ML20045G001

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Forwards Submittal 4 of Sys 80+ Design Descriptions & Associated Itaac,In Conjunction w/930629 Ltr
ML20045G001
Person / Time
Site: 05200002
Issue date: 06/29/1993
From: Brinkman C
ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LD-93-102, NUDOCS 9307090280
Download: ML20045G001 (68)
v • d • e


Text

i JL R ER 7%E9ED ASEA BROWN BOVERI June 29, 1993 LD-93-102 Docket No.52-002 ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

System 80+" Submittal #4 Design Descriptions and ITAAC

Reference:

Letter LD-93-104, C. B. Brinkman (ABB-CE) to D. M.

Crutchfield (NRC), dated June 29, 1993

Dear Sirs:

Enclosed is Submittal #4 of the System 80+ Design Descriptions and associated ITAAC (Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria) which are submitted for review and approval. This transmittal, in conjunction with that of the reference letter, completes ABB-CE's planned submittal of System 80+ design descriptions and ITAAC.

Please feel free to query us as the staff evaluates this submittal.

You may contact me or Mr. John Rec at (203) 285-2861 for assistance in this matter.

Very truly yours, M

C. B. Brinkman Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing GDH/ak

Enclosure:

As Stated cc: T. Boyce (NRC)

T. Wambach (NRC)

P. Lang (DOE)

J. Trotter (EPRI)

A. Heymer (NUMARC) 1 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power 0$

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SYSTEM 80+"

1.0 INTRODUCTION

l This document contains Design Descriptions; Interface Requirements; and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) for the Combustion Engineering, Inc., System 80+

  • Standard Design.

1.0 ,g,

l l

l i 1  :

SYSTEM 80+"

i i I i 1.3 SITE PARAMETERS l The design of safety-related structures, systems, and components is based on specific site-related parameters. The site parameters considered in the design of safety-related structures, systems, and components are listed in Table 1.3-1.

l l

l I

i 1.3 1

l SYSTEM 80+" i TABLE 13-1 SITE PARAMETERS 1

Maximum Ground Water Level: 2 feet below plant grade level Maximum Flood (or Tsunami) Level 1 foot below plant grade level l Precipitation (for Roof Design)

Maximum Rainfall Rate: 19.4 inches per hour and 6.2 inches .

per 5 minutes  ;

Maximum Snow Load: 50 pounds per square foot  !

Design Ambient Temperatures 0% Exceedance Values (Historical Limit Excluding Peaks < 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />)

Maximum 115*F dry bulb .

80*F coincident wet bulb temperature 81*F wet bulb (non-coincident) temperature j l -40 F Minimum Extreme Wind Basic Wind Speed 110 miles per hour i

r l

1.3  !

_._._-_...._.~.______.I _

i

, 1 SYSTEM 80+"

Tornado Maximum Pressure Differ- 2.4 pounds per square inch ential Missile Spectra A Wood Plank 115 pounds B Steel Pipe 287 pounds l

C Steel Rod 8.8 pounds D Utility Pole 1124 pounds E Steel Pipe 750 pounds

F Automobile 3990 pounds i

l Note: Missiles D and F are limited to l elevations from plant grade level to an l elevation of 30 feet above plant grade level.

l Soil Properties Minimum Static Bearing [15,000 pounds per square foot]*

Capacity l

l Minimum Shear Wave Velocity [500 feet per second]*

Liquefaction The soils under safety-related structures are stable against liquefaction at the site-specific Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) level.

Seismology SSE Peak Ground Accel- 0.30 g eration

  • Under evaluation I

1.3 .

h 1.4 FIGURE LEGEND AND ABBREVIATION LIST ,

(The figure legend and abbreviation list are provided for information only)

FIGURE LEGEND  !

Instrumentation ,

Toxic Gas Detector b Flow Instrument b Temperature Instrument b Radiation instrument b Differential Pressure Instrument @

Pressure Instrument g Level Instrument g i Current Instrument g Humidity Detector g Ultrasonic Instrument g Smoke Detector Sensor Annunciator (Alarm)

Annunciator Symbols For:

High High HH High H Low L 4

Low Low LL l

1.4 I

i FIGURE LEGEND (continued) ,

I Valves Gate Valve C>md  ;

> Check Valve N+

Butterfly Valve l%l Ball Valve @ i I i Relief Valve l Three Way Valve Valve Type Not Specified >T4  !

l Valve Ooerators l Operator Of Unspecified Type Fluid Powered Operator Motor Operator Solenoid Operator m

Diahragm Operator l Hydraulic Operator Pneumatic Operator i Position Indications For Hydraulic And Pneumatic Ooerators

-Fails As is FAI

-Fails Closed FC

-Fails Open F0 Mechanical Eauioment 1.4 Positive Displacement Pump k_

i FIGURE LEGEND (continuedl Centrifugal Pump =

0" =

Pump Type Not Specified  ;

Header [ [

n 4 Tank V ,

Filter r OR FILTER s

Strainer f Flexible Connection @ j Delay Coil M Orifice !l f I  :

v i Venturi n  ;

Compressor Or Fan O h.]

n:::

Air Distribution Device "5 Air Distribution Header 1111 Vaneaxial Fan M

-.- +

Heat Exchanger Un Vacuum Breaker Vent o y l 1.4 - - _ _ - . . - _ , . _ . _ _ _ , . . , . . _,

l FIGURE LEGEND (continued)

Damoers T

T T Manually Operated Damper '

z og j

- 1 i

Remotely Operated Damper  ;

1 Louver Fire Damper a; Smoke Damper s Back Draft Damper Pumo Drivers Turbine Drive Motor Drive Electrical Eouloment Battery g Circuit Breaker A Disconnect Link n 1.4 4

l FIGURE LEGEND (continued)

