ML20038A721
| ML20038A721 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 11/11/1981 |
| From: | Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111160217 | |
| Download: ML20038A721 (300) | |
Text
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Mr. Robert L. Tedecco
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Assistant Director for Licensing h u.8 %e%'4 A idgg 2' Division of' Licensing j2 U. S. Nuclear Regu]atory Commi scion N/ Washington, D. C. 20555 27] Oh~ Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Hos. 50 h40; 50-4h1 Response to Request for Additional Information - Power Systems
Dear L'r. Tedesco:
"his letter and its attachment is cubmitted to provide additional draft recponsec to the concerns identified in your letter dated August 13, 1931, in regard to Power Systecc. This submittal revises the recponses in our letter of October 1,1981, and providec all remaining responses.
It is our intention to incorporate these responces in a subsequent amendment to our Final Carety Analycic Report. Very Truly Yourc, N ,
&A Ealwy. R. Davidcon Vice President Cystem Engineering and Construction DED: clb Attachment ec: M. D. Iiouston C. Charnoff, Ecq. )O O l l URC Recident Incpector 5 i
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430.6 Operating experience at certain nuclear power plants which have two (8.3) cycle turbocharged engines manufactured by the Electromotive Division RSP (EMD) of General Motors driving emergency generators have experienced a significant number of turbocharger mechanical gear drive failures. The failures have occurred as the result of running the emergency diesel generators at no load or light load conditions for extended periods. No load or light load operation could occur during periodic equipment testing or during accident conditions with availability of offsite power. When this equipment is operated under no load or light load conditions, insufficient exhaust gas volume is generated to operate the turbocharger. As a result the turbocharger is driven mechanically from a gear drive in order to supply enough combustion air to the engine to maintain rated speed. The turbocharger and mechaniccl drive gear normally supplied with these engines are not designed for standby service encountered in nuclear power plant application where the equipment may La called upon to operate at no load or light load condition and full rated speed for a prolonged period. The EMD equipment was originally designed for locomotive service where no load speeds for the engine and generator are much lower than full load speeds. The locomotive turbocharged diesel hardly ever runs at full speed except at full load. The EMD has strongly recommended to users of this diesel engine design against operation at no load or light load conditions at full rated speed for extended periods because of the short life expectancy of the turbocharger l mechanical gear drive unit normally furnished. No load or light load operation also causes general deterioration in any diesel engine. To cope with the severe service the equipment is normally subjected to and in the interest of reducing failures and increasing the I availability of their equipment, has developed a heavy-duty turbocharger drive gear unit that can replace existing equipment. l This is available as a replacement kit, or engines can be ordered I j with the heavy-duty turbocharger drive gear assembly. l i L J
430.6 (Pg. 2) Cont'd To assure optimum availability of emergency diesel generators on demand, applicants who have in place, on order, or intend to order emergency generators driven by two-cycle diesel engines manufactured by EMD should be provided with the heavy-duty turbocharger mechanical drive gear assembly as recommended by EMD for the class of service encountered in nuclear power plants. Confirm your compliance with this requirement for your HPCS diesel generatcr.
Response
The HPCS diesel generator has the standard CM turbocharger drive gear unit. In accordance with the manufacturers recommendations, we will evaluate the heavy duty turbocharger for replacement upon reaching the 200 hour cummulative run time limit. l l t t J
430.7 Provide a detailed discussion (or plan) of the level of training (8.3) proposed for your operators, maintenance crew, quality assurance, and supervisory personnel responsible for the operation and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators. Identify the number and type of personnel that will be dedicated to the operations and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators and the number and type that will be assigned from your general plant operations and maintenance groups to assist when needed. In your discussion, identify the amount and kind of training that will be received by each of the above categories and the type of ongoing training program planned to assure optimum availability of the emergency generators. Also discuss the level of education and minimum experience requirements for the various categories of operations and maintenance personnel associated with the emergency diesel generators.
Response
Educational and uinimum experience requirements for all categories of operations and maintenance personnel are in accordance with the recommendations of ANSI / ANS 3.1-1978. Section 13.1.3 provides further information. Personnel from the Perry Plant operation and maintenance departments will be performing the operations and maintenance functions associated with the emerg-ency diesel generators. It is not anticipated that any assistance wlll be required or requested of nonplant operating or maintenance personnel. Vendor assistance will be requested if needed. These functions will be performed on a nondedicated basis. The number and type of personnel utilized for operations and maintenance of the diesel generator will be based on the complexity and requirements of the task being performed. In all cases, plant personnel util-ized will possess the qualifications and training discussed in this response. Supervisors of these functions will be from the respective department. Training will be provided for the operations and maintenance department per-sonnel including respective supervisors of these groups. The projected train-
430. 7 cpg. 2) Cont'd ing time, directly associated with emergency diesel generators, for each de-partment is expected te be approximately 80 hours. The proposed training to be received by the Perry Plant staff is as follows:
- 1. Operations Department Personnel
- a. Basic diesel engines: This segment of training includes theory of operation, application, and basic controls,
- b. Emergency diesel generator, related system training: This segment of training consists of instruction on mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation systems such as diesel fuel oil storage and transfer, intermediate ac distribution, emergency safety features actuation, and air start systems.
- c. Emergency diesel generators: This segment of the training provides the specific information concerning the diesel generator sets installed at the Perry Plant. This instruction includes related plant proced-ures and technical specifications associated with the emergency diesel generators.
- 2. Maintenance Department Personnel
- a. Basic diesel engines: This segment of training includes theory of operation, application, and basic controls.
- b. Emergency diesel generator, related systems training: This segment of training consists of instruction on mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation systems such as diesel fuel oil storage and transfer, intermediate ac distribution, emergency safety features actuation, and air start systems.
- c. Emergency diesel generators: This segment of the training provides the specific information concerning the diesel generator sets in-stalled at the Perry Plant. The instruction includes related plant procedures and technical specifications associated with the emergency
430.7 (Pg. 3) Cont'd diesel generators. In addition to the above training, it is proposed that vendor instruction will be obtained for installation, operation, and maintenance of the diesel genera-tor for selected key operations and maintenance supervisors and maintenance personnel. The proposed format of this course is:
- 1. Operations Department Personnel
- a. Theory of Operation
- b. Installation and Testing
- c. General Maintenance
- 2. Maintenance Department Personnel
- a. Theory of Operation
- b. Installation and Testing
- c. Basic Controls
- d. Specific Maintenance
- e. Troubleshooting Techniques i
I It is projected that the vendor instruction will occur during the installation and testing of the emergency diesel generators. i The Perry Training Unit provides for requalification and replacement training to ensura maintenance of proficiency for the operating organization consistent l with the recommendations of ANSI N18.1-1971. I l i 4 l l l 1
430.8 Periodic testing and test loading of an emergency diesel generator in (8.3) a nuclear power plant is a necessary function to demonstrate the RSP operability, capability and availability of the unit on demand. Periodic testing coupled with good preventive maintenance practices will assure optimum equipment readiness and availability on demand. This is the desired goal. To achieve this optimum equipment readiness status, the following requirements should be met:
- 1. The equipment should be tested with a minimum loading of 25 percent of rated load. No load or light load operation will cause incomplete combustion of fuel resulting in the formation of gum and varnish deposits on the cylinder walls, intake and exhaust valves, pistons and piston rings, etc., and accumulation of unburned fuel in the turbocharger and exhaust system. The consequences of no load or light load operation are potential equipment failure due to the gum and varnish deposits and fire in the engine exhaust system.
- 2. Periodic surveillance testing should be performed in accordance with the applicable NRC guidelines (R.g. 1.108), and with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. Conflicts between any such recommendations and the NRC guidelines, particularly with respect to test frequency, loading and duration, should be identified and justified.
- 3. Preventive maintenance should go beyond the normal routine adjustments, servicing and repair of components when a malfunction occurs. Preventive maintenance should encompass investigative testing of components which have a history of repeated malfunctioning and require constant attention and repair. In such cases, consideration should be given to replacement of those components with other products which have a record of demonstrated reliability, rather than repetitive
430 8 (Pg. 2) Cont'd repair and maintenance of the existing components. Testing of the unit after adjustments or repairs have been made only confirms that the equipment is operable and does not necessarily mean that the root cause of the problem has been eliminated or alleviated.
- 4. Upon completion of repairs or maintenance and prior to an actual start, run, and load test a final equipment check should be made to assure that all electrical circuits are functional, i.e., fuses are in place, switches and circuit breakers are in their proper position, no loose wires, all test leads have been removed, and all valves are in the proper position to permit a manual start of the equipment. After the unit has been satisfactorily started and load tested, return the unit to ready automatic standby service and under the control of the control roomoperator.
Provide a discussion of how the above requirements have been implemented in the emergency diesel generator system design and how they will be considered when the plant is in commercial operation, i.e., by what means will the above requirements be enforced.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 8.3.1.1.3.2 item b7 for the standby diesel generators and revised Section 8.3.1.1.3.3b7 for the HPCS diesel generator. 1
430.9 The availability on demand of an emergency diesel generator is (8.3) dependent upon, among other things, the proper functioning of its , RSP controls and monitoring instrumentation. This equipment is generally panel mounted and in some instances the panels are mounted directly on the diesel generator skid. Major diesel engine damage has occurred at some operating plants from vibration-induced wear on skid mounted control and monitoring instrumentation. This sensitive instrumentation j is not made to withstand and function accurately for prolonged periods under continuous vibrational stresses normally encountered with internal combustion engines. Operation of sensitive instrumentation under this environment rapidly deteriorates calibration, accuracy and control signal output. Therefore, except for sensors and other equipment that must be directly mounted on the engine or associated piping, the controls and monitoring instrumentation should be installed on a freestanding floor-mounted panel separate from the engine skids, and located on a vibration-free floor area. If the floor is not vibration-free, the panel shall be equipped with vibration mounts. Confirm your compliance with the above requirement or provide justification for noncompliance.
Response
Control and Monitoring Instrumentation for the diesel generator are installed
! on a free standing floor mounted panel separate from the engine skids. In addition, vital shutdown and control functions are performed pneumatically for reliability in a diesel environment. Operational experience has shown the normal vibration enduced by the standby diesel generator has no affect on the accuracy of the instrumentation.
1 The response to this question for the IIPCS diesel generators is provided in revised Section 8.3.1.1.3.3.
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430.10 The information regarding the onsite communications system (Section (9.5.2) 9.5.2) does not adequately cover the system capabilities during transients and accidents. Provide the following information: (a) Identify all working stations on the plant site where it may be necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the control room or the emergency shutdown panel during and/or following transients and/or accidents (including fires) in order to mitigate the consequences of the event and to attain a safe cold plant shutdown. (b) Indicate the maximum sound levels that could exist at each of the above identified working stations for all transients and accident conditions. (c) Indicate the types of communication systems available at each of the above identified working stations. (d) Indicate the maximum background noise level that could exist at each working station and yet reliably expect effective communication with the control room using:
- 1. The page party communications systems, and
- 2. Any other additional communication system provided to that working station.
(e) Describe the performance requirements and tests that the above onsite working stations communication systems will be required to pass in order to be assured that effective communication with the control room or emergency shutdown panel is possible under all conditions.
430.10 (. cont'd, pg. 2) (f) Identify and describe the power source (s) provided for each of the communications systems. (g) Discuss the protective measures taken to assure a functionally operable onsite communication system. The discussion should include the considerations given to component failures, loss of power, and the severing of a communication line or trunk as a result of an accident or fire.
Response
Figure 9.5-23 shows all :he maintenance and calibration jack stations which includes all working stations on the plant site required to attain a safe cold plant shutdown. This system as discussed in Section 9.5.2.2.2 is powered from a vital a-c bus. The maintenance and calibration system uses headsets with integral amplifiers to negate background sound levels. The page party communications system is set up to encompass all areas and equipment where communications would be required to attain a safe cold shutdown. Re-entrant type speakers are capable of being oriented in any desired direction after the entire assembly has been permanently mounted and wired. All speaker amplifier sections are equipped with controls for volume and high frequency ! attenuation to overcome any possible background noise level that could exist. The maintenance and calibration system is powered from a vital ac source and will be available during accident conditions. The page party system is fed from a non-Class lE source and is only available during an accident condition
- coincident with loss of off-site power.
The onsite working station communication system will be acceptance tested, demonstrating system performance for the design specification to assure effective communications with the control room or the emergency shutdown panel.
430.10 (Cont'd, pg. 3) The page party system as shown in Figure 9.5-6 shows the layout of this system utilizing a branch circuit arrangement with testing isolation stations connecting the branches to the trunk. There are also three trunks. This arrangement allows for a component failure or a short circuit on any one branch to be isolated from the remaining system. Also the loss of a trunk line will only cause the loss of communications in a limited area of the plant. Handy-talkie radio communication via 2 - 450 Mhz band repeaters will be available to operators and fire fighting personnel. The maintenance and calibration system is made up of a central patch panel, which is in itself three separate enclosures bolted together, containing a' total of twelve headset power supplies, each capable of carrying, 12 headsets simultaneously. In addition, two power supplies will be spares mounted in place. Each jack station is separately wired back to the patch panel. , 1 1 ) I i i
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430.11 Identify the vital areas and hazardous areas where emergency lighting (9.5.3) is needed for safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident. Tabulate the light.ing system provided in your design to accommodate those areas so identified. Include the degree of compliance to Standard Review Plan 9.5.1 regarding emergency lighting requirements in the event of a fire.
Response
The response to this question will be provided by November 30, 1981. e t
430.12 You state in Section 9.5.9, "High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator," (9.5.4) that the descriptions for the auxiliary systems (fuel oil, cooling (9.5.5) water, lubrication and air starting) are contained in Reference 1 (9.5.6) and/or 3 of Section 9.5.11 " Fire Protection Evaluation Report" (9.5.7) and NEDO-10905 "HPCS System Power Supply," respectively. Reference 1 (9.5.8) does not provide any descriptive information and Reference 3 provides (9.5.9) only a brief general description with no specific details on how the air starting, lubricating oil and fuel oil systems operate or the system design characteristics. No description is provided for the cooling water and combustion air intake and exitaust s stems. An adequate review of the HPCS diesel engine cannot be performed without this information.
Response
Section 9.5.9 has been revised to provide a more detailed description of the.IIPCS diesel generator auxiliary systems. i f I i f 1 I l f I L
i j i i 430.13 Describe the instruments, controls, sensors and alarms provided for (9.5.4) monitoring the diesel engine fuel oil storage and transfer system i and describe their function. Discuss the testing necessary to maintain and assure a highly reliable instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarm systen and where the alarms are annunciated. Identify the
, temperature, pressure and level sensors which alert the operator kaen these parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine l manufacturer and describe what operator actions are required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful effects to the diesel engine.
Discuss the system interlocks provided. (SRP 9.5.4, Part III, item 1). 1 t
Response
l j For the diesel engine fuel oil storage and transfer system there are no specific parameters which the engine manufacturer recommends be monitored, alarmed, and corrective action taken to prevent harmful effects to the engine. 3 For this system the overriding objective is to ensure that fuel oil is available i in the day tank at all times. The system instrumentation provided to assure that this objective is achieved as discussed in revised Section 7.3.1.1.15, j item b.1. Instrurantation testing requirements are presented in Section 9.5.4.4 and 9.5.9. System alarms, with alarming location, are presented in Section 8.3.1.1.3.2 and 8.3.1.1.3.3 for the standby diesel generators and the llPCS diesel generators respectively. During alarm conditions, the operator shall determine the nature of the alarm and then take appropriate action in accordance with the System Operation Procedure for that system. I i I l { l l l 1 l l l
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; 430.14 The diesel generator structures are designed to seismic and tornado j (9.5.4) criteria and are isolated from one another by a reinforced concrete i vall barrier. Describe the barrier (including openings) in more detail and its capability to withstand the effects of internally i
i generated missiles resulting from a crankcase explosion, failure of one or all of the starting air receivers, or failure of any high or l moderate energy line and initial flooding from the cooling system so 1 i that the as umed effects will not result in loss of an additional l l generator. (SRP 9.5.4, Part III, item 2). l I J Response i The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.4.3. I 1 i i i i 1 I i I i j l 1 ? i 4 a i 1 1
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! 430.15 You state in Section 9.5.4.3 and in Figure 9.5.8 that the diesel fuel 1
a 1 (9.5.4) oil storage and transfer system ventt overflows, fill, dipstick, and l (RSP) water removal lines are non-safety lines, and are therefore non-seismic. l
! A seismic event or a tornado missile with or without a single active failure would cause degradation of the fuel oil due to water entering
, the system cr potential loss of fuel due to tank overflow. We require E i, that these lines be design seismic Category I, ASME Section III, i Class 3, and be protected from tornado missiles. Comply with this l position. t
Response
The lines in question will be changed to ASME Sect. III Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I. Missile protection will be provided. The applicable sections and figures in the FSAR will be revised to reflect the change to Safety Class 3, Seismic . Category I lines. I l i I i i l l l I I 8 i i i l I l l l 1 i
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I J f i i 430.16 In Section 9.5.4.3 you state that corrosion protection for the tanks j (9.5.4) and piping will include providing a corrosion allowance as well as external coatings. This statement is unacceptable. Expand the FSAR ! to include a more explicit description of proposed protection of l ] underground piping. Where corrosion protective coatings are being I considered (piping and tanks) include the industry standards which ! will be used in their application. Also discuss what provisions will ! be made in the design of the fuel oil storage and transfer system i storage tanks in the use of internal corrosion protection, in addition r to external waterproof protective coatings. (SRP 9.5.4, Part II and i Part III, item 4). 4
Response
i The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.4.3. 4 i + 5 l l l l l i l
430.17 The FSAR text and Table 3.2-1 states that the components and piping (3. 2 ) systems for the diesel generator auxiliaries (fuel oil system, (9.5.4) cooling water, lubrication, air starting, and intake and combustion (9.5.5) system) that are mounted on the auxiliary skids are designed Seismic (9.5.6) Category I and are ASME Section III Class 3 quality. The engine (9.5.7) mounted components and piping are designed and manuf actured to (9.5.8) DEMA standards, and are Seismic Category I. This is not in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26 which requires the entire diesel generator auxiliary systems be designed to ASME Section III Class 3 or Quality Group C. Provide the industry standards that were used in the design, manufacture, and inspection of the engine mounted piping and components. Also show on the appropriate P&ID's where the Quality Group Classification changes from Quality Group C.
Response
I Compliance with current regulations is reflected in revised Sections 9.5.4.3, 9.5.5.3, 9.5.6.3, 9.5.7.3, 9.5.8.1, and 9.5.9.3. The industry standards applicable to the design, manufacture and inspection of the HPCS diesel generator are given in Section F of NEDO 10905. I The P&ID's indicate the safety classification changes from Safety Class 3 j (Quality Group C) to non-safety class. Refer to Figures 9.5-8, 9.5-9, ! 9.5-10, 9.5-11, and 9.5-12. I l t l l 5 I t
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i .i I i 430.18 In Section 9.5.4.1 you state that diesel fuel oil is available from (9.5.4) local distribution sources in the Cleveland area. Identify the sources
, where diesel quality fuel oil will be available and the distances l
required to be traveled from the source (s) to the plant. Also discuss
, how fuel oil will be delivered onsite under extremely unfavorable environmental conditions. (SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 5b). )
t i Response f The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.4.1.
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430.19 Discuss what precautions have been taken in the design of the fuel (9.5.4) oil system in locating the fuel oil day tank and connecting fuel oil piping in the diesel generator room with regard to possible exposure to ignition sources such as open flames and hot surfaces. (SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 6).
Response
The fuel oil day tanks are located no less than approximately ten feet f rom the exhaust manifold piping. In addition, the day tanks are protected to obtain a three hour fire resistance rating. The fuel vil piping is routed such that the nearest distance to hot surfaces is at the connection to the diesel engine. There are no open flames in the diesel generator room.
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430.20 Section 1.8 and 9.5.4.1, " Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Oil Storage and I (9.5.4) Transfer System (EDEFSS)" references ANSI Standard N195, " Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators" and Regulatory Guide 1.137,
" Fuel Oil Systems for Staudby Diesel Generators" with certain exceptions. Adequate justification for items la, 2a, 2b and 2c in Section 1.8 regarding conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.137 is not .
l provided. Provide your justification for the above or comply with ! l these positions in Regulatory Guide 1.137.
Response
l Justification relative to the positions of Regulatory Guide 1.137 is as d follows: i 1 Item la. See response to FSAR question 430.23. Item 2a. Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.137 is not required by the
" Implementation" section of the guide. For the normal control range for operating the pump the level in the day tank at which the supply pump is automatically turned on provides a 34 minute supply of oil. At the level in the day tank at which the supply pump is automatically turned off, there is a 68 minute supply of ;
oil. A 34 minute supply of oil is adequate to rectify an abnormal f situation which causes the level in the day tank to decrease to the shutoff point of the pump. i Item 2b. Shutoff will be accomplished at the tank truck valves. A strainer is provided in the transfer pump suction line. Item 2c. An abnormally high oil level would not adversely affect system operation. This condition would occur only during the tank filling operation which is administrative 1y controlled. A central oil l unloading / tank fill station is provided with a roadside pulloff for i the tank truck. The area surrounding the pulloff is suitably drained l so that spills or overflows are drained to an oil interceptor tank. l
430.21 Discuss the precautionary measures that will be taken to assure the (9.5.4) quality and reliability of the fuel oil supply for emergency diesel generator operation. Include the type of fuel oil, impurity and quality limitations as well as diesel index number or its equivalent, cloud point, entrained moisture, sulfur, particulates and other deleterious insoluble substances; procedure for testing newly delivered fuel, periodic sampling and testing of onsite fuel oil (including interval between tests), interval of time between periodic removal of condensate from fuel tanks and periodic system inspection. In your discussion include reference to industry (or other) standard which will be followed to assure a reliable fuel oil supply to the emergency generators. (SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Items 3 and 4).
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.4.4. l
J i 430.22 Discuss the design considerations that have determined the physical j (9.5.4) location of the diesel engine fuel oil day tanks at your facility. I Assure that the selected physical location of the fuel oil day tanks meet the requirements of the diesel engine manufacturers. (SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 5(c).)
Response
The day tank for the standby diesel generators is to be located at an elevation to flood the suction of the motor driven fuel oil booster pump and the engine I The fuel oil level in the day tank at the low-low level .! driven fuel pump. alarm is 632'-0 ". At the low-low alarm level, both fuel oil transfer pumps which supply oil to the day tank from the underground supply tank are turned off. The elevation of the suction of the motor driven fuel oil booster pump is 621'-7-5/8". The elevation of the suction of the engine driven fuel pump is 628'-9-11/16". Therefore, the location of standby diesel generator fuel oil day tank is acceptable. 1 s l i r I
4 i 430.23 Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of a diesel (9.5.4) generator for a prolonged period that would require replenishment of fuel oil without interrupting operation of the diesel generator. What provision will be made in the design of the fuel oil storage fill system to minimize the creation of turbulence of the sediment in the bottom of the storage tank. Stirring of this sediment during addition of new fuel has the potential of causing the overall quality i of the fuel to become unacceptable and could potentially lead to the degradation or failure of the diesel generator. 1
Response
i The fuel oil fill line enters the top of the tank and is directed to one small 4 area near the bottom of the tank to minimize the area affected by incoming flow. Oil entering the tank will do so at a relatively slow velocity. The intake nozzle of the eductor is located 18 inches above the bottom of the tank, which provides separation from any sediment on the bottom of the tank. Therefore, any disturbance of sediment which may exist at the bottom of the tank and ingestion of sediment into the fuel supply lines will be minimal. In addition, fuel oil filters are provided in the fuel lines to the diesel supply headers. i } l s
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . - - _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . .- __ _ _ I 430.24 Provide the source of power for the fuel oil storage tank motor-driven (9.5.4) fuel oil transfer pumps and diesel engine motor-driven fuel oil booster ) pump and the motor characteristics, i.e., motor hp, operating voltage, phase (s) and frequency. Also include pump capacity and discharge head.
. Revise the FSAR accordingly.
l
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Sections 9.5.4.2 and 9.5.9 i > for the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generator respectively. i f 1 t I l i i i l l l k i,~._._.__.__.-.____.______._.___..._....__..,__._,__._,.,
430.25 Expand your description of the diesel engine fuel oil system. The (9.5.4) FSAR text should include a detailed system description of what is shown on Figures 9.5-8 and 9.5-5. The FSAR text should also i describe: (1) components and their function, and (2) a diesel ) generator starting sequence for a normal start and emergency start. Revise your FSAR accordingly. 4
Response
. The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.4.2 and revised Section 9.5.9.1 for the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generators respectively.
I A detailed description of the HPCS diesel generator starting system is in revised Section 9.5.9. A description of the starting sequence is provided in NEDO 10905 Section 5.2.3, and Figure 5-2. For emergency starts the normal start sequence is shown on NEDO 10905 Figure 5-lc. 1 l l i i l l l l I
i 430.26 Section 9.5.5 indicates that the function of the diesel generator (9.5.5) cooling water system is to dissipate the heat transferred through the: (1) engine water jacket, (2) lube oil cooler, and (3) engine air water coolers. Provide information on the individual component heat removal rates (Btu /hr), flow (1bs/hr) and temperature differential (* F) and the total heat removal rate required. Also provide the design margin (excess heat removal capacity) included in the design of major components and subsystems. (SRP 9.5.5, Part III, Item 1).
Response
The response to this question will be provided by January 15, 1982. q l 1 i ( i L l 1 I l l
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1 1 430.27 Expand your description of the diesel engine cooling water system. I (9.5.7) The FSAR text should include a detailed system description of what is shown on figures 9.5-9 and 9.5-16. The FSAR text should also describe: (1) components and their function, and (2) a diesel i generator starting sequence for a normal start and emergency start. Revise your FSAR accordingly. l Response The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.5.2 and j revised Section 9.5.9.2 for the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generators respectively. f e i { I l
! 430.28 Indicate the measures to preclude long-term corrosion and organic l
(9.5.5) fouling in the diesel engine cooling water system that would degrade system cooling performance, and the compatibility of any corrosion inhibitors or antifreeze compounds used with the materials of the i ~ system. Indicate if the water chemistry is in conformance with the engine manufacturer's recommendations. (SRP 9.5.5, Part III, Item Ic.) 1 , Response The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.5.1 and revised Section 9.5.9.2 for the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel 4 generators respectively. i i l I I ) I l l l l' l l l l I 1 i i
1 430.29 Describe the instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarms provided (9.5.5) for monitoring of the diesel engine cooling water system and describe their function. Discuss the testing necessary to maintain and assure a highly reliable instrumentation, controls, sensors, and alarm system, and where the alarms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure, level, and flow (where applicable) sensors which alert the operator when these parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine manufacturer and describe what operator actions are required j during alarm conditions to prevent harmful effects to the diesel engine. Discuss the systems interlocks provided. (SRP 9.5.6, Part III, Item Ic.)
Response
The response to this question is provided in new Section 9.5.5.5. Revised Section 9.5.9.2 and NEDO 10905 describe the functions of the instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarms provided for monitoring of the HPCS diesel engine cooling water system. I 3 l i l 1 I
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430.30 Describe the provisions made in the design of the diesel engine (9.5.5) cooling water system to assure that all components and piping are filled with water. (SRP 9.5.5, Part III, Item 2.) Responsc Each generator system is vented to ensure that all spaces are filled with water. A jacket water standpipe serves as a reservoir and is equipped with a low water level alarm.
430.31 The diesel generators are required to start automatically on loss of (9.5.5) all offsite power and in the event of a LOCA. The diesel generator sets should be capable of operation at less than full load for extended periods without degradation of performance or reliability. Should a LOCA occur with availability of offsite power, discuss the design provisions and other parameters that have been considered in the selection of the diesel generators to enable them to run unloaded (on standby) for extended periods without degradation of engine performance er reliability. Expand your PSAR/FSAR to include and explicitly define the capability of your design with regard to this requirement. (SRP 9.5.5, Part III, Item 7.)
Response
i The response to this question is provided in revised Section 8.3.1.1.3.2 and 8.3.1.1.3.3a for the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel
- generators respectively.
t l
3 430.32 The diesel engine cooling water system is provided with an expansion
- (9.5.5) tank to provide for system expansion and for venting air from the system. In addition to the items mentioned, the expansion tank is to provide for minor system leaks at pump shaft seals, valve stems and other components, and to maintain required NPSH on the system circulating pump. Provide the size of the expansicn tank and location.
Demonstate by analysis that the expansion tank size will be adequate ; to maintain required pump NPSH and makeup water for seven days l continuous operation of the diesel engine at full rated load without makeup, or provide a Seismic Category I, safety Class 3 makeup water i supply to the expansion tank. Response ; The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.5.2. 1 i 5
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430.33 Provide the source of power for the diesel engine motor-driven jacket (9.5.5) water keep warm pump and electric jacket water heater. Provide the motor and electric heater characteristics, i.e., motor hp, operating voltage, phase (s), frequency and kW output as applicable. Also include the pump capacity and discharge head. Revise the FSAR accordingly.
Response
- The response to this question is provided in revised Sections 9.5.5.2 and 9.5.9 1
for the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generator respectively. i t
+
l i
. . .-_ --- ---.- - =- _ ____ - -
4 430.34 Figure 9.5-16 shows an immersion heater in the diesel engine cooling (9.5.5) water system attached directly to the lube oil cooler, and to the engine-driven pumps' suction and discharge lines. The FSAR in Section 9.5.9 does not provide a detailed description of how the diesel engine cooling water system operates during standby conditions nor does the design of this system seem to provide for preheating of the jacket water to enhance engine start capability. Provide a detailed description of how the diesel engine cooling water system operates on standby conditions. I l Response A detailed description of the diesel engine cooling water system is provided 4 in revised Section 9.5.9.2. l l i i I r f I i i t
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; 430.35 Provide a discussion of the measures that have been taken in the (9.5.6) design of the standby diesel generator air starting system to preclude the fouling of the air start valve or filter with moisture and contaminants such as oil carryover and rust. (SRP 9.5.6, Part III, i
Item 1.) i I t l
Response
l, i I The information provided in the response to question 430.39 explains the I measures being taken to reduce moisture. The reduction of moisture in the l air will minimize the formation of rust. The air dryers use a coalescing filter that traps any oil carryover from the compressor. i The response to this question for the HPCS diesel generators is provided j in revised Section 9.5.9. .i 1 1 I I i I l f I i I l l l i
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) i i i 430.36 Describe the instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarms provided I (9.5.6) for monitoring the diesel engine air starting system, and describe 1 i their function. Describe the testing necessary to maintain a highly i reliable instrumentation, control, sensors and alarm system and where i the alarms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure and level sensors which alert the operator when these parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine manufacturer and describe any ] operator actions required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful , 4 l effects to the diesel engine. Discuss system interlocks provided. Revise your FSAR accordingly. (SRP 9.5.6, Part III, Item 1.)
