ML23326A132
ML23326A132 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Indian Point |
Issue date: | 12/05/2023 |
From: | Sturzebecher K Reactor Decommissioning Branch |
To: | Fleming J Holtec |
References | |
EPID L-2022-LLA-0195 | |
Download: ML23326A132 (23) | |
Text
December 5, 2023
Jean A. Fleming Vice President, Licensing, Regulatory Affairs, and PSA Holtec International, LLC Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus 1 Holtec Boulevard Camden, NJ 08104
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - IS SUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 67, 300 AND 276 TO IMPLEMENT THE INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION ONLY EMERGENCY PLAN (EPID L-2022-LLA-0195)
Dear Jean Fleming:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) ha s issued the enclosed Amendment No. 67 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-5 for Indian Point, Unit 1 (IP1),
Amendment No. 300 to Renewed Facility License No. DPR-26 for In dian Point, Unit 2 (IP2), and Amendment No. 276 to Renewed Facility License No. DPR-64 for In dian Point, Unit 3 (IP3). The amendments issued are in response to your application dated Nov ember 17, 2022 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML22321A148). The Notice of Application for Amendment was published in the Federa l Register on September 5, 2023 (88 FR 60714).
The amendment revises the Indian P oint Energy Center (IPEC) Eme rgency Plan to reflect the requirements associated with em ergency preparedness necessary f or the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) only configuration, consisten t with the permanent removal of all spent fuel from the IPEC spent fuel pool. Specifically, the ame ndment implements a revision to the IPEC Emergency Plan and an associated Emergency Action Leve l scheme to implement the IPEC ISFSI-Only Emergency Plan (I OEP), which reflects the movem ent of all spent fuel into dry storage within the onsite ISFSI, an action that was completed o n October 16, 2023 (ML23289A158).
As discussed in the enclosed safety evaluation, the NRC staff h as reviewed the proposed changes to the IPEC IOEP, and concluded that the proposed chang es meet the standards of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.47, Emergency plans, and the requirements of Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Prepare dness for Production and Utilization Facilities, to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted, and co ntinue to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be tak en in the event of a radiological emergency at the IPEC site. Therefore, the propose d changes, as outlined in the letters referenced above, are considered acceptable. The basis for the NRC staffs conclusion is contained in the attached safety evaluation.
J. Fleming
The amendments are provided as Enclosures 1, 2 and 3. The licen se amendments are effective upon issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of the ef fective date. A copy of the related safety evaluation is also enclosed as Enclosure 4. A No tice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.
Pursuant to paragraph (c)(10) of 10 CFR 51.22, Criterion for c ategorical exclusion; identification of licensing and regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or otherwise not requiring environmental review, the Commission has determi ned that the issuance of this amendment is categorically excluded and pursuant to 10 CFR 51.2 2(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding, of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter will be available electronically for publ ic inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
If you have any questions concerning the above, please contact me at 301-415-8534 or via email at Karl.Sturzebecher@nrc.gov.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Karl J. Sturzebecher, Project Manager Reactor Decommissioning Branch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Docket Nos.50-003, 50-247, 50-286
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 67 to DPR-5
- 2. Amendment No. 300 to DPR-26
- 3. Amendment No. 276 to DPR-64
- 4. Safety Evaluation
cc w/enclosures: Indian Point ListServ
ML23326A132 OFFICE NMSS/DWUP/RDB OGC/GCRPS/HLW NMSS/DUWP/RDB NMSS/DUWP/RDB FCNS/NLO NAME KSturzebecher ACoggins KSturzebecher SAnderson THood for TH DATE 12 / 1 /2023 12 / 1 /2023 12 / 5 /2023 12 / 5 /2023 HOLTEC DECOMMISSIONING INTERNATIONAL, LLC AND
HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 2, LLC
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO.50-003
AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE
Amendment No. 67 License No. DPR-5
- 1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment by Holtec Decommissioning Inte rnational, LLC (HDI) and Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC (IP1 & IP2) for Indian Poi nt Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1 at the Indian Point Energy Cente r complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Chapter I, Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
B. The facility will be maintained in conformity with the appli cation, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Com mission;
C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities autho rized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and s afety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in comp liance with the rules and regulations of the Commission;
D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the c ommon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions, of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 67, Facility Operating License No. DPR-5 is hereby amended to authorize the revision to the Indian Point Energy Ce nter Emergency Plan to implement an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI )-Only Emergency
Enclosure 1
Plan, as set forth in the application dated November 17, 2022, as evaluated in the NRC staffs safety evaluation issued with this amendment.
