si Wor):crn Ifnion incal 212, Cinc innati, f or said ]vricx1. I have cuy)1cte! a 4 ye u-oppn:nticenhip program given at Chio t}:chnnical innt it ut e (O'11) . I haw work't.<1 - at the Zir.ncr ihn:] car lher Station at. Tbscoe, Ohio for a;proxinntcly fi of the . lant 6 years in die follo.eing capacitics: I was th fo2Ennu of 5 cri.vn for robdiill '
. ricctrical .
Elcetric, which is the General /Cantractor of the 7.it.::rr Conntniet ion l'r > ject. In this capacity T was the forcrnn of the Conduit. Cnu, imd nir.iervir:. ri t he innta lat ion of conduit, seinmic hangars,'and cab]c trayn, inn well an the wouding of seinraic hangers. As foreman of cable polling Crevs I nujrrvined the pulling of p::scr, instruientation, and control cables thmughout the ! Jant. An foremin of 'Jt nuinat. ion creus I stpervised the tenttination of cablen. I airo wan the foremm }mt in chare.c - of training personal to voi-): on D.D.C. corrections, and taught te inination clasr.er, to e]cct.ricians at Zinner. ,
. I sci prent:nt3y ciploycal an General Foremm for U nt inqhoa v 1:let t ric (bus, a t. 11r: 7.iraa.r ni t rr. I h avi bc 1d t.hiin lonit. ion 1 $r t hs: p.v:t 9 tuin te:. 3n thin napar i t y I trn n :qnic:ibl toi tha i n::t a llat ien c.' a l l t u?iin. , cr n val or, runt i oin.
reactor it::<1 ju ge:, and call oliv r 1:. ".t i:i.ibsuu n rr .:. u nt n, ans) th g t er.t inIl of ::a:.r . In the.- co. art:e of mf t.ork at. tha ;.iiit.rr nit e 1 bar. th:cm 4 t hi follo.eing
- prchicmn tex 1/or parsil.le pmbimu "
- 1. As itnich an 801 of the cahlt- 1.rayn thtuu.;hout t 'e lil. cit. aiu overlmt!al b. yea.)
1:aticnal Eb:et rical (hl. riccificatienn of mime p i t ray. % r: t ra y:: att filial to ,$n r.:. ch a*: l'30t of t apsr-i t3' in stru c. .:en, thir: i n tuit in. t h. adli t it a of niti.-
. pintes io armtralate ilus exam. e-abit:n. the .1. lit i. i eif th. se :isi! plan
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1 1 e a r. . for co::rt ic el J. :t , an Ja n not. add t o t ho c.quei t , t t is t i.ip . :hi.; o.s rl a edini-will cau e inductanm (heat ) 1:Sich will can e bre.dal:t en of c.ibl - i!
- h. h s t.
gair:trate d it. of a suf ficient icycl. Mdit ionally, in :t nr:r nt rulla.i. ions and
.y.
firen are a direct por.nibility due to the ov. rio:nling. - t
- 2. W Spreader lecxr. ie. diri cL1v leicv tle cont rol In:c:t an1 c mt.iin . all rnisit cn in,i
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~ cable. . fo: the plant C.r:.2:i6 c.: . h ayr. In:1 condait.
Jn thir: 3 0 'i il e cable tray:t
,. - . 1.n , rp.rd~ So:n: neinmie h:rigorr. in ,1h !:pirader 1 bon are arn:cn. i.* .d,
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. - oS ch. . . 1 tyt a.N Q;v.yr.t'. r -) Sartlent. and 1. undy :.:> eificat ii :; in that the ' are
. . < . a/,:,.c overit uded. Original fireproofing rpecificat ion c annot. 13 - re t d.ie to the douislitr; of the original cable annunt., in the Spreades 1 tion an l throu ihout t he plant .
, ;3. Evero cabics reihrate a wall there 'in a " grid" penetrat in. which specificatic: n require b2 scaled for possibic fire and conta:ninant control . Po.. to exect.riva c.,bles, penetrating thene walln, tihe original rrecified r. cal. tnt cannot be innt alled thrt.tv;h-
" out C : ;. . . int. Tne ov.Eloading through the wall 1xuiet.rationn hg canned rabic:t t.o be cut in hal f at t h" ! = >i nt of t hr~ wall ia nc t ration. .:n1 :imi.1.iorly could h e.v -
catr:nl almo.y In t h" in .nlation on othar cablen in t he plant . .
- 4. Control devices arc in many instancen of very por slu'ility, anS scuet.ines uhreliabic. Ccaponents for jobs such as thin are no.e tiia n ordewd au nuch as 3 to 4 years ahead of innta11ation, fliny ur. of this dat c have leen dinmntinued for a ,
, {rcre r..L !.cz v;:n:;i nent. fl'or exanple, Ptwier I)r.r.ecrn at mr. rvirory 1ccationn, I.C.' niejnal Irwon,. which near.urc vibratim, eccvnt.ricity, an.1 th nini !>:aring wear of rear: tor fn d pitap:;; sdiich 1. ave n, inn' li vn i lrin i d on n.s ise.tallat icers to m)re rel al.le o anpu nt r.. . -
- 5. 'nu ur.c of radionignal wall.ie-t t.ltio, aa u ni1*.' r.G. 1:. will cause 3.c. les 5, ar.d.oth2r rairmaap hit ;h frc:3nency minitoi in.) a vic - t o c:ni t foine sitynin.
- 6. Tacre ir, a lack of coordination letwen 4 tw 1. . 2 ennr.reible for cicetrical t esting . ii plant.: l'ulti-kp, J .N.C. , C.C. A r.. .". inti irtum, an ) R st inghoune 1-:li ci ric. In many inntaneen circuitn pr. vin nly . :n1.h.n. ms:nt erion .ly b .wi-
dinecuuicet ed. As a renoit, 1 .ru unable tc) .i:::mi e t hat. the ci n eui t etni. lit ion :sitr i it. in checked will rinoin tR n. e . -
- 7. Within the lant. year I (2;r.crvul rr<liux1.uit er.n:loit n nttm: , ite::a11cx1 on the sanc r.cinmic hanger, in direct violat. ion of np.cifi:.itinae.. 3 do nat laces wli-[ther thin prebicm has been correr-t evi t o d.ito. A large pnMalen in thrit t h. ne are e n.ent.ir, cables, nmitorc<1 by Goality Control, and should h.c.u h:en yelici. t.igge:1 lefore ~ ,
cabic pulling was done. Such was not the cano. ,: .
. s
...i T n:n neit her pro por atit inucicar. I lelieve at. thin t im atennic lo.si r n:iy la the nnst feasibic nothcxl of generation. My only macern is that 1s opic of p)k "r authority an:3 with nore intelligence th5n 3 take the t.i x which l an not. been'danc '
in the past, te do a nore 'thoreog10issli'etion for t.'e r.afety c$f everyone conceri.5d.
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f lun.sid Dlanch Ibte D,r>rn to and subscriled in ny prenenec: thin 26t1 d ay of ilune, 1979.
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DEC0.- .G-DocketNo.5$-356
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Cincinnati Cas and Electric { - gj Company f, As ATTN: Mr. Earl A. Borge.nn
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Vice Pres. dent Engineerin;. . %,%,% ,.* 139 Last 4th Street 45201 Cincinnati, Ot: Genticcea: This ref ers to the investigation conducted by Messrs. J. E. Toster,
- 7. E. Vendel and h. M. Wescott of this office on Septecher 15-22 4..s .
26-29,176, ,f activities at the **i.m er Unit I censtructicn sin , st.1erited by 3RC Construction Permit U4.. CIPR-EE, and to the dis-cussion of our findings with you,*lessrs. B. K. Culver and W. E. Schwie:s and others of your staff at the conclusion of the investigatien. . This investigation concerned allegations of inadequate caterials and
- welding of ceble trays, pans and fittings supplied to the Zin er U .it 1 site. Tne enclosed copy of our investigation report identifies these areas l
examined during the investigation. Within these areas, the investiptier. consisted of a selective exer.ination of procedures and representative records, observations, witnessing of tests, and interviews wit".' persennel. During this investigation, one of your activities appeared to be in
. noncompliance with NRC requirements, as described in the enc 1:sei
. Appendix A.
This notice is sent to you pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.201 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2. Title 10 Code of Tederal Regulattens. Section 2.201 requires you to submit to this office within thirty days of your receipt of this notice a written statement or explanation in reply, ncluding for each item of noncompliance: (1) correctiv'e i action taken and the results achievedt (2) corrective actien to be taken to avoid further nencompliance; and (3) the date when full compliance vill be achieved. l , j v- *
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Electric Company g (; <- . l . In accordance with Section 2.790 of the URC's " Rules of
- Practice," Part 2. Title 10. Code of rederal Regulations, a j
. copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to j this letter vill be placed in the liRC'a* Public Docunent Room, except as follows. If the enclosures contain information that you or your contractors believe to be proprietary, you must apply in writing to this office, within t_venty days of your receipt of this letter, to withhold such informatior. .
frou public disclosure. The application must include a full ' statement of the reasons for which the information is con-sidered proprietary, and should be prepared so that proprietary l information identified in the application is contained in an 8 enclosure to the application. I We vill gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this
?
inspectior.. , Sincerely, i R. T. Heislanan, Chief Reactor Construction and 1.ngineerint, Support Branch E:,closurec: 1 1. Appendix A, Hotice 8, of Violatier.
- 2. IE Investigation Rpt l 1;o. 50-358/78-21
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. J. R. Schott, Plant Superintendent Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b l PD%
Local PDR
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TIC U. Yount,Part, Power Siting Cosanissiou orrics> .R.I.U
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0; . Appendix A , NOTICE OF VIOLATION .
