ML18005B073

LER 89-015-00:on 890827,discovered That Fuel Handling Bldg Operating Floor Equipment Hatch in Storage Location on Operating Deck Not Installed as Required.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedure revised.W/890926 Ltr

ML18005B073
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/26/1989
From:	Richey R, Schwabenbauer CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HO-890097-(O), LER-89-015-01, LER-89-15-1, NUDOCS 8910020137
Download: ML18005B073 (6)

Text

gc CELE RATED DIOKBU'EON DEMONISTllON SYFI'EM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8910020137 DOC.DATE: '89/09/26 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACXL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400

AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Carolina Power & Light Co.

RICHEY,R.B. Carolina Power 6 Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFIL1ATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-015-00:on 890827,fuel handling bldg equipment hatch not installed as required during fuel, movement.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL .

SIZE:

TXTLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPXENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME ,LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BECKER-,D 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE .1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DS P 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 .1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR EP M 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1

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Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165

'ew Hill, NC 27562 SEP 2 6 1989 File Number'SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'HO-890097 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 89-015"00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, JtAI R. B. Richey, Man ger Harris Nuclear Project RBR:djs Enclosure cc.'r. R. A. Becker (NRR)

Mr. W. H. Bradford (NRC SHNPP)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC RII)

"~'~<"--OOO'~Or) r='0;; WqP+

II MEM/LER-89-015/1/Osl

NRC FORM 366 U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (669) APPROVED OMB NO. 31504)104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPFRWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104I, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMSER l2) PA E SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE(4)

UNIT 1 400>DF04 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EQUIPMENT HATCH NOT INSTALLED AS REQUIRED DURING FUEL MOVEMENT DUE TO PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) R E PORT DATE (7) O'THER FACILITIES INVOLVED (BI

'rm SEOUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR .'gc.'UMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

,karl NUMBER i) o s o o o Ill(0 08 27 8 9 8 9 0 1 5 0 0 0 9 2 6 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): (Check One or more Of the fotlovrlnp) (11 OPERATING MODE IB)

] 20.402(B) 20A05(c) 60.73(el (2) liv) 73.710>I POWER 20.405( ~ ) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(el(2) lv) 73.71(c)

LEVEL 0 20A05(e) u l(iil 50.36(cl(2) 50.73(el(2) lvli) OTHER ISpecify ln Atnrrect treiow end in Text, HIIC Form 20A05(e) (I ) (iii) 50.73(e) (2) li) 50.73(e)(2)(viii)(A) 36'6AI 20.405(el(1)(iv) 50.73(e I (2)(4) 50,73( ~ ) l2) (vii (BI 20.405(e)(1) lv) 50.73 (v) l2 I (iii) 50.73( ~ ) (2Hxl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

RICHARD SCHWABENBAUER TEI.EPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TECHNICIAN 91 9 36 2- 2 66 9 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. MANUFAC TURER TURER i~!(%38))i

<3i%%

SUPPLEMENTAL. REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES Illyer, complete EXPECTED SUdhtISSIOH DATEI NO ABsTRAGT ILlmlt to teoo rpecer, l.e., epproxlmetefy fifteen Ilnple rpet'e rypevrrlrren lintel l16)

The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 95 percent reactor power on August 27, 1989. Plant personnel were in the process of transferring spent fuel from the shipping cask to the spent fuel storage pool. Foll'owing the movement of the fifth fuel element at 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) operating floor equipment hatch was in the storage location on the operating deck, and not installed as required. Fuel movement was immediately stopped. The equipment hatch was then installed and fuel movement resumed. SHNPP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Page 9.1.4-7 assumes that no irradiated fuel, outside of sealed casks, will be handled or transported inside the FHB, unless the operating floor equipment hatch to the unloading area is in place.

The removal of the hatch cover would prevent the FHB Emergency Exhaust System from performing its intended function in the event of a postulated fuel handling accident.

The event was caused by procedural inadequacies.

Corrective actions will include procedure revisions and personnel training.

This event is being reported in accordance with '10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(v) as it resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition.

NRC Form 366 (669)

NRC FORM 355A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (889) APPROVED 0M B NO. 3)600)06 EXPIRES: 6/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT- REPORT ILERI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50i) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31604104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.

FACILITY NAME ul DOCKET NUMBER LT)

LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR ~S. SSQVSNTIAL grp RSVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR= POWER PLANT NVMSSR ~

NVM SR UNIT 1 o s o o o 4 o 0 1 5 0 0 02 OFO 4 TEXT ///more soeoe ir ~ /Ir/red, oee odd/o'one/H/IC Form 38583/ (IT)

DESCRIPTION:

The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 95 percent reactor power on August 27, 1989. Preparations for the transfer of spent fuel were in progress on" the night of August 26, 1989. At this time, it was reported t'o the senior reactor operator (SRO) assigned to the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) that all prerequisites for- the handling of spent fuel were complete with the exception of the Spent Fuel Bridge Crane start-up check list of Attachment III to Fuel Handling Procedure (FHP)-020, Fuel Handling Operations. Removal of some minor interference delayed completion of the check list until the morning of August 27, 1989. The operation was turned over to another SRO on the morning of August 27, 1989. This SRO also understood that all prerequisites were met. The SRO began the transfer of spent fuel at 0701 hours0.00811 days <br />0.195 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.667305e-4 months <br />.

