ML17305A644

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Forwards Suppl 1 to LER 89-013-00.Rept Being Submitted to Include Info Requested by Part 21
ML17305A644
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/1990
From: James M. Levine
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17305A645 List:
References
REF-PT21-90, REF-PT21-90-049-000 192-00641-JML-T, 192-641-JML-T, PT21-90-049-000, PT21-90-49, NUDOCS 9004100144
Download: ML17305A644 (19)


Text

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ACCESSION'BR:9004100144 DOC.DATE: 90/03/26 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECXPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk) R

SUBJECT:

Forwards Suppl 1 to LER 89-013-00.Rept being submitted to include info requested by 10CFR21.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE28T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: Licensee Event Report (LER) 6 Part 21 Rept Combination (50 Dkt)

NOTES 05000528 RECXPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 PETERSON,S. 1 1 INTERNAL ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 XRM TECH ADV 1 1 IRM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 NRR/ADP/DRP14E4 1 1 NRR/ADSP DIR 1 1 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H ..1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DET/ESGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OGCB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRAB1 0 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DRIS/RSI B9A 1 1 NRR/DRIS/RVIB9D 1 1 NRR/DST 8E2 1 0 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRR/DST/SPLB8Dl 1 1 NR~RDSg/~Kg3 8E 1 1 NSIC SILVERI E 1 1 EG.-EXLE ~=02 1 1 R'

REGION 1 REGION 3 REGION 5 1,1 1

1 1

'1 REGION 2 REGION 4 RES/DSXR/EIB 1

1 1

1 1

1 RES/DSR/HFB/HFS 1 1 RES/DSR/PRAB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G STUART,V.A 4 INPO RECORD CTR 1 1 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 D

D NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEl CONTACT THE, DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 56 ENCL 55

Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O, BOX 52034 ~ 'PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 JAMES M. LEVINE 192-00641-JML/TRB/SBJ VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION March 26, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)

Licensee Event Report 89-013-01 File'0-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 1 to Licensee Event Report (LER) No.

89-013-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.

The previous report was submitted as a voluntary report to inform the NRC of the concern on the seismic qualification of specific valve actuators.

Engineering evaluations of this condition have not conclusively determined if the as found actuator configuration was seismically qualified. Therefore, this report is being submitted to include the information requested by 10CFR21. In accordance with 10CFR21.21(b)(2), three copies of this report are being provided to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, (Acting) Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.

Very truly yours, JML/TRB/SBJ/kj Attachment CC: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)

E. E. Van Brunt J. B. Martin D. H. Coe T. E. Murley (3 copies)

T. L. Chan A. C. Gehr J. R. Newman INPO Records Center cIL)04 lOOl 9OO326~~,.g QOQID O ~O(

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NRC FORM 366 V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (669) APPROVED OMB NO. 31504H04 EXP IR ESI 4I30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS .

INFOAMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50AI HAS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS FORWARD'OMMENTS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630), V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E TITLE (4)

Palo Verde Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 5 28 1 OF Q8 Unqualified Containment Purge Isolation Valves EVENT DATE IS) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE 17) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR o?or SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI Seel NUMBER PS NUMISR Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 0 72 68 9 8 9 0 1 3 0 1 0 3 2 6 9 0 Palo Verde Unit 3 0 5 0 0 0 5 3 Q OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE RLOUIREMENTS OF 10 CF R (). ICneck one or more of tne foliose'npl III)

MODE (9) 20.402 (6) 20A05(c) 50,73( ~ ) (2)(ivl 73.71(6)

POWER 20.405( ~ l(1)B) 5046(c) (I) 60.73(e) (2)(v) 73.71(cl LEVEL p p p 20,405(e I (1)(il) 50.36 (c) (2) 50,73(el(2) (rii) OTHER (Specify In At?street

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~'. '+~ 20.405(e) Ill(i)i) 50.73( ~ ) l2)(il 50.73(el(2) (riiil(A)

Pefovr end In Test, PIRC Form 36SAI 20A05( ~ l(1) (iv) 50.73(el(2)(ii) 50.73( ~ ) (2)(viii)(B) 10CFR21 20.405(e)(1)(vl 66.73(el(2) (iii) 50.73( ~ )(2)(nl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Tiiomas R. Bradish, Compliance Manager 60 23 93 2 52 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOA EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

MANUFAC. REPORTABLE MANUFAC. EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TO NPADS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TVRER TVRER TO NPADS

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES Ilf yeL complere EXPECTED SVSJIISSION DATE) NO ABSTRACT ILlmlt to te00 speceL I e., epproslmerely fllreen slnple tpece typevrritren lines) (15)

On July 26, 1989, ae approximately 1803 MST, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in a refueling outage with t'e core (AC) off-loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power, and Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 6 (REFUELING) when APS Engineering Department personnel determined thae the coneainment purge power access valves were not insealled in accordance with the configuration specified in ehe Environmental Qualification Report for those valves. The containmene purge power access valves had a handwheel on the manual jacking screw which was noe included in the seismic analysis for the valves. These handwheels were installed in all three Units.