. Cincinnati Cas and Docket No. 50-35i Electric Company Based on the results of a NRC investigation conducted on September 16-22.
and 28-29, 1976, it appears that ce rtain of your activities were nct - conducted in full compliance with NRC requirements as noted below. This .
- item is~a deficiency. ,
10 CFR 50 Appendix B. Criterion IX requires, in part', that " Measures
- shall be established to assure that special processes, including ve3 ding.... are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, end other special requirements."
Paragraph 17.1.9.2 of t!'e Qaality Assurance Program docunented in the ZPS-1 TSAR states, in part, "Special processes are accomplished and controlled by qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, . . . . Section IX of the ASMI Code states that changer in essential variables to the velding procedure specification require requalification of the procedure and welder. Section IX further lists shielding gas'and I filler material size as essential variables.
- 1. !!usky Products, Incorporated, Welding Procedure No. 2. QAP 107, dated October 18,197', Revision No. 01, specifies that veldin; grade carbon dioxide shielding gas and 0.035" diameter filler metal be used.
.. Contrary to the above, the inspector determined by review of
, records that two (2) of the essential variables had been changed.
For a period of approximately four (4) weeks in November and December 1974, the shielding gas mixture and the size of the filler material was changed without benefi: of requalificatien ef the procedure.
- 2. In addition, two velders had made several steel TIG veldments with neither a qualified welding procedure specification nor qualification of the velders.
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Report h0. 50-35b.76 .'1 Docket :;o. 50-358 . Licen n :; . CPPh 5'. (
'deensee: Cincinnati C.s and Electric Comp.ny u
139 Last 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 T.cility ::hme: k'm H. Ifecer Nuclear Power Plant Investigation At: Zinner site, Moscow, Caio and Hasiy Products, ;- .. Florence, Kentucky " Investir,. tion Conducted: September 18-22, and 28-29, 1976 ' i =*
,. ). .: < su -- w-Investig. tor: ,J. E. Tost ,,J.
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- l. 1. k*escott
- 3. viewed hy: n. .t. 34 ayes Chief -
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. Projects Section
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- elius(t- _ _ . i f */ P
' Assistant to the Director i
Investfretfon Sunnerv Investigations on September 16-22 and Septenber 28-29, 1976 (Rencrtj.'.2 50-356/7b-21)
- Areas Inspectedi Review of cable trays, pans and fittings located at the Zinsr.er site and at the Husky Products. Inc. plant;revirv of activities at the Husky Products, Inc. plant; and observation of testing activity at independent test labs. The investigations involved 143 inspector-hours by three 1;RC '
inspectors. j Results:' One item of noncompliance (a deficiency) was identified in ! the control of special processes (velding). Details. Section Ill. r
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. I NTROD1*CT ION The Zimmer Unit I nucle.ir power pl.nt. licensed to the Cincinnatl C.s and Elcetric Comp ny, is under const ruction near lioscow, OLi ..
Sargent and Lundy is the Architect-Engineering firm for the plant. which is being constructed by Kaiser Engineering. The facilft. will utilize a Boiling Water Reactor (LWT.) designed by General Electric Corp ny. The liusky Products Division (Husky) of the Burndy Corporation has supp1ted electrical cable pans for the Zimmer plant. These cable pans are utilized to route both s.fety-related and nonsafety-related electric.) cables. REASON FOR INVEST 1 CATION On August 31, 1975, a copy of a letter written by Indivicual /.", a f ormer liusty employee, was received at the NRC Regior 111 (Rill) office (Exnibit 1). This letter expressed concerns relative to the quality of electrical cable pans produced by Husky for use in the Zin=ct and Clinton nucle.r power plants, and alleged the use cf weak mutetials and inproper welding in table pan construction. A. .
.iRC investigation va.s initiated into these allegations.
543EnRY OT FACTS Individaul "A" was cont.cted by RIII personnel en feptember 6, 1975. and his concerns were discussed in general. These concerns related to the use of low strength m.terials and improper velding as contair... in the lettet attached es Exhibit 1. During Septenber 18-20. 1978. R1ll inspector visually inspected electrical cable pans at the Zinner site, and found the velding ei
,the pans to be acceptable. Site personnel agreed to have samples cf
*,the cable pan materials tested for material strength, and to have sections of cable pan destructively tested to determine the strength of the welds. Cable pans to be tested were then selected at rander (by *;RC and Utility representatives).
Cable tray samples selected were tensile tested, with the tests witnessed by an R111 inspector. All of the saeples tested were found to exceel the specified yield point (test results attached as T.xhibit Y). Destructive testing of welds was performed on a sample of the cable p.scs at the Zinner site, also witnessed by RIII personnel. These tests indicated that the welds were of acceptable strength and size according l to American Welding Society criteria.
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- Individual "A" vos interviewed by Elli personnel. He ind i t..t ed ti. t the use of low strength materf.) w..s a one-time occurrence which took pl.ce during the manuf acture of cable pans for the Zimmer pl.rt .
Individaul "A" stated that a shipment of steel was found to bt t.f lov strength, and the decision w s m.de ,to use the shipment f r.
" fittings" (curved sections of cable pon) only, but the shipment wa-not properly segregated. The shipment w.s in.dvertantly used in tas
, production of straight sections of c.ble pan, he indicated.
Individual "A" was critical of the m. nuel welding performed by Husky velders, and the welding certification progran conducted by Husky. Ee in.iicat ed thot the Husky velders had difficulty in passing the certifi-cation tests, and weJded d!*ferently during the test than in producticn velding. In addition, comments were received whica related to work at the C:1.te-plent, and are covered in a sep.r.te report (IE report ilo. 50-46;/76-06). R111 perscr.nel made two visits to the Husky f acility in Florence. Keatuck/. During plant visits, tha manufacturing areas were toured, sork in progress was observed, pertinent records were resieved, and intervi.evs were neld with Husky personnel. Records reviewad, and interviews held with Husky personnel indicated that Husky welders had been qualified as required by the American 3cciety of Hechar:ical Engineers Code for Boilers and Pressure Vessels, Section IX (ASMI Section IX). ::o information relative to the use of low strength materials could be developed. On September 22, 1978 RIII personnel visited the Union Testing and Research Laboratory, where material samples had been tested for Husky during production of cable pans for the Zimmer plant. Records relating to all tests of material for Husky for the years 1974-1976 inclusive were reviewed. None of the test reports reflected that materials te
** be used in the Zimmer plant cable pans did not meet the specified
! ~ yield strength requirements. During a second visit to the Husky facility, signed statements were obtained from three Husky enployees. The personnel interviewed indicated that they had no knowledge of any low strength materials l being used in construction of cable pans for the Zimmer site. (See l Exhibits II,111 and IV;. l l t l l l l l
e e . During document review. it v.s found that the shielding. gas on-. da.-(tt: of the filler. material utilized for the welding process differs. frc the qualifies welding procedure for a period of approximately fec-weeks. This is in noncomf ornance with ASMI Section IX in thot .
. variable of the welc arneess was changed without subsequent rec..]i-fication of the wej.;,- irocedurs and welders.
Husky personnel sr-red tb.t they would h.ve their welding precer.r. quolified with t*. .':- ate shielding gas and filler material. t. demont trate that t !. s, . tity of the velds v s not affected by ths changes in weld 12- c. Later contacts with Husky personnt" indicated that s...,...au.1 welding had been perforned prior ts procedure qualification. . CONCLUS10!:S
- 1. :;o evidei. vos developed that Icv strength material had b i-utilized in f brication of electricel cable pans for thw II:. t -
plant.
- 2. Materials and welding for cable pans supplied by Husky tc the Zin er plant vera tested and found to be acceptable.
- 3. Welder certificaticn had been performed c.s required by Sectier. IX of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
- 4. Welding wire and shield gas wer- ot as specified in the qualifie.
welding procedure for a period . 1974. In addition, tve velders perforned welding without benefit of prior qualification. This is in nenconforn.nce with 10 CTR 50. Appendix 5. Criterier Iy and Section IX of the ASME code. (See Details Section Ill).
- c.
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o o . , DETAll.% Section 1 - Prep..rcil by J. h. Poster Reviewed by C. T.. Noreliun Assistant to the Direrter
- 1. Personnel Contacted Cincinn.ti Cas and Electric Company E. A. Borgm n. Vice President B. K. Culver, Project M. nager R. P. Ehes, Quality Assur.nce and Standards En:ineer D. C. Kramer, Quality Assurance and Stand.rds Engineer J. R. Schott, Station Superintendent W. W. Schweirs, Principal Quality Assurance and 5tandards Er. inter W. D. Wa'/ mire, General Engineering Department Kaiser Engineers. Inc.
R. Turner Qe.lity Assurance Manager Huskv Products Fred L. Banta, Engineering RED tbnager Don Dietrich Tool Engineer C1.re T. Duncan, Quality Control Manager Ronald C. Johnson, Production Torenen Randy Pratt. Industrf=1 Engineer Ken Rigley, Welding Operator f Duane Ring, President
, Barry Schuster Utilities }hrket Manager The William Povell Co. (Union Testing and Research Laboratervi Steven L. Togle, Assistant Manager of Laboratory Edvin E. Winterfeldt, Corp. Manager of Quality Assurance Individuals Individuals "A" through "J" l
l t I # i I
, . . _ - - _ ~ _ _ _ _ ._, . . . _ _ _ . , _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ .- _ __ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _
Sargent and Lundv . M. E. Schuster .
. Cincinnati Po st -En qu i r er .
