ML20064D332

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LTR-20-0073 Paul Blanch, Energy Consultant, E-mails Concern About the Gas Transmission Lines at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant
ML20064D332
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/03/2020
From: Blanch P
- No Known Affiliation
To: Raspa R, Kristine Svinicki, Jeff Baran, Annie Caputo, David Wright
NRC/OIG/AIGA, NRC/Chairman, NRC/OCM/JMB, NRC/OCM/AXC, NRC/OCM/DAW
Shared Package
ML20064D335 List:
References
LTR-20-0073
Download: ML20064D332 (41)
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Text

CHAIRMAN Resource From: Paul < pmblanch@comcast.net>

Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2020 10:22 AM To: David Lochbaum Cc: Raspa, Rossana; CHAIRMA.N Resource; Doane, Margaret; Haagensen, Brian; Holian, Brian; Jessica Roff; William Freebairn; Amy Rosmarin; Susan Babdolden; Courtney M.

Williams; Manna Jo Greene; Richard Kuprewicz; Pat Keegan; Ellen Weininger; Charles Langley; Nina Babiarz; Skeen, David; Tina Bongar; Amy Rosmarin

Subject:

[External_Sender] Re: Official copy of letter to OIG Fill in the blank "we really don't care about public safety" Sent from my iPhone

  • On Mar 3, 2020, at 8:27 AM, David Lochbaum <davelochbaum@gmail.com> wrote:

Hello Paul :

The situation with the natural gas pipelines near Indian Point seems to show the bathtub curve in action .

The original pipeline passing near the plant approached the end of its service life, or the wear-out phase of the bathtub curve where the chance of failure increases .

It was replaced by the new AIM pipelines in the break-in phase of the bathtub curve where the chance of failure is initially high and then decreases.

Lo and behold, the new pipeline experiences a fault in its break-in phase requiring its use to be halted .

During the downtime of the new broken pipeline, the plan is to return to using the old, worn-out one .

So, the hazard to the public is being managed by merely swapping between the high-risk ends of the bathtub curve?

Suppose the pipeline ruptured and caused a nuclear nightmare at Indian Point. How do you reckon the NRC would finish the answer to a question certain to be asked during the ensuing Congressional inquiry:

"well Senator, the reason we tolerated this well-known and elevated risk is "

I'm not sure I could come up with a defensible full-in-the-blank response that would appease the Congress, or any survivors.

Thanks, Dave Lochbaum Safely living more than 600 miles from Indian Point Sent from my iPhone On Mar 2, 2020, at 3:21 PM, Paul <pmblanch@comcast.net> wrote:

1

Rossana Please assure this gets the proper distribution Thank you Paul Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 06117 pmblanch@comcast.net 860-236-0326 Cell 860-922-3119

<20200302 LTR to OIG -.pdf>

Paul M. Blanch PE Energy Consultant Tuesday, March 3, 2020 Ms. Rossana Raspa NRC Office of the Inspector General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Commission and EDO continue "Backward Engineering" Dear Ms. Raspa Your recent OIG CASE NO.16-024 has identified numerous deficiencies in the manner the NRC staff responds to safety issues and the handling of 10 CFR 2.206 petitions.

2

One of many disturbing issues in the report was discussion of what "appeared to be backwards engineering to get a desired result." To the lay person this means that NRC management establishes the desired end result and subtlety "encourages" the NRC staff to_develop a result that justifies the management' s desired outcome .

An example in the OIG report is the manipulation of both probability and consequences of potential events such that the risks would be acceptable to the general population and the project could be approved. I firmly believe the "backwards engineering" described in the OIG report the result of management encouragement to get a desired result irrespective of the true risk and the truth .

One would logically believe that after this scathing report of potentially illegal and unethical practices, the NRC would go to the confessional and promise _never to do this again. WRONG!

On February 24, 2020 the EDO, Ms. Margaret Doane wrote a letter to all Commissioners that directed Mr. David Skeen to refute the OIG report by stating the conclusion she desired by stating:

"This conclusion is based on the following summary findings that are explained in more detail in the attached enclosure:

  • There is no significant degradation to defense-in-depth at either unit.
  • There is no significant loss of safety margin at either unit.
  • There is no high-risk impact at either unit from internal or external events, as all risk metrics are under the prescribed thresholds."

Not only is Ms. Doane ignoring the risk of a catastrophic accident to the reactor and the spent fuel pool, she is directing Mr. Skeen to "backward engineer" and justify an incorrect outcome by using "Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures, Appendix F" a document not approved by the NRC, not mentioned in Regulatory Guide 1.91, and more than 30 years outdated. Further, Ms.

Doane quotes probabilities totally inconsistent with this handbook. I just looked at my calendar and it is not "Groundhog Day."

Ms. Doane also misuses this 31-year-old handbook to say everything is fine when PHMSA data indicates a significant increase in pipeline failure probabilities over the past 10 years. My calculations, bases on the same reference show a probability in the range of less than 10-3 per mile-year. This is unacceptable and requires immediate action .

3

On a somewhat related issue, I was informed there is a defect in the AIM pipeline that requires shutdown and the reuse of an idle 26" pipeline adjacent to the control and switchgear rooms.

Failure of either of these will cause a total loss of all AC and DC power including the inability to use the FLEX systems. We all know the consequences of this occurrence of this event.

When I asked the OPA to confirm the existence of this alleged AIM pipe defect, I received the following email from Scott Burnell, the top person in the OPA office with no understanding of potential nuclear accidents:

Hello Paul; Questions regarding the current status of the pipeline located in the vicinity of Indian Point should be directed to the pipeline operator and/or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Thank you.

Scott Burnell Public Affairs Officer Nuclear Regulatory Commission I responded to Mr. Burnell saying:

Scott:

I understand the NRC has placed a "gag order" and won't allow anyone to speak.

This is a nuclear safety concern and you tell me to go to FERC or Enbridge?

They don't deal with nuclear safety concerns of a pipeline on the Indian Point property.

If you want to stick your head in the sand, I have other avenues.

Thank you for protecting us.

Paul Blanch 4

I am not please at the way nuclear safety is being addressed with such arrogance by the Commission, the EDO and the Office of Public Affairs.

This copy of this letter is notification to the Commissioners and the EDO to take immediately actions as required by 10 CFR 50 because Indian Point is operating in an unanalyzed condition.

I also request your office convey to the Commission that it appears that they have totally slapped the OIG in the face and will continue endorsing the clear violation of regulatory requirements.

<clip_image001.jpg>

Paul M . Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 06117 Cc: The Commissioners EDO David Skeen Congresswoman Lowey

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Failure data from Reference 1 5

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Direct quote from OIG report Copy enclosed 6

CHAIRMAN Resource From: Paul < pmblanch@comcast.net>

Sent: Monday, March 02, 2020 7:04 PM To: Raspa, Rossana; CHAIRMAN Resource; Doane, Margaret Cc: Haagensen, Brian; Holian, Brian; David Lochbaum; Jessica Roff; William Freebairn; Amy Rosmarin; Susan Babdolden; Courtney M. Williams; Manna Jo Greene; Richard Kuprewicz; Pat Keegan; Ellen Weininger; Charles Langley; Nina Babiarz; Skeen, David; Tina Bongar; Amy Rosmarin

Subject:

[External_Sender] Re: Official copy of letter to OIG Thank you Sent from my iPad On Mar 2, 2020, at 3:21 PM, Paul <pmblanch@comcast.net> wrote:

Rossana Please assure this gets the proper distribution Thank you Paul Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 0611 7 pmblanch@comcast.net 860-236-0326 Cell 860-922-3119

<20200302 LTR to OIG -.pdf>

Paul M. Blanch PE Energy Consultant Tuesday, March 3, 2020 Ms. Rossana Raspa NRC Office of the Inspector General 1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Commission and EDO continue " Backward Engineering" Dear Ms. Raspa Your recent OIG CASE NO.16-024 has identified numerous deficiencies in the manner the NRC staff responds to safety issues and the handling of 10 CFR 2.206 petitions.

One of many disturbing issues in the report was discussion of what "appeared to be backwards engineering to get a desired result." To the lay person this means that NRC management establishes the desired end result and subtlety "encourages" the NRC staff to develop a result that justifies the management's desired outcome .

An example in the OIG report is the manipulation of both probability and consequences of potential events such that the risks would be acceptable to the general population and the project could be approved. I firmly believe the "backwards engineering" described in the OIG report the result of management encouragement to get a desired result irrespective of the true risk and the truth.

One would logically believe that after this scathing report of potentially illegal and unethical practices, the NRC would go to the confessional and promise never to do this again . WRONG!

On February 24, 2020 the EDO, Ms. Margaret Doane wrote a letter to all Commissioners that directed Mr. David Skeen to refute the OIG report by stating the conclusion she desired by stating:

"This conclusion is based on the following summary findings that are explained in more detail in the attached enclosure:

  • There is no significant degradation to defense-in-depth at either unit.
  • There is no significant loss of safety margin at either unit.

2

  • There is no high-risk impact at either unit from internal or external events, as all risk metrics are under 11 the prescribed thresholds.

Not only is Ms. Doane ignoring the risk of a catastrophic accident to the reactor and the spent fuel pool, she is directing Mr. Skeen to "backward engineer" and justify an incorrect outcome by using "Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures, Appendix F" a document not approved by the NRC, not mentioned in Regulatory Guide 1.91, and more than 30 years outdated. Further, Ms. Doane quotes probabil ities totally inconsistent with this handbook. I just looked at my calendar and it is not "Groundhog Day."