- 3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuanc e and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Shaun Anderson, Chief ReactorDecommissioningBranch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Attachment:
Change to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-5
Date of Issuance: December 5, 2023 HOLTEC DECOMMISSIONING INTERNATIONAL, LLC AND
HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 2, LLC
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-247
AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY LICENSE
Amendment No. 300 Renewed License No. DPR-26
- 1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment by Holtec Decommissioning Inte rnational, LLC (HDI) and Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC (IP1 & IP2) for Indian Poi nt Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2 at the Indian Point Energy Cente r complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Chapter I, Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
B. The facility will be maintained in conformity with the appli cation, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Com mission;
C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities autho rized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and s afety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in comp liance with the rules and regulations of the Commission;
D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the c ommon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions, of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 300, Renewed Facility License No. DPR-26 is hereby amended to authorize the revision to the Indian Point Energy Ce nter Emergency Plan to implement an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI )-Only Emergency
Enclosure 2
Plan, as set forth in the application dated November 17, 2022, as evaluated in the NRC staffs safety evaluation issued with this amendment.
- 3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuanc e and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Shaun Anderson, Chief ReactorDecommissioningBranch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Attachment:
Change to Renewed Facility License No. DPR-26
Date of Issuance: December 5, 2023 HOLTEC DECOMMISSIONING INTERNATIONAL, LLC AND
HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 3, LLC
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3
DOCKET NO. 50-286
AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY LICENSE
Amendment No. 276 Renewed License No. DPR-64
- 1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment by Holtec Decommissioning Inte rnational, LLC (HDI) and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC (IP3) for Indian Point Nuc lear Generating Station, Unit No. 3 at the Indian Point Energy Center complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ( the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Chapter I, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ;
B. The facility will be maintained in conformity with the appli cation, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Com mission;
C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities autho rized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and s afety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in comp liance with the rules and regulations of the Commission;
D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the c ommon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions, of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Enclosure 3
- 2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 276, Renewed Facility License No. DPR-64 is hereby amended to authorize the revision to the Indian Point Energy Ce nter Emergency Plan to implement an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI )-Only Emergency Plan, as set forth in the application dated November 17, 2022, as evaluated in the NRC staffs safety evaluation issued with this amendment.
- 3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuanc e and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Shaun Anderson, Chief ReactorDecommissioningBranch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Attachment:
Change to Renewed Facility License No. DPR-64
Date of Issuance: December 5, 2023
SAFETY EVALUATION BY
THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 67, 300, AND 276
TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-5
RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-26 AND DPR-64
HOLTEC DECOMMISSIONING INTERNATI ONAL, LLC, HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 2, LLC,
AND HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 3, LLC
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS 1, 2 AND 3
DOCKET NOS.50-003, 50-247, and 50-286
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) facility consists of appr oximately 239 acres located at Indian Point in the Village of Buchanan of upper Westchester Co unty in New York State. IPEC is located approximately 24miles north of the New York City bo undary line. Rockland County is located west of IPEC, across the Hudson River.
Indian Point Unit 1 (IP1) permanently ceased operations on Octo ber 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1 reactor vessel by January 1976. In 1996, t he NRC issued an Order approving the safe-storage condition of IP1. In 2003, the NRC i ssued Amendment No. 52 to IP1s provisional operating license that changed the licenses expiration date to be consistent with that of the Indian Point Unit 2 (IP2) license at that time (Reference 1). On December 11, 2008 (Reference 2), Entergy Nuclear Operations, In c. (Entergy), the licensee at the time, notified the NRC that all spent fuel assemblies had b een removed from the IP1 spent fuel pool (SFP). IP1 spent fuel has been removed from the site or placed in the existing IPEC Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Holtec Dec ommissioning International, LLC (HDI, the licensee), on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, LL C and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, which became the IPEC licensee on May 28, 2021 (Reference 3), s tates that there is no IP1 spent fuel in wet storage at the IPEC site; IP1 spent fuel is s tored onsite in dry cask storage in an ISFSI.