Douglas Starr, St.fi Eeporter Meteutt Research Associetc5 L. J. Fritz, Material Testing Supervis r
- R.'E. Duvall. Test ing lechnician
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T&S M.chinine Services, Inc. J. Foster, President
- 2. SCOPE and CHRONOLOCY This investig.tien centered on the allegations provided by Incividual "A", relative to the use of low strengtn materials and improper, welding by Husky. This report covers those allegations and ins;ettions which pertain to the Zinner Unit 1 plant. Allegations made which pertain to the Clinton 1 plant will be reported in a separate report.
On August 31. 1978, a copy of a letter by Individual "A" was received at Rill. On Septe-ber 6,1976, Individual "A" was contacted by RIII personnel. Durine Septerber 19-20. 1978, inspections were cade at Clinton and Zim er. On September 20, 1976, Individual "A" was interviewed by R111
,. personnel.
*~
During September 20-22, 27-29, 1978, RIII personnel visited the - I Husky facility. On September 21, 1978, Individual "A" was contacted by telephone. On Septeeber 22, 197S, R111 personnel visited the Union Test L.*c . l On September 25. 1978, a second letter from Individual "A" vos I received at R111 (Exhibit VII). ae
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On September 27, 1978 Individual "A" was re-interviewed by R111 personnel. . During September 27-29. R111 personnel visited the Hu' sky faciltt . On September 28, 1976, tests were performed on cable pens f rt- t ;. Zimmer site. On September 29,1978, R111 personnel visited Modern k'eldfr., a r.: Sheet Metal. - f 3.' . Init ial Contact with Individuti "A"
- On ' September 8,1978, R111 personnel contacted Individual "A" b:r telephone. Individual "A" indicated that he had been the Mana:::
of Industrial Engineering f or the Husky Products Company. }:4 stated that he had worked for the coepany approximatelv five ve.ri. but was laid off on August 4, 1976. Indiviou.1 "A"'s concerns, as delineated in his letter of August li. 197s, were discussed in general terms. 4 Interview of Individual "A" Or. Septe ber 20, 1976, 3rdividual "A" was interviewed by RIII personne;. Individual "A" indicated that the order for cable pans for the Zinner plant was the first contract for which Husky had to meet nuclear requirements. He stated that these requirerer.t s included a special design requiring vrap-around splice plates, and pan side rails made free material with a rinieu- tensiic strencth of 35,000 pounds per square inch. l Individual "A" stated that for the Zimmer project, Husky procured. l steel from the Central Steel Company or J&L steel, purchasin; commercial quality steel, and then testing the steel to see th.t it met the minimum strength requirements. The steel supplier
- would take a " master" coil, and slit it into six (on the average) production coils for Husky usage. Samples would be taken frer the steel when it arrived at Husky, and the shipment would be placed on held until the results of thc tests were received.
Individual "A" indicated that these material tests had been per-formed by the Powell Valve Company test lab in Cincinneti (The Union Testing and Research Laboratory). i
. . . - _ . , . _ _ . . , _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ , , _ , . . _ _ . , ._ ___ ___._.-_,.,_..._,...-_.__,___.___._-.__.._.r. _ _ . , _ _ . _ . . . , . - . _ _ _ , , _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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Individual "A" sta ted t h.st it v.s found that comr.c r e i.il qual f t - steel varied in strength, and th..t one shipr ent was found tr N
- He stated th.t Individual "B" r .s low tensile strength stec).
the decision to use this low strength steef in "fitti*ngs" or curved sections of cable pan, where streng.h is not crucial, a.. th.t a memo to this effect h.d been written. Individual "A" st.:s-that on approxim.tely February 10,1%76, he found th'at the It. tensile strength n.terial mentioned h.d not been properly se6re. : (.. . , and had inadvertently been made intu streight sections of electr::, cable pen. . - Individual "A" indicated that he hed informed Individu.1 "D" the; the lov strength material had been used to manufacture cable p.t. and produced a honderitten note (see Exhibit V!) which he incicate. had been given to Individual "D". he also indicated that he h i informed Individuals "B". "C", "G", and "1" that this had h.ppene.. He stated th.t this one-tine occurrence had been the subjett cf discussion among Husky personnel for sever.1 years. Individual "A" s tated t ha t the ranual velds used to manufacture fittings were poorly done, and that the welder certification program w.s a " farce". He stated that welders who were te ver:- on cable pans for the Zinmer contract were required to pass a qualification test as required by Section IX of the ASME Code. When initially tested by Cladstone Laboratories, he said, the welders could not pass the qualification test, and generally succeeded in passing the test after multiple attempts. Individ. ;
. "A" stated that the velders did not perform their productier.
welding any differently after passing the welder certificatien test. Individual "A" ind2cated that several knowledgable people had bee-critical of the welding perforned by husky velders, includin; Individual "J" (whose report is attached as part of Ixhibit li. j Individual "A" indicated that Individus) "J" would have no part ei training Husky welders unless they at; ended the full trainin;
*. course that his velding school provided.
RIII personnel advised Individual "A" that the technical speedff-cation for the cable pans to be used in the Zimmer plant (ste:1ff-cation H-2199, Division 2, Section 202.1) required that the materi.Is be of a minimum yf_ eld strength of 30,000 pounds per square in h (yield strength is usually less than tensile strength). The comment 4
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*O regarding 35,000 3 b/squ..re inc h t ensile st rength is 1,nco rrec t .
Individual "A" was alsn idvised th.t the specification would not allow the use of 3cw st rength m.terial f or cable pan fitting .
- 5. Invest ig._t ion a t Huskv Products During September 20-22, 1978. R111 personne3 visited the hun- -
Products facility in Tlorence. Kentucky. Discussien with Husky personnel indicated that. due to the spe:1 .
- design of cable p.ns for the Zimmer contract, stee3 rolls utilized in their construction wete of unique size (7.7 and 5.7 inch vidt rolls) not usec for any other contract. As such, it was indicatec.
the 14 and 22 gauge material for the Zimmer contract could be e.sily traced through the receipt, testing, and eenufacturin: process, end such document.tfon could be identified by liushy Orac - No. 3995. R111 personnel toered the Husky facility, ob:erved the fabricatter of sections of electrical cable pan, and inspected equiprent utilized in the forming and welding processea. Storage and receipt inspe: tier. procedures were also reviewed. Husky personnel indicated that they had no knowledge of any ler J' , strength steel being received or utilized by Husky for any contr.:t. It was indicated that during 1974-1976 Husky purchased comeerci.; quality steel, and then took samples' f rom the material, which veuld be placed on hold unti. testing indicated that it met the contract i requirements. Husky personnel stated that they had experienced sone problems witn low strength aluminun, and some steel had beer returned to the vendor for roll flaws, but no 14 or 22 gauge steel had been found to be of lov yield strength. 1
- l '
Husky personnel stated that no decision had been cade to use lov strength material on cable pan fittings on the Zimmer contract er any other contracts. Husky personnel did indicate that half of cre shiprent of coiled steel had been returned to the vendor for coil defects known as -
" coil breaks". They stated that the coil breaks do net affect the strength of the material, but cause problems during manufacture, and detract from the visual appearance of finished products. Tec Husky offietals noted that it was possible that it was decided tc use rolls with coil breaks for fittings, as the coil breaks could be cut out during the manufacturing process. However, none of the individuals interviewed recalled such a decision.
- - _ _ -.- .-_. - ~ --__-- , ___ .- _ _ _ .
4 . 9 e - o . - A review of the Zimmer contract file indicated th,.1 part of a ship en; of 14 gauge steel for the Zimmer contract h.d been ret.arned t. t . .. vendor for b.ving " bad waves" (improper winding of the stee2 cc.) v.ild cause manufacturing problems) Additionally..a stec) shi: tnt received on February 10. 1976, vos found to be .002 inches t. thick, and was accepted. R111 personnel reviewed documents relative to receipt of m.terf.:s, shipment of materials to the Zimmer site, production records (t*;ering Zinner cable pans m nuf.etured during 1976, returned shipments i.- roll steel, correspondence with steel vendors concerning coi; bre.ks, discrepancy reports, and internal menor.nda. None c: thy documents reviewed indicated that unacceptable caterials had bes-utilized by Husky. RIII personnel aise reviewed welding proceddre and welder que:ific4 tion documentation. It was found th.t man,ual welding for the Zimmer plant was perfor ed using a Metal Inert C.s (MIG) procedure, and steel filler wirw. usin; semi .uton. tic equipment. On this type of equipment, velding p.r.- meters are set on the welding m. chine, and the velder positions the welding gun and pulls a trigger. The equipment then operates autom.tically, controlling shielding gas flow, electric current, filler vire feed rate, and time of the veld. Manual veldin; w s performed on " fittings" (curved sections of cable pan) only, wit'. the bulk of cable pan being straight sections welded by automatic resist.nce welding equipment. Weldin; records reviewed met the require unts of the Americun Societ:. of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure '.essel Cede. Sect 2on IX (ASMI Section 15), which was imposed on Husky by its inclusion in their Quality Assurance 2Lnual. f ASSE Section IX prescribes methods and procedures to be follcwed in
,, welding procedure and welder qualification. Individaul "A"'s comment that the Husky velders did not qualify in the same manner as they
- produced welds is correct, but is in conformance with AS!E receire-l ments. Qualification was performed to a butt veld procedure, per the requirements of ASME Section IX, and production welds were spot welds.
