ML23063A143
| ML23063A143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/2023 |
| From: | Sturzebecher K Reactor Decommissioning Branch |
| To: | Fleming J Holtec International SMR |
| Sturzebecher K | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23063A141 | List: |
| References | |
| EPID L-2021-LLE-0057, ML22335A535, ML23067A082, eConcurrence 20230309-70025 | |
| Download: ML23063A143 (18) | |
Text
Jean Fleming, Vice President Licensing, Regulatory Affairs, and PSA Holtec International, LLC Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus 1 Holtec Boulevard Camden, NJ 08104
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER - EXEMPTIONS FROM CERTAIN EMERGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED SAFETY EVALUATION (EPID L-2021-LLE-0057)
Dear Jean Fleming:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has approved the enclosed exemptions from specific requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.47, "Emergency plans," and Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," to 10 CFR Part 50, for the Indian Point Energy Center. This action is in response to your application for exemptions dated December 22, 2022 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21356B693), revised February 2, 2022 (ML22033A348), and supplemented by letter dated February 1, 2022 (ML22032A017).
The exemptions are provided in Enclosure 1 and the NRC staff's related safety evaluation is provided in Enclosure 2. The exemptions will be forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.November 1, 2023 J. Fleming 2 If you have any questions concerning the above, please contact me at 301-415-8534 or via email at Karl.Sturzebecher@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, Karl J. Sturzebecher, Project Manager Reactor Decommissioning Branch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket Nos.50-003, 50-247 and 50-286
Enclosures:
- 1. Exemptions
- 2. Safety Evaluation Cc w/enclosures: Indian Point ListServ Signed by Sturzebecher, Karl on 11/01/23
ENCLOSURE 1
EXEMPTION
HOLTEC DECOMMISSIONING INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 2, LLC, AND HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 3, LLC
INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER
DOCKET NOS.50-003, 50-247, 50-286, and 72-051 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos.50-003, 50-247, 50-286]
HOLTEC DECOMMISSIONING INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 2, LLC AND HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 3, LLC
INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER
EXEMPTION
I. Background.
Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Units 1, 2, and 3, are decommissioning power reactors
located on approximately 239 acres of land on the east bank of the Hudson River at the Village
of Buchanan in upper Westchester County, New York. The licensee, Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC (HDI), is the holder of IPEC Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-5, DPR-26,
and DFP-64. The licenses provide, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased generation on
October 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1 reactor vessel by January 1976. In
1996, the NRC issued an order approving the safe-storage condition of IP1. In 2003, the NRC
issued Amendment No. 52 to IP1s provisional operating license that changed the licenses
expiration date to be consistent with that of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2)
license at that time. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. HDI states
that there is no IP1 spent fuel in wet storage at the IPEC site; IP1 spent fuel is stored onsite in
dry cask storage in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
2 By letter dated February 8, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear
Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC licensees at that time,
collectively, "Entergy) certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at IP2 and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 2020, and
April 30, 2021, respectively. By letters dated May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021 (ML20113J902
and ML21131A157, respectively), Entergy certified to the NRC that power operations
permanently ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the
same letters, Entergy certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the IP2
and IP3 reactor vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 spent fuel pools (SFPs) as of May 12,
2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively.
Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified in Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR Part 50 renewed facility
operating license for IPEC (Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64) no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is still authorized to
possess, and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the
IP2 and IP3 facilities in the SFPs and in a dry cask ISFSI.
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety analysis reports (USARs)
for operating power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel
in the reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the release of
large quantities of fission products. With the permanent cessation of power operations at IPEC
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessels, many accidents are no longer
possible. The reactors, reactor coolant system (RCS), and supporting systems are no longer in
operation and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, the
3 emergency planning (EP) provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of
the reactors, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, "Emergency plans," and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part
50, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," continue
to apply to nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions
distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled
from those for a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements
that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility, HDI must obtain
exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then can HDI modify the IPEC Emergency Plan to
reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of
IPEC.
II. Request/Action.
By letter dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693), revised February 1, 2022
(ML22033A348), HDI requested exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR Part 50
for IPEC. Specifically, HDI requested exemptions from certain planning standards in 10 CFR
50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear power reactors;
from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment of plume exposure
and ingestion pathway EP zones for nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, which establish the elements that comprise the
content of emergency plans. In a letter dated February 1, 2022 (ML22032A017), HDI provided
responses to the NRC staff's requests for additional information (RAI) concerning the proposed
exemptions.