Multiplexer E isolation 1 Transformer Miscellaneous

~~~

A System Or Component l ~~~l .

That is not Part Of The i I

)

Defined System i_ _ _ _ _ _i

"""""" ~ ""

Containment Containment with Penetration 1

T l l

Building Separation i " ' "e u " n l

ASME Code Class Break An ASME Code class break is identified by a single horizontal or vertical line perpendicular to the designated location for the class break, as shown in the example below.

I ASME CODE SECT ON lit CLASS I (NOTE 1) i 2.N,j I X N'

+

I Notes:

1. The header, "ASME Code Section 111 Class", must appear at least once on each figure on which ASME class breaks are shown, but need not appear at every class break shown on a figure.

E Indicates Non-ASME Code Section 111 1.4 .. . . - _ - .-

SYSTEM 80+"

ABBREVIATION LIST Abbreviation Meaning AAC Alternate AC Source A/C Air Conditioning ADM Atmospheric Dump Valve AFAS Alternate Feedwater Actuation Signal ALMS Acoustic Leak Monitoring System APC Auxiliary Process Cabinet APS Alternate Protection System AVS Annulus Ventilation System BAC Boric Acid Concentrator CCCT Containment Cooler Condensate Tank CCS Component Control System j CCVS Control Complex Ventilation System CCW Component Cooling Water CCWHXSVS CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System CCWLLSTAS Component Cooling Water Iww Level Surge Tank Actuation l

CCWS Component Cooling Water System CEA Control Element Assembly CEACP CEA Change Platform CEAE CEA Elevator CEDMCS Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System CEDM Control Element Drive Mechanism l

CET Core Exit Thermocouple CFR Code of Federal Regulations CFS Cavity Flooding System CGCS Combustible Gas Control System i

CGS Compressed Gas Systems CH Channel l

l 1.4 i

SYSTEM 80+"

ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) )

Abbreviation Meaning  ;

CIAS Contanment Isolation Actt -.. iignal CIS Containment Isolation Systen.

CIV Containment Isolation Valve l COL Combined Operating License l t

CONT Containment  ;

CPC Core Protection Calculator CPVS Containment Purge Ventilation System CRS Control Room Supervisor CSAS Containment Spray Actuation Signal CSB Core Support Barrel CSS Containment Spray System  :

CST Chemical Sample Tank CT Combustion Turbine / Generator  !

l CVAP Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System CWT Chemical Waste Tank

^

DBVS Diesel Building Ventilation System DEMIN Demineralized DFSS Diesel Fuel Storage Structure DIAS Discrete Indication and Alarm System DIAS-N Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N DIAS-P Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P DNBR Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio DPS Data Processing System DSW Dry Solid Waste DVI Direct Vessel Injection DWMS Demineralized Water Makeup System 1.4 .- , - . _ - ___ _ _ _ . . - _ . _ _ . . _ _ . - - _ . . _ _ _ _ .-_. .._.. _ _ _ _ . _ . _ .

SYSTEM 80+"

ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued)

Abbreviation Meanine P

ECWS Essential Chilled Water System j EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EDT Equipment Drain Tank EFAS Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal l EFDS Equipment and Floor Drainage System f EFW Emergency Feedwater EFWS Emergency Feedwater System ,

EFWST Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank l ENS Emergency Notification System EPDS Electrical Power Distribution System  :

ESF Engineered Safety Features  ;

ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System ESF-CCS Engineered Safety Features - Component Control System l EWT Equipment Waste Tank r FBOC Fuel Building Overhead Crane FBVS Fuel Building Ventilation System i FDT Floor Drain Tank l FHS Fuel Handling System FTC Fuel Temperature Coefficient ,

FTS Fuel Transfer System f

GCB Generator Circuit Breaker GWMS Gaseous Waste Management System  !

HA High Activity HDR Header HFE Human Factors Engineering 1

l HJTC Heated Junction Thermocouple HPN Health Physics Network 1.4  ;

I

I i

i SYSTEM 80+" l l

ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) 4

Abbreviation Meaning I

HSI Human-System / Interface  !

l HVAC Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning HVT Holdup Volume Tank i

. HX Heat Exchanger l 1

HZ Hertz i IAS Instrument Air System ICI In-Core Instrument  ;

ILRT Integrated leak Rate Test I INIT Initiation l l

t INJ Injection  ;

l INST Instrumentation IPSO Integrated Process Status Overview IRWST In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i ITP Initial Test Program IVMS Internals Vibration Monitoring System IWSS In-containment Water Storage System l IX Ion Exchanger LA Imw Activity i

] LBB Leak-Before-Break LHST Laundry & Hot Shower Tank LOCA Loss-of-coolant Accident LOOP Imss-of-Offsite-Power LPMS Imose Parts Monitoring System LS Liquid Sample LTOP Imw Temperature Overrpressure Protection LWMS Liquid Waste Management System 1.4 1

_l

I SYSTEM 80+"

! ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) i 1

Abbreviation Meaning l

}

] MCC Motor Control Center i MCR Main Control Room l l MCRACS Main Control Room Air Conditioning Sptem MDNBR Minimum Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio l j MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve 1 MG Main Generator MOV Motor Operated Valve MPC Moderator Pressure Coefficient MSIS Main Steam Isolation Signal MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve

MSLB Main Steam Line Break
MSSS Main Steam Supply System MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve .

MSVH Main Steam Valve House MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient  !

j NA Nuclear Annex l NAVS Nuclear Annex Ventilation System NCW Normal Chilled Water l

NCWS Normal Chilled Water System NDE Non-destructive Examination NFE New Fuel Elevator NFS Nuclear Fuel System NI Nuclear Instrumentation NI Structures Nuclear Island Structures I

NIMS NSSS Integrity Monitoring System NNS Non-Nuclear Safety

, NPSH Net Positive Suction Head 1A I

I SYSTEM 80+"

ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) l Abbreviation Meaning NRC Nuclear Regulatory Conunission PA Public Address PABX Private Automatic Business Exchange PAMI Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation P-CCS Process-Component Control System PCPS Pool Cooling and Purification System PCS Power Control System PCS/P-CCS Power Control System / Process-Component Control System PERMSS Processing and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling System PPC Plant Protection Calculator l

PPS Plant Protection System PRA Probability Risk Assessment PSS Process Sampling System PSWS Potable and Sanitary Water Systems PZR Pressurizer RAT Reserve Auxilliary Transformer RB Reactor Building ,

RCGVS Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary RCS Reactor Coolant System l l

RDS Rapid Depressurization System RDT Reactor Drain Tank i RM Refueling Machine l RPS Reactor Protective System RSP Remote Shutdown Panel l

1.4 l l

i l SYSTEM 80+"

ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued)

Abbreviation Meaning  !

RSR Remote Shutdown Room RSSH Resin Sluce Slurry Header RT Reactor Trip RTSG Reactor Trip Switchgear RV Reactor Vessel l RWBVS Radwaste Building Ventilation System SAFDL Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limit l SB Shield Building l SBVS Subsphere Building Ventilation System SCS Shutdown Cooling System  !

SDS Safety Depressurization System 1

SFHM Spent Fuel Handling Machine SFP Spent Fuel Pool SFPCS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System SG Steam Generator SGBS Steam Generator Blowdown System SGDT Steam Generator Drain Tank SI Safety Injection SIAS Safety Injection Actuation Signal SIS Safety Injection System SIT Safety Injection Tank SSC Systems, Structures, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSW Station Service Water SSWS Station Service Water System i SWMS Solid Waste Management System l TBCWS Turbine Building Cooling Water System 1.4 I

i l

SYSTEM 80+

ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued)

Abbreviation Meanine TBSWS Turbine Building Service Water System TBV Turbine Bypass Valve TBVS Turbine Building Ventilation System TC Thermocouple TGSS Turbine Gland Sealing System TSC Technical Support Center TSCACS Technical Support Center Air Conditioning System UGS Upper Guide Structure UHS Ultimate Heat Sink UAT Unit Auxillary Transformer UMT Unit Main Transformer VCT Volume Control Tank VDU Video Display Unit WMT Waste Monitor Tank WSW Wet Solid Waste l

l l

1.4

. - .=

J f

a l

i SYSTEM 80+"  :

r 1 2.4.5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM i

! i i

! Design Description f

! j l He Containment Isolation System (CIS) provides a safety-related means to close  ;

j valves in fluid system piping that passes through Containment penetrations'. He CIS i j provides a pressure barrier at each of these Containment penetrations. l

, i t

I

{ ne Basic Configuration of the Containment isolation valves for piping which  !

penetrates containment is as shown on Figure 2.4.5-1: each Containment isolation j j ~

i valve arrangement is as shown in one of the configurations on the figure.

} Re ASME Code Section III Class for the CIS pressure retaining components is as j shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.2 1 -!

j The Containment isolation valves and connecting ASME Code Section III Class 2

  • j piping shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 are qualified Seismic Category I.  ;