Response
For the diesel engine air start system there are no parameters which the engine manufacturer requires be alarmed and corrective action taken to prevent harmful effects to the engine during operation. For this system the most
- important consideration is to insure that starting air pressure is always I
available or to alert the plant operators when it is not available. ! Instrumentation, controls and alarms are provided for these purposes as well as for performance monitoring, trending, and engine diagnostics. This instrumentation is discussed in revised Section 7.3.1.1.15, item b.2. Testing of the air start system instrumentation and controls is described in Section 9.5.6.4 and 9.5.9. System alarms, with alarming locations, are presented in Section 8.3.1.1.3.2 and 8.3.1.1.3.3 b10 for the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generators respectively. l There are no system interlocks applicable to this system. I During alarm conditions, the operator shall determine the nature of the alarm ! and then take appropriate action in accordance with the System Operating l Procedure. I l i l
.I i 430.37 You state in Section 9.5.11 (Reference 3) that each HPCS diesel (9.5.6) engine is provided with two independent air starting systems each j RSP with its own air receiver tank. You also state that this air start system has sufficient capacity for three successful starts. This is i
- not acceptable. We require, as a minimum, the air starting system
- for each HPCS diesel generator should be capable of cranking a cold diesel engine five times without the use of the air compressor.
l ! Revise your design accordingly. (SRP 9.5.6, Part III, Item 9b.) i l Response : The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.9 . a i h l l i I i i
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1 i l 430.38 Expand your description of the diesel engine starting system. The (9.5.6) FSAR text should provide a detailed system description of what is l shown on Figures 9.5-10 and 4.1 of Reference 3 of FSAR Section l 9.5.11. The FSAR text should also describe: (1) components and their function, and (2) a diesel engine starting sequence. In describing the diesel engine starting sequence include the number of air start valves used and whether one or both air start systems are used.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.6.2 and revised Section 9.5.9. 1 1 i i i i j l l l t
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l 430.39 A study by the University of Dayton has shown that accumulation of j (9.5.6) water in the starting air system has been one of the most frequent RSP causes of diesel engine failure to start on demand. Condensation of i entrained moisture in compressed air lines leading to control and starting air valves, air start motors, and condensation of moisture 1 on the working surfaces of these components has caused rust, scale and water itself to build up and score and jam the internal working parts of these vital components thereby preventing starting of the diesel generators. 1 In the event of loss of offsite power the diesel gencrators must function since they are vital to the safe shutdown of the reactor (s). I Failure of the diesel engines to start from the effects of moisture 1
; condensation in air starting systems and from other causes has lowered their operational reliability to substantially less than the desired i
reliability of 0.99 as specified in Branch Technical Position ICSB ! (PSB) 2," Diesel Generator Reliability Testing" and Regulatory Guide
- 1.108," Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants."
1 In an effort toward improving diesel engine starting reliability we require that compressed air starting system designs include air dryers for the removal of entrained moisture. The two air dryers most commonly used are the dessicant and refrigerant types. Of these two types, the refrigerant type is the one most suited for this application and therefore is preferred. Starting air shoold be dried to a dew point of not more than 50 F when installed in a normally controlled 70 F environment; otherwise, the starting air dew point should be controlled to at least 10* F less than the lowest expected ' ambient temperature. Revise your design of the HPCS diesel engine air starting system accordingly; describe this feature of your design. .i Response The design of the HPCS diesel engine air start system will be revised to provide either a dessicant or refrigerant type air dryer. Details of the design will be , later.
- . _. - - - - . - - . . - - . . . -__,,,_.- - .--. . - , = _ - , _ - ,- - - , . . , .--
i l 1 I 430.'40 For the diesel engine lubrication system in Section 9.5.7 provide the (9.5.7) following information: (1) define the temperature differentials, flow rate, anc heat remnval rate of the interface cooling system external to 3 the engine and verify that these are in accordance with recommendations of the engine manufacturer; (2) discuss the measures that will be taken to maintain the required quality of the oil, including the inspection and replacement when oil quality is degraded; (3) describe the protective features (such as blowout panels) provided to prevent l unacceptable crankcase explosion and to mitigate the consequences - of such an event; and (4) describe the capability for detection and control of system leakage. (SRP 9.5.7, Part II, Items 8a, 8b, 8c, Part III, Item 1.) i t
Response
The following response is applicable to the standby diesel generators:
- 1. . Lube Oil Cooler t
Shell Side (Lube Oil) Tube Side (Jacket Water) Flow (gpm) 500 900 Temperature In ( F) 185 148 Temperature Out ( F) 156 155
- Heat Removal Rate (BTU /HR) 3,224,100 j
2 The required oil quality is maintained by performing monthly laboratory analysis on a sample of the lub oil. From the results of the analyses, it is determined if the oil quality has degraded and replacement is necessary.
- 3. The crankcase is fully enclosed and theoretically air tight. To remove gases and vapors from the crankcase and to reduce the possibility of
. fresh air or oxygen being present, crankcase pressure is maintained at
- a' level slightly below atmospheric, measured in inches H 2O by a standard Nibtype mancmeter. Two motor driven blowers are used to draw directly from
,the crankcase to each engine, and discharge through oil separators where
/
oil vapors are removed. The discharge is piped outside the engine room to Uhe atmosphere.
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430.40 (Cont'd, pg. 2) 1 Crankcase vacuum readings shall be taken and compared with previous readings. In this way, gradual changes can be detected and investigated so that minor i problems can be corrected before they reach major proportions. Should the readings indicate a loss of crankcase vacuum, the cause should be promptly determined and corrected. , Crankcase vacuum readings shall be carefully observed during heavy load operations. Should the pressure go from a vacuum to a positive reading, the engine will be shut down immediately. The engine will not be operated with a positive pressure inside the crankcase since this indicates that the suction source for purging the crankshaft has been plugged and/or otherwise obstructed, or that some condition exists that is creating ! abnormal heat. If a hot spot develops in the engine and the oil flows or splashes over it, a considerable amount of oil vapor will be formed. This vapor is explosive and the engine will be stopped immediately. The engine will be allowed to rest for fifteen minutes to allow fumes and
- vapors to dissipate before removing any engine covers. The cause will be determined and corrected before continuing operation.
l As a further safety measure, doors on the crankcase will automatically open if the pressure inside the crankcase exceeds the pressure of the ambient atmospheric pressure by 0.7 psi. The doors are designed so that only a small amount of vapor will be released to the room. No oil will be released.
- 4. The following are two methods to detect oil leakage from the system:
- a. Make comparisans of oil levels and the rate of level reduction with previous rates. An increase in the rate of reduction of the oil level could mean a leak in the system.
I b. Visually examine the various components in the system during normal preventive maintenance work. The following response is applicable to the HPCS diesel generator: l I j
- 1. The diesel engine lube oil cooling system together with the diesel engine l
, . _ . - .. . - - . = . - . - _ _ . . _.
1 l l 430.40 (Cent'd, pg. 3) l l l l cooling water system are integral parts of the diesel engine. The cooling water system is designed to absorb all the heat carried from the engine by the lube oil system. A description of the cooling water and lube oil systems are provided in Sections 9.5.5 and 9.5.9. In particular, Table 1 9.5-2 summarizes the thermal characteristics of the cooling water system and its design margin. No external cooling is needed for the lube oil system. 1
- 2. The diesel engine manufacturer has provided a specification for the lube oil to be used in the engine. The oil quality will be chacked by means of administrative procedures. In addition clogged oil filters will be annunciated. A detailed description of the lube oil system is provided in revised Section 9.5.9.
- 3. A crankcase pressure detector is provided to detect change in the normally
( negative crankcase pressure to a positive pressure. If the crankcase t j pressure should become positive the high crankcase pressure alarm annunciates.
- The operator can then take appropriate action to correct the condition.
i
- See revised Section 9.5.9.
- 4. During the initial start up and periodic testing the lube oil system is checked for leaks. High lube oil temperature, low lube oil level or low lube oil pressure could be partly attributed to lube oil leakage. Excessive oil use may be partly due to oil leakage. This is checked by routine inspection. See revised Section 9.5.9.
t t i i t < ] i
n J 430.41 What measures have been taken to prevent entry of deleterious materials into the engine lubrication oil system due to operator error during recharging of lubrication oil or normal operation. [
Response
The valves and entry points used during recharging of lubrication oil will ] i be color coded and marked to prevent entry of deleterious materials due to operator error. i In addition, new lubricating oil will be stored in a designated lube oil storage facility. The storage of lubricants will be in containers designed to minimize the possibility of contamination and to provide safe storage. I f { I i J i l I
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- 430.42 Describe the instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarms provided 4
(9. 5. 7 ) for monitoring the diesel engine lubrication oil system and describe their function. Describe the testing necessary to maintain a highly reliable instrumentation, control, sensors and alarm system and where I the alarms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure and level sensors which alert the operator when these parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine manufacturer and describe any operator action required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful effects to the diesel engine. Discuss systems interlocks provided. Revise your FSAR accordingly. (SRP 9.5.7, Part III, Item le. ) i
Response
s The diesel engine lubrication oil system for the standby diesel generators is provided with instruments for monitoring system temperatures, pressure, and level. Abnormal values of these parameters which might lead to eventual engine damage are annunciated so that the plant operators can investigate and take corrective action before damage occurs. The system instrumentation also s provides information for engine performance monitoring, trending, and engine diagnostics. System instrumentation is discussed in revised Section 7.3.1.1.15 item b.3 and is shown on Figure 9.5-11. Testing of the system instrumentation > is described in Section 9.5.7.4. System alarms, with alarm locations are presented in Section 8.3.1.1.3.2. Alarms provided for monitoring the HPCS diesel engine lubrication oil system are listed in 8.3.1.1.3.3 item b.10. A revised system description which describes the functions and key sensors used by the operator is provided in Section 9.5.9.4. This section included discussion of operator actions required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful effects to the diesel generator. 1 The operator shall determine the nature of the alarm, and then shall take appropriate action in accordance with the System Operating Procedure for that system. I 1
l 430.43 Expand your description of the diesel engine lube oil system. The FSAR (9.5.7) text should include a detailed system description of what is shown in Figures 9.5.11, and 4.4 of Reference 3 of Section 9.5.11. The FSAR text should also describe: (1) components and their function. and (2) a diesel generator starting sequence for a normal start and an emergency start and standby operations. Revise your FSAR accordingly.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.7.2 and 9.5.9 for the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generators respectively. 4 k e l I.
.i l i 430.44 Provide the source of power for the diesel engine prelube (.9. 5. 7 ) and keep warm oil pump, and notor characteristics, i.e., motor hp, ] operating voltage, phase (s) and frequency. Also provide the l pump capacity and discharge head. Revise your FSAR accordingly. I 4 " Response a i The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.7.2. i i i i i L I 4 l* l i i l I i i l i i
430. 45 Several fires have occurred at some operating plants in the area of I (9.5.7) the diesel engine exhaust manifold and inside the turbocharger housing RSP which have resulted in equipment unavailability. The fires were started from lube oil leaking and accumulating on the engine exhaust manifold and accumulating and igniting inside the turbocharger housing. Accumulation of lube oil in these areas, on some engines, is apparently caused from an excessively long prelube period, generally longer than five minutes, prior to manual starting of a diesel generator. This condition does not occur on an emergency start since the prelube period is minimal. ! When manually starting the diesel generators for any reason, to minimize the potential fire hazard and to improve equipment availability, the prelube period should be limited to a maximum of three to five minutes unless otherwise recommended by the diesel engine manufacturer. Confirm your compliance with this requirement for the HPCS diesel generator or provide your justification for requiring a longer prelube time interval prior to manual starting of the diesel generators. Provide the prelube time interval your diesel engine will be exposed to prior to manual start.
Response
The EMD diesel engine recommendations for the Perry prelube period is 3 to 5 minutes. _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . - ~ . _ _ _ _ _ , , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . . . _ . _ - _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ - - . _ _ . . _ , . _ . - . _ - _
430.46 An emergency diesel generator unit in a nuclear power plant is normally (9.5.7) in the ready standby mode unless there is a loss of offsite power, an RSP accident, or the diesel generator is under test. Long periods on standby have a tendency to drain or nearly empty the engine lube oil piping system. On an emergency start of the eggine as much as 5 to 14 or more seconds may elapse from the start of cranking until full lube oil pressure is attained even though full engine speed is generally reached in about five seconds. With an essentially dry engine, the { momentary lack of lubrication at the various moving parts may damage bearing surfaces producing incipient or actual component failure with resultant equipment unavailability. The emergency condition of readiness requires this equipment to attain full rated speed and enable automatic sequencing of electric load within ten seconds. For this reason, and to improve upon the availability of this equipment on demand, it is necessary tc establish as quickly as possible an oil film in the wearing parts of the diesel engine. l Lubricating oil is normally delivered to the engine wearing parts by one or more engine-driven pump (s). During the starting cycle the pump (s) accelerates slowly with the engine and may not supply the required i quantity of lubricating oil where needed fast enough. To remedy this condition, as a minimum, an electrically driven lubricating oil pump, powered from a reliable DC power supply, should be installed in the lube oil system to operate in parallel with the engine driven main lube pump. The electric driven prelube pump should operate only durirg the l engine cranking cycle or until satisfactory lube oil pressure is established in the engine main lube distribution header. The installation of this prelube pump should be coordinated with the respective engine manufacturer. Some diesel engines include a lube oil circulating pump as an integral part of the lube oil preheating system which is in use I while the diesel engine is in the standby mode. In this case an additional prelube oil pump may not be needed. l l I t L
430.46 (Pg. 2) Cont'd Confirm your compliance with the above requirement for the IIPCS diesel generator to provide your justification for not installing an electric prelube oil pump.
Response
The diesel engine lube oil system is in compliance with the requirement defined in this question. An electric driven prelube pump is provided to supply oil during starting.
430.47 Describe the instrumentation, controls, sensors, and alarms provided in (9.5.8) the design of the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system
; which alert the operator when parameters exceed ranges recommended by the engine manufacturer and describe any operator action required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful effects to the diesel engine.
Discuss systems interlocks provided. Revise your FSAR accordingly. (SRP 9.5.8, Part III, Items 1 and 4.)
Response
For the combustion air intake and exhaust system the standby diesel engine manufacturer does not prescribe any parameters which require alarming and corrective action to prevent harmful effects to the diesel engine. That instrumentation which is provided is used for performance monitoring, trending, and engine diagnostics. Refer to revised Section 9.5.8.5. There are no system interlocks. Alarms provided for the KPCS diesel engine air intake and exhaust system are provided in Section 8.3.1.1.3.3b item 10. A revised system description describing the function and key sensors used by operators can be found in l Section 9.5.9. A detailed discussion of operator actions required are provided in the operating procedures in the instruction manual. There are no system interlocks. The operator shall determine the nature of the alarm, and then shall take appropriate action in accordance with the System Operating Procedure for that system. l we ,m . . -
430.48 You state in Section 9.5.8.3 that "there is no storage of gases in (9.5.8) the immediate vicinity of the air intakes, accidental release of these gases could affect the minimum quantity and oxygen content requirements for intake combustion air." This statement is contradictory, if there are gases stored onsite whose accidental release could cause degradation of diesel generator operation. Respond to the following. Provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that the function of your diesel engine air intake and exhaust system design will not be degraded to an extent which prevents developing full engine rated power or cause engine shutdown as a consequence of any meteorological or accident condition. Include in your discussion the potential and effect of fire extinguishing (gaseous) medium, recirculation of diesel combustion products, or other gases that may intentionally or accidentally be released onsite, on the performance of the diesel generator. (SRP 9.5.8, Part III, Item 3.)
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.8.3. 4 s I I
430.49 Show by analysis that a potential fire in the chart stor.ge room or (9.5.8) the diesel generator building together with a single failure of the fire protection system (i.e., fire damper fails to close or CO system 2 fails to operate) will not degrade the quality of the diesel combustion air so that the remaining diesel will be able to provide full rated power.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.8.3. l
430.50 Experience at some operating plants has shown that diesel engines have (9.5.8) failed to start due to accumulation of dust and other deleterious material on electrical equipment associated with starting of the diesel generators (e.g., auxiliary relay contacts, control switches, etc.). Describe the provisions that have been made in your diesel generator building design, electrical starting system, and combustion air and ventilation air intake design (s) to preclude this condition to assure availability of the diesel generator on demand. Also describe under normal plant operation what procedure (s) will be used to minimize accumulation of dust in the diesel generator room; I specifically address concrete dust control. In your response also consider the condition when Unit 1 is in operation and Unit 2 is under construction (abnormal generation of dust).
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.8.3. i i 1
430.52 Expand your description of the diesel engine combustion intake and (9.5.7) exhaust system. The FSAR test should include a detailed system description of what is shown on Figures 1.2-5, 1.2-6, 1.2-13, 9.5-12, 9.5-13 and 9.5-14. The FSAR test should also describe: (1) components and their function, (2) location of equipment (provide clear drawings), and, (3) a diesel generator starting sequence for a normal start and an emergency start. Revise your FSAR accordingly.
Response
J The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.8.2 for the standby diesel generators. A detailed description of the HPCS diesel engine ! combustion intake and e..haust system is provided in revised Section 9.5.9. Location of equipment is provided in Section 8.3.1.1.3.3.b item 10. The diesel generator starting sequence is provided in Sections 8.3.1.1.3.3. i i t 1 l l l 1 I l
430.52 Figure 1.2.5 of the Perry FSAR shows the ESF transformers located near (9.5.8) the control / diesel generator building complex. An ESF transformer fire with the right meteorological conditions could degrade engine operation by the products of combustion being drawn into the D/G ventilation system which supplies D/G combustion air. Discuss the provisions of your design (site characteristics, ventilation system and building design, etc.) which preclude this event from occurring.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.8.3. 4 c l l l l
430.53 You state in Section 9.5.8.3 of the FSAR that "If the carbon dioxide (9.5.8) fire extinguishing system is activated for the chart storage room in the control complex, or in a diesel generator room, the fire dampers for the respective room are automatically closed and the area isolated to prevent air, smoke or carbon dioxide from being exhausted. The isolated area will be cleared of these gases using strict administration controls to ensure that no possibility exists for large concentrations of gases to be ejected into the atmosphere and be drawn into the diesel generator air intakes." Describe the administrative procedures for venting the above areas. Include in the description the venting time duration (the time the dampers are open for venting), frequency, the means used to dilute the vented gases, the design criteria used to determine these values, and any design margins included in the procedures (i.e., vent time duration can be exceeded for X amount of time before combustion air becomes degraded, etc.).
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 9.5.8.3. l l l 1 l l
l 430.54 Provide a general discussion of the criteria and bases of the various (10.1) steam and condensate instrumentation systems in Section 10.1 of the FSAR. The FSAR should differentiate between normal operation instramentation and regired safety instrumentation.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.1. l l i l l l l l
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430.55 Expand your discussion of the turbine speed control and overspeed (10.2) protection system. Provide additional explanation of the turbine and generator electrical load following capability for the turbine speed control system with the aid of the system schematics (including turbine control and extraction steam valves to the heaters). Tabulate the individual speed control protection devices (normal emergency and backup), the design speed (or range of speed) at which each device begins operation to perform its protective function (in terms of
- percent of norn.al turbine operating speed). In order to evaluate the adequacy of the control and overspeed protection system provide schematics and include identifying numbers to valves and mechanisms (mechanical and electrical) on the schematics. Describe in detail, with references to the identifying numbers, the sequence of events in a turbine trip including response times, and show that the turbine stabilizes. Provide the results of a failure mode and effects analysis for the overspeed protection systems. Show that a single steam valve failure cannot disable the turbine overspeed trip from functioning.
(SRP 10.2, Part III, Items 1, 2, 3 and 4.)
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Sections 10.2.2.2, 10.2.2.3, and 10.2.2.4, Figure 10.2-3 and new Table 10.2-1.
i l i 430.56 Provide the closure times for the quick-acting extraction steam and (10.2) motor-operated stop valves installed in the extraction steam lines to the third, fourth, fifth and sixth point heaters. The first and second point heaters steam supply lines are not provided with shutoff and extraction steam valves. Show that stable turbine operation will result af ter a turbine trip. (SRP 10.2, Part III, Item 4.)
- Response The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.2.2.3.
4 l f r i l l
i 430.57 Discuss what protection will be provided the turbine overspeed control (10.2) system equipment, electrical wiring and hydraulic lines from the effects of a high or moderate energy pipe failure so that the turbine overspeed protection system will not be damaged to preclude its safety function. (SRP 10.2, Part III, Item 8.)
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.2.2.3.
J 430.58 In Section 10.2.3.6 you discuss in-service inspection and exercising (10.2) of the main steam turbine stop and control and reheater stop and intercept valves. You do not discuss the in-service inspection, testing and exercising of the extraction steam valves. Provide a detailed description of: (1) the extraction steam valves, and (2) your in-service inspection and testing program for these valves. Also provide the time interval between periodic valve exercising to assure the extraction steam valves will close on turbine trip.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.2.3.6. 3 1 i l l l l l l I
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430.59 Provide a complete list of turbine generator protective trips. (10.2) Separate these trips into two categories: (1) those that will trip the turbine due to mechanical faults, and (2) those that will trip the turbine due to generator electric faults, i i ! Response The response to this question is provided in new Section 10.2.2.4. 1 1 I i I f I I
430.60 Describe with the aid of drawings the bulk hydrogen storage facility (10.2) including its location and distribution system. Include the protective measures considered in the design to prevent fires and explosions during operations such as filling and purging the generator, as well as during normal operations.
Response
The response to this question is given in new Section 10.2.5. t J i i I i
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430.61 Provide a tabulation in you: FSAR showing the physical characteristics (10.4.1) and performance requirements of the main condensers. In your tabulation include such items as: (1) the number of condenser tubes, material l a and total heat transfer surface, (2) overall dimensions of the condenser, (3) number of pauses, (4) hot well capacity, (5) special design features, (6) minimum heat transfer, (7) normal and maximum steam flows, (8) normal and maximum cooling water temperature, (9) normal and maximum exhaust steam temperature with no turbine bypass flow and with maximum turbine bypass flow, (1) limiting oxygen content in the condensate in cc per liter, and (11) other pertinent data. (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 1.)
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.4.1.2 and new Table 10.4-3. l l
i i i i ! 430.62 Discuss the effect of main condenser degradation (leakage, vacuum, (10.4.1) loss) on reactor operation. (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 1.) i t 1 Response ! J The effect of main condenser degradation (leakage vacuum loss) on reactor l operation is provided in revised Section 10.4.1.4, Section 15.2.5, and I Reference 1 of Section 10.4.10. i i k I l 1 I I I t l } d l 1 l j
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430.63 Indicate and describe the means of detecting and controlling ' (10.4.1) radioactive leakage into and out of the condenser and the means for processing excessive amounts. (SRP10.4.1,PartIII, Item 2.)
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Sections 10.4.1.2 and
~
10.4.1.4. 1 I d 1
430.64 Discuss the measures taken for detecting, controlling and correcting (10.4.1) condenser cooling water leakage into the condensate stream. (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 2.)
Response
The response to this question is provided in Sections 10.4.1.2 and 10.4.1.6, . and revised Section 10.4.1.4. I. t l l l i I
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' ~430.6' Provide the permissi51e cooling water inleakage and time of operation ,! (10.G.1)'withinleakagetoassurethatcondensate/feedwaterqualitycanbe ,
maintaiaed within safe limits. (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 2.) ! l ,
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.4.1.4. r l' , b h ? s i i l l \ 1
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l l 430.66 In Section 10.4.1.5 you have discussed tests and initial field l 3 (10.4.1) inspection but not the frequency and extent of inservice inspection of
- the main condenser. Provide this information in the FSAR. (SRP 10.4.1, l Part II.)
l I Response The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.4.1.5. 1 l 4 4 l s 4 1 l l l I 4 l
i 1 i } 430.67 Indicate what design provisions have been made to preclude failures i
- (10.4.1) of condenser tubes or components from turbine bypass blowdown or j other high-temperature drains into the condenser shell. (SRP 10.4.1,
! Part III, Item 3.) i
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.4.1.2. I l i L i i l i I I l 4
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{ 430.68 Discuss the effect of loss of main condenser vacuum on reactor operation 1 ] (10.4.1) and operation of the main steam isolation valves (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, , a . Item 3). , i i i Response l i i l The response to this question is provided in revised Sections 10.4.1.4 and 10.4.1.6 , t
- and in Section 15.2.5.
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i i i 1 i j 430.69 Provide additional description (with the aid of drawings) of the l l (10.4.4) turbine bypass valves and associated controls. In your discussion include the number, size, principle of operation, construction, setpoints, and capacity of each valve and the malfunctions and/or modes of failure considered in the design of the turbine bypass i l system. (SRP 10.4.4, Part III, Item 1.) l
Response
( i i The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.4.4, new Table 10.4-4, and in Section 7.7.1.5. J i i f t
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1 i I 430.70 Provide the results of an analysis indicating that failure of the , (10.4.4) turbine bypass system high energy line will not have an adverse , effect or preclude operation of the turbine speed control system. 1 (SRP 10.4.4, Part III, Item 4.)
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Response
i 1 The high energy lines of the turbine bypass system (TBS) are located in the l turbine building. Piping and equipment in the turbine building inclusive t I of high energy line failure of the turbine bypass system were not analyzed 1 for protection against postulated piping failures, since there are no safety- ] I related components or systems in the turbine building. Therefore, in the t event of a high or moderate energy piping failure, it could be possible that the turbine could lose the electrical speed control system. It can, however, I be safely assumed that such a failure would not adversely affect the mechan-ical overspeed trip or the hydraulic speed control systems, since the loss '. of control fluid pressure due to a consequential fluid pipe rupture would j result in closure of the turbine stop and control valves, thereby preventing i ) the possibility of turbine overspeed. i i. B I f 2 l i I I {
430.71 Provide the results of a failure mode and effects analysis to (10.4.4) determine the effect of malfunction of the turbine bypass system on the operation of the reactor and main turbine generator unit. (SRP 10.4.4, Part III, Item 4.)
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Section 10.4.4.3 and in Appendix 15A.
430.72 In Section 10.4.4.4 you have discussed tests and initial field (10.4.4) inspection but not the frequency and extent of inservice testing and inspection of the turbine bypass system. Provide this information in the FSAR. (SRP 10.4.4, Part II.) Response ,
\
L Each of the seven bypass valves is individually cycled through an opening and closing test sequence to check for proper operation, by using the " Bypass ! Valve Test" pushbutton on the Steam Bypass and Pressure Regulator Control Panel in the control room. The fast acting colenoid is also checked during this test by causing the solenoid to fire when the valve reaches the 90 percent open position during the opening portion of tl.e test sequence. Each bypass valve will be tested in this manner on a weekly basis. In-service inspection of the bypass system will be performed during refueling outages. The frequency of inspection will be determined by considering current industry practice and the history of performance of similar systems. i
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P 1 1 430.73 Incidents have occurred at nuclear power stations that indicate a (7.0, deficiency in the electrical control circuitr'f design. These incidents 8.^) included the inadvertent disabling of a component by racking out the circuit breakers for a different component. 1 i As a result of these occurrences, we request that you perform a review of the electrical control circuits of all safety-related equipment at , i 1 the plant, so as to assure that disabling of one component does not, f through incorporation in other interlocking or sequencing controls, render other components inoperable. All modes of test, operation and t failure should be considered. Verify and state the results of your review. Also, your procedures should be reviewed to ensure that they provide, whenever a part of a redundant system is removed from service, the portion remaining in service is functionally tested immediately after the disabling of the affect 2d portion. Verify that your procedures include the above cited provisions.
Response
The inadvertent disabling of a component by racking out the circuit breakers of a different component on an intersystem or interchannel basis is precluded in the Perry Nuclear Power Plant design. If equipment in only one division is affected, then this condition is not prohibited. a The design provides annunciation or indication of the status of a redundant ! system when it is removed from service. The status of the portions of the I 1 system remaining in service is also indicated. Perry procedures will ensure that whenever a part of a redundant system is removed from service, the portion remaining is checked to verify that it has not been rendered inoperable. 4 i J
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I 430.74 Define the facility's operating limits (real and reactive power, (8.2) voltage frequency and other) which have been established and provide a brief description as to how these limits were established. Also, describe the operating procedures or other provisions (presently , planned) for assuring that the facility will be operated within i these limits. 1
Response
l The response to this question is provided in new Section 8.2.2.4. i l i l l l i i l l i l l
430.75 Detailed reviews of electrical control circuitry associated with the (8. 3 ) safety systems of nuclear stations show that these circuits may differ from station to station in that, for some stations, these control circuits are arranged so that an accident signal will override a test mode condition whereas in other stations (due to those circuits) the test mode condition will take precedence. In this regard, identify any redundant electrically controlled components in the Perry design whereby an accident signal will not override a test mode condition. Also, for each component identified, provide technical information which supports the adequacy of this design feature.
Response
Accident signals override the test mode for safety systems instrumentation. There are no existing requirements for an accident signal to override the test mode for a system, channel, or component. In addition, provisions for indication of inoperable and bypassed status of a system, channel or component while in the test mode for critical safety systems have been made. The reason for having such indication is to supplement administrative procedures for evaluating plant readiness for safety actions. This is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.47.
_ - . _ = _ . _ . . - _ . _ - . - - _ i l 430.76 Concerning the emergency load sequencers which are associated with (8.3) the offsite and onsite power sources, we require that you either provide a separate sequencer for offsite and onsite power (per i
! electrical division) or a detailed analysis to demonstrate that i
there are no credible sneak circuits or common failure modes in the ; sequencer design that could render both onsite and offsite power l sources unavailable. In addition, provide information concerning the reliability of your sequencer and reference design detailed l drawings. 3
Response
} Emergency Load Sequencers are not used for loading of the safety busses at j Perry. Rather each load has it:dividual timing relays which sequence on to the bus in accordance with Table 8.3-1. Automatic bus loading is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.2.8. Elementary diagrams for the individual loads give the detailed design of these circuits as shown on the B-208 drawing series. [ i i i l l I i
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430.77 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages (8.3) Events at the Millstone Station have shown that adverse effects on the Class 1E loads can be caused by sustained low grid voltage conditions when the Class IE buses are connected to offsite power. These low voltage conditions will not be detected by the loss of voltage relays (loss of offsite power) whose low voltage pickup setting is generally in the range of .7 per unit voltage or less. The above events also demonstrated that improper voltage protection logic can itself cause adverse effects on the Class 1E systems and equipment such as spurious load shedding of Class 1E loads from the standby diesel generators and spurious separation of Class IE systems from offsite power due to normal motor starting transients. A more recent event at Arkansas Nuclear Cae (ANO) station and the subsequent analysis performed disclosed the possibility of degraded voltage conditions existing on the Class 1E buses even with normal grid voltages, due to deficiencies in equipment between the grid and the Class IE buses or by the starting transients experienced during certain accident events not originally considered in the sizing of these circuits. Based upon these above events, we have developed the following four-part technical position:
- 1. In addition to the undervoltage scheme provided to detect loss of offsite power at the Class IE buses, a second level of undervoltage protection with time delay should also be provided to protect the Class 1E equipment; this second level of undervoltage protection shall satisfy the following criteria
- a. The selection of undervoltage and time delay setpoints shall be determined from an analysis of the voltage requirements l of the Class IE loads at all onsite system distribution levels.
430.77 (Pg. 2) Cont'd
- b. Two separate time delays shall be selected for the second level of undervoltage protection based on the following conditions:
(1) The first time delay should be of a duration that establishes the existence of a sustained degraded voltage condition (i.e., something longer than a motor starting transient). Following this delay, an alarm in the control room should alert the operator to the degraded condition. The subsequent occurrence of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) should immediately separate the Class lE distribution system from the offsite power system. (2) The second time delay should be of a limited duration such that the permanently connected Class 1E loads will not be damaged. Following this delay, if the operator has failed to restore adequate voltages, the Class IE distribution system should be automatically separated from the offsite power system. Bases and justification must be provided in support of the actual delay chosen.
- c. The voltage sensors shall be designed to satisfy the following applicable requirements derived from IEEE Std. 279-1971,
" Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"-
(1) Class IE equipment shall be utilized and shall be physically located at and electrically connected to the Class IE switchgear. (2) An indepeadent scheme shall be provided for each division of the Class 1E power system. I i
430.77 (Pg. 3) Cont'd (3) The undervoltage protection shall include coincidence logic on a per bus basis to preclude spurious trips of the offiste power source. (4) The voltage sensors shall automatically initiate the disconnection of offsite power sources whenever the voltage setpoint and time delay limits (cited in Item 1.b.2 above) have been exceeded. (5) Capability for test and calibration during power operation shall be provided. (6) Annunciation must be provided in the control room for any bypasses incorporated in the design.
- d. The Technical Specifications shall include limiting conditions for operations, surveillance requirements, trip setpoints with minimum and maximum limits, and allowable values for the second-level voltage protection sensors and associated time delay devices.
- 2. The Class 1E bus load shedding scheme should automatically prevent shedding during sequencing of the emergency loads to the bus.
The load shedding feature should, however, be reinstated upon completion of the load sequencing action. The technical l j specifications must include a test requirement to demonstrate the l operability of the automatic bypass and reinstatement features at least once per 18 months during shutdown. l In the event an adequate basis can be provided for retaining the load shed feature during the above transient conditions, the setpoint value in the Technical Specifications for the first level of undervoltage protection (loss of offsite power) must specify a value having maximum and minimum limits. The basis for the setpoints and limits selected must be documented. l l l.
