ML17266A493

Forwards Responses to NRC Requests for Addl Info.Responses Will Be Incorporated in FSAR Amend

ML17266A493
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	09/01/1981
From:	Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-81-381, NUDOCS 8109030087
Download: ML17266A493 (463)

Text

REGULAT INFORMATION DISTR IBUTIO (STEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8109030087 DOC ~ DATE. 81/09/01 NOTARI2ED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACILi:50 389 St, Lucie Plant< Unit 2E Flor ida Power L Light,Co, 05000389 AUTH", N %HE AU THOR AFF ILI ATION UHRIGPR,E, Florida POWer 8 Light CO, RECIP. NARE', RECIPIENT AFFILIATION E'ISENHUTED ~ G ~ Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

Forwards responses to NRC requests- for addi info, Responses will oe incorporated in FSAR a~end, DISTRIBUTION CODE: BOOIS COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TIITLE~: PSAR/FSAR AMDTS and Related Correspondence

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RECIPIENT COPIES REC IP IENT COPIES ID CODE/NAMEI ACTION(i A/OICENSiVG LIC. BR ¹3 LA

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1 0 INTERNAL': ACC ID EVAL BR26 AUX SYS BR 27 1 1 CHEM ENG BR 1). 1 CONT: SYS BR 09 1 1 CORE PERF. BR 10. 1 1 EFF TR SYS 1 1 EMRG PRP DEV 35. PRP LIC. 36 3t BR12'i4lRG 1 1 3 EQUIP QUAL BR13 3 3 FEMA REP DIV 39 1 1 GEOSC IENCES 28, 2 2 HUM FACT ENG 40 HYD/GEO, BR 30. 2 2 IEC SYS BR 1 1 ILEr 16'IC" 06'IC 3 3 GUID BR 33 1 1 QUAL BR 32 1 1 NATL FNG BR 17 1 1

/ MECH ENG BR 18 1 %PA 1 0 OELO 1 0 OP LIC BR 3rr 1 1 POPPER'YS BR 19 1 1 PROC/TST REV 20 1 1 QA BR 1 1 'R ESS BR22 1 1 SYS BR 23 ) Oi 21'EAC 1 1 1 SITI ANAL BR" 2Q 1 1 ST T ENG BR25 1 1 EXTERNAL~: ACRS 16 16 LPDR 03 1 NRC. PDR=. 02. ) 1 NSIC; 05' 1 1 NTIS ) 1 TOTAL NU4lBER'F COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 62 ENCL 57

FLORIDA POWER 8E LIGHT COMPANY September 1, 1981 Letter IIL-81-381 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Ch Attention: Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 , a[Kgg

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

S EP 02 1981 ~

QiliIIIlSAII~TOIg gOAVAISSPII Re: St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 Final Safety Analysis Report Re uests For Additional Information Attached are Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) responses to NRC staff requests for additional information which have not been formally submitted on the St. Lucie Unit 2 docket. These responses will be incorporated into the St. Lucie.

Unit 2 FSAR in a future amendment.

Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems & Technology REU/TCG/nlc Attachments cc: J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II (w/o attachments)

Harold F. Reis, Esquire (w/o attachments)

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( 8i09030087 ADOCK 05000389 8i090iI'DR A PDR HELPING BUILD FLO R I DA

Attachments to L-81-381 A. Meeting minutes from 9/1/81 Reactor Systems Branch meeting.

B. Revised response to question 240.3 C. Revised responses to MEB SER items 18, 40, 41, and 42.'I D. Supplement to MEB Question 33, Design Stress Limits for Code Class 2 and 3 NSSS Pumps E. Revised St. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan with proposed changes reflecting Unit 2.

F. Compliance with Reg. Guide 1,76.

G. Aux. Feed Pump Performance Curves.

Reactor Systems Branch Meeting Minutes 9/1/81 FPL commits to provide operator training for ATWS as stated below:

(A) Develop emergency procedures to train. operators to recognize anticipated transient without scram event, including considera-tion of scram indicators, rod position indicators, flux monitors, pressurizer level and pressure indicator, .and any other alarms annunciated in the contxol room with emphasis on alarms not pro-cessed through the electrical portion of the reactor scram system.

(B) Train operators to take actions in the event of an anticipated transients without scram, including consideration of manually scramming the reactor by using the manual scram button, prompt actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system to assure delivery to the full capacity of this system, and initiation of turbine trip. .The operator should also be trained to initiate boration by actuation of the high pressure safety injection system to bring .the facility to a safe shutdown condition.

2~ FPL's position for flow alarm on HPSI/LPSI pump discharge flow is accep-table to the NRC, SER write-up so stated this (fox individual discharge pump alarms). NRC's position is based on the status of PSL-2 construc-tion schedule and is considered an acceptable variance from normal plant requirement of individual pump flow.

34 FPL willsubmit a.x'eppxt on boron mixing during natural circulation.

FPL wi11 document applicability of SONGS test to PSL-2 and discusses acceptability of test for PSL-2 and the differences(include bases for differences). FPL will submit test for NRC review 30 days before OL (Note: FPL will perform a test of their own if SONGS is delayed).

4, FPL commits to supply the test results of the containment sump tests as soon as these results are available. This item will remain as a confirmatory issue. FPL commits to incorporate NRC comments into the sump test prior to conducting the test and commits to comple-tion with report submittal at, least 30 days prior to OL.

5~ FPL will supply operating data on the Bingham-Villamette pumps to demon-strate the capability of long term operation. These data will compare the St. Lucie 2 HPSI pumps to pumps of similar design manufactured by Bingham-Willamette. These data will be supplied by ll/15/81. This item is considered as a confixmatory issue.

Response to question 440.40 will be revised as follows:

Response 440.40 A critical valve is defined as one which, if it was te become mis-aligned would singly cause the failure of both trains of the safety system.

Inspection of the St. Lucie 2 Safety Injection System reveal that,no "critical" manual valves exist, but some manual valves do exist in t'e flow paths of the trains, which if improperly aligned could prevent flow from that train. ,These are: V3206 and 3207, which are of the LPSI pumps; V3411 and 3470, which are upstream ofgust'ownstream the HPSI pumps; V3414 and 3427, which are stop check valves downstream of the HPSI pumps; and valves V3202, 3203, 32004, and 3205 which are in the mini flow lines from the LPSI and HPSX pumps. Each of these are locked open and administrative procedures are used to 'assure their pro-per position. However, there is no single manual valve which if mis-aligned would disable both SIS trains.

By the same definition of "critical" valve, no single motor operated valve in the SXS can caus'e a complete failure of the syste'.

All motor operated valves in the ECCS are equipped with Limitorque motor operators. These operators allow disengagement of the motor for hand-wheel operation but are automatically re-engaged when the motor is activated. As a result, it is not possible for the motor operated valves to be disabled from automatic operation due to a prior manual handwheel operation.

No FSAR change is required.

The analysis for inadvertant PORV opening is not complete at this time.

This analysis will be provided at least by the time the Technical Speci-fications are submitted or earlier. This item will remain confirmatory.

Xn addition, an estimate will be made of the extent of failed fuel as-suming the most severe single failure and the resulting radiological dose will be provided.

FPL will provide a Steam Generator tube rupture analysis with the CESEC IIX code. Tech Spec tube leakage will be included in the dose calcula-tion. The analysis will be done with and without loss of offsite power.

This analysis will be provided by September 30, 1981. This item re-mains confirmatory.

Below is the response to the question on charging valve V-2504 and the ability to supply shrinkage makeup to the RCS during cooldown without having to leave the control room (see page 5.4-28E).

Response

If charging pump suction from the RVZ is unavailable, the coolant in-ventory in the boric acid makeup tanks is also sufficient to provide

makeup"for the reactor coolant shrinkage (due to cooldown-depressuri-zation of the RCS) to activate the safety injection system (SXS).

Analysis has shown that less than 6000 gallons makeup is required to account for shrinkage is incurred in cooldown/depressurization to the shutoff head of the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps.

The boric acid makeup tank (BAMT) has a capacity of 8000 gallons below the setpoint for the low level alarm (this volume will be assured by a Technical Specification). The shrinkage analysis was done assuming 50'F subcooling below the saturation temperature for the HPSX pump shut-off head. Below the HPSI shutoff head makeup will be provided by the HPSI pumps taking suction from'the refueling water tank. BAHT water used for the pressurizer sprays is makeup for the RCS.

FPL will provide additional feedwater line break analysis which will includean identification and assessment of the worst single failure.

The assumed time for main streamline isolation will be verified or adjusted conservatively in the analysis. This analysis will be pro-vided by September 30, 1981.

FPL will provide the performance curves for all auxiliary feedwater pumps. FPL confirms that the limiting safety analysis (main feedwater

'line break with loss of offsite power with a single failure) with re-spect to auxiliary feedwater flow requirements has shown a requirement for 320 gpm from one motor driven pump. Other transients that may be sensitive to low auxiliary feedwater flow conditions were analyzed assuming only 250 gpm auxiliary feedwater flow and the results were shown to be acceptable. Other transients that may be sensitive to high auxiliary feedwater flow conditions were analyzed assuming all auxiliary feedwater pumps were operating and the results were shown to be acceptable.

FPL commits to revise .the response to TMX item XX.K.3.1 (Appendix 1.9A) to agree to,the installation of an automatic PORV isolation control .

systein, .should such .a system be absolutely required 'by NRC.

FPL will update the response to 440.18 to confirm that the pressurizer heater cutoff on low level will be redundant where no single active failure will preclude this function of automatic cutoff..

FPL submits revised responses to NUREG 0737 items XX.K.3.2 and II.K.3.1 as follows:

II.K.3.2 St. Lucie Unit 2 is an active member of the C-E's owners group. The C-E owners group has provided the NRC staff Topical Report, CEN-145, on December 1979. This report provides an evaluation on the probability of a small break LOCA caused by a stuck open DORV. Xt also provides the failure rates associated with PORV's based on past operating history of operating plants. St. Lucie, Unit 1, was considered in the data base for CEN-145's probability as. essment. St. Lucie, Unit 2, is directly applicable to the results of CEN-145 due to its duplicate design to St. Lucie, Unit 1.

C-E's Topical report CHN-145 provides the bases used to determine the weed of an automatic DORV isolation system. In summary, the probability of a small break LOCA via a PORV failure was determined in the same order of magnitude range as a LOCA'. Should the staff absolutely require a PORV isolation system St. Lucie, Unit 2 will provide the system. St. Lucie, Unit 2 relies on the results of Topical Report CEN-145 for responses to items II.K.3.2 and II.K.3.1.

15. FPL will provide a revised response to 440.7 to show that the RCS volume will not drop below the level of the hot'eg following a moderate energy line break in the shutdown cooling line with no operator action for 20 minutes following alarm.

16. FPL submits the shaft seizure accident I

analysis {see attachment:)

as part of these minutes.

17. FPL will submit information on boron dilution alarms with the tech spec submittals. These submittals will be provided in April 1982.

i Sl 2-FSAR

15. 3.3 LIMITING FAULT-1 EVENTS 15.3.3.1 Limitin Offsite Dose Event None of the Limiting Fault-1'LF-1) event groups and event group combina-tions resulting in a decrease in Reactor Coolant System flow rate shown in Table 15.3.3-1 release a significant amount of radioactivity to the atmo-sphere. The additional failures and events considered here produce results only incrementally more adverse than the loss of offsite power described in Subsection 15.3.2.1. The offsite doses which would occur during the most adverse of these events are well w>thin the acceptance g uideline in Table 15.0-4.

15.3.3.2 Limitin Reactor Coolant S stem Pressure Event None of the Limiting Fault-1 event groups and event group combinations re-sulting in a decrease in reactor coolant flow rate shown in Table 15.3.3-1 produce Reactor Coolant System pressures greater than that produced by the loss of offsite power event described in Subsection 15.3.2.2. Therefore, the conclusions of Subsection 15.3.2.2 also apply to this section.

15.3.3.3 Limitin Fuel Performance Event None of the Limiting Fault-1 event groups and event group combinations re-sulting in a decrease in Reactor Coolant System flow rate shown in Table 15.3.3-1 produce a significant approach to fuel performance limits. The limiting event combination with respect to fuel performance is a one pump r esistance to forced flow (shaft seizure) with a failure to achieve a fast transfer of a 6.9 kY bus to a startup transformer. This is assumed to result in the loss of forced flow from three out of four reactor coolant pumps. For this event, no more thar, 5.0 percent of the fuel pins are calculated to

'xperience DNB. The results of this event are within the acceptance guide-line for fuel performance given in Table 15.0-4.

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SL2-FSAR 15.3.4 LIMITING FAULT-2 EVENTS 15.3.4.1 Limitin Offsite Dose Event None of the Lieth ting Fault-2 {LF-2) event groups and event group combina-tions resulting in a decrease in Reactor Coolant System flow rate shown in Table 15.3.4-1 release a significant amount of radioactivity to the atmo-sphere. The additional failures and events considered here produce results only incrementally more adverse than the loss of offsite power described in Subsection 15.3.2.1. The offsite doses which would occur during the most adverse of these events are well within the acceptance guideline in Table-15.0-4.

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15.3.4.2 Limitin Reactor Coolant S stem Pressure Event None of the Limiting Fault,-2 event groups and event group combinations resulting in a decrease in reactor coolant flow rate shown in Table 15.3.4-1 produce Reactor Coolant System pressures greater than that produced by the loss of offsite power event described in Subsection 15.3.2.2. Therefore, .

the conclusions of Subsection 15.3.2.2 also apply to this subsection.

15.3.4.3 Limitin Fuel Performance Event Hone of the Limiting Fault-2 event groups and event group combinations

'esulting in a decrease in Reactor Coolant System flow rate shown in Table 15.3.4-1 produce a significant approach to fuel performance limits. The limiting event combination with respect to fuel performance is a one pump

.resistance to forced flow {shaft seizure) with a loss of offsite power as a result of'enerator trip. This results in the loss of forced flow from all reactor coolant pumps. The transient minimum CE-1 DNBR of 0.362 occurs at 3.6 seconds. A plot of the minimum DNBR vs. time for the first 10 seconds of the transient is provided in Figure 15.3.4.3-1. For this event, no more than 13.0 percent of the fuel pins are calculated to experience DNB.

The initial conditi'ons for the most adverse case are identical to those

, listed in Table 15.3.5.1-4. The results of this event are within the acceptance guideline for fuel performance given in Table 15.0-4.

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15.3.5.1 Limitin 'Offsite Dose ve>t- n vm Resistance to Forced Flow C Shaft Seizure) with a Loss of Generator Tri with Technical Offsite Power as a Result; of S ecification Steam Generator Tube Leal<a e and Failure to Restore Offsite Power in Two Hours 15.3.5.1.1 identification of Event and Causes All of the Limiting Fault-3 (LF-3) event groups from the Decrease in Reactor Coolant System flow rate event type and LF-3 event combinations shown in Table 15.3.5-1 were compared to find the event resulting in the maximum offsite doses. The one pump resistance to forced flow with a loss of offsite power concurrent w'ith generator trip, technical specification steam generator tube leakage,.and failure to restore offsite power in two hours (1PRFF+LOP+

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FROP+TL) was identified as the limiting LF-3 event. This event maximizes the RCS heat-up and duration of condenser inoperability, therefore, maximizing the transfer of radioactivity from the secondary system to atmQophere.

All of the other events considered, including those with a low probability independent occurrence, produce a smaller RCS heat-up and/or a shorter duration of condenser inoper-ability.

The event groups and event combinations evaluated and the significance of the site boundary dose for each ar e indicated in Table 15.3.5-1. All of the events indicated as insigni-ficant ( I.) produce offsite doses well within the in Table 15.0-4. All events indicated as signi-acceptance'uideline ficant (S) produce offsite doses within the acceptance uideline. A one pump resistance to forced flow(shaft seizure event can be caused by seizure of the upper or lower thrust-journal bearings. Loss of offsite power concurrent with the generator trip may be caused 'by a complete loss of the external electrical grid triggered as a result of the turbine tr ip. The loss of offsite power causes a loss of r - ~~ ~ power to the start-up transformers~ The~'lo~+-powe~o-the-w&g~>-4rpnsA&>er> prevents the plant electrical loads te fast transfer@to them from the unit auxiliary tr ans formers. Ther e fore'the onsite loads wil 1 lose power and the plant will experience a simultaneous loss of feed-water flow, condenser inoperability, and a coastdown of all reactor coolant" pumps. Approximately 10 seconds after the.

loss of offsite power occurs the diesel generatogstartd providing power to the two plant 4.16kV safety buses. The steam generator tube leak rate is assumed to be at the technical specification value. No credit is taken for restoration of offsite power prior to initiation of shut-

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Sequence of Events and System Operation Table 15.3.5.1-1 presents a chronological list and time of system actions which occur rollowin ~he shaf seizure in a r eactor coolant pump.4 oss of offsite power is assumed to occur concurrent with the generatp~cip at.

