ML18033A012
| ML18033A012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/2018 |
| From: | Erin Carfang Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4 |
| To: | Rausch T Susquehanna |
| Carfang E | |
| References | |
| IR 2017004 | |
| Download: ML18033A012 (34) | |
See also: IR 05000387/2017004
Text
T. Rausch
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713
February 1, 2018
Mr. Timothy S. Rausch
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC
769 Salem Blvd., NUCSB3
Berwick, PA 18603
SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000387/2017004 AND 05000388/2017004
Dear Mr. Rausch:
On December 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2.
On January 19, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and
other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed
report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRCs Public Document
Room in accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections,
Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Erin E. Carfang, Acting Branch Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388
License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000387/2017004 and 05000388/2017004
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available
Sensitive Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP
NAME LMicewski SBarber EECarfang
DATE 01/28/18 01/31/18 02/01/18
1
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388
License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22
Report No. 05000387/2017004 and 05000388/2017004
Licensee: Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC (Susquehanna)
Facility: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: Berwick, Pennsylvania
Dates: October 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017
Inspectors: L. Micewski, Senior Resident Inspector
T. Daun, Resident Inspector
S. Barber, Senior Project Engineer
J. Ambrosini, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
A. Turilin, Project Engineer
M. Fannon, Resident Inspector
J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist
E. DiPaolo, Senior Reactor Inspector
T. Fish, Operations Engineer
T. Hedigan, Operations Engineer
Approved By: Erin E. Carfang, Acting Branch Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................ 3
1. REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................................... 4
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection ..................................................................................... 4
1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 5
1R05 Fire Protection .......................................................................................................... 6
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance ... 6
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 9
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................. 9
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments .....................................10
1R18 Plant Modifications ..................................................................................................11
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing .......................................................................................11
1R22 Surveillance Testing ................................................................................................11
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation .................................................................12
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System .................12
1EP5 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness ....................................................................13
2. RADIATION SAFETY ........................................................................................................13
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls .......................................13
2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls ...........................................................14
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment .............................................................................15
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ..........................................................................................................17
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ...........................................................................17
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution .....................................................................18
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit...........................................................................................23
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ...................................................................................... A-1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................. A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED .................................... A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED...................................................................................... .A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-9
3
SUMMARY
IR 05000387/2017004 and 05000388/2017004; October 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017;
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2; Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections performed by regional inspectors. The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions
(NRC) program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.
No findings were identified.
4
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On October 26, 2017, operators
reduced power to approximately 64 percent for a rod sequence exchange. Operators returned
the unit to 100 percent on October 29, 2017. On November 26, 2017, operators reduced power
to approximately 77 percent to perform a rod pattern adjustment and returned the unit to
100 percent the next day. On December 17, 2017, operators reduced power to approximately
77 percent to perform a rod pattern adjustment and returned the unit to 100 percent the next
day. On December 24, 2017, operators reduced power to approximately 80 percent to perform
a rod pattern adjustment and returned the unit to 100 percent power the same day. On
December 26, 2017, operators reduced power to approximately 65 percent to remove a reactor
feed pump from service to repair a hydraulic fluid leak on the pressure control unit. Operators
returned the unit to 100 percent power the same day. The unit remained at or near 100 percent
power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On October 27, 2017, operators
reduced power to approximately 60 percent by inserting a runback in response to rapidly
degrading main condenser vacuum caused by a spurious trip of the hydrogen recombiner.
Following restoration of a hydrogen recombiner, main condenser vacuum was restored and
operators returned the unit to 100 percent on the same day. On December 8, 2017, operators
reduced power to approximately 65 percent to perform a leak repair on the moisture separator.
Operators returned the unit to 100 percent the next day. On December 15, 2017, operators
reduced power to approximately 69 percent to perform a rod pattern adjustment. Operators
returned the unit to 100 percent power the next day, and remained at or near 100 percent power
for the remainder of the inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 2 samples)
.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Susquehannas readiness for the onset of seasonal low
temperatures. The review focused on the engineered safeguard service water pump
house and the emergency service water (ESW) system. The inspectors reviewed the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TSs), control
room logs, and the corrective action program (CAP) to determine what temperatures or
other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure Susquehanna
personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed
station procedures, including Susquehannas seasonal weather preparation procedure
and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the
selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the
operability of the systems during cold weather conditions. Documents reviewed for each
section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
5
.2 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Susquehannas preparations for a high wind and snow advisory
on December 12, 2017. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse
weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during this adverse weather
condition. The inspectors walked down the emergency diesel generators and ESW to
ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator actions defined in
Susquehannas adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential
systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse weather
response with operations and work control personnel.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
- Unit 1, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) during reactor core isolation cooling
(RCIC) system outage window (SOW) from October 23, 2017 - October 25, 2017
- Unit 1, division 1 residual heat removal (RHR) during division 2 SOW on
October 30, 2017
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the
reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed
applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, work orders,
condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of
equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted the systems
performance of its intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field
walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and
support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined
the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of
equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed
whether Susquehanna staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them
into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
6
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material
condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that
Susquehanna controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with
administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression
equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire
barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that
station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or
inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.
- Unit 2, core spray A pump room (fire zone 2-1B) on November 2, 2017
- Unit 1, remote shutdown panel room (fire zones 1-2B, 1-2D) on November 9, 2017
- Unit Common, diesel generator bay B (fire zone 0-41B) on November 22, 2017
- Unit 2, equipment and battery rooms east side (fire zones 0-28A-I, 0-28G, 0-28E,
0-28C) on December 11, 2017
- Unit 1, lower relay room (fire zone 0-24D) on December 11, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
(71111.11Q - 2 samples)
.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on October 23, 2017,
which included a feedwater heater leak resulting in a manual reactor scram, a loss of
coolant accident, and the failure of select components to automatically start as required.
The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified
completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and
emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness
of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant
conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The
inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by
the shift manager and the technical specification action statements entered by the shift
technical advisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and
training staff to identify and document crew performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
7
.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and reviewed reactivity manipulations associated with a rod
pattern adjustment conducted on Unit 1 November 26, 2017. The inspectors observed
the reactivity control briefing to verify that it met the criteria specified in Susquehannas
Operations Section Expectations Handbook. Additionally, the inspectors observed
licensed operator performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and
coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations
and standards.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11B - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021,
"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 11, and
Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification
Program.