By letter dated February 8, 2017 (Reference 4), in accordance w ith sections 50.4(b)(8),
Certification of permanent cessation of operations, and 50.82 (a)(1)(i) Termination of license -
For power reactor licensees, to Title 10 of the Code of Federa l Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (collectively, Entergy) certified to the NRC that it had decided to permanen tly cease power operations at
Enclosure 4
IPEC, Units 2 and 3, by April 30, 2020 and April 30, 2021, resp ectively, subject to operating extensions through, but not beyond, 2024 and 2025, respectively.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), by letters dated May 12, 20 20, and May 11, 2021 (References 5 and 6, respectively), Entergy certified to the NR C that the fuel had been permanently removed from the IP2 and Indian Point Unit 3 (IP3) reactor vessels and placed in the SFP. Upon the docketing of these certifications, under 10 C FR 50.82(a)(2), the IP2 and IP3 licenses no longer authorize operation of the reactors or empla cement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessels.
By application dated November 17, 2022 (Reference 7), as supple mented by letter dated July 11, 2023 (Reference 8), HDI requested prior approval by th e NRC of the proposed IPEC ISFSI-Only Emergency Plan (IOEP) and associated emergency actio n level (EAL) Scheme Technical Bases Document, to support the transfer of the spent fuel from the IP2 and IP3 SFPs to dry cask storage within a site controlled ISFSI, which has n ow been completed. The supplement provided additional information that clarified the a pplication but did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed and did not chan ge the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register (FR) on September 5, 2023 (88 FR 60714).
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
This safety evaluation addresses the acceptability of the propo sed IPEC IOEP and associated EAL scheme. This plan would repl ace the existing IPEC Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) and associated permanently defueled EALs after all spent fuel has been transferred from the SFPs to dry cask storage within a site con trolled ISFSI.
HDI states that the proposed IPEC IOEP addresses the applicable regulations stipulated in 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Eme rgency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities (as pre viously exempted by the NRC in letter dated November 1, 2023 (Reference 9), and is consistent with regulations in 10 CFR 72.32 Conditions of licenses and applicable guidelines established in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria for Preparation and Eval uation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 10).
The major changes of the proposed IPEC IOEP and associated EAL scheme from the PDEP and associated permanently defueled EALs were reviewed to meet the following regulations, as exempted:
- 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), as exempted, states, in part:... each pr incipal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial re sponse on a continuous basis.
- 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) states, in part:... adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available....
- 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), as exempted, states, in part: A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which incl ude facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility lice nsee.
- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A, as applicable, state s, in part: The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duti es of individuals assigned to the licensees emergency organization.
- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.1, as exempted, state s, in part: the emergency classes defined shall include: (1) Notification of un usual events, [and] (2) alert.
The associated guidance documents on which the NRC based its ev aluation and acceptance of the proposed IPEC IOEP and associated EAL scheme are as foll ows:
- Revision 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides a common reference and guidance source for nuclear fac ility operators to develop radiological emergency response plans.
- Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response / Division of Preparedness and Response (NSIR/DPR) Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) - 2, Emergenc y Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (R eference 11), which provides guidance for the review of permanently defu eled emergency plans for power reactor sites undergoing decommissioning.
- NUREG-2215, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage S ystems and Facilities (Reference 12), which provides emergency plan revie w guidance applicable to facilities licensed pursuant to the regulatory re quirements found in 10 CFR Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Sto rage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste.
- Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors (Reference 13 ), which was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated March 28, 2013 (Reference 14), as generic (non-plant specific) EAL scheme development guidance.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
NRC staff has reviewed HDIs regulatory and technical analyses in support of its proposed emergency plan changes, as described in the application dated N ovember 17, 2022, as supplemented by letter dated July 11, 2023. The technical evalu ation is detailed below.
3.1 Background
By letter dated December 22, 2021 (Reference 15), as supplement ed by letters dated February1, 2022, February 2, 2022, and May 12, 2022 (Reference s 16, 17 and 18, respectively), HDI requested exemptions for IPEC from certain e mergency plan requirements.
By letter dated November 1, 2023 (Reference 19), the NRC approv ed the requested exemptions. By letter dated November 13, 2023 (Reference 20), t he NRC approved the IPEC PDEP and associated Permanently Defueled EAL scheme.