1.0 seconds after the event initia tiorrORefer to Table 0l 5.3.5.1-1 while reading Mls and 6>e folio>Q.qg g~tiog.

>e success paths ref+"enced-ere Giose given on the sequence of events diagram (SED), Figure 15.3.5.1-1. This figure, together with Table 15.0-6, which contains a glossary of SED symbols and acronyms, may be used to trace the actuation ~'he an d in teraction of the systems used to mitigate the conse-quences of this event. The timings in Table 15.3.

may be used to determine when, after each action occurs.

~ initiation event sequence presented demonstrates that the operator can cool the plant down to cold shutdown during the event. If offsite power can be restored, then the operator may elect instead to stabilize the plant at a mode other than cold shutdown. All actions required to stabilize the plant and .

perform the required repairs are not described here.

The sequence of events and systems operations described below represent) the way in which the plant was assumed to respond to the event initiator. Hany plant responses are possible. However, certain responses are limi ing with respect to the acceptance guidelines for this section. Of the limiting responses, the most likely one to be followed was selected.

Table 15.3.5.1-2 contains a matrix which describes the extent to which normally operating plant systems are assumed t f tion during the transient. The operation of these systems is consistent with the guidelines of Subsectio n 15.0.2.3.

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Table 15.3.5.1-3 contains a matrix which describes the extent to which safety systems are assumed to function during the transient. h The success paths wn the sequence of events diagram, Figure

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15.3.5.1-1, are as follows:

Reactivity Control:

A o trip signal (RTS) is automatically generated by reacctor the Reactor Protective System on low reactor coolan The RTS opens the reactor trip circuit breakers to deenergize the control element drive mechanism (CEDH) bus power supply interrupting power to the CEDH holding coils, allowing the control element assemblies to fall into the core.

ii he char 9 in 9 p um p s are man8 0aded onto the safety bus and started. The RCS boron concentration is increased to the cold shutdown level by replacing the RCS volume shrinkage with borated water. This water is supplied from the boric acid makeup tanks {BAHT) by opening the gravity feed line valves and closing the volume control tank discharge valve.

Reactor fleat Removal:

The Reactor Coolant System provides natural circulation to remove core heat following coastdown of the undamaged reactor coolant pumps. The steam generators provide primary to secondary heat transfer.

The shutdown cooling system (SCS) is manually actuated when

. the RCS temperature and pressure have been reduced to 350 F and 275 psia, respectively. The SCS provides sufficient flow to cool the RCS to cold shutdown conditions.

Secondary System Integrity:

The CEDfi bus undervoltage relays sensing the interruption of power on the CEON power supply buses, generateekturbine trip signal (TTS). The TTS causes the digital electro-hydraulic control system to close the turbine stop and control valves. Upon the loss of offsite power both main feedwater pumps lose power and coast down. The steam generator pressure increases to the main steam safety valves {NSSY) setpoint, and they open to dissipate heat from the RCS. The NSSVs close when the secondary system pressure drops and will cycle open and closed throughout the transient. An auxiliary feedwater actuation signal is generated on low steam generator water level. The auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators:is controlled automatically by the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System. The condensate storage tank is the auxiliary feedwater source. The operator closes the main steam isolation valves and uses the atmospheric dump valve system to dump steam to the atmosphere to cool down the RCS until shutdown cooling entry conditions are reached.

Primary System Integrity:

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The pressurizer assists in the control of the RCS pressure and volume changes during the transient by compensating for the initial expansion of the RCS fluid.

As the reactor coolant system {RCS) pressure incr eases, the Power Operated Relief Valves'PORVs) open, discharging steam to the quench tank, Ahere it is condensed and contained.

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'ollowingofisolation the 'loss o Cha P rfh led bleedoff line by instrument air a relief valve lifts discharging the bleedoff flow to the quench tank. During cooldown, the operator controls the auxiliary sprays to reduce the

~ RCS pr essure. The operator uses the charging pumps to replace the RCS volume shrinkage.

Radioactive Effluent Control Due to the loss of instrument air to pneumatically operated valves on loss of offsite power, several lines penetrating "containment will be isolated. Those lines isolated include:

RCP controlled bleedoff, var ious sampling lines, reactor drain tank drain line, nitrogen supply, waste gas header, ',

containment air monitoring lines, containment sump pump discharge, and, steam generator blowdown lines. These actions are automatically initiated but do not contribute toward the mitigation of the event.

Naintenance of AC Power:

A low voltage on the 4.16 kV safety buses generates an undervoltage signal which starts the diesel generators.

The non-safety buses are automatically separated from the safety buses and all loads are shed. After each diesel generator set has attained operating voltage and frequency, its output breaker closes connecting it to its safety bus.

ESF equipment is then loaded in sequence o to this bus .

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15.3.5.1.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences Hathematical Hodels The HSSS response to one pump resistance to forced flow (shaft seizure) with a loss of offsite power as a result of turbine trip was simulated using the CESEC computer. program described in Subsection 15.0.4. The DHBR was calculated relationn using the TORC computer code which uses the CE-1 CHF cor-described in Subsection 15.0.4.

b) Input Parameters and Initial Conditions.

The ranges of initial conditions considered are given in Subsection 15.0.3. Table 15.3.5.1-4 gives the initial conditions used in this analysis. The rational for selecting the values of the initial conditions which have a first order effect on the analysis follows. Using the highest core power maximizes the RCS heat-up, which is the driving force of the secondary steam release. The lowest primary system pressure was assumed in conjunction with two power operated relief valves opening in or,de'r to minimize thenpressure transient/

thus maximizing the number of fuel pins which will experience DNB. A high core inlet coolant temperature was chosen since it yields the earthiest opening of the main steam safety valves.

The steam generator inventory and heat transfer was modeled to maximize the radiological consequences of the event. The lowest core flow rate is used because it results in Cate ~

larger percentage of fuel pins which experience DHB. Using the most positive moderator temperature coefficient and the minimum available scram CEA worth tends to maximize the heat flux after a reactor trip occurs, increasing the RCS heat-up. Assuming the operator initiates plant cooldown at 30 minutes maximizes the offsite doses. During this event two sources 'of 'radioactivity contribute to the offsite doses, the initial activity in the steam generator and the activity associated with a one gallon per minute steam generator tube leak. The initial secondary activity is assumed to be at the Technical Specification limit of 0.1 pCi/gm dose equivalent I-131. The activity assumed to be present in the reactor coolant leaking through the steam generator tubes is 0.4 pCi/gm (see Subsection. 15.0~4.3.1).

c) Results The dynamic behavior'f important NSSS parameters following a one pump resistance to forced flow {shaft seizure) with a loss of offsite power is presented on Figures 15.3.5.1-g to -11.

Table 15.3.5.1-1 summarizes the significant results of the event. Refer to Table 15.3.5.1-1 while reading this section.

The one pump resistance to forced flow (shaft seizure) event results in a flow coastdown in the affected loop and a consequent reduction in flow .through the core. The reactor is tripped on a low flow signal. The reactor trip causes a turbine trip signal to occur. The flow in the unaffected cold legs increases until the loss of offs'ite power (concurrent with generator trip)

- occurs. At this time the flow in the unaffected cold legs begins to decrease as a result of the reactor coolant pump coastdown. The loss of offsite power also causes a loss nf main feedwater and condenser inoperability. The tur bine trip with the SBCS and the condenser unavailable leads to a rapid buildup in secondary system pressure and temperature.

This increase in pressure is shown in Figure 15.3.5.1-9.

The opening ofthe HSSYs limits this pressure increase. The flow rate out the HSSVs is shown in Figure 15.3.5.1-10. The integral flow out of the HSSVs is shown in Figure 15.3.5.1-11".

The increasing temperature of the secondary system leads to

• a reduction of the primary to secondary heat transfer . Concur-rently, the failed reactor coolant pump and the .three reactor coolant pumps coasting down ( Figure 15.3.5.1-8)'result in reduced RCS flow which further reduces the heat transfer capability of the RCS. This decrease in heat removal from the RCS leads to an increase in the core coolant temperatures as shown in Figure 15 .3.5.1-5. The core coolant temperatures peak shortly after the time of reactor trip on low RCS flow.

The increase in RCS temperature leads to an increase in RCS pressure, as shown in Figure 15.3.5.1-4, caused by the ~

thermal expansion of the RCS fluid (see figure 15.3.5.$ -7).

The RCS pressure reaches a maximum value of 2427 psia at 6.25 seconds. After this time, the RCS pressure decreases rapidly due to the declining core heat flux {see Figure 15.3.5.1-3); in combination with the opening of the tlSSYs.

Opening of the HSSV limits the peak temperature and pressure of'he secondary system.

During the first few seconds of the transient, the combination of decreasing flow r ate, increasing RCS temperatures,'and increasing core power (see Figure 15.P5.1-2) results in a decrease in the fuel pins'NBR. The transient minimum DNBR of 0.362 occurs gt 3.6 seconds as indicated in Table 15.3.5.1-1. Figure 15.3.4.3-1 shows -the variation of the

. minimum DNBR with time. The negative CEA reactivity inserted after reactor trip causes a rapid power and heat flux decrease which causes the DNBR to increase again. For this event no more than 13.0 percent of the fuel pins are calculated to experience DNB and are assumed to fail (see Section 15.3.4.3)..

The offsite doses for this event result from steam released the main steam safety valves (HSSVs) and atmsopheric 'hrough dump valves {ADVs). The HSSVs are open intermittently during the first 30 minutes of the transient (see Figure 15.3.5.1-10).

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At 30 minutes, the operator is assumed to use the ADVs to begin cooldown. The total amount of steam released through the HSSVs is shown'n Figure 1 5.3.5.1-11.'able 15.3.5.1-1 shows the integrated steam release from the t<SSVs and the ADVs.

The radiological release roduced by the transient results in a 7.8 rem two hour inhalation h roid ose at the exclusion area boundary. The two hour and entire event doses for both thyroid and whole body are shown in Table 15.3.5.1-5.

15.3.5.1.4 Conclusion The evaluation shows that the plant response to a one pump resistance to forced flow (shaft seizure) with a loss of offsite power, technical specification steam generator tube leakage, and failure to restore offsite power in two hours results in a maximum offsite doses which are within the acceptance guideline in Table 15.0-4.

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15.3.5.3 Limitin Fuel Performance Event None of the Limiting Fault-3 event groups and event group combinations re-sulting in a decrease in Reactor Coolant System flow rate shown in Tab'le 15.3.5-1 produce fuel performances worse than that produced by the one pump resistance to forced flow {shaft seizure) with a loss of offsite power as a result of generator trip event combination described in Su'b-section 15.3.4.3. The results of Subsection 15.3.4.3, which are within the LF-3 acceptance guideline on fuel performance, also apply to this section.

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Question No.

'40 ~ 'iscuss the hydrologic technical 'specification e>plain<<g 3'2-4.13) measures to be used to monitor the existing beach dunes and mangrove arear'lii.ch are relied upon for hurricane protection.

Provided the following i.nformation:

(a) the means by which storm erosion will be measured and the frequency of such surveys.

N (b) the means by which the mangrove areas wi'll be monitored to identify blighted areas and the frequency of such surveys.

Response

A technical specification will be provided to assure the existance of the Highway A1A embankment and sufficient beach material east of the embank-ment in order to limit the heights of breaking waves to those used in the stalled hurricane erosion analysis.

This technical specification will commit Flordia Power 6 Light Company to:

1) A visual inspection by a qualified engineer of the Highway A1A embankment adjacent to the site following passage of any major storm to be followed by an immediate report to NRC of any signS.

ficant erosion (exosion requiring repair of roadbed or embank-ment). This report should also include a discussion of safety implications to the plant and proposed corrective actions. If storm damage is so severe that sections of the beach dunes and highway enbankment have been substantially removed the St. Lucie Plant will go into a shutdown condition.

2) An annual aerial photograph of the beach area adjacent to the plant site and. compariso" with. the previous years photographs for determination of any signifiant beach recession or dune erosion. These photographs and the results of the comparison including a summary discussion will be included in Florida Power 6 Light's annual report to HRC.

These additional surveys will not, however be required as long as exist-ing technical specifications on Unit 1 requiring beach dune surveys and moni-toring of Nangrove Swaps {Section 2.4.2.2 of SL2 FSAR) remain in effect.

uestion No. 18 Provide the methods used to handle the relative displacements of Category T.

supports.

~Res oese (1) The following is a summary of the method used to handle the relative seismic displacement of support in piping systems.

a. The relative. seismic displacements between supports/restraints installed on the same building structure are normally negligible in the stress. analysis.

b. The relative seismic displacements between supports/restraints located in two buildings on separate mats are to be derived from the combination of co-directional maximum absolute seismic dis-placement of the two buildings at the supporting elevation by SRSS (square root of the sum of the squares) method.

Since the adjacent buildings on separate mats are dynamically analyzed as decoupled systems, the real relative seismic dis-placement between piping restraints. on separate buildings are not readily available. As the soil interactions are incorporated in the dynamic analysis of the buildings, the maximum absolute seismic displacements of each building available for piping stress

'usage normally contain considerable soil movement which 'nalysis is expected to be closely in-phase for locations between the adjacent buildings.

This is evidently demonstrated in the Maximum Absolute Vertical SSE Seismic Displacement Tables for Reactor Containment Building (RCB) and Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). The values for RCB mat and the top of the steel containment are 0.0304 feet and 0.03067 feet respectively while the value of RHB mat and top mass of RAB are 0.02108 feet and 0.02145 respectively. The displacements for masses in between are approximately in the same magnitude.

A relative seismic displacement between RCB and RAB mats calculated by Absolute Sum Combination. of the two maximum absolute displacements (ABS) will result in a value of 0.05148 feet. This essentially represents an assumption of complete out-phase of the adjacent mats each at its peak movement at the .same instant. Zn consideration of similarity in surrounding soil properties, closeness of spacing and the seismic wave motion in ground, this is very-unlikely to happen. Furthermore, the fundamental frequencies of the adjacent building which normally dominate the displacement response are also not the same.

The Application of Absolute Sum Combination of the two maximum absolute building seismic displacement onto the interface piping will result in a piping system design overly emphasized in relative displacement condition. This, by the nature of flexibility require-ment, tends to undercut the conservativeness usually existed in normal seismic protection design on the basis of'seismic response of inertia effect which, being account'ed for the primary pipe stresses,

is more probable to cause, structural failure. The SRSS delineated in our Response lb, to Question 18 offer a better balanced seismic pro-tection design for a combined effect of seismic inertial and displacement on interface piping.

It is recognized that the pattern of the relative horizontal movement, between building at high elevation is usually hard to predict. A less conservative approach is to consider the complete out-phase of the two building structural response along with the close in-phase of the two adjacent mats. Therefore, the relative seismic displacements between support/restraints located on two buildings on separate mats can be derived by taking the absolute sum of each relative building seismic displacement towards each mat and the difference of the mats dis-placements. This is assigned asc5ABSR, in the attached table for com-parison of combination methods for evaluating relative seismic dis-placements.

As all the piping penetrations are located at the lower part of the building, the strong contribution from the soil movement to'he the relative displacements between the pipe restraints is an'ticipated. Relative Seismic Displacement derived by SRSS method (DSRSS)m as shown in the comparison table, is considerably higher than',ABSR.

c. The relative seismic displacements between supports/restraints located in two buildings on a common mat or attached to two structures within the same building are to be derived by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of each relative seismic displacement towards a common reference.

d. For piping connecting to equipments or primary piping systems of which the available maximum seismic displacements are relative to the base support of the major equipments, the base supports are to be selected as, the common reference; The maximum seismic displacement of the subject piping restraint system are to be converted into relative displacements towards the base support of connecting nozzle and the piping restraint system are then to be derived by taking absolute addition of the two relative seismic displacements which in turn are relative to the base support of the equipment.

e. The piping system will be analyzed separately with relative seismic displacement input, in each of the three orthaganal coordinate directions.

The resultant response (such as pipe stress, moment, force, etc) are obtained by taking SRSS of the response corresponding to each coordinate direction.

(2) Relative displacement among supports located at different floor elevations are not considered in cable tray and HVAC duct seismic analysis. Ducts are provided with flexible joints to accomodate relative displacement of the supports (3) For the coupled components of the RCS the relative support displacements are applied directly in the time hihtory analysis methods described in Section 3.7.3.1.2.3. For NSSS vendor supplied mutiply supported sub-systems analyzed by response spectrum methods, relative support dis-placements are applied statically in the most unfavorable manner.

SL-2 Question No.