430.77 (Pg. 4) Cont'd
- 3. The voltage levels at the safety-related buses should be optimized for the maxinum and minimum load conditions that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the offsite power sources by appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of the intervening transformers. The tap settings selected should be based on an analysis of the voltage at the terminals of the Class IE loads. The analyses performed to determine minimum operating voltages should typically consider maximum unit steady state and transient loads for events such as a unit trip, loss-of-coolant accident, startup or shutdown; with the offsite power supply (grid) at minimum anticipated voltage and only the offsite source being considered available, j Maximum voltages should be analyzed with the offsite power supply (grid) at maximum expected voltage concurrent with minimum unit loads (e.g., cold shutdown, refueling). A separate set of the above analyses should be performed for each available connection to the offsite power supply.
- 4. The analytical techniques and assumptions used in the voltage analyses cited in item 3 above must be verified by actual measurement. The verification and test should be performed prior
- to initial full power reactor operation on all sources of offsite f power by
- a. Loading the station distribution buses, including all Cless l 1E buses down to the 120/208 V level, to at least 30%.
- b. Recording the existing grid and Class IE bus voltages and bus loading down to the 120/208 volt level at steady state j conditions and during the starting of both a large Class IE l and non-Class IE motor (not concurrently).
i
430.77 (eg. 5) Cont'd Note: To minimize the number of instrumented locations (recorders) during the motor starting transient tests, the bus voltages and loading need only be recorded on that string of buses which previously showed the lowest analyzed voltages from item 3 above,
- c. Using the analytical techniques and assumptions of the previous j voltage analyses cited in item 3 above, and the measured existing grid voltage and bus loading conditions recorded
]' during conduct of the test, calculate a new set of voltages for all the Class 1E buses down to the 120/208 volt level.
- d. Compare the analytical derived voltage values against the test results.
With good correlation between the analytical results and the test results, the test verification requirement will be met. That is, the validity of the mathematical model used in performance of the analyses of item 3 will have been established; therefore, the validity of the results of the analyses is also established. In general the test results should not be more than 3% lower than the analytical results; however, the difference between the two when subtracted from the voltage levels determined in the original analyses should never be less than the Class IE equipment rated voltages.
Response
- 1. The decision on whether to provide a second '.evel of undervoltage protection vill be made after completion of the voltage analysis being done under Item 3.
j 430.77 (Pg. 6) Cont'd f 2. Load shedding will be prevented du-ing an automatic load sequencing I operation, but will be reinstated uptn completion of the load ,i sequencing operation.
- 3. An analysis is being performed to determine the minimum operating 4
voltages that will be experienced at safety related buses. We 1 expect this study to demonstrate that for all of the stated l contingencies and only the offsite source being considered available the voltages will still be above the value required for sustained equipment
- operation. The one level of voltage relaying can then be set below l
1 these values and used to detect the loss of offsite power. The results I of the analysis will be available by March 30, 1982.
- 4. After reviewing the voltage analysis we will determine what testing is
- necessary to confirm the design.
3 f I i i I i t
430.78 Provide a listing of all switchgear (by bus nomenclature) within the (8.3) design and specifically address the source of control power to each. This is needed to facilitate an independent review of how your emergency power system design meets the single failure criterion and to determine the extent of loss due to postulated failures.
Response
The response to this question is provided in new Table 3.3-8. j l t b l i 8
430.79 Provide a listing of all motor-operated valves within your design that (8.3) require power lockout in order to meet the single failure criterion and provide the details of your design that accomplish this requirement.
Response
There are no motor operated valves in the Perry Nuclear Power Plant design that require power lockout in order to meet the single failure criterion. Redundant valving and/or piping is provided so that the failure of a single motor operated valve will not disable a safety system. [ l i i
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i 4 l 430.80 Recent experience with Nuclear Power Plant Class 1E electrical system (8.3.1) equipment protective relay applications has established that relay trip setpoint drifts with conventioaal type relays have resulted in premature trips of redundant safety-related system pump motors when the safety system was required to be operative. While the basic need for ) proper protection for feeders / equipment against permanent faults is
; recognized, it is the staff's position that total nonavailability of redundant safety systems due to spuricus trips in protective relays I
is not acceptable. l 1 2 Provide a description of your circuit protection criteria for safety
- systems / equipment to avoid incorrect initial setpoint selection and j the above cited protective relay trip setpoint drift problems, i
Response
i On Class 1E 4160V pump motor circuits instantaneous overcurrent protection for phase and ground faults is provided. In backup time overcurrent protection is provided for phase faults. , The instantaneous phase overcurrent relays (1 per phase) are set at a pickup level greater than or equal to twice (2x) the locked rotor current of the pump motor at 100% rated voltage. The 200% margin over the locked rotor current on starting is secure against false operations due to transient motor fault current contributions to bus faults and starting transients greater than predicted. ; The instantaneous ground overcurrent relays (.1 per circuit) are set at a pickup of 15 amperes primary and 2 cycles fixed time delay. The ground relays use a window current transformer or ground sensor for detection of cable and motor ground faults. This sensing arrangement in conjunction with the 15 ampere primary I setting is inherently immune to false operations due to system disturbances. i Phase time overcurrent relays (1 per phase) are set at a pickup level greater than or equal to one-and-one-half (1b) times the full load current of the motor at 100% rated voltage. The time dial setting is determined by an actual loaded test of the motor. The time dial is set so that the induction disk does not l travel more than one-half (b) the distance to contact closure before the motor i pulls in and current reduces to rated current levels. i
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r 430.80 (Pg. 2) Cont'd (8. 3.1) The starting characteristic of the motor is monitored by a recording os-cillograph during initial testing to provide a benchmark against which future data may be compared. The record of starting characteristics pro-vide a verification of the manufacturer's published characteristics. In cases where test data exceeds published characteristics the pickup level is adjusted to assure a lb times margin over full load at rated voltage. Thus this time overcurrent setting procedure is secure against incorrect initial setpoint selection. The same oscillograph record is also used to confirm proper margin of the instantaneous phase overcurrent relays setpoint over the locked rotor current during motor starting. On Class 1E 480V motor circuits we provide solid state trip devices with long time pickup and instantaneous pickup. These trip devices are not continuously adjustable but have fixed tap settings. The instantaneous pickup is set at approximately 200% of the locked rotor current, within the constraints of available taps. The long time pickup is set at approximately 1505 of full load current of the motor. The protective relays are routinely checked per manufacturers instructions to verify operation and set points. The majority are routined at two year in-tervals with several not being required to be routined before five years.
430 .81 Provide a listing of the following for the containment electrical (8.3.1) penetrations by voltage class: 12 t ratings, maximum predicted fault currents, identification of maximizing faults, protective equipment setpoints, and expected clearing times. Provide a description of the physical arrangement utilized in your design to connect the field cables inside containment to the containment penetrations, e.g., connectors, splices, or terminal blocks. Provide supportive documentation that these physical interfaces are qualified to withstand a LOCA or steam line break environment.
Response
The response to this question will be provided by January 15, 1982. l l l l l l I l l l .
J e l 43a 82 We request that you perform a review of the electrical control circuits (8.3) for all safety-related equipment, so as to assure that disabling of one component does not, through incorporation in other interlocking or sequencing controls, render other components inoperable. All modes of test, operation, and failure should be considered. Describe and l state the results of your review.
Response
i The response to this question is provided as the response to question 430.73. i i I i i I i
l 430.83 You state the HPCS system emergency diesel generator unit consists of two diesel engines driving one generator. Expand the FSAR to include I I (8.3) a detailed description of the dual diesel drive for each generator. Provide justification for the selection of dual diesel drives per I generator as opposed to the more conventional single diesel engine l L driven generator. Demonstate that the proposed dual diesel engine 1 drive unit has an equivalent reliability as a single diesel engine drive unit. In your analysis, common mode failures as well as random l single failures should be considered.
Response
4
- The HPCS diesel generator unit consists of one diesel engine with 20 cylinders driving one generator. See revised Section 8.3.1 for a detailed description.
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i ! 430.84 Section 5.6.2.2(1) of IEEE-387-77 (endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.9 i (8.3) Revision 2) requires that a start-diesel signal shall override all
; other operating modes and return control of the diesel generator unit l to the automatic control system. The description of your design is l insufficient to assess whether your design meets this requirement.
< Verify that your design meets this requirement and provide a revised i description in sufficient detail to permit independent evaluation of j this design capability. l i The following discussion and recommendations are presented for your consideration. A design which does not meet the above cited requirement would necessitate operator action of varying levels of complexity, depending on the circumstances, in order to enable a diesel generator (D/G) in the test mode to respond to a bonafide emergency demand signal such as Loss of l Offsite Power (LOOP), Safety Injection (SI), or simultaneous SI and f i LOOP. The concern here is the high probability of human failure under these stress conditions, and the possible consequent disabling of a D/G or other action which degrades safety margin at a time when it is most needed. l l Each D/G must be periodically tested at a frequency as specified in f ( R.G. 1.108. This test frequency is normally once per month but could t be as high as once every three days. The duration of each test is one hour. During a normal successful test the D/G would be sequentially in the following states: starting, running disconnected from its bus, running loaded on its bus, tripping and coasting to a stop. However, during almost all of the one-hour test period the D/G is loaded on its bus with the governor operating in a drop mode, and the load carried by the diesel engine is a function of governor speed setting and speed drop setting. o
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, c.' Tne offsite power feed breaker is tripped.
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- d. ' Loads a're shed from the bus per design .
I
- e. The D/G protective , trips are bypassed per design.
- f. The D/G breaker is closed connecting the D/G to the bus per design.
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l ,
- g. ESF loads are sequenced to the bus per design.
~
f l On occurrence of a LOOP condi. ion wbile a D/G is on test and connected to its but, a LOOP signal _ woald probably not be generated because the
.- D/G would attempt to pr$v'ide power to the bus and to the offsite system
- s. e.,
through the closed offsitk power feed breaker. In this case, the D/G s, breaker must be relied upon to trip on overcorrent, underfrequency or N +'. ; nadfrvoltage. This would de-enert ize the bus thereby producing a LOOP N
. . . ,s
. w ' - J-sidal. In this case:
a
' - a. TLe of f' site power feed breaker is tripped,
,s. . , s
, t.
The D/G remains running in the'isochronous mode (or if stalled it is
- i. ' automatically startel).
^ c. The D/G breaker is closed cor.necting the D/G to the bus per design.
d.. The sha down.Loids are coneccted to the bus per design.
- e. On occurrence of a LOOP condition while a D/G is on test but is not
. _ :- connected to its bus, a LOOP signal will be generated immediately, 1
and this shoul,d initiate above actions (a) through (d). 4 1
Response
. The response to this question is provided in revised Section 8.3.1.1.3.2 for the standby diesel generators.
i l l l l
! 430.84 (Pg. 4)Conb'd j
._ The foll'eving conditions reader the HPCS diesel-generator incapable of g _ ;- s responding'to an automatic emergency start signal:
5 ~. ; , J- _
- a. ~ Diesel-generator lockout relay not reset.
1. l l b. . Diesel-generator manual / automatic control switch in manual 1' position. J
- c. Regulator selector switch in manual position.
- d. Diesel-generator keylock selector switch in maintenance position.
- e. Loss of d c power to diesel-generator controls.
- f. Diesel-generator output breaker in racked-out position.
- g. Loss of d-c power to diesel-ge.erator output breaker control.
All the above conditions are displayed to the operator in the control room and to the diesel-generator panel as described in revised Section 8.3.1.1.3.3 Item b.10. The current HPCS diesel-generator design is capable of performing its safety functions with apolication of appropriate procedures. The design ! as described and tested per NEDO 10905 has been approved by the NRC and no modifications are contemplated in the design. l e
. - - - - , , _ . . . . . - - ~ . . . . - . . , ~ , . . . . . . - - - . . - . - ~ - . _ _ _ _ , . . _ . , . . - . - _ . . -,,.-m, , -- _ . - - -
430.85 Diesel generator alarms in the control room: A review of malfunction (8.3) reports of diesel generators at operating nuclear plants has uncovered that in some cases the information available to the control room operator to indicate the operational status of the diesel generatot may be imprecise and could lead to misinterpretation. This can be caused by the sharing of a single annunciator station to alarm conditions that render a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start signal and to also alarm abnormal, but not 4 disabling, conditions. Another cause can be the use of wording of an annunciator window that does not specifically say that a diesel j generator is inoperable (i.e., unable at the time to respond to an automatic emergency start signal) when in fact it is inoperable for that purpose. Review and evaluate the alarm and control circuitry for the diesel generators at your facility to determine how each condition that renders a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start signal is alarmed in the control room. These conditions include not only the trips that lock out the diesel generator start and require manual reset, but also control switch or mode switch positions that block automatic start, loss of control voltage, insufficient starting air pressure or battery voltage, etc. This review should consider all aspects of possible diesel generator operational conditions, for example, test conditions and operation from local control stations. One area of particular concern is the unreset condition following a manual stop at the local station which terminates a diesel generator test and prior to resetting the diesel generator controls for enabling subsequent automatic operation. 1 Provide the details of your evaluation, the results and conclusions, and a tabulation of the following information:
- a. All conditions that render the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal for each operating mode as discussed above.
)
. . ~ . .. _ . . . ~ . - . _ . - , _ - . . _ , _ _ _. _ _ . . _ _ _ _ - - . _
430.85 (Pg. 2) Cont'd
- b. The wording on the annunciator window in the control room that is alarmed for each of the conditions identified in (a).
- c. Any other alarm signals not included in (a) above that also cause the same annunciator to alarm.
- d. Any condition that renders the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal which is not alarmed in the control room.
- e. Any proposed modifications resulting from this evaluation.
i
Response
This question is currently addressed in Section 8.3.1.1.2.b as follows:
- a. The automatic start circuitry is shown in Figure 8.3-6 and discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.2.b, Items 4, 5, 7, and 10.
4 b. The diese1 generator alarm is discussed in section 8.3.1.1.2b, Item 10(a). 4
- c. Other diesel generator alarms are provided with separate windows i as discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.2b, Item 10(c) through (e).
- d. The conclusion that all conditions rendering the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal
- are included in the "out of service" alarm and can be drawn 1
from a. and b., above.
- e. No changes to the diesel generator automatic start circuitry or associatcJ alarms are required.
I I J d d
l 430.86 It has been noted during past reviews that pressure switches or other (8.3) devices were incorporated into the final actuation control circuitry 5 for large horsepower safety-related motors which are used to drive pumps. These switches or devices preclude automatic (safety signal) and manual operation of the motor / pump combination unless permissive conditions such as lube oil pressure are satisfied. Accordingly, identify any sofety-related motor / pump combinations which are used in the Perry design that operate as noted above. Also, describe the
- redundancy or permissive devices that are used in this manner.
Response
The NSSS RHR (E12-C002A, B & C) and LPCS (E21-C001) motor / pump combinations have i permissive devices in the final actuation circuitry which preclude automatic (safety signal) and manual operation. The permissive device is a bus voltage availability signal. Upon receipt of an automatic initiation signal or manual signal, the motor circuit breakers will not close unless the voltage on the bus supplying the motors is above the set point of the undervoltage relays. Redundant relays are used to prevent the closure of the pump motor circuit breakers due to a single relay failure. Diversity is not required. I l l t I ( I l l 1 j
] 430.87 Identify all electrical equipment, both safety and non-safety, that 1 (6.3, may become submerged as a result of a LOCA. For all such equipment 8.3) that is not qualified for service in such an environment provide an analysis to determine the following:
- 1. The safety significance of the failure of this electrical j equipment (e.g., spurious actuation or loss of actuation function) as a result of flooding.
- 2. The effects on Class lE electrical power sources serving this equipment as a result of such submergence.
- 3. Any proposed design changes resulting from this analysis.
_ Response l Ihe response to this question is provided in revised Section 8.3.1.2.4. . i 1 J
. 430.88 Provide the results of a review of your operating, maintenance, and (8.3) testing procedures to determine the extent of usage of jumpers or other temporary forms of bypassing functions for operating, testing, or maintaining safety-related systems. Identify and justify any cases where the use of the above methods cannot be avoided. Provide the criteria for any use of jumpers for testing.
Response
During the initial checkout and run-in, and the preoperational test phases, as well as normal operation and maintenance activities, jumpers will be employed. The use of jumpers is a necessary part of the test program because of the various stages of completion systems are in. Control of jumpers is by administrative procedure which incorporates the use of tags and logs, except when a jumper is installed during a step in an approved test or calibration procedure, provided the procedure restores the system to its original condition. 2 i i i 4
l 430.89 Concerning the Class 1E Direct Current Power System, address the (8.3.2) following:
- 1. As a result of recent reviews on the adequacy of safety-related direct current power systems of operating plants, the following recommendations applicable to those plants undergoing operating license and construction permit reviews have been proposed.
In this regard, state if your design conforms to these recommendations and explicitly identify any exception.
- a. The position of circuit breakers of fused disconnect switches associated with the battery charger, battery and direct current bus supply should be monitored to conform to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.47," Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems" (May 1973).
- b. The technical specifications should include periodic testing of battery chargers to verify that the current limiting characteristics have not been compromised or lost.
- c. The technical specifications should require that cell-to-cell and terminal connection resistance measurements be made as recommended in IEEE Standard 450-1972, " Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement, and Large Stationary Type Power Plant and Substation Lead Storage Batteries."
- d. The direct current power system design should include the following monitors and alarms:
( (1) An ammeter (directional and dual range) in the battery output to monitor the batter input current while the battery is on floating and equalizing charge and to monitor the battery output current when it is supplying l power. l 1 l J
430.89 (Pg. 2) Cont'd (2) An annunciator to alarm whenever the charger goes into a current limiting condition. (3) A temperature indicator to measure the battery room ambient temperature,
- e. The voltage variation for an associated battery bus during any expected accident mode of operation should be within design specifications.
- f. The direct current equipment should be rated and qualified for operation at the equalizing charge voltage and rated discharge voltage (typically 110 to 145 volts for a nominal 125 volt direct current system).
- 2. State if the battery charger has sufficient capacity to operate all nonaccident shutdown loads assuming the battery is not available. Also, state if the stability of the battery charger output is load dependent and,1f so, describe.
Response
- 1. a. The status of main de bus circuit breaker is monitored and annunciated in the control room to indicate that the battery has been disconnected from the switchgear bus.
- b. The battery chargers will be testtd as described in Section 8.3.2.1.5. Performance tests will be in accordance with the manufacturers' recommendations and included in the Technical Specification.
- - - _ . . _ . =. = _ _ . . . . . ..
430.89 (Pg. 3) Cont'd
- c. PNPP is committed to meet the requirement of IEEE 450-1975 per Table 8.1-2 and Section 8.3.2.1.5.
Testing will be detailed in the Technical Specification.
- d. (1) An ammeter to provide the required indication is shown in Figure 8.3-21.
(2) An alarm is provided to indicate the battery charger is in a current-limiting condition. Refer to Section 8.3.2.1.2.3, which was revised I with Amendment 3 (9-11-81). l (3) Local ambient temperature indication is pro-vided in the Division 1 and 2 battery rooms but not in the Division 3 battery room (See Figure 9.4-1, Sheet 1 of 2).
- e. For discussion of voltage variation for Division 1 and 2 systems see Section 8.3.2.1.2.2 and for the i HPCS, Division 3 system, see Section 8.3.2.1.3.5.
- f. Refer to Section 8.3.2.1.2.3, which was revised with l
Amendment 3 (9-11-81).
- 2. The battery charger capacity is discussed in Section 8.3.2.1.2.2.
9 i
. , , - - . - , _ _ . . , , _ . _ , - , . . . - _ = . . , . , , _ _ , , . _ , , _ , , _ --c.-, .,,,-,.__---,--,,:...,_.___.._--_,--~--
430.90 Provide a description of the capability of the emergency power (8.3) system battery chargers to properly function and remain stable upon the disconnection of the battery. Include in the description any foreseen modes of operation that would require battery disconnection such as when applying an equalizing charge.
Response
The emergency power system battery chargers output voltage is adjusted to the proper float or equalize values at installation, and the sensing and control features of Thyristors, power diodes, resistct; and capacitors will control the output voltage to the set point value whether the batteries are connected or disconnected from the bus. The equalize operation does not require disconnection of the batteries from the system. The only action forseen for disconnection of the batteries is a maintenance or replacement function at which time the station would be out of service. i l l f i L -
. . _ _ _ _=. _ _ -
4 t
- 430.91 Provide the details of your design of the DC power system that assures (8.3) equipment will be protected from damaging overvoltages from the battery I
chargers that may occur due to faulty regulation or operator error.
Response
The direct current voltage equipment installed on the emergency power buses have been specified and tested to withstand a high voltage cf 145 volts dc. This value is in excess of the normal equalize voltage of the battery charger. In the event of faulty regulation or operator error, a high voltage relay will activate an alarm in the control room. 4 i l i h i I
430.92 The specific requirements for DC power system monitoring derive from (8.3.2) the general requirements embodied in Section 5.3.2(4), 5.3.3(5) and 5.3.4(5) of IEEE Std. 308-1974, and in Regulatory Guide 1.47. In summary, these general requirements simply state that the DC system (batteries, distribution systems, and chargers) shall be monitored to the extent that it is shown to be ready to perform its intended function. Accordingly, the guidelines used by PSB in the licensing review of the DC power system designs are as follows. As a minimum, the following indications and alarms of the Class 1E DC power system status shall be provided in the control room: Battery current (ammeter-charge / discharge) Battery charger output current (ammeter) DC bus voltage (voltmeter) Battery charger output voltage (voltmeter) Battery high discharge rate alarm DC bus undervoltage and overvoltage alarm DC bus ground alarm (for ungrounded system) Battery breaker (s) or fuse (s) open alarm Battery charger output breaker (s) or fuse (s) open alarm Battery charger trouble alarm (one alarm for a number of abnormal conditions which are usually indicated locally) j Response The following indications and alarms are provided in the control room at Perry for monitoring the DC power system. I
430.92 Battery Voltage Indication Bus Voltage Indication i Bus Undervoltage Alarm Bus Ground Charger Failure One Common Control Room Alarm Charger Input Breaker Open j " Battery . . . DC System Trouble" Charger Output Breaker Open Charger DC Output Undervoltage Charger DC Output Overvoltage I l t I 1 l \ f i I
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430.93 Explicitly identify all non-Class IE electrical loads which are or (8.3) may be powered from the Class 1E ac and de systems (refer to Figures 8.1-1 and 8.3-10). Also, for each load identified provide the horsepower or kilowatt rating for that load and also identify the corresponding bus number from which the load is powered.
Response
Non-Class 1E ac loads that may be powered from the Class 1E ac system are discussed in revised Section 8.3.1.1.2.5, which provides a reference to Figure 8.3-10. This figure provides the load description, rating and corre-sponding bus number, and has been revised to identify the non-Class 1E ac t loads. No non-Class 1E de loads are, or may be, powered from the Class 1E de system (see Section 8.3.2.1.2.1). 4
430.94 Concerning Regulatory Guides 1.93 and 1.108, we will require that the final technical specifications for this station include the applicable provisions of these regulatory guides. Accordingly, verify that these specifications will include these provisions or, if applicable, explicitly identify any exceptions.
Response
a Technical Specifications shall provide for testing in accordance with the applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.108 except for position c2a3. i The diesel generator units shall demonstrate full-load-carrying capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours at a load equivalent to the continuous rating of the diesel generator. The continuous rating of the
; diesel generator exceeds the maximum accident load and therefore is an adequate demonstration of diesel generator capability.
The full-load-carrying capability test shall consist of an interval of not less than 24 hours at a load equivalent to the continuous rating of the diesel generator. Technical Specifications shall provide for limiting conditions of operation in accordance with the applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.93. i I I l I
i j 430.95 Regulatory Guide 1.75, C.10 recommends that Class IE cables, installed (8.3.1) in exposed raceways, be marked at intervals not to exceed 5 feet. Indicate whether this requirement will be incorporated in the design; if not, provide justification for your position.
Response
The following information is marked on the outer jacket of all power, control and instrumentation cables used in the wiring of the Perry Plant except SkV armored cable where the data is printed on a marker tape applied longitudinally i under the armor and binder tape.
- a. Sequential footage numbers placed at 2-foot intervals (except cables less than .30 incles in diameter)
- b. Voltage rating (except RF cables)
- c. Number of conductors (or of pairs, triples or quads) and conductor size; also manufacturers part number or RG/U designation of any RF cables included in the assembly
- d. Name of manufacturer
- e. Trade name of insulation i .
- f. Year of manufacture j
- g. Bill of Material item number
- h. A unique number for each length of cable for traceability of material i or if not provided the sequential footage numbers do not repeat in the same item.
i l s
- - . . . - ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . - ._. .
430.96 You state in Section 8.3.1.1.2.4 that on loss of preferred power (8.3.1) supply, a manual transfer to the alternate preferred power supply can be accomplished by closing the alternate preferred supply feeder breaker. Explain whether on the loss of preferred power supply, the diesel generators would automatically connect to the I emergency buses. It is not clear whether the alternate preferred power source is used when the normal preferred power source is under maintenance or you use the alternate feed if the normal preferred power is last. In the latter case you would need an automatic eearch circuit. Revise your FSAR accordingly. 4
Response
[ The response to this question is provided in revised Section 8.3.1.1.2.4. I f i l i 1 J
l 1 i 430.97 on page 8.1-8 that interrupting devices actuated only (8.1) : current are not considered to be isolation devices,
.os acceptable coordination can be verified by test. For this alternate approach, you have not described whether you are using two breakers in series. In a separate section, describe in detail, at all voltage levels, the isolation devices being used.
i j Response Breakers used for isolation are tripped upon the receipt of an accident 2 signal. Additional isolation devices used on Perry are optical isolators in the GE NSSS Systems and Relay Isolation in accordance with IEEE 384-1974 for BOP Systems. For additional information on electrical separation refer to Sections 8.3.1.1.2.2 through 8.3.1.1.2.5. l
}
l l i l l l l i
- . ~ . . . ._- - - _ .
i
! 430.98 Section 8.3.1.1.3.2.b.3 states that only the generator differential (8.3.1) and overspeed trip functions will shut down the diesel generator I after a start resulting from a LOCA signal. Nonessential trip functions are bypassed upon receipt of a LOCA signal. Figure 8.3-6 shows that you are retaining the D/G loss of excitation trip.
i This relay should have been shown along with other protective relays in standby power supply shutdown logic. Revise the logic I diagram or provide a coincident logic if you want to retain loss cf excitation trip upon receipt of a LOCA signal. i
Response
1 ( Section 8.3.1.1.3.2.b.3 is correct in stating only generator differential and overspeed trip functions will shut down the diesel generator after a start resulting from a LOCA signal. Refer to revised Figure 8.3-6. i I I t l l 1 i (- ( l
4 l 430.99 We require that upon receipt of a LOCA signal when in a test mode, l (8. 3.1) the D/G breaker should be tripped. Your logic diagrams 8.3-6 and 8.3-8 do not comply with this requirement. Refer also to Q 430.84.
Response
The response to this question is provided in revised Figures 8.3-6 and 8.3-9. Additionally, Figures 8.3-8 and 8.3-9 were reversed to indicate proper i titles. i i I h J I I t l l
430.100 You state on p. 8.3-44 that the topical report on HPCS diesel
- (8.3.1) generator prototype qualification program will be further amended to include the results of prototype qualification tests.
l In staff's opinion start and load acceptance test (300 start test) ! was not performed on this type of diesel generator. Submit the I results of the qualification program when available. - Response l l A discussion of the results of the qualification program for the HPCS diesel 4 generator is provided in Section 8.3.1.1.6.11. I I A similar test program for the HPCS diesel generator which requires a successful prototype reliability verification program of 69 valid start and load tests with no failure has been reviewed and approved by the staff on another docket. (Grand Gulf SER, Pg. 8-8). i l l l f ) i i i
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1 430.101 It is stated on page 8.1-8 that the electrical penetration assemblies (8.3.1) are designed and applied in accordance with R.G. 1.63. Your i description of the compliance with the above regulatory guide is not adequate. The circuit overload protection system should conform to the criteria of IEEE Std. 279. Provide us with the ; j coordination curves for the electrical penetration and describe i in detail, at all voltage levels, how you meet R.C. 1.63.
Response
The response to this question will be provided by January 15, 1982. s l l t I l i i l l l l l l l l l _ _ , . . _ - - _ _ - - _ _ , _ , _ _ . _ . . _ . _ - . _ . . _ . , ~ . , _ , _ - - . . . - . . . - _ . . . . , - _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ , . _ . - , . . _ . . - _ _ _ . _ . - . _ . _ _ - . . - - _ _ . _ . . _ _
J J 430.102 Section 8.3.1.4.1.7 " Separation of Class lE and Non-Class lE Cables" (8.3.1) does not state the separation distance between Class lE and Non-Class lE cables. Provide the above information.
Response
l For separation of Class lE and Non-Class lE cables, the following separation distances are used:
- a. For cable tray, the separation distance is 8 inches minimum,
- b. For reactor protection circuits in cable tray, the separation distance is 3 foot horizontal and 5 foot vertical. This is reduced to 1 foot horizontal and 3 foot vertical in the cable spreading area.
- c. For conduit, the separation is 1 inch minimum.
I
- d. Equipment internal wiring separation is to be a minimum of 6 inches for Class IE and Non Class IE. Areas where this separation can not be maintained,
! the additional barriers, raceways and/or enclosures shall be utilized. I l l
d i. 430.103 You state in Section 8.3.2.1.2.2 that for Class lE Division 1 and (8.3.2) Division 2 the battery chargers are sized to supply the battery to fully charged condition from the design minimum charge of 1.75 V/ cell within 12 hours. For Division 3 you have not specified the time limit. Provide the time limit required to fully recharge a fully discharged battery while the charger is also supplying the largest combined demand of the steady state de bus loads irrespective of the status of the plant during which these demands occur.
Response
t a The Division 3 battery charger is capable of recharging the Division 3 battery from fully discharged condition in eight hours while also supplying the steady state d-c bus loads. This information is provided in NEDO 10905 "High Pressure Core Spray Power Supply Unit." J l l l i l l l l l 4 1 l L
1 430.104 Describe the design criteria used in selection of Class lE (8.3.1) equipment:
- 1. Service factor of motors.
- 2. Ability of the motors to accelerate their loads with 80% of the motor rated voltage at the motor terminals.
- 3. Selection of transformer impedances to permit starting of the largest motor on the bus without exceeding a maximum voltage drop of 20 perccnt and at the same time remaining within the interrupting and momentary capabilities of the breakers.
(S RP 8. 3.1-III . 4. )
Response
- 1. The service factor for motors at the Perry Plant is 1.0 for totally
{ enclosed motors and 1.15 for weather protected and dripproof motors. NEMA MG-1-12.47 standard service factor is 1.15 up to 200 horsepower and no service factor is recommended above 200 horsepower. The Perry design criteria recommends a service factor of 1.0 for low voltage motors j (below 200 horsepower), 1.15 for medium and high voltage motors, and j 1.0 for all totally enclosed motors or motors inside the reactor building.
- 2. Perry design requires the ability of motors to accelerate their loads at 75 percent of rated valtage. Refer to Section 8.3.1.1.4.lb.
- 3. The startup transformer and interbus transformer impedances were 4 elected with due consideration to the fault duty of the breakers and the voltage regulation on the Class lE buses. Calculations established the need for the present MVA ratings on the 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV switchgear. Calculations indicate the starting of the largest motor (6000 hp), presents a relatively
- small voltage drop (less than 5%) which is considered insignificant.
I k
i 430.105 State whether battery chargers incorporate protection to preclude (8.3.2) ac supply source to become a load on the battery upon loss of ac input power. (SRP 8.3.2-III.2.) '
Response
i The response to this question is provided in revised Section 8.3.2.1.3.6. I t i 1 i i 8 4 l l 6 4
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Valve position indicating lights and system bypassed, inoperative alarms in the control room provide the operator sufficient information to monitor the l status of the system and its devices. 7.3.1.1.15 Standby Power Support Systems - Instrumentation and Controls The Standby Power Support Systems consist of the HPCS and standby diesel genttator support systems (see Section 8.3.2).