t i i Eectrically powered Containment isolation valves are Class 1E. Rese Class 1E loads are powered from their respective Class 1E Divisions.  !

Redundant Containment isolation valves which require electrical power are powered from different Class 1E Divisions.'

i Displays of CIS valve positions for remotely operated and automatic Containment l

} isolation valves exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there.

i j Controls exist in the MCR to open and close CIS power operated valves.

i j Only those valves required to close automatically for Containment isolation are closed l by a Containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS). Containment isolation valves that l receive a CIAS close within the time allocated to the function performed.

j i Containment isolation valves that receive a CIAS, upon closure, do not reopen as a j direct result of reset of the CIAS.

4

. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves close upon loss of motive or control power to the valve.

l 1

+

)

2-4-5 <

)

i

. \

l SYSTEM 80+"

Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Isolation System.

NOTES:

Containment isolation valves are assigned as components of their respective systems.

Containment penetration leak rate testing is addressed in Section 2.1.1, Nuclear Island Structures.

Electrical penetrations are addressed in Section 2.6.1, Electrical Power Distribution System.

2-4 5 _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 80+

INSIDE l OUTSIDE E i 12.3 OR N 2l l

1. l l l

qf #e 1

NOTE 1 5 g ,

4 = *=  !

l AUTOMATK: lE AUTOMATIC OR REMOTELY l l l OPERATED E

E OR REMOTELY OPERATED i'

1 1' I

NOTE 2 NOTE 2 12.3 OR N 2I g l2 2,3 OR N l l ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS 1 g i

E 1

I l

AUTOMATIC OR REMOTELY E- OPERATED E

2.

NOTE 2 AND 12.3 OR N 2l ENOTE3 l2 2,3 OR N l E

l E

E

3. -.

I 2.3 OR N 21 12 2.3 OR N l E

E LOCKED l

l

/+

I y

gNOTE3 l2 2,3 OR N I 11.2 OR 3 2l l I

E l

I BLIND FLANGE E tocxro cLosto l

5.

T Q I Wm FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 1 OF 4)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION

- - - - - , -- ,, . - - , -. ------,m a t- --q-+-amypw g-- w-- w w pww+y- p '* ap.%g,ry- g --q,-

SYSTEM 80+

CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE 6.

I

l.  ::"*:2

--- WE IRWST -

1 I l DEI]

I AUTOMATIC AUTOMATIC SG

[+.

i_ J 37 I Wm AUTOMATIC AUTOMATIC

8. __

d +.

,, ,, l "

i E 2]

EI"EE +

\, na l

B jf AUTON@C

- _ i S* SG T

g

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NOTE 3 AUTOMATIC IE I FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 2 OF 4)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION

SYSTEM 80+

CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE I

i 1 o.

l AUTO-1 C AUTOMATIC E M rr l ri I

l IN 2l E"!O

!!sl#l q ,

S!sliEi?

11. 21"

{ ="

T n  : l l

I2 al I OP AT

12. ___

I inwsr I

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{ n r ,Si =

II D

=mg i

E Il FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 3 OF 4)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION

l SYSTEM 80+T" CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE I

IN 21 AUTOMATIC

13. _

% l W

LOCKED

" I'.' 1  !

l T

EE I EE I

i u-2.s l REMOTELY l OPERATED g

I AND

14. 1NTES l l h 1 REMOTELY l l2 2 l B OPEF ED f a l l l l

REMOTELY OPERATED yp '

l NOTES:  ;

1. LIQUID RELIEF VALVE CAN BE INCLUDED IN CONFIGURATION
2. VALVE CAN BE OPEN OR CLOSED IN NORMAL POSITION
3. FLOW ELEMENT / ROOT VALVES OMITTED FOR CLARITY, WHERE APPLICABLE.

FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 4 OF 4)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION l

1

SYMM 80+= TABLE 2.4.5-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. He Basic Configuration of the Contain- 1. Inspection of the as-built CIS con- 1. For the components and equipment ment isolation valves for piping which figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 and specified penetrates Containment is as shown on in Table 2.4.5-2, the as-built CIS Figure 2.4.5-1: each Containmerit conforms with the specified Basic isolation valve arrangement is as shown Configuration shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.

in one of the configurations on the figure.

2. The ASME Code Section III valves 2. A pressure test will be performed on 2. The results of the pressure test of shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 retain their those components of the CIS required to ASME Code Section III components of pressure tv udary integrity under be pressure tested by ASME Code the CIS specified in Table 2.4.5-2 internal pressures that will be Section III. conform with the pressure testing j experienced during service. criteria in ASME Code Section III.
3. Electrically powered Containment 3. Tests will be performed on the Contain- 3. Within the CIS, a test signal exists only isolation valves are Class IE. These ment isolation valves by providing a test at the equipment powered from the Class IE loads are powered from their signal in only one Class IE Division at Class IE Division under test.

respective Class IE Divisions. a time.

4. Redundant Containment isolation valves 4 Tests will be performed on the Contain- 4. Within the CIS, a test signal exists only which require electrical power are ment isolation valves by providing a test at the equipment powered from the powered from different Class IE signal in only one Class IE Division at Class IE Division under test.

Divisions. a time.

l 2.4.5 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

SYSTEM 80+" TARLE 2.4.5-1 (Continucd)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.a) Displays of CIS valve positions for 5.a) Inspection for the existence or retriev- 5.a) Displays of CIS valve positions for remotely operated and automatic ability in the MCR of displays of remotely operated and automatic Containment isolation valves exist in the Containment isolation valve positions Containment isolation valves exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. will be performed. MCR or can be retrieved there.

5.b) Controls exist in the MCR to open and 5.b) Tests will be performed using the 5.b) Controls in the MCR operate to open close CIS power operated valves. Containment isolation valve controls in and close power operated Containment the MCR. isolation valves.

6.a) Only those valves required to close 6.a) A test of the isolation function will be 6.a) Containment isolation valves respond to automatically for Containment isolation perfonned using a signal simulating a signal simulating CIAS as specified in are closed by a CIAS, CIAS. Table 2.4.5-2.

, 6.b) Containment isolation valves that receive 6.b) Tests of the closure times of 6.b) Containment isolation valves close upon a CIAS close within the time allocated automatically actuated Containment receipt of a signal that simulates a CIAS to the function performed, isolation valves will be performed using in less than or equal to the time a signal that simulates a CIAS. specified in Table 2.4.5-2, if specified.

6.c) Containment isolation valves that receive 6.c) Following closure of Containment 6.c) Containment isolation valves, once a CIAS, upon closure, do not reopen as isolation valves on a signal that closed by a signal that simulates a a direct result of reset of the CIAS. simulates a CIAS, tests will be CIAS, do not reopen as a direct result performed to verify that the valves do of a signal that simulates resetting the not reopen when a signal that simulates CIAS.

the CIAS reset is applied.

2.4.5 _ - __ ___ _- - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _. _ _ . . _ _ _ ___ . . _ . .__ ___-

l l

l l SYSTEM 80+" TAllLE 2.4.5-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria j Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves 7. A test will be performed on each 7. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves close upon loss of motive or control pneumatic Containment isolation valve close.

power to the valve. to simulate a loss of motive power and a loss of control power.

8. Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) that 8. Tests to close MOVs that receive a 8. Each MOV that receives a CIAS closes, receive a CIAS will close under CIAS will be conducted under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions, and under temperature fluid flow conditions, and under conditions. temperature conditions.
9. Containment isolation check valves 9. Tests of Containment isolation check 9. Each Containment isolation check valve having an active safety function will valves will be conducted under system specified in Table 2.4.5-2 closes.

close under system pressure, fluid flow preoperational pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. conditions, or temperature conditions.

l l

, 2.4.5 . . -____ - -__ _ _ - _ _ _ . - .. - - - _ _ _ . ..

SYSEM 80+= TABLE 2,4,5-2 l (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 r Maximum Closee On Velve item Service Velve CtAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Not Time ~

on CIAS 1 Main Steam Une #1 from Steam Generator #1 9 No Remotely Operated -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

i Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

l Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Manual Valve -

Manual Valve - -

2 Main Steam Une #2 from Steam Generator #1 9 No Remotely Operated -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

i Manual Valve -

! 3 Main S%am Une #1 from Steam Generator #2 9 No i l

1 Remotely Operated -