- 6. Visit to Union Testing and Research Laboratory t
On September 22,1978, R111 representatives visited the Union Testin; and Rese.rch Laboratory, a division of the William Powell Company i e l l - 1 _ _ _. _ _ - - _.
l O s Powell personnel indic.ted that they had performed materi ; tt*:= for llusks during the years 1974-1976, and followed the proce.- . of calling the company and informing them of the test result >. r,- l handwritten forms, then typing the test forms and sending v. to Husky for their records. R111 personnel reviewed Powell files f or Husky covering 19' .9N . All test reports reviewed indicated 34 and 22 gauge stet 2 v.* tested .nd found to be in excess of 30,000 pounds per squ.re ir yield strength. Typical values for such material ranre. fre 35,000 to 40,000 pounds per square inch. Records for the yer.r= 1975 and 1976 indicated one test of 16 gauge steel was teste. ...' to have 29,400 lbs/ square inch yield, and one sanple of alu-Inu-was tested and found to have 15,650 lbs/ square inch yield stren:t': . Powell personnnel stated that they did net recall any la er :: soupe steel which they had tested which did not e x c e e d 30, '. ~. . Ibs/ square inch yield , strength. They indicated that this w_s typical of la and 22 gauge steel, ar.d that steel vendors hac. r. difficulty producing such material.
- 7. Contact with Individual "A" Individual "A" was contacted by telephone by the RIII investigst.r en September 21, 1976, and asked to provide additional detail re-garding his alleged discovery of the use of low strength materi.1.
Individual "A" stated that he had been aware of the existen:e ei lev i strength material through receipt of inspection reports which h.: seer. routed through his office. He stated that some of the cateri.1 I was marked " return to vender", and some of it was marked "use fer fittings only - segregate". He indicated that he was in the Eush:- material storage are. on Tebruary 10, 1976, and asked a worker whcr. the Zimner low strength material was stored. The worker did nct know what he was talking about, Individual "A" said, and he askei the worker's supervisor the same question, with similar results. i
. Individual "A" stated that he then advised Individual "B" of the occurrence, and wrote the note attached as Exhibit VI to Individual "D". He indicated that Individual "D" vent to look into the natter, and later returned the note with a verbal comment to " forget it".
Individual "A" commented that he had not actually read the vTitten specification for the Zimmer cable pans, but he understood th.: the specification required material with a minimum tensile stren;th of 35,000 lbs. per square inch. He was again advised of the actual specification requirements. M e r-,, , _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ , _ _ , _ _ _ - _ - _ . - . . _ .__ _.-__-m. _ _ , - _ _ - _ _ . . _ _ . . - - - - _
8
" 1" S. Contact with IndA idum)
~ of the Technicron School of Welding, was cent.cte-'
Individu.1 "J". by tne Elli investigator on September 7, 1978. L.+ ..- Individus! "J" in:ic ted that his school utilized Gladstone tories (G).dstone) to certify his ve2ders, and that when Hus'- velders h.d difficulty possing weld cer tific. tion test s, c),c,: - h.d recommended him to Husky. Individua) "J" stated th.t he did not remenberallofthedetaf*=bf all of tneir his review of Husky, but he rec.13ed.thot most but not
, He indicated th.t he n.:
problems involved the welding of aluminua.. He. stated th.t he h.f fewer concerns relative to steel welding. looked at Husky from the viewpoint of a consultent with a vie-toe.rds training their velders at his school. Individu.1 "J" indicated that he had not refused te trair. welders f roe liusky, but ha had wanted the He welders te take the entire treintn. stated that Husky manape ent course which his school offerred. only vented their welders to be schooled in the two "J" weld proced indicated tn.tres (MIG and TIG) which they utilized. Individue) he did have some reservations that the older Husky welders veu24 not benefit from training at his school. aware During the discussion Individual "J" indicated that he was not He that his report had been attached to Individual "A"'s letter. had not contacted him, and that he had indicated that Individual "A" with the liusky comp.ny since the date of nis not been in contact report. on Septenber 27, ?.978
- 9. Interview with Individual "A" Individua) "A" was interviewed on September 27, 1976, and discussions were held on ti progress of the NRC investigation.
Individual "A" was advised that no evidence of low strength materi.) had been developed, and was requested to provide any addition.1"A" inf orm. tion which would add in the investigation. Individu.: of low strength indicated that in early 1975 prior to the shipment i steel which was inadvertently used for cable pans, another s'.ipment had been tested, found to be of lov strength meterial, and w.s properly returned to the vendor. He st ted that he believed th.t the 9
,-, _ .n_._ , . , . . . _ - , - - . _ _ , . , . ., , -__ . - - _ , _ . . - . . . , . - -
. o shipment which was improperly utilized was a sm.11 shipnent, e* pe+-i P of sis coils of steel. which was delive red durin- the conths December 1975 er J.nu.ry 1976. .
Individu.il "A" indient ed t hat he h.d alsu reemlled an occurrent. 2-lievember 1975 when Husky sent Zimmer m.terial to Modern Weldin. 2. Sheet Metal (PLdern), a specialty welding firm which did not h welders qualified to ASMI Section IX at the time. Individuul *" stated that thid was done because the Husky plant was on strike, at the comps,ny f elt t ha t they had to meet their contr.ct to supply tL cable pens. He stated that the order comprised over 100 pieces cf equipment. of three-piece const ruction. He indicated his underst.ndin: that the welders for Hocern were not qualified to ASMI Secticn IX until , sometine in 1976. . Individual "A" provided the R111 investigators with the name er.d t elephone nunber of a f or er Husi y empleyee whe, it v.s indic.tei. might have some recollection of the alleged use of low strer.;th material during m.nufacture of equipment for the Zimmer plant.
- 10. Contact with Individual "D" Individual "D" was contacted by the R111 investigator on Septe-ter 29.
1976. Individual "D" w.s questioned as to his knowledge of the use of Icw strength materials in the fabricatien of cable pans for the Zit er plant. He stated th.t he did not recall the use of any le. s t r en;ti. material on any of the Husky nucle 6r contracts. He indicated th.t he did not believe that anvene at Husky would knowingly allow such 6-occurrence, especially those in the Ouelity Control departnent. The scenario of the discovery of the use of the low strength r.ateri.1 as described by Individual "A" was discussed with Individual "D". and e, the note allegedly sent to him was read. Individual "D" stated th.t he h.d r.o recoll-etion of any such note, and indicated that it would . be unusual for him to return such a note without some kind of written comment, as he disliked verbal communications. Individu.1 "D" recalled cecurrences where shipments of steel were found to have various problems such as excessive oil, roll problers such as ripples or twists, or were rejected because of steel thickness variations. He indicated that he also recalled the incidenc? cf senc Y e ' ' - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - . . - - - - - . . . - . . . . . . . .. . .
. ~ - . , - - - , - . - . , -_ __-- _ _ - - .
~
.s 3ow strength aluminum, and st eel pre-galvani zed eit h .n .3 u .i . : -
, zine coating which was banned f ron inclusion in the Zimrier er. .in on:,
He stated that the m3uminum-zine co ted m.terini (Oh1valu 6s s. - t: be made into cable p.n covers, but Husky personnel recognize. t i.. t the 3.6L m3uminum content of the conting was undesirable dat t its large surf.ec .re.., and a progr.n v.s set up to insure th.: Glavalume p.n covers were shipped to the Zimmer site. Indiviv..:
"D" indic ted that on ..t 3e.st one oce.sfon, covers were inut s :ently
, fabric.ted of this m teria), were identified, and h.d to bs rs-{.tric.te4.
- 33. ,Visi: to Huskv Product s durine Septe
- er 27-29, 197E RIII personnel visited the Husky facility during September 27-29, 19;c.
During this visit, documentation related to velder qu.11fic.tien test-
, ing, production records, material tests, deficiency reports, internal memer.nd of the Industrial Engineering section, and ve3d pr.:ed rs qualific.tfons were reviewed. Interviews were he3d with Ees. - persenne:.
and three signed statepents were obtained. (See exhibits !!, Ill .n: 3Y).
- one of t'he documents reviewed, and none of the statements re
- eived during interviews indicated that lov strength materials h.J been utilized durinF manufacture of the Zimmer plant cable pans.
Velding certification was reviewed as pertaining to weldin; pre:edure l and welder qualification to Section IX of the ASMI Beiler and Pressure
)
, Vessel Code. Velder qualification records and welder qualificatien test pieces (stored at Husky) were considered acceptable. K+cerds indicated th.t ve3ders had made severa: qualification attempts in cany cases. This is acceptab3e under ASNI Section IX.
. During document reviews at Husky, it was found that the weldin; l procedure for manual welding on Zimmer equipment had been qualified j using carbon dioxide shielding gar and .035 inch diameter filler materi.1, but a mixture of shielding gas and .045 inch diameter l ~ filler material had been utilized for the period of November la - December 3, 1974. The is in nonconformance with ASMI Section IX. which required requalification of the welding procedure when these variables were changed.
- 12. Interview with Individual "E" Individual "E", Husky Purchasing Agent, was interviewed by RIII personnel on September 28, 1978, at Husky.
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Individu.il "E" stated that to his knowledr.e, Husty h..d n' t r. . ; cy , nor returned any steel which did not meet the appropriate n. strength requirements. 11. stated that since the steel t:.:. . . , purchased during the manufmeture of the Zimmer equipment w.. ' t .r : r...s. , to commercial steel specific.tions, and then tested, it vm.' nt have been returned if it did not meet the minimum strenet: rc .i rs - ments. No minimum strenrth requirenents are imposed on t.w st.. vendor when commercial grade steel is purchased. Individual "E" stated that flat stock steel was purchased ur.. c[r-trolled in the same f ashion as roll stock 1.e. , to comer.arit.1 gr.d.