Ms. Doane also misuses this 31-year-old handbook to say everything is fine when PHMSA data indicates a significant increase in pipeline failure probabilities over the past 10 years. My calculations, bases on the same reference show a probability in the range of less than 10-3 per mile-year. This is unacceptable and requires immediate action.

On a somewhat related issue, I was informed there is a defect in the AIM pipeline that requires shutdown and the reuse of an idle 26" pipel ine adjacent to the control and switchgear rooms. Failure of either of these will cause a total loss of all AC and DC power including the inability to use the FLEX systems. We all know the consequences of this occurrence of this event.

When I asked the OPA to confirm the existence of this alleged AIM pipe defect, I received the following email from Scott Burnell, the top person in the OPA office with no understanding of potential nuclear accidents:

Hello Paul; Questions regarding the current status of the pipeline located in the vicinity of Indian Point should be directed to the pipeline operator and/or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Thank you.

Scott Burnell Public Affairs Officer Nuclear Regulatory Commission I responded to Mr. Burnell saying:

3

Scott:

I understand the NRC has placed a "gag order" and won't allow anyone to speak.

This is a nuclear safety concern and you tell me to go to FERC or Enbridge?

They don't deal with nuclear safety concerns of a pipeline on the Indian Point property.

If you want to stick your head in the sand, I have other avenues.

Thank you for protecting us.

Paul Blanch I am not please at the way nuclear safety is being addressed with such arrogance by the Commission, the EDO and the Office of Public Affairs.

This copy of this letter is notification to the Commissioners and the EDO to take immediately actions as required by 10 CFR 50 because Indian Point is operating in an unanalyzed condition .

I also request your office convey to the Commission that it appears that they have totally slapped the OIG in the face and will continue endorsing the clear violation of regulatory requirements.

<clip_image001.jpg>

Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 06117 Cc: The Commissioners EDO David Skeen 4

Congresswoman Lowey

<clip_image003 .jpg>

<clip_imageOOS.jpg>

<clip_image007 .jpg>

<clip_image009.jpg>

<clip_imageOll.jpg>

<clip_image013.jpg>

<clip_image015.jpg>

Failure data from Reference 1

<clip_imageOl 7.jpg>

Direct quote from OIG report Copy enclosed 5

CHAIRMAN Resource From: Raspa, Rossana Sent: Monday, March 02, 2020 3:27 PM To: Paul; CHAIRMAN Resource; Doane, Margaret Cc: Haagensen, Brian; Holian, Brian; David Lochbaum; Jessica Roff; William Freebairn; Amy Rosmarin; Susan Babdolden; Courtney M. Williams; Manna Jo Greene; Richard Kuprewicz; Pat Keegan; Ellen Weininger; Charles Langley; Nina Babiarz; Skeen, David; Tina Bongar; Amy Rosmarin

Subject:

RE: Official copy of letter to OIG

Paul, This will be provided to the OIG mangers, as appropriate.

Thank you.

Rossana Raspa Senior Assistant for Investigative Operations Office of the Inspector General Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-5954 From: Paul <pmblanch@comcast.net>

Sent: Monday, March 02, 2020 3:21 PM To: Raspa, Rossana <Rossana.Raspa@nrc.gov>; CHAIRMAN Resource <CHAIRMAN .Resource@nrc.gov>; Doane, Margaret <Margaret.Doane@nrc.gov>

Cc: Paul M . Blanch <pmblanch@comcast.net>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Holian, Brian

<Brian .Holian@nrc.gov>; David Lochbaum <davelochbaum@gmail.com>; Jessica Roff <jroff@riverkeeper.org>; William Freebairn <william .freebairn@spglobal.com>; Amy Rosmarin <amyrosmarin@aol.com>; Susan Babdolden

<svandolsen@gmail.com>; Courtney M. Williams <mazafratz@yahoo.com>; Manna Jo Greene

<mannajo@clearwater.org>; Richard Kuprewicz <kuprewicz@comcast.net>; Pat Keegan <Pat.Keegan@mail.house.gov>;

Ellen Weininger <eewgrassroots.@gmail.com>; Charles Langley <langley@publicwatchdogs.org>; Nina Babiarz

<ninababiarz@outlook.com>; Skeen, David <David.Skeen@nrc.gov>; Tina Bongar <tina@bongarbiz.com>; Amy Rosmarin

<amyrosmarin@gmail.com>

Subject:

[External_Sender] Official copy of letter to OIG Rossana Please assure this gets the proper distribution Thank you Paul Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 0611 7 1

pmblanch@comcast.net 860-236-0326 Cell 860-922-3119 Paul M. Blanch PE Energy Consultant Monday, March 2, 2020 Ms. Rossana Raspa NRC Office of the Inspector General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Commission and EDO continue "Backward Engineering" Dear Ms. Raspa Your recent OIG CASE NO.16-024 has identified numerous deficiencies in the manner the NRC staff responds to safety issues and the handling of 10 CFR 2.206 petitions.

One of many disturbing issues in the report was discussion of what "appeared to be backwards engineering to get a desired result."ill To the lay person this means that NRC management establishes the desired end result and subtlety "encourages" the NRC staff to develop a result that justifies the management's desired outcome.

An example in the OIG report is the manipulation of both probability and consequences of potential events such that the risks would be acceptable to the general population and the project could be approved. I firmly believe the "backwards engineering" described in the OIG report the result of management encouragement to get a desired result irrespective of the true risk and the truth.

2

One would logically believe that after this scathing report of potentially illegal and unethical practices; the NRC would go to the confessional and promise never to do this again . WRONG!

On February 24, 2020 the EDO, Ms. Margaret Doane wrote a letterill to all Commissioners that directed Mr. David Skeen to refute the OIG report by stating the conclusion she desired by stating:

"This conclusion is based on the following summary findings that are explained in more detail in the attached enclosure:

  • There is no significant degradation to defense-in-depth at either unit.
  • There is no significant loss of safety margin at either unit.
  • There is no high-risk impact at either unit from internal or external events, as all risk metrics are under the prescribed thresholds."

Not only is Ms. Doane ignoring the risk of a catastrophic accident to the reactor and the spent fuel pool, she is directing Mr. Skeen to "backward engineer" and justify an incorrect outcome by using "Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures, Appendix F" a document not approved by the NRC, not mentioned in Regulatory Guide 1.91, and more than 30 years outdated . Further, Ms. Doane quotes probabilities totally inconsistent with this handbook. I just looked at my calendar and it is not "Groundhog Day."

Ms. Doane also misuses this 31-year-old handbook to say everything is fine when PHMSA data indicates a significant increase in pipeline failure probabilities over the past 10 years. My calculations, bases on the same reference show a probability in the range of less than 10-3 per mile-year. This is unacceptable and requires immediate action.

On a somewhat related issue, I was informed there is a defect in the AIM pipeline that requires shutdown and the reuse of an idle 26" pipeline adjacent to the control and switchgear rooms. Failure of either of these will cause a total loss of all AC and DC power including the inability to use the FLEX systems. We all know the consequences of this occurrence of this event.

When I asked the OPA to confirm the existence of this alleged AIM pipe defect, I received the following email from Scott Burnell, the top person in the OPA office with no understanding of potential nuclear accidents:

3

Hello Paul; Questions regarding the current status of the pipeline located in the vicinity of Indian Point should be directed to the pipeline operator and/or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Thank you.

Scott Burnell Public Affairs Officer Nuclear Regulatory Commission I responded to Mr. Burnell saying:

Scott:

I understand the NRC has placed a "gag order" and won't allow anyone to speak.

This is a nuclear safety concern and you tell me to go to FERC or Enbridge?

They don't deal with nuclear safety concerns of a pipeline on the Indian Point property.

If you want to stick your head in the sand, I have other avenues.

Thank you for protecting us.

Paul Blanch I am not please at the way nuclear safety is being addressed with such arrogance by the Commission, the EDO and the Office of Public Affairs.

This copy of this letter is notification to the Commissioners and the EDO to take immediately actions as required by 10 CFR 50 because Indian Point is operating in an unanalyzed condition .

I also request your office convey to the Commission that it appears that they have totally slapped the OIG in the face and will continue endorsing the clear violation of regulatory requirements.

4

Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 06117 Cc: The Commissioners EDO David Skeen Congresswoman Lowey 5

LrNrTEO STATES UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMJSSION WASMOt(HQh DC 7°"S-O,a,Ol Febrv.1ry 26, 2020 ME MORAND\JM 10 Cl ,rman SY1n1 lo.,

CommtSSloner Baran CommtsSJonesr CapUlo CQmm1 :;,c;,n11;1 Wrigl11 FROM 1,targa,e-1 M Doane IRA/

E:xe,attrvi, O,,et1D< !or Opem,.,,..