Examination Results
The operating tests for the week of November 27, 2017, were reviewed for quality and
performance.
On December 22, 2017, the results of the annual operating tests were reviewed to
determine if pass/fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021,
"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 11, and NRC
IMC 0609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance
Determination Process. The review verified that the failure rate (individual or crew) did
not exceed 20 percent.
- 1 of 70 operators failed at least one section of the Annual Exam. The overall
individual failure rate was 1.4 percent.
- 0 of 13 crews failed the simulator test. The crew failure rate was 0 percent.
Written Examination Quality
The inspectors reviewed three written examinations previously administered during the
October/November 2016 examination cycle for qualitative and quantitative attributes as
specified in Appendix B of Attachment 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification.
Operating Test Quality
Ten job performance measures (JPMs) and five scenarios were reviewed for qualitative
and quantitative attributes as specified in Appendix C of 71111.11, Licensed Operator
Requalification Program.
8
Licensee Administration of Operating Tests
Observations were made of the dynamic simulator exams and JPMs administered during
the week of November 27, 2017. These observations included facility evaluations of
crew and individual performance during the dynamic simulator exams and individual
performance of JPMs.
Examination Security
The inspectors assessed whether facility staff properly safeguarded exam material.
JPMs, scenarios, and written examinations were checked for excessive overlap of test
items.
Remedial Training and Re-Examinations
The remediation plans and retake exams for operators who failed either the 2016
operating test or 2016 biennial written exam were reviewed to assess the effectiveness
of the remedial training. Remediation for the individuals was processed in accordance
with site procedures.
Conformance with Operator License Conditions
Medical records for three senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses and three reactor
operator (RO) licenses were reviewed to assess conformance with license conditions.
All records reviewed were satisfactory.
Proficiency watch standing records from January 2016 through November 2017 were
reviewed. All active licensed operators met the watch standing requirements to maintain
an active license.
No operators were reactivated from inactive status since the last inspection. Therefore,
this area was not inspected.
Records for the participation of licensed operators in the requalification program from
January 2016 through November 2017 were reviewed. Records for the performance of
licensed operators on annual requalification operating tests and biennial requalification
written exams were reviewed.
Simulator Performance
Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plant
control room. A sample of simulator deficiency reports was also reviewed to ensure
facility staff addressed identified modeling problems. Simulator test documentation was
also reviewed.
Problem Identification and Resolution
A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspection
reports, the licensees corrective action program, and the most recent NRC plant issues
matrix. The inspectors also reviewed specific events from the licensees corrective
action program which indicated possible training deficiencies, to verify that they had
been appropriately addressed. The senior resident inspector was also consulted for
insights regarding licensed operators performance. These reviews did not detect any
operational events that were indicative of possible training deficiencies.
9
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of
maintenance activities on structure, system, and component performance and reliability.
The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance work
orders, and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that Susquehanna was
identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the
maintenance rule. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the structure,
system, or component was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance
with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2)
performance criteria established by Susquehanna staff was reasonable. As applicable,
for structures, systems, and components classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed
the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these structures, systems, and
components to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Susquehanna staff was
identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across
maintenance rule system boundaries.
- Unit Common, sticking contacts on 480 volts-alternating current (VAC) motor control
center breakers on November 7, 2017
- Unit 1 and 2, electro-hydraulic control system degradations System 193/293 on
November 14, 2017
- Unit Common, commercial-grade dedication of capacitors on December 22, 2017
(quality control)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Susquehanna
performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The
inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the
reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that
Susquehanna personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)
and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When Susquehanna performed
emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and
managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and
discussed the results of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to
verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also
reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant
safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and
applicable requirements were met.
10
October 25, 2017
November 29, 2017
- Unit 1, protected equipment during division 2 ESW piping replacement on
December 13, 2017
- Unit 2, elevated risk during functional test of reactor pressure vessel low water level
automatic depressurization system (ADS) permissive on December 22, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 7 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-
conforming conditions based on the risk significance of the associated components and
systems:
- Unit Common, control room envelope in-leakage on October 4, 2017
- Unit 1, RCIC with a 53VDC short on October 25, 2017
- Unit Common, ESW/residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) piping corrosion
found during in-service inspection on December 15, 2017
- Unit Common, degradation of heater in Standby Gas Treatment System on
December 21, 2017
- Unit Common, containment boundary valve limit switches not environmentally
qualified for safety function on December 20, 2017
- Unit Common, fuel oil leak on diesel fuel oil pump on December 22, 2017
- Unit 1, standby liquid control accumulator tank pressure low on December 26, 2017
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to
assess whether technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject
component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk
occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate
sections of the TSs and UFSAR to Susquehannas evaluations to determine whether the
components or systems were operable. The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate,
compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
11
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 1 sample)
.1 Permanent Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated a modification to the containment hydrogen and oxygen
analyzers, Install Delphi Control System 11901 Temperature Control Board and
11901-MK Modification Kit. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing
bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the
modification. In addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated
with the upgrade and design change, including design specifications, system drawings,
installation and testing procedures, and the consequence risk factors screening.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed
below to verify that procedures and test activities adequately tested the safety functions
that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in
the procedure were consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis
and/or design basis documents, and that the test results were properly reviewed and
accepted and problems were appropriately documented. The inspectors also walked
down the affected job site, observed the pre-job brief and post-job critique where
possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was maintained, and witnessed the test or
reviewed test data to verify quality control hold point were performed and checked, and
that results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
- Unit Common, control room envelope testing on November 30, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of
selected risk-significant structures, systems, and components to assess whether test
results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, and Susquehanna procedure requirements. The
inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated
operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test
instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application,
tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied.
