LD-95-026, Requests Addl Explanation of Probablistic Risk Assessment. Request for Clarification & Does Not Impact Conclusions of Evaluation Already Reported in FSER

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Requests Addl Explanation of Probablistic Risk Assessment. Request for Clarification & Does Not Impact Conclusions of Evaluation Already Reported in FSER
ML20093B271
Person / Time
Site: 05200002
Issue date: 10/06/1995
From: Brinkman C
ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LD-95-026, LD-95-26, NUDOCS 9510110309
Download: ML20093B271 (2)


Text

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A BB 4 NO October 6,1995 B

LD-95-026 Docket 52-002 Attn: Document Control Desk

' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

~ System 80+" Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Dear Sirs:

The System 80+ Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER) has been widely distributed in the U.S. and abroad. This FSER has been well received and feedback has demonstrated that the FSER is a detailed document that authoritatively addresses safety issues. However, one item in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been significantly mis-interpreted, and ABB-CE, therefore, requests that the NRC provide an additional explanation of the PRA results.

This request is only for clarification and does not impact the conclusions of the evaluation already reported in the FSER.

The System 80+ base case core damage frequency (CDF) assumes reactor vessel failures are oflow-probability, but credible, and that common cause failures are also credible. These base case results have been misused by comparing them to PRA results reported to NRC by other designers that assume reactor vessel and common cause failures are incredible. Section 19.10.10 of CESSAR-DC describes System 80+ CDF sensitivity to assumptions on reactor vessel rupture and common cause failures. System 80+ results, assuming that reactor vessel and common cause failures are incredible, are presented in Table 19.10-1, item 10C.

To avoid future misrepresentation, it would be most helpful ifNRC staffissued a letter and/or FSER supplement stating that, based on the sensitivity results presented in Table 19.10-1 item IOC, the System 80+ CDF is reduced from 1.67E-06 events / year to 1.41E-07 events / year. In addition, it may be appropriate to alert readers that comparisons ofPRA results, if done at all, require careful review to ensure that equivalent assumptions are used.

100036 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Systems Cg ist=-

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j combusbon Engineenr4 Inc. 1000 Prospt:ct Hdt Road Telephone (203) 688-1911 k ji a Jrf .,

PO Box 500 Fax (203) 285-5203 "5'.cT w m -

9510110309 951006 PDR ADOCK 05200002 C PDR

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Please call me or Mr. Stan Ritterbusch at 203-285-5206 ifyou have any questions.

Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.

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. C _ w/ -s C. B. Brinkman Director Nuclear Systems Licensing cc: S. Magruder (NRC)

N. Fletcher (DOE) l l

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