SUBJl:Cl CONCl:l~NS P!:.IUAI ING IO GAS IRJ\ NSMISSION LIN l:S Al THE I DIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT*

DETERMINATION 'OT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTI lh,s memor fldum reSij)Onds 10 ate Chrurman's l*ebrtts1ry ;M , 2020, d,recl.ooo to ttle ueeuwe Director for Opetllt1011S (COO) 10 udd1e!:s ,noou;,!l misell rr\ die ucle:u Reguta!Ocy Comm1ss1011 (NRC) Olooe ot lhe Inspector Groeral (OIG) repcr1, E~m lnQUlfV , *concerns Pen anrng io Gas 1ransmmron Lines at the lnca.:in Po1n1 oclear Power 1-'1:anr (Case No 16 02.11) In liliiit mcmQrar,d"m, 1"4: Ch.Jfln., n d~clcd the prc;,mpl cx.isnin,;it,on IQ determine ii immcdia1c rog11lat,ooy ac-tioo 1s ncooed oos.cd on 11torma1J011 in l1lc OlG r ~ and 10 promplly n>lor1n lhe Cornnns,;ion tll l he, te!lulls 01 lhal t.llitnuntJltcn ,md ....ti:,t atb0n$. 11 ,11,y, 1he ,st;,11 pkm:.

le;, lake Far l hc follgw1ng reawrr., 111.1\l'r. dr.tenmned lh;i, 11,c.-rr:, ,s nc, n )(.'<!, !Qr 1mmr.d1;iJe, regvlalOty IKbon In re5900sc lo tile Cha-fflliln's dlrcc1Jon, I tasked Or M1rcla Gavnlas to exam1De the 111foml.aboo in me OIG report (a<IYance copy) and evaluate promplly whether 1mmed1ate ac.bon ts warranted Dr G;Jvli._1$ w:i:; not mVQlved ., !he m;iM r in q11e,st,on in thl.: OIG repo,1 Or G,rvrii;J$ r tc*ved her Pll D in nutlc..tr engincc~ from t!M: Massadlusetls lnstrlulc o1 Tedmology and has dec3dM ol e.1tpl!f1ente 111 tl<lde:u power plant ~alety 111e delermination on wheUler 1mme<1 te acbOfl is needed was pe.rlormed 111 acc<<dance h die age1'1Cy l)<<toe<lure used to r<!'.!lpood to nuclea1 pow.er plrutl emerge,ll 1 - lhrs. prooe<lure is 1oond'" scct!on 4 2 1 of UC-504 Rev. 4 1 ntcprall'd Risk-Informed OGasi-Ma ng Process for Emerg1mt l s'.Wes* (AQencywllle Documents Access and Management Sy5'~m Acce-sS10n No M L 140:lS,A14~) Afler r,iim!WW!g l l>c: finr:hng$ 1n u..,OIG rq,orl ;,oo lh tc,~~tl a,i;pcxls or lhe 42-irn;h gas Inc 11>.-.1 " ' ~ lf>c lndlil'n Point E ncruy Ccn1er pl'Qll(lrty (lPECI.

Dr G.(1vr£-is hM detern,:tted ti I lt1ere ,s no ~arety ,ss...-, warrari1,ng 11nmedia.1e, regulatory a t.ttot,

rt "'111.er Ui,~ '} Clf llnrl 11 6

This conclu'N/1 is based on Che folil!Yimg wmmmy f11tooiw, thai arc cxplw'ned Ill mere detail in

't he ,,ti.idled en~IQ$ure

  • rhere 1s DD 519n1bcant degrada~o11 to defense l!Hiepth at either unit There 15 no 519nifil:ant loss of safety marg:,'I at << .her umt
  • There ,s no hlgh.t,;:k ,mpa~ ot e1111er un,t l'!'Qn1111tema1 o, e<<tetnal e,*e11tfa, ;l$ all lti:-k melrii;s ore llJldcr !he prc,;wbcd lflrc,;hold:.

I have a,;si!;lllCd Dami Skeen to lc;td a Cciffl'I oj c1pmr, to ~lid to !he remaining r;sucs 1n tile

(;h'11rma1l's mi:,mc,r,Jn(l1.1m. includ1n; IM du<<hon 10 provl#e the Ci)Jnml!l~IOn w,U, !~ re$\1IW <d astilff rcvicw'l'lnhm 45 days ol l!lcd.rtc cl th-c memorandum, Mr. Sllccn has been a mcrnber of 1he senior E~l!lwe Si: rvic,, fr;,, more Uh;m ;_o r;lei;.irJc. ;md Pl\."VIOV~lv :.t.'<Y<xl lJ~ 1h,:, thrm:tor ,;,I the J~n Lessons-t..eamed Directorate In !hat tapacit;, he had a tev role: in evaruat111g 1he t:;;,fety of lhe U S 11mch.,.Jr ~ 1 pl <1nt llc(,t rn rt.~JX>'\$0 lo Lhe ever>t,i. <11 !It . Fvku,;hrm;, D.ifi~

nuclear power plant caused by the Great Tohoku ealthqua e and csunami Mr Skeen was not mvolrod in the matt= addressed i11 llie OIG ~port A~ ~ oo,,terr,plaled 111Jder lhe p,ocedur e. LIC..504, du~-.g lhe course of tile te;,r,i-s rewew. 1he team will be mindful of the nl!'ed to assess any new emerge11t issues Fnclo:;vre l:11111taa1Jon or Emer9en1 lnro,rnm,on Pc:,1;1ir1J11.g lo G,1s Tr;1n:,rnil.$iol1lines 31 lhe tll&an l'<Htll Nuclea, !'owe, Plant

<;c;: SECY OGC OIG O PA D Skeen SUBJECT CONCER!NS PERTAIN! G TO GAS TRANSMISSIO LI ES A1 THE INDIAN P01NT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OH ER INATION NOT TO TN<E IMMEOIATE ACTI DATE D fl:: BRUARY 26 2010 l'tOAMS Ac~nk>n Nvml>tr: ,., LZ()OHDHS O FF ICE OEDO NRR OGC 1:00 NAMF OJ;,ck$<lll MGmnd. c. M7ohlt:r MDo;me

?J~ lt)WQ OFFICIAi:. ~ECOIID COPY 7

l;.y;}JlillM!} or E.merge111Ulllounilll_QDJ'{:r 111!1010 Gas T,ansm15s,,on Lines at 1M flld1an Po1n1Nuclear Power Plant 1116 evaluabon I!. In response to 1he Cha1rman's 1a!ikmg o1 rellru.ary 24, 2020, lo <1eterm111e ti

,mmed:atc r~atoly action is l"ICClC"ssary This prompt l!l'I.J aoon was pcrfortmc,d ill acrordancc WIAh SectlClll '1 21 of Oifke or Nuclear Reac1or Reg11taoon INRR I o16ce mstrucilon LJC-&04 Rev ditiol> if ~crtsc,1rHlt'plfl 1s sijµidica nUy dcg.r,Jdcd (c !l

  • multiple barncrs arc nllClde ntlo,ly lo sig111fic;;irdly degmd;,d, fur,e1,or1.~I 1edllnd;'111t:y 0 1 d,ve*111dy r., s.gt11f1ta111ly

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Wtiilc .i f>11"' n,pl ta,:, to;ii.dd imp.id c,e,.11;,m ~ln 114;lutc;~ Qn lhc; :;ilc; (c; 9 , g;rs ll,llbo,e f1,1o;:I oil 1i111k~.

tile s chy.ard, emergeoc:J operabons laCllity, l'Ll::X equipmem storage buMlllg), Ille p,pehne ,s IOC.:11.ed .r1woXJ1Ta.11ely 1500 II (mv :;>J lrom 11>1: ne;ul'o$1 $31.:Ly rel;)lc;d $1rudwe il11Cl l:.une:r:; lo ra<l;oac:bve release (1e , 11\e fuel cladd::119, reacror c001an1 sy!llem preS&we l>Oundal)' aoo OOf1taitU'l.et11) W(JUJd be ,n:111 auled lrnpoc-Js !O 11ea;t,y !l.lnttlutes c.ould :iNeet Ill!! ~ 1t111e,pa11s" measures or the proo.ab1llty oi ad~htJooal 1111t1a1ors HoweveJ, Ulefe are sbll mulbple diverse bamers afld i'fu1,g:i.1aoa ,;iea!ltltes 111 place eo m.n,m,.re. tile chil!leflges. to II~ pla111, p1even1111g events lr001 progre1;smg to core damage, contammg the ra<l.ioaclwe soLM"ce temi, and enSffllflg emerge11ey preparectDe11s capa ,es lmp.'lCJs 011 suucrures ,11 ltle pro:.:wnnv 01 the ei,pkls..on <10 not significandy degrade dc-l'ense III depth UC-504 stil'c:-s !hilt .idd1oonal rcgulalo l'/ oction may be rcQuired to pli!cc o r maintilin the plan1 '"

a safe oollditioo if there 1s sigrnficanl loss of safety maigm fe g , tile calculated ASME <ic:de s1ructural lacllOfs kw o component are eq;,a lo ot ~s than 1) l~eglllaroi,y Guide 1 17-1 also indicates that salc'ty margirtS are adequate ii ( 1) tll>C codt>S and standards or thetr ahcmillives appl'Olle<I tor use by lhe RC are met aoo (2) hcenS¥1g baSIS sa1ety anlltyS15 acc.ep<<ance crnena arcmfl A JMPC r\lpl.\lrc docs Ml .ilfc~ the pt.Ml1's complia!'Ce ~ t, c.odcs and SQll(jard:; Comaif,antc Wllh the J)lllnl's 1echn1cal sp,ecifical!OOs ensures adeQuate marg is ma1n1ained "'9<lins.1 design bai;is acQIOOnts 8

Rl}k Mwssmeot Assumptions ;Jnd Inputs :