12
Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that
equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors
reviewed the following surveillance tests:
- Unit 1, RHR division 1 quarterly flow surveillance on November 9, 2017
- Unit 2, drywell leakage on November 28, 2017 and November 29, 2017
(RCS leak detection)
- Unit 1, RHRSW pump A automatic transfer logic test on December 18, 2017
- Unit 2, RHRSW division 1 quarterly flow verification testing on December 19, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted an onsite review to assess the maintenance and testing of the
Susquehanna alert and notification system (ANS). During this inspection, the inspectors
reviewed the Susquehanna siren system and backup route alerting, and the associated
ANS procedures and the Federal Emergency Management Agency ANS Design Report
to ensure compliance with design report commitments for system maintenance and
testing.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
(71114.03 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the Susquehanna Emergency Response
Organization (ERO) augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying
and augmenting the ERO to verify the readiness of key staff to respond to an emergency
event and to verify their ability to activate their emergency response facilities (ERFs) in a
timely manner. The inspectors reviewed: the Susquehanna Emergency Plan for ERF
activation and ERO staffing requirements, the ERO duty roster, applicable station
procedures, augmentation test reports, call-in drill reports, and corrective action reports
related to this inspection area. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of ERO
responder training records to verify training and qualifications were up to date.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
13
1EP5 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness (71114.05 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the efficacy of efforts to maintain the Susquehanna emergency
preparedness (EP) program. The inspectors reviewed: memorandums of agreement
with offsite agencies; procedures for the 10 CFR 50.54(q) Emergency Plan change
process; Susquehannas maintenance of equipment important to EP; records of
evacuation time estimate population evaluation; and provisions for, and implementation
of, primary, backup, and alternative ERF maintenance. The inspectors also verified
compliance with NRC EP regulations regarding: emergency action levels for hostile
action events, protective actions for on-site personnel during events, emergency
declaration timeliness, ERO augmentation and alternate facility capability, evacuation
time estimate updates, on-shift ERO staffing analysis, and ANS back-up means.
The inspectors further evaluated the ability to maintain Susquehannas EP program
through their identification and correction of EP weaknesses, by reviewing a sample of
drill reports, self-assessments, EP-related CRs, and 10 CFR 50.54(t) reviews since the
last NRC EP program inspection in November 2015.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstones: Occupational/Public Radiation Safety (PS)
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Susquehannas performance in assessing and controlling
radiological hazards in the workplace. The inspectors used the requirements contained
in 10 CFR 20, TSs, Regulatory Guide 8.38, and the procedures required by TSs as
criteria for determining compliance.
Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed the performance indicators (PIs) for the occupational exposure
cornerstone, radiation protection program audits, and reports of operational occurrences
in occupational radiation safety since the last inspection.
Radiological Hazard Assessment (1 sample)
The inspectors conducted independent radiation measurements during walkdowns of the
facility and reviewed the radiological survey program, air sampling and analysis,
continuous air monitor use, recent plant radiation surveys for radiological work activities,
and any changes to plant operations since the last inspection to verify survey adequacy
of any new radiological hazards for onsite workers or members of the public.
14
Instructions to Workers (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed high radiation area work permit controls and use, observed
containers of radioactive materials and assessed whether the containers were labeled
and controlled in accordance with requirements.
The inspectors reviewed several occurrences where a workers electronic personal
dosimeter (EPD) alarmed. The inspectors reviewed Susquehannas evaluation of the
incidents, documentation in the CAP, and whether compensatory dose evaluations were
conducted when appropriate. The inspectors verified follow-up investigations of actual
radiological conditions for unexpected radiological hazards were performed.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (1 sample)
The inspectors observed the monitoring of potentially contaminated material leaving the
radiological controlled area and inspected the methods and radiation monitoring
instrumentation used for control, survey, and release of that material. The inspectors
selected several sealed sources from inventory records and assessed whether the
sources were accounted for and were tested for loose surface contamination. The
inspectors evaluated whether any recent transactions involving nationally tracked
sources were reported in accordance with requirements.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency
(1 sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance with respect to radiation
protection work requirements. The inspectors evaluated radiation protection technicians
in performance of radiation surveys and in providing radiological job coverage.
Problem Identification and Resolution (1 sample)
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with radiation monitoring and
exposure control (including operating experience) were identified at an appropriate
threshold and properly addressed in the CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls (71124.02 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed Susquehannas performance with respect to maintaining
occupational individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably
achievable (ALARA). The inspectors used the requirements contained in 10 CFR 20,
Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10, TSs, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for
determining compliance.
15
Inspection Planning
The inspectors conducted a review of Susquehannas collective dose history and trends;
ongoing and planned radiological work activities; previous post-outage ALARA reviews;
radiological source term history and trends; and ALARA dose estimating and tracking
procedures.
Radiological Work Planning (1 sample)
The inspectors selected the following radiological work activities based on exposure
significance for review:
- Radiation work permit (RWP) 2017-2339, Main Steam Relief Valves
- RWP 2-17-2320, Drywell Scaffold
- RWP 2-17-2315, Drywell Temporary Shielding
For each of these activities, the inspectors reviewed: ALARA work activity evaluations,
exposure estimates, exposure reduction requirements, results achieved (dose rate
reductions, actual dose), person-hour estimates and results achieved, and post-job
reviews that were conducted to identify lessons learned.
Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Control (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed radiological work controls and ALARA practices during the
observation of in-plant work activities. The inspectors verified use of shielding,
contamination controls, airborne controls, RWP controls, and other work controls were
consistent with ALARA plans. The inspectors ensured that work-in-progress reviews
were performed in a timely manner and adjustments made to the ALARA estimates
when appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the results achieved against the intended
ALARA estimates to confirm adequate implementation and oversight of radiological work
controls. The inspectors also verified that the ALARA staff was involved with emergent
work activities and were revising both dose estimates and ALARA controls in the
associated RWPs/ALARA Plans, as appropriate.
Problem Identification and Resolution (1 sample)
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with ALARA planning and
controls were identified at an appropriate threshold and properly addressed in the CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the monitoring, assessment, and reporting of occupational
dose. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, Regulatory Guides 8.9 and
8.34, TSs, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
16
Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed radiation protection program audits, National Voluntary
Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) dosimetry testing reports and procedures
associated with dosimetry operations.
Source Term Characterization (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed the plant radiation characterization (including gamma, beta,
alpha, and neutron) being monitored. The inspector verified the use of scaling factors to
account for hard-to-detect radionuclides in internal dose assessments.
External Dosimetry (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed dosimetry NVLAP accreditation, onsite storage of dosimeters,
the use of correction factors to align electronic personal dosimeter results with NVLAP
dosimetry results, dosimetry occurrence reports, and CAP documents for adverse trends
related to external dosimetry.