- a. System Function ,
The purpose of the diesel-generator support system instrumentation and control is to ensure the availability of an adequate fuel oil supply and starting air pressure to star; and operate the diesel-generators and to ensure that the ventilation fans are available to carry away heat from the diesel-generators and prevent heat buildup in the room. Additionally, labricating oil level and temperature and coolant temperature are maintained and monitored to assure quick start capability. The diesel-generator ventilation system is discussed in Section 7.3.1.1.8. 2 The diesel generator support systems for each of the standby and HPCS diesel generators include the following five subsystems:
- 1. Diesel-generator fuel oil system.
- 2. Diesel generator starting air system.
- 3. Diesel generator ventilation system.
- 4. Lubricating oil system.
- 5. Cooling water system.
- t. System Operation 9
s
- 1. Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System f+
The instrumentation and controls for the diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system are provided to ensure that fuel is always 7.3-44
- - e e<-1
t available in the day tanh and to alert the plant operators to any
, conditions which might jeopardize that objective so that corrective action can be taken.
Level switches are provided to automatically start and stop the fuel
~
i ' [ transfer pumps to maintain the fuel oil level in the day tanks within predetermined limits. Abnormal level conditions within the fuel tanks are annunciated in the control room. Pressure and level indicators are , provided locally at the equipment as shown on Figure 9.5-8. 1 The diesel-generator fuel oil transfer system has two moter-driven fuel transfer pumps per day tank. Tnese pumps are normally operated - automatically, although manual operation is possible from the local control panel for functional checkout or instrumentation calibration. l In the autocatic mode, a " low" level switch on the day tank starts the j primary on-line pump. A separate " low-low" level switch starts the i standby pump and annunciates this condition on the local diesel coatrol @ . s panel and in the control room by actuating the general diesel generator Q trouble alarm. Both pumps are stopped by individual "high" level Y l switches. Additional-level switches on the day tanks annunciate alarms ! on the level diesel generator control panel and in the control room if the tank level should continue to rise past the high level pump cutoff point or drop below the standby pump start level. Overflow is diverted l back to the main storage tank. f Level switches are provided on the main storage tank to annunciate when
- j. fuel oil inventory drops below minimum required levels. Separate alarms are provided, both on the local diesel generator control panel-and in the main control room, for level corresponding to a seven day I supply of fuel oil and for level corresponding to a 24 hour supply of fuel oil. Alarms are also provided on the local diesel generator control pane 1~for fuel oil transfer pump strainer high pressure drop.
Actuation of any of the alarms on the local control panel annunciate i the diesel generator trouble alarm in the control room. h 7.3-45
~
Control room indication is provided for the storage and day tank levels. Local indication is provided for day tank level, transfer pump discharge pressure, and fuel oil strainer pressure drop. m A discussion of diesel generator engine protection interlocks is s 4 l contained in Section 8.3. The detailed description of the fuel oil day m tanks, storage tank, and fuel transfer system is provided in Section 9.5.4. .
- 2. Diesel Generator Starting Air System The diesel generator starting air system instrumentation and controls are provided to ensure that an adequate supply of compressed air is always available during plant operation. Alarms are provided to alert the plant operators to lack of adequate air pressure in either of each diesels redundant air start systems so that corrective action can be taket. The starting air system is completely described in Section R.S.6 and is shown on Figure 9.5-10. g m
i Control of each engines two independent air compressors is through q b controls mounted on the compressor. The compressor may be operated manually by use of a selector switch in these controls but the normal mode ic automatic operation through a pressure switch which is connected to its corresponding air receiver tank by a pressure sensing line. The pressure switch and controls cycle the compressor as required to maintain the required receiver tank pressure. A local pressure indicator is provided for each receiver tank. To provide for monitoring of starting air availability and interfacing with the engine controls, a pressure sensing line is routed from just upstream of each pair of air admission solenoid valves on the engine to the local diesel generator control panel. In the control panel these lines connect to the following instrumentation: 7.3-46
(a) Pressure switches, one per air start system, either of which will actuate common starting air pressure low alarms on the local diesel generator control panel and in the control room. Actuation of the local alarm also actuates the diesel generator trouble alarm in the control room. ~ (b) Pressure switches, one per air start system, which interlock with the diesel generator start circuit. Inadequate starting air pressure will prevent the corresponding start air admission solenoid valves from opening. 4 G (c) Pressure transmitters, one per air start system, which provide o t signals to a recorder which plots selected engine parameters during the start transient for monitoring and diagnostics. (d) Pressure gauges, one per air start system. A discussion of engine generator protection interlocks is contained in Section 8.3.
- 3. Diesel Generator Lubrication .fstem The diesel engine lubrication oil system is provided with sensors, controls, and alarms as required to ensure -
lete monitoring of satisfactory system performance, safe engine operation, and to alert the plant operators to abnormal conditions requiring investigation and corrective action. This system is instrumented as shown on 9.5-11. Instrumentation and controls are provided to monitor system pressures at important points, lubrication oil temperatures in and out of the ar engine, sump tank level, and provide automatic operation of the f keepwarm circulating pump and heater. 9 3 To alert the plant operators of abnormal conditions which should be I investigated for corrective action, alarms are provided for the following parameters: 7.3-46a ) l l
(a) Sump Tank Level Low (b) Lube Oil Pressure Lov
- (c) Right Bank TurbocLorger Oil Pressure Low (d) Left Bank Turbocharger Oil Pressure Low (e) Lube Oil Filter Pressure Drop High
[ (f) Lube Oil Strainer Pressure Drop High (g) Lube Oil into Engine Temperature Low (h) Lube Oil into Engine Temperature High (i) Lube Oil from Engine Temperature Low (j) Lube Oil from Engine Temperature High (k) Keepwarm Oil Pump / Heater Control Switch not in "AUT0" (1) Engine Trip due to Low Lube Oil Pressure (m) Engine Trip due to Low Turbocharger Oil Pressure (n) Engine Trip due to High Lube Oil Temperature With the exception of the Control Switch not in Auto alarm (item k.), each condition annunciates a separate alarm on the local diesel generator control panel. The local alarm for item k. is shared with other control switches which are normally to be in an AUTO position. N
}
Actuation of any of the local alarms also annunciate a common diesel _. v generator trouble alarm in the control room. Additionally, those *. b parameters which cause an engine trip (items 1, m, n) are separately annunciated in the control room. The three engine trip functions (low lube' oil pressure, low turbocharger oil pressure, high lube oil temperature) are only available when the engine is started for non-emergency purposes, e.g. , periodic surveillance testing, and serve to trip the engine during normal operation long before damage might occur. When the engine is
' started by an emergency signal these three trips are de-activated but not their corresponding alarms. This allows the plant operators to evaluate the operating condition of the engine against overall plant requirements and then make a decision as to whether or not to shut down the diesel generator.
7.3-46b
The keepwarm oil pump is provided with controls permitting automatic or manual operation. Except for testing or maintenance situations the pump is operated in the AUTO mode and is interlocked with the diesel generator so that the pump runs whenever the diesel generator is not running. The keepwarm heater control is interlocked with the pump so that the heater can only be energized when the pump is running. = [ When the keepwarm pump is running, the heater cycles on and off as demanded by a lubricating oil thermostat located on the engine. Separate indicators are provided on the local diesel generator control panel for lubricating oil pressure, right bank and left bank turbncharger oil pressure and lubricating oil filter differential pressure. Thermocouples in the lubricating oil piping feed signals corresponding to lubricating oil temperature into and from the engine f to the multiple position st!ector switch on the local control panel. f Through the use of this switch, which also receivea signals from the h combustion air intake and exhaust systen and the engine cooling water system, these temperatures may be displayed on the digital temperature indicator on the local control panel. Another set of thermocouples in the lubricating oil piping feed oil temperature in and out of the engine signals to a slow speed temperature recorder in the local control panel. This recorder operates continuously and provides a continuous record of important rTgine temperature for performance monitoring, trending and engine diagnostics.
- 4. Diesel Generator Cooling Water System I
< The diesel engine cooling water system is designed to remove the heat loads of the engine air intercooler, oil cooler and water jacket. Additional information on this system is provided in Section 9.5.5. l 7.3-46c f l _. __ _ ._. _ _. ~. _
conditions. The most c ritically sized component is the startup transformer. The maximum load could occur with one startup transformer out of service, an accident in one unit, and a unit trip with shutdown in the other unit. Under these assumptions, all auxiliary loac' is transferred to the remaining startup transformer; each startup transformer is sized based on this criteria. 8.2.2.4 Operating Units Each Unit's operating timits are 1,446,700 KVA at 0.90 power factor and rated voltage of 22,000 V sith a tolerance of 15%. The machine is designed to operate at or near 60 Hz (15%) in synchronism with all other generators'on the transmission system. These limits determine the magnitude of the current which the machine must carry and, therefore, the sizing c components and cost of the machine. The system operator adheres to the system voltage schedule in order to maintain predetermined voltage levels at certain critical buses on the transmission system. This in turn supports the voltages on all other buses on the system. The system operator provides for an adequate supply of reactive power for voltage support through his selection of generating units to be brought on line, switching on capacitor banks, etc. . E
~s System frequency is maintained on a continuous basis by the actions of system operators who maintain a balance of load and generation on the system. During normal system operations, this consists of varying the power output of the generators via control of the steam (or water) to the turbines, with spinning reserve kept available on some or all of the machines. The speed governor, which is a local continuous control device, is adjusted for the desired frequency within a narrow range around the loading level on the machine. Under emergency conditions, i.e., system separation, where the system experiences an imbalance in load and generation, the generator will either speed up (generation exceeds load) or slow down (load exceeds generation). Relays set to trip the unit on overspeed will initiate shutdown of the unit for the former case. The latter case is l handled by shedding load as necessary until generation and load are once again in l balance. If under emergency conditions frequency drops below the lowest acceptable machine level, relays will operate to trip the machine.
8.2-11 l . _ -
i l 8.2.3 REFERENCE FOR SECTION 8.2
- 1. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Guide for Safety in AC
- Substation Grounding," IEEE Std. 80.
i . i I i 4 4 e 4 4 i-8.2-11a
- w , .,- ., v. ,,% , .-- ,- . _ , . <.,, ,, - y.. . + ,, y .,
8.3.1.1.2.1 Power Supply Feeders Power is supplied to each of three 4.16 kV Class IE buses from the interbus l transformer. The preferred power opply is the startup transformer through the l 2 nit interbus transformer. An alternate preferred power supply feeds the 4.16 kV Clare IE buses through a manually operated, normally open circuit breaker (alternate preferred source feeder breaker) for each division. An alternate preferred supply is the startup transformer and interbus transformer associated with th: other unit. Three diesel generators fulfill onsite power requirements for each unit for the three load groups. 8.3.1.1.2.2 Arrangements The Class IE a-c system is comprised of three divisions: Divisions 1 and 2 are redundant, while Division 3 supplies power for the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system. Divisions 1 and 2 supply power from the 4.16 kV buses to 480 volt double-ended load centers and 480 volt motor control centers. Division 3 supplies power from the 4.16 kV bus to a 4.16 kV/480 volt transformer which feeds a 480 volt motor control center. 8.3.1.1.2.3 Supplied Loads Engineered safety features loads and loadings are listed in Table 8.3-1. Note ! that the common system engineered safety feature loads are supplied from the Unit 1 Class IE power system. 8.3.1.1.2.4 Manual and Automatic Interconnections between Buses, Buses and Loads, and Buses and Power Supplies i No provision is made for automatic parallel operation of any onsite power supplies with other onsite power supplies. Neither buses nor loads can be int 7rconnected through the onsite supplies nor are there any provisions for interdivisional connactions between onsite supplies and buses. All three divisions receive power from the non-Class IE preferred power supply. The diesel $3
'S generator breaker EH1102 (EH1201) as shown in the breaker logic diagram, cannot g 8.3-3
l close automatically on the bus under an undervoltage or LOCA condition unless the preferred and alternate preferred source br'eakers are both open. A manual transfer to the alternate preferred power supply can be accomplished by g ; closing the alternate preferred supply feeder breaker for each division. f 9 This is a temporary condition, such as when the normal source is under r maintehance. Automatic transfer is not used. Circuit breakers which feed each~ 4.16 kV Class 1E bus from the preferred power supply and 8.3-3a
alternate preferred power supply are interlocked with each other to preclude paralleling of the preferred and alternate preferred power supplies. 8.3.1.1.2.5 Interconnections between Safety Related and Non-Safety itelated j Buses ; Interconnections are made at the 4.16 kV level between Division 1 and a non-Class IE bus, and between Division 2 and a separate non-C. lass IE bus. These non-Class IE buses (" stub" buses) supply critical non-Class IE loads, such as the q control rod drive pumps and nuclear closed cooling water pumps (see s'f Figure 8.3-10). Circuit breakers feeding the stub buses are qualified isolation ) devices, are housed in Class IE switchgear, are tripped upon receipt of a LOCA signal, and satisfy the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.75. 8.3.1.1.2.6 Redundant Bus Separation Class 1E switchgear, load centers, and motor control centers of each division are located in rooms separate from similar equipment of other divisions. Figures 8.3-3 through 8.3-5 depict equipment locations. 8.3.1.1.2.7 Equipment Capacities Equipment capacities are listed in Table 8.3-2. 8.3.1.1.2.8 Automatic Bus Loading and Stripping The diesel generator for each division is automatically started upon receipt of a I LOCA signal and/or an undervoltage signal at the associated division bus. If the diesel generator is started by a LOCA rignal only, the diesel generator is not connected to the bus but remains in standby operation, non-Class IE 4.16 kV buses
~
(stub buses) fed from Division 1 and 2 buses are shed, and LOCA loads are started and fed from offsite power. Class IE bus feeder breakers are tripr 6 by bus undervoltage which is detected at each division bus by two 3 phase undervoltage relays and specific coincident logic. For Divisions 1 anu 2, 4.16 kV load i , l 8.3-4 aw - , ,-- n-o n w w-r ,n e e e,w- vw n.
- b. Division 3 HPCS Testing The HPCS 4.16 kV bus (EH13), with associated feeder and load breakers, are designed to respond automatically to two abnormal conditions, either separately or simultaneously. These abnormal conditions are a bus i
,' undervoltage condition corresponding to a loss of offsite power supplies and a LOCA condition.
Testing to verify these responses will be accomplished in two separate, but related, test procedures:
- 1. The standby diesel generator pre-operational test. .
- 2. Emergency core cooling system integrated initiation with preferred source of offsite power available and during a loss of offsite power pre-operational test.
Abstracts of the above test procedures are provided in Chapter 14. Testing of Division 3 equipment is in accordance with the applicable design bases table 8.1-2 and in particular Regulatory Guide 1.68. It is designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those whose operation is not normally demonstrated as detailed in the Technical Specifications, periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages, the latter based on actual accident simulated conditions. These tests demonstrate the operability of diesel generator, station battery system components, and logic systems and thereby verify the continuity of the system and the operation of components. 8.3.1.1.3 Standby Power Sources 8.3.1.1.3.1 Description Each division is provided with a diesel engine driven, 4.16 kV, 3 phase, 60 Hz synchronous generator (see Figure 8.3-1). The diesel generator sets are l 8.3-14
electrically and physically isolated from each other and are located in a Seismic Category I structure adjacent to the control complex. Figure 8.3-3 shows the ; locations of the standby power sources. l 1 I Table 8.3-1 lists loads required for various maximum loading conditions, such as forjedshutdownandLOCA. The basis for the power required for each safety related load is the motor nameplate rating. In each case this rating is greater than the horsepower required by the driven equipment. Safety-related control power and instrument power for each diesel generator are supplied from the 125 volt d-c battery of the respective division. Two control circuits are provided for engine starting to increase reliability. These circuits are of the same division as the diesel generator with which they ar. associated. Class IE motors, associated with diesel generator auxiliary systems which require 480 volt, 3 phase a-c power, are supplied from motor contre,1 centers associated with the diesel generator. Motors associated with tne diesel generator auxiliaries are listed in Table 8.3-1. , 1 8.3-14a
System reliability and qualification testing are discussed further in ;
- I Section 8.3.1.1.3.2, Item b.11.
l
- b. Design Aspects ,
- 1. Start Initiating Circuits The diesel generators are automatically started upon receipt of a LOCA signal or an undervoltage signal from the associated bus. The diesel generators can also be manually started remotely from the control room or locally at the diesel generators. A mode selector switch located at the diesel generator permits transfer of manual control capability to and'from the control room. Figure 8.3-6 presents the logic diagram for Division 1 and 2 diesel generators. The diesel generators are capable s S
of operating at rated speed and no load for seven days without f degradation of engine performance or reliability. $
- 2. Starting Mechanism and System The diesel generators are pneumatically started. Redundant starting air supplies are provided for each engine. Additional details concerning the starting air system are presented in Section 9.5.6.
- 3. Tripping Devices Only the generator differential and overspeed trip functions will shut down the diesel generators after a start resulting from a LOCA signal.
The following additional, nonessential trip functions are bypassed upon receipt of a LOCA signal but will shut down the diesel generators when operating in all other modes: (a) Higt jacket water temperature. (b) High engine bearing temperature. (c) High lubric'ating oil temperature. (d) Low turbocharger oil pressure. (e) Low lubricating oil pressure. l (f) High vibration level. 8.3-16 l
- 7. Testability The diesel generators can be tested during normal plant operation or during plant shutdown periods. Administrative controls allow testing of only one diesel generator at a time. Prior to performing the test,
[ all operating functions are transferred to equipment supplied from the bus not affected by the test. In order to achieve this optimum equipment readiness status, the following requirements should be met: (a) The surveillance instruction will have a require ant to load the diesel to a minimum of 25% full load for each diesel whenever the diesel is to be operated for an extended time period. (b) A conflict between NRC guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.108 and the engine manufacturer does not exist. (c) The preventative maintenance program will provide methods for data collection and review of any malfunction or discrepancies encountered. This data will be maintained in a computerized equipment history file along with corrective maintenance ] information. O The computerized maintenance system will permit ease of access to information for trending and evaluation. These evaluations will then be used to revise preventative and corrective maintenance practices and, as necessary, to initiate equipment repair, modification and replacement. (d) Upon completion of repairs or maintenance, the applicable valve and electrical line-up sheets for the affected diesel auxiliary systems, diesel starting air, diesel fuel oil, diesel jacket water, diesel lube oil and diesel intake and exhaust, will be completed to return the unit to the correct standby mode. 8.3-18
l The standby power system can be tested from either the diesel generator room or the control room. The diesel generators can be manually synchronized with the preferred or alternate preferred power sources. The diesel generators cannot be
~
synchronized with the alternate preferred power source from the diee21 generator rooms. Circuitry is provided which overrides the test mode in the event of a LOCA or loss of 4.16 kV bus voltage. The controls for the diesel generator are designed such that if an emergency start signal is initiated while the unit is undergoing its periodic exercise test, 4, h whether the unit is starting, running disconnected, running loading, - tripping under 6 fault other than overspeed or generator differential, } a coasting to a stop, the control system will cause the unit to return to rated speed and voltage, and will disarm. All protection except overspeed and generator differential when the unit comes up to speed and voltage as required, a " ready to load" signal will be genera +.ed to use in the loading sequence circuit. Trip inputs which are in effect during diesel generator testing are indicated uy Figure 8.3-6. Testability of bypassed trip inputs is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.3.2, Item b.10.
- 8. Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System The fuel oil storage and transfer system is discussed in Section 9.5.4.
- 9. Cooling and Heating Systems Cooling and heating systems associated with the diesel generators are discussed in Section 9.5.5.
8.3-18a
~
l i l The HPCS diesel generator is capable of quickly restoring power to the HPCS pump motor in the event that offsite power is unavailable and can provide all power for startup and operatian of the HPCS system. The HPCS diesel generator starts automatically upon receit.t of a signal from the plant protection system (low water level or high drywell pressure-LOCA initiation [ signals) or upon detection of HPCS bus 'undervoltage. When the preferred power supply is unavailable, the HPCS diesel generator is automatically connected to the HPCS bus. The HPCS electrical system is capable of functioning when subjected to design bases natural phenomena. In particular, the system is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements and is housed within a safety class structure. The HPCS system and its power supply unit is part of the ECCS. HPCS and the diesel generator by itself does not meet the single failure criterion, although the criterion is applicable at the ECCS level. The HPCS diesel generator is provided with a separate fuel day tank and fuel storage tank of sufficient capacity to support operation of the standby power source while supplying maximum post accident HPCS power requirements for a time sufficient to bring the plant to a safe condition. Tank size is discussed in Section 9.5.9.1. The HPCS diesel generator is provided with a cooling water system as described in Section 9.5.9.2, and a lubrication system as described in Section 9.5.9.4 and a combustion air intake and exhaust as described in Section 9.5.9.5. A general description of the application of the diesel generator is to be found in NEDO 10905 and supplements and a description of the HPCS system application is provided in Section 7.3. The HPCS diesel generator for the Perry project is a Stewart and Stephenson 1 X 20 cylinder EMD diesel generator and the qualification tests described in NEDO 10905-3 are applicable to the Perry application. 8.3-27
An automatic start signal to the HPCS diesel generator overrides the test mode. Control is accomplished from either the control room or the HPCS diesel room. The following conditions render the diesel generators incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal:
,' 1. Diesel generator lockout relay not reset.
- 2. Diesel generator manual / automatic control switch in manual position.
- 3. Regulator selector switch in manual position.
- 4. Diesel generator keylock selector switch in maintenance position.
- 5. Loss of d-c power to diesel generator controls.
- 6. Diesel generator output breaker in racked-out position.
h N
- 7. Loss of d-c power to diesel generator output breaker control. g 4
All the above conditions are displayed to the operator in the control room and to the diesel generator panel as described in Section 8.3.1.1.3.3 Item b.10. Appropriate pro.edures assure the capability of the design. A discussion of the air start system is in Section 9.5.9.3. The Division 3 Class IE d-c power supply system provides d-c power to the HPCS system for control and protection. Figure 8.3-23 is a functional block diagram of the HPCS diesel generator. The diesel generator is required to operate in three modes:
- 1. Normal operation, e.g. , to meet the periodic test requirements for the diesel generator.
8.3-27a
- 2. In accident conditions with loss of offsite power l
- 3. In accident conditions with no loss of offsite power The diesel generator is only used for emergencies and testing. It is not
,' used for peaking during norma) operation of the station. Operating procedures specify that, whenever possible, the diesel generator should be operated under fully loaded conditions. The manufacturer's recommendation specifies that at synchronous speed and loads less than 20 percent of rated, a 200 hour cumulative time limit should be placed on the diesel engine turbocharger. Between 20 percent and 50 percent load, there is a 1000 hour cumulative time limit. The time limits specified above are conservatively lower by a factor of three than the time limits arrived at from operating experience, test and analysis given by EMD. Diesel generator overhaul should be undertaken at this point. ,
h
.N In operating modes .ad 2, the diesel generator is not placed under no load b N
or light load conditions for extended periods. Indeed, the cumulative K operating time under low load conditions should be very small cespared with the cumulative time limit provided that operating procedures are followed (which includes compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.108). In operating mode 3, the diesel generator is likely to operate under low load conditions but in this instance the event is extremely rare and easily documented. Operating procedures call for 15 minutes of load of at least 75 percent of rated load every 4 hours of operation and the equipment is $ required to be operable for one week, i.e., 168 hours. This procedure has k K been developed to assure operation through prevention of lubricant oil exhaust as well as in consideration of turbocharger problems.
- b. Design Aspects
- 1. Start Initiating Circuits The Division 3 (HPCS) diesel generator is started automatically upon receipt of a LOCA or associated bus undervoltage signal. Manual i l l
\ l 8.3-27b
i s starting capability is provided in the control room (remote) and at the i diesel generator (local). A mode selector switch located at the diesel ~ generator transfers manual start-stop capability from the diesel generator to the control room. Figure 8.3-8 illustrates system logic. 4 8.3-27c
- 2. Starting Mechanism and System The HPCS diesel generator is pneumatically started. Redundant starting air supplies are provided for each engine. Additional details concerning the starting air system are presented in Section 9.5.9.3.
- 3. Tripping Devices Only the generator differential and overspeed trip functions will shut down the diesel generator after a 6 tart resulting from LOCA signal.
The following additional, nonessential trip functions are bypassed upon receipt of a LOCA signal but will shut down the diesel generator when operating in all other modes: (a) High jacket water temperature. (b) High engine bearing temperature. (c) High lubricating oil temperature. (d) Low turbocharger oil pressure. (e) Low lubricating oil pressure. (f) High vibration level. (g) High crankcase pressure. (h) Reverse power. (i) Instantaneous overcurrent. (j) Generator neutral ground fault. (k) Generator field ground.
- 4. Interlocks No interlocks are provided in the HPCS diesel generator starting circuit. The diesel generator circuit breakers are interlocked with the associated preferred and alternate preferred power source circuit breakers. Both the preferred and alternate preferred power source circuit breakers must be open before the diesel generator circuit breaker can be closed following receipt of either a LOCA or a bus undervoltage signal. Interlocks also prevent the preferred and 1
8.3-28 l
alternate preferr d power source circuit breakers from being closed at the same time. However, the diesel generator can be manually paralleled with either the preferred or alternate preferred power ! sources. I
' 5. Permissives Permissive conditions which must be satisfied for automatic HPCS diesel generator start are as follows:
1 (a) Maintenance-test-auto switch must be in auto position. 2 (b) Starting air supply pressure must be greater than 150 psig. (c) Engine generator lockout relay must be reset. (d) HPCS diesel generator circuit breaker must be open.
- 6. Load Shedding Circuits Load shedding circuits are discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.2.8.
r 7. Testing Periodic surveillance testing will be performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108 and the manufacture's operating manual, between which there are no conflicts. It is not anticipated that the DG should experience no load or light load operation for extended periods during periodic testing (Section 8.3.1.1.3.3 a). Normal operating procedures will include a precaution that the diesel generator be loaded to at 3t least 25 percent of full load and run for a minimum of 30 minutes 4 whenever a non-surveillance start occurs that is not terminated within N, b 2 minutes. Normal preventative maintenance will be performed in accordance with the manufacturers and Regulatory Guide recommendations. Equipment failures will be monitored by a maintenance history and periodically reviewed for failure rates and trends by the Plant Staff. 8.3-28a l l
(16) Diesel generatur emergency start signal received. (17) Diesel generator protective relay trip. (d) Local alarms, as listed below, are also provided for the HPCS diesel generator: (1) Failure to start /run. (2) Charger failure. (3) Control power failure. (4) High water temperature. (5) Overspeed. (6) Low starting air pressure. (7) High stator temperature.
-(8) Low expansion tank water level.
(9) Low fuel level. (10) Engine tripped. (11) Low turbocharger lubricating oil pressure. (12) Low cooling water pressure. (13) Crankcase pressure high. (14) Main fuel pump failure. (15) Reserve fuel pump failure. (16) Restricted fuel oil filter. (17) High lubricating oil temperature. (18) Low lubricating oil temperature. (19) Low lubricating oil pressure. (20) Restricted lubricating oil filter. The above local alarms are annunciated on the main control room Diesel Generator trouble alarm. 8.3-31 4
1 The HPCS diesel generator controls are installed on a free standing floor mounted panel i.e. the DG control panel is separate from the engine skid. The location of this panel and its design g-is such that it is able to withstand continous vibrational d M stresses anticipated during operation. Only sensors and other 7d equipment which by their nature require attachment to the engine generator and associated equipment are to be found there.
- 11. ,
Qualification Program The HPCS diesel generator qualification program is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.6.11. l t i 4 i a 8.3-31a
8.3.1.1.6.11 HPCS Diesel Generator Prototype Qualificatica Program The HPCS diesel generator is a Stewart and Stephenson diesel generator package with one EMD 20 cylinder diesel engine. A prototype diesel generator qualification program is described in NED0-10905-3. During this program, tests werhperformedatLaSalleandloadsandenvironmentalconditionstobefoundat Perry are similar. As part of the program, the HPCS diesel generator and associated equipment (e.g. , switchgear, MCC transformer) were qualified in accordance with IEEE Standard 323 1971 and IEEE Standard 344 1971 (ree Section 7, NED0-10905). Qualification of the diesel generator is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.6, 1.9 and 1EEE Standard 387 as described in Section 8.3.1.2.3. A comprehensive discussion of the qualification program is provided in Section 3.10 and 3.11. Prior to intial fuel loading, the HPCS diesel generator is subject to pre-operational testing as defined in the operating procedures and in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.68. 8.3.1.1.6.12 Acceptability Criteria for HPCS Diesel Generator The HPCS diesel generator is acceptable if it is capable of starting and accelerating the design load to the desired speed within the specified time while maintaining voltage and frequency within limits that will not degrade the performance of the system below requirements during load application and/or load removal and it demonstrates a torque margin, i.e.,'a torque capability 10 percent in excess of the starting period torque requirements. 8.3.1.2 Analysis
)
8.3.1.2.1 Compliance with General Design Criterion 17, Regulatory Guides, l and Standards The ESF onsite distribution system has been segregated into three separate and distinct load groups. These load groups are Divisions 1, 2, and 3. This arrangement complies with General Design Criterion (One) 17 and the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.6, in addition to other design bases described in Table 8.1-2. Each load group is complete with respect to 4.16 kV l 8.3-44
and 480 volt switchgea , 120 volt a-c and 125 volt d-c equipment, and standby power source. Each load group also has access to the preferred power source and the alternate preferred power source. Control power for operating circuit breakers in a particular division is supplied from the associated 125 volt
<v 8.3-44a
Mechanical and electrical system interactions between the HPCS diesel ger.erator and other units of the standby power supply, the nuclear plant, the conventional plant, a-d the Class IE electrical systems are coordinated so that the HPCS diesel generator design function and capability are realized for any design basis event, except failure of the HPCS diesel generator. 8.3.*1.2.4 Safety Related Equipment in Hostile Environments Safety related equipment that may be required to operate in a hostile environment and the corresponding specified normal and accident design environments are presented in Section 3.11. Class IE electrical cable tor use inside the drywell and containment are qualified to satisfy the normal and accident conditions and are also discussed in Section 3.11. Class IE equipment, whether located inside or outside the containment, which must function during an accident is deeigned to withstand the temperature, humidity, N and other conditions expected at the specified location. No Class 1E electrical % equipment that is located in the dry well and/or containment is mounted such that D it will become submerged as a result of a LOCA. 8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety Related Equipment Identification of safety related equipment is addressed in Section 8.2.1.1.2.9. 8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems 8.3.1.4.1 Physical Separation Requirements for Class IE Equipment 8.3.1.4.1.1 General Requirements Electrical equipcent and wiring for Class IE electrical systems are segregated into separate independent divisions, designated Division ), Divison 2, and Division 3, such that no single credible event is capable of disabling sufficient equipment to prevent reactor shutdown, removal of decay heat from the core, and isolation of containment in the event of an incident. Division separation requirements apply to equipment and wiring systems concerned. 8.3-56
of being tested during service to detect faults. It is inherent in the design of s the battery chargers to include diodes which'will prevent the a-c supply source 6 from becoming a load on the battery if the a-c input power is lost. All abnormal h conditions of selected system parameters important to surveillance of the system are annunciated in the control room. Automatic cross connections between the Div[sion3(HPCS)125voltd-csystemsandotherd-csystemsarenotprovided. Control power for the circuit breakers in the HPCS switchgear is supplied from the Division 3 (RPCS) battery, ensuring the follnsing:
- a. The unlikely loss of the HPCS system will not jeopardize the supply of offsite or onsite power to other ESF busrs.
- b. The differential relays and all interlocks associated with HPCS are supplied from the Division 3 (HPCS) 125 volt d-c system, only. Thereby, any cross connections between the redundant d-c systems are eliminated.
8.3.2.1.4 Ventilation Complete details of battery room and d-c equipment room ventilation systems are presented in Section 9.4.1. Each room is provided with an ionization type smoke detector which, upon detection of smoke, actuates an alarm in the control room. T 8.3.2.1.5 Maintenance and Test
> Periodic maintenance tests will be performed on the 125 volt d-c systems to ! determine the condition of each individual component. Batteries will be checked for electrolyte level, specific gravity, cell voltage, and visual indications of deterioration. A performance discharge test of the batteries will be conducted re;ularly. Battery chargers will be visually inspected and performance tests will be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis.