As immediate corrective action, the containment power access purge valves were declared inoperable until the handwheels were removed. This condition was caused by personnel error during the review, preparation, and subsequene approval of qualification reports. Current qualification procedures provide the criteria to ensure thorough reviews of qualification reports are performed.

An engineering evaluation of this condition has not conclusively determined if the as found actuator configuration was seismically qualified. Therefore, APS assumes that the actuators are not seismically qualified. Accordingly, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR21. No previous similar events have been reported.

())00410C) 1 "I0 P)00326 FOR ADOCK 0 00052:-::

NRC Form 366 (669) PDC

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NRC FORM 365A UJL NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO)r(MISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3(60d(06 (589)

EXPIRES: 6/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) COLLECTION REOUESTI 600 HRS. FORWARD 'NFORMATION COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20566, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160d(oi). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)

YEAR for SEOUCNTIAI NUM 64

)Lo'SVrerON

'+~ NUMSER Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 5 2 8 89 0 13 01 02 o" 0 8 TEXT ///more e/reoe /e rer/rr/rer/ Iree m(d/o'orN/HRC Prem 356A3/ OT)

DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:

A. Initial Conditions On July 26, 1989, at approximately 1803 MST, the following plant conditions existed when APS Engineering Department personnel (utility, non-licensed) determined that the containment purge power access valves (JM)(ISV) were not installed in accordance with the configuration specified in the Environmental Qualification Report for those valves.

Palo Verde Unit 1 was in a refueling outage with the core (AC) off-loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool.

Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power.

Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 6 (REFUELING).

B. Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):

Event Classification: Condition outside of design basis (10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iii)). Condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (10CFR21).

Note: This section includes information requested by 10CFR21 concerning the nature of the defect and dates for which information was obtained/developed, On July 26, 1989 at the 1803 MST, Engineering Department personnel determined that containment power access purge valves had a handwheel on the manual jacking screw which was not included in the seismic analysis for the valves. These handwheels were installed in all three Units.

A review of the qualification documentation for the containment purge power access containment isolation valves indicates that the valve actuators were qualified to seismic category I without the manual handwheels in place. These valves are:

NR C Form 366A (549)

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ra NRC FORM 388A UJL NUCL'EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION rr APPROVED 0MB NO. 31800104

{889)

EXPIRES: rU30)92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COLLECTION REQUEST: 80J) HRS. FORWARD THIS,'NFORMATION COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PJ)30). U.L NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20858, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)800104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

YEAR yS> SeaueNWAL NUM SII r(FP REVISION rr O NUMSSII Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 52 889 0 1 3 0 1 0 3'OF 0 8 TEXT II/moro oPoce Jr rtu)krorL u>> or)rJ/dorro) HRC Fonrr 388AS) (17)

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 1J-CPA-UV-4A 2J-CPA-UV-4A 3 J - CPA-UV-4A 1J-CPA-UV-4B 2J-CPA-UV-4B 3J-CPA-UV-4B 1J-CPB-UV-5A 2J-CPB-UV-5A 3J-CPB-UV-5A 1J-CPB-UV-5B 2J-CPB-UV-5B 3J-CPB-UV-5B The subject valves are used as intake and exhaust containment isolation valves for the containment purge system. These valves are normally used during power operation to reduce the radioactivity level inside containment when an entry into containment is required. These valves are also used to relieve and maintain the containment pressure at or below 2.5 psig as required by PVNGS Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.4. The time limit for the closure of the subject valves is less than or equal to 8 seconds, as identified in PVNGS Technical Specification Table 2.6-1 for Units 1, 2, and 3.

Prior to the event, the original Limitorque actuators for the above valves were replaced with G. H. Bettis actuators supplied by Henry Pratt Company. The reason for replacing the actuators was to meet the required containment closure time of less than 8 seconds. The original Limitorque actuators would fail "as is" during a postulated loss of off-site power scenario. This condition was reported to the NRC by Deficiency Evaluation Report 84-96 transmitted on December 7, 1984. The original actuators were replaced prior to the startup of Units 1, 2 and 3.

The purchase order for procurement of the G. H. Bettis actuators was awarded to Henry Pratt Company. The purchase order required that G. H. Bettis model number "N521-SR80-M3 Handwheel Actuator" be provided. The purchase order also required that a seismic report, and operability and environmental analysis report be provided.