3.2 Proposed Changes
In its application dated November 17, 2022, as supplemented by letter dated July 11, 2023, HDI requested that the NRC review and approve a proposed IPEC IOEP, which included an ISFSI-Only EAL scheme based on the applicable guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The proposed amendment would replace the existi ng PDEP and associated Permanently Defueled EAL scheme.
By letter dated February 15, 2023 (Reference 21), HDI notified the NRC that all IP2 spent nuclear fuel assemblies have been placed in dry storage within the ISFSI. And by October 16, 2023 (Reference 22), HDI completed the transfer of the spent fuel from the IP3 SFP to dry storage within the ISFSI. Specifically, the proposed cha nges would modify the scope of onsite emergency preparedness measures to reflect the reduced p otential for radiological accidents with all spent fuel in dry cask storage within the on site ISFSI. The off-normal events and accidents addressed in the IPEC IOEP are related to the dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel at the ISFSI and include only off-normal, accident, natura l phenomena, and hypothetical events and consequences affecting the IPEC ISFSI.
The major changes that HDI is requesting are:
- 1) Removal of the various actions related to an emergency invol ving the SFPs;
- 2) Removal of non-ISFSI-related emergency event types;
- 3) Clarifying definitions for security EALs;
- 5) Identification of the ISFSI Shift Supervisor title as the position that assumes the Emergency Director responsibilities following an emergency decl aration.
Under the IPEC PDEP with spent fuel stored within the SFPs, the most severe postulated beyond-design-basis accident involved a highly unlikely sequenc e of events that causes a heat-up of the spent fuel, postulated to occur without heat transfer, such that the zirconium alloy fuel cladding reaches ignition temperature. While this scenario was shown to be highly improbable, based on IPECs calculations in support of the PDEP, as verifie d by the NRC staff, the resultant zirconium alloy fire could potentially lead to the release of f ission products to the atmosphere.
However, after removal of the spent fuel from the IPEC SFPs, th e accident scenarios and analyses demonstrate that the age and configuration of spent fu el stored in dry cask storage precludes the possibility of such a zirconium alloy fire scenar io. As such, with all the spent fuel transferred to dry cask storage within the onsite IPEC ISFSI, t he number and severity of potential radiological accidents is significantly less than whe n spent fuel was stored in the SFPs.
For these reasons, the potential radiological consequences of a ccidents possible at IPEC with all spent fuel transferred to the ISFSI are further reduced.
There continues to be no need for formal offsite radiological e mergency preparedness plans under 44 CFR Part 350, Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness, at IPEC because no design-basis accide nt or reasonably credible beyond-design-basis accident can result in radioactive releases that exceed the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase protective ac tion guides (PAGs)
(Reference 23) beyond the exclusion area boundary.
3.3 Evaluation
The NRC staff reviewed the changes from the current IPEC PDEP a nd associated Permanently Defueled EAL scheme to the proposed IPEC IOEP and EAL scheme, i ncluding HDIs evaluation of the changes, to verify that the proposed IPEC IOEP and EAL s cheme continue to meet the standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted, for the long-term defueled conditi ons at IPEC. The NRC staff also performed a review to ensure that the proposed IPEC IOEP w ould be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32(a). Although the requirements of 1 0 CFR 72.32(a) do not apply to a 10 CFR Part 50 licensee, such as IPEC, the NRC examined th ese regulations to promote consistency in the emergency planning requirements between spec ifically licensed (Part 72) and generally licensed (Part 50) ISFSIs. These requirements, an d their applicability to facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 72, are further described in NUREG-2 215.
3.3.1 Elimination of Spent Fuel Pool (SPF) Initiating Conditions and EALs
Because all fuel is removed from the SFPs, there is no longer a ny potential for the accidents previously described in the PDEP associated with SFP operation that would increase risk to the health and safety of the public. These accidents included event s specifically related to the storage of the spent fuel in the SFPs. HDI provided that the of f-normal events and accidents addressed in the IPEC IOEP are related to the dry storage of ir radiated nuclear fuel within the IPEC ISFSI and include only the off-normal, accident, natural p henomena, and hypothetical events and consequences presented in the Holtec International ( Holtec) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System Holtec Certifica te of Compliance (CoC)
No. 1014. HDI states that the IPEC ISFSI contains casks loaded under Amendments 2, 4, 6, 9, and 15 of CoC No. 1014. The remaining spent fuel has been loade d under Amendment 15 of CoC No. 1014, issued on May 13, 2021 (Reference 24). Now that t he transfer of the spent fuel from the SFPs to dry cask storage has been completed, the spent fuel storage and handling systems associated with the SFPs will be removed from operation. Therefore, accident conditions associated with the SFPs will no longer be applicabl e.