Internal Dosimetry (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed internal dosimetry procedures, whole body counter
measurement sensitivity and use, adequacy of the program for whole body count
monitoring of plant radionuclides or other bioassay technique, adequacy of the program
for dose assessments based on air sample monitoring and the use of respiratory
protection, and internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure.
Special Dosimetric Situations (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed Susquehannas worker notification of the risks of radiation
exposure to the embryo/fetus, the dosimetry monitoring program for declared pregnant
workers, external dose monitoring of workers in large dose rate gradient environments,
and dose assessments performed since the last inspection that used multi-badging, skin
dose or neutron dose assessments.
Problem Identification and Resolution (1 sample)
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with occupational dose
assessment were identified at an appropriate threshold and properly addressed in the
CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
17
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 9 samples)
.1 Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed data for the following three EP PIs: (1) drill and exercise
performance, (2) ERO drill participation, and, (3) ANS reliability. The last NRC EP
inspection at Susquehanna was conducted in the fourth calendar quarter of 2016.
Therefore, the inspectors reviewed supporting documentation from EP drills and
equipment tests from the fourth calendar quarter of 2016 through the second calendar
quarter of 2017 to verify the accuracy of the reported PI data. The review of the PIs was
conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151. The acceptance
criteria documented in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment PI Guidelines, Revision 7,
was used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Susquehannas submittal of the Mitigating Systems
Performance Index for the following systems for the period of October 1, 2016 through
September 30, 2017:
- Unit 1 RHR System
- Unit 2 RHR System
- Unit 1 RHRSW/ESW
- Unit 2 RHRSW/ESW
To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, the inspectors
used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 7. The inspectors also reviewed Susquehannas
operator narrative logs, CRs, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports,
event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the
submittals.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
18
.3 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee submittals for the occupational radiological
occurrences PI for the first through third quarter 2017. The inspectors used PI
definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy
of the PI data reported. The inspectors reviewed electronic personal dosimetry
accumulated dose alarms, dose reports, and dose assignments for any intakes that
occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were potentially
unrecognized PI occurrences. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of various Locked
High and Very High Radiation Area entrances to determine the adequacy of the controls
in place for these areas.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Effluent Occurrences
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee submittals for the radiological effluent TS/Offsite Dose
Calculation Manual radiological effluent occurrences PI for the first through third quarter
of 2017. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI 99-02,
Revision 7, to determine if the PI data was reported properly. The inspectors reviewed
the public dose assessments for the PI for public radiation safety to determine if related
data was accurately calculated and reported.
The inspectors reviewed the CAP database to identify any potential occurrences such as
unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have
impacted offsite dose. The inspectors reviewed gaseous and liquid effluent summary
data and the results of associated offsite dose calculations to determine if indicator
results were accurately reported.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples)
.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution,
the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant
status reviews to verify Susquehanna entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate
threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and
addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive
equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors
performed a daily screening of items entered into the corrective action program.
19
The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as applicable, for identified
defects and non-conformances, Susquehanna performed an evaluation in accordance
with 10 CFR Part 21.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues to identify trends that
might indicate the existence of more significant safety concerns. As part of this review,
the inspectors included repetitive or closely-related issues documented by Susquehanna
in trend reports, site PIs, major equipment problem lists, system health reports,
maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The inspectors also
reviewed Susquehannas CAP database for the third and fourth quarters of 2017 to
assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human performance
issues, etc.), as well as, individual issues identified during the NRCs daily CR review
(Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed the most recent trend report for the period of
May to August, 2017, conducted under LS-125-1009, Station Trending Manual,
Revision 2, to verify that Susquehanna personnel were appropriately evaluating and
trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors noted a significant reduction in the number of CRs written in the past
year. The licensee identified that there was a decrease in CR generation in the most
recent trimester, but noted that taken on an annual basis, Susquehanna is still within
5 percent of the industry average for CR generation rate. The licensee documented an
action in DI-2017-18445 for the Performance Improvement group to evaluate the
decrease in CR generation. The inspectors will continue to monitor the trend, as well as
review the results of the licensees evaluation.
The inspectors continued to focus on the licensees assessment and management of
plant risk. Inspectors noted that the licensee has implemented a more formalized
process for communicating risk management actions (RMAs) to the station during
periods of elevated risk by including a written explanation of RMAs in the Plan of the
Day. This has heightened awareness of the plant staff as a whole, and also specifies
who is responsible for ensuring the completion of each RMA.
The inspectors continued to monitor the stations actions to address human performance
errors and events. Susquehannas analysis of the adverse trend had determined that
the common flawed defenses were questioning attitude, procedure use and adherence,
and verification practices. Since these are already key elements of Susquehannas
Focus on Five communication strategy, which is emphasized to the station on
pamphlets, posters, and emails, the station intends to continue to communicate using
the Focus on Five theme.
20
In the past two quarters, the inspectors have noted fewer examples of human
performance errors, with no scrams. The inspectors will continue to monitor, as it is
difficult to determine what is driving the statistical improvement, and whether or not it is
sustainable and permanent. The licensee independently recognized this trend in the
May - August 2017 Performance Assessment Report, which noted a 19% decrease in
human performance error trend codes applied to CRs written for the 2nd trimester 2017,
in comparison to the last 5 quarters, and that there were 10% fewer crew clock resets
this trimester than the average for the last 5 trimesters.
.3 Annual Sample: Actions to Address an Adverse Trend in CR Initiation Timeliness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensees analysis and corrective
actions associated with CR-2016-16254, Trend in CR initiation timeliness identified,
written July 1, 2016. Specifically, a trend was identified in the timeliness of generating
CRs, as well as processing CRs through the corrective action program.
The inspectors assessed Susquehannas apparent cause evaluation and the
prioritization and timeliness of Susquehannas corrective actions were appropriate.
The inspectors review was predominantly focused on the results of daily CAP item
screenings to gauge the timeliness of writing CRs for emerging issues.
The inspectors also reviewed specific materials such as documentation of work group
discussions, email communications to the plant staff about expectations and standards
for writing CRs, and special articles in weekly plant newsletters that addressed the
adverse trend. This review constituted one follow-up inspection sample for in-depth
review as defined in IP 71152.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective
actions and that these actions were generally adequate to address the trend of untimely
CR generation. The inspectors noted that occasionally, CR generation does not meet
the station expectation of timeliness.