4 The information provided by HDI included justifications for each exemption requested. The
exemptions requested by HDI would eliminate the requirements to maintain formal offsite
radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR, Emergency Management and Assistance, Part
350, Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and
Preparedness, and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at IPEC. HDI stated that application
of all the standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix E are not needed for adequate emergency response capability, based on the
substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of accidents still possible at the
permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared to an operating facility. If offsite
protective actions were needed for a highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident that could
challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at IPEC, provisions exist for offsite agencies to take
protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) under the
National Preparedness System to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this
context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in FEMA's
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, "Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations
Plans." Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal,
and local EP in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of
risk-informed planning and decision-making and helps planners at all levels of government in
their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is
flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel,
equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for "all-hazards planning."
5 Ill. Discussion.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon
application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
These special circumstances include, among other things, that the application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to both operating and shutdown power reactors. The NRC
has consistently acknowledged that the risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor
that has permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel
is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer, than at an
operating power reactor. However, current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power
reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release from credible
emergency accident scenarios is significantly reduced. The reduced risk is largely the result of
the low frequency of credible events that could challenge the SFP structure, and the reduced
decay heat and reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory due to decay. The NRC's
NUREG/CR-6451, "A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants," dated August 31, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML082260098) and NUREG-1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," dated February 28, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors bounded
by the assumptions and conditions in the reports, the risk of offsite radiological release is
significantly less than that for an operating power reactor.
6 In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by HDI, have been granted to
licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors. However, the exemptions did
not relieve the licensees of all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees
to modify their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific risks that were
consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled status. Specifically, the NRCs approval
of these prior exemptions from certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's
demonstration that: (1) the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents would not
exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective Action
Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary, and (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond-
design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the
SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health
and safety of the public. Based on prior exemption requests, the NRC has generally approved
such exemptions when the site-specific analysis demonstrates that there is sufficient time
following a loss of SFP coolant inventory until the onset of fuel damage to implement onsite
mitigation of the loss of SFP coolant inventory and if necessary, to implement offsite protective
actions. In prior exemptions, sufficient time was demonstrated if the time exceeded 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />
from the loss of coolant until the fuel temperature would be expected to reach 900 degrees
Celsius (°C), assuming no air cooling.
With respect to design-basis-accidents at IPEC, the licensee provided analysis
demonstrating that 15 months following permanent cessation of power operations, the
radiological consequences of the only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite
radiological release (a fuel handling accident in the Reactor Building, where the SFP is located)
will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. With respect to
beyond-design-basis accidents at IPEC, HDI analyzed a beyond-design-basis accident involving
7 a complete loss of SFP water inventory, where adequate fuel handling building air exchange
with the environment and air cooling of the stored fuel was available. HDIs analysis
demonstrated that, as of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to
keep the fuel within safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel cladding damage or offsite
radiological release.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the requested exemptions against
the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR
50.12(a) will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of the HDI EP
exemptions is described in SECY-22-0102 dated November 18, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML22231A160). The Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the
exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-22-0102, dated October 24, 2023
(ADAMS Accession No. ML23297A027). Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by
HDI and the NRC staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-22-0102. The
staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP exemptions
requested by HDI are provided in the NRC staff's safety evaluation dated November 1, 2023
(ADAMS Accession No. ML23067A082).
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, appendix E,Section IV, which would allow
HDI to revise the IPEC Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled
condition of the facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission
may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the
licensee's proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.
8 B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, HDI provided analyses that show the radiological consequences of
design-basis accidents will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR Part
50 will no longer be needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary,
based on the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents still possible at IPEC.
Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-basis accident that
might result in significant offsite radiological releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the
risk of beyond-design-basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 concludes that the event sequences
important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large
earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative
to the operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different sequences make
significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements, under
10 CFR Part 50, a few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report
further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small
because the overall risk is low, and because even under current EP requirements for operating
power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the
severe earthquake event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops (for
which offsite radiological emergency plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in
likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 to
maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will
not present an undue risk to the public health and safety.