The initiating conditions (ICs) and EALs associated with the em ergency classification levels in the current PDEP are based on Appendix C, Permanently Defueled Station ICs/EALs, to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, which addresses a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and transferred spent fuel from the reactor vessel t o the SFPs (permanently defueled). Because all spent fuel has been removed from the SFP s and placed in dry cask storage within the ISFSI, the ICs and EALs in Appendix C to NEl 99-01, which are associated with the SFPs at a decommissioning facility, are no longer requ ired. Additionally, certain ICs and EALs, whose primary function is not associated with the SFPs, a re no longer required when administrative controls are established to limit source term ac cumulation and the offsite consequences of uncontrolled effluent releases.
Examples of administrative controls for radiological source ter m accumulation limits and methods to control the accidental dispersal of the radiological source are:
- limits on radioactive materials collected on filter media and resins (dose rate limit);
- limits on contaminated materials collected in shipping contain ers (dose rate limit);
- limits on surface or fixed contamination on work areas that ma y create airborne radioactive material (activity limits), and
- limits on contaminated materials collected in radioactive liq uid storage tanks (activity concentration limits).
Examples of potential methods to control accidental dispersal o f the radiological source term include limits on dispersal mec hanisms that may cause a fire (e.g., limits on combustible material loading, use of a fire watch to preclude fires, etc.), placement of a berm around a radioactive liquid storage tank, and packaging radioactive mate rials within confined boundaries with ventilation controls established.
Other ICs proposed for deletion include those associated with t he SFP mitigative strategies contained in certain IPEC license conditions, as well as respon se procedures for potential or actual aircraft attacks. The NRC staff has previously maintaine d EALs for potential or actual aircraft threats for facilities transitioning into decommission ing with spent fuel stored in an SFPs, as well as maintaining the mitigative strategies license condit ions. These can be eliminated now that the spent fuel is removed from the SFPs and is in dry cask storage within the onsite ISFSI.
The proposed deletions of ICs from the proposed EAL scheme for IPEC are shown in strikeout in the table below. The deletions are appropriate because eithe r (1) the ICs are associated solely with IPEC SFP operations, or (2) for those ICs whose pri mary function is not associated with the SFPs, sufficient administrative controls to limit poss ible effluent releases have been established. The ICs and EALs being deleted in their entirety i nclude all ICs and EALs associated with the categories of abnormal radioactivity releas e and system malfunction, as these two categories apply only to SFP operation.
Emergency Plan Initiating Conditions Being Deleted
ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT PD-AA1 Release of gaseous or liquid PD-AU1 Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater radioactivity greater than 2 times the Offsite than 10 mRem TEDE or 50 mRem thyroid Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) limits for CDE. 60 minutes or longer.
PD-AA2 UNPLANNED rise in facility PD-AU2 UNPLANNED rise in facility radiation levels that impedes facility access radiation levels.
required to maintain spent fuel integrity.
PD-HA1 HOSTILE ACTION within the PD-HU1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne or threat at the Independent Spent Fuel attack threat within 30 minutes is occurring Storage Installation (ISFSI).
or has occurred.
EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EALs): (1 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EALs): (1 or 2 or 3) or 2) 1. A SECURITY CONDITION that
- 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or does not involve a HOSTILE has occurred within the ISFSI as ACTION as reported by the reported by the Security Shift Security Shift Supervisor.
Supervisor. OR
- 2. A validated notification from NRC of an 2. Notification of a credible security threat
- 1. aircraft attack threat within 30 minutes directed at the site.
of the site OR
- 3. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.
PD-HU2 Hazardous Event affecting equipment necessary for spent fuel cooling.
PD-HA3 Other conditions exist which in the PD-HU3 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT. declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT.
PD-SU1 UNPLANNED spent fuel pool temperature rise.