General maintenance and testing procedures will be in accordance with IEEE l Standard 450'Is) , as detailed in the technical specifications. 't 8.3-69
TABLE 8.3-8 POWER CONTROL SOURCES FOR SWITCHGEAR
,' Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC)
(By Bus Nomenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Disc Switch No. L1102 D1B DIB07 6 L1103 D19 DIB07 19 L1104 4 D1B07 19 L1105 DIB D1B06 19 L1106 DIB D1B06 19 L1107 DIB DIB06 19 11108 DIB 91B06 19 L1109 DIB v1B06 19 L1110 DIB D1006 19 L1202 D1B DIB07 8 L1203 D1B D1B06 21 , L1204 DIB D1B06 21 } L1205 DIB D1B06 21 E L1206 DIB D1B06 21 L1207 D1B D1B06 21 L1208 DIB DIB06 21 L1209 DIB DIB06 21 L1210 DIB D1B06 21 L1001 DIB DIB06 17 L1003 DIB DIB06 17 L1004 DIB D1B06 17 L1006 DIB D1B07 16 L1007 D1B DIB07 16 L1008 D1B DIB07 16 L1009 D1B D1B07 16 ; L1010 D1B DIB07 16 1 8.3-102 i i
l l TABLE 8.3-8 (Continued) Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC) (By Bus Nomenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Diuc Switch No. L2001 D2B D2B06 17 L2003 D2B D2B06 17 L2004 D2B D2B06 17 L2006 D2B D2B07 16 L2007 D2B D2B07 16 L2008 D2B D2B07 16 L2009 D2B D2B07 16 L2010 D2B D2B07 16 H1101 DIB D1B07 15 H1102 DIB DIB07 15 H1103 D1B DIB06 3 H1104 DIB D1B06 3 HI205 D1B D1B06 3 H1106 DIB D1B06 3 m H1107 DIB D1B06 3 d H1108 D1B DIB06 3 H1109 D1B D1B06 3 H1110 DIB D1B06 3 H1111 DIB DIB06 3 H1112 DIB D1B06 3 H1201 DIB D1B07 5 H1202 DIB DIB07 5 H1203 DIB D1B06 5 H1204 DIB 91B06 5 H1205 D1B DIB06 5 H1206 DIB DIB06 5 H1207 DIB DIB06 5 H1208 D1B DIB06 5 H1209 DIB DIB06 5 H1210 DIB D1B06 5 8.3-103
I TABLE 8.3-8 (Continued) Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC) (By Bus Nomenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Disc Switch No. H1211 DIB DIB06 5 H1712 DIB D1B06 5 H1213 DIB DIB06 5 H1214 D1B DIB06 5 EH1101 DIB DIB06 12 EH1102 EDIA EDIA06 24 EH1104 EDIA EDIA06 23 EH1105 EDIA EDIA06 23 EH1106 ED1 ^. EDIA06 23 I EDIA EDIA06 23 EH1107
; EH1109 EDIA EDIA06 23 EH1110 EDIA EDIA06 23 EH1111 E'1A EDIA00 23 EH1113 EDIA EDIA06 23 R EH1114 EDIA EDIA06 24 o' EH1115 EDIA EDIA06 24 EH1116 EDIA EDIA06 23 XH1101 DIB DIB06 12 XH1102 D1B DIB06 12 EH1201 ED1B ED1B06 22 EH1203 EDIB ED1B06 21 EH1204 EDIB ED1B06 21 EH1205 EDIB EDIB06 21 EH1206 EDIB EDIB06 21 EH1207 EDIB ED1B06 21 EH1208 EDIB EDIB06 21 EH1209 ED1B ED1B06 21 EH1210 EDIB EDIB06 21 EH1211 ED1B EDIB06 21 EH1212 ED1B ED1B06 22 8.3-104
TABLE 8.3-8 (Continued) Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC) (By Bus Nomenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Disc Switch No. EH1213 ED1B ED1B06 22 EH1214 EDIB EDIB06 21
.' XH1201 D1B DIB07 10 XH1202 DIB D1B07 10 XH1203 DIB D1B07 10 XH1204 D1B DIB07 10 EH1301 EDIC 11 N/A EH1202 EDIC 11 N/A EH1303 EDIC 11 N/A EH1304 EDIC 11 N/A EH1305 EDIC 11 N/A EF1A03 EDIA EDIA06 20 EF1A04 EDIA EDIA06 19 EF1A05 EDIA EDIA06 19 EFIA06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A R EF1A07 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A d EF1A08 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIA09 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIA10 EDIA EDIA06 19 EFIA11 (Spare) EDIA EDIA06 19 EFIA12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EF1B03 EDIA EDIA06 20 EF1B04 EDIA EDIA06 19 EFIB05 EDIA EDIA06 19 EFIB06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EF1B07 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIB08 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A ED1B09 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIB10 (Spare) EDIA EDIA06 19 EFIB11 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A 8.3-105
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TABLE 8.3-8 (Continued) l Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC) (By Bus Nomenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Disc Switch No. EF1B12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIB13 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIC03 ED1B EDIB06 20 EF1C04 ED1B EDIB06 19 EFIC05 ED1B EDIB06 19 EFIC06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIC07 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFICOS (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIC09 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIC10 EDIB EDIB06 19 EFIC11 (Spare) EDIB EDIB06 19 EFIC12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFIC13 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFID03 EDIB ED1B06 20 EFID04 ED1B ED1B06 19 EFIDOS EDIB ED1B06 19 R EFID06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFID07 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFID08 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFID09 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFID10 (Spare) ED1B EDIB06 19 EFID11 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A EFID12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIA03 DIB D1B07 7 FIA04 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIA05 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIA06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIA07 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A F1408 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A
- 8.3-106
TABLE 8.3-8 (Continued) Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC) Qy Bus Nceenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Disc Switch No. FIA09 (Manual) D1B D1B06 7
. FIA10 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIA11 DIB DIB06 7 FIA12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIA13 D1B D1B06 7 FIA14 D1B DIB06 7 FIA15 DIB D1B06 7 FIA16 (Spare) DIB DIB06 7 FIA17 (Manual) N/A N/A ,N/A FIB 03 DIB DIB07 7 FIB 04 (Mant'al) N/A N/A N/A FIB 05 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIB 06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIB 07 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A e FIB 08 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A N FIB 09 DIB DIB06 7 FIB 10 DIB DIB06 7 FIB 11 (Spare) D1B D1B06 7 FIB 12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIB 13 DIB DIB06 ,
7 FIB 14 DIB DIB06 7 FIB 15 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIB 16 (Spare) D1B DIB06 7 FIC03 D1B DIB07 9 FIC04 D1B D1B06 9 i i FIC05 DIB DIB0f;> 9 F1C06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIC07 (Manual N/A N/A N/A 7, FIC08 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A . e t N 8.3-107
l i TABLE 8.3-8 (Continued) Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC) (By Bus Nomenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Disc Switch No. F1C09 D1B DIB06 9 FIC10 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIC11 (Spare) D1B D1B06 9 FIC12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIC13 DIB DIB06 9 FIC14 DIB DIB06 9 i FIC15 D1B DIB06 9 F1C16 DIB D1B06 9 FIC17 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A
, FID03 D1B DIB07 9 FID04 D1B D1B06 9 FID05 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FID06 (Menual) H/A N/A N/A FID07 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FID08 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A e FID09 (Spare) D1B D1B06 9 d FID10 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FID11 D1B DIB06 9 FID12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FID13 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FID14 DIB DIB06 9 FID15 DIB DIB06 9 FID16 D1B DIB06 9 FIE03 DIB D1B07 11 FIE04 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIE05 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIE06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIE07 D1B DIB06 11 FIE08 D1B D1B06 11 8.3-108 - _ L _ _- -
l TABLE 8.3-8 (Continued) Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC) (By Bus Nomenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Disc Switch No. FIE09 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A
. FIE10 D1B D1B06 11 FIE11 D1B DIB06 11 FIE12 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIE13 D1B D1B06 11 FIE14 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIE15 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIE16 D1B DIB06 11 FIF03 DIB DIB07 11 FIF04 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIF05 / Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIF06 DIB DIB06 11 FIF07 D1B DIB06 11 FIF08 D1B DIB06 11 DIB D1B06
- FIF09 11 FIF10 DIB DIB06 11 N FIF11 D1B DIB06 11 FIF12 DIB DIB06 11 FIF13 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIF14 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIF15 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIF16 D1B D1B06 11 FIF17 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIG 03 FIG 04 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIGOS (Manual) N/A N/A N/A FIG 06 DIB D1B06 13 FIG 08 (Spare) D1B DIB06 13 8.3-109 l
i
TABLE 8.3-8 (Continued) Switchgear Control Power Source (125VDC) (By Bus Nomenclature) Bus Breaker Fused Disc Switch NJ. FIG 09 (Spare) DIB DIBC6 13
. FIG 10 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A XFIA01 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A XF1A02 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A X21A03 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A XFIA04 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A [.
XFIA05 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A. O XFIA06 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A XFIA07 (Manual) N/A N/A N/A XFIA08 D1B DiB06 14 Reactor Recirc. Brkr. 2A 1R22-S010 DIB D1306 20 Reactor Recire. Brkr. 2B 1R22-S011 DIB DIB06 20 Reactor Recire. Brkr. 3A 1R22-S012 EDIA EDIA06 26 't Reactor Recire. Brkr. 3B IR22-S013 EDIA EDIA06 26 Reactor Recire. Brkr. 4A 1R22-S014 ED1B EDIB06 26 Reactor Recirc. Brkr. 4B 1R22-S015 ED1B EDIB06 26 ( I a 8.3-110
TABLE 8.3-9 HPCS DIESEL GENERATOR DIESEL ENGINE / GENERATOR - Diesel engine
- Type Stationary, solid injection water cooled, two stroke cycle in-line, compression ignition type.
Auxiliaries Compressed air starting systems (including compressor and accumulators), engine control panel; cool-water system (including pump and heat exchanger, and standby heater with temperature control), lubrication oil system (including oil reservoir, pumps, strainer, fil6er, cooler and standby heaters with temperature control). Diesel engine Accessories Fuel filter, intake air filter / silencer, exhaust muffler, ladders and catwalks, overspeed trip devices. Generator Voltage 4160 Current 380 amps Frequency 60 Hz Auxiliaries Generator control panel including exciter and voltage regulator; generator grounding system. Accessories Grounding compartment including grounding transformer and grounding resistor; resistance temperature detectors with common terminal box; current transformer. Seismic classification Class 1 l 1 8.3-111
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'9.5.4 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM The mections that follow discuss the fuel oil storage and transfer system for the standby diesel generators. This system for the high pressure core spray (KPCS) diesel generator is discussed in Section 9.5.9.1.
9.5$4.1 Desian Bases
; Separate fuel oil storage and transfer facilities are provided for each of the four standby diesel generators (two per unit). Diesel generator fuel oil i
systems are not shared between Units 1 and 2. They are all designed to provide sufficient fuel oil for at least seven days of operation carrying the design electrical load of the associated generator. This storage capacity criterion is considered adequate since fuel oil delivery from the Cleveland area, in the amounts required, is considered to be available with a two to three day delivery notice. Tank trucks will deliver the fuel oil to a central
- fill station.
There are numerous fuel oil dealers in metropolitan Cleveland capable of
- supplying the quality fuel oil in the amounts required. Tank trucks wil'. ,
deliver the fuel to a central fill station. Table 2.2-2 and Figure 2.2-2 show
]
the major roads, their proximity to the plant and the daily traffic. As the O roads are heavily travelled they are kept clear by the State Highway Department. 4 1 1 All system components are accessible for an inservice inspection without J affecting the availability of fuel to either of the standby diesel generators. 4
- l. Conformance with applicable GDC's is discussed in Section 3.1. Conformance i with regulatory guides is discussed in Section 1.8. Conformance with Branch l
Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, as related to fuel oil system fire protection, j is detailed in a separate report ( ) for PNPP. Conformance with Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and NEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containment, is discussed in i Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. .The guidelines presented in Branch Technical i 9.5-28
Position ICSB-17 (PSB) have also been considered in the design of this system, as discussed in Chapter 8. 9.5.4.2 System Description The' standby diesel generator fuel oil system is shown in Figure 9.5-8 and the layout arrangement is shown in Figure 1.2-5. Each standby generator har its own separate fuel oil system consisting of the following components with associated piping, valves, strainers, filters and controls: a .- Fuel oil storage tank
- b. Fuel oil day tank
- c. Two fuel oil transfer pumps
- d. Fuel oil booster pump
- e. Fuel oil drip tank and drip waste return pump 4
The fuel storage tanks are buried horizontal cylindrical atmospheric tanks. Each tank has a 90,000 gallon storage capacity which is sufficient to operate its corresponding diesel generator for seven days during the postulated emergency reactor shutdown under post-accident conditions. 4 kK The fuel oil day tanks a:e 550 gallon vertical cylindrical atmospheric tanks mounted in the respective standby diesel generator room at an elevation that provides the required priming head for the diesel generator engine mounted and driven fuel oil pump. Each day tank is equipped with an overflow line which vill return excess fuel oil delivered by the transfer pump back to the fuel oil storage tank. The transfer pumps traasport fuel between the underground storage tank and the i day tank. The transfer pumps are located in the Diesel Generator Building. 4 Each pump motor is 15 horsepower, 460 volts, 3 phase, 60 Hz and is powered f from a Safety Related Class IE 480 volt motor control center. Each pump has a k capacity of 90 gpm and a discharge pressure of 75 psig. The fuel oil transfer pumps may be operated with manual control switches; however, they normally are operated automatically by level switches on the day 9.5-28a
tanks. A " low" level switch starts the normal pump, a " low-low" level switch i starts the standby pump and a "high" level stop switch is provided for each rum, " Low" level swit.ches are provided in the stcrage tanks to stop the pwps at the minimum safe level for operation of the pumps. l One. engine driven fuel oil booster pump is supplied with and located on each didelengine. The booster pump is driven by the diesel engine, has a capacity of 35 gpm, and a discharge pressure of 40 psig. One motor driven fuel oil booster pump is supplied with each fuel oil system. The pump motor is two horsepower,125 Vd-c and is fed from a 125 Vd-c non-safety $ battery supply. The pump has a capacity of 35 gym and 3 discharge pressure of 40 psig. These pumps supply the fuel from the day tanks to the engine manifolds, and start when the diesel start signal is received. The fuel not consumed by the engine is returned to the fuel oil drip tank from which it is pumped back to the day tank by the fuel return pump. The fuel oil drip pump is controlled by a level switch in the fuel oil drip tank. Each standby diesel generator is also equipped with a 100 percent capacity, d-c motor-driven fuel oil booster pump for diesel generator starting use during maintenance or other times when the engine-driven pump may be g unavailable. The fuel oil booster pump is automatically started on manual or i automatic diesel start signal and will drop out with the diesel generator up to speed and the engine driven fuel oil pump functioning. With the diesel generator up to speed, the booster pump will auto start on engine driven pump failure. Control of the system is normally automatic during all modes of plant operation. In the event of a diesel generator start, the standby diesel generator fuel oil system operates automatically to support the operatioa of the diesel generator by supplying fuel to the engine day tanks. In the event of failure of the automatic operation of the normal transfer pump, the standby pump, with separate automatic controls, is provided as emergency backup. 9.5-28b
.- . . - - _. . .-- =.. - . .
f i 1 Refer to Section 8.3.1 for further details on the diesel generator starting {' sequence. Refer to Section 9.5.9.1 for description of the HPCS diesel generator fuel oil system. 1 t 1 r 4 't i 2 1 .I l 1 i 1 9.5-28c l 1
- - - - - - ,. n, , , ,_,
__, _ l
9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation ; The standby diesel generator fuel oil system meets the single failure criterion, ie, if a failure in the system prevents the operation of the associated diesel generator, the other two divisions of the emergency power system (described in Section 8.3) will provide adequate power to safely shut down the plant or to mitigate the consequences of any of the postulated accidents. The standby diesel generator fuel oil system is designed in accordance with l the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, N O the National Fire Protection Association Standards 30 and 37, State of Ohio g. safety regulations and DEMA standards. The system is classified Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I, with the exception of vents, overflows, fill lines, fuel oil waste return pumps and booster pump d-c motors, and dipstick and water removal lines which are non-safety. The diesel generators and their auxiliary systems, including the fuel oil storage and transfer system, arti isolated from one another by a reinforced concrete wall. The diesel generator exposed walls and roof, including the dividing walls, are designed and constructed as discussed in Section 3.5.3. Any external openings to the } outside are protected as discussed in Section 3.5.2 and Table 3.5-5. The k
+
overall description of the diesel generator as a Seirmic Category I Structure ir, given in Section 3.8.4.1.7. The effects of postulated high energy pipe ruptures are discussed in Section 3.6.1.2g. No openings in the walls separating the individual diesel generators exist. Two 100 percent capacity fuel transfer pumps are provided for filling each of the day tanks. The backup pump is started automatically by a " low-low" level switch in the day tank if the normal pump fails and the day tank level continues to fall. No physical interconnection of piping exists between the standby or high pressure. core sprsy diesel generators. l l l 9.5 -29 i
Two 100 percent capacity fuel transfer pumps are provided for filling each of 1 the day tanks. The backup pump is started automatically by a " low-low" level switch in the day tank if the normal pump fails and the day tank level continues to fall. No physical interconnection of piping exists between the standby or high pressure core spray diesel generators. 1 W l l l l 9.5-29a
Corrosion protection for the tanks and piping will include providing a corrosion allowance to the tank wall thickness and the external use of bituminous coatings applied to thicknesses to assure complete uninterrupted coverage. Cathodic corrosion protection of the buried storage tanks and piping is used to withstand corrosive conditions in the system. The
~
underground yard piping is coated with coal-tar enamel and bonded double asbestos-felt wraps, following the American Water Works Association's Standard k, C-203, " Coal-Tar Protective Coatings and Linings for Steel Water Pipelines - k b Enamel and Tape - Hot Applied." The standby diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks are coated internally with a one coat, 2 mil-thick coating of Rustoleum. Leakage due to corrosion, allowing water to enter the tank, will be detected by a slow increase in the fuel level; this level will be read and logged at regular intervals. Such a leak would be slow starting and would increase at a slow enough rate to allow pumping the water out of the tank. Corrective action could be taken long before the water accumulates to an amount that interferes with fuel transfer. The standby diesel generator fuel oil systems are not redundant, since two 100 percent capacity diesel generators are provided. A program of sampling and periodic replacement of the oil will be conducted to prevent long term deterioration of the fuel oil. Due to fuel consumption during periodic testing, it is anticipated that fuel oil replacement for deterioration will not be required. Algae growth in the tank will be prevented by routinely removing the water in which it grows, and if necessary, by using an algae inhibiting additive in the oil. The fuel oil storage tanks are provided with porous Class A bedding and backfill as an extension from the main plant underdrain system. The Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) level is lowered to a point 10 feet below the bottom of the tanks in this area due to the main plant underdrain system and 9.5-30 I I 1 l
Class A bedding; this will avert the threat of possibly lifting the storage l 1 tanks due to hydrodynamic forces from a buildup of water around the tanks. ! (See Figures 9.5-21 and 9.5-22.) The storage tanks are designed so that all openings are above the ground water and[PMFlevelstopreventtheentranceofwater. The only anticipated source of water into the tanks will result from moisture being carried with air that enters the tank through the vent. The maximum rate of this accumulation would occur during a prolonged run of the standby diesel generator when air is drawn into the tank to displace fuel used. Under the worst possible conditions on a l l
/
l 9.5-30a
l . hot humid day, approximately 110 cu ft per hour of air will enter the tank and approximately .25 lb of water per hour will be deposited. This accumulation of water will be detected by routine sampling and will be peuped out as required. 9.5.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Proper operation of the transfer pumps and the level alarm signals will be checked at scheduled intervals to assure their availability. This includes checks of the following:
- a. Normal transfer pumps start and stop automatically at the desired levels.
- b. Backup transfer pumps start and stop automatically at the desired levels.
- c. Alarm signals for high and low day tank levels function at the designated levels.
- d. Low level signals for the storage tanks function at the designated levels.
The fuel oil that supplies the emergency diesel generators is No. 2 diesel fuel oil that meets the manufacturer's specifications listed below: Maximum Minimum Viscosity, S.S.U. at 100*F 45 32
- Gravity, Deg. A.P.I. 38 26 ;;
Sulphur, % 1.05 - Ne Sulphur, Corrosion Test Pass Pass (Cooper Strip, 3 hrs. at 212*F) Conradson Carbon, % 0.20 - Ash, % 0.10 - Water & Sediment, % 0.50 - 9.5-31
- - - _ a _
Maximum Minimum i Flash Point *F (P.M.C.C.) 150 or legal Pour Point, at least 10*F below coldest fuel oil temperature DISTILLATION, 'F 90%jPoint 675 IGNITION QUALITY Cetane Number 40 { f
- Heat - determine from A.P.I. gravity limits shown to determine total or net Btu /lb or gallon.
The above specification covers fuel oils classed as Grade F.S. No. 2. The procedure for testing newly delivered fuel, periodic sampling and testing of onsite fuel, periodic inspection and periodic removal of condensate is done in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137. 9.5.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements The standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is provided with controls for automatic transfer of fuel oil from the storage tanks to the day tanks. In addition, alarms and indicators of sufficient number and at appropriate locations are provided to ensure that the operator can determine system status and operation from the control room. Details of the instrumentation and controls for the standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system are presented in Section 7.3.1. 9.5-31a
9.5.5 DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM ( The sections that follow discuss the cooling water system for the standby diesel generators. This system for the high pressure core spray (HPCS) diesel generator is discussed in Section 9.5.9.2. 9.5.5.1 Design Bases 4 ] The standby diesel generator cooling water system is designed to dissipate the heat given up by the engine air intercooler, the lube oil heat exchanger, the governor cooler and the engine water jacket heat exchanger. There are no shared systems or piping interconnections among each of the standby diesel generators cooling systems. The jacket water heat exchanger is cooled with water from the emergency service water system. Cooling for the engine water jackets, the lube oil heat exchanger, governor cooler and the engine air intercoolers are provided k with a closed loop cooling system in which treated demineralized water is used. ny This demineralized water is treated by the addition of antifreeze (ethylene $f glycol) to prevent long-term corrosion and organic fouling of the jacket water. Db Antifreeze is one of the materials recommended by the engine manufacturer. The performance and water chemistry of the diesel generator cooling water system is in conformance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Conformance with applicable GDC's is discussed in Section 3.1. Conformance with regulatory guides is discussed in Section 1.8. Conformance with Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containment, is discussed in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. The guidelines presented in Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB) have been considered in the design of this system as described in Chapter 8. i 9.5.5.2 System Description The standby diesel generator cooling water system is shown on Figure 9.5-9. The entire cooling water system is supplied as part of the diesel generator auxiliary skid. The system consists of a separate piping network for each engine that circulates 1ske water from the emergency service water system through the jacket water heat exchanger. ! 9.5-32
The engine jacket water cooling system consists of a closed loop in which denineralized water is circulated through the engine, the lube oil heat exchanger, and the jacket water heat exchanger with an engine driven centrifugal pump. It then passes through a three-way temperature control valve (R46-F507A,B) which directs the coolant through or around the engine jacket water heat exchanger, as necessary, to maintain the required water temperature. The water then returns to the pump suction and the cycle is repeated. The 100 percent capacity engine driven cooling water pump has a capacity of 1800 gpm at 43 psig discharge pressure and operates whenever the diesel generator is in operation. l The jacket water heat exchanger is a shell and tube type, with emergency service water on the tu'.,e side and diesel generator cooling water on the shell side. The tube side capacity is 1000 gpm with an inlet water temperature of I 80*F and an outlet water temperature of 129*F. The shell side capacity is 1800 gpm with an in'.et water temperature of 175*F and an outlet water i temperature of 197.8*F. N 4 9
! O The lube oil heat exchanger is a shell and tube type with diesel generator h cooling water on the tube side and lube oil on the shell side. The tube side capacity is 900 gpm with an inlet water temperature of 147.8*F and an outlet
, water temperature of 154.9*F. The shell side capacity is 500 gpm with an inlet lube oil temperature of 185*F and an outlet lube oil temperature of 156.4*F. The closed cycle system also includes a jacket water standpipe and a heating system to keep the system warm for standby purposes. The diesel engine cooling water system standpipe (expansion tank) is a 30 inch diameter vertical tank 18 feet 10 1/2 inches high, having a working water volume of 651 gallons M with the system at operating temperature. Tne standpipe is skid mounted and 9 e adjacent to the diesel engine. The heating system includes a 75 kW, 460 volt m electric heater inside the jacket water tandpipe and a motor driven pump to circulat.e warm coolant at a temperature of approximately 150*F through the 7 h A i 9.5-33 l
~
1 i d engine. A chack valve is included in the warmup line to prevent back flow during operation of the engine. The skid mounted cooling water pump, piping, valves and accessories are designed for near zero leakage during continuous operation at full load. The man,dfacturers estimate that refilling intervals with demineralized water will be approximately six months due to this slight leakage and to a small amount p; of evaporation through the atmospheric vent. The level decrease over a [VI m seven day period would therefore be approximately 2.17 inches of water height 4 or 6.64 gallons. The NPSH required for the pump is 11.5 feet. At operating temperature and with the water at the low level alarm point the NPSH available is 20.05 feet. The results of this analysis indicate that the level decrease of 2.17" over a seven day period would not impair pump performance. The keepwarm pump is of the horizontal, centrifugal type with a capacity of 9 50 gpm at 50 ft head with a three horsepower 460 volt, 3 phase, 60 hertz m motor. The motor is powered from a safety related Class IE motor control $( center. The pump may be operated with a manual control switch; however, with hk its control switch in AUTO it will operate continuously with the diesel in standby and will de-energize when the diesel comes up to speed. N The jacket water standpipe is of the horizontal cylindrical type which N v j maintains constant head on the pump and allows for expansion and bleeding of % 4 entrained air. The heater in the standpipe is an electric immersion type with an output of 18 kW. The heater is automatically operated from a temperature switch in the standpipe. The standby diesel jacket water heat exchanger will be without emergency service water flow for approximately 70 seconds from the start of the diesel generators. Ten seconds are required to bring the diesel generator up to speed and 60 seconds elapse before the sequential loading process initiates emergency service water system operation. The standby diesel engine cooling water system can operate without emergency service water for 1-1/2 minutes , I l 9.5-33a l
l l l before the maximum allowable cooling water temperature of 190*F io reached. The standby diesel cooling water system is required to remove 21,550,100 Btu /hr, and is capable of removing a maximum of 23,748,000 Btu /hr. The temperature of the cooling water coming out of the standby diesel during normal operation is approximately 175'F.
~
Control of the system is normally automatic during all modes of plant operation. f{ Details of the diesel generator starting sequence are discussed in '$b Section 8.3.1. The HPCS cooling water system is discussed in Section 9.5.9.2. 9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation The standby diesel generator cooling water system is designed in accordance with the 9.5-33b
requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and k TEMA and DEMA standards. The system is classified Safety Class 3 and Seismic M K Category 1. The standby diesel generator cooling water system is Seismic Category I. Each diesel generator set, with its attendant cooling water system, is located in a sepirate Seismic Category I structure. No non-Seismic Category I structures or components are located close enough to impair diesel generator cooling water system operation. The system meets the single failure criterion, i.e., if a failure in the system prevents the operation of the associated diesel generator, the other two divisions of the emergency power system (described in Section 8.3) will provide adequate power to safely shut down the plant or to mitigate the consequences of any of the postulated accidents. Each standby diesel generator cooling water system is cooled by a separate emergency service water system loop (see Section 9.2.1). 9.5.5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements To encure the availability of the standby diesel generator cooling water systen, scheduled inspection and testing of the equipment are performed as part of the overall engine performance checks. Instrumentation is provided to monitor cooling water temperatures and head tank level. These instruments will receive periodic coi'bration and inspection to verify their accuracy. During standby periods, th- keepwarm feature of the engine jacket water cooling closed loop syster is checked at scheduled intervals. This will ensure that the water jackets are warm enough to assist quick starting of the engine. l The cooling water in the engine jacket water closed loop system will be analyzed at regular intervals and will be treated, as necessary, to maintain the desired quality as specified by the manufacturer. 9.5-34
9.5.5.5 Instrumentation Application ! l I i The diesel generator cooling water system is provided with sensors, controls, and alarms as required to ensure complete monitoring of satisfactory system performance, safe engine operation, and to alert the plant operators to abnormal conditions requiring investigation and correctve action. The diesel generator cooling water system is instrumented as shown on Figure 9.5-9 and described below. Instrumentation and controls are provided to monitor system pressure, cooling water temperatures in and out of the engine, standpipe level, and provide automatic operation of the keepwarm .t circulating water pump and heater. To alert the plant operators to abnormal conditions which should be investigated for corrective action, alarms are provided for the following parameters:
- a. Water pressure low n/
- b. Standpipe level low d h
- c. Water into engine temperature low f,
- d. Water into engine temperature high
- e. Water from engine temperature low
- f. Water from engine temperature high
- g. Circulating water pump / heater control switch not in "AUT0"
- h. Trip of unit due to high temperature water from engine.
With the exception of item g., each parameter actuates a separate alarm on the local diesel generator control panel. The local alarm for item g. is shared with other control switches which are normally to be in an AUTO position. Actuation of any of the alarms also actuates a common diesel generator trouble alarm in the control room. During the periodic surveillance testing of the complete diesel generator unit the engine will automatically trip if the cooling water temperature from the engine exceeds 190*C This condition also actuates an alarm, b. above. 9.5-34a
l However, when the diesel generator is automatically started in response to an . l emergency signal, this trip feature is defeated but the alarms still actuate.
- This allows the plant operators to evaluate the operating condition of the engine against overall plant requirements and make a decision as to whether or not to shut down the diesel generator.
The circulating water pump is provided with controls permitting automatic or manual operation. Except for testing situations, the pump will be operated automatically. The pump controls are interlocked with the diesel generator so that under the automatic mode the pump runs continously whenever the diesel generatar is not running. The keepwarm heater control is interlocked with the hy circulating pump so that the heater cycles on and off in response to its j' thermostatic control switch only when the pump is running. When the pump is 4A not running the heater cannot be energized. Water level indication is provided on the jacket water standpipe. System pressure at the engine inlet is indicated on the local diesel generator control panel. Thermocouples in the jacket water piping feed signals corresponding to water temperature in and out of the engine to the multiple position temperature selector switch on the local control panel. Though the use of this switch, which also receives signals from the combustion air intake and exhaust system and the lubricating oil system, these temperatures may be displayed on the digital temperature meter on the local control panel. Another set of thermocouples in the jacket water piping feed water temperature in and out of the engine signals to a slow speed recorder in the local control panel. This recorder operates continously and provides documentation of important engine temperatures for performance monitoring, trending and engine diagnostics. 9.5-34b
Each redundant diesel generator starting system train is capable of providing five cranking start cycles, each with a duration of three seconds. Each air compressor is capable of recharging one air receiver tank from minimum (200 psig) to maximum (250 psig) starting air pressure in 28 minutes. The,' air compressors are reciprocating, two stage, air cooled type with a capacity of 84 scfm at a discharge pressure of 250 psig and a 30 horsepower
- motor.
The compressors may be operated with manual control switches; however, they normally are operated automatically by pressure switches which sense the air pressure from the respective receiver tanks. The pressure switches start and stop the compressors, as necessary, to maintain the desired system pressure range. The after coolers are the air cooled type and are provided downstream of each compressor to cool the compressor discharge air temperature prior to entering $ the air dryer. The compressed air passes on the tube side of the cooler, and K cooling air is fan-blown over the finned tubes. Each aftercooler operates continuously in conjunction with its respective compressor. An air-to-air aftercooler is provided on the downstream side of both the diesel and motor-driven starting air compressors to cool the compressed air prior to entering the air dryer. The compressed air passes on the tube side of the cooler and cooling air is fan-blown over the finned tubes. Each aftercooler operates continuously in conjunction with its respective Compressor. Each starting air dryer assembly consists of a prefilter, two dehydrator towers, an afterfilter, and the interconnecting piping and valves which control the air flow to each tower. Each air dryer assembly processes 77 scfm of air at 140*F and 250 psig through one of the two available dehydrator towers which contain desiccant to remove moisture. While one tower dries the air, the other tower is purged with a portion of the dried air to reactivate the dessicant. An automatic control system provided with the air dryer 9.5-36
assembly reverses the modes of the towers on a timed basis, thus ensuring the air is dried with freshly regenerated dessicant. The air dryer reduces the starting air dewpoint to -40* F at 250 psig. The prefilter removes entrained water from the air entering the air dryer and the afterfilter removes any dessicant which may become airborne during drying.