Following the movement of the fifth fuel element at 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that the FHB operating floor equipment hatch was in its storage location on the operating deck, and not installed as required. Upon this discovery, fuel movement was- immediately stopped. The equipment hatch was then installed and fuel movement resumed.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Page 9.1.4-7 assumes that no irradiated fuel, outside of sealed casks, will be handled or transported inside the FHB unless the operating floor equipment hatch to the unloading area is in place. The event resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition.

CAUSE:

The process of handling spent fuel involves several site procedures.

Corrective Maintenance (CM)-M0300, Spent Fuel Cask Handling .(IF-300 Cask),

includes steps for removing the operating deck cover (step 7.1.3) and the closing of the FHB railroad car door. The operating deck hatch cover is also removed by CM-M0300 (step 7.14.1) prior to moving the cask back to the loading bay. There is no intermediate step in CM-M0300 that reinstalls the deck cover prior to spent fuel movement.

In the applicable Fuel Handling Procedure, FHP-020, there are 14 prerequisites (covering 1 page) and 44 Precautions and Limitations (P&L) (covering 16 pages). A large number of P&Ls are operating limitations on crane and hoist operation and fuel assembly manipulation. The prerequisites do not require signoff, and also do not list the hatch cover as a prerequisite. The hatch cover is listed as a P&L. Standard practice requires operators to verify prerequisites and review P&Ls prior to commencing an activity. However, P&Ls routinely are limits to be observed while performing an activity, not conditions that must be established prior to the activity. The account by the SRO who initiated fuel movement is that he understood that the hatch cover was a prerequisite and had been previously checked.

NRC Form 388A (889)

NRC FORM 366A UA. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (64)9) APPROVED OMB NO. 31504)104 r

EXPIRES: 4/30)92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) ESTIMATED BURDEN PER AESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD TEXT CONTINUATION 'OMMENTS REGAADING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWOAK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER 12)

LER NUMBER (5) PAGE I3)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR g<?:

SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUM>>ER NUM>> ~ R UNIT 1 o s'o o o 4 015 0 0 0 3 oF0 4 TEXT Nmor>> EO>>O>> J>> I>>0>>(r>>d, Ir>>>>>>dddion>>l JVRC Forrrr 35543 I (17)

CAUSE: (continued)

While the position of the hatch cover could have been discovered during the review of P6Ls it was not. The error resulted because applicable procedures did not call out the replacement of the hatch cover, did not identify replacement as a prerequisite and because replacement was "buried" in a large number of PKLs.

SAFETY CONSE UENCES:

The FHB design includes an Emergency Exhaust System. The function of this system is to (1) actuate on high radiation in the FHB, (2) isolate the non-nuclear ventilation to the operating floor, (3) create a negative pressure of 1/8" water gauge in the operating floor area, and (4) exhaust the FHB air through High Efficient Particulate Air (HEPA) and charcoal filters.

The system is designed to limit doses from a postulated fuel handling accident to less than the guidelines of 10CFR Part 100. With the hatch cover not in place, the volume and potential leakage paths increase. In particular the supply ventilation ducts for the unloading bay are not isolated by the actuation signal for the FHB emergency exhaust. Also, while the FHB access door was closed at the time of the event, the leak tightness of the door is not tested.

While a fuel handling accident did not occur while the hatch cover was off, the off-site dose consequences of such an accident would be higher. With the hatch cover removed, the normal air supply system would remain open to the loading area and probably prevent the FHB emergency exhaust system from performing its intended function.

This event is being reported resulted in the plant being in in accordance with 10CFR50(a)(2)(v), as it an unanalyzed condition.

There have been no similar events reported.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS/ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

1. The FHB operating floor equipment hatch was installed prior to any further fuel movement.

2. FHP-020 will be revised to include placement of the hatch cover as a prerequisite.

3. FHPs will be revised to include signoffs for prerequisites, and the PGLs will be reviewed for items that should be moved to the prerequisite section.

4. CM-M0300 will be revised to include a step to replace the hatch cover after the spent fuel cask has been placed in the decontamination pit.

NRC Form 366A (689)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (689) APPROVED OMB NO. 3)50010E E XP I R ES: E/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 503) HRS. FOAWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE AECOADS IJ'I, TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR <>Pr SEQVENTIAL ~>'(y REVISION NVMSER ~jy NVMSER UNIT 1 o s o o o 4 o 0 1 5 0'0 04 pF 04 TEXT /llm<

>cu lf <<puke. usu agio'cu>>f HRC F<<m 366AB/OT) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS/ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: ,5. This event will be reviewed with appropriate personnel involved with fuel movement. EIIS CODE INFORMATION: Fuel Handling Building ND Spent Fuel Bridge Crane DF NRC F omI 366A (669)