On April 20, 1989, while Unit 3 was in Mode 6 (refueling),

operators (non-licensed, utility) could not open'ontainment purge valves 3J.-CPB-UV-5B and 3J-CPB-UV-4B manually. Engineering personnel contacted G. H. Bettis, the actuator manufacturer, during the investigation into the valve manual operation problem.

During the conversation with the actuator manufacturer, a statement was made by the manufacturer that valves were not tested (environmentally or seismically) with the handwheel.

Having identified that the valves may not have been analyzed with N RC Form 388A (889)

]r NRC FORM 386A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO, 31500104 (889)

EXPIRES: 4)30N2 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION AEOUESTI 50A) HRS. FORWARD" COMMENTS REGARDINQ BUADEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PJ)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 131500104), OFFICE OF MANAG E M 5'T AND B UDQ ET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I I DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SSOVSNTIAI. a~'g IISVISION NVMSSII NVMSSII Palo Verde Unit 1 o s'o o o 5 28 8 9 0 1 30 1 0 4 OF 0 8 TEXT (IF mort tPtot it ItqIt)sd, ott NRFo)VNJ IYRC Fomr 38849) I I3) the handwheel, Nuclear Engineering reviewed the applicable design documents and specifically all the pertinent qualification reports. Per the Seismic/Environmental Qualification Report Log

%605-171-2 performed by G. H. Bettis, four model actuators were tested. The models are: N732C-SR-80-12, NT420B-SR1-12, NT520B-SRl-12 and NCB-520-SR80-12. These fou'r models were chosen to be the type tested since they best represented all of the variables affecting environmental qualification, exhibit the lowest natural frequencies within their series based on their respective mass, centers-of-gravity and size, and exhibit the highest stress levels during operation, Appendix I of the qualification report further explains that the actuator model N732C-SR-80-12 is the generic parent test actuator of all nuclear rated Heavy Duty (HD) model actuators.

The appendix also details the design similarities that are shared by all HD model actuators. In addition, a letter in the above referenced log number states that Model N732C-SR80-12 actuator is the largest of the heavy duty actuators and would be the least rigid. The Engineering Data sheet published by the actuator manufacturer (Bettis) stated that the HD Series (Pneumatic)

Actuators encompass the following model number series: 521, 721, 722, 731, and 732. For the model 732, the M3 description refers to the manual jacking screw assembly without the actuator handwheel. Based on the fact that the model number 521 series is in the HD family of actuators, the qualification of the model 732 series actuator can encompass the model 521 series actuators manual jacking screw assembly minus the handwheel, nut and washer, based on similarity. Therefore, the model N521-SR80-M3 actuator without the handwheel assembly is considered qualified for use on the above referenced Containment Purge Valves.

The handwheel material is fabricated of aluminum and the weight is 7.3 lbs. (handwheel - 3007.9 grams; nut - 249.6 grams; washer-55.4 grams; Total - 3312.9 grams or 7.3 lbs). The calculation 13-NC-ZC-202 Revision 2 "Post Loca Hydrogen Generation", evaluates the hydrogen generation inside of containment based upon an assumed weight of 2000 lbs of aluminum present inside of containment. The actual identified aluminum weight in the calculation is 1144 lbs. Hence, the calculation has a margin of 851 lbs. for any unidentified aluminum inside the containment.

The weight of the two handwheel assemblies (2 X 7.3 lbs. 14.6 lbs) is very small compared to the available margin.

NR C F oIm 368A (689)

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NRC FORM'366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (669) APPROVEO 0MB NO.31504104 .o<<;r "<g.

EXPIRES: S/30I92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS, LICENSEE EYENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 600 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER Il) LER NUMBER I6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NVMSSR NVMSSR Palo Verde Unit 1 o 5 o o o 52 889 0 1 3 01 05 oFo 8 TEXT Ilfmore eoece (I reeked, ore rr(o'ooe)HRC Form 36SAS) (Ill Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:

Not applicable - there were no structures, systems, or components inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

Cause of each component or system failure, if known:

Not applicable - there were no component or system failures.

Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known:

Not applicable - there were no failed components with multiple functions.

F. For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected:

Not applicable - there were no failed components.

For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the trains were returned to service:

Not applicable - there were no failures.

H. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error:

Not applicable - there were no component or system failures.