, *- requirement s, and then tested to insure that it met the mini r strength requirements. .
Individual "E" stated that the Central Steel Co= pan:. h.d su;711ef all of the 14 gauge, steel utilized for the Zimmer cable pans.
. 13. Eisit to Modern Welding and Sheet Metal i On Septemeber 29, 1978. RIII represent.tives visited the Mscar::
Welding and Sheet Metal Company. Discussions were held with Individual "T", one of the managers fer the firm. Individual "T" indicated that the majority of the ve ri. ! that his firm does for Husky is specialty velding of seperaters. junction boxes, cable bus, and aluminum velding. He indicated th.t to the best of his knowled,ce, his firm had not performed any vs. fin; on c.ble p.ns f or Husky at any time. Individual "T" vas requested to review his files for work perferr.. for Hushy for the years 1975 and 1976, with attention to any ve6 on electrical cable pans. Individual "T" stated that he ceu'.4 r.:t find any orders concerning electrical cable pans, and the Husky identification number (3995) for the Zimmer project was not feund
, in his revier of his files.
- On October 12, 1978, the RIII investigator contacted Individual "T" and requested that he again review his files, and provide the UKC with information as to any products manufactured for Husky durin; November, 1975. Individual "T" provided this informatien, whi.-h indicated that tap boxes and cable separators had been fabricated by his firm for Husky, but no work had been done on cable p.ns. .nd none of the Husky tags applied to the work had ref erenced the Zinner identification number.
4 e G t .
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I o .
. l I
l I t. . Cent ac t vith Individu ) "C" Individual "A" had advised R111 personnel that Individual "C" rigr.t have inform.stion concerning the use of lov strength materf.1 in the Zimmer equipment. This individu ) v.s cont acted i s the R111 in esti-gator on october 5,1976. - - Individual "G" stated that he had been in the hospital durint ti t period of the alleged use of lov strength materials. He indic.it. that he had no knowledge of such an occurrence, and th.t he h.d not heard anyone at the Husky plant discuss such an occurrente whi;e. he was employed there (his employment terminated in Tehruary, 1972).
- 15. Contact with Individual "H" Individual "H", an employee of Hebart k'elding vhe had acted .s .
consultant to Husky on velding and welding qualificatien. vos centatted on September 29, 1978. . Individual "H", indicated that his first contact with Husky was approxicately five years ago, and that Individual "1" h.d beer trained in the Hobart school. He stated that Husky had long best involved in welder qualification and in upgrading their veldin;. Individual "H" advised that five or six years ago, the Hushy velders did have soce welding problems, and that they did acceptabic weldin; on the production line, but m.de poor qua2ificatien test pieces. Individual "H" stated that he believed that Husks had a goed pre;ra-for welcing qdalification testing, and had used the progra- te "veed out" the pocrer welders.
- 16. D,iscussions with Individual "A"
! . Several telephone discussions were held with Individual "A" concernin; the findings of the investigation. Individual "A" expressed dis-satisf action with the findings of the investigation, and previded additional allegations concerning Husky. Individual "A" stated that the Husky welders had not qualified en both the vertical and horizontal welding positions, and had performed vertical welding during cable pan manuf acture. Individual "A" indicated that he felt that the Husky welds had been required to be of pressure vessel quality. He was advised that the specification had not required welds of pressure vessel quality. Welds of pressure vessel quality require non-destructive examination e e y, - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - . , - - - mean y me,, . ,,, , , , ,-, ., , _ _ , , - . . ,,n- , , . . . - - - - - - , . . - > - - - - . .-ee--- -
O . such as mannetic particle, radionrephic, liquid penet rant , r.r ultrasonic testing, as a veri ficat ion of thei.r quality, .n. i.- 5 n;. inspections were required. . Individo.,1 "A" =1so indicated th.t he felt that the comp.n. ime nat met all of the requirements 'of Code of Federal P.egulations., ;i::s . _ , P rt 50. Ippendix B. Qual'ity Assurance Criteria for Nucle r ! e.wr Plants (a copy of this regulation had been provided to hir e 3.21; personnel). R111 personnel explained that all of the req.fre ents cf this regulation were imposed on utilities, but t he pro. i s a rr..e. of the Husky Qu.11ty Assarance >Lnual were the requirenent ir esci . on Husky af ter approval of the manual by utility represents: 1ve s.
- 17. Contact with Husky Personnel Telephone contacts with Husky personnel indicated that sone cal:e channels had been fabricated by !!odern, with the order beine pr::es-sed during November,1975, and completed in later nonths. hu s ,--
personnel indicated that this material was for another r.uclest power plant, and was fabricated prior to the par:icluar utili:y's imposition of a requirenent for work done by welders qualified tc Section IX of the ASMI Cede. Husky personnel also indicated that virtually all of their welcin; was done in the horizontal welding position, and they did net recall any pieces for the Zinmer contract which necessitatet vertica3 welding. A review of Husky velder certifications for the horizontal and vertical positions indicated th.t one Husky welder was net q;*1ified in the MIG procedure vertical (3G) welding positien. k* elders previously indicated by Husky personnel as having preduced the majority of the Manual MIC welding for the Zimner project (at work center 35) were recorded as having been qualified in born
, horizontal (2G) and vertical (3C) positions. Qualification te the
,' "3G" vertical position also qualified a welder to perfort flat (IG) velding per AS)E Section IX.
I S. Contacts with Husky Personnel Telephone discussions with Husky personnel on October 24, and 29, 1976, provided additional information on lov strength alucinu- , materials. Husky personnel indicated that aluminue materials were orderec to 6063T6 requirements, which include a minimum 30,000 lbs. per square inch yield strength (as shown by mill certificates). They stated that a shipment of the material was thought to be of lov
- . . _ . _ - m-___ - - - . - -
- ~
strength, and sample test pieecs sent tn their test 1.5 ca.r.'ir s tl t the material was below requirements. Husky personnt) 1. . . i . .. t s . that as a result of this, the entire lot of material was reti.rra t. the vendor, and the balance of their orders with the venJ r v : O cancelled. Husky personnel stated that the rejections of this materf.' .t re in October and November 1977, with the original discrep.nc, r e. r . being generated in September of 1977. They stated that in Jhr...r. 1976, representatives of
- he vendor visited the Husky f.t ilit- c..
, discussed the problem. .
4 a OO e N
l . . Section 11
. 1
, Prep. red by T. E. V.ndel Reviewed by D. W. H.yes, Chief -
Projects Section
- 1. Sit,e, Review Activities
- The following Zinner site activities were performed by the ins,e:t r relative to the alleg.tfons reg.rding in.dequete material and velcin:
of Husky Products, Inc. (Husky) cable trays, p.ns and fittinpr:
. e.- A review was conducted of the Ifeensee source evaluatier.,
surveill.nce and auditing activities performed reg.rdir.t Husky. It was established th t the licensee propr.- fer vendor evaluation and auditing had been accor.plished it. that the Husky Quality Asrurance program and Velding procedures had been reviewed and approved by licer.see representatives. Additionally, an audit by the licensee was performed of the implementation of the program at the Husky plant prior to start of fabrication. In response to questioning, the inspector was informed that no source inspection of material was done prior te shipment since the material was readily amenable to inspection upon receipt at the site. It was added that the material was considered so standard and unsophisticated as to not warrant shop inspection.
- b. In review of the cable trays, pans and fittings on site, it was established that essentially all of the material has been installed and indeed have been filled with cables.
During visual inspection of th; installed trays no faulty or inadequate trays were identified. In discussiens
. with the licensee representatives regarding the difficulty
- , of visual inspection of welds now covered by galvanizing, it was concluded that testing of selected random samples of material would be a more meaningful test. Therefore, the following list of samples, randomly selected by the licensee representative and the NRC inspectors, was picked for testing by either tension pull tests (yield strength) or by veld tear testin; or both.
Tjgde P.O. Number Stock Number Tes:= Components l l Straight tray 18" 707D-27655 55M1-18-144 Two yields, I one tear
". Straight tray 24" 707D-27303 55:-11-24-144 One yield, twe tear l 1 l
l
l Fitting 7070-27223 5531-12-H30 ont yield, ont te.r Sttaight tray 24" Rnute #1276% 55'11-24-144 - Ont yield, (f rom ronti -1 roor ) (P.O. unknown) ont te.r Fi r . - 7070-27655 55"1-24-V190*-12 One yield ont tear
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. Ju . '- - -
7070-28009 5551-24-v130 -12 One yielde
* " ' - . . . was considered necessary since the fitting had in'auVestentay been torn during handling and the results of those weld tears showed adequate welding.
. It was further agreed that the yield strength testing would be d-- '- an independent testing laboratory in accordance to A5!"
st.. Td E-8 Tension Testing of Metallie Materials and that the minimum strength acceptance criteria vill be the S&L specification H-2199 requirement of paragraph 202.1; i.e., yield strength to be a minimue of 30,000 psi. In addition, the veld tear tests would also be done by an independent facility and that the secep*.bi . ity of the welds would be judged as outlined in N.:- standard C-1.1.
- 2. k'itness of Testing The inspector witnessed the following testing at independent labera-tories of the samples previously selected at the site.
- a. Yield strength testing was conducted on September 26, 1975. It Metcut Research Associates f acility. The inspector reviewed th:
qualifications of the operator, the calibration and adequacy ef the testing machine and the QA program standards of the f acility and considered them to be acceptable for the test. It v.s
** further Jc rned that the tensile specimens had been prepared in accordot.ce with the ASTM E-8. The results of the l tests are as follows.
