ML18011B048

LER 95-009-00:on 951005,unanticipated Actuation of ESF Components While in Refueling Outage 6 Due to Defective Retest Procedure.Revised Temporary Procedure to Reset SI signal.W/951103 Ltr

ML18011B048
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	11/03/1995
From:	Donahue J, Fleming C CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-95-099, HNP-95-99, LER-95-009-01, LER-95-9-1, NUDOCS 9511090110
Download: ML18011B048 (6)

Text

~ PRIORITY (ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSLON NBR:9511090110 DOC.DATE: 95/11/03 'NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 pi AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FLEMING,C.W. Carolina Power & Light Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power & Light Co. R RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 95-009-00:on 951005,unanticipated actuation of ESF components while in refueling outage 6 due to defective Oi retest procedure. Revised temporary procedure to reset SI signal.W/951103 ltr.

R DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE-TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. I i NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 T

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 FILE 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 DE7EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DS SA/S PS B/B 1 1

'RR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 N

NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESKS ROOM OWFN 5DB (415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 27 ENCL 27

Carolina Power & Light Company William R. Robinson PO Box 165 Vice President New Hill NC 27562 Harris Nuclear Plant NOV 0 5 1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-95-099 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report concerns an unexpected ESF actuation of the 1B-SB train's Emergency Safeguards Sequencer during shutdown conditions.

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue General Manager Harris Plant MV Enclosure c'r. Mr.

S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)

Mr. D. J. Roberts (NRC - HNP)

~ rgP 9511090110 951103 I PDR ADQCK 05000400 (

S PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC Tel 919362-2502 Fax 919362.2095

~ ~

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150.0104 I(4)5) EXPIRES 04I30I98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH TIES MANDATORY )NFORMATIO COLLECTION REQUEST: 50O HRS. REPORTED lESSON LfARRED ARE )NCORPORATED RIT TIE UCENSING PROCESS AND FE0 BACK TO UIOUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDUI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) f BURDEN STNATE TO THE INFORMATlONAND Rf CORDS MANAGEMENTBRANCH(Ye F33)

U.S. NUClfAR REGUIATORT ColQl)SSIO)L WASHNGTO)L OC 205550m), AND TO (See reverse for required number of PAPERWORK REDUCT)ON PROJECT O)50010)L OFHCE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET WASHWGTOIL DC 20503.

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FACIUTY NAME u) DOCKET NUMSER (2) PAGE ls)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit )(r 1 50-400 1 OF 3 TITlE ta)

Unanticipated actuation of Engineered Safety Features {ESF) components while in Refueling Outage 6, due to a defectiv retest procedure.

EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 FACILIIYNAME DOCKET NVMGER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER FACILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 05 95 95 009 00 11 03 95 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR Er Check one or more 11 MODE (9) 5 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a) (2)(v) 50.73(a) (2) (I) 50.73(a) (2) (viii)

POWER 0.2203 a 1 20.2203 a 3 I 50.73 a 2 ii 5073a 2 x LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2) (I) 20.2203(a) (3) (ii) 50.73(a) (2) (iii) 73.71 s-" .v v" mac<:v'"-v 20.2203 a 2 ii 20.2203 8 4 50.73 a 2 iv OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a) I2)(v) Specify In Abstract balo or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Onclvda Area Cods)

Carey W. Fleming, Project Analyst - CAP/OEF (919) 362-2313 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 REPORTABLE REPORT'ABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single. spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 5, 1995, an inadvertent Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation occurred while the plant was in Mode-5 (Cold Shutdown) for Refueling Outage 6. During the performance of a temporary test procedure used to satisfy Technical Specification surveillance requirements for Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System Flow Control Valves, unexpected Solid State Protection System (SSPS) signals were generated that initiated the 1B-SB (B-Train)

Emergency Sequencer's Safety Injection (Sl) program and tripped the Reactor Auxiliary Building No)mal Ventilation System. The Sequencer functioned properly and started available B-uain components as required. No Emergency Core Cooling System flow was delivered to the Reactor Coolant System due to the alignment of the Residual Heat Removal System. This event was caused by inadequate technical content of the temporary procedure. The procedure did not contain proper guidance to ensure that the applicable SSPS Slave Relay was reset prior to relanding electrical leads during the restoration portion of the test.

Corrective actions included revising the temporary procedure to reset the SI signal and restore the B-train components.

Additionally, a similar temporary test, which contamed the same error, was reviewed and revised prior to its use.

The plant's procedure review and approval process was also revised to specify the use of multi-discipline technical reviews when warranted. There were no component or system failures associated with this event.