~
The dessicant type air dryer was chosen over the refrigeration type air dryer for a number of reasons. The dessicant type air dryer typically produces a
; lower air dew point temperature in the range of -40* F; the refrigeration type dryer dew point temperature is limited to 35* F, which is not sufficient in I colder temperature climates. The dessicant air dryer also is more reliable,
.while the refrigeration type dryer requires a periodic replacement of the k refrigeration unit, which can become suddenly inoperative. Finally, the dessicant air dryer is very simplistic in design, the only active components being electrical controls and a purge valve.'
4 The air receiver tanks are 305 ft.3, horizontal, cylindrical type with a design pressure of 275 psig at 250* F. l Control of the system is normally automatic during all modes of plant operation. Following receipt of the start signal, starting air is admitted to the power cylinders and the cranking cycle duration is approximately one
! engine revolution.
Details of the diesel generator starting sequence are discussed in Section 8.3.1. The HPCS starting air system is discussed in Section 9.5.9.3. The performance of the diesel generator starting system filters and strainers for the standby diesel generators is monitored by a pressure sensor located in each of the starting air lines, just upstream of the solenoid valves which admit air to the air header on the engine. The pressure sensors detect pressure downstream of the final strainer in the sys'em and signal an alarm on-the engine control panel when starting air pressure.is low. The filters and strainers are manually checked for cleanliness during routine testing and inspection. , 9.5-36a
u Details of the instrumentation and controls for the standby diesel generator 9o air start system are discussed in Section 7.3.1. % 4 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluttion Each standby diesel generator set, with its attendant starting air system, is
~
located in a separate Seismic Category I structure. No non-Seismic Category I structures or components are located close enough to impair diesel generator starting system operation. a Essential components of the standby diesel generator starting air system are designed in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler j and Pressure Vessel Code. The system is classified Safety Class 3 and Seismic g Category I from the check valve upstream of the receiver tanks to the connection at the diesel engine. The system is non-safety from the . compressors to the check valve upstream of the receiver tanks. The components located on the standby diesel generator skid are manufactured to DEMA standards. l The starting air facilities for each of the standby diesel engines are t completely redundant with each redundant section capable of supplying enough i air for a minimum of five engine starts. The capacity of the starting air 3 system will provide cranking capacity for five cranking cycles, each with a duration of three seconds. The system can be recharged from minimum starting i air pressure to maxumum starting air pressure within 30 minutes. i, 1 J
, 9.5-36b
The starting air facilities for each of the standby diesel engines are completely redundant with each redundant section capable of supplying enough air for a minimum of five engine starts. The capacity of the starting air system will provide cranking capacity for five cranking cycles, each with a duration of three seconds. The system can be recharged from minimum starting air pressure to maxumum starting air pressure within 30 minutes. p i 1 9.5-36c
)
l If starting air pressure at the engine from either of the two redundant sections drops beslow the required minimum alarms are annunciated both in the main control room and at the local diese) control panel. 9.5.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Proper operation of the air compressors, aftercoolers, dryers, system low pressure alarms and the engine air admission valves will be checked at scheduled intervals to assure their availability. The following will be checked:
- a. System pressure control pressure switches automatically start and stop the compreasors, as required, to maintain the desired pressure range in their respective receiver tanks.
9 9
- b. Low pressure alarm signals for low air pressure to the engine are lfY actuated at the designated pressure.
- c. Engine air admission valves function properly in response to the engine start control.
- d. Pressure gauges on the receiver tanks indicate accurately.
5 9.5-37
The circulating lube oil picks up heat from the diesel engine and rejects it to the lube oil heat exchanger. The lube oil heat exchanger is of the shell and tube type in which coolant from the standby diesel generator jacket water system flows through the tubes, ) and oil flows through the shell as controlled by the thermostatic control
~
valve in the standby diesel generator jacket water system to cool the heated lube oil. The system has been designed and fabricated by the standby diesel manufacturer to provide proper cooling for the lube oil heat exchanger. The tube side capacity of the heat exchanger is 960 gpm with an inlet water temperature of 147.8 F and an outlet water ten:perature of 154*F. The shell side capacity is 500 gpm with sn inlet lube oil temperature of 185*F and an outlet lobe oil temperature of 156.4*F. The engine driven lube oil pump has a capacity of 500 gpm at 60 psig discharge pressure and operates whenever the diesel generator is in operation. The lube oil sump tank is a cylindrical, two partitioned, atmospheric type with a capacity of 450 gallons. The system also includes a standby preheating system to keep the engine ready for fast start operation. It consists of a positive displacement keepwarm pump with a 15 HP, 460 volt, 3 phase, 60 hertz, motor, which takes oil from the suap through an electric heater, and directs it through a filter, the engine bearings and back to the sump. The pump has a capacity of 90 gpm with f4 a discharge head of 15 psi. The motor is powered from a safety related { Class IE motor control center. The keepwarm pump may be operated with a manual control switch; however, with its control switch in AUTO it will operate continuously with the diesel in g standby and will de-energize when the diesel comes up to speed. 1 h The heater in the lube oil is an electric inanersion type with an output of 18 kW and is automatically operated from a temperature switch in the heater assembly to maintain the circulating lube oil at a temperature of approximately 150*F. 9 . 5 ~,9
. The lube oil system is provided with various filters and strainers to maintain the required quality of the lube oil during engine operation. The filters are changed and the strainers are cleaned in accordance with the manufacturer's I
-instructions to assure an adequate supply of clean oil to the engine.
s4 Details of the diesel generator starting sequence are discussed in
~
i Section 8.3.1. The HPCS lube oil sy:. tem is discussed in Section 9.5.9.4. 9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation The standby diesel generator lubrication system is an integral part of the diesel generator. The system meets the single failure criterion, since if a failure in this system prevents the satisfactory operation of the associated , , diesel generator, the other two divisions of the standby power system (described in Section 8.3) will provide adequate power to safety shut down the plant or to mitigate the consequence of any of the postulated accidents. There are no shared systems or piping interconnections betreen systems. The standby diesel generator lubrication system for each diesel is cooled by a separate, redundant safety related cooling water system (see Section 9.5.5): The design and fabrication of the standby diesel generator lubrication system are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and 4: Pressure Vessel Code, the National Fire Protection Association Standard 37 and g DEMA Standards. The standby diesel generator lubrication system is classified Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category 1. No protective interlocks in the lubrication system will preclude standby diesel generator operation during emergency operations. 9.5-39a
9.5.8 DIESEL GENERATOR COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEM 9.5.8.1 Design Bases The standby and high pressure core spray (HPCS) diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system supplies air of reliable quality to the standby and'HPCS diesel generators and exhausts the products of combustion from the diesel generators to the atmosphere. The system is designed so that each standby and HPCS diesel generator has its own separate and independent i coubustion air intake and exhaust system. Also, failure of any one component on one combustion air intake and exhaust system does not lead to the loss of function of more than one diesel generator. , The standby and HPCS diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is safety related from the inlet filter to the exhaust blowoff hatch. The j exhaust silencer is non-safety related since any blockage of the silencer would be automatically bypassed through the blowoff hatch. The system design conforms with the requirements of GDC's 1, 2, 4, 5 and 17 (see Section 3.1). Guidance presented in Regulatory Guides 1.26, 1.29, 1.68, 1.102 and 1.117 has i been considered in the design of the system. The degree of conformance with these regulatory guides is discussed in Section 1.8. Conformance with Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as relates to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containment, is discussed in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. The guidelines presented in Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB) have also been considered in the design of this system as discussed in Chapter 8. The standby and HPCS diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is classified as Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I, except for the crankcase vent lines and exhaust silencers which are non-safety related. The system is 'rs designed in accordance with NFPA-37 and DEMA Standards. h 2 i 9.5.8.2 System Description Each standby and HPCS diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust i system consists of two air intake filters, two air intake silencers, expansion 9.5-41
1 1 l joints, exhaust blowoff hatch, exhaust silencer and associated piping and valves connecting the equipment. Combustion air at a rate of 14,078 scfm (each filter) is drawn through 50 percent capacity oil bath type air intake filters located in louvered cubicles on the diesel generator building roof. These filters clean the ambient air for admittance to the diesel generator. The air then passes through skid mounted 50 percent capacity tubular duct type inlet silencers located in the diesel generator room. These silencers are provided to reduce the noise level in the diesel generator room. N Before being relased to the atmosphere, diesel generator exhaust passes y through a spark arresting type exhaust silencer at a rate of 30,500 scfm. The (j tw silencer is mounted on the diesel generator roof and is provided to reduce the qi noise level in the vicinity outside the diesel generator building. The blowoff hatch, located in the exhaust line on the diesel generator building roof, is provided for exhaust line overpressure protection. Details of the standby diesel generator starting sequence are discussed in Section 8.3.1. The intake and exhaust systems contain no flow control devices (louvers, dampers). The standby and HPCS diesel intake and exhaust systems are shown in Figures 9.5-12, 9.5-13 and 9.5-14, and the layout arrangement is shown in Figures 1.2-6 and 1.2-13. 9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation Each standby and HPCS diesel generator is provided with a completely separate and independent combustion air intake and exhaust system. These systems are not redundant since there are three divisions of the emergency power system (see Section 8.3). The elevation of this system is well above the maximum ; flood design water level (see Section 3.4). l l 9.5-42 l l
Arrangement and location of combustion air intake and exhaust, as shown in Figures 1.2-6 and 1.2-13, are such that the dilution or contamination of intake air by-exhaust products will not preclude the operation of the standby and HPCS diesel generators. Recirculation of standby and HPCS diesel engine , combustion products t o the air intakes is prevented by locating the exhaust stac,ks at a higher elevation away from the intakes. Since hot exhaust gases rise and disperse, recirculation into the intakes cannot occur. The 4 accidental release of onsite stored gases (CO 2and H )2 in the yard (see J Table 2.2-10) will not affect the performance of the diesel generators. The maximum concentration of these gases at the diesel generator air intake was calculated assuming total release of the stored inventory in accordance to Regulatory Guide 1.78 and are as follows: Stored Gas Stored Inventory Gas Concentration 02@ Intake f in Yard % by Vol. % by Vol. k
- L CO 2
4 t ns 7.5 19.4 3 H 2 7,387 ft 5.5 19.8 i The required oxygen content at the diesel air intake to ensure no degradation of the diesel generator performance is 18 percent by volume,'which is i equivalent to a gas concentration at the intake of 14.3 percent by volume. The only plant carbon aioxide fire extinquishing systems in the vicinity of the emergency diesel generator air intakes ara located within the diesel generator rooms and in the control complex. If the carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system is activated for the chart storage room in the control complex, or in a diesel generator room, the fire dampers for the repsective room are automatically closed and the area isolated to prevent air, smoke or h carbon dioxide from being exhausted. The isolated area will ' remain isolated 6 T. until the fire is controlled and it is determined that gases can be-safety 4 vented from the isolated area. In the diesel generator room, the gases are y vented from the exhaust outlets, which are remote from the air intake vents S and at a higher elevation, as described above. In the chart storage room the gases can be purged, when necessary, by using a portable blower. 4 9.5-42a
If a single failure of the fire protection system occurs in the chart storage room, the fire barrier would contain the fire for the required three hours. If Of smoke and/or gases would be free to escape from the room, the vents are vented ~ to the Unit I hallway and are rated at 50 cfm. The smoke and gases could then g; be handled by the control complex habitability systems, as discussed in Section 6.4. Os
. E d
Any gases released from an isolated area would be a less critical situation than (( described above by a single release from the onsite storage of gases. 4 l 9.5-42b
If a postulated fire would occur in the 500,00 gallon fuel oil storage tank located above. ground over 650 f t from the intakes, it would be coni. rolled using a foam extinguishing system discussed in Section 9.5.1. Foam is composed of water, foam concentrate and air. The concentrate is proportioned with water at a 3 to 4 percent concentration and air is induced into the resulting solution to form foam bubbles. The foam bubbles form an extinguishing blanket which excludes oxygen from the seat of the fire and extinguishes it. No carbon dioxide is involved or generated in the extinguishing process. An analysis made of the actual burning process, assuming ideal combustion, results in a carbon dicxide generation rate of 4,270 lb/ min. The total combustion gases would be approximately 20,900 lb/ min. Very high flame temperature in the vicinity of 3,000*F would exist during such a fire. The large temperature difference between the fire and the atmosphere would cause a significant stack effect. Under low wind conditions, the stack effect could be several thousand feet and would not drop below several hundred feet with higher winds over 39.6 ft/sec. The results of assuming the minimum stack effect and a 12 m/sec wind speed indicates a maximum gas concentration at the
-22 lb/ min. of combustion products. Slower wind speeds intakes of 5.45 x 10 would result in lower concentration due to the higher stack effect.
It has been determined that the postulated fire in the 500,000 gallon fuel oil j storage tank described above would be the most critical case in reference to the diesel generator air intake quality and other postulated fires, including 'g the ESF transformers. The essential system components exposed to atmospheric conditions such as ice and snow are protected from possible clogging during standby or operation of the system. The essential portions of'the system are housed within Seismic Category I structures provided with louvers. The standby and HPCS diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system components and piping are , protected from missiles, pipe whip and jet impingement that might result from piping cracks or breaks. Refer to Sections 3.5 and 3.6 for a discussion of 1 9.5-43
The ingestion of dust and other deleterious materials into the combusticn air system is precluded by the use of an air filter on the combustion air intake lines of the standby and HPCS diesel generators. O There will be little concrete dust generated. During construction, the y m conc [reteisdeliveredpremixedtotheplantandafterpouringandcuring,the 4 c9acrete is painted to protect its finish. Any concrete dust generated by hammering, grinding, etc., on already poured concrete will be treated as described above. 9.5.8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Each system is tested in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations during initial tests and operation. The standby and HPCS diesel generators will be operated every month for periodic testing. Operation of air intake and exhaust system components is verified during this testing. Additional inspection, checkout and maintenance ace performed as required. 9.5.8.5 Instrumentation Applications l T'he diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is instrumented 3 as shown on Figure 9.5-12. A pressure indicator is provided on the local diesel generator control panel which displays intake manifold air pressure. Either the left or right bank pressure may be selected for display through use of a manual slide valve. A temperature selector switch and temperature indicator are also located on the local diesel generator control panel. By using the selector switch, one of the following temperatures may be selected for display: intake N i manifold air temperature, either the left or right bank; exhaust stack gas 4 6 temperature, either the left or right bank; each individual cylinder exhaust m gas temperature. The selector switch and temperature indicator may also be used for local display of jacket water and lubrication oil temperatures. The combustion air intake and exhaust system parameters which are displayed on the local diesel generator control panel will be logged during the periodic engine testing. This information is used for engine performance monitoring, trending and engine malfunction diagnostics. 9.5-44a
9.5.9 HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DIESEL GENERATOR The sections that follow discuss the applicable high pressure core spray (HPCS) diesel generator auxiliary systems. The HPCS system power supply unit is a part of ECCS system power supplies. The HPCS diesel generator, by itself, does not meet the single failure criterion. However, this criterion is met at the system level. 9.5.9.1 HPCS Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System The sections that follow discuss the fuel oil storage and transfer system for the HPCS diesel generators. I 9.5.9.1.1 Design Bases Separate fuel oil storage and transfer facilities are provided for each of the two HPCS diesel generatort (one per unit). Diesel generator fuel oil systems . are not shared between Units 1 and 2. They are all designed to provide I, sufficient fuel oil for at least seven days of operation carrying the design j electrical load of the associated generator. This storage capacity criterion is considered adequate as discussed in Section 9.5.4.1. Tank. trucks will f, i deliver the fuel oil to a central fill station. All system components are accessible for an inservice inspection without affecting the availability of fuel to either of the HPCS diesel generators. Conformance with applicable GDC's is discussed in Section 3.1. Confo rmance with regulatory guides is discussed in Section 1.8. Conformance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, as related to fuel oil system fire protection, is detailed in a separate report ( for PNPP. Conformance with Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containment, is discussed in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. The guidelines presented in Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB) have also been considered in the design of this system, as discussed in Chapter 8. 9.5-45
1 I 9.5.9.1.2 System Description Separate diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer systems are provided for each unit of the Perry project, one for each HPCS diesel generator. Each {divisionoftheECCShasitsownseparatedieselgeneratorfueloilsystem, each of which is independent and physically separated from the other divisions. Each HPCS fuel oil storage and transfer system consists of one diesel fuel oil storage tank, one diesel fuel oil day tank, two diesel fuel oil transfer pumps, one diesel generator set and necessary piping, valves and instrumentation. A diagram of the system is shown in Figures 9.5-15. i The underground storage tank is of the horizontal type and is located outside the diesel generator building. The tank has a capacity of 39,375 gallons ! sufficient to eperate the DG for 7 days while supplying post LOCA design maximum electrical load demands. The storage tank is provided with a flame arrester which prevents the ignition of flammable vapors on one side of the arrester if the other side is exposed to an ignition source. The storage tank is internally protected with a corrosion inhibiting coating. The outside of the tank is covered with a prime coat and finish coat of paint. The day tank is located in the diesel generator building and has a capacity of 555 gallons. The day tank is fitted with a flame arrester. Two transfer pumps transport fuel between the storage tank and the day tank. The transfer pumps are located close to the day tank in the diesel generator building. Each pump motor is 15 horsepower, 460 volts, 3 phase, 60 Hz and is fed from a class IE motor control center. Each pump has a capacity of 90 gpm and a discharge head of 200 feet. The transfer pumps may all be operated with manual control switches; however, they normally are operated automatically by level switches on the day
- tanks.
A " low" level switch starts the normal pump, a " low-low" level switch starts 9.5-46
the standby pump and a "high" level stop switch is provided for both pumps. l'.
" Low-Low-Low" level switches are provided in the day tanks to stop the pumps at the minimum safe level for operation of the pumps. .An overflow line is provided from the day tank to the associated diesel fuel oil storage tank to provide a closed recirculation loop. Because the day tanks are always full, corrosion of these tanks are minimized.
The diesel oil day tanks are located inside the diesel generator building, a seismic Category I structure. The connecting diesel oil piping is physically separated from all hot surfaces or other potential ignition sources within the diesel generator room. i One fuel oil booster pump is supplied with and located on the HPCS diesel l engine. This pump, which is driven by the diesel engine, has a capacity of 4.5 gpm and a minimum discharge head of 60 psig and will be used to supply i fuel from the day tank to the diesel engine fuel injectors. During startup of the diesel generator, there is also a motor driven fuel oil injector pump which transfers fuel from the day tank to the fuel injectors. Each fuel oil l injector pump motor is 3/4 horsepower and 125 V d-c and is fed from its y respective Class IE d-c power source. Each fuel oil injector pump has a $ capacity of 4.5 gpm and a minimum discharge head of 60 psig. The injector pump turns off when the diesel attains 850 RPM. The fuel pumps (injection or booster) draw more fuel oil from the day tank than is consumed by the engine. The excess fuel is returned to the day tank by a separate return line. The transfer pump transfers more fuel oil to the day tank than the fuel pump draws out. The excess fuel is returned to the storage tank through a separate overflow line. The day tank is located above the suction elevation of the fuel oil booster pump to assure a slight positive prer sure on the booster pump inlet. A recirculation line containing a Y-type strainer is provided from the I discharge of the transfer pump back to the fill line of the associated storage tank. This line is used to clean up the fuel oil if necessary and provide a j sample tap for testing fuel oil quality. 9.5-47
The eductor inlet of each storage tank is 18 inches from the tank bottom to i prevent any sediment that accumulates from entering the day tank. A strainer ia the inlet line to the HPCS diesel generator skid and a duplex
-filter in each line from the fuel pumps to the engine are provided to remove ;
~ particulates which could hamper engine operation. To further purify the oil, f I the injector assemblies each contain strainers, one in the inlet and one in I the return line to the day tank. Maintaining the day tank full at all times ; will clso minimize the accumulation of any appreciable amount of water. A break in the fuel oil transfer line, from the transfer pump to the day tank, is detected by a low level in the day tank. The low day tank level is alarmed in the control room. A'l storage and day tanks are located at sufficient distance from the plant control room to preclude any danger to control room personnel or equipment resulting from explosion and/or fire. The diesel fuel oil is grade No. 2 in compliance with the requirements of ASTM - D975. The diesel fuel oil storage and transfer system conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.137 and ANSI N-195 with exceptions as discussed in Section 1.8. Component data for the diesel generator fuel oil system is shown in Table 9.5-3. 9.5.9.1.3 Safety Evaluation The HPCS diesel, generator fuel oil system, except for components located on the diesel generator skids, is designed in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, the National' Fire Protection Association Codes 30 and 37 and State of Ohio safety regulations. Components located on the diesel generator skids are designed and manufactured to DEMA standards. The system is classified Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I, with the exception of fuel oil waste return pumps and booster pump d-c motors, which are non-safety. 9.5-47a
l Two 100 percent capacity fuel transfer pumps are provided for filling the day { tank. The backup pump is started automatically by a " low-low" level switch in the day tank if the normal pump fails and the day tank level continues to fall. No physical interconnection of piping exists between the standby or
,'high pressure core spray diesel generator.
9.5.9.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Proper operation of the transfer pumps and the level alarm signals will be checked at scheduled intervals to assure their availability. This includes checks of the following:
- a. Normal transfer pumps start and stop automatically at the desired levels,
- b. Backup transfer pumps start and stop automatically at the desired levels.
- c. Alarm signals for high and low day tank levels function at the designated levels.
- d. Low level signals for the storage tanks function at the designated levels.
The diesel fuel oil system is designed to permit periodic testing as described in Section 8.3 and has been designed to provide accessibility to all active components for periodic inspection and maintenance. The operability of the HPCS fuel oil storage and transfer system will be demonstrated during the regularly scheduled diesel generator tests. 9.5.9.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements The HPCS diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is provided with controls for automatic transfer of fuel oil from storage tanks to the day tanks. In addition, alarms and indicators of sufficient number and at appropriate locations are provided to ensure that the operator can determine 9.5-47b
system status and operation from the control room. Details of the instrumentation and controls for the HPCS diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system are presented in Section 7.3.1.
'9.5.9.2 Division 3 HPCS Diesel Generators Cooling Water System i i
A functional block diagram which shows the relationship between the diesel generator cooling water system and the other parts of the diesel generator is to be found in Figure 9.5-16. 9.5.9.2.1 Design Bases
- a. The diesel generator cooling water system (DGCWS) is designed to remove sufficient heat from the diesel generator assembly to permit continuous operatian at maximum load. Heat removed from the DGCWS is transferred to the shutdown service water system (see Section 9.2.1).
- b. The system is designed to process the capability to provide heat to the engine to maintain it in a standby condition.
9.5.9.2.2 System Description A separate cooling water system is provided for the HPCS diesel generator. The diesel generator cooling water system is supplied as a part of the diesel generator structure, and connects to the shutdown service water system. Heat from the diesel generator in the engine jacket water cooling system is kY Q dissipated into a closed loop in which demineralized water is circulated 5 through the engine, the lube oil heat exchanger, and the turbocharger after-coolers by means of two engine driven pumps. The closed cooling water system consists of immersion heater, expansion tank, temperature regulating valve and lube oil cooler. The immersion heater is thermostatically controlled and, in conjuction with the temperature regulating valve, will maintain the jacket water at a steady temperature during standby condition. I 9.5-47c 1 l
The immersion heater _is 15 kW, 460 a-c, 3 phase, 60 Hz and is fed from its associated Class lE motor control center. During engine shutdown condition:;, jacket water heated by the immersion heater will circulate through the lube oil cooler by thermosyphon action to warm the lubricating oil which is 4
. circulated by an a-c motor-driven pump. This " keep warm" feature will provide ) *the engine with capability of quick start and load acceptance. The engine h low-temperature condition will be annunciated in the main control room.
l The closed loop water cooling system connects to an external heat exchanger l which dissipates heat to the eraergency service water system. i l The engine of the HPCS diesel generator is provided with two 50 percent capacity pumps. Both pumps are driven by the diesel engine. When the diesel 4 ! engines are in the standby condition, the cooling water is maintained at a I l constant temperature by circulating it through the separate electric immersion f, heater. The jacket water heater element is installed near a low point in the l diesel generator jacket water supply, and by natural convection circulation, i the hot water from the heater, by being le.ts dense, rises causing a natural i flow. This flow causes a thermosyphon effect drawing water over the heater, I i which is set to turn on at 125'F and shut of f at 155"F. The heat conduction
- from the water channels and the engine will keep the lube oil as well as the j engine block warm. Operating experience has demonstrated that a motor driven Jacket water " keep warm" pump is not necessary. This " keep warm" feature l
helps to provide the engine with high reliability and enhances its capability l of quick start and load acceptance. The immersion heater is thermostatically controlled and operates in conjunction with a temperature controlled l regulating valve. Natural circulation of the cooling water is used for the l diesel generators. i l The HPCS DGCWS also provides a sufficient heat sink to permit a hot HPCS l diesel engine to start and operate for 2 minutes without standby service water i flow through the DGCWS heat exchanger. Standby service water flow through the HPCS diesel generator DGCWS heat exchangers begins 10 seconds af ter the generator supplies power to the bus. Power is supplied to the bus 10 seconds after the HPCS generator start signal. Therefore, the additional time during 1
)
l 9.5-47d
i-l- I which the HPCS diesel engines could operate without standby service water flow, the time margin, is 1 minute, 40 seconds. The DGCWS can be vented to ensure that the entire system is filled with water. l
.'The diesel generator is treated as appropriate to preclude long term corrosion ,
and organic fouling. Because of the potential environmental consequences involved with chromates, a nitrite type inhibitor is used in all diesels. , Demineralized water is used for makeup to the cooling water system. In the unlikely event that both the immersion heater and the diesel generator ventilation system fail, with concurrent severe weather conditions, ethylene ;); glycol antifreeze can be added per manufacturer's recommendations. Since j$ failure of these support systems would render a diesel generator inoperable, l' 4s without corrective action, station technical specifications would-provide adequate assurance that action would be taken. These additives are compatible with the carbon steel material construction of the cooling water system for diesels. Water chemistry complies with generally accepted water quality standards of the industry. A diagram of the diesel generator cooling wa ter system is shown in I Figure 9.5-16. Component data for the diesel generator cooling water system j is shown in Table 9.5-4. l 0 9.5.9.2.3 Safety Evaluation I The HPCS diesel generator cooling water system, except for components located l l on the diesel generator skids, is designed in accordance with the requirements - of Section III of the ASMI Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Components located on the diesel generator skids, are designed to DEMA standards.
- The HPCS diesel generator cooling water system is Seismic Category I. Each diesel generator set, with its attendant cooling water system, is located in a sep'arate Seismic Category I structure. No non-Seismic Category I structures or components are located close enough to mpair diesel generator cooling.
The system is classified Safety Class 3, detailed in Section 3.2. 9.5-47e <
During the standby condition of the diesel generators, the engine cooling water is heated and circulated to facilitate a quick engine start. Failure of the warming system is annunciated by a cooling water low temperature alarm in ; the diesel generator room and by a trouble alarm in the control room. !
'9.5.9.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements To ensure the availability of the HPCS diesel generator cooling water system, scheduled inspection and testing of the equipment are performed as part of the overall engine performance checks. Instrumentation is provided to monitor cooling water temperatures and head tank level. These instruments will receive periodic calibration and inspection to verify their accuracy.
] During standby periods, the keep warm feature of the engine jacket water j cooling closed loop system is checked at scheduled intervals. This will ensure that the water jackets are warm enough to assist quick starting of the engine. Toe cooling water in the engine jacket water closed loop system will oc analyzed at regular intervals and will be treated, as necessary, to maintain the desired quality as specified by the manufacturer. The diesel generator cooling water system is designed to permit periodic testing and inspection of all components. Periodic testing is described in Section 8.3.1. The cooling water system operability will be demonstrated during the regularly scheduled tests of the diesel generators. The frequency of these tests is given in Section 16.3. The system will be hydrostatically tested prior to initial startup. The cooling water will be sampled and analyzed periodically to verify that its quality meets the diesel manufacturer's recommendations. 9.5-47f
9.5.9.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements i Instrumentation for each diesel generator cooling water system consists of two i locally mounted temperature switches in the engine outlet line. The first [ switch is used to alarm on the local control panel in the event of high coolant temperature. The second switch is used to automatically shut down the engine in the event of high-high coolant terperature. This trip is bypassed on a LOCA start s,ignal. A diesel generator trouble alarm actuates in the main control room if any of the alarms on the panel annunciates. A list of alarms used in the diesel generator water cooling system is provided in Section 8.3.1.1.3.3. 9.5.9.3 Division 3 HPCS Diesel Generator Air Starting System i A functional block diagram which shows the relationships between the diesel j generator air starting system and the other parts of the diesel generator is l to be found in Figure 9.5-24. 9.5.9.3.1 Design Bases I
- a. The diesel generator starting systems for the HPCS diesel engine is f
provided with independent and redundant starting trains, with each train capable of starting its respective engine five times without re:harging the associated air receiver,
- b. T1. starting system initiates an engine start so that within 10 seconds af ter receipt of the start signal the diesel generator is operating at rated speed, voltage, and frequency.
- c. The portions of the starting system essential to the starting of a diesel engine are of Seismic Category I design. The entire diesel generator starting system is housed within a Seismic Category I structure capable of protecting the system from extreme natural phenomena, missiles, and the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement and water spray from high- and 9.5-4?g i
l 1 l moderate-energy pipe breaks (Sections 3.5 and 3.6). The diesel generator starting system is a Safety Class 3 and quality group as described in Section 3.2 and detailed in Table 3.2-1. .
- d. The DG starting system meets IEEE 323 and IEEE 344 as described in Sections 3.11 and 3.10. Detailed summaries of qualification data are provided in the tables in Sections 3.11 and 3.10.
- e. Conformance with applicable GDC's is discussed in Sectica 3,1.
Conformance with applicable regulatory guides is discussed in Section 1.8. Conformance with Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containment, is discussed in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. The guidelines presented in Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB) have been considered in the design of this system as described in Chapter 8. 9.5.9.3.2 System Description Separate diesel generator air starting systems are provided for each unit of the Perry project, one for each HPCS diesel generator. Each division of the k ECCS has its own separate diesel generator air starting system, each of which g is independent and physically separated from other divisions. The starting system for the diesel generator is rhown in Figure 9.5-24 and consists of the following components and associated piping, valves, and controls:
- a. Starting air compressors,
- b. Starting air receivers, and bs 5
'5
- c. Starting air motors. $
i 9.5-47h i
Table 9.5-5 contains the applicable data for these components. A starting system consisting of two redundant trains is provided. Each train contains , 1 one air receiver connected to one starting air motor system. The two air ; I receivers are charged by an individual compressor associated with that
-particular air receiver. The Division 3 compressors have 7 1/2 horsepower, 575 V a-c, 3 phase, 60 hertz electric motor drives. Each compressor is fed from its associated Class IE motor control center. One of the compressors is driven from a separate diesel engine, the other has an electric motor driver fed from the HPCS bus. The air is delivered to the air receiver by the air compressors where it is stored at rated pressure (250 psi) until it is :.eeded to start the diesel engine. This allows moisture in the air to precipitate in the bottom of the tank. The engine start system connection is located away from the bottom so that moisture in the tank will not be carried in the air ,%
S l being supplied to the air start motors. Blowdown valves are provided in the bottom of the air receivers to drain any moisture that may have collected in y the bottom. The blowdown valves will be opened periodically on a suitable { maintenance schedule to blow moisture out of the tank. The requirement for this periodic maintenance is called for in the diesel generator instruction manual. With this scheduled maintenance program, moisture in the air tanks will not affect the air start system. To minimize the problems of particle carry over, wye strainers are provided in the start system piping. Inspection {, and cleaning of the system components will be made after the initial runs !k s during the installation period. It is expected that after the initial trial runs, all loose particles will either collect at the strainer or get blown out. Both compressors operate in response to system pressure switches and start automatically when the system pressure drops to 200 psig, and shut off , when the air pressure reaches 250 psig. ; On receipt of the engine start signal, (whether in normal or emergency start) a normally closed solenoid valve is opened and air flows to the piston for the pinion gear of the lover motor. The entry of air moves the pinion gear forward to engage with the engine ring gear. Hovement of the pinion gear uncovers a port, allowing air pressure to be released to the upper motor pinion gear piston which in turn engages its pinion gear with the engine ring gear. Full engagement of the upper pinion gear permits air flow to the air , 9.5-47i
l l
! l valve which in turn opens the air starting valve and releases the main starting air supply. Starting air passes through the air line lubricator, releasing an oil air mist into the starting motors. The motors drive the l pinion gears, rotating the ring gear and cranking the engine. Only two of the - air motor pinions neen to be engaged to the flywheel ring gear of each diesel cngine to start the engine in the required time. However, all four of the air motor pinions are engaged to the flywheel simultaneously to improve starting reliability. The engine will normally start with one bank of dual air starting motors. However, to ensure positive starting, both solenoids are energized simultaneously and both banks of dual starting motors crank the engine.