E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL):
Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than EITHER of the following:
- 40 mRem/hr (gamma + neutron) on the top of the OVERPACK
- 220 mRem/hr (gamma + neutron) on the side of the OVERPACK, excluding inlet and outlet ducts.
For a facility in which all spent fuel is stored in the ISFSI, the conditions addressed in PD-HU2 remain fully addressed by IC E-HU1.
The ICs listed in the table below are to be retained since they remain appropriate to address an event related to an ISFSI-only facility (i.e., no spent fuel st ored in the SFPs).
ISFSI Emergency Plan Initiating Conditions
ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.
Hazards and Other Conditions PD-HA1 HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or PD-HU1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION has occurred. or threat at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).
PD-HA3 Other conditions exist which in the PD-HU3 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT. declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT.
The most severe beyond-design-basis accident postulated for IPE C with spent fuel stored within the SFPs involved a highly unlikely sequence of events that cau ses heat-up of the spent fuel, postulated to occur without heat transfer, such that the zircon ium alloy fuel cladding reaches ignition temperature. Because this limiting, beyond-design-basi s scenario is no longer possible due to the transfer of spent fuel from the SFPs to dry cask sto rage in the onsite ISFSI, HDIs assessment focused on the following design-basis accidents asso ciated with the performance of decommissioning activities with all irradiated fuel stored in t he IPEC ISFSI: (1) cask drop event
(fuel related event); (2) radioactive material handling acciden t (non-fuel related event); and (3) accidents initiated by external events.
As previously discussed in the letter dated November 1, 2023 (R eference 19), exemptions from certain emergency planning requirements for IPEC, an analysis o f the potential radiological impact of a design-basis accident at IPEC in a permanently defu eled condition indicated that any releases beyond the exclusion area boundary were below the EPA early phase PAGs. The basis for these exemptions has not changed and remains in effec t for the proposed emergency plan changes.
For design-basis accidents (1) and (2) cited in the paragraph a bove, the results of HDIs assessment indicate that the projected radiological doses at th e exclusion area boundary continue to be less than the EPA early phase PAGs. The effects of accidents initiated by external events, (3) cited above, such as aircraft impacts, fir es, flood, wind (including tornadoes), earthquakes, lightning, and physical security breac hes on the IPEC ISFSI that could affect the confinement boundary of the ISFSI, remain unchanged from the effects that were considered under the PDEP. The NRC staff examined the assumptio ns used in HDIs analyses and verified that inputs were more conservative than those used in the approved PDEP, and therefore, determined that the associated accident analyses are sufficient to conclude that any releases beyond the exclusion area boundary will be below EPA e arly phase PAGs.
Because of the very low risk of consequences to public health a nd safety resulting from the postulated accidents related to the IPEC ISFSI, potential emerg encies continue to be classified no higher than the Alert level in accordance with the requireme nts of Section IV.C.1 to Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted. Classification of em ergencies at no higher than an alert level also maintains consistency with the regulations in 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3), Classification of accidents.
Based on the NRC staffs review of the proposed IPEC IOEP and a ssociated EAL scheme, as described above, the NRC staff concludes that planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.1, as e xempted, pertaining to a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the IPEC IOEP and associated EAL scheme, considering the permanently shut down and defueled status of the facility, and the completed transfer of all remaining spent fuel from the SFPs to dry cask storage within the onsite ISFSI.
3.3.2 Emergency Response Organization Revision
The existing IPEC PDEP provides for two ERO augmented positions, a Technical Coordinator and a Radiation Protection Coordinator. The proposed IPEC IOEP would replace these positions with two other positions: a Resource Manager, and an individual trained in radiological monitoring and assessment. The Resource Manager will assist in assessing the event and coordinating needed resources, including public information int erface. The Resource Manager will be in contact with the Emergency Director within two hours of declaration of an Unusual Event or an Alert classification level. The Resource Manager do es not need to physically report to the IPEC ISFSI to perform their responsibilities. The Resour ce Manager augments the Emergency Director by assisting in assessing the emergency cond ition and coordinating the required resources, including serving as the public information interface. Services provided to the Emergency Director by the Resource Manager can be provided remotely and do not necessitate an onsite response by the Resource Manager. By resp onding remotely, the actual response time is decreased (as compared to the ERO response req uired by the PDEP as
described above) with no negative impact to services and functi onal responsibilities provided by the Resource Manager. The Resource Manager's functional respons ibilities could be performed in a timely manner either by reporting to the site or performin g the function remotely in the specified timeframe.