40. A discussion which demonstrated that those components designed to the FSAR criteria have an adequate margin of safety should be submitted in the FSAR. In addi-tion, the applicaht should verify that the allowable

, stresses of MSS-SP-58, "Pipe Hangers and Supports" are used without the addition of a shape factor to account for bending stresses.

~Res ense The adequacy of the margin of safety of support and re-straint design is demonstrated based on use of normal AISC and MSS-SP-58 stress limits as the design basis for all load combinations including faulted. Shape factors are not used to account for bending stress.

This is discussed in the revised Subsection 3.9.3.4.

As a result of discussions of this response during the review

'eeting, Question 40el was generated. This question and its

.response are attached.

uestion 40.1 a) Compare AISC .allowables with those of ASHE Code Appendix 17, Show them comparable.

b) How is reduced mat'erial yeild strength at elevated temperatures addressed when using the AISC code?

c) ASHE requires CMTR's and C of C's. What material documentation does AISC require?

~Res esse a) The allowable stresses in the AISC Code and ASME Code Appendix 17 have been reviewed and are similar in most respects. The following differences have been identified:

1) At the contact surface of a weld producing a tension load in the through thickness direction of plates and elements of rolled shapes, the allowable tension stress is limited to 60% of yield by AISC and 30% of yield by ASMF. Appendix 17.

Ultrasonic testing of both shop and field welds has been specified for materials used in A/E supplied NSSS component supports where lamellar tearing may be a problem.

The materials used in piping suppor ts are less than one inch thick in the majority of cases, therefore lamellar tearing is not considered a problem. In addition, lamellar tearing is most likely to occur during or shortly after the welding process. This has not been identified as a problem with piping supports.

Further, the requirement to limit these stresses to 30%

of yield has been deleted from Appendix 17 of the ASME Code in the 1980 Edition.

2) ASME Code Appendix 17 Load Increase Factor is 1.2 Sy/Ft not to exceed 0.7 Su/Ft. Ebasco has used an increase factor of 1.6 across the board. This is applied to minimize redesign and refabrication which might support design.

The SL2 design criteria for the NSSS supports in the factored (faulted) condition alloys 'the AISC allowables to be increased by 1.6 but less than .96xFy or .90x critical buckling where applicable. HEB requested that the NSSS supports in the faulted condition be reviewed for compliance to ASME III Sub. NF F-1370(a) wherein the allowable stresses in Appendix XVII may be increased by a factor ranging from 1.4 to 2.0 depending upon the material tensile and yield stresses. Critical elements in the NSSS supports have been reviewed and the actual design stresses are below those allowed by ASHE III Sub. NF.

0 The only material used for Seismic Category piping supports for which Sy/Su exceeds 0.73 is SA-,500 Grade 8 structural tubing. Support designs are currently being reviewed to identify and justify and cases where load increase factors exceed 1.2 Sy/Ft. This will be completed by September ll, 1981 b) No reduction in yield strength is taken for application below 700oF, in accordance wit'h the AISC Manual of Steel Construction

(

Reference:

Effect of Heat on Structural Steel). Austenitic material in Seismic Category I component supports is for hy-pochlorination piping supports for the intake cooling water pumps. The austenitic piping supports are located in the intake structure. Austenitic material is also used for welded attachments on austenitic pipe and is designed to the same allowables as the pipe.

c) Ebasco practice for seismic Category I requires Certificates of Compliance and CMTR's as appropriate.

uestion No.

41. Provide in a tabular form for both BOP and NSSS Code Class 1,2 and 3 component supports the load combinations, stress limits for various plant conditions.

~Res onse The stress limits and load combinations for various olant conditions are presented in Tables 3.9-17 and 3.9-l8 for Class 1,2,and 3 supports and restraints.

For NSSS scope of supply see the Tables in Question'3.

As a result of discussions of this response during the review meetings, question 41.1 was generated. This question and its response are attached.

Question 41.1 a) Justify the use of SRSS for combination of SSEI and SSED in the faulted condition.

b) Provide the faulted allowable stresses for bolts.

Compare Table 3.9-5 with the loading tables of Section 3.8.3.

d) Define the materials for which allowables are given in Tables of Section 3.8.3.

~Res oase a) Where the fundamental frequency of the piping system is beyond the resonant region of the supporting structure the SSE will be combined in the following manner: SSE NISEI + SSED Where the, piping fundamental Frequency is not beyond the structural resonant region the SSE will be combined in the following manner:

SSE ~ ISSEII + ISSEDI b) Faulted allowables for bolts are established as 1.6 X AISC allowables (normal).

Raterial A-325 A-490 AIRC Allowable Tensile Stress 54 Ksi Allowable tensile stress For Faulted Condition 64 Ksi 86 Ksi

.  %%d of Ultimate 53%%d (3

II lu dia )

6l%%d (1 1/8"-1V'ia )

c) Requirements for component supports are addressed in Section 3.8.3. A comparison between AISC and ASHE support requirements has been done.

Attached is 'the table comparing the two support requirements to this response.

d) Allowable stresses are based on Section 1.5 of AISC which in turn are based on ASTM material values. AISC factors of safety vary from 1.67 to 2.0 on yield strength. The development of factors of safety is documented in the Commentary to the AISC Code.

Oj SI;qUI;I:CI'. OF EVENTS, COI RESIO:;uT:;G T~ .I'.S AND SUII.".AIn OF RESIII.TS FOR ONE PU'IP RI SLS'I'A'FACE TO FOIlCI 9 FLOI" (SIlAIR'i'l'.I'll'!'E) HJTIl A I.OSS Ol Ol I'Si.'I.'I: 1'01'ER AS A RESULT OP GEI'I IUD'OR TI'XP, Tl'.CIINZCKI, SI'I'.CgplCATXO" .STI'.AH GENE!4YJ'OR 'I'UUI. LI ANGE, AND FAZLURE TO RESIORE ORSSI'IE li.'R IN 'IMO ilOURS-Success Patl(s 6 W CP 0 4J 4J 0(

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-charging pumps X

-pressurizer heater X ~

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0 g n 3 0 3 3 UTILIZATIOA OF SAFETY SYSTL':fS 1'Ol'YE PUiffI:SISX'ANCE TO FORCI'.D FI.OU (SflAFT Sf IZUf<f) UITff A LOSS OF OF1'SITE PAhi'.ll AS A RESULT OF GENERATOf'RIP TECINICAL SPECIFICATION STEAlf GEiXERATtcRTUBE LEAME, AiXD FAILUIK TO

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CHA Mnrth for Trip, 10 2Q p -5,5 fade

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0' uestion No. 42 Provide the allowable buckling limits for AS".K Class 1 linear and plate and shell type component supports subjected to faulted condition load. Also provide additional information concerning the design of support bolts and bolted connections.

~Res oese All safety-related component supporting structures are designated "Seismic Category I." Load combinations and allowable stresses are in accordance with Standard Review Plant 3.8.3 and Standard Review Plant 3.8.4. The margin of safety for these structures is inherent in the design equations in the AXSC Specifications.

For linear and plate and shell type component supports subjected to the accident (faulted) load condition, the design stresses are limited to ninety (90) percent of the critical buckling stress as applicable.

For design of support bolts and bolted connections, refer to the above paragraph.

CE--

a) Buckling failure mode of the RCS supports is not credible due to the design characteristics of the supports.

b) The bolts in CE scope of supply (Steam Generator Skirt to Sliding Base) are designed to be below 70% of ultimate which, for the material, is less than 75% of yield.

c) Required Preload of interface Anchor Bolts (S. G. Snubber, Pressurizer Skirt) were specified to Ebasco.

NRC Position: Any support for a Class 1, 2 or 3 component in which the buckling stress p 67% critical buckling must be justified as to why the margin against buckling failure is sufficient.

As a result of discussions of this response during the review meeting, Question 42.1 was generated. This question and its response are attached.

0 e') What the design values for buckling stresses?

b) Commit to using 2/3 of critical buckling stress as a design limit and justify those cases where it is needed.

Re~sense a) The design values for buckling stresses are specified in Section 1.5.1.3 of the AISC code. This Section identifies a minimum factor of safety of 1.67 which is in agreement with Appendix XVII of the ASME Code, Article XVII-2110 b).

Supports of ASME III Class 1, 2 and 3 components have been reviewed and it has been found that buckling stresses do not exceed 67% of critical buckling.

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'0 SLZ-FSAR 3.9.3.4 Com onent Su orts For NSSS supplied components procured prior to July 1, 1974 design stress li'mits for ASHE Code Class 1 vessel supports, piping supports and supports for the reactor coolant pumps (including the attachment welds to the vessel or piping assemblies) are defined in the component specification. For the faulted condition the stress limits are defined as: the limits of Section IXI, NB-3220 using an Sm value equal to the greater of 1.5 times the tabu-lated Sm value and 1.2 times the tabulated Sy value, but not exceeding .7 times the material tensile strength, with the values taken at the appropri-ate temperature. Design stress limits for other loading conditions are

. those identified in applicable subsections of the ASME Code.

A/E supplied supports for Code Class 1, 2 and 3 mechanical systems, compo-nents and piping are designed in accordance with codes in effect at the time of purchase order. The supports for components procured prior to July 1, 1974 are designed per AISC guidelines. For normal and upset conditions, normal AISC stress limits apply.

Supports for components procured after July 1, 1974 are designed in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF, with its applicable stress limits.

The only supports designed to Section NF are for the following components:

Containment Spray Pumps Intake Cooling Mater Pumps Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps Basket Strainers Safety Injection Tanks SG Sliding Base and Bearings Ion Exchangers Bottom Loaded Filters Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers Instrument Racks Letdown Heat Exchanger Regenerative Heat Exchanger (cont'd on next page)

0 3.9.3.4 (cont'd)

, The extent of deformation of the supports is limited by the allowable stresses discussed above.

The waste gas compressor supports and anchor bolts are designed to the criteria of the AISC Hanual of Steel Construction, 1970, except that the increase i'n the allowable stresses due to seismic and wind loads per Paragraph 1.5.6 Part 5, is not permitted.

All safety-related component supporting structures are designated "Seismic Category I." Load combinations and allowable stresses are in accordance with Standard Review Plan 3.8.3 and Standard Review Plan 3.8.4. Refer to FSAR 3.8.3 and FSAR 3.8.4. The margin of safety for these structures is inherent in the design equations in the AISC Specifications.

For linear and plate and shell type component supports subjected to the accident (faulted) load condition, the design stresses are limited to ninety (90)~percent of the critical buckling stress as applicable. For design of. support bolts and bolted connections, refer to the above paragraph.

Piping supports and restraints are designed to accommodate the loading combinations shown in Table 3.9-16. The normal allowable stress limits of A1SC and HSS-SP-58, as summarized in Table 3.9-15, are used in original support and restraint design for all loading combinations, including faulted.

To minimize redesign and refabrication, which might result from revised stress analyses, the following criteria apply as necessary when evaluating existing restraint designs against revised faulted loading: stresses in hangers and restraints shall be less than 1.6 times AISC limits, not to exceed .96 times material yield stress, where shear yield stress is assumed to be .577 times tensile yield stress. Also, stresses shall not exceed

.90*times critical buckling stress, when that is a controlling factor.

Supports are designed to the highest loadings that would result from transient conditions such as relief valve operation, fast valve closure, or system thermalgradients. Thermal stresses are considered as primary stresses for supports and as secondary stresses for components.

The operability assurance program for active components and their supports is discussed in Subsection 3.9.3.2. Preoperational tests for piping systems and their supports are discussed in Subsection 3.9.2.1.

• Cases where buckling stresses in the supports of ASME Class 1, 2 or 3 components exceed 67% of critical buckling stress will be justified on an individual basis that the margin against buckling is sufficient.

SL2 FSAR TABLE 3.9-17 STRESS LIMITS, FOR PIPE SUPPORTS

Reference:

MSS SP-58 & AISC Manual 7th Edition Fb Ft Fv Fp Tension at'in SR~as & Use ~Ben din Tension Shear ~Beanie Hole 21,6002 N/A 14,400 14,400 N/A Steel 23,760 Standard Han er Com onents 14,500 14,500 11,600 23,200 105850 Plates and Bars 14,500 14,500 .11,600 21,600 10,850 Rods at Threads N/A 9,000 N/A N/A N/A Rods Plain 14,500 'N/A N/A N/A N/A Pins 14,500 N/A 11,600 23,200 N/A

~Pi e 15,000 15,000 12,000 See Note 3 N/A Bars & Plates 304 Steel 11,200 11,200 8,950 17,900 8,400

~Pi e 304 Steel 11,200 110200 8,950 See Note 4 N/A Bolts N/h, 15,000 12,000 21,600 N/A For Notes, see next page.

TABLE 3.9-17 Notes

1. for compact sections as defined in AISC 1.5.1.4.1

2. for other sections as defined in AISC 1.5.1.4.4 and 1.5.1.4.5

3. tables for compression values in AISC 1.5.1.3.1

4. calculated per AISC 1.5.1.3.1

5. These values are used in original design for all loading combinations including faulted. Vhen checking an existing support or restraint design against revised faulted loads stresses are limited to the following:

stresses in hangers and restraints shall be less than 1.6 times AISC limits, not to exceed 0.96 times material yield stress, where sliear

. yield stress is assumed to be 0.577 times tensile yield stress. Also, stresses shall not exceed 0.90 times critical buckling stress, when that is a controlling factor. Cases where buckling stresses in supports "of ASME Class 1, 2 or 3 components exceed 67% of critical buckling stress will be )ustified on an individual basis that the margin against buckling is sufficient.

0 TABLE 3.9-18 LOADING COMBINATIONS AND STRESS LIMITS FOR P:PING SUPPORTS Plant Operating Design Load Piping Support Condition Combination Stress Limit ASME CODE Normal SW Refer to Table 3.9-17 CLASS l . Upset a) b)

SW+OBE SW+OBE+FVC c) SWHOBE+RVO d) SW+OBE+T.

Emergency SW+OBE+RVO+FVC Faulted(>) SW+ (SSE2 + FC2)~

ASME CODE

-CLASS Normal SW Refer to Table 3.9-3 7 Upset a) SW+OBE 2 & 3 b) SL~BE+FVC c) SW+OBE+RVO Emergency SW+OBE+FVC+RVO Faulted SW+ (SSE2 + FC2)

Notation:

SW Largest of: a) DW+Max(+) TH b) DW+Max (-) TH c) DW DW Deadweight (includes sustained mechanical loads)

OBE = Operating Basis'arthquake SSE = Safe Shutdown Earthquake RVO = Relief Valve includes both open and closed systems FVC = Fast Valve Closure TH Thermal expansion SSEI= Inertia Portion of SSE SSED= Displacement Portion of SSE T Transient FC Dynamic loads associated with plant faulted condition (1) a) Where the fundamental frequency of the piping system is beyond the resonant region of the supporting structure the SSE will be combined b) Where the piping fundamental frequency is not beyond the structural resonant region the SSE will be combined in the following manner:

SSE JSSEIt + ISSEDI

TABLE 33-6 DESIGN STRESS LIt1ITS FOR CODE CLASS 2 AHD 3 HSSS PUMPS CONDITION STRESS LIMIT Design {~ or ~l)+ <b 1.5 NOTE". 1. For the LPSI Pump, S is replaced by Sm

2. Supports satisfy the stress limits of AShfE III, HF.

For those pumps ordered prior to the issuance of NF, supports satisfy the AISC stress limits..

0 ST. LUCiE PLANT P

RADXOLOGICAL EMERGENCX PLAN pate I'os' ural IT 2.

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O.