Safety Valve -

, Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

, Remotely Operated -

f%motely Operated -

j Remotely Operated -

! Manual Valve -

i 1

)

l 2.4.5 I

SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2A.5-2 (Continucd) i (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3)

Maalmum Closee On Velve item Service Velve CtAS Closure N o. Arrangement (Yes, Nol Time on CIAS 4 Main Steam Une #2 from Steam Generator #2 9 No Remotely Operated -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Valve -

Safety Vaive -

Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Manual Valve -

Manual Valve -

5 Main Feedwater to Downcomer Nozzle Steam Generator #1 8 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

4 Check Valve -

6 Main Feedwater to Downcor ier Nozzle Steam Generator #2 8 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operate 4 -

Check Valve -

Check Valve -

7 Main Feedwatet to Economizer Nozzles for Steam Generator #1 7 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

8 Main Feedwater to Economizer Nozzles for Steam Generator #2 7 No j Remotely Operated -

g Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

b 2.4.5 i 1

i

. . . . - _ _ - - - - . - - - - - = , - - _ , .,-- ,---- -- _ _ - . - -

SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 243-2 (Continued)

(Note 11 (Note 21 (Note 3)

Maximum Clooes On Velve item Service Velve CtAS Closure ,

No. Arrangement (Yes, Nel Time on CIAS 9 Motor-Driven EFW Pump #1 Dscharge 2 No Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

10 Motor-Driven EFW Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

11 Steam-Driven EFW Pump #1 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated -

Check Vatve -

12 Steam-Driven EFW Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

13 Safety injection Pump #4 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

14 Safety injection Pump #2 Discharge 14 No y

Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

Remotely Operated -

15 Safety Injection Pump #3 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - t Check Valve -

i i

2.4.5 ,

_ _ - - . _ . . . - - . - .--._-._--..-~....-.-.._..u__ .--------.--___-_ _ -.- - --- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - -

-r - .,--- . - < , - - - , - - . -r--,,- , . _ - - - - - - _ - - _ _ _ - - -

SYSTEM 80+= TAHLE 2,4 5-2 (Continued)

(Note il (Note 2) (Note 3)

Maximum Closee On Valve item Service Valve CtAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes.Nel Time on CIAS 16 Safety injection Pump #1 Discharge 14 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

Remotely Operated -

4 17 SCS Pump #2 Suction 11 No Remotely Operated -

Relief Valve -

Remotely Operated -

18 SCS Pump #1 Suction 11 No Remotely Operated -

Relief Valve -

Remotely Operated -

19 Hot Leg injection loop #2 4 No Remotely Operated -

Check VsJve -

l 20 Hot Leg injection Loop #1 4 No

, Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

21 Containment Spray Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

, 22 Containment Spray Pump #1 Discharge 2 No i Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

1 i

l 2.4.5 i-awere t- ___ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ . .

m.m_- ___ _ _ _ __.__ - 4'_d T' - w --- ___-e4+-+e+' Y-* . _ _ - - _e-=-_ _ _ - - -

SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2 4.5-2 (Continucd)

(Note il (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closee On Valve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Not Time on CIAS 23 Safety injection Pump #1 and Containment Spray Pump #1 Suction Une 6 No Remotely Operated -

24 Safety injection Pump #2 and Containment Spray Pump #2 Suction Une 6 No Remotely Operated -

25 Safety injection Pump #3 Suction 6 No Remetely Operated -

26 Safety injection Pump #4 Suction 6 No Remotely Operated -

27 S!S DMslon 1 Miniflow Retum to IRWST 12 No Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

Remotely Operated -

28 SIS DMslon 2 Miniflow Retum to IRWST 12 No Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

Remotely Operated -

29 Retum Header from St Tanks 13 No Remotely Operated -

Manual Vafve -

Relief Valve -

30 CCW Suppty to Letdown Heat Exenanger 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 ex Check Valve -

2.4.5  ;

SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2,45-2 (Continued)

(Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closes On Valve hem Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 31 CCW Return from Letdown Heat 6 changer 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve -

32 CCW Supply to RCP Heat & changers 1 A and 1B 1 No Remotely Operated -

Remotery Operated -

Check Valve -

33 CCW Retum from RCP Heat & changers 1 A and 1B 1 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

34 CCW Supply to RCP Heat behangers 2A and 28 i No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

35 CCW Retum from RCP Heat & changers 2A and 2B 1 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

Check Valve -

36 Shutdown Purification Line to Letdown Heat & changer 4 No Manual Valve -

Check Valve -

37 Letdown to Purification System 10 Remotely Operated Yes 60 sec Remotely Operated Yes 60 sec 2.4.5 - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

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SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2,4.5-2 (Continued) t (Note 1l (Note 2) (Note 3l 1

Menimum Closee On Velve item Service Vefve CIAS Closure No. Arrengement (Yes, Nel Time on CIAS 46 Instrument Air Supply 2 Yes 60 sec i Remotely Operated Check Valve 5, 47 Refueling Pool Deanup Suction une 3 No

, Manual Valve -

Manual Valve -

j i

48 Refueling Pool Deanup Retum Header 3 No f Mar.ual Valve -

Manual Valve -

l 49 Pressurizer Uquid Sample une 1 Yes l ,.

! i Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Opctated 60 sec j

50 Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Une 1 Yes i'

Remotely Operated 60 sec ,

60 sec  !

Remotely Operated i St Hot Leg Sample Une 1 Yes

! Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 see

)

1 52 Holdup Volume Tank Sample Une 1 Yes +

l t

l Remotely Operated 60 sec l Remotely Operated 60 sec l Remotsly Operated 60 see i

j 53 Steam Generator #1 Cold leg Sample 1 Yes

' Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec l

2.4.5  ;

SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2,45-2 (Continucd)

(Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closee On Velve item Service Valve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes. Not Time on CIAS 54 Steam Generator #1 Hot Leg Sample 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sac 55 Steam Generator #1 Downcomer Sample 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 56 Steam Ganerator #2 Coid Leg Sample 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 57 Steam Generator #2 Hot Leg Sample 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 58 Steam Generator #2 Downcomer Sample 1 Yes Remotely Operated to see Ramotely Operated 60 sec 59 High Volume Containment Purge System Supply #1 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 60 High Volume Containment Purge System Supply #2 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec

> Remotely Operated 60 sec 61 High Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust #1 1 Yes l

l Remotely Operated 60 see Remotefy Operated 60 see i

2A.5 _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ __ _ . _ _ _ _ __ ._ .- -- -. -

SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.43-2 (Continued)

(Note 11 (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closee On Velve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes.Nel Time on CIAS 62 High Volume Containment Purge System Dhaust #2 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 63 Low Volume Containment Purge System Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 30 see Check Valve -

64 Low Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust 1 Yes Remotely Opera *d 30 sec Remotely Operated 30 sec 65 Steam Generator #1 Combined Blowdown 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 66 Steam Generator #2 Combined Blowdown 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 67 Fire Protection Water Supply to Containment (Une Number 1) 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 68 Fire Protection Water Supply to Containment (Une Number 2) 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 69 NCWS Supply to Containment Ventilation Units and CEDM Units (Division l} I No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

2.4.5 _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ -_ _ _ ___ __ __- _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _

SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2,45-2 (Continued)

(Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3)

M aximum Closes On Valve item Service Valve CIAS Closure N o. Arrengement (Yes. Not Time on CIAS 70 NCWS Supply to Cc:stainment Ventilation Units and CEDM Units (Division II) 1 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

7t NCWS Return From Containment Ventilation Units and CEDM Units (Division I) 1 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

72 NCWS Retum From Containment Ventitation Units and CEDM Units (Division 11) 1 No Remotely Operated -

Remotely Operated -

73 Containment Radia ion Monitor (Inlet) 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 74 Containment Radiation Monitor (Outlet) 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 75 ILRT Pressure Sensir.g Une 3 No Manual Valve -