I. Cause of Event:

The root cause for this condition was cognitive personnel error The inconsistency between the valve actuator supplier's {Henry Pratt Company) certification letter and the valve actuator manufacturer's qualification documentation was the result of inadequate documentation, review, and preparation. Subsequently, the approval of the stress and qualification test reports by APS were the result of inadequate review by Engineering personnel

{utilitynon-license). There were no unusual working conditions that, contributed to the event. There have been no procedural NRC Form 366A (M9)

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NRC FORM'366A UJL NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO. 31604106 I6$ 9) EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH IP$ 30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 131504104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME II ) DOCKE'T NUMBER I2) LER NUMBER IS) PAGE IS)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMSSR NVMSSR Palo Verde Unit 1 05'000528 8 9 0 1 3 01 06 DFO 8 TEXT /// moro J/rtco /1 rtr)rr/ror/ rr>> or/dirr/rrro/ ///IC Forrrr 36649/ I 12) errors identified that contributed to the condition.

J. Safety Syst: em Response:

Not applicable - there were no safety system responses and none were necessary.

Failed Component Information:

Note: This section includes information requested by 10CFR21 concerning the identification of the firm supplying the basic component and the number and location of the valves at Palo Verde.

The containment power access purge valve actuators were manufactured by G. H. Bettis, Model Number N521-SR80-M3. The actuators were supplied by Henry Pratt Company. The following valves have this model actuator.

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 1 J - CPA-UV -4A 2J-CPA-UV-4A 3J-CPA-UV-4A 1J-CPA-UV-4B 2J-CPA-UV-4B 3J-CPA-UV-4B 1J-CPB-UV-5A 2J-CPB-UV-5A 3J-CPB-UV-5A 1J-CPB-UV-5B 2J-CPB-UV-5B 3J-CPB-UV-5B II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:

Note: This section contains the information requested by 10CFR21 concerning the nature of the safety hazard which is created or could be created.

In order to determine the safety implications of installing the unqualified valves stated above the following two scenarios are evaluated:

Evaluation of the valve operation during Loss of Coolant Accident while performing power access purge operation.

The twelve 8-inch diameter containment power access purge valves have been successfully surveillance tested in PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 with the manual handwheel in place for a total of 217 stroke tests (total for the 12 valves) as documented in surveillance tests 73ST-9ZZ07, 73ST-9ZZ05, 73ST-lZZll, 73ST-1ZZ03, 73ST-2ZZ11, 73ST-9ZZ03, 73ST-3ZZ11 and 73ST-3ZZ03. The subject testing has NRC Form 366A I6$ 9)

II NRC FORM'266A (680)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMB NO.3ISOOIOS ...S.

EXPIRES: 6/30)92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60J) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PJ)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)OS), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) I.ER NUMBER IS) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NVMSER ~m NVMSER Palo Verde Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8 8 9 0 1 3 01 07 OF 0

TEXT IIImare <<Moe Je IFI)kreIE uee erJIJRraaeJ HRC Farm 366ABJ (17) shown that the ability of the valve to function within the required technical specification time frame is not compromised with the manual handwheel in place.

Engineering Evaluation Request (EER 89-CP-004) has evaluated the increase in the, containment aluminum content versus calculation 13-NC-ZC-202 Revision 2. The result of the review indicates that the additional 14.6 lbs aluminum added by the two handwheels (two valves inside containment) is insignificant with respect to the 851 lb margin available in the calculation.

2. Evaluation of valve operation during a seismic event.

The 8-inch diameter power access purge valves must maintain integrity during and after a seismic event. With the handwheel installed on the actuator, it has not been demonstrated that the valves could perform their design function during a seismic event.

Therefore, installation of the handwheel on the containment power access purge valve actuators is assumed to have resulted in the valve not being able to meet its intended function during a seismic event.

III. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate The containment purge power access valves were declared inoperable in Units 1 and 3. The handwheels were previously removed in Unit 2.

The handwheel kit (i.e., handwheel, nut and washer) have been removed from power access purge valves in all three units.

As mentioned before, the valves are seismically/environmentally qualified for use at PVNGS per vendor report without the manual handwheel in place. Therefore the valves are considered operable.

Action to Prevent Recurrence:

A review of current PVNGS equipment qualification plans, procedures, and reports indicate that adequate criteria is stated for conducting a thorough review of qu'alification plans and reports to prevent recurrence of such qualification discrepancies.

NRCForm366A(569)

I NRC FOR/2366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3)504106 4666) V EXPIRES: S/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION (X)LI.ECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20655, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31604104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME I'l DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NVMSER NVMSSR Palo Verde Unit 1 5 2 889 0 1 3 0108 or'8 TEXT //I moro Sosso /s trqrr/rsr/ IISS S//OO'o's/ HRC Form 3/SJA's/ l 17)

IV. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

No previous similar events have been reported.

N RC Form 366A (669)

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