One recent example from September 2017 is CR-2017-16658 which was not written by
plant staff until more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after plant staff were made aware of a deficiency,
and only after the inspectors made station management aware of the condition. This
deficiency concerned inadequate control of clear plastic on the refueling floor, with
several noted examples of noncompliance with station procedure NDAP-QA-0507,
As another example, in July 2017, and again in November 2017, when engineering staff
wrote CR-2017-13423 and CR-2017-19520 to document conditions adverse to quality
concerning safety-related equipment, the descriptions had a level of detail beyond what
is required for the initial reporting of a condition, including multi-page attachments,
calculations, and analyses justifying operability.
21
Station procedure NDAP-QA-0703, Operability Determinations and Functionality
Assessments, states that a person discovering a potential or suspected degraded or
nonconforming condition shall immediately notify the main control room and ensure the
concern is documented in a CR. The procedure further states that entry into the CAP
should not be delayed while waiting for completion of extensive evaluations.
The intent of the process laid out in the procedure is to inform the main control room as
quickly as possible so a licensed operator can perform an Initial Operability Screening
(IOS). The procedure does allow for an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of more in-depth information
gathering and analysis through the prompt operability determination process, if this is
considered appropriate following the initial operability screening. The inspectors
determined that in both cases, CR generation was unnecessarily delayed while the
engineer worked to first gather the information needed to support a potential prompt
The inspectors independently evaluated the deficiencies noted above for significance in
accordance with the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B,
Issue Screening, and Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The inspectors
determined these conditions were deficiencies of minor significance and, therefore, are
not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
.4 Annual Sample: Actions to Address Inadequate Self-Assessment of Fire Brigade
Deficiencies
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensees analysis and CAP
associated with CR-2017-10767, CR-2017-14358, and the associated NRC-identified
violation documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000387; 388/2017002.
Specifically, the inspectors noted numerous discrepancies during a fire drill on
May 1, 2017 that were not identified or documented by the drill controllers.
The inspectors assessed Susquehannas cause evaluation and the prioritization and
timeliness of Susquehannas corrective actions to determine whether Susquehanna was
appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting the problems identified during
the May 1 drill. The inspectors also reviewed specific materials such as documentation
of training and coaching provided to fire brigade members and drill controllers, and CRs
generated following subsequent fire brigade drills. On December 20, 2017, the
inspectors observed another fire drill to assess the performance of the fire brigade as
well as the effectiveness of the drill monitors at identifying and critiquing deficiencies.
This review constituted one follow-up inspection sample for in-depth review as defined in
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors assessed that the corrective actions taken by the licensee were
adequate to address the issue. The inspectors noted very few weaknesses in fire
brigade performance during the December 20, 2017 drill, and most of these were
independently identified and critiqued by the licensee drill monitors. However, the
inspectors observed that the control room once again did not sound the fire alarm until
approximately nine minutes after drill initiation.
22
This was also an observation made during the May 1, 2017 drill. The inspectors noted
that the control room staff was waiting to sound the alarm because the step in the fire
response procedure said to sound the alarm upon confirmation of actual fire, even after
the drill simulation had presented two diverse indications that installed fire protection
systems had actuated.
The licensee subsequently entered the issue into the CAP and intends to revise the fire
response procedure to include an explicit definition of a confirmed actual fire.
.5 Annual Sample: Repetitive Failures of Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Swing
Bus Automatic Transfer Switches (ATSs)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Susquehannas identification,
evaluation, and resolution following repetitive failures of LPCI Swing Bus ATSs. This
issue resulted in non-cited violation (NCV) 05000387, 388/2016004-02, Failure to
Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality with LPCI Swing Bus ATS. Two
redundant Class 1E 480 VAC swing buses provide power to their respective divisions
LPCI valves. The LPCI swing bus is capable of receiving electrical power from either of
two Class 1E 480 VAC sources, a preferred and an alternate source. An ATS is
provided to automatically transfer the swing bus from the preferred to the alternate
source upon a loss of power from the preferred source. The NCV was written as a result
of two failures of ATSs to properly swap power supplies (one in March 2016 and one in
September 2016) during surveillance testing. Both of these failures were determined to
be the result of inadequate corrective actions. The issues were entered into the CAP as
CR-2016-05589, CR-2016-21554, CR-2016-25715, and CR-2017-03953.
The inspectors assessed Susquehannas problem identification threshold, causal
analysis, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and
timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether Susquehanna was appropriately
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these issues and
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors
compared the actions taken to the requirements of Susquehannas CAP, Title 10 of the
CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and with the reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. In
addition, the inspectors reviewed documentation associated with this issue, and
interviewed engineering and regulatory affairs personnel to assess the effectiveness of
the implemented and planned corrective actions.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors determined that Susquehanna took appropriate actions to identify the
apparent cause of the ATS failures and appropriately identified, prioritized, and
implemented corrective actions. The March 2016 failure of 1ATS229 was determined to
be due to a deformed upper linkage bolt caused by the upper linkage rod being out of
proper adjustment. Prior corrective actions from an ATS failure in 2013 determined that
linkage rods needed to be adjusted for proper operation of the ATSs. However, the
preventive maintenance instructions were not adequate to ensure optimal linkage rod
adjustment. The September 2016 failure of 2ATS219 was determined to be due to
inadequate lubrication.
23
During the prior performance of preventive maintenance on 2ATS219 the task of
performing cleaning and lubrication of the main contactor hinge point was not performed.
A CR was written to generate a work order and reschedule the task, however, the task
was not rescheduled or performed.
Following the September 2016 failure of 2ATS219, Susquehanna consulted the ATS
vendor manufacturer (Russelectric). The vendor provided technical input regarding
proper linkage rod adjustment, ATS component lubrication practices, and well as other
improved maintenance practices.