' TABLE OF CONT NTS Planning Standards

~Pa e (NUREG&654) 1 ) GENERAL INFORM~)XON 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Defiaitioas 1.3 Scope and Applicability 1-6 1.4 Concept of Operations 1-6 1.5 Supporting Plaas aad Agreements 1-12

2. ORGANXZATXON) FACXLITX"S, AND SUPPORT SERVXC S A) B) C) H) L) N 2.1 Elements of the Emergency Respoase Organization 2-1 2.2 Florida Po~r & Light Company Emergency Response Organization 2-11 2.3 Emergency Response Support aad Resources 2-34 2.4 Emergency Facilities aad Equipment 2-34 2.5 Medical aad Health Support 2W3

3. EtPKZNCY CLASSVXCATXON SYST2f D)H

3. 1 Unusual Eveat I 3-1 I

3.2 Alert 3 1 3.3 Site Area Emergency 3~2 3.4 General Emergency 3-3 3.5 Emergency Act'on Levels 3-5 4 ~ NOTXPZCATXON AND COMHPifXCATXONS r I 4.1 FPL Emergency Response Organization ~ . 4-1 4.2 State Agencies 4-7 4.3 St. Lucia County Disaster Preparedaess Coordinator 4-11 St. Lucie 8/1/81

4-12

'4.5 Notification oi the Public by the State/County 4-12 4.6 Communications Equipment 4-13 4.7 Testing 4-15 5 ~ RESPOHSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS H)I)J)K)M 5.1 Accident Assessment 5-1 5.2 Protective Response 5-9 5.3 Radiological Exposure Control 5-22 5.4 Recovery and Re-entry 5-25

6. PUBLIC ZHFOR!KTXOH F 1 'reparatory Public Information Program 6-1 6.2 Florida ?ower 8 Light Company Emergency Public Information Program 6-1

7) iGIXHTAZHIHG EiiERGEHCY PREPAKZNESS N,O,P 7,1 Exercises and Dr )ls 7.2 Emergency Response Training 7-7 7.3 Planning E'fort Development 7-14 7.4 Emergency Equipmont Maintenance 7-16 APPEHDXX A FLORXDA.'S RADXOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN FOR iNUCLZ)Qt POVQl FACILITI"S APPE))DIX B RESERVED APPENDIX C FLORIDA HIGKfAY PATROL APPENDS D SUPPORT L"-TTER BET))ED FLORIDA PQMER 6 LZGBT COMPANY AND THE ST. LUCIZ COUNTY - FT. ?ZERO FIRE DZSTRZCT St. Lucio 8/1/81

0 APPEi%)IX E SUPPORT I TZERS BET'rK N FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AND U.S. COAST GUARD SUPPORT LETT-PS BETWEN U.S. DEPARZKHT OF E'KRGY (REACTS) AND .LORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY APPENDIX G MISCELLANEOUS LETZ~ OF SUPPORT SUPPORT LETTRE AND wKRGENCY MEDICAL PLAN BETWEEN FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AND REEF ASSOCIATES, ZNC. (i~A)UNT SINAI MEDICAL CENT R)

APPEÃ)LC X AGRK~NT BETWEEN:LORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AND RADXOLOGY'SSOCIATES INCA (LPJRWOOD MEDICAL CENT R)

APPENDIX J LISTING OF . ERGENCY PLAN ZMPL- KiKWG PROCEDURES St. Lucre 8/1/81

LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS

~Pa e Figure 1-1 Plume Exposure Pathway (10-PALe)

Emergency Planning Zone 1-8 Figure 1,-2 Initial Notification Flow 1-13 Figure 1-3 Coordination and Information Flow 1-14 Figure 2 1 Overall FPL ~rgancy Raspon"a Organization 2-2 II Figure 2-2 Plume .Exposure Pathway EPZ Organization for Radiological Response 2"4 Figure 2-3 St. Lucia Plant Normal Operati~

Organization 2-13 Figure 2-4 Immediate (On-site) PPL Response Organization 2-17 Figure 2-5 Expanded ZPL Response Organization 2-22 Figure 2-6 Se. Lucia Plant Emergency Pacilitias Location Y~p 2-36 Figure 4-1 Initial No eification Plow 4-2 Figure 4-2 Communications Inearracas '4-9 Figure 5-1 Site Evacuae" on Routes 5-20 Pigura 6-1 Public Information Interfaces 6-3 St Lucia 8/1/81

~ ~ ~ ~ I LXST OP TABLES

~Pa e Table l-l . Sequence of Actions 1-10 Table 2-1 Line ox Succession for Emergency Coordinator 2-19 Table 2-2a Shift and Emergency Staffing Capabilities 2"29 Table 2-2b Emergency Response Organization Functions aad Responsibilities During Alerts, 'Site Area Emergencies and Genera'margeac's 2-32 Table 2-3 Control Room Emergency Equipmeat 2-38 Table 2-4 Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Equipmeat 2-39 Table 2-3 Operatioas Support Center Emergeacy Equipment 2-42 Table 3-1 Events aad Eaitiat ng Coadit'oas for, Emergencies 3-6 Table 4-1 Communications Responsibi'it"es 4-3 Table 4-2 Information Contained in Xnitial Noti icatioa to BDP 4~8 Table 5-1 Summary of Available Neteorological Data 5-5 Table 5-2, Sources of Meteorological Data Table 5-3 Protective Action Recommendatioas 5-10 Table r

7-1 L~ple Scenario Format 7-3 jt% Way g ~ tb v St. Lucia 8/1/81

1 ~ GENERA. THFPRMATXON 1.1 ~Pur oaa This Emergency Plan contains Florida Power cg Light Companygs olans ior coping with emergencies at the St. Lucia Plant, a nuclear facility~located in St.

Lucie County, Florida. n8s C aM The plan has been designed-to preclude or mitigate the adverse health and safety effects oi an emergency. Four general objectives have been considered in the development oi this plan:

1) Timely and accurate assessment oi oif-normal or emergency conditions and proper not'iication oi responsible authorit'es.

2) Ef factive coordination of emrarerranc>> actions ~nner al 1 organi~ations having a response role.

3) Continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both on-site and oif-site.

4) Continuing maintenance oi an adequate state oi emergency preparedness.

1a2 Definitions Architect/Engineer - Ebasco Assessment Actions - Those actions taken during or azter an acc'dent to obtain and process information necessary to make decisions to implement specific emergency measures.

~Coa aa - plordda paver a llg1rr Coapaay (ppl).

Corrective Act'ons - Those measures taken to mit'gate or terminate an St. Lucio 8/1/81

emergency situation at or near the source of the problem in order to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material or to reduce the magnitude of a release, e.g ~ shutting down equipment, firefighting, repair and damage controls Dut Call Su exvisor - A designated supervisor assigned from the nuclear plant staff to provide 24-hour response to any off-normal operating condition, any emergency, or any problem upon not"fication by the aucleax plant supervisor.

He is responsible for notiiying the persons needed to 'correct the problem, and

'4'f cS in case of an emergency, pe eh~akk-neee~ the Emergency Control Oificer of the off-site emergency organixation or the Radiological Duty Ofxicer, additional plant technical staii and the primary emergency teams.

~E'er enc - Sny off aot-nal event ot coaddtioa which sftnfffcsntly incteasas the risk of harm to the health and safety of the public and/or site personnel. A radiological emexgency at the Plant is classii'ed as an Unusual Event, an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency.'mer enc Action Levels (EAL's) - Radio3.ogical dose rates, specific contamination levels of airborne, waterborne, ox surface-deposited.

concentrations oi radioactive materia3.s; or specific Xnst~~ent indications (includ'ng their rates of change) that may be used as thresholds for initiating such specific emergency measures as designating a part'cular class of emergency, or initiating a particular protective action.

Emer enc Control Of icer (ECO) A designated Company corporate ox icer or senior manager who will have the authority to make pol'cy and expend funds xor emergency response activities.

Recove M~nafyer (R8) - A designated senior manager who wi3.1 have responsibi3d.ty for managing the FPL off-site emergency response organimtion.

Emervenc Coordinator (EC) - The title assumed by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor in the event ox a radiological emergency at, the P3.ant. The EC is responsible for notifying ofi-sita authozities, both inside and outside the Company and has fu11 authority and responsibility for on-site emergency response actions.

1-2 N

e s ~ St. Lucie 8/1/81

Emer enc Information Mana er (E2f) - A designated Company corporate ox'iicer or senior manager who will serve as the principal spokesman iox'he Company.

Emer enc News Center (EHC) - A designated facility for use by the EDi and tu.s staff in communicating with the news media.

Emer enc 0 erations Center (FOC) - Designated oii-site iacilities from which the St. Luc'e County,,'fartin County and State oi ?lor'da urgency Response Organization will di'rect necessary assessment and protective actions ior ox-site areas.

emergency activities will be coordinated.

to guide plant operations during potential or actual emergency situations.

consideration o" the plume exposure and ingest"on pathways has been given in order to assure that prompt and eiiective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event oi a rad'ological emergency at the Plant.

Emer ency Procedures (Emer enc Plan Tmnlementi Procedures) - A set oi emergency response procedures init'ated and followed by the ??L Emergency Response Organization to act'vate the appropriate sections oi the Emergency Plan, assess and classify the emergency, notify the appropriate authorities, and provide continuing xesponse capability.

~paar an: Rasronsa Qrranf samoa - Thar. portion of tha FPL organfzszfon assigned responsibilities upon initiation ox the Emexgency ?lan.

Emer enc Secur". <dna er (ESA) - A, designated Company managex'r supervisor who will have the responsibi1ity for security aspec s of the emergency response.

L-3 St. Lucie 8/1/81

Governmental Affairs Hang er (GAH) -A designated Company corporate otiicer or senior manager who has the responsibil'ty for liason between the Emergency Contx'ol Officer and political officials ot the State and Pederal Governments during an emergency.

Emer enc Technical Haaa er (EW) - A designated Company manager who will be responsible for providing technical support for emergency zespoase actions.

Nuclear Steam System Suool (NSSS) Vendor - Combuscioa Eagiaeering Of -site E=er enc Organization A. group of designated 'ndividuals from within the normal Compaay organ'zat'oa 4o may cease aoxmal activit'es aad assume responsibility ior augmenting FPL corrective, assessmenc and protective actions in the eveat of a xadiological emergency at the Pl.ant.

Owner Cont plied Area - That ooreioa ox PPL oroperty surrounding aad including the St. Lucie Plant which is subject to limiced access aad control as deemed appr o pri ate Qy PPT ~

0 eraeioas Suaoorc Center (OSC) - An emergency assembly point ae the plant to which FPL operat'ons support personneL can report and a~~t assignment.

Off-site - All property outside the Owner Controlled Area.

On-site - The Owner Controlled Area.

Plant - tha Pt. tnnta Plant, Untta ltnn< P .

Plume Emosure Paehwa - That area, appro~tely 10 miles in radius from the center of the Plant, ior which detailed plans are made to pxotect people irom exposure to a plume coatai~ radioactive macer'als.

In estioa Pathwa - That area, approximately 50 miles in radius from the center of the Plaae, ior which plans are made to procect people from iagestion of food-scuifs aad water contaminated by radioactive materials rel.eased from che Plane.

St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 Protected Area - The area (within the Owner Controlled Area) occupied by the nuclear unit and its associated equipment enclosed within the security perimeter .fence.

,Protective Actions - Those measures taken for the purpose oi preventing or minimizing radiological exposure to persoas.

Radiation Controlled Area (RCA) - The area (within the Protected Area) wherein personnel access is restricted for the purpose of monitoring and controlling exposure to radiatioa.

Radiolo ical Duty Officer - A designated member of the PPL General Office Power Resources staif Cth responsibility for responding to radiologica3.

,emergencies or inc'dents on a 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day basis.

Recove Actions - Those actions taken after an emergency to restore the Plant neaow1 y ats weSihl e re f res r Oetel d ti On herO ra the tteeareeanty, REZP (Radiatioa mr eacy Evaluation Pacility) - A medical care organization which provides primary care staif aad facilities at Mount Sinai Hospital in Miami Beach.

State - The State of Slotida S stem Ooerat'oas Power Coordinator - An PPL System Operations posi&oa wnich is staffed 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s/day for. uninterrupted coordination oi electr'cal power distribution. Communication is maiatained with all FPL plaats, service ceaters, and the General Office.

Technical Support Center (TSC) - A, designated oa-s'e facility thar. serves as a work area for use by technical and management personnel 'n order to provide technical support to Control Room personnel.

Technical Su port Center Supervisor - The person assigned to supervise the persoaael aad direct the technical support ac ivities in the TSC.

1-5 St. Lucie 8/1/81

1.3 Sco e and A olicabillt The Emergency Plan describes Plorida Power 6 Light Company's plans ior responding to emergencies that may develop at the St. Lucia Plant. The plan has been prepar d to meet the requirements oi 10 CPR 50.47, 10 CFR 50.7Z, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E The purpose or this plan is to define and assign authority and responsibility in order to protect the health and safety or'he public and plant personnel. This plan applies to all plant emergencies which have resulted in, or which signiiicantly increase the risk oi the accidential release of radioactive materials to the environment.

Plans have been'developed based upon knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, and release characteristics of a spectrum or events. Emergency Planning Zones have been deiined. Pigure 1>>1 illustrates the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone for the St. Lucie Plant. The map (Pigure 1-1) does not specifically include the area of ocean east or t¹ plant. S< nce there are no islands in that direct" on, any evacuation 'of boating eraiiic would be addressed on a best eifort basis. A. key component oi this plan is coordination with federal, state, and county authorities who contribute to the overall response e fort. This plan outlines Company responsibilities within the framework of the overall emergency response organization, and provides a conceptual basis for the development of the detailed procedures necessary to implement the plan.

1.4 Conce t of Operations The Emergency Plan deiincs emergency conditions and delineates the responsibilit'es and dut"as oi the PPL Rnergency Respouse Organizat"on (See Figure 2-1). The Emergency Plan is concerned with the following bas'c activities, which are discussed in the Plan in detai':

1) Organization and resources adequate to detect the presence or an emergency condition, assess the condition, and respond in an appropriate manner (Chapter 2).

1-6 St. Lucie 8/1/81

-2. Assignment of an off-normal event to its proper classiiication (Chapter 3).

3. Notiiication oi off-site authorities, as required, and continuing communications (Chapter 4).

4. Gathering and interpreting data to determine appropriate actions (Chapter 5).

5. Assisting governmental agencies in the development oi information ior the public both in terms of preparatory education and emergency response information (Chapter 6).

6. Maintaining FPL in a state oi emergency preparedness (Chapter 7).

Associated with this Emergency Plan are implementing procedures which provide a source of pertinent information and data'equired by the response organisation during an emergency. These procedures are 1'sted in Appendi:c J.

Off-normal events have been separated into the following four classifications of emergencies:

1) Unusual Fvent.

2) Alert.

3) Site Area Emergency.

4) General Emergency. 4 These four classes represent emergency conditions which trigger activat" on oi emergency plans and procedures. When an emergency is declared in connect'on with one ox these four classes, individuals assume new titles with special responsibilities. The Unusual ".vent class requires notiiicat'on to ".ederal and state agenc's, but it does not require full implementation oi this Rnergency Plan or its implementing procedures.

1-7 St. Lucia 8/1/81

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Each emergency class is characterized by abnormal plant events detec'ted by Control Boom instrumentation and/or routine or directed surveillance activites.

The Company's response to emergency condition (Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency) is deiined in terms oi an immediate response and an expanded response reilecting the need for a dynamic emergency response organization which can read&~ y adapt to an emergency condition as it develops. It is expected that the required response to an Unusual Event would be coniined to an immediate response, only.

The immediate response phase encompasses the period oi time and sequence oi actions associated with the initial detect"on of an accident through the activation oi the expanded response capability, ii required. During this phase, the Nuclear Plant Supervisor assumes responsibility as the Emergency Coordinator and initiates the following general activities:

1) Diagnosis of the emergency.

2) Corrective action.

3) Classification oz the emergency.

4) Notification of appropriate FPL authorities.

5) Notification of appropriate of"-site authorities.

During the expanded response phase, the Emergency Control Of icer will assess the situation and expand the emergency response as necessary. A13. available company resources (on-site and ozf-site) can be mobili"ed as needed during this period. State, county and federal response organi=ations can become fully operational both near the site and in the Emergency Operations Centers as required. Continuing cor ect've, assessment, and protective act'ons are underway as required.

1-9 St. Lucia 8/1/81

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'I Table 1-1 summarizes the sequence of actions taken during the phased response. Figure 1-2 delineAtes the initial notification flow. Figure 1-3 summarizes the coordination and information flow fo" Florida Power & Light Company's Emergency Response Organization, and Figure 2-2 shows the same for the state and county organizations.

As discussed throughout this plan, FPL maintains adequate facilities and equipment for detecting, assessing, and responding to emergencies. Redundant means of communications among key response participants are maintained. FPL also maintains agreements that will provide emergency medical, rescue, or ire support on-site, if needed. The training program is designed to maintain the proficiency of the Emergency Response Organization.

TABLE 1-1 TYP ICAL SEOUENC OF ACTIONS Detect" on of Off-Normal Condit" ons Actions: 'ndividual identifies off-normal condition.

'Individual.immediately notifies Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS).

Immediate Response Actions: NPS diagnoses condition and classiiies it in accordance with i plant procedures. If the condition is classified as an emergency, the NPS activates the Emergency Plan and becomes the Emergency Coordinator (EC).

il EC (MPS) directs initial corrective action to cont=ol or mitigate the condition.

The EC orders mobi'ization of the Technical Suppor" Center (TSC) for Alert class or higher.

1-10 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 0

EC initiates accessary oroceccive actions for oa-site per soaael.

The EC mobil'zes on-site response teams as necessary to assess

'and control the emergeacy.-

EC notifies Duty Call Supervisor.

EC notifies state and county ia accordance with plant procedures. (The State will notiiy county response agencies for the Unusual Event).