Meteut Site Sample Yield Strength Ultimate Percent Mumber Number Pounds per Strength Elon. cat ien Souare inch T-2 1162 1276n 40,700 48,100 31.9 T-2 1163 55?;112-H30 42,600 47,800 30.- T-2 1164 55X24V190-12 43,100 48,900 28.3 T-2 1165 55; 1-24v130-12 42,400 47,000 32.6 T-2 1166 55M1-24-144 42,100 - 44,70C' 33.0 T-2 1167 55M1-18-144(!!o. 1) 42,200 44,900 30.4 T-2 1168 55M1-18-144(No. 2) 41,400 44,800 33.7
e o .. 4 . As can be noted from the table .huve, the yield stren;th v :in= were we) 3 abnve t he mininun yield v.3 ue of 30.000 psi .n. t . . . r . -- f ore =3 3 test semp3cs were deemed accept.ble. ~ b. Al so on Septer.ber 28.1976. the. we3d te.r tests of the resist .a spot welde, were witnessed by the ::RC inspector at ths Ti *: . Lint Comp.ny. loc.ted in Hnseow, obli..
- A test rig had been essembled whereby the test a s s e .b 3 ;. s .
- anchored was pulled to theat apart floor and by use of a fork 2fft truck the asst-il;.
the welds (side panels to tray botto weless.
~~ The test method performed adequatelv vith the followiny result =
established. Site Sample number Number of Welds in results of 7.ar Test Testin. 55M1-24-1*: (::. . 1) five Acceptable ve:ds 55::1-24-14a (No. 2) three Accept.b:e ve3ds 55M1-24-la; (Note 1) three t.cceptatle telds
!!K 1276K 55M1-24-144 three Acceptable vcids 55:*3-3 2-h30* fit ting seven one veld h.! a reducec sp.t sectier., set ::ete 2 55::)-2;Y190"-12 fitting eight Tve velds h.f .
reduced stet, se* Mote 2 55::1-18-la
- three Acceptable velds
' Note 1: An additional test assembly, available for test in eddition to the two planned to be tested, was aise tested fer a total of seven test assemblies tested. Note 2: The reduced spot section welds were subsequently l l measured and found to be adequate per the minimun size specified I in AUS C-1.1. A total of seven test assemblies were tested with a total of 32 velds being tested. All welds were determined te be adequate with three spots being evaluated as being acceit ris to AWS C-1.1. ,
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/ -
- ~.e
/
.s.
8- eus 9
e e . e e . As can be noted from the t.ble above, the yield stren; tie v :n. e were wc)) above t he mininun yield s.lue of 30,000* psi .n ' t;..r. - fore .22 test s.mples were deemed acceptable.
- b. Also on Sept er.ber 28, 1976, tht- we3d te.r tests of the resistor. t spot welde, were witnessed by ti.e ::RC inspector at the T4C *: .s :, int Conp.ny, located in licscow, Ohis.. .
A test rig had been essembled whereby the test assenbly v.. anchored to the floor and by use of a fork lift trucl the .s so-i::. was pulled apart at the welds (side panels to tray botto velts).
. The test methed performed adequate!v with the followin, results established.
Si t e Sample ::ur.ber Number of Welds in results of Tear Test Testir.. 55M1-24-14 (::. . 1)* , fiv. Accept.:!* re;is 55::1-24-1*4 (No. 2) threr Accept.b;e velds 55M1-24-144 (:fote 1) three f.cceptatie velds
!!K 1276K 55M2-24-144 three Acceptable velds 55::1-12-h30* fit ting seven one ve:d h.d a redu:e: sr. t sectier., s** ::ete 2 55::3-24Y190"-12 fitting eight Two velds h.i .
reduced sp t, se. Note 2 55::1-16-144 three Accepteble velds
- Nete 1: An additional test assembly, available for test in
. addition to the two planned to be tested, was aise tested for a total of seven test assemblies tested.
Note 2: The reduced spot section welds were subsequently measured and found to be adeqJate per the minimun size specified in A1.'S C-1.1. A total of seven test assemblies were tested with a total of 32 velds being tested. All welds were determined te be adequate with three spots being evaluated as being acce; t.r!. to AWS C-1.1.
/
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- 21 -
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1
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. . l Section 111 ,
Prepared by H. !!. Wescott - Reviewed by D. W. Ilayes, Chief
- Projects Branch Review of Weh'ing Requirenents and Observ.t f on of inst.11ed C.t '.c T r.-
- 1. _
The inspector r eviewed selected document s and made observ. tion > c.i saf ety rel.ted cable t'r.y and fit tings, as f ollows: .
- a. Review of Sargent and Lundy specification ,H-2199, dated !:.rch IE.
1973. Revised July 17, 1973, titled, " Specification for C.tle Pans".
- b. Review of NEMA Standard YEl-1971 used in conjunction wit!. tr.v specification.
- c. Review of the Husky Products, Inc. Quality Control M.nual.
Section IX "Centrol of Special Processer", issue date Dece .ber if, 1974, revised January 15, 1975.
- d. Review of We !!. Zimmer Unit 1 " Documentation Check Lists" (Tor-QAS-106).
- e. Review of certificates of compliance.
- f. Review of Galvanizing Inspection reports.
;. Review of Wm H. Zimmer receiving inspection plans (KE1 Term
- 30. QA-6).
- h. Observations made of cable tray installed and in storage are..
. 1. Participated in selection of randomly selected cable tray an!
fittings to be tested for minimum yield strength and weldment strength tests. (
- 2. Review of Welding Procedures, Qualifications and Observations at Burndv/ Husky The inspector reviewed welding procedure specifications, procedure qualifications records, welder performance qualifications, and selected documents pertaining to safety related cable tray and fittings, es follows:
I ( t 2
e e *
- m. Review of all velder qualifications.
- b. Review of Welding Procedure specification QAP-107: Wel d i r..
. Procedure Nc. 2 "Mann.) Gas Met.1 Arc Welding Process,"
effective d.te October 18, 1974, Revision No. 01.
- c. Review of QAP 104 "Procco'ure for Inspection of Resistan:e h- :
Welding", effective d.te August 18, 1974, Revision ::c. 0: .
- d. Review of inter-office correspondence concerning veldin.,
th t indicated QAP-107 should be reque13fied to reflec t -
~
changes in essential variables.
- e. Discussion with man.gement and shop personnel.
- f. Observations made in the shop area of fabrication in procress.
- g. Review of in process inspection records.
O' O' I
- I I
e" r
Review of a Burndy/ Husky memnr.ndum from the Husky welding entineer d.ted November 14, 1974, Subject " Welder Perform. nee Ou.11fic. tion"
~
indic ted th.t a 751 argon and 25? carbon dioxide shielding g.s c1>.tur. and .045 filler m.terial w.s substituted f or the welding grade c rten dioxide shielding gas and 0.35 filler m.terial that was specifie ' in QAP-107 ")Lnual Gas Hot.1 Arc Welding Pro, cess", dated October IE,197 , Revision No. 01. Th. memo further st.ted that, "The ASME Section s.v' that if this occurs, the procedure must be requalified along witn tns perform.nce. tests. (Section QW 281.2 QW 281. 3 and Qu 281.4)". y An Inter-of fice letter dated December 3,1974, stated that the argon' carbon, dioxide gas mixture would be used until the supply was exh.tsted
. at which time the welding grade c.rbon dioxide would be used.
The argon / carbon dioxide shielding gas mixture was.used for approxinatel) four weeks with no requalification of the welding procedure specification and welders. Husky managenent personnel indicated that QAP-107 would be requalified using the 75% argon and 25 gas mixture using the .045 filler material. This is considered to be an item of noncompliance to 10 CTR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX. (50-256/78-21-02) Subsequent to the investigation telephone contacts with Husky persennel by the investigation specialist established that steel TIG welding had been performed on cable tray prior to qualification of the welding procedure specification by two velders that had not qualified for the process. Husky personnel were requested to review the qualification records of the personnel who had performed the welding and infor= R1:1 of the results of their review. Husky personnel informed RIII of the review by telephone, and followed with written notification dated November 10, 1978. The Husky reviev indicated that the two welders had performed TIG welding on equipnent
*for the Zimmer plant prior to the welding procedure qualification for the
-TIG process.
l The steel TIG welding procedure was qualified on August 26, 1975, by one of the two welders. The second welder was qualified to the pro-cedure on !!.rch 10, 1976. Both velders had made several steel TIG welds prior to being qual,ified. 1 I I 4 l ;
These conditions were contrary to 10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criterio:. IX cf the AS!!I code. (35B/78-23-01) , Exit Interview 5.m ..r-The inspectors and the Chief, Remetor Construction and Eng'ineerin; :. Br.neh met with licensee representatives noted in Details Sectir r under Personnel Contacted, at CC&E Co. on September 22, 1976. Ths inspectors summ rized the scope and findings of the investig. tion and the licensee acknowledges the findincs.
- Attachments: Exhibits 1 through VII
] .
t O
e a August l',1973 . Public Interest Resecreb Group 2003 F Street N. W. - -. Vsshington, D. C. 20336 Attenti'on: Ir. John Abbotts Detr 16. Abbotts: . I as vriting this as a for=er er.ployee of Hasky Preducts Inc. of Flerer.:e , Kentucky to repsrt serious and deliberste nen-ecr.foraanee to 10 CTE 5: Fa:1etr Require 3e:t= asd En2i neering Spe:Aficatier.s based on the above requireaccts. To aske it eve: verse they send out cettrized Certifi:ater of Ce:pliacce with the Pall knsvledge they are false. In May of this year I had e:casien te visit the Ziazer Nu: lea- Ce:tair.ser.t ares and to see the ss:leus control areas and in particular to see H; sty cable t ays in pesition and many filled with the cables. Sin:e this visit I have been disturbed by tvo asp:ets of Rasky's ze:-:::. formar.:e, particularly as they relate to the safe opsratics of this plan. after cospletion of constru: ties. Taese two iape.-tant aspe:ts are as felleva
- 1. Use of inferier and weak material completely eut of spe:ifications.
