ML18005A434

LER 88-009-00:on 880422,discovered That on 880419 Tech Spec 3.0.3 Violated.Caused by Train a Being Placed in Test While Train B Declared Inoperable for Maint & Testing Due to Personnel Error.Procedures Will Be revised.W/880519 Ltr

ML18005A434
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	05/19/1988
From:	Jerrica Johnson, Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-880113-(O), LER-88-009-03, LER-88-9-3, NUDOCS 8806010189
Download: ML18005A434 (7)

Text

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) 1

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DEACCESSION NBR: 880601018 DOC. DATE: 88/05/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET F*CIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Pone< Plant Unit i Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION JOHNSONi J. R. Carolina Power 5 Light Co.

WATSONi R. A. Carolina Power 5 Light Co.

RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-009-00: on 880419i during test oF A triani plant response would not meet Tech Specs requirement. caused bg personnel error. Addi operator training 5 procedures revised.

W/880519 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR l ENCL TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpti J SIZE:

etc.

NOTES: Application for permit renewal Filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BUCKLEYi B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB DEDRO 1 ANSI' 1 1 1 NRR/DEST/*DS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 NRR/DEBT/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB WILLI 8D 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 10 1 1 ,NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2 NRR/DRIS/SIB 9A 1 1 PMA LRB12 1 -

1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 02 1 1 RES TELFORD. J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 RES/DRPS DEPY 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG8cG 4 FORD BLDG HOY> A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS. J 1 1 NSIC MAYSi G 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45

sPRC Form 365 UA. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION (943)

APPROVED OMB NO. 31604104 EXPIRES: 6/31/BS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME ll) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAO6 3 S ON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT T 1 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 OF04 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION WHILE TESTING THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) 4EPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IS)

MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR .<P~. BeaveitriaL 4evsw OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMes DOCKET NUMSERISI yRA NUMBBR  : .. NVMBeR MONTH 0 5 0 0 0 1 9 8 8 8 0 0 9 0 0 051988 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF R (): (Check one or more of the foiiovfinpl l11) 0 5 0 0 0 OPE4 AT IN 0 MODE (9) 20.402(B) 20.405(c) 60.73(el(2)(iv) 73.71(B)

POWER 20A05(el(1)BI 50.36(e) (1) 50.73( ~ )(2)NI 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 20.405( ~ l(1) (9) 50.35(c) (2) 50.73(sl(2)(viil OTHER (Specify In AOtiieet INiow end In Text, NRC Form 20.405( ~ ) (1) (IIII 50.73(e) (2) (Il 60.73(e)(2)(riil) (Al 3PEAI 20A05(e) (1) (Irl 50.73(e)(2)(e) 50.73( ~ ) (2)(rliil(S) 20.405(e) (1) (v) 50.73(e) l2)(III) 60.73( ~ )(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

TELEPHONE NUMBER JOSEPH R. JOHNSON AREA CODE SENIOR SPECIALIST REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 919 362 -2 083 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILV4E DESC4ISED IN THIS REPORT (13)

MANUFAC. EPORTABLE $ . '

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM 'COMPONENT MANUFAC. EPORTABLE . ~r TURER TO NPROS TURER TO NPRDS y

IJIIRI

o r< I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SV 5 MISS I ON DATE (16)

YES IIIyet, complete EXPECTED SVBMISSIDII DATEI NO ABST4ACT ILImlt to f400 rpscet, I.e., epproxlmsrely fifteen tlnpie specs typewritten linn) (15)

ABSTRACT:

'On April 19, 1988, at 1310, the plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100X power.

Train "A" of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) was placed in test from 1310 until 1426, preventing automatic actuation of the "A" train engineered safeguards components. At the same time, some "B" train components for testing or preventive maintenance. Consequently, Technical werE'noperable Specification 3.0.3 appl.ied for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 16 minutes while the Train "A" SSPS was in test. This situation was not recognized by operations personnel, and neither the Technical Specifications nor plant procedures explicitly prohibited the configuration. The problem was discovered on April 22, 1988 during review of Equipment Inoperable Records (EIRs) ~

This event was caused by an error made by the Operations'ersonnel in the Clearance Center and the Main Control Room, coupled with a situation which was not adequately covered by Technical Specifications or applicable operations procedures.

Corrective actions will include additional operator training, and revisions to plant procedures.

8806010189 88051'7)

PDR ADQCI4I 05000EIOO 8 PDR NRC Form 366 (94)3)

NRC Form SSSA US. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (843 l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (1I OOCKET NUMSER (21 LER NUMSER (Sl PACE (31 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NVM ER NVMSER SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 o s o 0 o4 0088 0 9 0 0 0 2 QF0 4 TEXT ///moro 4/roco /4 /lr//orS Nm aAWonV/YRC Form ~ 3/ (Itl DESCRIPTION:

On April 19, 1988, at 1310, the plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100X power.

Train "A" of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) (EIIS:JG) was placed in test for routine, required surveillance from 1310 until 1426. The plant Technical Specifications allow an SSPS channel to be in test for up to two hours if the other channel is operable, however, several. components of the "B" train had been previously declared inoperable at various times during the day for preventive maintenance and testing. The "B" train components which had been declared inoperable included the "B" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pump, the "B" Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump, the "B" Control Room Emergency Filtration unit, and the "B" Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)

Emergency Exhaust. The actual status of these components are discussed more thoroughly in the "Analysis of Event" section of this report.