Manual Valve -

76 Demineralized Water 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve -

77 Nitrogen Cupply to Gafety injection Tanks and RDT 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Check Valve -

1 2.4.5 9

i SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2A.5-2 (Continued)

(Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closee On Velve item Service Valve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes Not Time on CIAS 78 ILRT Pressurization une 5 No Manual Valve -

Flange -

79 RCP Oil Fill Une 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated -

80 Containment Sump Pump Discharge Une 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec Check Valve -

! 81 Containment Ventilation Units' Condensate Drain Header 1 Yes l Remotely Operated 60 see i Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 82 Reactor Drain Tank Gas Space to GWMS 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec

! 83 Decontamination Une 3 No i

Manual Valve -

Manual Valve -

l j 84 Division 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Suction from Containnient 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec j Remotely Operated 60 sec 85 Division 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Suction from Containment 1 Yes i

j Remotely Operated 60sec

! Remotely Operated 60 sec l

i

. 2.4.5 I I

1 SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2AS-2 (Continued)

(Note 1) (Note 2! (Note 3)

M aximum Closes On Valve item Service Velve CIAS Closure N o. Arr:ngement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 86 Division 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Dscharge to Containment 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve -

87 DivLon 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Dscharge to Containment 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve -

88 Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation Retum to steam Generator #1 4 No Manual Vafve -

Check Valve -

89 Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation Retum to steam Generator #2 4 No Manual Valve -

Check Valve -

NOTES:

1. Valve arrangements are in accordance with the Containment isolation valve configurations shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.
2. Paragraph Number 3 of the General Provisions (Section 1.2) applies to Containment isolation valves which receive a CIAS.
3. A dash (-) denotes NOT APPLICABLE 1 1 2.4.5 _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - ._ ___ _ ___ - --_-_ _ - _ - .

SYSTEM 80+"

2.53 DISCRETE INDICATION AND ALARM SYSTEM AND DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM Design Description The Discrete Indicatim and Alarm System (DIAS) and the Data Processing System (DPS) are non-safety related inst.wmentation and display systems which display information for monitoring conditions in the reactor, the reactor coolant system, Containment and safety-related process systems during and following design basis events.

The Basic Configuration for the DIAS and DPS is as shown on Figure 2.53-1.

The DIAS and the DPS are located in the nuclear island structures.

The DIAS and the DPS use sensos, transmitters, signal conditioni!g equipment, information display equipment and digital equipment which perf 3rm 11 e data processing, data communication, calculations, and logic to display safetv-rehted information.

The DIAS is divided into two segments:

DIAS - Channel P (DIAS-P)

DIAS - Channel N (DIAS-N)

Physical separation and electrical isolation are provided between the DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS as shown on Figure 2.53-2.

The hardware and software used in the DPS for information processing and s. splay is diverse from that used in the DIAS-N and the DIAS-P.

The DIAS-P provides a continuous display in the main control room (MCR) of key parameters for indication of critical function status during and following design basis events. These parameters are provided to the DIAS-P displays via two channels of i

instrumentation which include protection system signal conditionig equipment and l post accident monitoring instrumentation (PAMI) equipment, as shown on Figure 3 2.53-2. The PAMI computers calculate values for the reactor coolant subcooled l

margin, the coolant temperature at the core exit, and the coolant level in the reactor i vessel which are displayed by the DIAS-P. One channel of the information provided {

to the DIAS-P displays is communicated via means which are diverse from the i communication software used in the plant protection system (PPS) and the l engineered safety features-component control system (ESF-CCS).

2.5.3 -1 l

i_

i SYSTEM 80+"

The DIAS-N provides for display of the key parameters for indication of critical function status during and following design basis events, and the operating status of success path systems using dedicated display devices. The DIAS-N prosides multi-parameter displays with access to backup information for the key indicators, and access to diagnostic information. 'Ihe DIAS-N provides displays for specified alarm conditions. The DIAS-N al<o provides displays with access to information from non-safety-related systems.

l l The DPS displays provide access to information from safety rehted systems, as l identified above for DIAS-N, and to non-safety related information.

The DIAS-N and the DPS provide for monitoring of the following:

a) Specified process conditions in the reactor and related systems for startup, operation, and shutdown from the MCR and for shutdown to hot standby from the remote shutdown room.

b) Reactor trip system status to confirm that a reactor trip has taken place and whether or not a setpoint for initiation of a reactor trip response has been reached.

c) The status and operation of each engineered safety features system and for specified related systems in the post accident period.

d) The position of the control element assemblies.

e) Specified parameters that provide information to indicate whether plant safety ,

functions are being accomplished during and following design basis accident l events. '

f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable status of plant safety systems, as follows:

i. Status of plant operating mode related bypasses of the PPS.

ii. Bypass status of each bypassed channel of the PPS.

iii. Bypass and inoperable status of engineered safety feature systems.

g) The status of core cooling prior to and following an accident, as follows:

i. Subcooling.

ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor vessel above the fuel alignment plate.

2.5.3 . _ - _

j SYSTEM 80+"

iii. Steam temperature at the core exit.

h) Four channels of PPS status information.

l i) bur channels of status and parameter information from the ESF-CCS.

j) The following information from the power control system and the process component control system (PCS/P-CCS):

alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal status, pressurizer pressure, and l

i steam generator 1 and 2 levels.

l l 'Ihe DIAS-N and the DPS perform automatic signal validation using cross channel l data comparison prior to data presentation and alarm generation.

l Electrical isolation devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS and at interfaces to display devices in the MCR and remote shutdown room.

Electrical isolation b provided between the DIAS-P display devices and one of the two channels of protection system signal conditioning equipment, as shown on Figure 2.53-2.

The DIAS and DPS software is designed, tested, installed and maintained using a process which defines the organization, responsibilities, and activities for the software engineering life cycle and which specifies requirements for software quality assurance, verification and validation, configuration management, and operations and maintenance, and which incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.53-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for the Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System.

2.5.3 SYSTEM 80+

I I I i

' I DIAS CHANNEL P DIAS CHANNEL N DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM I i I i I i l l I I PAMI I l 1 I I I Illi Ill I I ll11 Illl l I __ llll l I I

PROTECTION I

, _ _P P S g _ ~[lll _ _ _ _ ] lll lll SYSTEM l SIGNAL I l ~ ~ '" ~ 1-ESF-CCS Jl1 l

lI II

CONDITIONING g g ,_ _ _ _____  ;

EQUIPMENT i _ _ _~ _ .

l PCS .

__ .l _ _ __ __]i I I _~ _~ _~ _~ l- - - -l l I _P-CCS___l_ _ _

t FIGURE 2.5.3-1 DIAS AND DPS CONFIGURATION

SYSTEM 80 +TM PS -

DISPLAY DEVICES DIAS CHANNEL N PRINTERS & INFORMATION DISPLAYS DEVICES STORAGE DEVICES A A DIAS CHANNEL P DIAS CHANNEL N DPS DISPLAYS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS JL JL

[f k [ .

' l l DIAS CHANNEL N NETWORK 'DP S NETWORK i

! ! 844 88 884I h 8' JL88888 dddd A A

l:eeee memo e g ll eeee eeee e g llll l !IA[Blh D afb l ) D L _P,PS. J LE,SF-CCSj pCS

' L ~

Py

--- I AlBfC1 Dl A}Bl

, , L - PPS j LESF-CCSj D! rg g71 L- JI gjg 1

_ _ . _I

.. . . . . . . . . . .l . . .. . ..

06

.. l l@ e PAMI l PAMI COMPUTER . COMPUTER KEY:

CHANNEL A . CHANNELB j( j( j(  ? HARD WIRED OR hj L DATA UNK

~

CT'lO === N N-CONDUCTING

'PROTECTlON PAMI PR"O SYSTEM SYSTEM @PAMI DATA LINK OR DISCRETE SIGNAL gg SC-A SC-B

] ISOLATION i

JL Ak il AN @

SC-A SIGNAL e**s ,"*s s'*s ,- s CONDITIONING (Sj (Sj (Sj (S} CHANNEL A FIGURE 2.5.3-2 DIAS-P, DIAS-N, DPS, AND INTERCONNECTIONS

SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.53-1 DISCRFFE INDICATION AND ALARM SYSTEM AND DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acccotance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the DIAS 1. Inspection of the as-built configuration 1. For the components and equipment and DPS is as shown en Figure 2.5.3-1. of the DIAS and the DPS will be shown. on Figure 2.5.3-1, the as-built conducted. DIAS and DPS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2. Physical separation and electrical 2. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P, 2. Physical separation exists between the isolation are provided between the DIAS-N ad DPS equipment will be DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS.

DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS as conducted. Electrical isolation devices are provided shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. at interfaces between the DIAS-P, DIAS-N and DPS, consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2.

3. The hardware and software used in the 3.a) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P, 3.a) Digital equipment used for data DPS for information processing and DIAS-N and DPS equipment will be processing, data communication and display are diverse from that used in the performed. display in the DPS uses microprocessors DIAS-N and the DIAS-P. which are diverse from the microprocessors used in corresponding equipment in the DIAS-N and the .

DIAS-P. -

3.b) Inspection of the DPS, DIAS-N and 3.b) The design documentation confirms that DIAS-P design documentation will be the design group (s) which developed the i performed to confirm that the software DPS software is different from the was developed by different design design group (s) which developed the groups. DIAS-N and DIAS-P software.

i 2.5.3 1_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ .__. - . _ . _

SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses _ Acceptance Criteria 4.a) He DIAS-P provides a continuous dis- 4.a) I spection of as-built DIAS-P equipment 4.a) The DIAS-P displays in the MCR pro-play in the MCR of the key parameters will be performed. vide the key parameters for indication of for indication of critical function status critical function status during and fol-lowing design basis events, and two 1

during and following design basis events. These parameters are provided channels of instrumentation which in-to the DIAS-P displays via two channels clude protection system signal condi-of instrumentation which include pro- tioning equipment and PAMI equipment tection system signal conditioning equip- are used to provide the information to ment and PAMI equipment, as shown the DIAS-P displays consistent with on Figure 2.5.3-2. Figure 2.5.3-2.

4.b) One charmel of the information provided 4.b) Inspection will be performed on the as- 4.b) Communication of the signals from the to the DIAS-P displays is communicated built DIAS-P equipment and, if digital signal conditioning equipment to the via means which are diverse from the equipment is used for communication of DIAS-P display devices is consistent communication software used in the PPS signals to both DIAS-P channels, then with Figure 2.5.3-2 and implements and the ESF-CCS. inspection of the desiga documentation either of the following for at least one will be performed to confirm that the communication channel:

signal communication software used for i at least one channel was developed by a i. hardwired signal communication, or

group different than the group umi to
develop the signal communication ii, digital signal communication equipment l software for the PPS and ESF-CCS. that uses microprocessors which are diverse from the microprocessors used
in the PPS and ESF-CCS signal com-munication equipment, and soflware for which the design documentation con-firms that the software was developed by a different design group than used to

, develop the signal communication software for the PPS and ESF-CCS.

l

. 2.5.3 r l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - . . -.a

SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Insocctions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

5. The DIAS-N provides for display of the 5. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N 5. He DIAS-N provides dedicated display key parameters for indication of critical equipment will be performed. devices in the MCR for the display of function status during and following the key parameters for indication of design basis events and the operating critical function status during and status of success path systems using following design basis events and the dedicated display devices. The DIAS-N operating status of success path systems.

provides multi-parameter displays with He DIAS-N provides multi-parameter access to backup information for the key displays in the MCR with access to indicators and access to diagnostic backup information for the key information. The DIAS-N provides indicators and access to diagnostic displays for specified alarm conditions. information. The DIAS-N provides displays in the MCR for specified alarm conditions.

6. The DPS provides for display of the key 6. Inspection of the as-built DPS equipment 6.a) The DPS displays in the MCR provide parameters for indication of critical will be performed. for display of the key parameters for function status during and following indication of critical function status j design basis events, the operating status during and following design basis of success path systems, backup events, the operating status of success information for the key indicators, path systems, backup information for the access to diagnostic information, and for key indicators, access to diagnostic specified alarm conditions. information, and for specified alarm conditions.

1 4

2,5.3 _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _

SYSTEM 80+ TAHLE 2.5.3-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment InSDections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. The DIAS-N and the DPS provide for 7. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N and 7. He DIAS-N and DPS display monitoring the following: DPS displays in the MCR and remote equipment provide monitoring capability shutdown room will be performed. for the following:

a) Specified process conditions in the a) Specified process conditions in the reactor and related systems for startup, reactor and related systems for startup, operation, and shutdown from the MCR operation, and shutdown from the MCR and for shutdown to hot standby from and for shutdown to hot standby from the remote shutdown room. the remote shutdown room.

b) Reactor trip system status to confirm b) Reactor trip system status to confirm that a reactor trip has taken place and that a reactor trip has taken place and whether or not a setpoint for initiation whether or not a setpoint for initiation of a reactor trip response has been of a reactor trip response has been reached. reached.

c) The status and operation of each c) ne status and operation of each '

engineered safety feature system and for engineered safety feature system and for specified related systems in the pest specified related systems in the post

accident period. accident period.

d) The position of the control element d) The position of the control element assemblies. assemblies.

e) Specified parameters that provide e) Spaified paraneters that provide information to indicate whether plant information to indicate whether plant safety functions are being accomplished safety functions are being accomplished during and following design basis during and following design basis accident events, accident events.

2.5.3 - - _ - _ _ _ - . - _ _ _ - - - . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _

SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. (Continued) 7. (Continued) f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable status of plant safety systems, as status of plant safety systems, as follows: fo!!ows:
i. Status of plant operating mode i. Status of plant operating mode related bypasses of the PPS. related bypasses of the PPS.

ii. Bypass status of each bypassed ii. Bypass status of each bypassed channel of the PPS. channel of the PPS.

iii. Bypass and inoperable status of iii. Bypass and inoperable status of engineered safety feature systems. engineered safety feature systems.

g) The status of core cooling prior to and g) The status of core cooling prior to and following an accident, as follows: following an accident, as follows:

i. Subcooling. i. Subcooling.

I

! ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor l vessel above the fuel alignment vessel above the fuel alignment plate. plate.

iii. Steam temperature at the core exit. iii. Steam temperature at the core exit.

2.5.3  !,

SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.5.3-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. (Continued) 7. (Continued) h) Four channels of PPS status h) Four channels of PPS status information. information.

i) Four channels of status and parameter i) Four channels of status and parameter information from the ESF-CCS. information from the ESF-CCS.

j) The following information from the j) The following information from the PCS/P-CCS: PCS/P-CCS:

alternate reactor trip status, alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal altemate feedwater actuation signal status, status,

, pressurizer pressure, and pressurizer pressure, and steam generator I and 2 levels, steam generator 1 and 2 levels.