Appefldlll I' ITT the feceral Emergency Millllagemet1I Ag,ency (FE IMI ' Handbook of Cihermcal 14:Qard Analy-,:.$ P,Cla!dure~* 1989.(~6.-0!IS-10576, 1939 (ref 1) id,mtiroet ,11::acfenl ,.,res ra, ptpel ,es wilf, " diaimeler grea!Of th;u1 :>O 111c.hes ill SF "4 :tccid,.,.it,; per yem pev pl)f,ln,e milt, Too FEMl1. Hanoo~ also stales lha1 only 20'!. of events con uie laf\l0 pipe ri,ptures 13.1..ed on tins p1(,b.1b6fy, lhe. r,equency of p1pe6ne rup1u1e ,s c:rla d.:rled assumrng 393.511ol

,ptpelu,e :ire ne:u lhe ..te This ,s equ:11 lo (J.~ f l I (5280 11 1 mo ) ) - 0 745 nu o1 p1pe6ne (reef 2)

Too /reqocncy of pipeline rl.U)lures rs lllefcfore f r,equrlll)' <JI pipt'lill<' r u~uJ'<.' = l',1lluJ'1.' al<'

  • tupluJ'<.' pt'ItCnlag* of fail ure*
  • pipt'll ne l rtQ;UI f.~uency afplpth.nUuJtlUre

= (5, 10*

  • 1a
  • reslyear,'p1pe ne mJeJ(0.2 cc:mplete rup1ure-slfallure )(0.7.-15 PIJll!linem1les) fl'e<lui!nt)' of pipeline ru~,un, = 7c45
  • 10 >

T l,,., v;1hP<!li o r ,~ lo he: IX>fflp.,r,:d :tg;11n~t the ri;k :,clJOn tJrreshnkls prc;,v,cfed in l IC-504 a,.,

1;1JlGIA1~ hy m;,kif>ll 11\rec ~Or.wiv.1.1iv¢ o:;:;.11rni?h\lnr.*

  • All~~ wpt~rc~ lilmd ~ t y 11> ~o,c d;),'lliJ9C
  • The us
  • eon~ ~1;. t<ll 45 d:ly!l (the (turabo11<1I tfoe Cl ia:tnt)11's wku1; menlt,)
  • Lar9e eally retease probab1IT1y 15 o I o! the core damalJ!l ,irobJ!l1tnv lJn:ler tlte<...e as!.Limptums
  • The cu11cl!tional tore dani.19e lrequett<.y (CC01'1 t:;in be wioulaled as Ifie lrequentyal a 11-~lin., 1uplurtl:!s tr!tle$ Cle problbildy 1l'la1 a pipel111e rup ture ~<1$ ,10 ocre d.lma~. err (7.45
  • 1.0"5) * (1} = US.* 10* s
  • lhe tondlllClflaf l.lrge early relea,.e lre:;-uency (CLERF) is w lu1 t£<1 asO 1 of 11le

,r;ondit'lollill c-0rc dih"Ttll1)C pmtabilny cir (7,4S

  • 10"') * (0,l ) ~ 745
  • llO "
  • T~ ut~rem!!nt'II ClQ'll(filtQ~'II CQII! lj;mt:,~ pro!;,(lb:l'ty (tCCDP) 1n th',! 454;,y wif\1!1tw c;.ln

,be ~ . ~ted by m11l tiply!J!91hl.l ~onrt~,I (I!l"C d;Jll'lil.!i'J pmb.J:i:IJJy, t~..e i!t.'tm l!!l event frequency a11d 1hc du'rooon of the ten~ or.

(l) * ('1.4S

  • 10 5 <"*<<'.l\t5/t'f~f) * (4S~r,16!.~Yl'/Yr.J<) ,:; '.i.18
  • 10* 6
  • llle tntremenlill large e:irty rehlase prollabtL1y {ICLERP} c:<1.11 oo mlcUJated as *D 1 ot 1he l!l(.'fet11ent.il a:ndllloool oore damage, pl'ClbatrJ:ty, or (9.18* 10-6). (o, i, - 918. ui,-,

9

Tite5e values can be c001parcd aga,ns1 lhe rrsk acbon true~holds m LIC-504 Pilr.J!Tlelel LIC-:>04 Rrsk Ac'IIOO I lrc,sfJQl,;J Ci!l1;W[c:cl Villue CCOF lE-3 7 45E-5 CLERF 1E-4 74(,1:-6 ICCl)P ~e-5 S 18c-6 ICLERt> 5E-6 9 HIE-7 Dlse11ss lon:

l he number!o. p1ovl(fe(J above represent med

  • n est,mates 01 tile 0000.illonal core damage probability ilnd large early rcle;m: p,ooobdity Howc'IC:f. lhey were ~aloulillcd i!5summg vil,rous C>Qif>l'erv;:11,sm~. sc.nne ol which ;,re en1,11 ,er.rted ,n 1he !, bte below source al eomerv= filed 1..arge pipe fl4)tJ.lres lead to oenagra:,::ms << Cletooaboos The FEMA 1 orde1 of magll!llJOe l~tndbcl(II: llOle!; lh, *wi lfll! eve,, u
  • 1 1,e,., I!!
  • lmk11.-. .., :i 11pt!hfte. mt$!

ot:en Int' outcome rs a small teak -

AssuinpbOnS oo plpelllle ralure rales were smictured arou!ld !o.rudl!!S 1 order oJ magnitude (or pertonned 111 me 1980s s..,c,e lrlell, oooes nci SUJl'ld~ds rlllvt! I ~ g,e:r:et) l!nO l)l{IOilb~ Of l:lrkJr~ wo~ be le$$ lh;Jn U'lll$C iJS$1!mcd The pn:t>ablllly ot !all.mt lor lhlS spcclflc secilOn 01 pipetlne ts redJlll!'d SIBoo It was coostrucled 10 ~pecifieatons 1n.a1 exceed ci.nenl oooe reqLifernenlS

,l'l(J,.. *s~ec ..,,,, <<wrtt~ p~tnkf. tQ prevec111n.'ld*erte111 ri.,,n.~ s.om diooino.

r1ie ~ s ass1,11T>C1; IMI ppeltnt r.iuun'5111:;JCJ Cl*ectty to tote Oilm,;Jlge rn 3 or1'Ctl; or m..,gl¥1ltoo realty. a plpcifllc: l!'llPI05lOO 1>'0Uld not dlrecUy c:ause damage to lhe reactor (CJ greatl!f) oore, ll'loo!Jl'l tt tot.m dl!m.ige Silfi:ly-rei.-:,:~,:1 cqu:pmcnl lh<'ll "'"Y lie n.ceoe<3 10 prNefll core ~ nano111er 1nmatr1g C"iC~ were to OCC\lr ill Ille same 1rme I hus, !be calculaled values tor CCOf- of 7 4SE-5, CLERF of 7.45E-6, ICCOP ol Q UIE 6, and ICLERP of 9 . I 8E-7 represent upper bound e-sbrnates, and there are several orders ol m:ig;t ude ot co,"' rv:1h!ltt1 sepaim,ng 1hese volut,$ r,orn more reahst,e estrm:,tes Cooclus;oo,;

No sign 1can1 degradabcn ol defense in depUl nor loss of sajety margins were 1dentlfied Tile evamtion above snows !hat the CCD F, CLERF, ICCDP, and tCLERP val\Jes associaled with p,pelrne e.cpl0s,orr$ t ti'i-c. re sm,1 let th:'111 lht: I IC-504 11sk etton lhreSIIOld H,ererore. no 1mmedr:ile regulatory 3,:;i,on ,s required 10 ma,n1.1,n the pl:wit rn a s:ite condrllOn

  • ,t40f.c ttliJC tllrs is a WflSCIYillM:ly oouni:11111 vaai~ lo, a staoon blil'1\out 11~ by a ptpcloc cicploo!OII tiec.11.1SC nQt>e5 noc i!(:(1';11J711 lo< \rilfll)\15 1,Q0<5. su,h :>s 111e urn::ec 1~ 04 srghl betWt'Cfl Irle e;iploslon and 1ne 011!5.el gienerallOI JJttlklrr;gs l

Safe Evalua!Jon Performed by Enlefg',' Under 10 Cf~ 50 S9 {ADAMS Accc:ssto11 No ML t4253A339), Augu!ll '-1 , ?()1,11 2 FEMA "Hi111dbook of Chemical Hazard AnalY51s Proocdures," Appcr,d1X F, 009-026-0!if>.