Duty Call Supervisor notifies che Plant Manager aad che off-site Emergency Coacrol Officer (ECO). If the ECO cannot be reached, the Radiological Duty Officer (RDO) is notified.

EC notifies NRC via EHS communications link.

Expanded Response (Alert Class and Hi her)

Actions: ECO consults with appropriate technical and operac'ng managers and mobilizes che Offsite Emergency Orgaaization to che extent deemed advisable.

ECO aad R"L proceed co General Office Emergency Center, the neax site Interim Emergency Operations Facility, or the on-site Techaical Support Center, as appropriate. LM notiiies EC when he is operational aad assumes responsibility for overall management or FPL emergency response and for communications with off-site organizations. (ECO assumes respoasibilities of the RK prior to the arrival or che RM)

ED proceeds co the Inter'm Emergency Operations Facility ii appropriate aad establishes communications vich the ECO and che Emergeacy News Ceater.

St. Lucie 8/1/81

I RH organizes response teams at interim EOP as appropriate.

'M relieves the EC of his of"-site emergency response responsibilities (including communications with the state and

'ounty) The EC can now devote himself to control of the power

~

plant.

RM (or designated response staff) receives and assesses periodic plant status, radiological data, and meterorologica3.

data, and continues communications and coordination with tne state and county authorities.

RH continues assessment or conditions and control oi PPL response until Plant conditions stablize then c3.oses out with verbal summary to oif-site authorities or prepares for further long-term activities.

1.5 Supporting Plans and Agreements Supporting plans and agreements are included in the Appendices of this plan. Appendix A, State of Ploxida Plan, contains a signed agreement by FPL, state, and county of icials.

Additional material uti3.i ed Xn the preparation oi the St.

Lucia Plan are:

a) NUREG&654, Rev. 1 b) NUREG&578 c) NUREG-0737 d) 10 CZR 20 e) 10 CPR 50 f) EPA 520/1 - 7S/001 g) Reg. Guide 1,97 St. Lucia 8/1/81

EHERGEHCY COOADIHATOA STATE OF FLORIDA EHERGfNC'Y CONIROL DUTY CAI.L FPL OF DISASTER SUPERVISOR OFFICER OR OFFSITE EHERGDICZ Jgg~~

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AUD 1 IUtthL OEPAATHftll OF HfALTII A PLANI SUPPORT AEIIAUILIThlIVE SERVICES SYSTEH Ot'f Ahf IONS POWER COOADIttATOA ST. I UC IE~HlUtT ltl COUiiT I E fHEfiGftiCY TfAN TEAN HEWERS OFFICF. OF l)ISASTER s LEADEAS MEME'~

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fEEEPIINIE IHTE fllH EHEROENCY TfhtIS LOCAL SiN'f'ONT ST. IUCIE COUHIY-FT.

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OA Rf fF AT ttf . S ltlAI <<IIEDICM AND FIRE EtIERGENCIES OIILY ST. LUCIE PLANf INITIAL HOT I FIOAT ION FLOW PitlHAAY COIISHICATIONS FLOW FIGURE 1-2 AL1EP%LTE CO'BttNICATIOtlS fLOW

FIGURE 1-3 COORDINATION AND IHFORHATIOH FLOW EMERGENCY CONTROL OFFICER GOVERNh1EiiTAL RECOVERY BlERGE) ICY AFFAIRS MANAGER TECHNICAL htAHAGER MANAGER EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY IHFORKATION COORDINATOR SECURITY tNHAGER MANAGER CONTROL FEDERAL, STATE, AND YifDIA ROON COUNTY RESPONSE STAFF AGENCIES 1-14 St. Lucre 8/1/81

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2. ORGAHXZATXOH, FACXLXTX:"S. AND SUPPORT SERVICES 2.1 Elements ox the Emer eac Response Organization This sectioa deiines the primary components of the overall Emergeacy Response Organization aad the relationship or each component to the total effort.

2.1.1 Florida Power & Ll ht Compan Plorida Power & Light Company (PPL) is the licensed. operator of the St.

Lucie Plant. As the licensed operator, PPL has developed this Emergency Plan (and associated procedures) to specify actions and provide a framework for emergency response. PPL's primary responsibilities include the following:

1) Diagnosis and corrective action.

2) Emergency classiiication.

3) Notification or appropriate outside response organizations and continuing commuaicatioa.

C

4) Xaitiatioa oi protective actions for employees and others oa-site

5) Recommendation ox protective actions, for the public, to the state.

6) Hobilization of clorida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization.

4

7) Continuing dat* collectioa, dose pro)ection, aad assessment actions.

8) 'ecovery aad re-entry 2-1 St. Lucia 8/1/81

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The Florida Power 6 Light Company Emergency Response Organization is described in detail in 'Section 2.2 and illustrated in Figure 2-1.

2.1.2 State of Florida Response Or anization Figure 2-2 illustrates the overall State ox Florida Emergency Response Organization.

State of Florida Bureau or Disaster Preparedness The Bureau of Disaster Preparedness (BDP) is the state agency authorized to receive initial noti ication from Florida Power 6 Light Company and is I

responsible for mobilizing the state and county emergency response agencies. This emergency response is conducted in accordance with the Florida Radiological Emergency Plan for Nuclear Power Facilities, prepared by the BDP, in coordination with other emergency response. This plan appears in Appendix A. The BDP's defined responsibilities include:

1) Overall responsibility for coordinating the development and implementaton of state and county emergency response plans.

2) Command and control of State emergency response resources.

3) Hotification or state and county response agencies.

4) Coordination amorig state and local. agencies.

State of Florida Dependent or Health and Rehabilitative Services The Deparmeat of Health and Rehabi'itative Servic s (DHRS), Radiolog'cal Health Services, is the state agency authorized to provide the BDP with technical support and expertise in radiological matte s. The DHRS defined responsibilities include:

2-3 St. t.ucie 8/1/81

FIGURE 2-2 ORGANIZATION FOR RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE Ib D

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PLUME E:CLOSURE PATE5lAY EPZ

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1) Radiological monitoring, of f-site.

2) Off-site radiological exposure control and protective rhsponse recommendations for off-site areas.

3) Emergency medical services, public health, and sanitation.

4) Econoad.c and social services.

Division oz clorida Ei hwa Patrol, De artment of 2. hwa Safe and ..otor Vehicles The Florida Highway Patrol, at the direction of the BDP, provides the following services.

') Traffic control.

2) Communications (support) .

3) Law enforcement coordination.

4) Transportation of radiologicaL emergency teams.

5) Render assistance at the scene of off-site radiation emergencies within their jurisdiction.

6) Nothin their authority, evaluate and exclude individuals f om designated public areas.

Other State Agencies As defined" in the state's plan (Appends A), the BDP can request support

=,as necessary from the following state agencies:

1)'epartment of Transportation, Division oi Road Operations 2-5 St. Lucre sl</s<

0

~ J a ~

2) Departmene oz Agriculture aad Consumer Services.

3) Department of Natural Resources, Division oi Law Enforcement, Patriae Patrol.

4) Department of Environmental Regulat'on, Division of Environmental Programs.

5) Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, Division oi Law Enf orcomeat.

6) Department 'oi Military Affairs.

2.1.3 Coune Res onse Or aaizaeioas Counties that fall wiehin the plume exposure pathway EPZ include St. Lucie County and Hartin County. Counties that fall within the ingeseioa pathway EPZ include St. Lucie County, lhztin County, Xndian River Couaty, Bzevard County, Palm Beach County, Osceola County, Okeechobee County, Highlands County, Glades Couaey and Hendry County.

The local orgaaizaeioas are described in Anaex P oi the State Plan.

Counties may have respoasibilit'es with respect to plume exposure risk, response, hoseiag of evacueees, and ingestion paehway protect on.

County has respoasibili.ey with respect to risk, hosting aad St.'ucie ingestion pathway. Yaztin County has responsibility with respect eo risk, hosting and iagestioa pathway. Indian R'ver County has responsibility for hosting and ingeseioa pathway. Palm Beach County has responsibility for hosting and ingestion paehway. Osceola County has respoasibiliey for ingestioa pathway. Okeechobee Couney has responsibility for iageseioa paehway. Highlands County has resooasibility for i.ngestioa pathway.

Glades County has responsibility for ingestion pathway. Headzy County has responsibility for ingestioa pathway.

Attachment 1 to Annex P addresses shore term actions required i.n the plume I

exposure pathway EPZ. Attachmene 7 addresses the ingestioa pathway EPZ.

2-6 St. Lucie 8/1/81

State agencies take lead in controlling ingestioa pathway response. 'to Annex P establishes procedures to protect citizens oi St.

Lucie County and visitors to the County from the effects oi an accident at the St. Luc' plant. Attachment 2 inc3.udes the St. Lucie County Radiological Emergency Organization. Attachment 3 to Annmc P describes procedures to protect citizens of Hartin County and visitors to Hartin County from the eifects oi an accident ac the St. Lucie plant. Attachment, 3 describes the Hartin County Radiological Emergency Organization.

Attachments 4, 5 and 6 to Annex P include host plans for Indian River County, P~ Beach County, and 3revard County, respectively.

Boards or County Commissioners will take prooer and respoasible action to protect life, health, safety, property, and the environmeat-from the consequences oi nuclear- cower accidents. Dur" ng radiological emergencies, resources and personnel .oi St. Luc'e, Hart" n, Indian'River, Palm Beach, and Brevard Count'es wi3.1 be reserved and availab3.e for use by County Commissioners. Decision to implement protective action recommendatioas wilL be made Jointly by Chairmen, Boards oi Couaty Commissioners, and the Governor or State Director, Division oi Public Saiety Planning and Assistance. If time does not permit State involvement in initial decisioa making, the 'decisioa to take protective actions may be 'made by the Ch"irmen, Boards oi Couacy Commisioaers, or their designated alrernates All County'ersonael aad resources will be under the control or the County Commissioners.'- Federal and State r'esources will also be available to the Counties.

Alerting, ~borning, and evacuation of populatioas vill be in accordance with procedures prese ibed in Attac?~nts 2 and 3 to Annex P. Attachments 2 through 5 describe hosting responsibilities, including shelter location and operation, and evacuee registration, monitoring, and decoataminatioa.

Responsibility for directioa and coat ol rests with the Chairman, Board oi County Commissioners, unless a disaster declaration under provisions of Florida Statutues, Chapter 252 is in effect. If a disaster has been dec3ared, responsibility for direction and control rests with the Governor or Director, Division oi Public Safety Planning and Assistance.

2-7 St. Lucie 8/1/81

County Divisions of Disaster Preparedaess report eo the Boards of County Commissioners. This is also true for ocher Couaty resources, including the Sheriffs'ffices, Engineers'ffices, fire departments, public health offices, school boards, aad ocher County organizations.

The Chairmen, Boards of Commissioners, have responsibility for overa13.

emergency response planning. County Disastex Preparedness Directoxs are responsible for actual plan deve3.opmenc and updating. St. Lucie County Matin County, Indian R'ver County, aad Brevard County each have an Emergency Operaeioas Cancer.

St. Lucie and Hartin Count Disascer Preparedness Coordinators The. Disaster Preparedness Coordinator for St. "Lucia County has the ma)or responsibility while the Disaster Preparedness Coordinaeor ior Ywrtia County fuaccioas ia a supporting role. The County Disaster Preparedness Coordinators receive initial aotificatioa from Plorida Power 6 Light Company simultaneously with BDP via MANAS for Site Area or General Emergencies. (Notifications of Unusual Events wiLl. be made by the State and Alert aotificaeions are made by telephone). The St. Lucie and Ywrcin County Disaster Prepaxedness Coordinacors chen have respoasibi3~ ty any necessa'ry protective accioas ior oif-sita areas (inct.uding fox'nitiating off-site evacuatioas) based upon available information'from ehe ZPL Emergency Coordinator and Radio3.ogical Health Services (DT'S). The St.

Lucia County and 8~tin County plans are a part oi the State plan provided in Appendix A.. "In add" cion to overa13. responsibility, che Disaster Preparedness Coordinators have responsibility for the following:

I) Direction and coacro3..oi county resources.

2) Protective response ior of -site areas inc3.uding warning aad evaclLxcioae

3) Communications.

2-8 St. Lucia 8/1/81

4) Public information.

5) Of f-site radiological exposure control.

6) Coordination of arrangements for shelter and feeding of evacuees.

Count Sheriffs (St. Lucio and Mrtin Counties)

At the request or the respective Disaster Preparedness Coordinator, the County Sheriffs can prova the followig support services:

1) Law enforcement.

2) Harn'ng and evacuation (implementation).

3) Traffic control.

4) Communications (support).

5) Rescue (support).

Other Local encies As defined'n the County plans, the Disaster Preparedness Coordinator can request support as necessary f=om the fol'wing:

1) Pire"Rescue Services.

2) County Road Department.

3) Department of Public Health.

St. Lucie"County-."ort Pierce Pire Department by agreement with Florida Power 6 Light Company (Appendix D) will respond to emergenc'es on-site upon request.

2-9 St ~ Lucia 8/1/81

2.1.4 Federal Response encies U. S..Nuclear Re ulato Commission The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will be notified via a direct,

'edicated telephone line (hot Line) from the Control Room to the Bethesda, ifd. Operations .Cent r within one hour after identifying the existence oi an emergency condition.

U. S. Coast Guax'd At the request oi Florida Power 6 Light Company (on-site activ'ities) and the BDP (oif-site act'vities), the Coast Guard can provide xescue assistance Xn accordance with their general authority as described in Appendix E.

U. S. Department oi Ene zv (DOE).

Upon request by the BDP, DHRS can request that the DOE provide a Radiological Assistance Team to aid in evaLuating radiological hazards.

This support would be provided out oi DOE's Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, South Carolina. This provision is described in Anne.. F or the State plan.

2.1.5 Private Sector Or anizations REEF Associates, Tnc.

REEP Associates, Inc. Located within the Ht. Sinai Hospital complex, provides immediate availability oi a fuLly equipped primary medical facility with an adequate staif or physicians, .nurses, and technical personnel soled ln the diagnosis and treatment of radiation injury and personal contamination. This support is provided in accordance with REEP's Radiat'on urgency Plan (provided in Appendix H) ~ REEP is discussed in detail in Sect'on 2.5, Hedical and Health Support.

St. Lucie 8/1/81

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (XTPO)

I:PO maintains industry source lists for personnel and equipment which can be made available for support services during an emergency.

Combustion Zn ineeri Corporation Combustion Eng'neer'ng is the Nuclear =team System Supply (!fSSS) vendor for the St. Lucie Plant and can provide iniormation and advice upon request.

2.2 Plor'da Power 6 Li ht Com an Emer enc Response Or ani ation The pu"pose oi this section is to describe FPL's Emergency Response Organization including both on-site and oii-site organizational resources.

The Emergency Response Organization is defined relative to'he two phases of response and actions which are anticipated. This approach recognizes that the organization Wll be ~ dynamic nue, dependent upon response time ~ad the severity of the emergency. The immediate" response organization consists of the plant duty shiit and other plant personnel as available to be called in from ofi-site to diagnose the emergency and rake corrective actions. The "expanded" response organization includes corporate resources which can be made available, if the emergency war ants, to assist in assessment actions, control, and stabilization.

2 2.1 Normal 0 eratin Or anization The normal operat"ng organization chart for St. Lucie Plant is shown in Figure 2-3. The plant is staffed and qualified to take the necessary actions to implement the Emergency Plan and to initiate the necessary immediate response actions.

2-1 1 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0

The normal hours operating staff at the St. Lucie Plant consists of approximately 225 people. During off-hours approximately 15-20 employees are on-site. Key operating positions are described below:

Plant iona er The P3.ant Nna~er reports to the Assistant la~ nager oi Power Resources-Huclear and is responsible for the conduct of operation and maintenance, of tne plant in a safe, reliable and efficient manner. He is usually available and on call 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day.

0 erations Suaerintendent The Operations Superintendent has the overa13. responsibi3ity for directing the day-to-day operation of the p3.'ant- He reports directly to the Plant 5unager and the Operations Supervisor reports to him. He coordinates operation related maintenance activit'es with the Yxintenance Superintendent. He assumes all of the Plant >mnager's responsibilities and authority 'n his absence..He is also responsible for directing supervisory activities in the areas of Health Physics, Chemistry, and Reactor Engineering.

0 erations Supervisor The Operations Supervisor has responsibility for directing the acf'vities of the nuclear plant operating shifts, including the Nuclear Plant Supervisors and ifuclear Watch Engineers. He holds an iKC Senior Reactor

.Operator License. He is a3.so responsible for supervision oi uel handling operations .

