ML20046A368

Provides Notification That Actions Committed to Be Accomplished Prior to Startup Associated W/Ten Issues Discussed in 930607 & 22 Ltrs Completed.Listed Actions Given as Not Yet Completed in Ref 2 Have Been Performed

ML20046A368
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	07/16/1993
From:	Horn G NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Milhoan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20046A364	List: ML20046A368 ML20046A369 ML20046A371 ML20046A372
References
NSD930787, NUDOCS 9307280007
Download: ML20046A368 (4)

Text

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! i GDfAAL OFFICE i P.O. BOX 4M, COLT maar an, NESRASKA 40002.o499 .j Nebraska Public Power District ' "TJE""22*"'

i i NSD930787 l July 16, 1993  ;

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Mr. James L. Milhoan Regional Administrator I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corsnission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive. '%ite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

Subject:

Completion of Issues Related to Unit Startup Cooper Nuclear Station i NRC Docket No. 50-298, License No. DPR-46 I l

Re fe rences : 1. G. R. Horn to J. L. Milhoan (NSD930690), dated June 7, 1993,  !

Status of Issues Related to Unit Startup

2. G. R. Horn to J. L. Milhoan (NSD930779), dated June 22, 1993, l sama subj ect 1

Dear Mr. Milhoan:

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The referenced letters provided the status of ten issues that had been identified )

by the NRC during the 1993 Refueling Outage at Cooper Nuclear Station.(CNS) as

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requiring resolution. Some of the District actions, committed to be performed prior to plant startup, had not been conpleted as of the dato of reference 2.

This letter provides notification to the NRC that the actions committed to be accourplished prior to startup that were associated with the ten issues discussed in the references have been completed. Specifically, the following actions, 1 given as not yet completed in reference 2, have been performed:

1. Satisfactory Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) leak rate testing of valve RHR-M025A.

2. Satisfactory PIV leak rato testing of both Core Spray injection check valves.

3. Review of primary containment sampling system configurations that are similar to the H 2 /0, analyzer to ensure that applicable portions are tested in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. No similar concerns were identified.

4 Approval of a component operability evaluation including a 10CTR50.59 Safety Evaluation, to verify Safety Relief Valve operability during the upcoming Cycle 16 operation and that postulated setpoint drift does not present an unreviewed safety question.

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I. l Mr. James L. Milhoan Page 2 of 4 July 16, 1993

5. Satisfactory acceptance and Appendix J testing of the primary containment, isolation function of the containment atmosphere monitor (RVM-RM-4).

6. Station Operation Review Committee approval of a revision to the i applicable CNS procedure that addresses previous concerns with Diesel l Generator fuel oil particulato levels and sampling of storage and day tanks for water.

7. Submittal of a proposed revision to the CNS Technical Specifications j that will incorporate new limiting conditions for operations and 1 surveillance requirements for Diesel Generator fuel oil for particulate levels and water. I 8 Supplemental testing for the H /0, analyzer has been developed to further 2

ensure the effectiveness of the analyzer uP5rade durin5 plant operation.

This testing will be implemented during the initial stages of power operation and will verify the resolution of water problems discussed in ,

the references. I l

9. NRC approval of a 10CFR50 Appendix J Exemption request for testing of j ten valves in the reverse, nonconservative direction, was received on l June 23, 1993. l

10. Satisfactory resolution of all items related to plant'startup identified ,

by the Corrective Action Pro 5 ram Overview Group. )

l In addition, durin5 our presentation at the June 22, 1993, public meeting, the j District committed to review past Design Chan5es for any concerns related to l primary containment integrity such as that identified with RMV-RM-4 as discussed '

in the reference. This review has been completed and no similar concerns were identified.

Three topics regarding the CNS service water and service water booster pump systems were discussed with memoers of your staff and personnel from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on July 6, 1993. In this discussion, members of the NRC requested that information pertainin5 to these topics and their resolution be addressed in this lettar. Accordingly, this information is provided as follows:

1. A throughwall leak was recently discovered in a three inch service water sample return line. A preli=inary evaluation of the cause suggested that Microbiological 1y Induced Corrosion (MIC) may be involved; however, additional testing vill be necessary to confirm this finding. The District has established a Corrosion Action Plan to:

a. identify susceptible portions of service water piping,

b. determine the extent of corrosion in this piping through ultrasonic examinations, hydrostatic testing of selected portions of the piping, and removal and inspection of some piping samples,

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c. assess the overall effect of the findings from this determination on _j the service water system operability for the next operating cycle l and, I

d. determine future activities concerning the control and monitoring of possible MIC or other identified corrosion mechanisms in the CNS  :

service water piping.

This Corrosion Action Plan- was discussed, in detail, with Mr. James Cagliardo of the NRC Region IV staff during a recent visit at CNS and in a telephonic discussion earlier today. All activities of the Action Plan needed to assess the system's operability during the next _l operating cycle will be completed prior to startup from the 1993 l Refuelin5 Outage.

2. Flow induced erosion found in the vicinity of vent plugs in the Service Unter Booster Pump Casings was also discussed. The erosion _was caused by flow high velocity turbulence-within the pump casing directly, underneath the plugs. Since this discovery, replacement plugs _that extend flush within the pump casings - have been installed - and seal welded. The new plugs conform to the interior pump casin5 to Breatly reduce the flow turbulence that was allowed by the configuration of. the old plu5s. Measurements were taken and repairs were ' made , where appropriate, to the pump casing around the plugs to ensure that the casing thickness was within acceptable limits. The area around the plugs in the pump casing will be examined during the periodic inspections done on these pump casings in order to verify the adequacy of the now configuration in reducing the flow induced erosion.

3. "he topic of service water system flow indication was also discussed.

The calibration factor for differential pressure to indicated flow race for the flow indicator was found to be incorrect. The incorrect  !

calibration factor gave an indicated flow reading that was higher than i the actual flow rate in the system. This situation was discovered as I part of the corrective action resulting from a similar situation found in the High Pressure Coolant injection System and reportad in Licensee Event Report 93-015, dated May 20, 1993. Since its discovery, the proper calibration factor has been implemented for. the service water flow indicator.

As discussed in the reference, the issue of compliance with the inspection requirements of 10CFR50.55a.5 for the service water system remains open and was identified as an apparent violation in inspection Report 93-17. The District has reassessed the scope of its ISI pro 5 ram for CNS and has decided to incorporate the safety related portions of the Service Water and REC systems into our ISI program. The District currently considers the Service Water and REC systems to be fully capable of perfor:ning their intended functions for the upcoming operating cycle based on component inspections. testing, surveillances and evaluations, the results of which are on file at our offices. Accordin51y, the '

incorporation of ' tha safety-related portions of these systems into our ISI

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program will take place after plant startup and be implemented during the next refueling outage.

In conclusion, the actions the District committed to complete prior to plant I startup from the 1993 Refueling Outage in response to the ten startup issues i discussed in previous correspondence have been completed. Our present schedule l has plant startup commencing on July 17, 1993. We will contact members of your I I

staff prior to this date in order to advise them of our plans and schedule, and to ensure no outstanding questions or concerns remain. Should you have any additional questions or require additional information, please contact ne at your earliest convenience. i I

Si erely, i

/w

. Horn Nuc ear Power Group Manager

/ dis cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coc: mission Document Control Desk Washington, DC NRC Resident Inspector Cooper Nuclear Station 1

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