8. The DIAS-N and the DPS perform 8. Tests will be performed simulating the

, automatic signal validation using cross multiple channel input signals to the channel data comparison prior to data DIAS-N and DPS for each parameter presentation and alarm generation, selected as a key indicator of critical function status, as follows:

i 8.a) The input signals will simulate a failure 8.a) The DIAS-N and the DPS display a of one of the multiple channels ofinput value for the parameter under test which signals for the parameter under test. is consistent with the signals which were simulated not to fail, and the DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the displayed value is validated.

2.5.3 i

SYSTEM 30+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.b) The input signals will simulate a failure 8.b) The DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the of all but one of the multiple channels of displayed value for the parameter under input signals for the parameter under test is not validated.

test.

9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided 9.a) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N and 9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the DPS equipment will be conducted. at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the i PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS and at PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS and at interfaces to display devices in the MCR interfaces to display devices in the MCR and remote shutdown room. and remote shutdown room, consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2.

9.b) Electrical isolation is provided between 9.b) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P 9.b) Electrical isolation devices are provided the DIAS-P display devices and one of equipment will be conducted. between the DIAS-P display devices and the two channels of protection system one of the two channels of protection l signal conditioning equipment, as shown system signal conditioning equipment, i on Figure 2.5.3-2. consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2.

l l

2.5.3  : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - -- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . -. __ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

10. The DIAS and DPS software are 10. Inspection will be performed of the 10.a) The process defines the organization, designed, tested, installed and process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities and activities for the maintained using a process which maintain the DIAS and DPS software, following phases of the software engineering life cycle:

a) defines the organization, responsibilities, and activities for the software

  • Establishment of plans and engineering life cycle, and methodologies for all software to be developed.

b) specifies requirements for software quality assurance, verification and

  • Specification of functional, system and validation, configuration management, software requirements and identification and operations and maintenance, and of safety critical requirements.

c) incorporates a graded approach

  • Design of the software architecture, according to the software's relative program structure and definition of the l importance to safety. software modules.
  • Development of the software code and testing of the software modules.
  • Interpretation of software and hardware and performance of unit and system tests.
  • Software installation and checkout testing.

, a Reporting and correction of software defects during operation.

233  :

SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment InSDeClions. Tests. Analyses ACCCDiance Criteria 10.b) The process has requirements for the following software development functions:

  • Software management, which defines organization responsibilities, documentation requirements, standards for software coding and testing, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective actions.
  • Software configuration management, which establishes methods for maintaining historical records of software as it is developed, controlling software changes and for recording and reporting software changes.

<

  • Verification and validation, which specifies the requirements for the verification review process, the validation testing process, review and

! test activity documentation and revieurr independence.

l 2.5.3 i

SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued)

DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFEIY REIATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desist Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criterg 10.c) He process establishes the method for classifying DIAS and DPS software elements according to their relative importance to safety. The process defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety 4

classification.

4 i

i i

1

2.5.3 t 6

_.____ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ ~ -,,-wv.--,. - --- + - . . .- -+ ++-o- - +- - . - , - e . . , - , .,.- -

?

F 4 .

l SYSTEM 80+"  !

2.7.30 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM '

Design Description  ;

The Turbine Building Ventilation System (TBVS) is a non-safety-related system that  ;

is used to maintain the environmental conditions in the turbine building.  !

i The TBVS has fans, intake louvers, exhaust fans, ductwork, instrumentation and l controls. The TBVS also has recirculation fans to provide mixing of air within the >-

turbine building, and roof-mounted vents.  ;

Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria:

None  !

9

[

i i

o l

1 2.7.30 i

. . - , . . _ . - . - . . . - , ~ - . _ -

I i SYSTEM 80+" l 2.7.31 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER STRUCTURE VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System (CCWHXSVS) is a non- ,

safety-related system that is used to maintain environmental conditions in a CCW heat exchanger structure.

The Basic Configuration of the CCWHXSVS is as shown on Figure 2.731-1. ,

The CCWHXSVS has one air supply unit and one air exhaust unit for each Division of the CCW heat exchangers. Each CCWHXSVS air supply unit has a damper,  ;

instrumentation and controls. Each CCWHXSVS air exhaust unit has an exhaust fan,  !

a damper, ductwork, instrumentation and controls. Air heaters are provided in each t I

l Dhision.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria: -

Table 2.7.31-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance ,

criteria for the CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System.  ;

l

)

l 2.7.31 -1

SYSTEM 80+TM 1  :

I UPPER I g ELEVATION g

' ["T _

" I LEE...

I I I I I I I Og AIR OUTSIDE Tq hM h IS HAR ~*E AIR ""

' t [

2

--+ '

g

= . ;;;.;i

' = [0 iN

1 CCW Hx STRUCTURE CCW Hx STRUCTURE ,

VENTILATION SUPPLY VENTILATION I I UNIT EXHAUST I UNIT l LOWER I ELEVATION I I E  !: g l ...... y L.----------- _ ___ _ __ _I FIGURE 2.7.31-1 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER STRUCTURE VENTILATION SYSTEM (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS)

. - - * - - - --__m - ,-r- - - -

+w -----+ - v - - - -

SYSTEM 80+= TAHLE 2.7.31-1 CCW IIEAT EXCIIANGER STRUCTURE VENTIIATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Comr.aitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the 1. Inspection of the as-built CCWIiXSVS 1. For the components and equipment CCWiiXSVS is as shown on Figure configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.31-1, the as-built 2.7.31-1. CCWHXSVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

4 4

l d

2.7.31 06-25-93

SYSTF,M 80+"

2.9.4 PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEM Design Description The Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling System (PERMSS) provides components to monitor liquid and gaseous effluents prior to release to  ;

unrestricted areas, and to monitor for inplant radioactivity.

Components of the PERMSS are located in the nuclear island structures, the radwaste building, the turbine building, and the station service water pump structure.

The PERMSS has components that provide radiological monitoring of gaseous and liquid processing systems and their effluents, airborne radioactivity, radiation areas, and specified plant equipment.'

l The PERMSS is non-safety-related with the exception of the control room air intake  :

radiation monitors, the reactor coolant radiation monitors, the high range containment area monitors, and the containment atmosphere particulate monitors, each of which l is safety-related and Class 1E.

Displays of the PERMSS safety-related instrumentation (the control room air intake ,

J radiation monitors, the reactor coolant radiation monitors, the high range containment area monitors and the containment atmosphere particulate monitors) exist in the main l control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.9.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling System.

2 The radiation monitors that monitor gaseous and liquid processing systems and their effluents and the response of these systems to detection of radiation are addressed in the individual systems which they support.

2.9.4 _ . _ . _ _ ___ .._. __ . _ _ _ .__ _ , _ _ _ , _ . . . _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _

SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.9.4-1 PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEM i Inspections. Tests. Analvscs. and Acceptance Criteria i

Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The PERMSS has components that pro- 1. Inspection of the PERMSS components 1. The PERMSS provides the components vide radiological monitoring of gaseous will be performed. specified in Table 2.4.9-2.

and liquid processing systems and their effluents, airborne radioactivity, radiation areas, and specified plant i

equipment.

2. Displays of the PERMSS safety-related 2. Inspection for the existence or 2. Displays of the PERMSS safety-related instrumentation (the control room air retreivability in the MCR of instrumentation (the control room air intake radiation monitors, the reactor instrumentation displays will be intake radiation monitors, the reactor coolant radiation monitors, the high performed. coolant radiation monitors, the high range containment area monitors and the range containment area monitors and the
containment atmosphere particulate containment atmosphere particulate monitors) exist in the MCR or can be monitors) exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. retrieved there, c

I f

1 1

2.9,4 . _ _ ., , ,

SYSTEM 80+"

TABLE 2.9.4-2 GASEOUS PROCESS AND EFFLUENT MONITORS Gaseous waste management system waste gas discharge Nuclear island structures unit vent  !

Containment high purge exhaust Containment low purge exhaust Condenser air removal system LIOUID PROCESS AND EFFLUENT MONITORS Component cooling water system Liquid waste management system liquid waste discharge Steam generator blowdown sample Reactor coolant gross activity Turbine building drains Station service water system Steam generator drain tank discharge Containment cooler condensate tank AIRBORNE RADIATION MONITORS Containment atmosphere Radwaste building ventilation exhaust Fuel building ventilation exhaust Ventilation systems multisampler 1 Nuclear annex building ventilation I

, Main control room air intake ,

I l

l Reactor building annulus exhaust t

l Reactor building subsphere ventilation exhaust i

j Portable airborne Emergency operations facility ventilation l 2.9.4 ,

l

SYSTEM 80+"

TABLE 2.9.4-2 (Continved)

AREA RADIATION MONIR)RS Reactor Containment entrance Refueling machine In-core instrumentation equipment Decontamination area Sample room l Main control room l Ilot laboratory l

New fuel storage area l Spent fuel pool bridge  !

Fuel building area Nuclear annex building Reactor building subsphere  :

Solid waste drum storage and handling area I Radwaste building loading bay ,

Ilot machine shop flot instrument shop 3

Radwaste building areas .

Technical support center l SPECIAL PURPOSE AREA RADIATION MONIW)RS Main steam lines Purification filters Primary coolant loops Iligh range containment area monitors 2.9.4 I

1 1

SYSTEM 80+"

3.2 RADIATION PROTECTION 1 l 1 l Design Descriptmn i 1 l l Radiation Protection features are incorporated in the plant design to keep i radiological exposure to plant personnel and the general public within specified limits. l l

The radiation pro:ection design provides for:

shielding of rooms, corridors, and operating areas commensurate with their expected occupancy and use; shielding of cubicles, labyrinth access, and space for temporary shielding in plant areas where maintenance is performed during normal plant operations; accessibility for equipment operation under design basis accident conditions; ventilation features to maintain airborne radioactivity levels within specified limits; and monitoring of radiation levels in specified areas of the plant.

The radiation protection design is based on radiation environments associated with operational modes and post-accident conditions.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for Radiation Protection. j 32 -1

SYSTEM 80+= TAHLE 3.2-1 RADIATION PROTFLTION Inspections. Tests. Anaivscs. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Insucctions. Tests. Analyses Acccatance Criteria

1. He radiation protection design provides 1. An analysis will be performed to predict 1. Maximum predicted radiation levels are
for shielding of rooms, corridors, and the expected radiation levels in the plant less than or equal to the radiation levels operating areas commensurate with their areas expected to be occupied er used in the radiation zones as specified in expected occupancy and use, by plant personnel. He analysis will Table 3.2-2.

consider radioactive sources and their respective source strengths, the geometry of the source, and the shielding in the areas analyzed.

2. The Radiation Protection design 2. Analysis will be performed to determine 2. Radiation levels are predicted to be less provides for shielding of cubicles, radiation levels present in plant areas than or equal to 2.5 mrem /hr in plant labyrinth access, and space for where maintenance is performed during areas where maintenance is performed temporary shielding in plant areas where normal plant operations. during normal plant operations.

maintenance is performed during normal plant operations.

3. The Radiation Protection design 3. Analysis will be performed to determine 3.a) he predicted total exposure for the provides for accessibility for equipment the radiation levels in areas which duration of the anticipated access operation under design basis accident require access for mitigation of or periods required to perform mitigative conditions. recovery from a design basis accident. or recovery actions is less than or equal to 5 rem to the whole body, or its equivalent (based on the frequency and duration of access required).

3.b) For areas requiring continuous  ;

occupancy, the predicted radiation levels do not exceed 15 mrem /hr, averaged i over 30 days.

l i

32 -. - . - . - _ - _ . . - - _ . - . - . - -. -

SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued)

RADIATION PROTECTION Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Insocctions. Tests. Analvscs Acccatance Criteria

4. The Radiation Protection design 4. An analysis will be performed to predict 4. Predicted in-plant airbome radioactivity provides for ventilation features to airborne concentrations it rooms, levels are within specified limits for maintain airbome radioactivity levels corridors, equipment cubicles, and personnel access during normal within specified limits. operating areas requiring personnel operations.

access during normal operations.

5. The radiation protect;on design provides 5. An analysis will be performed to 5. Air borne radiation monitoring, including for monitoring of radiation levels in identify the number of airbome radiation alerting capability, is pmvided as specified areas of the plant. monitors required and the locations for required by the analysis.

their installation.

4 i

i 32 ._ _ . . - . - . - - - - . . - . ._ - - . _ - - . . - . .- . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _

SYSTEM 80+"

i TABLE 3.2-2 RADIATION ZONE DESIGNATIONS FOR COMPONENTS DURING NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS Zone Designation' OPERATING SHITIDOWN Annulus Ventilation System Filters 2 2 Boric Acid Batch Tank 3 3 Boric Acid Concentrator 5 5 Boric Acid Concentrator Ion Exchanger 5 5 Boric Acid Filter 5 5 Boric Acid Makeup Pumps 5 5 Channel A, B, C, D Battery Room 1 1 Charging Pumps 5 5 ,

Charging Pump Miniflow Heat Exchanger 5 5 Chemical and Volume Control System Equipraent Drain Sumps 5 5 Condenrate Cooling Water Surge Tank 2 2  ;

Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 3 5 Containment Spray Miniflow Heat Exchanger 3 5 Containment Spray Pump 3 5 Control Complex Corridors up to the Radiation Access Control Point 1 1 Control Room 1 1 Control Room HVAC Areas 1 1 Deborating Ion Exchangers 5 5 Division 1 Battery Room 1 1 Division 2 Battery Room 1 1 Emergency Feedwater Motor Driven Pump 2 2 Emergency Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump 2 2 Equipment Drain Sumps 5 5 Equipment Drain Tank 5 5 Essential Chillers 1 1 Floor Drain Sumps 5 5 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 3 3 Fuel Pool Filters 5 5 l Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger 3 3

, Fuel Pool Ion Exchangers 5 5 Fuel Pool Purification Pumps 5 5 Fuel Transfer Tube 5 5 Gas Stripper 5 5 Hi Purge Filters 2 2

, Holdup Pumps 5 5 l letdown Heat Exchanger 5 5 Lo Purge Filters 2 2 Nuclear Annex Ventilation Filters 2 2 32 - . - . _ .

l 1

l l sYsTai 30+=

TABLE 3.2-2 (Continued) J RADIATION ZONE DESIGNATIONS FOR COMPONENTS DURING NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS Zone Designation 8 OPERATING SHUTDOWN Post-accident Hydrogen Recombiners 2 2 Preholdup Ien Exchanger 5 5 Purification Filters 5 5 l

Purification Ion Exchangers 5 5 Radiation Access Control Point 1 1 Reactor Coolant System 5 5 Reactor Vessel Ilot and Cold Irgs Steam Generators

! Reactor Drain Filter 5 5 l Reactor Drain Pumps 5 5 Reactor Drain Tank 5 5 Reactor Makeup Water Filter 5 5 Reactor Makeup Wate. P;mp 4 3 Regenerative Heat Exchanger 5 5 l Remote Shutdown Room 1 1 l

Resin Sluice Tanks 5 5 Safety Injection Filters 5 5 Safety Injection Pump 3 5 Sampling Panels 5 5 Sampling Panels Pipe Chase 5 5 Seal Injection Heat Exchanger 5 5  ;

Shutdown Cooling System Heat Exchanger 3 5 Shutdown Cooling System Pump 3 5 i Spent Fuel Pool (Bottom) w/ fuel 5 5 Subsphere Ventilation System Filters 2 2 Vital I & C Channel A, B, D, D 1 1 Volume Control Tank 5 5 8 Radiation Zone Desicnations Exposure (Dose) Rate (mrem /hr) 1 < 0.5 2 2 0.5 to < 2.5 3 2 2.5 to < 15 4 215 to s 100 5 > 100 32 .._ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _.~ ._

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