NRC FORM 366 (4.95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO R45I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 1 DOCKET LER NUMBER 6 PAGE 3 YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹1 50-400 2 OF 3 95 009 00 TEXT (ifmore spaceis required, use addirional copies of iVRC Form 366A/ l17l During Refueling Outage 5 (RFO5), which occurred during the spring of 1994, a modification was made to the opening circuitry for the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System Pumps Flow Control Valves. Post-modification testing was completed during RF05. Subsequently, the required tests for this new ESF function were included into the appropriate refueling outage interval surveillance tests. The initial performance of this new test requirement was conducted in RFO6 with revised ESF Actuation Test Procedure, OST-1825. During this test, one portion was not adequately verified which resulted in the need to retest the "automatic open" signal from the B-train K635 Slave Relay.

On October 5, 1995, the plant was in Mode-5 (Cold Shutdown) for Refueling Outage 6 with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) fill and vent preparations in progress. RCS pressure was being maintained between 325 and 350 psig and RCS temperature was less than 180 degrees. To perform the previously mentioned retest for the AFW Flow Control Valve's "automatic open" signal from the B-train K635 Slave Relay, a temporary operations surveillance test procedure (OST-9013T) was performed. To prevent actuating unnecessary functions during this test procedure, electrical leads other than the circuit to the AFW Flow Control Valves were removed from the B Train K635 Slave Relay. Successful testing was accomplished which verified the operability of the "automatic open" signal circuitry. However, during the recovery portion of the procedure, when the first electrical lead was landed to the K635 Slave Relay, a SSPS signal was generated which isolated the Reactor Auxiliary Building Normal Ventilation System. When the second lead was landed, a signal was generated that initiated the 1B-SB (B-train) Emergency Sequencer's Safety Injection Program. Operations personnel in the Main Control Room diagnosed the ventilation system trip and B-train sequencer actuation and took actions to ensure the plant was in a stable condition. Components that were not already running and not administratively removed from service (i.e., under clearance) started as demanded by the B-train sequencer. Safeguards verification printouts from the plant's process computer were used by the control room staff to verify the actuated equipment per the Post-Trip/Safeguards Actuation Procedure (OMM-004). Due to the existing operating alignment of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System and the fact that no other slave relays actuated, there was no delivery of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) fluid to the Reactor Coolant System. Throughout the event, decay heat removal was adequately maintained by the in-service A-train RHR pump. This event constituted a four-hour NRC notification pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii), and the notification was made via the Emergency Notification System at 1811 hours0.021 days <br />0.503 hours <br />0.00299 weeks <br />6.890855e-4 months <br />.

CrKK:

This condition was caused by inadequate/incorrect procedural guidance contained in OST-9013T, with respect to removing the actuation signal and resetting Slave Relay K635 before landing the lifted leads (i.e., defective procedure).

Both of the SSPS signals were generated when the K635 relay leads were relanded with the relay still in its "actuated" condition following testing. A factor that contributed to the procedure discrepancy was that personnel involved in writing the temporary procedure and performing the required technical reviews, did not initially understand the process which was required to be accomplished to remove the actuation signal and to subsequently reset the K635 Slave Relay.

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event since safety related components actuated as required and there were no temperature, pressure, or reactivity perturbations on the primary plant. The ESF actuations that occurred were not required to be operable with the plant in Mode-5, Cold Shutdown. The event involved limited actuation of components from one slave relay only; there was no ECCS injection into the Reactor Coolant System. During at-power operating conditions, a test of this type would not have been performed due to the limitations of Technical Specifications. This condition constitutes an unplanned ESF actuation and is therefore being reported per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

NIIC FORM358AI445I

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4eSI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME 1 DOCKET LER NUMBER 6 PAGE 3 YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹1 50-400 3 OF 3 95 009 00 TEXT /Ifmore speceis reriuired, use edditionel copies of hfRC Form 366Ai l17)

There have been no unplanned ESF'actuations due to incorrect slave relay test procedures.

1. A temporary change was made to OST-9013T to reset the B-train K635 relay to its normal, non-actuated, position and the procedure was successfully completed.

2. Another temporary procedure (OST-9014T) for testing a similar slave relay of this type was prepared and available for use at the time of the event. This test was not performed until a revision was completed based on the lessons learned from this event. Following revision, OST-9014T was satisfactorily completed.

3.. The procedure review and approval process (AP406) has been revised to specify the use of multi-discipline technical reviews when warranted.

System Codes:

Engineering Safety Features Actuation System - JE Component Code:

Device, Master Sequence - 34