In addition, HDI proposes that a minimum of one person trained in radiological monitoring and assessment will report to the IPEC ISFSI within four hours of a declared emergency involving radiological consequences.
In its evaluation of the proposed changes to the ERO, the NRC s taff considered the accident analysis referenced above, related to the deletion of EALs, eit her partially or in their entirety, as indicated, as they relate to SFP operation. Specifically, the N RC staff considered the postulated accidents that could occur with all the spent fuel moved into d ry cask storage within the onsite ISFSI, which pose a very low risk to public health and safety. The NRC staff notes that HDI also continues to commit to maintain the appropriate level of augmen ted response to an emergency, to include an event involving radiological consequences.
In the Statement of Considerations for the Final Rule for Emerg ency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS) (60 FR 32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission s tated, in part:
For there to be a significant environmental impact resulting fr om an accident involving the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, a significant amount of the radioactive material contained within a cask must escape its pa ckaging and enter the biosphere. There are two primary factors that protect the p ublic health and safety from this event. The first is the design requirements fo r the cask that are imposed by regulation.
These general design criteria place an upper bound on the energ y a cask can absorb before the fuel is damaged. No credible dynamic events h ave been identified that could impart such significant amounts of energy to a storage cask after that cask is placed at the ISFSI.
Additionally, there is a second factor which does not rely upon the cask itself but considers the age of the spent fuel and the lack of dispersal m echanisms. There exists no significant dispersal mechanism for the radioactive m aterial contained within a storage cask.
Based on the design limitations, the majority of spent fuel is cooled greater than 5 years. At this age, spent fuel has a heat generation rate tha t is too low to cause significant particulate dispersal in the unlikely event of a ca sk confinement boundary failure.
Although the IPEC spent fuel analysis has not been able to iden tify any design-basis accident that would result in a failure of the confinement barrier for t he dry storage casks or the irradiated fuel itself, the IPEC IOEP nonetheless requires augmentation of one person trained in radiological monitoring and assessment, who will report to the station within four hours of the emergency declaration for an event involving radiological conse quences.
The proposed IPEC IOEP also provides that additional personnel resources may be directed to report to IPEC ISFSI to provide support, as needed, to assess r adiological conditions, support
maintenance and repair activities, develop and implement correc tive action plans, and assist with recovery actions. The augmentation personnel are available from IPEC staff and can be requested from various contractors.
Based on the NRC staffs review of the proposed IPEC IOEP and a ssociated EAL scheme, as described above, the NRC staff concludes that planning standard s 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) and (b)(2), and the requirements of Section IV.A of Appendix E to 1 0 CFR Part 50, as exempted, pertaining to timely augmentation of response capabilities and coping with radiological emergencies, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the IPEC IOEP, considering the permanently shut down and defueled status of the facility, and the proposed transfer of all remaining spent fuel from the SFP to dry cask storage within th e onsite ISFSI.
3.3.3 Replacement of the Shift Manager with the ISFSI Shift Supervisor
In Section 1.1, On-Shift Positions, of the proposed IPEC IOEP, HDI reassigned the following Emergency Director responsibilities from the Shift Manager to t he ISFSI Shift Supervisor. The ISFSI Shift Supervisor will be at IPEC ISFSI on a continuous, 2 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per day basis, and will be the senior management position during off-hours. This positi on is responsible for monitoring ISFSI conditions and managing the activities at the IPEC ISFSI. This position assumes overall command and control of the response as the Emergency Director a nd is responsible for monitoring conditions and approving all onsite activities.
The non-delegable responsibilities of the ISFSI Shift Superviso r/Emergency Director include the following:
- Classification of an event;
- Approval of emergency notifications to the State of New York; Westchester and Rockland Counties, and the NRC (although the ta sk of making notifications may be delegated); and
- Authorization of radiation exposures in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 limits.
