ML19242D627

Submits Suggestions Re Need for More Operator Training in Handling Casualty conditions,in-plant Casualty Training During Refueling,& Utilization of Emergency Teams During Extreme Casualty Conditions

ML19242D627
Person / Time
Site:	Zimmer
Issue date:	05/30/1979
From:	Adams J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML19242D625	List: ML19242D627
References
JEA-P-3, NUDOCS 7908150564
Download: ML19242D627 (3)

Text

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May 30, 1979 JEA-P-3 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission H 1149 1717 H Street NW Washington DC 20555 Genticmen, I am writing this letter in response to telecon communications that I recently had with Mssrs. Thompson, Sauter, Mosley and others in an effort to present my own personal ideas and points of view concerning actions that could be taken to promote nuclear safety in light of recent events in the nuclear power industry. I am presently the operations superintendent for GE at the Zimmer I Nuclear Power Plant and have been in the startup business with GE for 6 years (including the startup of Browns Ferry 1,2,3.) Pre-vious to that I was in the nuclear navy on submarines (USS Silversides SSN679 and USS Lafayette SSBN616) as a qualified submarine officer.

I received my B.S. in Nuclear Engineering in 1969 from Texas A&M Univer-sity. With this background I now state my ideas whien again are per-sonal, not corporate.

I believe our basic existing problem today (aside from the established need for re-design in some cases) is the credibility of the utilities to operate their plants in a responsible and reliable fashion in the eyes of the American public. I also believe that the public is not tot-ally convinced that the NRC is maintaining its credibility in enforcing the utilities to this. I would respectfully suggest the following changes:

1. Training a) There is a distinct need for more training for the operators, shift supervisors or any other licensed Z person who could tite charge under casualty conditions (this would include operations superintendents, plant superintendents if their procedures indicate for them to take control under any conditions) . I would recom-mend this training take the form of simulator traininc involving casualty drills once a year which would be culminated by NRC evaluated drills. This evaluation should be used when considering the re-licensing of the operator. In addition to the simulator training, I believe a specialized team of NRC inspectors should visit (untancunced) each site once a year to evaluate the plant in the follcwing areas:

1. Interview each operator and shift supervisor in the area of casualry drills, tech specs and cther information needed to opere.te the plant.

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2. Exhmine the plant records such as the daily leg, night order book, tag out log , etc. to In turn, see how the plant is doing business.

some of the interview questions would be to see if the supervisory people understood what was out of service, what standing orders were in existance, etc.

3. Examine their emergency procedures - see if the '

operators understood it as well as anyone else identified in it (local civil defense, sheriff's office, etc.)

4. Examine the condition of the plant - what equip-ment is out of service and how long has it been that way, oil spills, water leaks, conditions. of the rad / chem labs, maintenance shops, how many outstanding work orders are not done, etc.

5. Interview their instrument and maintenance tech-

- nicians - do they understand what an essential piece of equipment is, how do they take it out of service and coordinate this with the control room.

6. Interview the plant superintendent and operations.

superintendant. Do they understand the condition of their plants?

7. There are many other areas too numerot.s to list in this letter, but the idea is there.

2. Casualty Training in Plant This is a very sensitive area which most utilities and people in the industry feel is detrimental to the indust:'f.

My personal feelings are that random drills of a nature that affect plant availability or potential equipment damage are detrimental, but I feel there are times something of this nature can be useful. The one time I believe scram drills are possible is when the utility is already planning to shut-down for refueling or planned maintenance. In this situation drills could be initiated by the NRC or, if this is too harsh, NRC evaluated trips in which the operators are aware that they will be scrammed and how. The NRC is there only to witness how they handle it and hcw the plant handles it. The details on this are lengthy, so I will delete them unless more infor-mation is desired.

3. Emercency Teams I believe one other area the NRC is considering is sending emergency teams to a site under extreme casualty conditions to take charge. I am sure this sounds good to the general public but, in my opinion, this is not feasible. I say this because I witnessed chaos that this can create at the Browns Ferry fi re . It is literally impossible for semecne (even if they are certified and qualified en that particular plant) i l' '\ ]~

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to ccme into a casualty condition and hope to direct activities unless they actually work in that capacity at that plant everyday. Each site is unique in its configuration and in order to direct the plant and its people you have to know its history, the capabilities of the operating people and all the events which have occurred leading up to the cas-ualty condition. It is not even possible, again in my opinion, for the plant superintendent or the operations superintendent to take charge under.these conditions unless they also go through the casualty re-training the operators and shift supervisors do. In short, if your operations and shift super-visors can't handle it, no one can. An NRC casualty team can be used in many ways, but don't take the control of their plant away from them - that's what they get paid to do.

Very Respectively, jy -

James E. Adams Operations Superintendent Zimmer I Nuclear Power Plant 737 (1 { ') , -