The conflict between the "B" train inoperable equipment and the "A" train SSPS test was not recognized by operations personnel at the time, consequently, Technical Specification 3.0.3 applied for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 16 minutes while the train "A" SSPS was in test. This situation was discovered on April 22, 1988 during review of Equipment Inoperable Records (EIRs).

CAUSE:

This event was caused by an error made by the Operations personnel in the Clearance Center and the Main Control Room, coupled with a situation which was not adequately covered by Technical Specifications or applicable operations procedures. Neither 'he plant Technical Specifications nor the operating procedures explicitly addressed mechanical equipment associated with instrument channels. Each of the EIRs were done at a different time, and the interrelationship was not noticed by the preparers or reviewers. The oversight was identified during a subsequent review of a group'of EIRs.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The Operations unit uses EIRs to track the status of equipment covered by Technical Specifications and to track completion of applicable compensatory actions and LCO actions. EIRs are used when equipment is voluntarily removed from service as well as when equipment is found to be inoperable. The "B" train components listed above were voluntarily removed from service to perform testing. During the event, the status of each component was as follows'.

r The "B" AFW Pump had been declared 'inoperable to change a setpoint on a blowdown isolation signal but would have still responded to all manual or automatic signals as needed. The ESW Pump breaker was racked out to prevent a start during calibration of the discharge pressure transmitter but could have been returned to service very quickly if needed. The air handling unit NRC FORM 344A *U.S.GPO:1880 0 024 538/455 (8831

NRC Sores 348A US. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 10831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3180&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 SACILITY NAME lll OOCKET NUMSER 121 LER NUMSER (El ~ AOE 131 YEAR SEOUENZIAL REVISION NUMEEIS NUMEEIS SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 o oooo 400 009 0 0 3 OF 0 4 TEXT 0'moro EEMco ir /44voorE Ir>> a/4/ono/N//C %%dnrr 3SSES/1171 ANALYSIS OF EVENT: (continued) breakers were racked out for heater testing, but their failure to start would have little short term effect on plant response to an accident. They could have been easily restored to service if "A" SSPS involved testing of the actuation logic. During the test, the "A" needed. 'he surveillance test on the SSPS train was not capable of actuating "A" train equipment when valid signals with the minimum coincidence were input to the logic train.

The impact of this equipment configuration is presented below.'.

Train "A" components were always available by manual control from the Main Control Room.

2. If there had been a loss of off-site power, the "A" train components controlled by the loss of off-site power sequencer would have been started. These components are similar to the loads req'uired by a Safety Injection signal. However, a Safety Injection signal from the "A" SSPS is required to automatically start the "A" Residual Heat Removal pump and align the valves to put Safety Injection equipment into the proper configuration. Plant Emergency Operating Procedures require confirmation of proper equipment alignment by the control operators after an indication of the need for Safety Injection or React. or Trip.

3. In the event of a demand from the "B" SSPS, concurrent with off-site power available, all "B" train components, except two air handling units and the ESW pump would have responded properly. A Safety Injection signal would cause Emergency Service Water to isolate from the Normal Service Water system. However, in this scenario the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) would not be loaded and could run at no load for a period of time without damage. Emergency Service Water flow to the "B" train could have been established from the Main Control Room after the Safety Injection signal was reset.

4. In the event of a demand from the "B" SSPS concurrent with loss of off-site power, Emergency Service Water would not be available for operation of the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator. Manual operator action would be required to detect the loss of "B" train ESW and shut down the "B" EDG pending restoration of the breaker for the "B" ESW pump.

In summary, during the test of the "A" train SSPS, the plant response would not mee't the minimum equipment capability required for a design basis accident. As stated above operator action would compensate for starting "A" train components, but would not 'meet the response time required to mitigate design basis accidents.

NRC PORM 344* o U.S.GPO: I 0800424 838/4dd I0831

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NRC foIol 3SSA US. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION I04)3)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3I50&104 EXPIRES: 8/3)/88 fACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMSER I2) LER NUMSER IS) PACE I3) yCAR',g) 5CCUCNTIAL ' jjI) OCVISION NUMCCR $ NUM CII SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 04 00 8 009 0 0 4 oF 0 4 TEXT /8'IIKoo R>>ce )I ICCM)NE I>>o SIC/ooo//YRC Foml 3SSA'4/)17)

ANALYSIS OP EVENT: ('continued)

A thorough review was conducted of EIRs that were in effect during performance of monthly SSPS tests during the previous 12 months. It was discovered that a similar event occurred on August 18, 1987. At that time, Train "A" of the SSPS was placed in test for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 2S minutes while the "B" ESW Screen Wash Pump and the RAB Exhaust Damper (D-61) were inoperable. This event was not recognized at the time, and consequently, was never reported.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. The relevant operating procedures will be revised to highlight the need to consider the operability of all equipment on the other train when performing testing of the solid state protection system.

2. The "Operator Prerequisite Summary Sheet" in the SSPS Actuation Logic and Master Relay tests will be revised to remind operators that opposite train equipment must be evaluated before permitting these tests to be run (MSTI-0001 and MSTI-0320).

3. Training on this event will be provided to active licensed personnel.

NIIC POIIM 545A *U.S.GPO:10884).824.538/455 IS83)

Carolina Power 8 Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 MAY i 9888 File Number.'HF/10-13510C Letter Number'. HO-880113 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 88-009-00 Gentlemen.'n accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project JRJ:acm Enclosure cc. 'Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP)

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MEM/LER"88"009/1/OS1