10575, 00!>

Failure data from Reference 1 10

For example, a la.."'Se fl!.Ctluy may be OO!ll'$0.ly m.odi!lled as ~lDf: storage opcrat101u, loadI.ng/wtloadrng o~tions, and proccssuig opcnuons. These Cil.ll respecuvel)' ~

rcp~ted by 5tora~ ll!llk fllllmu and luks, hose failu=, and ptpm.g and process vessel failures.. The raiu suggested for each of 111.ese t1re-:

Slomgc iallk - double walled 1O'/iank-ycar SromJtC 1anlc

  • single wa!lod 1(}</tank *yeat' l>res~an: vcsSel.& 10+/Vd5el- year Piping 1.5 x 1(></ft-year Loading hoses 10,./opcra.ll.mt oc 10>/hose-year ill Direct quote from OIG report ill Copy enclosed 11

CHAIRMAN Resource From: Paul < pmblanch@comcast.net>

Sent: Monday, March 02, 2020 3:21 PM To: Raspa, Rossana; CHAIRMAN Resource; Doane, Margaret Cc: Paul M. Blanch; Haagensen, Brian; Holian, Brian; David Lochbaum; Jessica Roff; William Freebairn; Amy Rosmarin; Susan Babdolden; Courtney M. Williams; Manna Jo Greene; Richard Kuprewicz; Pat Keegan; Ellen Weininger; Charles Langley; Nina Babiarz; Skeen, David; Tina Bongar; Amy Rosmarin

Subject:

[External_Sender] Official copy of letter to OIG Attachments: 20200302 LTR to OIG -.pdf Rossana Please assure this gets the proper distribution Thank you Paul Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 0611 7 pmblanch@comcast.net 860-236-0326 Cell 860-922-3119 Paul M. Blanch PE Energy Consultant Monday, March 2, 2020 Ms. Rossana Raspa NRC Office of the Inspector General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission {NRC)

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Commission and EDO continue " Backward Engineering" 1

Dear Ms. Raspa You r recent OIG CASE NO.16-024 has identified numerous deficiencies in the manner the NRC staff responds to safety issues and the handling of 10 CFR 2.206 petitions.

One of many disturbing issues in the report was discussion of what " appeared to be backwards engineering to get a desired result."[l] To the lay person this means that NRC management establishes the desired end result and subtlety "encourages" the NRC staff to develop a result that justifies the management's desired outcome.

An example in the OIG report is the manipulation of both probability and consequences of potential events such that the risks would be acceptable to the general population and the project could be approved . I firmly believe the "backwards engineering" described in the OIG report the result of management encouragement to get a desired result irrespective of the true risk and the truth .

One would logically believe that after this scathing report of potentially illegal and unethical practices, the NRC would go to the confessional and promise never to do this again. WRONG!

On February 24, 2020 the EDO, Ms. Margaret Doane wrote a letterill to all Commissioners that directed Mr. David Skeen to refute the OIG report by stating the conclusion she desired by stating :

"This conclusion is based on the following summary findings that are explained in more detail in the attached enclosure:

  • There is no significant degradation to defense-in-depth at either unit.
  • There is no significant loss of safety margin at either unit.
  • There is no high-risk impact at either unit from internal or external events, as all risk metrics are under the prescribed thresholds. "

Not only is Ms. Doane ignoring the risk of a catastrophic accident to the reactor and the spent fuel pool, she is directing M r.

Skeen to " backwa rd enginee r" and justify an incorrect outcome by using " Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures, Appendix F" a document not approved by the NRC, not mentioned in Regulatory Guide 1.91, and more than 30 years outdated.

Further, Ms. Doane quotes probabilities totally inconsistent with this handbook. I just looked at my calendar and it is not

" Groundhog Day."

2

Ms. Doane also misuses this 31-year-old handbook to say everything is fine when PHMSA data indicates a significant increase in pipeline failure probabilities over the past 10 years. My calculations, bases on the same reference show a probability in the range of less than 10-3 per mile-year. This is unacceptable and requires immediate action .

On a somewhat related issue, I was informed there is a defect in the AIM pipeline that requires shutdown and the reuse of an idle 26" pipeline adjacent to the control and switchgear rooms. Failure of either of these will cause a total loss of all AC and DC power including the inability to use the FLEX systems. We all know the consequences of this occurrence of this event.

When I asked the OPA to confirm the existence of this alleged AIM pipe defect, I received the following email from Scott Burnell, the top person in the OPA office with no understanding of potential nuclear accidents:

Hello Paul; Questions regarding the current status of the pipeline located in the vicinity of Indian Point should be directed to the pipeline operator and/or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Thank you.

Scott Burnell Public Affairs Officer Nuclear Regulatory Commission I responded to Mr. Burnell saying:

Scott:

I understand the NRC has placed a "gag order" and won't allow anyone to speak.

This is a nuclear safety concern and you tell me to go to FERC or Enbridge?

They don't deal with nuclear safety concerns of a pipeline on the Indian Point property.

If you want to stick your head in the sand, I have other avenues.

Thank you for protecting us.

Paul Blanch 3

I am not please at the way nuclear safety is being addressed with such arrogance by the Commission, the EDO and the Office of Public Affairs.

This copy of this letter is notification to the Commissioners and the EDO to take immediately actions as required by 10 CFR 50 because Indian Point is operating in an unanalyzed condition .

I also request your office convey to the Commission that it appears that they have totally slapped the OIG in the face and will continue endorsing the clear violation of regulatory requirements.

Paul M . Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 06117 Cc: The Commissioners EDO David Skeen Congresswoman Lowey 4

UNl'TfiO STATES UCl.EAR REGULATORY COMMISS10N WAIMINGTOK DC 10>>S-o:G1 Feb!Uilry 26, 2020 MEMOIU!.NDUM TO ~ra11man swuctu CommtsSionc-1 Baran CClmmtsSKJner CaplJ1o c-rni$!1ioncr Wrigl,1 fRO M Mmgare1 M Doone /RAJ l'xeaitrve Ouedo, lo, Oper.1fic11S SUBJE.Cl CONCERNS PE:RIAI ING TO GAS TRANSMISSION LINES Al THE I DIAN .POINT NUCLEAR POW ER PLANT DETERMINATION NOT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTI l h,s memorandum re~nds 10 ltle Chatrm.an 's February 2-4, 2020, d,reet,on lo Ille Execu- Ou ecllll 1cn Op;;,,allOris (tOO) *10 addre!l9 tn:nters ra~ u, IJre Nuclefli Reyulaltlty Comnus.~ (NRCI Offire ot the Inspector Geoeral (OIG) repor1, EYenA lnquuy. 'Concerns Penwrung to G,a-s lranSllllS"Slon LIAeS at the lrodlan Po1n1 Nuclear Powe, Plant'" (Case No 16 024 t In l'h.11 mcmor.,ndum, the: ChuffTlilfl d7eclcd the prompt c:qmin;Jt,on 1,;, determine; ii immediate rG91.1lato<tv ectioo 1s needed based oo in.1orrna1ion in 100 OfG ri:l)Ort and 10 prompll';

inronn lhe Comnii$Si0n al the rei;uHs 0111'1:i.1 e:uinuti tmn nd wtwt act10ns.. ii

  • r,y , lhe .a:111 plans lO l;ake Fo, ,he !Qllc,wtng re.l$0115, I h;Jo,e delennined lh,11! tl>ere 1$ no nr:eo for immed1;i1<,

rl!i)!Jlat.o,y acliOO In re59011se lo Ule Channan's dnc'bo11, I ta-sked Df M1rela Gavrilas to examine the l'li'olmatlOfl in lhe OIG report (advance c opy) and eval\Ja1e promptly wtlelher tmmedtate oc1Jon ts warranted Dr G..wli.."1$ wm; ro, inllQlved ., l hc m;,t1cr in qut:$1lon in the O IG rcJ)(J"l 0,, G;,.,ril.'1$ r1ice~

her P'II D in nuc~.a,r cr,ginccnng from the Mit5S<lc;tiusctts l~1tutc o4 TcdmolQIJI' and ha&.

d e e - of expe,,ence 1t1 nude r power pl3"1 salely I ne delerm1na110n on l'lflelh.er tmllle(J.ate acoon 16 needed was pei'lonned tn ac<.<<dance Ylltll die agerocy flW(leedure used to respood to nuclear pow,*e1 plan! emergt!fll is.sues. I h,s prooedure is 1oun,d in sc,;bol'I ~ 2 1 ol LIC-504 Rev 4 1n1.ograled Ris.t-tnformod Doasioo-M.along Procer.s for Emergent Issues* (Agencywlde Documents Acces,s and Managemenl Syslem Ac.cess,on No 11.4 L1403.s.A 143) Aller reviewing the f1r11:hf1'9$ in the OIG report and the 1<<hnac.1l 11$pe,c1$ or the 42-inch gas lr!c 1~1 tli!~ IIIC lndi;Jon Poinl Encl'))Y Ccn1cr prop,cn)' (lPEC),

Dt Ollvrllas has delierm,ned tlia11t,ere rs no safety mue wartar'111lQ 11nmedia1e regulatoi"y 3ct,Qf1

lt edlili!r U11~ ? OI lJnil 3 Tht
; coor;lu&JM is t,.,.-.,q;t on !t~ l'ollov.i.ng summary ltn:rmg.'> tool arc cc.q>la:ood 111 more d:!talt in the atl[rdted entlnt.urll
  • There 15 P.O!i!!Jt1if1t:ant degrad.ltton lo defense m.depth at ent1er wilt
  • 1h£re t!I oo s1gmfic.arll l!>s!i of safely marp at EilhEr unit

,,t

  • rnl.!M I!; n:, high-11,,k tttipatl erlfler t1ni( i','Qm rntem::il or er!f.!m(ll everru., , all 1,sk metric; me IW!dt!f !hr, pw.,.r.nlloo lftrtr"..hofd:;_

I INl'l'll as,si11nttd D11vr4 Skc,rn t;:, le~ ii le.am of i:xi!{'lt* Ir::!_ ~nd ln the n;maimng 1Y.;1.tc-i. rn Jtw Ch&mmn'r.1t1el!)(lr.tni11im, l!'lr;ludii,g the 4tle,.'i!l.ln ,., prtVlidt< the C-.orr,mc;s,on wJ\h Ill~ re:;,Jftr; n1 a stiff review within 45 day,-s of Im.' dale of~ memorandum. Mr. S1,;cC'11 has been a member of 1he Senior Eir;e,,;11tive sen,ic;e IQ< more: i,,;in ;Jo deaidc, ,ll'>d p~"Vior,r.;ly :;er,ed a:; l hc d*re~gr Qf