- 2. Irnye velded by incesnetent velders with every type veld defe:t present in every tray. assembly.
7ne fellewir.g illustrator these two aspe ts in more detall. Thsy are related te the Zix.e- job spe:ifically which was the original job with the 10 CFP. 53 requirese:ts. On this job flagre.nt and serious non-:er.fe 2-an:e e:carred and with this as a pattern it has e:eurred en all subsequent jobs. MATr*.I A*.: All tray is designed with a lema capacity which incluess a safety facter.
. The tensile d ength of the side rails largely determines this espacity.
On the 21sser job the tensile strength of the side rail material was to be in excess of 35,003 pounds. >bsk7 received and tested material as les as (B,003 pounds and a censiderable amount in the range of 20 to 23,033 pennen. Sene was rejected, seio accepted en the basis it would be ueed for fitting vbero strength is not as critical. Exhibit I Fage I of 7 , 1 l' - - - . . . - - ,- ___. - - - - - . - . .
4 # ,
,, Tott 2.
- Instead the material was not kept s*Farate and thas maro very vesk :!d-
, rails vs,s e made up into long straight assemblies. Afi.er finding eat tut cesson aill steel varied se videly in tensile strengtn no more testir..-
var den, se that they coald remainaccavare" of this condition. In:ide:. tally seis testing of T-6 aluminu.3 var aise performed and a vide rance of ter. rile strengts was alse found. This was also ignores as above. Vr.at this aitz up a is that Esky hen trailt tray that v1.1.1 not carry the rated lead over. wit.. safety facter in:1uded.
. ~. -
Vn.DI G: - fne 2inser job was the first job requiring the use of Certified velde 1:
- -erder te insare goed welds. Esky centra:ted with G:sdeter.e Iaboraterier of Cincinnati to set up a welder certification prograa. Tcey did th.is a:d t:er.
tested all t$a velders. Without exception they failed th* tests aircrah'... Esky then called in va.rieas velding I:gineers and W. Ind "J" ef Te:t-nieren Scheel of Welding in Cin:icnati vhe subsitted a vritten repsrt e.* findings. A copy of his report is attached. In general al.1 the veld I pr.eer
. con:a red with }f . Ind. "J" repert.11. Ind. "J" was asked if he ecd:
er weald train the velders. He refased, stating that it is vs.y difff .;1, if not nearly impssrible to untrain people first, then try to retrair., . than it is to start fre:h with a persen having ne prior velding kno.les e er experien:e. Es);y then proceeded te verk on their o.n in crash progra.:s in viich t:e velders finally velded one piece which vo.dd pass a bend test. 7:12 veidst taen be:aae " Certified" by Esky. Hesever., what is critica.117 intertar.. is that nethis:g e: curred to tne quality of the predaction velds! In fa:- l it remains to date in the sa.se sai state as M . Ind. "J"s fit. dings dated Deteber 32, 197e.. Just a few vesi: age one velier was "teste!" over t4 tie e before hs finally nade a test pie:e which was only nargina*_y ae:eptable. Nov he is a Esky " Certified" welder! Slu-ting in July and continuing this month a new type of r.or.-eenfer.itare . It presently in pre:ese en the Clinten jeb. Fittings are being Mig syst velded contrary to specific Engineering re uirements. In addition Alnina Bronze filler red ir being used with full krevleige that alninn is not permitted 'in the containient area. Even verse the position of the spot le in occh a nanner the veld is less than 35% effective! Sub:tantiation of a.11 these charges can be acco:711shed thru er.asientier er Eshy de:uients in relation to Meterial and to tne Velders by tha re:eri:, visual exasinatien of the velds and by retesting the se called " Certified" welders by a co rpetent Velding Engineer. Visual inspection of the Clinte: fittings vill substantiate the obarges eutlier.d. Exhibit I
~~. Page 2 of 7
Pag- 3. What distu.-l.s se even more than the actua.1 incidente dos:ribed is th-fact se many top man *Eement people see nothing vrent to all these a: tie r. Se littla real concern is shec to preda:ing a truly quality,p edu:t within the specificatione. Tr.ie sheuld beoese even more particu.larly se
. when nae 3 ear safety is directly ir:velved.
Yours truly,
~
Individael "A" . Distribution as fel. lows: - Engineering Ce:peies that may cr may not be car:ernel. Ibas co Ur.ited D ineers a:ut Cor.st: acte': r Be:htol Corp. Bre.c & Reet , w ,n, __ Sargent & Lundy Stoas & k'ebst:r Bla:k & Vest:b Tnio nay not be complete, hoverer to the best of aqe kneeledge it is. Governsent 4 1 sn:les: Naelear Esplatory Cenissie:. Cenrecesisna.1 Joint Ater.ie herEy Couittee Private Ceeup: {.iblic Interest heeearch Ceaup i Exhibit I I Page 3 of 7
. . J'
- s. j d
Report of the Tindings at . Husky Products Incorporated
- on October 30, 1974 Submitted by: .
Technichron Inc. , sch'ool'of Welding It was generally found that the reason your coepany has had difficulty in certifying your welders is due to the fact that while some cf your men are qualffsed wc]dars, they suffer fron. the ills of an ca.ployee ' that in offering an incentive program. In order for an ceployee of yeur company to e.eet his required produ: tier, Icv:1, plus bene!!! by the intentive program it was found that their vc3dir.g machines were set at assiumor output allowabic, which is just below the
'pnint of hiccing holes in the parent retal. 1his condition crestes irprrr::
welding 4.ethods, and instead of establishing good we* 'ing, you have a situatson cf b)ncting the met.=1 together. These extrer.c amperage settir.;5 a3so n.ske it necessary to use highet gas flow in order to control the
- c. This hs: to be er.tremely cestly te your coepany, because of the conditions that exist (ve3diny, machine settings and gs: f3cws) it was observed thst ieproper welding is a ennr.on occurance at llucky Products. The velds are not structurally sunnd.
. Alur19um Mc1 dire: l A11 the' welds have craters and it was observed that most of these - crate,ts chue the come.cn condition known as " crater cracking". It was further observed that there were many welds that had both cracking condations in the weld as well as the crater. These conditions are primar $1y causcJ by the extremely high amperager ond F.n s envern.a c. Your velders are running extre mely hot velds due to speed med thus you have rapid cooling conditions and cracking. 1he binh gas flows (while costly) niso causes rapid cooling and thus crackint.. , Cenenally it was observed that the veldors in ynur aluminum weldi*g areas had good welding techniques however lack knowledge in settir.c wp ti:e proper welding conditions before welding. M e Exhibit I Fage 4 of 7
These snen 3. eked the f ollowing knowleJAr:
- 3. Setting the welding machine ,
- 2. Set ting the proper gas flow ,
- 3. Iloiling the tungsten rather then '
pointing it
- 4. Contro311r.g the weld to prevent craters
- 5. Cleansnt, the parent inctal bef ore velding steel Veld!g: .
l'oi;r r.cn were ot served in the st eel veldinr. areas. One sran had the kneviedr.c ci proper nachine and gas flew settint.s 1.ovever he Jacked tbt veldJnr t es.hniqut a.. 'this run was one of )eur oldett wele!ern. Tar. ot her thrce nr. hsd very lit tle k'invler';t about proper settings and one of the tierce 3acked the prorer weldieg technis)ues. This sta. uns y..iir nide.ut employee in your weltling derar(n.ent. Apoin it w.is ar).a r 6 ot tl..et all cor.ditions exi sted to turn nut r.wimum pro.h::ti: . ta. J.rs , :in yriu have there ennditionr. you will find that certif yf og vel.'; r. is tsn':r to Le extremcly dif ficult. Whr- obse ving several of t he te-: cu.:pt: s rur 1.y yout welders it was f ound that the follosin; conditte-s exi r.t s d :
- 1. Crystal 11:stions of the veld
- 2. Perosity l
- 3 renctration that exceeded 200%
4 l)ndercut
- 5. k'e.iif og of pat ent metal in the heat ,
cffetted zone All ti.e tunditions are created directly by running too high of ampers;e . tou high of t.nc flows, and dirty metal. Exhibit I P ye 5 of 7 G W
l 6 m/ . Other Observations: - l
- 3. The v' sing of fans in the welding areas is common practice. This condition causes the gas shield to be bloen av.'y, thus causing porosity in the welds. This is another reason
- for the high gas 'floV pressures which is costly since Intger volumes of gas,are used then necessary.
It was noted that Argen/CO 2mix was being used 2. in your H.1.C. we3 ding operations on steel. This 7 again is costly because C0 yould be adequate fer your operation. St3 sight CD costs about 1/6 of what 75/25 Argon /CO rim costs.
- 3. Many of your employees do not use eye protection or face prote: tion. I'm certain you must have frequently absenteeism due to eye flash injuries.
- 4. No use of safety glasses in the entire plar.t.
k' elders must wear safety gInr.r.cs under their welding hood. (An OSilA Standard). .
- 5. The p)snt is not in co plinnee wit'h OPIA Stendards.