As a result, Susquehanna revised preventive maintenance instructions to incorporate the
vendor recommended maintenance practices and reduced the preventive maintenance
intervals for the ATSs. The inspectors verified that Susquehanna also incorporated
these actions for the sites other Russelectric ATSs (i.e., the emergency diesel generator
ATSs). The inspectors concluded that the actions taken by Susquehanna to incorporate
the vendor recommendations into maintenance instructions were appropriate and, had
they been incorporated earlier, could have prevented subsequent failures.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On January 19, 2018, the inspectors presented the inspection results to
Timothy S. Rausch, President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the
Susquehanna staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained
by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A-1
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Personnel
T. Rausch, President and Chief Nuclear Officer
B. Berryman, Site Vice President
D. Jones, Plant Manager
J. Barnhart, Radiological Operations Supervisor - Programs
B. Bridge, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Genovese, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J. Gorman, Emergency Preparedness Manager
B. Franssen, Support General Manager
J. Jennings, Nuclear Support General Manager
J. Jessick, Radiological Operations Supervisor - ALARA
T. Karc, Preventive Maintenance Program Owner
M. Krick, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Supervisor
C. Manges, Regulatory Affairs Senior Engineer
N. Pagliano, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
R. Williams, Components Maintenance Optimization Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
None.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
NDAP-00-1913, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 9
Condition Reports
CR-2017-18002
CR-2017-18004
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
2037807
2081395
Miscellaneous
Certification Letter for Winter Readiness, November 29, 2017
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
SO-152-002, Quarterly HPCI Flow Verification, Revision 72
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
2091242
Attachment
A-2
Drawings
M-155, Unit 1 P&ID HPCI, Sheet 1, Revision 59
M-156, Unit 1 P&ID HPCI Turbine-Pump, Sheet 1, Revision 39
M-156, Unit 1 P&ID HPCI Lubricating and Control Oil, Sheet 2, Revision 11
M-151, Unit 1 P&ID RHR, Sheet 1, Revision 72
Miscellaneous
DBD004, Design Basis Document for HPCI
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Miscellaneous
FP-213-237, Core Spray Pump Room A (II-17) Fire Zone 2-1B Elevation 645-0, Revision 5
FPRR Volume 1 & 2
FP-113-109, Remote Shutdown Panel Room (I-109) Access Area (I-102) Fire Zones 1-2B, 1-2D
Elevation 670-0, Revision 5
FP-013-192, Diesel Generator Bay B Fire Zone 0-41B Elevations 677, 660 and 710,
Revision 4
FP-013-171, Equipment and Battery Rooms Unit 2 East Side (C-613, 609, 614, 615) Fire Zones
0-28A-I; 0-28G; 0-28E; 0-28C Elevation 771-0, Revision 4
FP-013-139, Unit 1 Lower Relay Room (C-203) Fire Zone 0-24D Elevation 6980, Revision 9
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
ON-SCRAM-101, Reactor Scram, Revision 6
ON-FWHTG-101, Feedwater Heating Off-Normal Operation, Revision 1
ON-LVL-101, RPV Level Control System Malfunction, Revision 1
EO-000-103, Primary Containment Control, Revision 19
EO-000-102, RPV Control, Revision 17
OP-AD-300, Administration of Operations, Revision 24
RE-OTP-103, Guidelines for Planned Power Maneuvers, Revision 15
GO-100-012, Power Maneuvers, Revision 53
OP-AD-338, Reactivity Manipulations Standards and Communications Requirements,
Revision 31
2017 LOR Annual Operating Exam Sample Plan
OI-AD-044, Return to Shift Duty
TQ-106, Licensed Operator Requalification Program
14.ON.20370.151 49.ON.39967.151 50.EO.26390.003 00.EO.27617.101
34.EO.20802.151 52.OP.26092.151 31.OP.20280.101 00.EP.20919.101
00.ON.20986.102 73.EO.23889.101
Biennial Written Exams (Previously administered October-November 2016)
2016 Biennial Exam Alpha Shift
2016 Biennial Exam Bravo Shift
2016 Biennial Exam Foxtrot Shift
Simulator Scenarios
LOR 315 LOR 402 LOR307 LOR 508 LOR618
A-3
Simulator Testing
SSES-5301, Manual Scram, Revision 6
SSES-5303, Simultaneous Closure of all MSIVs, Revision 6
SSES-5501-2016-HP, Simulator to Reference Plant Comparison at Power Level, Revision 13
LOR-EXM-601 ATWS, Revision 12
LOR-EXM-516, Main Steam Leak, Revision 0
LOR-EXM-517 LOCA, Revision 0
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Condition Reports
CR-2017-02584 CR-2017-10276 CR-2017-10807 CR-2017-11645
CR-2017-12018 CR-2017-12022 CR-2017-13783 CR-2017-13785
CR-2017-13829 CR-2017-14505 CR-2017-16696 CR-2017-17198
CR-2017-18883
Action Requests
16896
17169
1145057
Miscellaneous
FA-07112136-1, Failure Analysis Report for Cutler Hammer A200 Starter Part Number
A200M1CACE, Revision 1
Failure Analysis of a Reversing Starter, Model A210M1CACE, Batch/Serial 351022228-STR-1,
November 1, 2017
Failure Analysis of a Reversing Starter, Model A210M1CACE, Batch/Serial 50985-002-00001,
November 1, 2017
Failure Analysis of a Reversing Starter, Model A210M1CACE, Batch/Serial 56547K1-02-0001,
November 1, 2017
B 3.6.3.2, Drywell Air Flow System, Revision 2
10CFR Part 21 Notification: P21-06092017, A200 Series Contactor failing to open when
de-energized, June 9, 2017
Eaton letter, Status update- Field reports of A200 Size 1 contactors failing to open when
de-energized, June 9, 2017
Eaton letter, Status update- Field reports of A200 Size 1 contactors failing to open when
de-energized, September 26, 2017
Exelon Lab Report, Failure Analysis of a Reversing Starter Manufacturer:
Eaton-Cutler Hammer, April 11, 2017
Level of Effort Checklist, CR-2017-11645
Maintenance Rule Basis Document- System 60
Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet, July 14, 2017
VP-0717415-1, Starter & Overload Relay Test Data Sheet, Revision 30
Maintenance Rule Basis Document- System 93L
EDU-CAP-0048, Capacitor Manufactured Formally BY GE, Revision 1