!he J ~ Lessons-teamed 0..-ectorate In lhat capacity, he had a 1,;ey role in evaluating the s.il'cCy QI lhc U S I\IICleiJI pq~r pl.int flecl in IC$PQl\$C to the evl:)II[:; ,11 lhc Fuku:;lllffla D.iiici*

nuclear power l>lant caused by lhe Great Tohoku eartllQua e and tsunami Mr Sk11en was 001 involved ill the matt= i1ddrt'S$CO in tile O IG report A.~~ ooruemplal ed Utlder the procedure, l lC-504. d ur**,g tt,e course ol the lle,uw,s tf!'tleW , fhe team will be mtndful cd lhe need to assess any new emergent issues F1>!;:IQ$ur" Evalustton ot l:.mergen1 ln10ffn3110n i>(.'11amn9 lo G;,$ Tr;m$mii;sion lini:$

al lhe 11\dnan P(llfll Nuclent Power Planl cc; SECY OGC O IG OPA D Skeen 5

3 SUBJECT CONCEI~ S PERTAINING TO GAS TRANSMISSIO LINES AT THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DETERMINATION NOT TO TAl<E IMMEDIATE ACTION DATED r[BRUARY 76 2020 AOAMS Ae~nlon Nvml>tr:

OfFICE OEOO NRR OGC EOO NAME' MDo,me DATE W60.0;>o Ol"l'ICIAL REC ORO COPY

~aJ"Ao or emlWl:fll lntounahgn recw10100 tQ Gas Transmtss,on lines a1 the lod1<1n Poml Nuclear Power Plant 1 has evalui3bon is m reSf)Oflse to the Chairman's 1a!lklllg ol 1-e-bruary 24, 2020, 10 detefmlrle ,t 1111mechate rcgui.atOfY action is - r v This l)l!OfTll>1 evil!uatlon was pet:bmcd in accoJd.inoo h Secoon '4 21 of Ottice of Nuclear Reactor Reg laoon {NRR) ollice instrucbon UC W.

Rew -4 ' lnregratc:d Risk-Jnformcd Decision-Mak,ng Procci;,; lor Emergoo1 lswc$" (Ag,mq,wide Oo<;wnoots Access and Management Sys4em IADAMS I A<eesston No . ML 1'1005A 143) w, 24 h,;,urs of tt.e reqUCSI l lC-$04 s * 'e$ ll>ri1 .1dd11ion;;,I rt!gula1ory :1cl1t1n m;,y be rt!quned IO pl:tc,, or m.;11nt:Ur1 lhe pl,1111 .,

a safe c;oooitlQll rl defense-ill-depth as i;i\Jnd"11:antly do!llrildcd (c g, , muhiple barne,,; arc mOderately IO s,gmfic::inlly degr.:tded, lllncttCII\: ~nc:1:1ncy o, c:1,vers,,y r.: Slgtllfoe:inlly c;ompr0ffll5Cd , or vul~rty lo 51r1glc laiilurc5 rs 5ig111fir;anlty rn=ascd)

Wilde ,, PIM' n,;,lure ~uld imp.,~ c;ed;un ~n_11;I\I= on lhe $lie (e g , g;n lr.utmc fuel orl t;wrks the SIM/lchyard, emergency operabons laalty, FLEX equlpmeM slOrage btJ~g}, Ille pipeline ts loeitte<l 3J,p<OXJ111111e1y 1500 II (ti:'! J!) lrorn 111t, ~11e$1 $.'ilety relaled $1fuctun: :.nd 1>;r.111ers 10 radlOlldive release (t e , the ftlel clitdcmg, reactor coolafll sySlem pre!l!>lfre bollndar;, and oontairrn.er,t) would tie, ,n:1,n1a11W:d lmpact,s tc ne:wt>y s.truew1es tould anect Ille j)lllnl te~portse measures or the J¥Ollabrllly of addtUooal ,nma10rs However, there .are s bl mulUple diverse barr~s anc:I fflllrgM,On measures ,n place 10 rn,n,nuze I.Ile challenges lo lhe pl:1111 preveAlrrlQ events Iran progressmg lo core <l<lmag,e. contamrng the raocllOactJVe so11rce leflTI, afld ensumg emergency preparedl)e'SS capa~ lmpae1s on s.1rucrures 1n lhe pro:..m1ty of !he ellPf,osoon do not signrficanlty degrade' dl!'fense i'1 depth Qlll$

LIC,504 stilles ll>al ilddioonal rcguliJ!ory actJoo may be required 10 pl.Jee or rtlilintarn lhc plant .,

a safe OOMlbon rl 1h1?re is signrficilf'!t loss or safety margin (e g . ltle cakulated ASME code s1ruc1..-a1 lac~ kw a a,rnpooent are equal to or less man 1) Rf!91dator; Gulde 1 1r4 also indicates 01,at s.ale1y margiAS arc adequalc rf ( 1) tne codl?'; and standards or the-tr attemalives approved for use by Ille RC afl! met and (2) hcenSlflg b.as,s s.a.fety analys,s acceplance cn.'ena arc rTld A ptpe roptvrc does not illfe~ the plimfs c;omplian<<' 'Mlh codes and 5'a;rl.dards Compliance

~h the p4ool's techntcaJ sp,ecificaoons ensures adeQuale mar(llll ts mall\lained agarnSI des,ogn bi>~ ;icQ!dr.nt'l' 6

R,sk t;r,gssment

.AssumprJons and Inputs :

Al)poodlX F 111 the Federal Emergency Manapemet1I Agency (I-EMAi ' Ha..'ldbook of Chemical 1gazaJt1 Ar1aly$$ PtOC.t.'dure:ii* 19~9--026--035-10575, tSS9 (ref 1) iden:ifi~ :icacren1 ,. 11!$ for pcpehnes wilt, :, di mieler gre;t:e, 1h:"' ,0 ,rid,es M SE..ol l>Ctidellt$ pc, year pea J>l>elu>t mile Too FEtllA Handbook also slates ma1 only 20,0 of even~ constltllle lar~ llli:>e ~ $

13.,,st,d on dz prob;,bity, lll1! r,.,.....,,,cy of p,peir,,e rupture 15 c.alad.:.led ,!1.Un11ng 3915 fl o(

pipeline ,ire neiu lhe site Thi, IS equ:rl 10 (3.935 fl I (5:n!O It I mr ) ) - 0 745 nu of p1pdne (ref 2)

Tile fr'l!<rooncy of p1pe/lne llJJ)lllll!S 1s lllefefore FrequenL)' cl pip,,liue rupcurc, "' Failure, raie

  • rup,turc, p,P.Ceol-.K~ ol failure,
  • pip,,li 11~ lt,ngth F~1Je11<1 of plpi,li~ rutltlre

.. l5

  • rn-* I resi'yean'jttp1c e mJe H<l.2 tomplete rupbJl'l!SJIJJlure )(0. 745 i:.'IJ)elllll! rnllesJ f'nr.:iueocy of pl~linHu~n, = 7 "S , 10 '

Tbc vail111!$ ol 11$1( to be c;Qmj>,lrcd ;,g,,inGt lhe n~k a,;1,on lhri:,,;hold$ p,ow,ded in l lC-504 a,e

~~ a!,:,;l l.,y rno1<in11 !hie(: co~tvll11VI: ,,*.* 1ro;,tm1:;

, All wmplc1t11 rupk1re~ lcoo ditl: . ty Cti ~ore di1Jn.J91l

  • The ' J!.
  • t00ll1>00 e!U!.1" rar 45 d..y-.. (too ¢'.if;ltsoro ur Ut,,. Clla-11tt:1n'!. rar.lung rnerr.11)
  • Large ealfy rerease prooabllity 15 0 1 .ii the c<1re darna;pe probabll1ty
  • lt,ie ~uoott,onal wre dani.lgt, lro,qui,iocy {CCi>Fl e.111be c:alt111.lted llS the rrequenc:-y 01 a jti,,ehn.e ,uplures ~ fflU! ptob-.Jbildy tl'la1 .113,pehne ruplure leads to oo:e l.lama#e, *OI (7.45
  • 10 ~) * (t) = 745
  • 1()" 5
  • Tb!! comittlorol urge early releiiSe fre1pency \CL£Rf) is ted ss O , or tne c;ow.libonal core damage prooabdity o,

{7 AS* 10- ') * (0.1) c:: 7AS * .10

  • Tt>e mc,r-!,11QO-nd11to1,;il o:ttte dam..,ge pn)!>>btty (tCCOP) 1n lt!e 45..ct.-.y ,vind- t:Jn bu~ ated by mu11,p,'yin.9 lhc Q>n~I t-lJru dilll'liJJ!l' probJ!Jdity, t
  • rn* ' tng CVl'lll fre>Q11cncy. an.I the duraoon of the c-0nd'lion or.