9 C. The Exemption is Consistent with the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by HDI only involve EP requirements under 10 CFR Part 50
and will allow HDI to revise the IPEC Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at IPEC are not affected by the
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite radiological emergency plans
and the reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at IPEC will not adversely affect HDIs
ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed
exemptions are consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, appendix E,Section IV, is to provide reasonable assurance
that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological
emergency, to establish plume exposure and ingestion pathway EP zones for nuclear power
plants, and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite radiological emergency
plans. The standards and requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the
risks associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These
risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section Ill of this document, because IPEC Units 1, 2, and 3
are permanently shutdown and defueled, there will no longer be a risk of a significant offsite
radiological release from a design-basis accident exceeding early phase PAGs at the exclusion
area boundary, and the risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-
basis accident is greatly reduced when compared to the risk at an operating power reactor. In a
10 letter dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693), revised February 1, 2022 (ML22033A348),
the licensee provided analyses to demonstrate that the radiological consequences of design-
basis accidents at IPEC will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at IPEC by comparing the generic
risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions at IPEC; and has
determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented by IPEC.
In addition, the significant decay of short-lived radionuclides that has occurred since
shutdown of IPEC provides assurance in other ways. As indicated by the results of research
conducted for NUREG-1738 and more recently, for NUREG-2161, "Consequence Study of a
Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
Reactor" (ML14255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs
with significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal
offsite radiological EP requirements were relaxed. HDI's analysis of a beyond-design-basis
accident involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, where adequate fuel handling
building air exchange with the environment and air cooling of the stored fuel is available, shows
that as of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep the fuel within
safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel cladding damage or offsite radiological release.
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that progresses to a condition
where a significant offsite release might occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP
drains in such a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable,
which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heat up of the spent fuel. HDI's analysis of this
beyond-design-basis accident shows that 15 months after shutdown, a minimum of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />
would be available between the time the fuel is initially uncovered (at which time adiabatic heat
up is conservatively assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652
degrees Fahrenheit (°F) (900 °C), which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding
11 oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release. This analysis conservatively
does not include the period of time from the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water
inventory until all cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified HDI's analyses and its calculations. The analyses provide
reasonable assurance that in granting the requested exemptions to HDI, there is no design-
basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident
affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer,
because all Units at IPEC have been shutdown for well over 15 months, there will be a minimum
of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> to
initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a
radiological release were projected to occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />
is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 have previously been
approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> are available
following a loss of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the zirconium rapid
oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does
with the HDI-requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> are available to initiate
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to
implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite radiological
emergency plans, required under 10 CFR Part 50, are not necessary at permanently shut down
and defueled power reactors.
12 Additionally, in HDIs letters to the NRC dated December 22, 2021, and
February 2, 2022, HDI described the SFP makeup strategies that could be used in the event of
a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple strategies for providing makeup water to the
SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy between
IP2 and IP3 that relies on installed Primary Water Storage Tank, fire water inside the SFP
buildings, and fire water using a temporary diesel pump from outside of the SFP buildings; or an
external strategy that uses portable pumps to initiate makeup flow into the SFPs through a
standpipe and standard fire hoses routed to the SFPs or to a spray nozzle. These strategies will
continue to be required as License Condition 2(N), Mitigation Strategy License Condition and
2(AC), Mitigation Strategy License Condition for Units 2 and 3 respectively. Considering the
very low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse
strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or spray water to the SFP
before the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release. Because of the length of time, it
would take for the fuel to heat up, there are 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> available to respond to any draindown
event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup or providing spray to
the IP2 or IP3 SFPs.
For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that HDIs requested exemptions
meet the underlying purpose of all of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, appendix E, and satisfies the special
circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological
consequences associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the IPEC
facility. The staff further concludes that the exemptions granted by this action will maintain an
acceptable level of emergency preparedness at IPEC and provide reasonable assurance that
adequate offsite protective measures, if needed, can and will be taken by State and local
government agencies using a CEMP approach, in the highly unlikely event of a radiological
13 14emergency at the IPEC facility. Since the underlying purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction in the scope of the onsite EP activities at IPEC, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31 (a), the Commission has determined that the granting of these exemptions will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment, as discussed in the NRC staff's Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact published on October 31, 2023 (88 FR 74536).
IV. Conclusions.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), that HDI's request for exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY 0102, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants HDI exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the staff's safety evaluation dated. The exemptions are effective as of
.November 1, 2023 15Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jane Marshall, Director Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and SafeguardNovember 1, 2023 Signed by Marshall, Jane on 11/01/23
ML23063A141; Ltr ML23063A143 OFFICE NMSS/DWUP/RDB NMSS/DUWP/RDB NMSS/DUWP NMSS/DWUP/RDB NAME KSturzebecher KS SAnderson SA JMarshall JM KSturzebecher KS DATE Mar 22, 2023 Nov 1, 2023 Nov 1, 2023 Nov 1, 2023