The following measures have been taken in the design of the diesel generator starting systems to preclude the fouling of the air start valve or filter with moisture and contaminants such as oil carry-over and rust,
- a. The air for the diesel is delivered to the air receiver by the air compressors where it is stored at rated pressure until required to start the diesel engine. The volume of the receiver allows sufficent time for moisture and oil to precipitate in the bottom of the tank. The y connection to the engine start system is located far enough above the S9 bottom so that the moisture in the bottom will not get carried in the air b being supplied to the air start motors. Blowdown valves are provided in the bottom of the air receivers to drain any moisture that might have collected in the bottom. The blowdown valves are opened periodically on a suitable maintenance schedule to blow moisture out of the tank.
- b. The air start s/ stem is completely redundant. Failure of one system will not prevent the other system from starting.
- c. Wye strainers are provided in the air start system piping to filter any particulate carryover. Inspection and cleaning of the system components are made after the initial trial runs during installation. It is expected that after the initial trial runs, all loose particles will either collect or get blown out.
9.5-47j
- d. Fouling of the air start valve by oil carryover tu precluded by the air lubricator being located downstream of the air start valve.
9.5.9.3.3 Safety Evaluation Furthermore, the diesel generator air starting system has two redundant air start component trains to provide redundancy. Essential components of the HPCS diesel generator starting air system are designed in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The system is classified Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I from the check valve upstream of the receiver tanks. The components located on the HPCS diesel generator skid are manufactured to DEMA standards. Each HPCS diesel generator set, with its attendant starting air system, is located in a separate Seismic Category I structure. No non-Seismic Category I structures or components are located closed enough to impair diesel generator starting system operation. The system is classified Safety Class 3 as detailed in Section 3.2. The starting air facilities for the diesel engine are completely redundant with each redundant section capable of supplying enough air for a minimum of five engine starts. The capacity of the starting air system will provide cranking capacity for five cranking cycles, per train under a no load [ l condition without operation of the compressors, each with a duration of %y three seconds. The system can be recharged from minimum starting air pressure 4 to maximum starting air pressure within 30 minutes. The control panel for the diesel generator has an indicator light to signal low starting air pressure in the system. (see Section 8.3.1.1.3.3, item b. 10). r 9.5-47k
1 l There are no cross connections between the starting air systems of the diesel generator units - the loss of one diesel generator and its associated i md group will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. l lTheairstartsystemairreceivers(storagetanks)arepr)videdwithdrains which may be opened periodically to remove moisture or oil carry-over which may have accumulated from the starting air compressors. This minimizes formation of rust within the system. In addition, the system piping for the HPCS diesel generator is provided with an air filter installed before the starting air solenoid valve, is installed at an elevation lower than the engine inlet, and has a drip leg to provide for removal of any water which may be present in the lines. The HPCS diesel generator starting air piping system is provided with a strainer before the starting air solenoid valve, which removes particulates and allows for periodic draining of water present in the lines. 9.5.9.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 1
; The starting system is designed to permit periodic testing and inspection of all components.
i j The system operability will be demonstrated during the regularly scheduled tests of the diesel generators. The frequency of these tests is given in ] Section 16.3. The system will be hydrostatically tested prior to initial startup. Further discussion of the periodic testing requirements is provided 1 in Section 8.3.1. l Proper operation of the air compressors, aftercoolers, dryers, system low ] pressure alarms and the engine air admission valves will be checked at scheduled intervals to assure their availability. The following will be checked:
- a. System pressure control pressure switches automatically start and stop the compressors, as required, to maintain the desired pressure range in their respective receiver tanks.
i 9.5-471
- b. Low pressure alarm signals for low receiver tank pressure and low air pressure to the engine are actuated at the designated pressures. j
- c. Engine air admission valves function properly in response to the engine .
start control.
- d. Pressure gauges on the receiver tanks indicate accurately.
9.5.9.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements Instrumentation for each diesel generator starting system consists of two locally mounted pressure switches which monitor the air pressure in the air receiver tanks. One air pressure switch automatically starts the a-c power air compressor when pressure drops to 200 psig, and stops the compressor when ry pressur? rises to 250 psig. The other pressure switch is used to give a low l7$ pressure alarm on the local control panel, and input to the common trouble 4s alarm in the main control room. If this alarm annunciates and the compressors have not automatically started at the required pressure, they will be manually started from the local control panel. 9.5.9.4 Division 3 HPCS Diesel Generator Lubr. cation System A functional block diagram which shows the relationships between the diesel generator lubrication system and c:her parts of the diesel generator is to be found in Figure 9.5-25. 9.5.9.4.1 Design Bases
- a. The diesel generator lubrication system is designed to supply lube oil to the engine bearings and moving parts at controlled pressure, temperature and cleanliness conditions.
- b. The lubrication system includes a keepwarm feature, and a circulating oil subsystem. The keepwarm feature maintains the lube oil temperature in a ready condition. The circulating oil subsystem pre-lubricates the turbocharger bearings.
9.5-47m
- c. Each lubrication system is of Seismic Category I design and is housed within a separate Seismic Category I structure capable of protecting the ,
system from extreme natural phonomena, missiles, and the effects of pipe , s whip or jet impingement f rom high- and moderate-energy pipe breaks. l
- d. Conformance with applicable GDC's is discussed in Section 3.1.
Conformance with applicable regulatory guides is discussed in Section 1.8. Conformance with Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and HEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high- and moderate-energy piping systems outside containment, is discussed in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. Conformance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 is detailed in a separate report (I) for PNPP. (e) The diesel generator lubrication system is Seismic Category I, Safety { Class 3. The system is described in Section 3.2 and is detailed in Table 3.2-1. e I-9.5.9.4.2 System Description I A separate diesel generator lubrication system is provided for each of the : i HPCS diesel generators. The diesel generator lubrication system consists of ! I lube oil pumps, lube oil sump pan, lube oil heat exchanger and lube oil heater together with associated piping, valves, filters, strainer and controls. The k lube oil sump for the HPCS diesel engine is integral with the engine. The 4 lube oil is warmed through the main lube oil heat exchanger while in standby. The detailed arrangement is shown in Figure 9.5-25. Table 9.5-6 contains applicable data for the above components. The system provides lubricating oil to all moving parts of the diesel engine and rejects the heat picked up during circulation to the diesel cooling water system via the lube oil heat exchanger. The diesel engine coo:ing water system is designed to absorb all the heat carried from the engine by the lube oil system. The thermal characteristics and design margin of the cooling water system are shown in Table 9.5-4. No external cooling is needed for the lube oil system. 9.5-47n
l i l 9.5.9.4.3 Safety Evaluation i The HPCS diesel generator lubrication system is an integral part of the diesel
, generator. There are no shared systems or piping interconnections between - systems. The HPCS diesel generator lubrication system is cooled by the HPCS diesel generator cooling water system (see Section 9.5.5).
Components of the HPCS diesel generator lubrication system are entirely located on the diesel generator skids and are designed to DEMA standards and Seismic Category I requirements. They are also designed, rabricated, and tested in accordance with NFPA Standard 37. No protective interlocks in the lubrication system will preclude HPCS diesel generator operation during emergency operations. The lubrication system is designed to Seismic Category I requirements and is housed inside a Seismic Category I Structure. During the standby condition of the diesel generator, the lubricating oil is warmed by the circulating water and circulated by the pre-lube pump to facilitate a quick engine start. Failure of the warming system is annunciated by a lube oil low-temperature alarm in the diesel generator room and by a trouble alarm in the control room. 9.5.9.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The diesel lubrication system is tested and inspected along with the overall engine during scheduled testing of the engine. Instrumentation is provided to , ensure proper operation of the system by monitoring the lube oil temperature, pressure and sump level. During standby periods, the keepwarm feature of the system is checked at scheduled intervals. This will ensure that the oil is warm enough for quick starting of the engine. 9.5-47o
Leakage from the HPCS diesel generator lubrication system will be detected by I lube oil pressure and sump level instrumentation, or visual inspection of the ; system. Lube oil filters and strainers are duplex type to allow for inservice
. cleaning or replacement.
The lubrication system is designed to permit testing and inspection of all components. The diesel engine lubrication system operability will be demonstrated during the regularly scheduled tests of the diesel generator. The frequency of these tests is given in Section 16.3. The system will be hydrostatically tested prior to initial startup. The lube oil will be sampled and analyzed once every 3 months to verify that it can adequately perform its function (i.e., that it meets the specification for diesel engine lube oil laid down by the manufacturer). Methods of periodic testing are described in Section 8.3.1. 9.5.9.4.5 Instrumentation Application The following instrumentation is provided to monitor the lubrication system for the HPCS diesel engine. The outlet from the turbofilter has three pressure switches. The first switch is used as crank lockout to prevent engine start when . - lube oil pressure is present. The second switch is used N gs to alarm low lube oi pressurr Jn the local control panel and input to the common trouble alarm in the tcin control room. The third switch is used to shut down the engine in the event of low-low lube oil pressure except if a LOCA or ECCS signal is present. The engine sump is monitored by a level switch and a pressure switch. The level switch is used for low oil level alarm. The pressure switch is used for high crankcase pressure alarm. Both alarms are on the local control panel and the common trouble alarm in the main cont-ol room. The engine turbocharger is monitored by a presnure switch which alarms on low oil pressure. This alarm is on the local control panel and the common trouble I alarm is in the main control room. , 9.5-47p
I v The lube oil filter is equipped with a differential pressure switch. This l ! switch is used for alarm of a clogged oil filter. This alarm is on the local control panel and also has input to the common trouble alarm in the main control room. Oil from the oil cooler is monitored by two temperature switches. The first 7 switch is used to give an alarm for low lube oil temperature on the local control panel and input to the common trouble alarm in the main control room. The second switch is used for alarm of high lube oil temperature on the local control panel and input to the common trouble alarm in the main control room. Alarm indicators are described in Section 8.3.1.1.3.3., item b. 10. 9.5.9.5 Division 3 HPCS Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System A functional block diagram which shows the relationship of the diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system to other parts of the diesel generator is to be found in Figure 9.5-26. 9.5.9.5.1 Design Bases
- a. The diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is capable of supplying reliable quality air to the diesel engine and exhausting the products of combustion to the atmosphere.
I
- b. The combustion air intake and exhaust system is of Seismic Category I design. The safety related portions of the system are housed within a separate Seismic Category I structure capable of protecting the system from extreme natural phenomena, missiles, and the effects of pipe whip or jet -impingement from high- and moderate-energy pipe breaks. The piping is classified as Safety Class 3.
1 l 9.5-47q
a
- c. The HPCS diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is l classified as Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I, except for the crankcase vent lines and exhaust silencers which are non-safety related.
The system is designed in accordance with NFPA-37. Further compliance is described in Section 3.2 and Table 3.2.1.
- d. The HPCS diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is safety related from the inlet filter to the exhaust blowoff hatch. The exhaust silencer is non-safety grade since any blockage of the silencer would be automatically bypassed through the blowoff hatch. The system design conforms with the requirements of GDC's 1, 2, 4, 5 and 17 (see Section 3.1). Guidance presented in Regulatory Guides 1.26, 1.29, and 1.68 has been considered in the design of the system. The degree of conformance with these regulatory guides is discussed in Section 1.8.
Conformance with Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high- and moderate-energy piping systems outside containment, is discussed in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. The guidelines presented in Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB) have also been considered in the design of this system as discussed in Chapter 8. 9.5.9.5.2 System Description The HPCS diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system consists of an air intake filter, air intake silencer, expansion joints, exhaust blowoff hatch, exhaust silencer and associated piping and valves connecting the equipment. N 9 An independent combustion air intake and exhaust system is provided for each jf HPCS diesel generator. The system components are sized and physically 4 arranged such that.no degradation of the operation of the engine will occur when the diesel is required to continuously operate at rated output. Table 9.5-8 contains the applicable data for the above components. The combustion air intake and exhaust system provides filtered ambient air to the diesel engine for combustion and exhausts the products of combustion to l 9.5-47r l
the atmosphere. Air for th: combustion is taken from a missile protected air { intake cubicle separate from the diesel generator room. All of the air intake and exhaust components, except the exhaust silencer, are located inside the diesel generato:- building which provides protection from extreme environmental [ phenomena. The exhaust silencer is not required for diesel operation and is therefore located on the roof vf the diesel generator building with respect to other site components. The HPCS diesel intake and exaanst system is shown in Figures 9.5-13 and 9.5-14, the layout arrangement is shown in Figures 1.2-6 and 1.2-13. . 9.5.9.5.3 Safety Evaluation The combustion air intake and exhaust system is designed to Seismic Category I requirements and is housed inside a Seismic Category I structure. Arrangement and location of combustion air intake and exhaust, as shown in Figures 1.2-6 and 7. 2-13, are such that the dilution or contamination of intake air by exhaust products will not preclude the operation of the HPCS diesel generator. Recirculation of HPCS diesel engine combustion products to the air intakes is prevented by locating the exhaust stacks at a higher elevation away from the intakes. Since hot exhaust gases rise and disperse, recirculation into the intakes cannot occur. Additionally, there is no storage of gases in the immediate vicinity of air intakes that if accidental release could affect the minimum quantity and oxygen content requirements for intake combustion air. The only plant carbon dioxide fire extinguishing systems in the vicinity of the emergency diesel generator air intakes are located within the diesel generator rooms and in the control complex. If the carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system is activated for the chart storage room in the control complex, or in the HPCS diesel generator room, the fire dampers for the respective room are automatically closed and the area isolated to prevent air, smoke or carbon dioxide from being exhausted. The isolated area will be cleared of these gases using strict administration controls to l l 1 9.5-47s
ensure that no possibility exists for large concentrations of gases to be , ejected into the atmosphere and be drawn into the diesel generator air intakes. In this way essentially ambient quality air will be available at all times at the diesel generator air intakes. If a postulated fire would occur in the fuel oil storage tank located above ground over 650 ft from the intakes, it would be controlled using a foam extinguishing system discussed in Section 9.5.1. Foam is composed of water, foam concentrate and air. The concentrate is proportioned with water at a 3 to 4 percent concentration and air is induced into the resulting solution to form foam bubbles. The foam bubbles form an extinguishing blanket which i excludes oxygen from the seat of the fire and extinguishes it. No carbon i i dioxide is involved or generated in the extinguishing proce.s. l t An analysis made of the actual burning process, assuming ideal combustion, l results in a carbon dioxide generation rate of 4,270 lb./ min. The total combustion gases would be approximately 20,900 lb./ min. Very high flame temperature in the vicinity of 3,000*F would exist during such a fire. The large temperature difference between the fire and the t.cmosphere would cause a significant stack effect. Under low wind conditions, the stack effect could be several thousand feet and would not drop below several hundred feet with higher winds over 39.6 ft/sec. The results of assuming the minimum stack effect and a 12 m/see wind speed indicates a minimum gas concentration at the j 22 - intakes of 5.45 x 10 lb./ min. of combustion products. Slower wind speeds , would result in lower concentration due to the higher stack effect. The essential system components exposed to atmospheric conditions such as ice , and snow are protected from pos,sible clogging during standby or operation of the system. The essential portions of the system are housed within Scismic { Category I structures provided with louvers. The standby and HPCS diesel . generator combustion air intake and exhaust system components and piping are l protected from missiles, pipe whip and jet impingement that might result from l piping cracks or breaks. Refer to Sections 3.5 and 3.6 for a discussion of missile and pipe whip protection. The system components and piping are designed or protected from the effects of earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, and internally and externally generated missiles. 9.5-47t
l l The first part of the exhaust pipe and the blowoff hatch on the exhaust system are tornado missile protected. A horizontal barrier and a vertical barrier protect the blowoff hatch from a tornado missile. + [9.5.9.5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The system is tested in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations during initial tests and operation. The HPCS diesel generator will be operated every month for periodic testing. Operation of air intake and exhaust system components is verified during this testing. Additional inspection, checkout and maintenance are performed as required. For a more detailed discussion of periodic testing, see Section 8.3.1. i 9.5.9.5.5 Instrumentation Applications i j Local temperature and pressure indicators are provided as shown in l Figure 9.5-24. Clogging of the air intake filter is alarmed by a high differential pressure alarm on the HPCS diesel generator control panel with a
! common trouble alare in the control room. Details of the instrumentation and 4 controls for the HPCS diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust
'i h system are discussed in Section 7.3. Alarms which indicate the status of the M diesel generator air intake and exhaust system are summarized in Section 8.3.1.1.3.3, Item b. 10. i 9.5-47u
I l TABLE 9.5-3 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA DIVISION III (HPCS) Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank
- Type Horizontal Quantity 1 per diesel generator Capacity, gallons 39,375 Design pressure Atmospheric Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Type Horizontal centrifugal Quantity 2 per diesel generator Capacity, gpm 90 TDH, ft 200 Driver hp 15.0 Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank Type Vertical Quantity 1 per diesel-fenerator Capacity, gallons 555 Design pressure Atmosp'reric 4
Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Pumps
- a. Engine-Driven Pump Type Gear Quantity 1 Capacity, gpm 4.5 TDH, ft 12
- b. Motor-Driven Pump Type Gear Quantity 1 Capacity, gpm 4.25 TDH, ft. 12 Driver hp 0.75 9.5-57 l
l I
- .. - _ . ~ - .- . ..
E TABLE 9.5-4 DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM DIVISION III (HPCS) COMPONENT DATA a. Cooling Water Pumps Quantity 2 per engine, engine driven capacity, spm 330 each Head, it 100
- b. Cooling Water Heat Exchanger (Jacket Water Cooler)
Quantity 1 per engine Type TEMA CPK Duty, Btu /hr 5.446 x 10 6 Design Conditions Tube Side-SSW Cooling W'ater $ a. Inlet temp, *F 95
- b. Outlet temp, 'F 116.5
- c. Flow, gpm 850
- c. Cooling Water Expansion Tank Quantity 1 per engine Type Horizontal Capacity, gal 150
- d. Cooling Water Immersion Heater Quantity 1 per engine Output, kw 15 1
4 e t - 9.5-58
I l 1 TABLE 9.5-5 i DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM DIVISION III (MPCS) COMPONENT DATA
- a. Air Receivers Quantity 4 Type Horizontal Capacity, it3 (total) 64
- b. Air Compressors Quantity 2 (I motor-driven, I driven by separate diesel engine)
Capacity, scfm (each) 15 Discharge pressure, psi 250
- c. Air Motors Quantity 2 dual, air starting motors Type Rotary multivane 9.5-59
l TABLE 9.5-6 DIESEL GENERATOR LUBRICATING OIL SYSTEM . DIVISION III (HPCS) COMPONENT DATA I l
, a. Lube Oil Piston Cooling Pump Quantity 1 Capacity, gpm 66 Head, ft 50
- b. Main Lube Oil Pressure Pump Quantity 1 Capacity, gpm 157 Head, ft 50
- c. Lube Oil Scavenging Pump i
Quantity 1 Capacity, gpm 279 Head, psi 35
- d. Lube Oil Soak Back Pump (de)
Quantity 1 Capacity, gpm 5 to 6 Head, psi 25
- e. Lube Oil Circulating Pump (ac)
Quantity 1 Capacity, spa 6 Head, psi 25
- f. Lube Oil Heat Exchanger (Cooler)
Quantity 1 Type Fin-tube core type Duty, Btu /hr 1.744 x 10 6 9.5-60 , 1
. . . ~ . . .. ._. .
- _ _ . . .~ . .- - _- . .
l l l 1 TABLE 9.5-6 (Cont'd) f { 1 }
- g. Lube Oil Sump j Quantity )
j . Capacity, gal
. Total / usable 306/234
- h. Maximum Lube Oil Consumption l @ rated load, gal _ 0.83 1
i kw-hr
, i t
O 1 4 e 4
)
i 4 h j . I 9.5-61 i - , _ - . . _ . - _ .. . . _ _ .._ _ - _ , - . - .. ._ - ____ , _ . . . _ _ _
TABLE 9.5-7 DIESEL GENERATOR COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST . DIVISION III (HPCS) COMPONENT DATA
- a. Intake Air Filter Quantity 2 Type Oil bath Capacity, cfm 7,100 each @ 90*F
- b. Intake Air Silencer Quantity 2 Type Residential, straight through Capacity, cfm 7,100 each @ 90 F
- c. Exhaust Silencer Quantity 2 Type Residential, chamber Capacity, cfm 15,800 each @ 790 F 9.5-62
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' Calibration System Device List l
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"- - ' Ns' THE CLEVELAND ELECTitlC lLLUMINATING COMPANY
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HPCS Air Start Schematic
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OVEarLOW LnNE b NOTE: Dupt:( _ _ DRAmAG C!
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' 5. lTEM 22.- CLOSES AT l' M a.O. OPENS AT .8** H a.O.
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ML40i T 5OCKET-wEID ENDS 808mEf 34 7 CNECK VALVE s7i' STEEL HL4 05 T L. 30 C.ub'% VALVE- l' STEEL SOCKET-WELO EARC BohWE1 swsTCN C A AN,s Loc K ou r- 50 D A o s t. AC vv 25 B. 29 S (, c4 0 2. - B C ylt 3 5' 8* Sue rC H, H8 GN Lu BE. TEMPE R A TUAf (AL AR fM SQ O Z8 5 Z8 72485 R 3 E,9 2. 85 1 2I 3 34 EwsTCH, LOW LutsE TCM PE RATUR E (At./4s M) . s* 50 0 90t2 AC W 8
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- PUMP, CIRCULATING 6 GPM PART Or ITEN 84 ,l EE E
- 4 80 VOLT 15 ELECTRIC MOTOR l HP PART OF ITEM 14 '
ENGINE. 8 14 ClQCULATING PUMP ASS'r (INCLUDES ITEMS 15 ( IM 72915 ;PART OF ENGsM6 a i 13 VALVE , SALL :)y ~ . 7298'i ' PaRT Cf 5TRaevEa A*J13 IZ VALVE .!,T RAINER E=0DY ORAIN E Cb D ' I Sol 2. Atw.t i 88 : ** SWITCH LOW PRES 5URE-LUBE (564WTOOivhl #G PhtG JZ IO GAUGE PR(SjtuR_E_10- /00) 2 8/' zewia&& //d._2) " 1 7 9t'5 a320705* i 9 VALVE , REllEF- - FILTER (Wth h\.tsitu . ou TNc.T1
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NO. NO. _ ..._ . .-- i _._._ullST OF MATERIAL _OR PARTS LIST ' . PERRY HUCLEAR POWER PLANT 8' THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
~
i lLLUMIN ATING COMP ANY HPCS Engine Lube Oil Schematic l Figure 9.5-25 I l l l
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l The only portions of the steam and power conversion system (balance of plant) that are safety related are:
- a. For the main steam system - outer containment isolation valve (N11-F028A,B,C,D) to the outermost system isolation valve
- (N11-F020A,B,C,D) .
- b. For the feedwater system - from the first system isolation valve (N27-F065A,B) to the reactor.
These porticra cf the main steam and feedwater systems are Safety Class I and z, and Seismic Category I. Refer to Sections 10.3, 10.4.7 and 5.4.9 for further discussion. Sy. tem instrumentation is discussed, in general, in Sections 10.2 U} R through 10.4. Safety related instrumentation associated with this system is .e discussed in Sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.7. l 10.1-3
The. turbine generator / pressure regulator instrumentation and controls are described in Sections 7.7.1 and 7.7.2. The inservice inspection program for the main steam reheat valves is discussed in Section 10.2.3.6. A set of seven bypass valves with a total capacity of 35 percent of full load throttle flow is installed immediately upstream of the inlet stop valves. The
~
bypass valves permit rapid load reduction, up to 35 percent capacity, without requiring that the reactor be tripped. The heat cycle provides for extraction at six pressure stages for feedwater heating as follows:
- a. One on the high pressure turbine cylinder (Heater No. 6).
- b. One on the moisture separator (Heater No. 5).
- c. Four on each of the three low pressure turbine cylinders.(Heater Nos. 4, 3, 2 and 1).
10.2.2.2 Electrohydraulic Control System P The turbine-generator uses an electrobydraulic control (EHC) system which, in coordination with the NSSS steam bypass and pressure control system, controls the ' turbine speed, load, pressure, and flow for startup and normal operations. The g
+
EHC system operates the turbine stop valves, control valves, and combined stop !f and intercept valves. Turbine generator supervisory instrumentation is provided d M for operational ars a and malfunction diagnosis. 4, Automatic control functions are programmed to protect the nuclear steam supply system with appropriate corrective actions. The turbine EHC system combines the principles of solid-state electronics and high pressure hydraulics to control steam flow through the turbine. The control system has the following major subsystems. 10.2-3 i
- a. Speed-control unit
- b. Load-control unit
- c. Flow-control unit.
The speed-control unit receives speed signals from the shaft speed pick-ups, which are compared to a speed reference signal, to produce a speed / error signal. The speed-control unit also differentiates the speed signals to produce acceleration signals. These signals are compared to the acceleration reference to produce acceleration error signals that are integrated and combined with the 9 speed /e;ror signal, to produce an output to the load-control unit. d h The load-control unit accepts the speed-acceleration error signal from the speed 4 control unit and compares the signal with the preselected load demand signal, which is provided to the NSSS steam bypass and pressure control system. The load-control unit also accepts limit signals (e.g. , load limit, pressure limit, power load unbalance limit, etc.) and combines them with the load demand signal to generate flow reference signals, which are provided to the flow control unit. The flow control unit positions the turbine steam control valves at the required position to satisfy each valve flow reference signal from the load-control unit. It consists of the individual valve positioning units, which essentially are electrohydraulic, closed-loop, servo-mechanism valve position-control systems. , 10.2.2.3 Turbine Overspeed Protection System The turbine overspeed protection system is not a safety-related system. Since the turbine overspeed control system equipment, electrical cables, and hydraulic N j lines are not required to safely shutdown'the reactor, no protection is provided q for the overspeed protection system from the effects of high or moderate energy pipe failure. Refer to Section 3.6 for' further discussion of pipe break I criteria. Nevertheless, the turbine is provided with a highly reliable and redundant control system to trip the turbine in the event of a turbine overspeed I condition. i 10.2-3a
s The normal speed control function is provided by the turbine electrohydraulic d control system described in Section 10.2.2.2 above. In addition, a redundant } overspeed protection system is included which features an emergency mechanical j Ys overspeed trip and a backup electrical overspeed trip. Redundancy is achieved by using at least two independent channels from the signal source to the output device that controls the emergency trip system, fluid pressure which actuates the , I turb'ine steam valves. Figure 10.2-3 is a block diagram of the turbine protection d system. A failure mode and effects analysis for the turbine overspeed protection 9 systems is provided in Table 10.2-1. This demonstrates that any specific valve 7 e3 h failure cannot disable the turbine overspeed trip from functioning. l 3 The mechanical overspeed trip is an unbalanced ring which is held concentric with the shaft by a spring. When the speed reaches the trip speed (110 percent to 111 percent of rated), the centrifugal force of the ring overcomes the force of the spring, and the ring snaps to an eccentric position. The ring then strikes the trip finger which operates the mechanical trip valve. This releases the fluid pressure on the disk dump valves for main stop and control valves and intermediate stop and intercept valves, thereby closing the turbine steam valves. The overspeed trip device may be tested by tripping it at normal speed by the application of oil through the oil trip valve. i ,
\nn.
lh4 J The electrical backup overspeed trip device (see Figure 10.2-3) consists of a
- D-speed trip relay (set at 0.5 percent above the mechanical trip setpoint) that is operated by a signal from a magnetic pickup from the turbine shaft. The signal I from the speed trip relay will energize the master trip relay which will deenergize both coils of the electrical trip solenoid valve. When both coils are i
deenergized, the electrical trip valve operates to release the fluid pressure on the actuator of the steam valves. Redundance is also achieved within the electrical overspeed trip system by maintaining at least two independent channels g ]. from the signal source to the dutput device that controls the emergency trip E system (E.T.S.), fluid pressure which actuates the turbine steam valves and an i m air relay dump valve. The air relay eump valve controls air to the extraction j h steam check valves which limit contributions to turbine overspeed from steam and water in the extraction lines and feedwater heaters. The total energy in these 4 steam lines down to the check valves has been included in the turbine overspeed + 10.2-3b
analysis. The extraction steam lines from the t urbine to the No. I and 2 feedwater heaters are located within the main condensers and do not have any non-return valves provided in them. The turbine overspeed analysis takes into account the total energy in these extraction lines to the No.1 and 2 heaters down to and including the water and steam in the heater and subcooler shells. This data has been used by General Electric to calculate the maximum potential overspeed assuming turbine load is suddenly reduced from maximum to zero, with no restraint of reverse flow in the extraction lines being considered, but assuming that all other turbine control and extraction non-return valves operate normally. This General Electric analysis demonstrates that these bottled-up volumes of steam and water within the turbine and extraction steam system will not cause the turbine speed.to rise above a certain maximum value (as established by General {' Electric steam turbine design rules and code requirements) after a full load 6 rejection or trip. f The closing time for all extraction non-return valves is less than two seconds. The motor-operated stop valves in the extraction steam lines from the turbine are not relied on to provide overspeed protection, but have been included to prevent water damage to the turbine, so their closure times are not relevant to overspeed 3 protection. 4 Additional overspeed protection is provided for the condition of load rejection i that follows: For the unbalance between turbine power input and generator power output in excess of 40 percent of rated, the power / load unbalance relay will operate. The power / load unbalance relay:
- a. Actuates the control valve solenoid valves to cause fast closing of the control valves'and intercept valves;
- b. Changes the load reference signal within the loading unit to zero load, such that the slightest speed increase will start closing the intercept valve;
- c. Runs the load setter toward zero load.
10.2-3c
- - - .--.- n -, -
Each component of the mechanical and electrical overspeed protection systems will be tested during normal operation, on a weekly basis, by the following tests:
- a. A mechanical overspeed trip test at the EHC Panel to test for operation of the overspeed trip device and mechanical trip valve.
- b. A mechanical trip piston test at the EHC panel to test for electrical activation of the trip mechanism.
- c. An electrical trip test at the EHC panel to test for operation of the electrical trip valve.
- d. A backup overspeed trip test at the EHC panel to test the 2 out of 3 logic circuits.
10.2.2.4 Turbine Protection System In addition to overspeed trip signals discussed above, the emergency trip system closes the main stop and control valves and the intermediate stop and intercept valves, shutting down the turbine on the signals listed in Section 10.2.2,4.1 and 10.2.2.4.2. The sequence of events and response times following a turbine trip are given in ) . Section 15.2.3, Figures 15.2-2 through 15.2-5, and Tables 15.2-2 through 15.2-5. h, O N 10.2.2.4.1 Turbine Trip Signals Due to Mechanical Faults th The turbine is shut down due to the following mechanical fault signals:
- a. Loss of vacuum trip; a
- b. Excessive thrust bearing wear;
- c. Prolonged loss of generator stator coolant at loads in excess of a preset value;
. 10.2-3d
. l l
i
- d. External trip signals, including remote manual trip on the control panel; i
- e. Loss of hydraulic fluid supply pressure (loss of emergency trip system fluid pressure automatically closes the turbine valves and then energizes the master trip relay to prevent a false restart); ~
- f. Low bearing oil pressurc;
- g. Loss of both speed signals when turbine is not in standby control;
- h. High exhaust hood temperature;
- i.