(l) * (7.45

  • U)*S c-.rnt*;/)<cilr) * (4S hys/;lt,Sd,n/yc*v) 'i.tl:l
  • t(l *~
  • Too IJl(;remental lari;e early retease prol>.1lb!L1Y 111:!l EAPJ c;an oo calcUlated as O1 ol the lllt.-iemenl.ll a111dlllonal core d:1m.1ge proballllity, c (9.18
  • 10 6) * (0.1) 918
  • 10* '

7

These values can oo compared aga1n!".I the rrsk action 1h esholds m UC-504 Paramctn LIC-W-1 R1$11 Act00<1 I l>>'emokl C;Jlt1Rlcd Value CCOF t E-3 7 45E-5 CLERF 1E-.t 7 45E-6 ICCDP ~t-5 9 IIIE~

ICLERP 5E-6 9 18E-7 The numbers prowcl,e(f abOve represent med,an e!ltJmates 01 Ille colX1tlional rore damage probillbility and large Cilrly rcle-ase probability Howe'l'l:f , lhc,y were i::altvlaled assumlllO lliJJIIOUS 0011$erv.11ism$. some c,.f whith are cn,,un,er.,te,d in lhe 1. ble below scuree or Coo!:elvm,sm Elfeci Large pipe f14)1Ure5 lead lo deffagra:ions Of detooabals TIie FEMA t oroer ct magndllde Jj,'ll'ldbaQlc h0li!$ 111;)1 *.., il',e, eve1U U 111,e,e IS liilklre ,n :'I ppelaie. nl0$1 Ol:en tne outcome ts a small leak

  • AssumpllOOS oo jMpetlne fajure !'ales were s!rucb.Jred around ~Jes 1 oroer ~ magnlllM!e (or pe11onnee1 Ira Ille 198&.I SlOOe tllefl, ~ liDd 5.landams tilM! lfllll'ovetl gre~er) l!llC! prot.._,o OJ tail'J~ ~ be IC$$ 11'1;.ln lhOJe §Rimed The l)fllbabAlly ot ral.lre 1or lhts spectnc sectlorl of J)IIM!lne IS reworo SIBce It was COl'61J\lctecl 10 speclliCatons 11\al exceed ctrrent oocie requrement!.

.t*n<J *1'S CO\lere<I ""'"' tonertle pl(in IO preven1 n.'ltl*ertenl o:,,n:-,g<: 110,11 d - =.

The ~ .JSWll>C$ " " ' JJPC!ne r.Jtlurcs IC;Jld OtrCCtly IO t01C: ~ - In 3 nrOcrs of milgl¥t\lOC realty. a JMl)ellne e,cp1os1on wru<l l'IOI e11recuy cause damage to Jhe re,aclOr (Of gll!illl!f) core. 1r,oogn tt c;out;1 dilfflil9C $i!lety-rct.Jlcd cqu;,mcn1 lh.rl m;:,y be nceocd IO prewm COil! damage II arMMer trvtlirlrlg l!Yef)! were to ocair al Jhe same

'ldne ll\115, tile calculilled values tor CCOF of 7.4SE S, Ct.ERF of 7.45E 6, ICCOF' oJ 9 UIE 6, alld ICLERP of9 18E-7 represent upper bound esnmates, and lhere are several orders of m:q ucie (II co1>l.er.r,,1,sm sep:11m,ng these valu~ flon, mo,e rer,hsloc estun.,~ s Cooclusjoo:s No s,gndic.anl degradalloon .of defense 1n depth nor loss of s.a1ety margns were 1dentJfied Tile ev ation above shows that the CCDF, CLERF, ICCOF', and ICLERP value:s assoaa'led wrlh p,pehne e,,:pl0$10tl$. t IPrC \Ire $1'1'1: ll 11 the l lC-504 risk c:1,on lhreSll0ld$ n,e,erore. no

,mmed111te reg1.1ta10ry act,on is required 10 ma1nta,n the plant in a ~le cond,t.on

  • Note ltlat ll:!IS is ii CO<l5CfYollrvciy boUOOfl\il Y1ltJe !of a 5talloo bliJtkool inH.~ 111' ii P!)lCillle oplD5!011

~use ij e1oes no1 ~ '

3!ld lhe Cliesel g,eoeraflOI 1JUtld111gs

'°' Vill10U5 liK*Jr5. suth i!IS the lun.--.cd line OI Sl!Jhl ~ !fie r ~

l Sateiy Evalua1Jon Performed l,y Entergy lm<ler 10 CFR SO 59 (ADAMS A<<esston No ML 14253Al39), August 21 , 20 14 2 FE AA "Handbook of Chemical Hazard Ana~12; ~ r e s . " Appcndc* F, 1009-62~095-10575, tl:!li9 Failure data from Reference 1 8

For e:nmp e, a wse facduy may be coarsely modellod u bav1n1: storage opcra.uoos, loadlng/ullloadins opm.'tions, and procasm5 operations. These ca.n respccuvcly be rcpl'C$Cn.tcd by storage tank wt= and lean, hose fail.~, and p1pm.i: and process vessel failuru. The mtu suggested for each of lhese ~:

Stc,mgc lank - double walled 10"/lB.nk-ycar S1oras.e !llnlc * ~;le walled 1(}'/lank-year Pressun: vessels 1l}'/vcUcl-yc:ar Plplng l .S X ] (}'/fl-)'tar l..oading hoses 1()-'/opc:ru.llon or ll}*jbose-ycar ill Direct quote from OIG report ill Copy enclosed 9

Paul M. Blanch PE Energy Consultant Monday, March 2, 2020 Ms. Rossana Raspa NRC Office of the Inspector General U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Commission and EDO continue "Backward Engineering" Dear Ms. Raspa Your recent OIG CASE NO .16-024 has identified numerous deficiencies in the manner the NRC staff responds to safety issues and the handling of 10 CFR 2.206 petitions.

One of many disturbing issues in the report was discussion of what "appeared to be backwards engineering to get a desired result." 1 To the lay person this means that NRC management establishes the desired end result and subtlety "encourages" the NRC staff to develop a result that justifies the management's desired outcome.

An example in the OIG report is the manipulation of both probability and consequences of potential events such that the risks would be acceptable to the general population and the project could be approved. I firmly believe the "backwards engineering" described in the OIG report the result of management encouragement to get a desired result irrespective of the true risk and the truth.

One would logically believe that after this scathing report of potentially illegal and unethical practices, the NRC would go to the confessional and promise never to do this again. WRONG!

On February 24, 2020 the EDO, Ms. Margaret Doane wrote a letter2 to all Commissioners that directed Mr. David Skeen to refute the OIG report by stating the conclusion she desired by stating:

1 Direct quote from OIG report 2

Copy enclosed

"This conclusion is based on the.following summary findings that are explained in more detail in the attached enclosure:

  • There is no significant degradation to defense-in-depth at either unit.
  • There is no significant loss of safety margin at either unit.
  • There is no high-risk impact at either unit from internal or external events, as all risk metrics are under the prescribed thresholds. "

Not only is Ms. Doane ignoring the risk of a catastrophic accident to the reactor and the spent fuel pool, she is directing Mr. Skeen to "backward engineer" and justify an incorrect outcome by using "Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures, Appendix F" a document not approved by the NRC, not mentioned in Regulatory Guide 1.91, and more than 30 years outdated. Further, Ms. Doane quotes probabilities totally inconsistent with this handbook. I just looked at my calendar and it is not "Groundhog Day."

Ms. Doane also misuses this 31-year-old handbook to say everything is fine when PHMSA data indicates a significant increase in pipeline failure probabilities over the past 10 years. My calculations, bases on the same reference show a probability in the range of less than 10-3 per mile-year. This is unacceptable and requires immediate action.

On a somewhat related issue, I was informed there is a defect in the AIM pipeline that requires shutdown and the reuse of an idle 26" pipeline adjacent to the control and switchgear rooms. Failure of either of these will cause a total loss of all AC and DC power including the inability to use the FLEX systems. We all know the consequences of this occurrence of this event.

When I asked the OPA to confirm the existence of this alleged AIM pipe defect, I received the following email from Scott Burnell, the top person in the OPA office with no understanding of potential nuclear accidents:

Hello Paul; Questions regarding the current status of the pipeline located in the vicinity of Indian Point should be directed to the pipeline operator and/or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Thank y ou.

Scott Burnell Public Affairs Officer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission I responded to Mr. Burnell saying:

Scott:

I understand the NRC has placed a "gag order " and won Yallow anyone to speak.

This is a nuclear safety concern and you tell me to go to FERC or Enbridge ?

They don Ydeal with nuclear safety concerns of a pipeline on the Indian Point property.

ff you want to stick your head in the sand, I have other avenues.

Thank you for protecting us.

Paul Blanch I am not please at the way nuclear safety is being addressed with such arrogance by the Commission, the EDO and the Office of Public Affairs.

This copy of this letter is notification to the Commissioners and the EDO to take immediately actions as required by 10 CFR 50 because Indian Point is operating in an unanalyzed condition.

I also request your office convey to the Commission that it appears that they have totally slapped the OIG in the face and will continue endorsing the clear violation of regulatory requirements.

Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.

West Hartford, CT 0611 7 Cc: The Commissioners EDO David Skeen Congresswoman Lowey

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C . 20555.0001 February 26, 2020 MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Svinicki Commissioner Baran Commissioner Caputo Commissioner Wright FROM : Margaret M. Doane /RAJ Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

CONCERNS PERTAINING TO GAS TRANSMISSION LINES AT THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT:

DETERMINATION NOT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION This memorandum responds to the Chairman's February 24, 2020, direction to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) to address matters raised in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report, Event Inquiry, "Concerns Pertaining to Gas Transmission Lines at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant" (Case No.16-024). In that memorandum , the Chairman directed the prompt examination to determine if immediate regulatory action is needed based on information in the OIG report and to promptly inform the Commission of the results of that examination and what actions, if any, the staff plans to take. For the following reasons, I have determined that there is no need for immediate regulatory action .