SUS-57107, Exelon Power Labs, CGD Testing of Capacitors, October 24, 2017
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Condition Reports
CR-2017-20468
A-4
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
2111655
Miscellaneous
Protected Equipment Clearance Order, Unit 1 HPCI Protected During RCIC SOW
Protected Equipment Clearance Order, Unit 1 Division 1 RHR, October 30, 2017
Protected Equipment Clearance Order, Unit 1 RCIC, November 27, 2017
Protected Equipment Clearance Order, ESW Division 1, December 11, 2017
Protected Equipment Clearance Order, Fire Risk Management Zones Protected by OI-013-002,
Attachment D, December 11, 2017
Risk RMAs for the Week of December 11, 2017, December 8, 2017
Risk RMAs for the Week of December 25, 2017, December 22, 2017
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
NDAP-QA-0703, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Revision 30
NDAP-QA-0424, Control Room Envelope Habitability Program, Revision 3
SO-070-B01, Monthly Standby Gas Treatment Train B, Revision 4
Condition Reports
CR-2017-13061 CR-2017-13423 CR-2017-17462 CR-2017-17463
CR-2017-17485 CR-2017-17522 CR-2017-17659 CR-2017-18243
CR-2017-18437 CR-2017-19246 CR-2017-19490 CR-2017-19520
CR-2017-20222
Action Requests
17458
Drawings
E-324, Schematic Diagram Annunciation Reactor Core Cooling System Benchboard IC601,
Sheet 3, Revision 4
E-324, Unit 1Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Cooling System Benchboard IC601, Sheet 7,
Revision 15
E-381-16, Connection Diagram Reactor Protection System RHR & RCIC Terminal Boxes,
Revision 9
VC-157, Common P&ID HVAC Control Diagram Reactor Building Standby Gas Treatment
System, Sheet 3, Revision 34
Miscellaneous
EC-030-1019, SSES Control Room Habitability Envelope Hazardous Chemical Analysis,
Revision 2
EC-RADN-1125, CRHE and Off Site Post LOCA Doses, Revision 6
EC-030-1018, Response to NEI 99-03 Control Room Habitability Guidance Appendix A Smoke
Evaluation, Revision 0
NRC Generic Letter 2003-01, Control Room Habitability
PLA-5711, SES Follow-up response to Generic Letter 2033-01 Control Room Habitability,
February 3, 2004
PLA-5861, SES Follow-up response to Generic Letter 2033-01 Control Room Habitability,
February 11, 2005
PLA-5916, SES Follow-up response to Generic Letter 2033-01 Control Room Habitability,
June 28, 2005
BOP-VT-17-169, Inspection of Wrapped Coatings and General Condition, October 27, 2017
A-5
EC-070-0013, Standby Gas Treatment System Charcoal Filters, Revision 1
NEDC-31344, Environmental Qualification Report, MSIV Limit Switch
EQAR-004, SSES EQ Binder EQAR-004, NAMCO Limit Switches Model Numbers
EA740-20000, -20001, -20100, -50100, -80000, -80001 Environmental Qualification
Assessment Report, Revision 14
EC-053-1001, Determination of Design Basis and Pressure Requirements for SLC
Accumulators, Revision 3
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Drawings
J17-46, Unit 1 & 2 K-IV Electrical Wiring Diagram Panels 1C226A, 1C226B, 2C226A & 2C226B,
Sheet 2, Revision 6
M-2157, Unit 2 P&ID Containment Atmos Control, Sheet 3, Revision 28
J17-46, Unit 1 & 2 K-IV Electrical Wiring Diagram Panels 1C226A, 1C226B, 2C226A & 2C226B,
Sheet 4, Revision 6
Miscellaneous
EC 1848599, Install A Delphi Control System 11901 Temperature Control Board and
11901-MK Modification Kit, Revision 0
4.30, Delphi Control Systems, 11901 Temperature Control Board and 11901-MK Modification
Kit Field Installation Procedure, Revision 2
Document 19350, Bill of Material Bechtel Power Corp, SSES Units 1 & 2, Purchase Order
88-56-J-17-B
Comsip Inc. Model K-IV Instruction Manual, Revision 2, March 24, 1982
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
SO-149-B02, Quarterly RHR System Flow Verification Division 2, Revision 29
SO-150-002, Quarterly RCIC Flow Verification, Revision 57
OP-150-001, RCIC System (Reactivity Impact), Revision 47
SO-152-006, HPCI Comprehensive Flow Verification, Revision 25
SO-152-015, Two Year HPCI System Remote Position Indicator Checks, Revision 9
SO-152-004, Quarterly HPCI Valve Exercising, Revision 31
NDAP-QA-0424, Control Room Envelope Habitability Program, Revision 3
SO-030-151, Control Structure Boundary Envelope Air In-Leakage VIA Tracer Gas Testing,
Revision 1
Condition Reports
CR-2016-18196 CR-2017-17463 CR-2017-20094 CR-2017-20141
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
1808107 1855263 1993843 1997594 2018444 2018446
2041918 2054060 2079619 2081468 2085813 2086042
2105241 2107704 2111091 2111110 2111655 2114269
Miscellaneous
E1105-02
E1520-02
PLA-5916, SSES Final Resolution to Generic Letter 2003-01 Control Room Habitability,
June 28, 2005
A-6
PLA-5861, SSES Follow-Up Response to Generic Letter 2003-01 Control Room Habitability,
February 11, 2005
PLA-5711, SSES Follow-Up Response to Generic Letter 2003-01 Control Room Habitability,
February 3, 2004
SO-116-A02, 92DY-RHRSW Valve Exercise- Div 1, Unit 1
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
SO-149-A02, Quarterly RHR System Flow Verification Division I, Revision 27
OP-149-001, RHR System, Revision 47
SO-116-312, 1P506A Unit 1 RHRSW Pump A DC Control Automatic Transfer Logic Test,
Revision 0
Condition Reports
CR-2017-17671
CR-2017-19627
Drawings
M-151, RHR, Sheet 1, Revision 72
Miscellaneous
SO-200-006, Drywell Leakage Calculation Worksheet, Revision 87
SO-200-006, Drywell Floor Drain Inleakage Calculation Worksheet Instruction, Revision 87
SO-216-A03, 92DY- RHRSW Sys Flow Verif- A LOOP, Unit 2
Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Evaluation
Condition Reports
CR-2016-25200
CR-2017-10496
Miscellaneous
SSES Emergency Plan, Revision 61
Susquehanna Nuclear Power Station, Siren Alert Notification System Design Evaluation,
Final Report, dated September 2008
Letter from FEMA Region III to Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, dated November 7, 2008
TEMPEST T-112/ T-121 Omni-directional Siren Installation, Operation, Maintenance and
Parts Manual, Revision E
EP-108, Alert Notification System-American Signal Corporation Sirens, Revision 2
ANS Testing and Maintenance Records, Spring 2016 - Spring 2017
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Miscellaneous