This could cause extreme hardship in the future especially if you have a severe injury of one of your ceployees. Sugge t t o:.: Iluely Products Inc., should considct a training program for thoses ( JndividuIs enployed in their welding department. This program shocid j ,4aphasize welding methods as well as welding techniques. i Any success arising from this training program is highly questionable, since proper velding nicthods and techniques vould cut production. Tre present attitude in your welding department is quantity not quality. Sound certified quality wc3ds will definitely reduce quantity, however . the savings in cost of materials will most likely icprove or equalize profits, r l Exhibit 1
'tage 6 of 7 0 .
l .
,o .
. 1
.s -4 v
I am subeitting this report with the intension of creating many censtructive suggestions and have no intension to sound like 1 se being critical. You realized you had so-e concerns or you wnuld have never contacted Technichron in the first p3nce. Thereforc, I sinieerely hope that I have been %f service to your corpany and -
. that vs. ::.;) serve you ogsin in the future. ,
Thank you.
~
Respectively Subitted Individual "J" , Technichron School of Welding 1 l e. Exhibit I Page 7 ef 7 h e M
l o 1 I
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I, Individual "B" , make the following written voluntary statement to James Toster who has identified himself j to me as an investigation specialist of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I understand that I do not have to make a statement and that any statement I do - make may be used in legal proceedings. , I have no knowledge of low yield strength steel, below 30,000 lbs. per square inch, having been present at the Husky Products Plant nor of such material having been utilized in the production of cable pans for the 21mner Nuclear Power Plant. . I have read the preceding statement consisting of one page and made corrections where necessary. It is a true representation. Signed Individ:.:a1 "E" Date 'h h
- Y
.. /
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Witness or e// 7 / [s#/- f Witness
.i Wm -
- V b/ f7f
/
Exhibit 11 e e
Ze Individual "C" , make the following written voluntary statement to James Toster who has identified himself
. to me as an investigation specialist of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I understand that I do not have to make a statement and that any statement I do make may be used in legal proceedings.
I have no knowledge of low yield strength steel,
.below 30,000 lbs. per square inch, having been present at the Husky Products Plant nor of such materia 1'having been utilized in the production of cable pans for the Zimrrer Nuclear Power Plant. -
I have read the preceding statement consisting of one page and made corrections where necessary. It is a true representation.
~
Signed Indiyidust "C" Date ~d8- )8
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Witness [ M f/ o
- 7JI Witne 8* _
, ey/*,-f t/
s / r < . 'ryn '* .
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~
" Exhibit Ill
~- - -- - --
- 1. Individual "1" m.ke the f ollowing voluntary written statement to
...._ James l'. Foster, who has identified himself to me as an Investir. tin-Specialist of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I understand thet I do not h.ve to m ke a statement, and any statement that I d e r.a k e r..-
be used in legal proceedings. I am presently employed by Husky Products (as) an Indust rial Engineer. To the best of my knowledge, no low yield point material has ever been utilized in the z.nufacture of equipment for the Zimmer ::ucle.r Power Plant, Unit 1. I have been directly involved with the in-heuse welder certification program since its inception. This program h.s been properly conducted, and follows the provisions of ASNI Section IX for welder certification. I did not object to my participation in this program, but h.d to become knowledgeable in welding before becomin. . centrally involved in the program. I feel that welder certfficatier has been honestly conducted. k'elding procedures and welders have not been re-qualified when veld shield gas or gas mixtures have been changed. I pointed out te l Individual "A" that this had not been done. After 3-4 weeks Husky started using C0 y gas strictly as the procedure calls for. Exhibit IV Fage I of 2
d Individual "1" - 2 -- . i I was av.re that the Aluminum-Bronze MIG spot veld process had n : . 1 felt that these qualific.tions been qualified as to process or welders. were not necessary, as the process is similar to resistence veldin, in
- that it is semi-automatic. The welding paramete'rs are set, and the welder only aies the welding gun.
I have read this voluntary statement, consisting of two (2) pages, and made corrections where necessary. It is a true representation. Witness: 12-.= r rnee., c /99 /7g Signed Individual "1" Earvey M. Wescott 9/26/78 put, 9/28/78 I l Exhibit IV
** Page 2 of 2 l
Report No. l' Y J7// 3-/ B Tensile Testing of ( 7) , Sp e c im e n s M anu f" ' ""+d t c, M++eut-Drn ang-No. , i., ,_. . (n / f(. ( (, g c. - Nominal Gage Section: C .tr Y x' (> . s pb g ,y. g, [Y l Temperature: .h,. -l ,
- y. ,
Strain Rate through 0. 2% Yield: O UOT in. /in. / min. Hsed Rate thence to Failure: O , O .[ in. / min.
.02% y , r g. .
MRAI. Spec. U, T. S. y, . pc,, g __ Eic,ng , g g, No. No. (ksi) (ks' (ksi) (%) 47
-r - .;I w, S'S r11 - t E. - I 4 v 4'f.G ( -
.p.~ 3 . .v ' D
-r - .'s I L- T Sa r11 - te - ti V LI'!. ? \ yt V 3.- ? /
-r b u IM. sse: 1 - av-tyY W.9 / l W.i -:.u' %
n u tur s.m 1 2,-tyv la7c n q!<. I ( yo.'? .5 4. 9 ; /
- f. .: t tu5 ss N 1 - r:) - H 30 LI7. b N % 3::.7 l l
-r -O l' d SS NJ - 4 4 v1 t a 4'b'. 9 ) W. / 28.3 l
3
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~ l l L:$ SS & L c)Q L'1 - 3Q -l? N l. Ls { O.f .M.b .
) x
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3 i ( : l / I l l ( !
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l Notes: , i t Exhibit V Paga 1 _ of I Project Engineer . Laboratory Technician
. S' ,' . j'-// 76 o 6e
/ p y- [f/.'6,
- f fin'D.*I*)' ,
gp,<;,.,9 e ,,s i. *x . d
} ),* Yf)*8 b S/
y3. ci /.h t-lx 6 4G c=e t g)* h/T) .Sl fl' , i A f..t;.)-m >O.%~f t//' *$,$ -
.n j llf y",h,? .Y './ .
pe., , r
,-l 'jfoy e.. f < f ' '
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Text: Individual "D": 2-10-76 Low tensile Zimmer stringers mixed in stores and now being used - for straights! Individual "A" Returned with verbal reply to " forget it" 2-10-76. Exhibit VI
, Sheet 1 er 2 +. 's , , i tomber 20, 1978 * - }iasky manufactures Cable Trays toNDi4 Stant%rds as per a catalog as a cowroial item.
spacials It aise manufactureu to a custours medifiestion" of Standsrd items :r.c specifications. s Zimmers were special in t. important ways as follows.: -
- 1. They required special vrap around splice p ates with different i.ti ,
holes to strengthe:. tne joints warre .' trays come together.
- 2. Tney 35,000specified peands. side rail 'naterial to have a minium tensile str ::.g c cf
, 3. Velding was to be Mic Velded in accordence with AS?. Section 9
' s ad te be performed by certified welder:..
- 4. All pertinent records relative to Qas11ty are to be retained o:.
long term retention basis.
- In respect to the velding this mee.nt that the ve]ds were to have a qutlity level equal to that reqaired for boilers and press.tre vess-is. Tnese were tc be top quslity velds with good fusion, structurally sound and with mini.w-of defects. The:e were to be velded by qualified welders certified as such .
thru testing as called m.t in Section 9 er ASE. Leky velders are ceapetent to preduce couereial type velds for an ordinary couercial predact where de*ects and lack of fusion is acceptable. This is the type of vold done daily en our eenercial work. W hue Incentive Standard: en this verk and ou veldors er.rn frei 160 to 200% day in and day out. This is the type velding described in Mr. Ind. "J"s report.
- Testing er eu- wellers established their inecipetence te preduce gus11ty veld.a nt pressure vessel standards. Esky worked with the vellers until they mah one goed pleoe which weald pass a bend tett.. The velder is then certified and then g es rignt back te productien r.aking couercial iy;.e veids fer Incentive l
v:2ich is tne enly tjie veld ever mada. Oatside of making this e:4e t--t piect-1 they have no production experience in this ty>e veld. Essed on their difficulty in pa,ssing the test they nee 5 considerably mers trainin3, fol3 o. e.i with ac'.uti i production type'ef weld. experience, betere they can be ecmpetent te produce a high qualit.y Q.ialit/ veloing would greatly increase the manufacturing cest, partie ilarl-if we changed all velding to bece :e quality type. A second alternative weald be to produce quality velds when required en nuclear verk a.ad co.aercial l gaality en all other work. msky'e decisien was to certify the velders but produce enly the normal oenercial type veld.m en r.11 verk. W.veuld tell peeple l we veld to Section 9 et ASE vith certified velders. This has never changed. We have never made amy offert to produce pressure vessel quality velds. Exhibit VII i Page 1 of 2 SEP 251978 1 l l l . I
Sh2et 2 of 2
,;( -
Tcie was done en the Zimmer job and was incerperated into the Quality Central Eknual that Hasky Welding is in ornfor..ance with ASM3 section 9 and tne veld: p-are made by certified welders. This is misleading in that people thirik thst they vi31 get quality velds. In: tend everybody gets oe.cnercial quality velde ande hy a velder vho ence made er.e quality veld piece. On this basis Ha:'cf s has secured additional nacicar verk.
, The top }hnagers of Hasky are on a benus setup. Anything that adds cost , subtracts fres profit which in turn redaces their bonus. Te produce qualit. I would be very expensive and would redace tneir bonus. It is entirely pas. ible the decision not to produce the specified quality velds var bsses entirel;.
en the cost required to de se. The reason given to me ar.d my people was, "that it is cespletely unnecesssry. Individual "A" . September 22, 1975
- Exhibit VII Page 2 of 2 l
l I
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