In response to the Chairman's direction, I tasked Dr. Mirela Gavrilas to examine the information in the OIG report (advance copy) and evaluate promptly whether immediate action is warranted.

Dr. Gavrilas was not involved in the matter in question in the OIG report. Dr. Gavrilas received her Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and has decades of experience in nuclear power plant safety.

The determination on whether immediate action is needed was performed in accordance with the agency procedure used to respond to nuclear power plant emergent issues. This procedure is found in section 4.2.1 of LIC-504 Rev. 4 "Integrated Risk-Informed Decision-Making Process for Emergent Issues* (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No.: ML14035A143). After reviewing the findings in the OIG report and the technical aspects of the 42-inch gas line that traverses the Indian Point Energy Center property (IPEC),

Dr. Gavrilas has determined that there is no safety issue warranting immediate regulatory action at either Unit 2 or Unit 3.

The Commissioners This conclusion is based on the following summary findings that are explained in more detail in the attached enclosure:

  • There is no significant degradation to defense-in-depth at either unit.
  • There is no significant loss of safety margin at either unit.
  • There is no high-risk impact at either unit from internal or external events, as all risk metrics are under the prescribed thresholds.

I have assigned David Skeen to lead a team of experts to respond to the remaining issues in the Chairman's memorandum, including the direction to provide the Commission with the results of a staff review within 45. days of the date of the memorandum. Mr. Skeen has been a member of the Senior Executive Service for more than a decade, and previously served as the director of the Japan Lessons-Learned Directorate. In that capacity, he had a key role in evaluating the safety of the U.S. nuclear power plant fleet in response to the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant caused by the Great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. Mr. Skeen was not involved in the matters addressed in the OIG report.

As is contemplated under the procedure, LIC-504 , during the course of the team's review, the team will be mindful of the need to assess any new emergent issues.

Enclosure:

Evaluation of Emergent Information Pertaining to Gas Transmission Lines at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant cc: SECY OGC OIG OPA D. Skeen

The Commissioners

SUBJECT:

CONCERNS PERTAINING TO GAS TRANSMISSION LINES AT THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: DETERMINATION NOT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION DATED FEBRUARY 26, 2020.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML20068D08S OFFICE OEDO NRR OGC EDO NAME DJackson MGavrilas MZobler MDoane DATE 2/26/2020 2/26/2020 2/26/2020 2/26/2020 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Evaluation of Emergent Information Pertaining to Gas Transmission Lines at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant This evaluation is in response to the Chairman's tasking of February 24, 2020, to determine if immediate regulatory action is necessary. This prompt evaluation was performed in accordance

  • with Section 4.21 of Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) office instruction LIC-504 Rev. 4 "Integrated Risk-Informed Decision-Making Process for Emergent Issues* (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No.: ML14035A143) within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the request.

Defense-in-Depth LIC-504 states that additional regulatory action may be required to place or maintain the plant in a safe condition if defense-in-depth is significantly degraded (e.g., multiple barriers are moderately to significantly degraded, functional redundancy or diversity is significantly compromised , or vulnerability to single failures is significantly increased).

While a pipe rupture could impact certain structures on the site (e.g. , gas turbine fuel oil tanks, the switchyard, emergency operations facility, FLEX equipment storage building), the pipeline is located approximately 1500 ft (rev 2) from the nearest safety related structure and barriers to radioactive release (i.e., the fuel cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary, and containment) would be maintained. Impacts to nearby structures could affect the plant response measures or the probability of additional initiators. However, there are still multiple diverse barriers and mitigation measures in place to minimize the challenges to the plant, preventing events from progressing to core damage, containing the radioactive source term, and ensuring emergency preparedness capabilities. Impacts on structures in the proximity of the explosion do not significantly degrade defense in depth .

Safety Margins LIC-504 states that additional regulatory action may be required to place or maintain the plant in a safe condition if there is significant loss of safety margin (e.g ., the calculated ASME code structural factors for a component are equal to or less than 1). Regulatory Guide 1.174 also indicates that safety margins are adequate if (1) the codes and standards or their alternatives approved for use by the NRC are met and (2) licensing basis safety analysis acceptance criteria are met.

A pipe rupture does not affect the plant's compliance with codes and standards. Compliance with the plant's technical specifications ensures adequate margin is maintained against design basis accidents.

Risk Assessment Assumptions and Inputs:

Appendix F in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) "Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures* 1989-626-095-10575, 1989 (ref 1) identifies accident rates for pipelines with a diameter greater than 20 inches at 5E-4 accidents per year per pipeline mile.

The FEMA Handbook also states that only 20% of events constitute large pipe ruptures.

Based on this probability, the frequency of pipeline rupture is calculated assuming 3935 ft of pipeline are near the site. This is equal to (3935 ft/ (5280 ft/ mi))= 0.745 mi of pipeline (ref 2).

The frequency of pipeline ruptures is therefore:

Frequency of pipeline rupture = Failure rate

  • rupture percentage of failures
  • pipeline length Frequency of pipeline rupture

= (5

  • 10- 4 failures/year/pipeline mile)(0.2 complete ruptures/failure )(0.745 pipeline miles)

Frequency of pipeline rupture = 7.45

  • 10- s The values of risk to be compared against the risk action thresholds provided in LIC-504 are calculated by making three conservative assumptions:
  • All complete ruptures lead directly to core damage.
  • The "as-is" condition exists for 45 days (the duration of the Chairman's tasking memo).
  • Large early release probability is 0.1 of the core damage probability.

Under these assumptions:

  • The conditional core damage frequency (CCDF) can be calculated as the frequency of a pipeline ruptures times the probability that a pipeline rupture leads to core damage, or:

(7.45

  • 10- 5 ) * (1) = 7.45
  • 10- 5

(7.45

  • 10- 5 ) * (0.1) = 7.45
  • 10- 6
  • The incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) in the 45-day window can be calculated by multiplying the conditional core damage probability, the initiating event frequency, and the duration of the condition, or:

(1) * (7.45

  • 10- 5 events/year)* (45 days/365 days/year) = 9.18
  • 10- 6
  • The incremental large early release probability (ICLERP) can be calculated as 0.1 of the incremental conditional core damage probability, or:

(9.18 .10- 6 ) * (0.1) = 9.18

  • 10- 1

These values can be compared against the risk action thresholds in LIC-504 :

Parameter UC-504 Risk Action Threshold Calculated Value CCDF 1E-3 7.45E-5' CLERF 1E-4 7.45E-6 ICCDP 5E-5 9.1 8E-6 ICLERP 5E-6 9.18E-7 Discussion:

The numbers provided above represent median estimates of the conditional core damage probability and large early release probability. However, they were calculated assuming various conservatisms, some of which are enumerated in the table below.

Source of Conservatism Effect Large pipe ruptures lead to deflagrations or detonations. The FEMA 1 order of magnitude Handbook notes that "in the event that there is a failure in a pipeline, most often the outcome is a small leak.*

Assumptions on pipeline failure rates were structured around studies 1 order of magnitude (or performed In the 1980s. Since then, codes and standards have improved greater) and probabilities of failure would be less than those assumed. The probability of failure for this specific section of pipeline is reduced since it was constructed to specifications that exceed current code requirements and was covered with concrete planks to prevent inadvertent damage from diaaina.

The analysis assumes that pipeline failures lead directly to core damage. In 3 orders of magnitude reality, a pipeline explosion would not directly cause damage to the reactor (or greater) core, though it could damage safety-related equipment that may be needed to prevent core damage If another initiating event were to occur at the same time.

Thus, the calculated values for CCOF of 7.45E-5, CLERF of 7.45E-6, ICCDP of 9.18E-6, and ICLERP of 9.18E-7 represent upper bound estimates, and there are several orders of magnitude of conservatism separating these values from more realistic estimates.

Conclusions No significant degradation of defense in depth nor loss of safety margins were identified. The evaluation above shows that the CCOF, CLERF, ICCOP, and ICLERP values associated with pipeline explosions at IPEC are smaller than the LIC-504 risk action thresholds. Therefore, no immediate regulatory action is required to maintain the plant in a safe condition.

  • Note that this is a conservatively bounding value for a station blackout initiated by a pipeline explosion because it does not account for various factors , such as the limited line of sight between the explosion and the diesel generator buildings.

References

1. Safety Evaluation Perfonned by Entergy Under 10 CFR 50.59 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14253A339), August 21, 2014
2. FEMA "Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures,* Appendix F, 1989-626-095-10575, 1989 Failure data from Reference 1 For example, a large facility may be coarsely modelled as havmg storage operations, loading/unloading operations, and processmg operanons. These can respectively be represented by storage tank fatlures and leaks, hose failures. and p1pmg and process vessel failures. The rates suggested for each of these are:

Storage tank - double walled 1O'/tank-year Storage tank - single walled 104/tank-year Pressure vessels 104/vessel-year Piping 1.5 X 1()4/ft-year Loading hoses 104/operanon or 1{}4-/hose-year

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