2-12 St. Lucie 8/1/81

Nuclear Plant~Su rvisor s

The Nuclear Plant Supervisor is responsible for the actual operation of the nuclear plant and fuel handling operations on his assigned shift. He holds an NRC Senior Reactor Operator License. He directs the activities of the personnel on his shift and is'cognizant of md.ntenance activities being performed whi3.e he is on duty. He reports directly to the Operations Supervisor.

Nuc'ear 'latch En~~"eer The Nuclear Match Em~inper is the working operating foreman assigned, for CJN S+a~

each shi't~ He reports directly to the. Nuclear Plant Supervisor. He hoids an URC Senior Reactor Operator License Health Ph sics Su ervisor The-Health Physics Supervisor supervises the Health Physics Department He is responsible for monitoring implementation of the corporate radiation protection program. He reports directly to the Operations Superintendent and can report directly to the Plant Ms nager ChemistzZ Supervisor supervises the Chead.stry Department. He is responsible fox chenf.cal w

He and radiochemical monitorings anaLysis, and evaluation. He supervises overal3. laboratory operation and ensures that chemistry training, record keeping and reporting requirements are met. He reports directly to the Operations Superintendent.

shuffles Raeccor Vnssnearenn Suoervssor ~ v e a He supervises the Reactor Engineering Department. He is responsib3.e for day-to-day reactor operation, nuc3.ear physics testing, fuel burnup calculations, fue3. during refue3'ngs, and various administrative duties. He reports directLy to the Operations Superintendent 2-14 S t. Lucia f

Pena(in/ Si'rgb nepoii'~ l"i'on. 8/1/81

Saint'eaance Superintendent He supervises the ElectricaL ~maintenance, Mechanical Maintenance, and Instrument and Control (I & C) Departments. He is responsible for the mainteaanc oi mechanical, electrical, and I,& C equipment in the nuclear units. He reports directly to the Plaat ~ieger.

Technical Department Supervisor He supervises the Shift Technical Advisors aad other genera'lant engineers and technicians. He reports directly to the Plant Nanager.

~ual~it Control Supervisor He supervises the Quality Control (QC) Department. He is responsible for directing the activities of the Document Control sect'oa and the QC Inspectors who perform surveillance aad inspectioa of nuclear safecy related activities to monitor for techxd.cal specification and regulatory compliance. He reports directly to the Plant iMaager.

2.2.2 Emer enc Res oase Or anizatioa The Emergency Plan is structured insofar as practical so that normaL company operations'are aot significantly disrupted. Personnel are designated as part of the Off-site Emergency Organization and arrangements are made for others in the normal corporate organization to carry out routine duties ia the event oi an emergency. Of "site Emergency Organization members are also available periodically to develop, review, aad practice procedures covering their responsibilities.

n~ "3 The Emergency Plan Supervisor is responsible for maiatainiag emergency preparedness as discussed in Chapter 7. He maiataias a roster ox Off-sita Emergeacy Organizat'oa participants aad their alternates. This roster is reviewed periodically and confirmed by a telephone call to the listed numbers. Each participant is responsible for advisiag the Emergeacy Plan Supervisor when his duties are changed such that he can ao longer St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 participate. In the event of transfer or termination, the Emergency Plan Supervisor should be notified by the employee's department head and a replacement named and trained.

2.2.2. l Immediate Response Phase Initiatin Event (Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency)

The emergency response is initiated by any individual who discovers an emergency condition. This person notifies the Nuclear Plant Supervisor by the fastest means possible. This first phase is characterized by diagnosis and ~ediate action by the plant operators on shift.

Or anization Zf the diagnosis indicaties that the condition should be classified as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, then the Nuclear Plant Supervisor declares an emergency.

The Nuclear Plant Supervisor becomes the Emergency Coordinator and, as such, directs the On-site Emergency Organization. During this initial phase, the operating staxf constitutes the response organization.

Emergency requirements take immediate precedence over aoxmal opexating I

responsibilities (as determined by pxocedure or at the dixection of the Emergency Coordinator) . The Plant Staf Emergency Assignments section (2.2.2.3) describes the emergency services that can be provided initia11y by plant staff. Figure 2-4 shows the immediate response organization.

2-l6 St. Lucis 8/1/81

0 0

FIGURE 2-4 IMMEDIATE RESPONSF. ORGANIZATION EKRGENCY COORDQfATOR (NUCLEAR PCAiMT SUPERVISOR)

SHIr Z NUCL~

TECHNICAL 7lATCH ENGINE~

ADVISOR INTERIM RADIATION PLANT OPRATORS TEAM LEADER FIRE TERN LEADER INTERIM FIRST AID/

DEC&fZAi5XNATION

TEAM LEADS XNTERQf SECURITY TEAM LEADS 2-17 St. Lucre s/x/sz

Line of Succession Table 2-1 provides the line oi succession for the position of Emergency Coordinator should che Nuclear plant Supervisor be incapacitated. IX che fuaction is assumed, it is the responsibility of che new Emergeacy Coordinator to ascertain the status of all Emergency Coordinacor responsibilities. This table also provides for relief or the EC by higher level plane management.

Actions The Emergency Coordia*tor iaitiaces the following actions:

1) Orders corrective actions to bring the emergency uader control.

2) Nocifies the State Bureau oi Disaster Preparedness Duty '>laming Officer and the Jouncy Disaster Preparedness Coordiaators, in accordance with plan" procedures.

3) Yabilizes the On-site Emergency Orgaaimtion.

4) Notifies HRC via ENS within oae hour oi dec~ration of an emergency condition.

5) Provides recommendacions for offsite protective actioa as discussed in Seccioa 5.

DD~e Dation The Emergeacy Coordinacor shall aoc delegate the following respoasibili t" es:

1) Decision to aoc'fy stace and local authorities.

2) Recommended protective actions for the public (off-site) ~

2-18 St. Lucie 8/1/81 '

0 TABLE 2-1 LZNE OF SUCCESSZON FOR E.URGENCY COORDZNATOR Emergency Coordinator: Nuclear Plant Supervisor Zn the event the Nuclear Plant Supervisor is incapacitated, the Emergency Coordinator will be (in order of succession o 8 from &C.

a.Qc,cled uni 9):

1) Nuclear Vatch Engineer with a Senior Reactor Operator license.

2) Reactor Control Operator with a Senior Reactor Operator license.

The Emergency Coordinator can g ant permission for watch relief, including his own, when it is safe in his judgement to do so.

At the discretion of higher level plant management, the Emergency Coordinator may be relieved of his duties; following proper turnover procedure. (i,e. Plant Manager, Operations Superintendent, Operations Supervisor or off-duty NPS).

2-19 St. Luc'e 8/1/81

0 r

2.2.2.2 Bcoanded Response Phase

'\

Initiatia Action The second phase is initiated by the Emergency Coordinator. His notification activities mobilize che Plorida Power & Light Compaay Oif-site Emergency Organization as well as state, local, and iederal emergency response organizacioas. Mobilization proceeds to the degree necessary to respond to the severity of the accident as detained by the ECO. P'ant conditions are stabilized and responsibility ior response ls centered about che plant organization (inc'uding oii-duty personael notified to report to the plant) with backup provided by the oif-site organization.

This, phase represents the period where augmentation oi stafi support ls determined by the Emergency Control Officer as described below. Figure 2" 5 shows the response organization that can develop during this period, if required.

Emer eac Control Oificer (ECO)

The ECO will be a designated corporate officer or seaior maaager with the authority to establi,sh policy and co expend the funds necessary co cope with any emergency situations that arise. He is responsible for all of PPL Offsite Emergency Organization activities, including personnel assigamencs aad commuaication arrangemencs. JJe provides ior dispatching a Company represeacative to the St. Lucie County urgency Operacions Center.

Primary: Vice President, Power Resources Alternaces: (l) Assistant to Vice P"esident, Power Resources (2) Manager,Power Resources-H'uclear 2-20 St. Lucie 8/1/81

Recove Mana er (RM)

The RM will be a designated senior manager who has haowledge oi nuclear plant operations and design and who will be responsible for directing the Company's expanded emergency response organization. The RM can repox't to the the General Office Emergency Center, the near-site Interim Emergency Operations Pacility or the on-site Interim Technical Support Center depending upon his assessment of the situation. Specific responsibilities for the RM or his designee include the following:

1) To inform periodically the Emergency Control Officer of the on-sita status of the emergency and immediately or any significant changes.

2) To provide support and data as necessary to the Emergency Coordinator.

3) To obtain information on diagnosis and prognosis of the emergency, estimates of radioactive x'eleases, prevailing meteorological conditions, pro5ected radiological exposures, and recommend d of=-

site p'roteckive actions')

To assume from the EC, the responsibility for communicating such information to and coordinating with the state and county response organizations.

5) To assure continuity of technical and administrative support, and material resources.

6) To request additional support rrom EPL and others as necessary.

7) To provide logistic support for emergency personnel (e.g.

transportat'on, communications, temporary quarters, food and water sanitary facM~ities in the field, and special equipment and supplies procurement ~

2-21 St. Lucie 8/1/81

l l

FIGURE 2-5 EXPANOED RESPONSE ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY CONTROL OFFICER EMERGENCY . GOVERNMENTAL RECOVERY INFORMATION MANAGER AFFAIRS'ANAGFR MANAGFR EMERGENCY EMERGEiNCY

.SECURITY TECHNICAL MANAGFR MANAGER BlERGENCY AGO ITTONAL COOROINATOR STAFF AS REQUIREO 0 2-22 St. Lucie a/1/sx

Primary i %wager, Power Resour ces-Nuclear Alternates: ( I ) Assistant Fwnager, Power Resource's-Huclear (2) ~i ager, Power Resources-Nuclear Services Emer eac Information Mana er (EXM)

The EIZ will be a designated corporate officer or senior manager experienced ia disseminating information to the public via the news media. During this phase, the EZi can operate f om the General Office Emergency Center or the later~ Emergency Operacioas Facility, as.

coadicions dictate. He will have the following respoasibilitiesi

1) To serve as principal public spokesman for PPL.

2) To disseminate available information from the ECO to the news media and to provide periodic updates.

3) To work with HRC, state and county news media represencatives to effec )oint releases and public appearances.

Primary Vice President, Corporate Commuaiccions Alternate: Manager, Commuaications (Alternate contact may be made via Corporate Communications Duty Officer; iS his telephone number U.seed.in the Offsite'mergency Roscer Procedure.)

Emer eac Securi 'Yang er (ESH)

The EPf wi13. be a Company supervisor or manager with security experience and will be zespoasible to the RM for providing liaison wich county law enforcemenc and, rescue agencies.

Primary. Senior Security Coordiaator - Nuclear Alteraat s: (1) Manager of Security (2) 'ecuricy'oordinator 2-23 St. Lucia 8/1/81

Emer enc Technical Mana er (EM)

The ETH wil3. be a senior manager with detailed knowledge of nuc3.ear plant design an'd who will be responsible for providing technical support and information regarding engineering design for the plant.

Primary: Chiei Engineer, Power Plants Alterna tes: (1) A sistant Chief Engineer, Po~er Plant's (2) Manager, lfechanical/Nuclear Engineering (3) Hanager, Electrical Engineering (4) Senior Pro)ect Manager, Turkey Point Plant (5) Senior Project Mnager, St. Lucie Plant Governmental Affairs ~dna er (GAH)

The GAM will be a designated corporate officer or senior manager experienced in interfacing with political officials oi the State and Federal governments. He acts as liason between the FCO and these political officials.

Primary: Vice President, Governmental Afiai s Alternate: Federal Regulatory Representative (Other alternate telephone numbers are provided in the Ofi-site Emergency Roster).

Au nted Staff Suo rt Additional staff support can be provided during this phase to augment the operating staif on-site and off-site. The Emergency Control Officer will have access to this support through the Ofi-site Emergency Roster nttlg maintained by the Emergency P3.an Supervisor.

Lines of Succession Lines of succession for the Emergency Control,Oiiicer and Minage'rs oi the Ofisite Emergency Organisation are cont=oiled by procedures and are ning maintained by the Emergency PlaqSupervisor.

2-24 St. Lucis 8/1/81

Dele ation Delegation authority is controlled by pxocedure.

Emergenc Classification I

Declaration of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency will initiate the establishment of the expanded response organization. The FPL Offsite Emergency Organization will be notified and mobilized.

Notification of an Unusual Event will be made to the ECO.

'In an Alert, the FPL Offsite Emergency Organization will be notizied and placed in a standby state.

2.2.2'3 Plant Staff'mer enc Assi nments a) Interim (Shift) Emer enc Team

1) The Interim Emergency Team is ccmposed of members chosen from shift personnel assigned to the plant. All are qualified in procedures and practices xequired for the performances of their duties as team leaders or members. The Interim Team will take action xegardless of the fact that the Primary Emergency team

- n may be present.

2) Hembers of the Interim Emergency Team may consider themselves relieved ~onl upon the specific instructions of a recognized superior or the Primary Emergency Team Leader. Mire3.y knowing that a superior or a Primary Emergency Team Leader is present does not constitute a release from emexgency duties and responsibilities. ~ ~

b) Piima Emer enc Team

1) The Primary Emergency Team is composed oi first line management personnel and others who normally wox'k a regular day work schedule.

2"25 St. Lucie 8/1/81

2) At their own option, and with the knowledge oi the Emergency Coordinator, line management members of that team may relieve their counterpart on the Interim Emergency Team.

c) Functional Areas of Emergenc Activity

1) Plant 0 erations and Assessments of 0 erational As ects The Nuclear Plant Supervisor on duty becomes the Emergency Coordinator in the event of an emergency. He may be relieved as the Emergency Coordinator by the Plant ML nager, the Operations Superintendent, the Operations Supervisor, or off-dut~ Ngg. His nk<cTi4 alternate is the Nuclear Watch Engineer~ The lfuclear <<+'ormal Plant Supervisor and Nuclear Watch Engineer positions are constantly manned. The Emergency Coordinator initially supervises the operations of the plant systems and controls the actions of emergency teams.

2) Emrgenc Direct"on and Control Emergency Coordinator as previously discussed.

3) Noti'fication and Communication - Emergency Coordinator as previously. discussed.

4) Radiolo ical Accident Assessment and In-Plant Protective dctdcca - The prdnary Haddatdcc Tean Leader le the Health Physics Supervisor. He directs the radiological surveillance performed, by the technicians under the orders of the Emergency Coordinator. The Health Physics representative , on-site, is designated as the Interim Radiation Team Leader with support from Nuclear Operators. The Radiation Team Leader recommends appropriate protective actions to the EC when not covered by

~

'-26 procedure.

St. Lucie 8/1/81

0

5) Plant S stem En ineerin, Re air, and Corrective Actions and Su rt of Operational Accident Assessment - The Shi-t Technical Advisor will provide the initial technical support necessary for repair, corrective actions, and opexational accident assessment.

6) Fixefighting The Nuclear Watch Engineer is the Pire Team Leader. This position is manned continuously, but if he 's not ava"lable, other personnel from the Nechanical Maintenance Department may act as his alternate (if qualified). The St. Lucie County Ft.

Pierce Pire Department may respond to fires on-site, ii requested.

7) Rescue. 0 erations and First Aid ae Rescue Operations involve the First Aid/Decontamination Team and the Radiation Team as necessary. Under the control of the Radiation Team Leader, entry to potentially hazardous areas will be made by the First Aid/Decontamination Team with assistance from the Radiation Team. Upon notification of the injury, both teams will respond per the Emergency Coordinator's instructions.

b. The Chemistry Supervisor is the primary First Aid/Personnel Decontamination Team leader with a Chemistry Technician as his alternate. A Nuclear Operator, trained in first aid and personnel decontamination, will act as the interim team leader. gf no Chemistry Department personnel are on-sita, f-i'.ia any trained employee could act as a First Aid/Decontamination Team member until primary team members can be called in.

2"27 St. Lucie 8/1/81

8) Site Access Control and Personnel Accountabilit The Security Supervisor will act as the Security Team Leader with the Guard Captain as his alternate. The Guard Force supervisor will be the interim Team leader. Personnel control and accountability are the resp'onsibility of the Security Team. Notification of occupants in the Owner Controlled Area wi'l take place dur'ng the security sweep of the area. Zt is estimated that personnel accountability can be accomplished within 30 minutes, of declaration of an evacuation, by the Security Team.

9) Re air and Damage Control Repair and damage control will be performed by assigned teams. These teams may be composed of members from any of the emergency teams and may be augmented by non-Florida Power 6 Light Company supoort personnel. Under the direction of the Emergency Coordinator or his designee, these teams are used to mitigate the consequences of the accident and to help restore the normal operation of the plant. Actions include the movement and set-up of portable shielding, tools, emergency equipment, and the operation or plant systems.