EP-102, Review, Revision, and Distribution of the SSES Emergency Plan and 50.54(Q)
Evaluations, Revision 7
SSES Emergency Plan, Revision 61
On-call pager test results 2016-2017
EP-113, Emergency Preparedness Staff Training, Revision 0
TQ-113, Emergency Plan Training, Revision 4
50.54(q) Screens and Evaluations:
A-7
S2016-06-06-01, Revision 2
S2017-02-16-01
S2017-07-03-01
E2017-09-08-01
E2017-09-07-01
Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Condition Reports
CR-2016-02543 CR-2017-02868 CR-2017-18657 CR-2017-18694
Miscellaneous
SSES Emergency Plan, Revision 61
NOSP-QA-401, Internal Audits, Revision 1
NASP-QA-406, Control of Audit Commitments, Revision 13
Focused Area Self-Assessment DI-2015-29217
Focused Area Self-Assessment DI-2016-00962
Focused Area Self-Assessment DI-2015-29216
EP Excellence Plan, Revision 7
EP-115, Equipment Important to Emergency Response, Revision 8
ETE Annual Assessment, 2015 and 2016
SSES Evacuation Time Estimate Sensitivity Study Construction of the South Valley Parkway in
Nanticoke, Pennsylvania, November 2016
Letters of Agreement/Memoranda of Understanding 2016, 2017
SI-179-319B, 24 Month Calibration of Containment Area High Radiation Monitoring System
Channel RITS-15720B, Revision 0
SC-233-115, Calibration of the Unit 2 Turbine Building Vent Radiation Monitor System Low
Range Noble Gas Channel, Revision 1
SC-233-116, Calibration of the Unit 2 Turbine Building Vent Radiation Monitor System Accident
Channels, Revision 1
Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Condition Reports
CR-2017-05095 CR-2017-05119 CR-2017-05590 CR-2017-06369
CR-2017-06865 CR- 2017-07325 CR-2017-07337
Section 2RS2: Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Miscellaneous
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Unit 2 18th Refuel and Inspection Outage Radiological
Performance Report
Section 2RS4: Occupational Dose Assessment
Procedures
HP-TP-223, Internal Dose Investigations and Evaluations, Revision 14
HP-TP-201, Operation of the Whole Body Counting System Using Apex-Invivo Software,
Revision 3
HP-TP-208, Performance Verification and Calibration of the Whole Body System, Revision 14
HP-TP-723, Personal Air Sampling, Revision 0
HP-TP-222, Special Dosimetry Issuance and Criteria, Revision 23
NDAP-QA-0625, Personnel Radiation Exposure Monitoring Program, Revision 18
A-8
Condition Reports
CR-2017-04795
CR-2017-05329
Miscellaneous
Lesson Plan HP009, Prenatal Radiation Exposure Briefing, Revision 4
NVLAP Annual Reports 2016 & 2017 for Landauer, Inc. Scope of Accreditation
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
NDAP-QA-0737, Reactor Oversight Process Performance Indicators, Revision 18
Condition Reports
CR-2016-14083
CR-2017-06220
Miscellaneous
ANS Reliability PI data, September 2016- June 2017
DEP PI data, September 2016- June 2017
ERO Drill Participation PI data, September 2016- June 2017
EP-114, Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators, Revision 1
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI RHR System, Performance Limit Exceeded, Unit 2,
October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI RHR System, Unavailability Index, Unit 2, October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI RHR System, Unreliability Index, Unit 2, October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI RHR System, Performance Limit Exceeded, Unit 1,
October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI RHR System, Unreliability Index, Unit 1, October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI RHR System, Unavailability Index, Unit 1, October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI Cooling Water System, Unreliability Index, Unit 1, October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI Cooling Water System, Unreliability Index, Unit 2, October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI Cooling Water System, Unavailability Index, Unit 1,
October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI Cooling Water System, Performance Limit Exceeded, Unit 1,
October, 2017
MSPI Derivation Report, MSPI Cooling Water System, Performance Limit Exceeded, Unit 2,
October, 2017
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Condition Reports
CR-2016-05589 CR-2016-10998 CR-2016-11217 CR-2016-11618
CR-2016-12098 CR-2016-12854 CR-2016-13039 CR-2016-14500
CR-2016-14613 CR-2016-15295 CR-2016-16254 CR-2016-18049
CR-2016-21554 CR-2016-25715 CR-2016-27289 CR-2017-03953
CR-2017-10767 CR-2017-14358 CR-2017-19229 CR-2017-19239
CR-2017-19928 CR-2017-19433 CR-2017-20755 CR-2017-21207
A-9
Miscellaneous
ACE for CR 2016-16254 Revision A, August 4, 2016
ACE for CR 2016-16254 Revision B, August 19, 2016
CARB Meeting Minutes, August 23, 2016 - August 25, 2016
Hot Box 17-27, October 11, 2017
Fire Brigade Quarterly Drill, Scenario #15
TQ-171-0102, Fire Brigade Drill Critique Form, Revision 4
Licensee Event Report 05000387/2016-007-00, Inoperability of Swing Bus Transfer Switch due
to Deformed Bolt on Linkage, May 3, 2016
Russelectric Inc. Operation and Maintenance Instructions, Russelectric ATS, June 20, 1979
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACE apparent cause evaluation
ADS automatic depressurization system
ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable
ANS alert and notification system
ATS automatic transfer switch
CAP corrective action program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR condition report
ERF emergency response facility
ERO Emergency Response Organization
ESW emergency service water
HPCI high pressure coolant injection
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
LER licensee event report
LPCI low pressure coolant injection
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
PI performance indicator
RCIC reactor core isolation cooling
RHRSW residual heat removal service water
RMA risk management action
RO reactor operator
RWP radiation work permit
SOW system outage window
SRO senior reactor operator
SSES Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
TS technical specifications
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
VAC volts-alternating current