- High shaft vibration;
- j. Loss of 125 volt d-c electrohydraulic control power supply when turbine is operating at greater then 75% rated speed; -%.
D
- k. Loss of 24 volt d-c electrohydraulic control power supply; %
k'
- l. High level in moisture separators;
- m. High reactor water level;
- n. Low shaft pump discharge pressure when turbine is operating at greater than 75% of rated speed;
- o. Operation of the manual mechanical trip at the front standard; or
- p. Low bearing oil pressure to the trip piston.
10.2.2.4.2 Turbine Trip Signals Due to Generator Electrical Faults Generator electrical fault signals that trip the turbine are as follows: li 10.2-3e
345 KV breaker failure; a.
- b. Main transformer differential;
- c. Main transformer sudden pressure;
- d. Main transformer 345 KV neutral overcurrent;
- e. Unit 345 KV bus differential;
- f. Unit auxiliary transformer neutral overcurrent "X";
Unit auxiliary tranformer neutral overcurrent "Y"; :
- g. !
i
)
- h. Unit auxiliary transformer sudden pressure;
))
- 1. Unit auxiliary transformer differential; 9
- j. Generator volts /Hz;
- k. Manual operation of exciter when generator is not connected to system;
- 1. Underfrequency;
- m. Negative sequence overcurrent;
- n. Generator loss of excitation with no voltage balance;
- o. Generator out of step with no voltage balance;
- p. Low load generator loss of excitation when both generator lockout relays are reset and no voltage balance;
- q. Generator neutral overvoltage; 10.2-3f
- . . - . . . ~ . . . --. - . . - .. .- . . . .-_.- . . . . .... .
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- s. Generator *~ differential No. 2; ,
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i-1 i !~ This inspection will consist of the following visual, surface, and volumetric '. examinations: l
- a. A thorough volumetric examination of all low pressure wheels and high pressure rotors, including areas immediately adjacent to keyways and bores,
! ' will be conducted. This examination is predicated on the development of j suitable remote inspection equipment. l j b. Visual examination of all accessible surfaces of rotors and wheels,
- c. Visual and surface of all low pressure buckets.
- d. Surface examination (100 percent) of couplings and coupling bolts.
4 The inservice inspection of main steam and reheat valves will include the l following: Dismantle at least one main steam stop valve, one main steam control valve, one reheat stop valve, and one reheat intercept valve, at approximately 3-1/3 year intervals during refueling or maintenance shutdowds coinciding with the inservice inspection schedule required by ASME Code Section XI, and conduct a visual and surface examination of valve seats, discs and stems. i If unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion are found in a valve, all
; valves of that type will be inspected. Valve bushings will be inspected and ! cleaned, and bore diameters will be checked for proper clearance.
- b. Main steam stop and control, reheat stop and intercept valves, and turbine 3
' overspeed trip mechanism will be exercised at least once a week by closing f each valve or performing the overspeed trip' test and observing, by.the valve
! position indicator, that the valves move smoothly to a fully closed I position. This observation will be made in accordance with technical specification requirements by actually watching the valve motion, The extraction non-return valves are of the swinging disc type and are I c.
equipped with a side mounted air cylinder operating mechanism, which is 10.2-7 u
i l spring loaded to assist in closing the disc part way. The valves and operators are designed to close automatically on cessation or reversal of flow, independent of air cylinder operator action. The operators are provided with local manual test valves, with which air [pressureisequalizedacrosstheactuatorpistonallowingspringforceto move the valve disc part way toward the closed position. During pre-operational system acceptance testing, the response of the actuators, on the extraction non-return valves, to a simulsted turbine trip will be measured. The time between a turbine trip and full stroking of the power assist actuator will be verified to be two seconds o'; less. During normal unit operation, the power assisted non-return valves will be k tested by partially closing the valves usir.g the local manual test valves. S For critical power assisted valves (see Fig.10.2- 9 ) this testing will be done weekly. Because of the potential of high radiation in the vicinity of the local manual test valves, this interval will be evaluated after actual test experience is obtained. For noncritical power assisted valves (see Fig.10.2- 9 ) this testing will be monthly. Inservice inspection of the extraction steam valves will be performed during refueling outages. The frequency of inspection will be determined considering current industry practice and the history of performance of similar valves. 1 10.2-7a
i l l 1 10.2.5 hTDROGEN AND CARFON DIOXIDE SYSTEMS 10.2.5.1 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The hydrogen and carbon dioxide systems are designed to provide the
[ necessary flow and pressure at the main turbine generator:
- 1. During startup when air is purged from the generator by carbon dioxide.
- 2. During startup when carbon dioxide is purged from the generator by hydrogen.
- 3. During shutdown when hydrogen is purged from the generator by carbon dioxide.
- 4. During shutdown when carbon dioxide is purged from the generator by air.
- 5. During normal operation where hydrogen is continuously supplied to the generator to make up for generator hydrogen leakage D
- b. Each unit has its own hydrogen bulk storage system. N2
- c. The carbon dioxide supply is common to both generating units. 9
- d. Should the carbon dioxide portion of the subject system fail, the plant DT Sh'ould the hydrogen portion of the \*
could continue in normal operation. subject system fail, the plant could continue in normal operation until the generator hydrogen pressure begins to fall below 60 psi after which the generator should be operated in accordance with the turbine generator manufacturer's requirements. 10.2.5.2 System Description The hydrogen and carbon dioxide system consists of hydrogen supply cylinders and piping with all necessary valves, pressure reducers, instrumentation, gas purity measuring equipment, carbon dioxide vaporizer, and carbon dioxide supply piping with all necessary valves, and instrumentation and hydrogen bulk storage cylinders for each unit. The hydrogen and carbon dioxide system components, piping, valves and instrumentation are shown in Figures 10.2-4 through 10.2-8; the hydrogen and carbon dioxide bulk storage units are located outdoors. The hydrogen cylinder filling area for each unit is near the heater bay. The carbon dioxide tank for generator purge is located near the service building. I 1 10.2-9
10.2.5.3 System Evaluation TLe hydrogen and carbon dioxide system serves no safety function. System analysis has shown that failure of the hydrogen and carbon dioxide system will not compromise any safety related systems or prevent safe shutdown. Nine hydfogenstoragecylindersforeachunit,withatotalcapacityof66,483SCFat 90 psig, are located in the yard near the heater bay as shown on Figure 1.2-2. The separation together with the open space location precludes advarse effects resulting from the unlikely possibility of any explosions or fires. A fire safety shutoff valve is provided that can be closed to shut off hydrogen to the turbine building in case of fire or high temperature in plant. A fence is i erected around the hydrogen bulk storage units to further protect the storage area. "No Smoking" signs and " Danger Regulating Station" signs are posted in accordance with NFPA requirements. They hydrogen distribution headers inside the turbine building are routed as D follows: gg d
- 1. Headers are located to prevent physical damage to pipe. F)
J hs
- 2. Headers are located away from equipment that present a fire hazard to l hydrogen.
i 3. Headers are routed through ventilated areas. The protective measures taken to prevent fires and explosions include the strict i observance of the turbine vendor's operating instructions. These protective measures include the following during operation and maintenance:
- a. During normal operation, hydrogen is used to cool the generator. To prevent b'ydrogen from leaking through the generator shaf t seal glands into the
- turbine building, a shaft oil sealing system is provided. I l
I i To avoid having an explosive hydrogen-air mixture in the generator at any_ l time, such as when the generator is being filled with hydrogen prior to a being placed in service or when hydrogen is being removed from the generator for maintenance or inspection, a carbon dioxide purge is used. Hydrogen concentrations are controlled with the aid of a gas analyzer. 10.2-10
'Before filling or purging the generator, the carbon dioxide analyzer will be calibrated with air, carbon dioxide and hydrogen.
i
- b. Hydrogen removal from the generator before it is opened for maintenance
[Whilethegeneratorisatstandstilloronturninggearoperationandthe shaft-sealing system is in operation, carbon dioxide is admitted into the l i generator, maintaining a pressure between specified limits in the generator , casing, until the carbon dioxide concentration in the discharge is in excess of 95 percent measured by a gas tester on the control board of the hydrogen and carbon dioxide gas system. When hydrogen is being purged from the casing, all hydrogen supply piping and headers will be disconnected to I prevent hydrogen from entering the casing because of possible leakage or faulty operation of valves. A leakage test is conducted after purging - O hydrogen from the casing, and the casing is not to be opened; additional g,
-carbon dioxide is admitted to the casing to attain the required test f pressure. The carbon dioxide will be purged from the casing with dry air. n3 i
- c. Air removal from the generator before hydrogen fill following maintenance While the generator is at a standstill or on turning gear opert, ion and the shaft-sealing system is in operation, carbon dioxide will be admitted to the bottom of the generator through carbon dioxido distribution piping, and air
- in the generator will be discharged to atmosphere through the hydrogen feed pipe.
While the generator is being filled with carbon dioxide, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the gas mixture being discharged from the generator to the atmosphere should be measured by the carbon dioxide-air scale of the carbon dioxide analyzer.- Carbon dioxide will be admitted to the generator until air nas been displaced by carbon dioxide.
~
l 10.2-11
I
- d. Filling generator with hydrogen i j When the air has been displaced by carbon dioxide as determined by the gas analyzer, hydrogen is admitted to the top of the generator through the sparger and carbon dioxide is vented to atmosphere through the lower
~
. sparger, where it was originally admitted. When hydrogen concentration in 9 the vented gas is above 90 percent hydrogen in carbon dioxide, the vent to atmosphere may be closed and the hydrogen pressure raised to the required operating pressure. (y 10.2.5.4 Tests and Inspection The hydrogen and carbon dioxide system is proved operable by its use. System piping and components are pneumatically tested prior to startup.
j'
.I l
l l 10.2-12
TABLE 10.2-1 , TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS Component Malfunction Comment One valve fails to close All steam valves are in pairs in Steam Valve series. Thus, failure of one (MSV, CV, IV, ISV) on overspeed trip valve to close does not defeat overspeed protection.
\t 9 c$
Turbine Extraction One valve fails to close The overspeed potential of the g feedwater heating system is q [; Nonreturn Valve small. The total energy addition Pi due to any single extraction valve failure can contribute no more than 3 percent to the running speed of the turbine generator. Mechanical Trip Fails to drop ETS pressure The backup electrical overspeed Valve upon actuation of trip de-energizes the master mechanical overspeed trip trip solenoid valve which, in turn, results in a drop in ETS pressure.
TABLE 10.2-1 (Continued) . Component Malfunction Comment Master Trip Fails to drop ETS pressure The mechanical overspeed Solenoid Valve upon actuation of trip actuates the mechanical overspeed trip trip valve which, in turn, results in a drop in ETS 9 0 pressure. O Im Piping fails causing All steam valves close as in b Hydraulic Trip
- System Piping depressurization overspeed trip.
? Y Z D-C Electric Power Power supply is lost Loss of two speed signals causes Supply master trip solenoid valve to be de-energized which, in turn,results in a drop in ETS pressure.
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10.4 OTHER FEATURES OF STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10.4.1 MAIN CONDENSER 10.4,.1.1 General The main condenser acts as a heat sink for the three low pressure turbine exhausts, limiting the back pressure and thus increasing the amount of available work from the turbines. The main condenser serves as a collection point for turbine bypass steam, moisture separator-reheater relief valve flow, and other flows. The main condenser also deaerates and provides storage capacity for the condensate which is reused after a period of radioactive decay. ) 10.4.1.2 Design Bases 1 i The design bases for the main condenser are as follows: n
- a. The main condenser is designed to accept the influents specified in Table ) '%j 10.4-3 without exceeding 5 inches Hg absolute or 200*F at the turbine exhaust to any shell. The main condenser is designed for the following approximate conditions:
9 Condenser duty 8.1 x 10 Btu /hr Circulating water inlet temperature 94*F (design) Circulating water temperature rise 32*F Air in-leakage 45 scfm Disassociated H and 02 fr a the BWR H 162 scfm 2 0 81 scfm Steam processed through the main condenser normally contains small amounto of radioactive material. Noncondensable gases are removed via the steam jet air y ejectors (SJAE) to the off-gas processing system. Liquids are processed R through the Condensate Filter and Demineralizer Systems. Excessive 10.4-1
G radioactive leakage is detected by the main steam line radiation monitors and g the off gas pretreatment monitor. O 4 i 1 10.4-la
k
- g. To prevent tube failure during operation of the turbine bypass, direct steam impingement on the tubes is prohibited by use of spargers to M, distribute the flow inside the condenser. All other high energy drains k are also provided with spargers or baffles inside the condenser. +
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10.4.1.3 System Description The main condenser is a three shell, three pressure type with a rubber expansion joint in each neck. Differential water levels are maintained in each of the three condenser hotwells allowing condensate to flow from the lowest pressure to the intermediate pressure then to the highest pressure hotwell where it is reheated. From there it flows to the hotwell storage located under the intermediate pressure condenser. This hotwell is an ,. extension of the high pressure condenser hotwell and is connected to it by a cross-under pipe. The hotwell storage is isolated from the IP condenser by a solid divider plate and is vented to the HP condenser. Condensate leaves the 55 hotwell through two outlets. Design information for the main condenser is provided in Table 10.4-3. k 1-During normal operation the main condenser receives the following flows:
- a. Main turbine exhaust steam
- b. Auxiliary condenser condensate
- c. Drains from low pressure heater No. 1
- d. Steam packing exhauster drains
- e. Steam jet air ejector (SJAE) condenser drains
- f. Off gas condenser drains
- g. Feedwater heater vents
- h. Turbine governor valve leakoffs
- i. Seal steam header flow
- j. Feedpump seal leakoff Possible flows during startup or abnormal conditions include:
- a. Hotwell pump, SJAE condenser, steam packing exhauster, and condensate booster pump recirculation.
- b. Hotwell pump startup vents
- c. Feedwater cleanup flow
- d. Emergency drains from feedwater heaters No. 6, 5, 3 and 2
- e. Moisture separator and reheater drains l
l 10.4-3
- f. Condensate makeup
- g. Turbine bypass flow
- h. Feedwater heater vents Systems which have relief valves discharging to the condenser include:
- a. Reheat steam relief
- b. Heater vents and relief
- c. Off gas condenser
- d. Off gas water separation effluent line
- e. Off-gas air preheater
- f. SJAE intercondenser
- g. Steam seal evaporator 10.4.1.4 Safety Evaluation Since the main condenser operates at a vacuum, any leakage is into the shell side of the main condenser. Provision is made for detection of circulating water leakage into the shell side of the main condenser. Water leakage is y detected by measuring the conductivity of sample water extracted from a tray \9 located beneath the tube bundles. A leak will allow the circulating water to drain over the tube bundles and collect in the tray. Sampling methods are 4 described in Section 9.3.2. Radioactive leakage to the atmosphere cannot occur. g o
Air inleakage and noncondensable gases, including hydrogen and oxygen gases, D contained in the turbine exhaust steam due to dissociation of water in the 4 reactor, are collected in the condenser from which they are removed by the main condenser evacuation system described in Section 10.4.2. Disassociated hydrogen is removed by the steam jet air ejector to the off-gas system. Noncondensible gases cascade from the highest to lowest pressure main condenser shell eliminating the possibility of hydrogen buildup in any shell. In the event one steam jet air ejector set should fail, a standby is available to preclude loss of vacuum. l 10.4-4
(O a The main condensers are not required to affect or support the safe shutdown of q rr the reactor or to perform in the operation of reactor safety features. ws The influence of the main condenser on the reactor coolant system is reduced by the decoupling effect of the hot surge tank. Pressures, temperatures and flopsareinfluencedbythepumps,heatersandstoragetanksdownstreamofthe condenser. The effect it has on the reactor coolant system is its contaminant removal and radiation decay capacity. The anticipated inventory of radioactive contaminants during operation and shutdown is discussed in l l Section 11.1. If condenser coding water leakage into the condensate stream b o ! occurs, conductivity elements detect the leakage. The circulating water f I n, passes through three main condenser shells in series. Four seperate S ( circulating water circuits and conductivty elements are provided, allowing l
- I unit operation without a severe load reduction or trip when it is necessary to o '
remove one circuit from service to plug a leaking tube. Reference 1 addresses k4 the problem of condenser tube in leakage on the quality of the condensate /feedwater for a plant using seawater for the circulating water. ! Reference 1 is used as a conservative guideline (considering the high 6 I conductivity of seawater compared to fresh water) for permissible coding water inleakage and time of operation. The high pressure condenser is equipped with ao G l four absolute pressure sensors which will close the main steam isolation ,y valves on loss of condenser vacuum. The effect of a loss of cordenser vacuum O i N' I on reactor operation is provided in Section 15.2.5. o O N l Normal deaeration of the turbine exhaust steam in the main condenser controls oxygen to satisfy the feedwater chemistry requirements of a BWR. i 10.4-4a
Exhaust hood overheating protection is provided by exhaust hood sprays which are activated before the trip point is reached. Under normal operating, transient and emergency conditions, no detrimental effect is foreseen on the reactor coolant system and no radioactive leakage can be anticipated. There is no safety related equipment located in the turbine building. A failure of the main condenser will not cause unacceptable flooding of areas housing safety related equipment. Flooding analysis is discussed in Sections 2.4.10 and 10.4.5.3.1. The loss of main condenser vacuum will cause the turbine to be tripped. The condenser instrumentation interface with the main steam isolation system is described in Section 7.7.1. 10.4.1.5 Tests and Inspections The main condenser is subjected to a shell side hydrostatic test in the field. The pressure is limited to the static head of water at the turbine flange. The waterboxes and tube circult are field hydrostatically tested to 1.5 times the design pressure. Visual inspection of pipe weld joints will confirm the exterior condition of the weld joints. The condenser is provided with access manways to permit entry into the I waterboxes (for inspection of tubes and tube joints), into the hotwells and into the condenser shells to permit internal inspection of the condenser. Inspection can be undertaken if there are indications of condenser operating abnormalities (such as tube leaks), or for general inspection purposes. Each condenser will consist of draining the condenser, removing the inspection sg covers, and inspecting for waterbox fouling, impingement erosion, internal \S, O structural damage and cleanliness. rn 4 The main condenser will be continually monitored for its performance and tube leakage. If this monitoring reveals condenser operating abnormalities, then the main condenser will be inspected and appropriate corrective action taken. In addition, as a minimum, the steam sidc of the main condenser will normally be inspected at each refueling. 10.4-5
I 10.4.1.6 Instrumentation The following instrumentation is provided for the main condenser:
- a. Each condenser shell is provided with local and remote hotwell level and
.. pressure indication.
- b. The condensate levels in the condenser hotwell are maintained within proper limits by autoaatic control. Transfer condensate is passed to and from the condensate storage tank as needed to satisfy the requirements of the system.
l l i 1 l 10.4-5a l 1
- c. Turbine exhaust hood temperature is monitored and controlled with water sprays to provide protection from overheating.
- d. A condenser high back pressure alarm is provided at approximately five inctes Hg absolute. Turbine trip is initiated on loss of condenser
. vacuum or when condenser back pressure exceeds approximately 7.5 inches g Hg absolute. Main steam isolation valve closure is initiated at i 8 in. Hg. (absolute). g
- e. Waterbox temperature and level measurements are provided.
- f. Conductivity elements detect leakage of circulating water into the condenser.
10.4.2 MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM 10.4.2.1 General The main condenser evacuation system maintains condenser vacuum by removing non-condensable gases including disassociated hydrogen and oxygen and air in-leakage. 10.4.2.2 Design Bases Mechanical vacuum pumps are used to draw down the main condenser. The mechanical vacuum pumps have a total capacity of 7,500 to 8,500 cfm at 27 inches Hg vacuum. Discharge is to the atmospheric vent. Vacuum is maintained in the main condenser by one steam jet air ejector set;
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another set is used as a spare. The sets are designed to handle the following capacities:
- a. Air in-leakage for main condenser 55 scfm
- b. Disassociated H 2 162 scfm
- c. Disassociated 0 2 81 scfm 10.4-6
level control valves which maintain the water level in the steam seal l
. evaporator drain tank. The flow of heating steam is regulated by the steam seal evaporator pressure control. Steam and seal header pressure is regulated by the header pressure control.
Liquid level in the steam packing exhauster is maintained by a trap connected to the main condenser by a level control valve. Pressure and temperature instrumentation is provided to monitor operation of the system. 10.4.4 TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM 10.4.4.1 Design Basis The design basis of the turbine bypass system is as follows:
- a. The turbine bypass system is designed to control reactor pressure during reactor heatup to rated pressure while the turbine is being brought up to speed and synchronized during power operation when the reactor steam generation exceeds the transient turbine steam requirements; and cool down of the reactor.
- b. The turbine bypass system capacity is designed for 35 percent of the 100 percent rated reactor steam flow. The bypass system will accommodste a 35-percent load rejection. The bypass system works in conjunction with the turbine controls (pressure control). See Section 7.7.1.5.
- c. The turbine bypass valves are capable of remote manual operation in their normal sequence, during plant startup and shutdown, and for exercising to verify that the valves are operable.
10.4.4.2 System Description 10.4.4.2.1 Operational Function 0 The turbine bypass' system is shown in Figures 10.4-1, 10.4-2, and 10.4-3. The 4 m turbine bypass system controls primary steam pressure by sending excess steam hp flow directly to the main condenser. This permits independent control 4 10.4-12
k of reactor pressure and power during reactor vessel heatup to rated pressure, as the turbine is brought up to speed and synchronized under turbine speed-load control. Following main turbine-generator trips, the turbine bypass will control reactor pressure to within reactor design limits in acco,rdance with the steam generation rate. The bypass valves are automatically closed whenever vacuum in the main condenser falls below a preset value. The chronological sequence of events and effect on the turbine, turbine bypass system and reactor are discussed in Section 15.2.5. 10.4.4.2.2 Bypass Valves The turbine bypass system consists of seven automatically operated, regulating type bypass valves connected by appropriate piping to the main steamlines 2 l upstream of the main turbine stop valves. Each bypass valve outlet is piped directly to the main condenser. The bypass valves have regulation capability and a fast opening response approximately equivalent to the fast closure of the turbine stop and control valves. Each of the bypass valves in the system is individually controlled by a servo loop which drives a double-acting hydraulic actuator. The valve is positioned in response to a valve position error signal that represents the difference between current valve position and the bypass valve demand signal generated by the steam bypass and pressure i regulation system. Each bypass valve also has mounted on it a fast acting solenoid valve which is fired to open the valve very quickly if the error 0- N signal (in the opening direction) becomes excessively large. Bypass valve db outline and sectional drawings are provided in Figure 10.4-3. Bypass valve 55 design data is presented in Table 10.4-4. The valve casing (valve chest) is D+ b welded to a branch line coming from the main steam pipes. This connection j point to the main steam pipes is downstream of the outboard mainstream isolation valves and upstream of the main turbine admission valves. Mounted in the chest are several bypass valves, each of which is connected to its own hydraulic actuator. The steam bypass valves receive electronic positioning from the pressure
- regulator cabinet and are hydraulically powered by an external source of high pressure hydraulic fluid.
- 10.4-13 l
When the steam bypass valves are open, steam enters each end of the chest, flows downward between the seat and the stem, and then exits out through the i discharge casing. The amount of steam passing through each valve is I controlled by the lift of the valve. The valve disk and seat are hardsurfaced l at their mutual contacting points to improve the ability to maintain adequate l sea (ingcontact. l The force required to open and position each steam bypass valve is applied to the valve stem by the power actuator which is mounted directly below each valve. , I The double acting hydraulic cylinder operator is equipped with an air bleed in both end caps, and internal stop tube on the rod side to limit stroke. The yiston is fitted with a small leakage plug to allow a small amount of fluid to i leak from the high pressure side to the low pressure side of the piston. This small leakage assures a continuous flow of fluid and prevents fluid stagnation. Db A hydraulic control manifold is provided with the necessary passages to 4, connect the hydraulic supply and drain to the correct ports on *he 4% nr servovalves, fast acting solenoid valve, and cylinder. The 1ervovalve is mounted on the manifold and it controls the fluid flowing to each end of the hydraulic cylinder. The valve receives an analog electrical signal from the pressure regulator cabinet and is used for normal positioning of the steam bypass valve. In the event that the steam bypass valves must be opened faster than that allowed by the flow capacity of the servovalve, a parallel fluid path to the cylinder is provided by opening of the fast acting solenoid valve. This valve is opened by an electrical current originating in the pressure regulator cabinet. Since considerable time may elapse between the actuations of the solenoid valve, provision is made in the valve test logic to exercise this valve. During valvetesting, the steam bypass valve is slowly stroked open by sending an appropriate electrical signal to the servovalve. After the valve is stroked to approximately its 90 percent open position, the switch rod collar closes a switch in the switchbi . These contacts complete a circuit to 10.4-13a
the fast acting solenoid valve which allows hydraulic fluid to pass into the b hydraulic cylinder at a high rate of flow. Using this scheme, the steam qb bypass valve slowly strokes open to the 90 percent position and then " snaps" $4' fully open. h4 10.{.4.2.3 Classification The steam bypass system is classified as a primary power generation system. That is, it is not a safety system and its operation is essential to the power production cycle. 10.4.4.3 Safety Evalua'; ion The turbine bypass system is not essential for turbine operation. Should the bypass system malfunction and inadvertently admit bypass steam to the condenser while the turbine is under load, the steam flow to the turbine would be reduced by action of the pressure controller. If, under these conditions, s. the condenser heat rejection rate is inadequate and the exhaust pressure is becomes excessive, the turbine will be tripped by vacuum trips. In addition, kb should the turbine exhaust pressure continue to increase, additional redundant vacuum trips are provided to trip the bypass stop and control valves and MSIVs. The effects of a malfunction of the turbine bypass system valves, and the effects of such failures on other systems and components, are evaluated in Chapter 15. There are no safety related components located in the turbine building. A pipe break in the turbine bypass system will not have an adverse affect on any safety related systems and components. s The turbine bypass system can malfunction in either the open or closed mode. Is The effects of both of these failure modes on the operation of the reactor are discussed in Appendix 15A, which provides plant Nuclear Safety Operational 4 Analysis. The analyses are system level / qualitative - type plant failure mode 1 i ! and effects analyses. ( . l O The effects of turbine bypass system malfunctions on the reactor operation are ;
-bounded by events presented in Appendix 15A as follows: j 10.4-13b
I
- a. A bypass system line failure is bounded by the pipe break outside containment accident. Refer to event 38 in Section 15A.6.5.3. j
- b. A failure of the bypass system to open is bounded by the turbine ds us Refer to events 30 <d trip and load rejection without bypass events.
A6
. and 31 in Section 15A.6.4.3. **
- c. An inadvertent opening of the bypass system, at worst, might cause a high steam line flow or low steam line pressure with a resultant MSIV closure trip. Refer to event 14 in Section 15A.6.3.3.
10.4.4.4 Tests and Inspections I The opening and closing of the turbine bypass system valves will be checked during initial startup and shutdown for performance and timing. The bypass steam line upstream of the bypass valves will be hydrostatically tested to I l 10.4-13c' j I
atmospheric temperature, 30.6*F cooling tower range (average condenser Wt), and an 18*F cooling tower approach to wet bulb. This represents the maximum heat rejection from the cycle (turbine valves wide open) under the most adverse weather conditions (design wet bulb temperature exceeded less than 1 Percent of the time). The circulating water system is independent of the emergency cooling facilities. 1 a-T i l l l-I i 10.4-14a l l
TABLE 10.4-3 MAIN CONDENSER DESIGN DATA
. Manufacturer Ecolair (Ingersoll-Rand)
Number of Shells 3 Number of tubes: Low press. shell 39,824 Inter. press shell 39,824 High press. shell 39,824 Tube length: Low press. shell 36'-2 29/32" Inter, press. shell 46'-2 29/32" O High press. shell 50'-2 29/32" Surface Area: 2 Low press. shell 326,930 ft Inter press. shell 418,168 ft 2 High press. shell 454,663 ft 2 Number of passes, per shell 1 Tube size (OD) 7/8 in. Tube gage 22 BWG Tube material ASTM A249, Type 304 Stainless steel Hotwell capacity at normal water level: Low press. shell 0 Inter. press, shell 0 High press. shell 72,000 gallons 10.4-37 s
1 TABLE 10.4-3 (Continued) Overall approx. dimensions (height, length, width):
,' Low press. shell 45' x 54' x 30' Inter. press. shell 56' x 59' x 30' High press. shell 56' x 62' x 30' 9
Condenser duty (heat transfer) 8.1 x 10 Btu /hr. Condenser Guarantee Point (Normal Design Flows): Flow Enthalpy Pressure ci (lb/hr) (Btu /lb) (psia) O (1) Turbine exhaust steam 8,600,473 997.8 - (2) Auxiliary condenser condensate (flows to highest pressure main condenser shell only) 186,789 76.7 2.5 in. (3) L.P. I heater drain 2,219,232 81.4 - (4) Steam packing exhauster drains 7,200 180.2 - (5) Seal steam header by pass flow 14,800 1174.1 - (6) High pressure turbine gland leakoffs 6,638 1087.5 190.7 (7) Turbine governor valve 3,007 1190.8 965 leakoffs 10.4-38
TABII 10.4-3 (Continued) Intermittent Flows: In addition to the guaranteed design, the condenser is able to handle other fluids inte:,rmittently but not simultaneously. These fluids include the following: Flow Enthalpy Pressure Temp (1b/hr) (Btu /lb) (psia) (*F) (1) Turbine by pass steam before throttling and attemperation 5,635,438 1190.8 965 - (2) Moisture-separator drains 891,045 349.7 - 372.1 360,455 1197.7 - 372.1 (3) Reheater drains 376,020 461.3 555.5 - g 293,966 534.8 950.6 - g (4) No. 3 low pressure heater drains 401,067 196.9 - 228.5 (5) No. 2 low pressure heater drains 448,820 134.7 - 166.7 (6) Moisture Separator-Reheater Relief Valve Flow The main condenser is also designed to receive steam from the moisture separator-reheater shell relief valves for a maximum period of one minute at the following conditions:
- a. Flow, Ib/hr 11,243,633
- b. Enthalpy, Btu /lb 1278.3
- c. Pressure, psia 182.1 i
Guaranteed free 0 2
- a. Plant loads from 10% to 50% 0.010 cc/ liter
- b. Plant loads from 50% to 100% 0.005 cc/ liter 10.4-39
TABLE 10.4-3 (Continued) Normal Circulating Water Temp. 67'F to 86*F (varies seasonally) Maximum Circulating Water Temp. 94'F (less than g
.. 1% of the time) j Turbine Exhaust Normal Pressure / Temp.
Low press. shell 2.01 in. Hg/102*F Inter. press. shell 2.48 in. Hg/10S*F High press. shell 3.22 in. Hg/118*F W l l l 10.4-40 l
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l l Table 10.4-4 Turbine Bypass Valve-Design Data Manufacturer General Electric Type Regulating-Angle globe (grouped in steam chests) Number of steam chests 2 Number of valves 7 (4 in one chest, 3 in the other chest) Design flow, per valve 769,800 lbm/hr Total bypass flow (35% of NB rated flow) 5,388,600 lbm/br Nominal valve size 6 1/2 inch Steam chest inlet connections (2) 18" nom. diam. Steam chest outlet connections (3 or 4) 10" nom. diam. D' O Design pressure / temp. 1250 psig/575'F q "i Valve actuation: lh Time lag from initial electrical signal to the time the bypass valve starts to open . . . . 10.10 sec. Total time from initial electrical signal to the time the bypass valve is fully open 10.30 sec. Deadban, pressure regulator demand to steam bypass valve motion, % Rate Nuclear Boiler Steam Flow 10.2% (Pressure regulator setpoint, 935 Psia) ,
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