2"28 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0'ABLE 2-2a Shift and Emergency Staffing Capabilities Capability ror additions (45-Position 90 minutes Ma)oz Haj or Title or On after Area Tasks Exaertise Shif t* notification)

Plant Operations and Nuclear Plant Supervisor (SRO)

Assessment of Nuclear Watch Engineer (SRO) Th chic c.~cj P~/

Operational Aspects Nuclear Control Center Operator pend)~

PL (SRO & RO)

Nuclear Operator Nuclear Turbine Operator Auxiliary Equipment Operator Shift Technical Advisor Emergency Direction and Nuclear Plant Supervisor ControL (Emergency Coordinator)

Notification/ Notify licensee, State, Communication local and Federal personnel.& maintain communication Radiological Accident Emergency Operations . Recovery Manager Assessment and Support Facility (EOF) Director of Operational Accident Offsite Dose Assessment Assessment Chemistry Representative Offsite Surveys NP Technicians or RPH's 4 Onsite (out-of-plant) llP Technicians or RPH's 2 In-plant surveys llP Technicians or RPM's 2 Chemistry/Radio- Rad/Chem Technicians 1 I chemistry 00 CA W tt co r 0

m

0, f

Table 2-2a (continued)

Shift and Emergency Staffing Capabilities Capability for (45-;'dditions Position 90 minutes Ma)or Ha)or Title or On after Area Tasks ~Es ertise EILEErs notification)

Plant System Technical Support Shift Technical Advisor Engineering, Repair Core/Therraal Hydraulics and Corrective Actions Electrical Mechanical LL Repair and Corrective Mechanical Maintenance/

Actions Rad Haste Operator Electrical Maintenance/

Instrument and Control (I&C) Technician Protective Actions Radiation Protection: llP Technicians or RPM's (In-Plant) a. Access Control E b. )lP Coverage for CD repair, corrective actions, search and rescue first-aid &

firefighting

c. Personnel monitoring

d. Dosimetry Firefighting . Pire Local Brigade Support per

.'echnical Speci fications Rescue Operations Local CXI W

C/l rt and First-Aid Support QO C O

fD

0

~

Table 2-'2a (continued)

Shift and Emergency Staffing Capabilities Capability for additions (II5-Position 90 Iainutes Ha)or Major Title or On after Area Tasks ~Ex ertise Shift* notification)

Site Access Control Security, firefighting Security Personnel All per and Personnel communications, Security plan Accountability personnel accountabili.ty Notes:

Shift requirements will be met by 7/1/82. Staffing that is indicated as a Shift requirement can be added within 45 minutes after notification of a qualified individual beginning 9/1/81.

• • Function may be performed in addition to other assigned duties.

CD IJI

~ ~

CD C n

lb

TABLE 2-2b Florida Pover & Li ht Emer enc Response Or anization Functions and Responsibilities Res nsibility Function Immediate ~Ex anded Command and Control Emergency Coordinator Recovery Manager (Nuclear Plant Supervisox')

Warning Emergency Coordinator Recovery Manager Notification Emergency Coordinator Recovery Manager Communications Public Information Emergency Infoxmation Emergency Inxormation Manager Manager Accident Assessment Emergency Coordinator Recovery Manager (assisted (assisted by Shift by Emergency Technical Technical Advisor) Manager and his staff.)

Fire Team Leader Fire Team Leader Rescue Interxa Radiation Team Primary Radiation Team Leader Leader Traxric Control Interim Security Team Primary Secuxity Team Leader Leader Emergency Medical Interim First Aid/ Primary First Aid/

Services Decontamination Team Decontamination Team Leader Leader 2-32 S t. Lucre 8/1/81

TABLE 2-2b (Continued)

Florida Power & Li ht Fmer enc Response Organization Functions an'd Res nsibilities Res poas ibilit Function Immeaiate ~Ex anded Transportation Interim Security Team Emergency Security Manager Leader Protective Response Emergency Coordinator Health Physics Supervisor (On-site) (assisted by RM's staff)

Radiological Exposure Emergeacy Coordinator Health Physics Supervisor Control (on-site) (assisted by RH's staff) 2-33 St. Lucie 8/1/81

2.3 Emergenc Resnonse Support and Resources This section describes the arxangements that Florida Power & Light Company has made for assistance to augment the Emergency Response Organization.

2.3.1 Res nse Or anization'Re resentatives Florida Power & Light Company has provided facilities in the near-site Emergency Operations Facility for representatives from FPL, state, local, and federal response organxzations.

2.'3.2 Radiological Laboratories Florida Power & Light Company has primary and backup radiological laboratory facilities on-site. A hot lab backup will be provided by portabLe equipment is described in procedures. Environmental sampling will be augmented by the state's Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory within approximately three hours of noti"ication. If required, the laboratory facilities at FPL's Turkey Point Plant can'e used; appropxiate arrangements wi3.1 be made on an as needed basis.

2.3.3 Additional Assistance The Institute for Nuclear Power Opexation (IhPO) maintains industry source lists for personnel and equipment which can be made available for support sexvices during an emergency. Additional technical assistance can also be obtained directly from the NSSS vendor. (Combustion Engineex'ing Co.).

2.4 Emer~enc Facilit'es and E uipment This section describes the facilities and, equipment that Flor'da Power & Light.

Company maintains in readiness for an emergency situation. Figure 2-6 shows the locations of the facilities.

2-34 St. Lucie 8/1/81

2.4 ' Control Room For any emergency response, the Control Room g~ nA'ccrc( un ~

serves as the initial point cA'cdcd unit s of control. The Nuclear Plant Supervisor stations himself in the Control Room when he assumes the role or Emergency Coordinator. The EC can leave the Control Room if necessary to make a personal assessment regardiag plant safety.

are.

The Control Rooms'esigned ro remain tenable under conditions described in the FSAR. All plant lated operations are directed from the Control Room. Nuclear plant instnmentation, including area and process radiation system instrumentation, is provided in the Control RoomSto give 'onitoring early warning of a potential emergency and to provide 'or continuing indication of an emergency situation. The Control Rooms'containp'he controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the reactor under normal and emergency conditions.

A supply of protective c~othing.and respiratory equipment is maintained in the Control Room8. Table 2-3 provides a list of emergency ~quipment maintained in the Control RoomS~

The Control RoomScontairy( the necessary communicau.ons equipment for

'otifying on-site personnel and 'off-site authorities in the event of an accident. This inc~udes the National Warning System (NAWAS), Local Government Radio (LGR) System, Emergency Notification System (ENS hot line) to tne NRC Operations Center (in Bethesda, Hd.) and the NRC Region IX Office (in Atlanta, GA.), commercial (Bell) telephones, Florida Power &

Light Company radio system, public address system, PAX telephone system, FH radio system, portable radio sets (walkie-talkies), and a radio oaging system. These systems are used as defined by procedure to accomplish the necessary notifications and communications.

2-35 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 URE 2-6 LOCATION OF INTERIM

.EHERGEHCY.. MkLkTI 85

( z~. ~Z .LZ h '!

~ ~ ~ I'/'.i) 1

~ ~

I ci.

yb -: PARKIHG AREA IIOUSE

c uNIT L REACTOR COHTAIlNEHT BUILOIHG

) w~~

REACTOR AUXILIARY MBU I LO I llG (Interim TSC) gZ uH1T2

F OSC REACTOR COHTAIHQEHT OUILOIHG REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILOIHG 0

gh IHTERIH

~ 'o '"

~'OF IHDlAN Riy<A

/g

2.4.2 Interim Emerzenc 0 eracions: Pacilit.

The Compaay maintains an Interim Emergency Operations Facility oa-site from which evaluation and coordination of all PPL accivicies related to an emergency can be carried oue and from which FPL can provide information,to federal, staee, and local auchorities.

Activation of the Interim Emergency Operations Facility will be init"aced by the Emergency Control Officer. The Emergency Operaeioas Facility will be mobilized 'or better concinuit- during Sice Area Emergercy or "eneral Emergency.

The Interim Emergency Operations Facility is designated as the Unit No. 2 site construccioa office building. This allows ior suizicient space to accommodate che Florida Power & Light Company response organization and representatives of the designated federal, state, aad local authorities. ~

The Ia,terim Emergency Operaeioas Facility coaeains emergency radiological monitoring equipment and supplies, proceceive clothing, respiratory protection devices. Table 2>>4 provides a listing oi the emergency equipmene maincained in the Emergency Operations Facility. Essential, pr calculated emergency daea and pertinent reports and drawings are readily available.

The interim Emergency Operacioas Pacility has an emergeacy communications network includ"ng Local Goveramene Radio, and commercial telephone lines.

The Incerim Emergency Operations Facility will be scarfed as required under che direction of the Emergency Control Oificer. Arrangements will be made to scarf che Interim EOF in a timely manner.

2-37 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 t 0

TABLE 2-3 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT ST. LUCIE PLANT CONTROL ROOM STORAGE LOCKER

l. Coveralls

2. Hood

3. Gloves

4. Shoe Covers

5. Self Contained Bxeathing Apparatus

6. Full Face Respirators and Filters 7 ~ Pocket Dosimeters

8. Dosimeter Chargers

9. TLD's

10. Portable Count Rate Instrumentation 11 'ortable Dose Rate Instx'umentation

12. Contamination Smears

13. Envelopes

14. Radiation Tape/Rope

15. Radiological Signs

16. Industrial First Aid Kit

17. Step-Off Pads

18. Plastic Bags 2-38 St. Lucie 8/1/81

TABLE 2-4 RADIOLOGXCAL EMERGENCY EQUIP."KNT ST. LUCIE PLANT EMERGENCY OPERATXONS FACXLXTY LOCKER

1. Coveralls

2. Hoods

3. Gloves and Liners

4. Shoe Covers

5. Full Face Respirators and Filters

6. Pocket Dosime ters

7. TLD'

8. Dosimeter Charger

9. Portable Count Rate Instrumentation

10. Portable Dose Rate 1nstrumentation ll. Contamination Smears 12'- Envelopes

13. Radiation Tape/Rope

14. Radioxoigcal Signs

15. Plastic Bags 2-39 St. Lucie 8/1/81

5 Cp

2.4.3 Alternate Emer enc 0 eratioas Facili The alternate Emergency Operations Facility is maintained at FPL's Malton .

Transmission and Distribution Substation. (approximately 5 miles west of the plant). This facility will be used if the Interim Emergency Opera'tions Facility should become untenable. Continuity of EOF functions during any transition between the interim and alternate facilities will be maintained by 'the General Office Emergency Center and TSC.

2.4.4 Interim Technical Support Center (TSC)

The Company maintains an on-site Interim Technical Support Center to provide the Control Room and the Interim Emergency Operations Facility with in-depth diagnostic and engineering assistance without adding to congestion within the Control Room. This assistance can help determine the operational decisions that would be appropriate to better control and

(~re~

mitigate the consequences oz the emergency. The TSC is located in the trainxng classroom area adjacent to the Unit 1 Control Room.

Activation of the Interim Technical Support Center will be initiated by the Emergency Coordinator in the event of an Alert, Site Area Emergency or irlfcriw General Emergency. Arrangements will be made to staff the TSC in timely manner.

The Interim Technical Support Center contains pertinent records and drawings.

The Interim Technical Suppozt Center has an emergency communications network including commercial telephone lines to the Control Room/>the Interim Emergency Operations Facility, and the ENS dedicated phone line to the i'perations Center (in Bethesda, Hd.) and the Region XT. office (in Atlanta, GA.).

2-40 St. Lucie 8/1/81

2.4.5 0 erational Support Center (OSC)

The Company maintains an on-site Operational Support Center (OSC) to serve as an assembly point for auxiliary operators, health physics technic'ans, maintenance personnel, and other plant shift pexsonnel available to support the emergency response. Required staff will be assigned to appropriate activities by the Emergency Coordinator or his designee.

Equipment that can be used by personnel dispatched from the OSC is stored in the Administration Building. Table 2-5 indicates the types of material and equipment stored there.

Activation of the OSC will be initiated by the Emergency Coordinator. The OSC will be in operation for an Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Arrangements will be made to staff the OSC in a timely manner.

The OSC is maintained in the zirst floor maintenance area of the Service Building. PAX telephone communications are maintained, between the OSC and the Control Room.

2.4.6 Alternate 0 erational Su ort Center In the event that the OSC becomes untenable, the Emergency Coordinator will designate an alternate location.

2.4.7 Emer enc News Center (ENC)

An Emergency News Center (ENC) is pxovided to allow the news media access to information from the Interim Emergency Ooerations Pacility. The Emergency Inrormation Manager will designate an individual to supervise the ENC.

The ENC is located near the Interim EOF. If a larger facility is needed or if radiological conditions make it necessary, the Jensen Beach Holiday Inn will be used. It is on Hutchinson Island south of the Jensen Beach Causeway approximately 7 miles SSE of the Plant on AlA.

2-41 St. Lucie 8/1/81

U TABLE 2-5 RADIOLOGICAL EHERGENCY E UIPHENT ST. LUCIE PLANT OPERATIONS SUPPORT SCENTER

1) Coveralls

2) Shoe Covers

3) Head Covers

4) Gloves

5) Full Face Respirators and filters

6) Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

7) Pocket Dosimeters

8) Dosimeter charges

9) TLD'S

10) Portable count rate instrumentation

11) Portable dose rate instrumentation

12) Radiological signs

13) Contamination smears and envelopes

14) Flashlights

15) Survey maps

16) Writing materials

17) Log Book

18) Decontaminat on ld.ts

1. 9) Radiological tape/rope

20) Selected procedures

21) Waste storage bags

22) Assorted batteries 2-42 St. Lucie 8/1/81 ~

0 0

2.4.8 General Office Emer enc Center The General Office Emergency Cancer is an area within the Power Resources nagement area at the Florida Power 6 Light Company General Offices. It is equipped with dedicaeed telephone to the Plant Manager's off'ce. The Emergency Control Officer aad his staff will man che center to direct the Off-site Emergency Organization (Figure 2-5) and to provide support and resources to the on-site organization until the ECO directs the Organization to scafr the interim EOF.

2.4.9 St. Lucie County Emer ency 0 erations Center The St. Lucie County EOC will be the point from which county response activities wiLL be controlled. The facility is located ac 408 Browa Court, Ft. Pierce, Florida. Communications include TWAS, Local Government Radio, teletype, police and fire networks, and telephone.

2.4.10 Florida State Field Emer enc 0 erations Cancer State response activieies wilL be directed from the state's Souch Florida Area EOC in Jupiter, Florida which has VAWAS, LGR, teletype and telephoae.

2.5 Medical and Health Sup ort Th~s section describes ehe agreements- and provisions that Florida Power 6 Lighe Company has made for emergency medical support.

2.5.1 Plant First Aid Facilit

~First Aid RoomSon the grouad floor of che Auxiliary BuildingSie Cc.re provided with firsc aid supplies. In addition, standard 24-unit first aid kits are maiatained ac numerous locations throughout the St. Lucie Plant. A commerciaL first-aid kic, containing the same type of supplies as the 24-unit kit, buc in greater quaneity, is maincained in the Site Assembly Staeioa. The medicaL supplies and first aid kits in the first-aid seaeions, are checked at least every two months and replenished as necessary by the Chemistry Department and Maintenance Departmene.

2-43 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0

Nl6

+Personnel decontamination washroom5and shower rooeSk" provided on the ground floor of the Auxiliary BuildingS. Accepted decontamination practices wi3.1 be employed on-site and are described in a Health Physics procedure. Life endangering injuries such as extensive burns, serious wounds or fractures shall receive prompt attention in prererence to decontamination. Personnel with injuries involving radiation or radioactive contamination vill be handled by REEF Associates, Xnc. at the designated facilities at Mount Sinai Hospital, or by Radiology Associates, Xnc. at the Lawnwood Medical Center, Ft. Pierce, FL.

2.5.2 REcZ Associates, Xnc.

REEF Associates, Xnc. (REEF), located within Mt. Sinai Hospital, provides for immediate availability of fully equipped primary medical facilties with an adequate stafr of physicians, nurses, and technical personnel skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of radiation injury and personnel contamination, and fully equipped and staffed regional facilities to provide definitive medical care for serious cases of radiation exposure (Appendix H). REEF, at the request or Florida Power & Light Company, wil3.

work with representatives of FP&L to evaluate the medical aspects of an incident involving the community, will assist in the investigatxon of causes of radiation injury and the means of preventing a recurrence thereof, and will assist in tne investigatxons of actual or alleged radiation injury and <<Ml provide documentation and testimony as required.

REEF wi13. provide for hospital treatment, medica3. examinations, and laboratory services for those employees and other persons designated by Florida Power & Light Company who allegedly have been involved in a radiation incident. Shen primary facilities are considered inadequate by REEF because of the nature or severity of the injury sustained, then 'the injured person may be referred to a regional facility for hospitalization. Medical records, including bio-assay records, will be maintained permanent1y by REEF and copies furnished to Florida Power &

Light Company.