Key delegable responsibilities of the ISFSI Shift Supervisor/Em ergency Director include the following:
- Notification of the emergency classification to the State of N ew York, Westchester and Rockland Counties, and the NRC;
- Management of available station resources;
- Initiation of mitigative, corrective, and onsite protective ac tions;
- Decision to call for law enforcement, fire, or ambulance assis tance;
- Augmentation of the emergency staff, as deemed necessary;
- Coordination of security activities;
- Performance of initial radiological assessment;
- Maintaining a record of event activities;
- Suspending security measures; and
- Termination of the emergency condition when appropriate.
Section O, Emergency Response Training, of the proposed IPEC IOEP provides the requirements for emergency preparedness training and identifies the level and the depth to which individuals are to be trained. The personnel assigned to the ISFSI Shift
Supervisor/Emergency Director and Resource Manager positions sh all have training conducted on an annual basis such that proficiency is maintained on the t opics listed below:
- EAL Classification,
- Offsite Notification Procedures,
- ERO Activation,
- Dose Rate Meter Operation,
- Radioactive Release Assessment,
- Emergency Exposure Control,
- Protective Actions for Onsite Personnel,
- Review of Applicable Drill/Exercise-Identified Deficiencies.
The NRC staffs evaluation verified the retitled position of IS FSI Shift Supervisor is on-shift at the IPEC ISFSI 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day and serves as the senior manageme nt position during off-hours.
This position assumes overall command and control of the event response as the Emergency Director and is responsible for monitoring conditions and appro ving all onsite activities and has the requisite authority, management ability, technical knowledg e, and staff to manage the site, emergency response, and recovery organizations. The IPEC IOEP c learly identifies non-delegable responsibilities, along with other designated tasks, for the ISFSI Shift Supervisor. The NRC staff considers this retitli ng activity to be an administrative change that will not impact the timing or performance of existing emergency response duties.
Based on the NRC staffs review of the proposed IPEC IOEP and a ssociated EAL scheme, as described above, the NRC staff concludes that planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) pertaining to the adequate staffing to provi de initial facility accident response, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the IOEP. In addition, the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A, as exempted, pertaini ng to the organization for coping with radiological emergencies is described, including de finition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to HDIs e mergency organization, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the IPEC IOEP, considering the permanently shut down and defueled status of the facility, and the completed transfer of all remaining spent fuel from the SFP to dry cask storage within the onsite ISFSI.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the install ation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 C FR Part 20 and changes administrative procedures or requirements. The NRC staff has de termined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no signifi cant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no si gnificant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards cons ideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding, which was published in the Federal Register on September 5, 2023 (88 FR 60714). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusions set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10)(ii). Pu rsuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, a New York Sta te official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on October 31, 2023. By lett er dated November 8, 2023, (Reference 25) the New York State official had no comments.
6.0 CONCLUSION
Based on review of the proposed IPEC IOEP and associated EAL sc heme, the NRC staff finds that the proposed changes would continue to meet the applicable emergency planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted. The NRC staff finds continued reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological e mergency at the IPEC facility. In addition, the NRC staff concludes that the IPEC IOEP will be co nsistent with the emergency planning requirements for a specific licensed ISFSI under 10 CF R Part 72. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that HDIs proposed IPEC IOEP and associated EA L scheme in its letter dated November 17, 2022, as supplemented by letter dated July 11, 202 3, are acceptable.
The NRC staff has concluded, based on the considerations discus sed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public w ill not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there continues to be rea sonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission' s regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common de fense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
7.0 REFERENCES
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Changes to Effectively Coordinate Indian Point Nuclear Generati ng Station, Units 1 and 2, Programs, dated August 11, 2003 (ML032240282).
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- 4. Vitale, Anthony J., Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Notification of Permanent Cessation of Power Opera tions Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50- 286 License Nos.
DPR-26 and DPR-64, dated February 8, 2017 (ML17044A004).
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Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 NRC Docket No. 50-247 Renewed Facility Operating Lic ense No. DPR-26, dated May 12, 2020 (ML20133J902).
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- 8. Fleming, Jean A., Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Response to Request for Additional Info rmation Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan and Emer gency Action Level Scheme, dated July 11, 2023 (ML23192A100).
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10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E for Indian Point Un it Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Including Site-Specific Calculations, dated February 1, 2022 ( ML22032A017).
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Request for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirem ents of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E for Indian Point Un it Nos. 1, 2, and 3, dated February 2, 2022 (ML22033A348).
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Principal Contributor: Jeannette Arce