2-44 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 0

~lm lemenrk Or.anlzarken REEF Associates, Inc., a group of physicians, basic scientists, and technologists at the Division of Nuclear i/edicine, Hount Sinai Hospital, Miami Beach, has developed the Radiation Emergency Medical Plan (Appendix H) and the Radiation Emergency Evaluation Facility (REEF) to carry out the terms of the REEF Associates, Inc. agreement with Florida Power & Light Company. REEF will:

1) Coordinate 'the efforts of the multiple medical disciplines within the Il1ount Sinai Hospital of Greater I&ami which are committed to support the radiation emergency medical treatment effort of REEF.

2) Develop plans, procedures, and training programs for the reception, diagnosis, and treatment of personnel with injuries involving radiation exposure and/or radioactive contamination.

3) Designate the physical facilities and equipment to be used for initial emergency care and subsequent definitive care and treatment of personnel with radiation injuries.

4) Designate physicians, basic science personnel, and medical support personnel and al'ternates for special hospital 'and REEF emergency teams to handle radiation emergency patients.

5) Train the designated emergency team personnel and others involved in the care and treatment of radiation injuries.

6) Provide training for selected Florida Power 6 Light Company employees in the special aspects of first aid related to serious radiation exposure, and to injury accompanied by radiation exposure and/or radioactive contamination, including the evacuat'on of casualties to ofr-site medical facilities.

2-4 5 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0

7) Ensure that key medical team personnel are familiar with the first aid and personnel decontamination capabilities at the St. Lucie Plant.

8) Plan and implement periodic emergency drills and exercises to ensure the prompt and effective emergency care, treatment and evaluation oi radiation inj uries.

9) Provide training for selected radiation emergency response personnel of the Lawnwood Medical Center.

The facilities of REEZ are located in the Mount Sinai Hospital of greater Miami. The patient receiving area is an active nuclear medicine diagnostic and research area, and is equipped for patient decontamination and the performance of emergency medical procedures for life saving purposes. Additional emergency medical facilities in the hospital incxude the emergency room and an ~mtensive Care Unit available for the treatment of decontaminated radiation accident casualties or persons who have 1

received only external radiation exposures.

Regional Facilitates A letter of agreement between the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAIJ) and REEF Associates, Inc. provides back-up support for the definitive care N

and treatment of seriously irradiated persons. The ORAIJ Medical and Health Sciences Division operates the Radiation Emergency Assistance Canter/Training Sire (REAC/TS) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the U. S.

Department of Energy. It studies radiation and radioactive materials in diagnosis, therapy, and research. Its specialized facilities are available for the care and treatment of possible radiation accident victMs transferred from REEF.

2-46 St. Lucia 8/1/81

2.5.3 R~adfolor assocdaeas, Inc.

Ineardn Radlolo Ical Haddcal Ru pore (appandde P)

Radiology Associates, Inc., located within Lawnwood Medical Center, Ft.

Pi~rce, FL, pxovides for the immediate availability oi fully equipped interim medical facilities with a staff of physicians and nurses skilled in the treatment of personnel injury accompanied by radioactive contamination.

This facility, avaQ,able on a 24-hour basis, will usually be used ii the primary facility is not accessible or available, or if the seriousness of a physical injury dictates its use..

Lawnwood Medical Center maintains radio contact with any ambulance transporting injured personnel to the hospital. Vital functions of injured pex'sonnel can be telemetered to the hospital, also.

2.5.4 ~Trans reaefon of In urad parsonnal Non-Radiological Ft. Pierce-St. Lucie County Pire District Rescue service, company, or private vehicle will provide transportation of routine personnel injuries (not associated with xadiation or contamination).

Radiological Pt. Pierce-St. Lucia County Pire District Rescue service will provide transpoxtation, when called, of injured personnel to the Lawnwood Medical Center associated with xadiation ox contamination.

2-47 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 Yg

3 ~ EHERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYS~

The system which has beea adopted for categorizing oif-noxmal events or conditions. at the Plant has Cour classes. In order of increasing severity, these are: Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency, 3.1 Unusual Event The Unsual Event catagory applies to off-normal events or conditions at the Plant" for which no significant degradation of the level of safety of the plant has occurred or is expected. Any releases oi radioactive material which have occurred or which may be expected are minox aad constitute ao appreciable health hazard. The full activation oi this Emergency Plan is not required. FPL actions in response to an Unusual Event will be:

1. Report the Unusual Event to off-site authorities (PPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

2. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coodinator.

3. Provide periodic plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Close out by verbal summary to off-site authorities, or escalate to a higher class.

3. 2 Alert This classification is represented by events which involve an actual or imminent substantial degradatioa or the level oi safety of the plant combined with a potential for limited uncontrolled releases of radioactivity xrom the plaat.

3-1 St. Lucie 8/1/81

FPL actions in response to this category will be:

1 ~ Report the Alert Status to offsite authorities (FPL and non<<FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

2. The Emergency Coordinator will augment resources by activating the on-

, site Interim Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center.

3. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

4. Dispatch monitoring teams as directed by the Radiation Team Leader.

5. Provide periodic plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures.

6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures if releases axe anticipated or occurring. If releases. are occurring, provide dose estimates for actual releases.

7. Close out by verbal summary to off-site authorities, zollowed by a written summary within 24 hours, or escalate to a higher class.

3.3 Site Area Emergenc This cxassification is represented by events which involve actual or U.kely major failures of plant functions needed for protection oi the public combined with a potential for significant uncontrolled releases of radioactivity zrom the plant.

FPL actions in response to this category will be:

1. Report the Site Area Emergency Status to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

3-2 St. Lucie 8/1/81

2. Augment resources as necessary by activating the on-site Interim Technical Support Center, the on-site Operational Support Center, and .the neax'-site Interim Emergency Operations Facility. The Alternate Emergency Operations Facility may be activated if radiological conditions near-site make th's advisable.

3. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

Dispatch monitoring teams as directed by the Radiation Team Leader.

5. Provide periodic plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures.

6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures.

7 ~ Provide release and dose projections based on available plant and meterological information and foreseeable contingencies.

8. Close out or recommend a change in emergency class when appropriate by briefing offsite authorities.

9 ~ Submit a brief written summary to off-site authorities within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after closing out the emergency.

Thxs cxassification is represented by events which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation and potential loss of containment integrity combined with a likelihood oz signi=icant uncontxolled releases of radioactivity from the plant.

3-3 St. Lucie 8/1/81

FPL actions in response to this category will be:

1. Report the General Emergency status to off-sire authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

2. 'ugment resources by activating the on-site Interim Technical Supoort Center, the on-site Operational. Support Center, and the near-site Interim Emergency Operations Facility. The Alternate Emergency Operations Facility may be activated if radiological conditions near-site make this advisable.

3. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

4. Dispatch monitoring teams as directed by the Radiation Team Leader.

5. Provide periodic plant status updates in accordance with plant I

procedures.

6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures.

7. Provide release and dose projections based on available plant and meterological information and foreseeable contingenc'es.

8- Provide ozfsite protective action recommendation to the state BDP.

9. Close out'or recommend a reduction in emergency class when appropriate by briefing off-site authorities.

10. Submit a brief written summary to off-site authorities within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after closing out the emergency.

3-4 St. Lucie 8/1/81

3.5 ~Eme'r enc Action Levels Emergency action levels for a vide variety og hypothetical off-normal plant occurrences are listed in Table 3-1. The emergency action levels represent conditions generally observable by plant personnel, and can be used to properly classify an occurrence as an Unusual Event, an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency. Included in t4~ table are 'all accidents discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

The Emergency Coordinator may cxassxfy off-normal events into one of the four categories based on'is assessment that plant conditions have or may have adverse effects on the level of safety.

~ l

-\

~

3-5 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 0

TABLE 3-1

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                              ). caAcp}ctu nctlunc ltuteA)    E}n un hl,gkr CUSCgLlgr                       un Slrg hkgh S}tggCSHCy                           Cy2}kkhL gUSSCg}}CX CUSCgblsr L'UUSUhf. $ (S}g Cl}L'CKL)Sf                                                              Cj}KCSLlg   f 6

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e TABLE 3-1 {COHTID) PlUJllhL QVEllT $ 1TE AlIEA EIIEECEIlCf UEIIERAL EIIESCEIICX pnooutroltn4 tire nup lIIvo)vtIIg, Unctuittullu4 f)L'u, potentially gtge yeuulttng lu 4eIfre4vfton e vqfuty vyutuu, but fpqulyfng uffentlng Vufety ayeteue nnp af Safety nyutuuu. of f-QIL4 Ey~>yurt ~ roqplr)ng o!f"etfe uuypogf. ICrttsI COIEpfutu ul Lluuu )tlltu4 ua 1 ~

                    <Uu UI~USuAL  EyEIq CURCqlqr.

1 on ALERT CI!fCÃLlA'.Cwptetu Con/lute actlunu ttute4 nuLlunu ltutu4 ua SlTR AREl RIIEQCENCT CllECVl.lRT (rI ill CD I WC A IP

0 0

TQBLE 3-1 (CONT'D} IEMhllkflllllIN CJlllaaaL L'kiailLITIKa StTU hUK4 EHERCEIICY CEUERhL EHERCEUCY v.vQCT fUtU>PAI &Ply deaf EI(CIIIREaIEII SIIPEl'Y ). 4 Rsfugy fuu)ursa acluatfup ). Qqe of functlonu prcgsg for Loss uf <<ny fuuccloo pr syutcas FEhTIlREa+REhCTOR systems fuasrtloaaa) Ianff alaopss po)4 aslauldovla ~ OR vhlcb prrc5udru placluS tins EROTECT 1OM SYSTEls lsl 1'sag)palcsl Speci ftpalflun falant )sl Uog Shut4ouo, ~O Shirr-~ThMII SYSTEHS O 'PLRCE tall ls ).3-3 bsaouue fqopufeble g. /allure of elis kruc1oy PLhllT LIt COlll prf fpcbsatcal Sppc)f fpcf foU frotrcftop Syutcsss co Iartaag Cuugrpl Ruosa 'hq rvecuatu4 3-3 ~ k ) hlRI rus'life% f fallf )lap Fuse]ur eubcFff)rp} uiacsa (for othur tissu ll laaarpuucs COLTRGL !de $ 4IIt guUp ~ OR o dad OR aud ulaaatduaan coaatrof pauaaoc bu OPERhTYIIIl hUII establlrlicd )ucully et t4u Ugt Y1RE Piu7TECrr~n7 2a Ttso fffp suppt'rusfou ayuqpu gvqcuefloo ot cuaalrul Fu~ Sbutdoup Control fhnu) sall t)ilaa SYSTEH up a fapyt luo tbrrcuf IIFcuppR (fnr Otlscr tissu alrl)$ faaIr- )5 slluulps. laauprtablc pRF 'frclasalcta) fsuuru) aaltla slautduuu coaatro) Spec ff j.

                                              )gal)lou 3.)a) ) hQ)                eutabl)shed       lucally <<t tbu a hapl J Fos plass'a)lu)guHU.                 guf. Shattdosaaa    Cusslrof gaair).

IlISS OP hl>RIIS S/Rsslftgaaag luau uf off lucalf pit asuaunclatua'u lost. hll supunclator olarsss lost

                               ~ uaPttorlssR     csPsbt1llya uure1ulo-                                                         )l5   aataautcu   ult4   plauC saul laa Rlcsl     4 usaf Cur taap lsautgusauIItql fuss                                                  culd shutdouu;        OR cuaaaaiuaa)crtloaau    ~  lsaijfcacfvp clad                                                     fluaat tt'auul<<ns. occurs ulC4 alaaas panels, cac. ~ aa)alc4 taalaahrs                                                         el) a)rrrsu lout.

abtllty ln ~ra foaas accldupt or

                               ~prgcaacy <<Rsa.uracaat.

h~CT I OI l. Cuasplcfu uct Jusas llstsd osa 1. Cusaplutu rctlunu hluycd on 1 ~ Cuiaplcte actloasu llutl'4 UUUSUhL RYh'ILT CP/CKL1S$ . hLERT CUECELlST. aau SlTE hgEh EHERCEUCY fdlECE L1ST. Crl c/l W rt CO I w Cn Isl

TABLE 3-.1 (CONT'f}) MGRhohTtoN OY CatrtsOL Ohp*51L T1ES LItJOWAL wIIPlT ALERT 0$Q JLREA. PISKCasKIiC f lOSS CIY a>IMTALN-4a ga:uptl'e)luaae tequ)ge4 tp lao gluer4 gut taaIL ecolgeag gullgl-ftuaae Iatn JlQ)l

                             ). Caaiaptal<<of beiaalt p)uppaj py tfaa $ $ faS, OS

g. alpaca'ylltuat Ciuea) Py uanue) atelypy<

pl)la) tlraage>>, oa e4tvaaaajln p4)Viaa eerureai tai ttapt giuen4 pueltluqg erccpt aae f pruv) Ja d lu Tulle l.4-2 of feciaailcel Siauct f lc41 )oA

                                  >~ l kali O"~
                                      ~

p. gaa eq4)peunt lartC}a le Iaut r.)uua4 aaaI4 curie/i AR~

                         "g. )Ia ulrlocg le nut upesuble ec TeclIOlcel Spqct t lcel )oIl ti:S....
                               .S.f.)l    n; Aa

p. g ue4llnIL 1 ILlaeaatug aaaaaao-cteteg aaiala 4 peucta'eLluu (e.g., aaelge, guifuaae, ug g-rtaaiie) taecueee fnupeleplp.

      ~hlON               ). Cueplete pctluue lteteal on PliU-'.Pkl- fYPZ CIIKXifS7 t CD CA w  rt CD l n

Cta

TABLE 3=1 (cQNT'D} tthÃhtttttt TO STAT10tt OyetthTlOO CLAgS KVtttg )tgttti)th). )Vgtcf hbeaT Q)T)t A)tyh )')tettge))CT. cet)etthl ~oettcT A~tactta > 'tua)i tSt kt!X f. tttKQTtt)S Srqal h)rcratfg claub una)ca a)aaaetttnt) h)rcraft gfauh un a)tu pn-alCu Oy pf ttaatttuaf hlCCraf) g)at<<f tttrtaclttf<<. alttuaS)tatt Vltul )alatt) uyuceaaa ac)jv)ty Oyt:C )ac)))ty O$ f a rat C f fe aa al ~ tut51'hatt tftattaal os tttadto laadlC4))uq atf ftaaaat)u to fan)llcy )ay eat)outott )taaaattu cu uufa aataucdutan eeyp~lo9 fot at<<ux) )c ultan taeur ur Pq-1 f)>>a t,hte)t atfgactV falanc otaorallo>t. ea)ulfaaaaealc fgoaa aalaellaa or ex)a)oatuat TaÃttt Ott ~A )aaqfca) lo(t.)yguaau) o) olhatat)VO) eaacry ug cuxlc ur jtaaaaaub)a hlaraa laadlcaatluta lu Ceca)vad

       ~tthtt tt Clx         of    h atuar tty on-alen )utt)p                 gaa qnco aceaa         pucentlu)ly            un pacectu-Chlor or toxic og ytau c'a:)eaux. u)'laauaaa)a)u af feC))n)t    )a)aatg  ulaeaatlun.           f)uutxabla ttaa )aau a)))fuuaa)
                                                                                                                            )n)o vlca) acu<<q.

ttlSSl1 YS plaaaal oc'ud!)atu lndlcat tun Paaaaa)ta Cu uufa ehufdoana 4gutt-of aalaat)ta laa)aacc oaa talaaac u<<aac fruaa aalual)ea or a)raacta)reata a:x)a lux tun. YIIlldllII!I~II nxc Quual ltadlcaclun clast clna lucLlna caolntt haa bua:n

                                                                              )aaaaugratea)    )ay  Lladtaatt.

AAt r~tax l. Cuutaluca ua:cluuu lluteal un l. cuaataleta accluna ltuceg l. Cuaatalete actluna llxcaad l)aaa QIOSUA). RVetff CtteC)U.lg. <a htZST q)eCu.)ST. oaa S)TS h)teh p)ettcettCy Ctl KGB.l ST. crt cA W rt Qt n tta

KLKCTklCht. tlALt'UNTIOtt hLKtrl'/TÃ

                                                                                                                                                  ~
                       ~as        tt){ltsfJhf. KYKICT                                                                        hRLh BIKKOKttlM                         CKttKPat. KttKRCKttCT lYKIFF I Cka  Ilk I'Ilkl:k Luaca of ofLu)ce+o~vot 0 ~nake
                            ~ool - (to hC Laovpr ca+aQLCCI Tacfl'< te gene ef       fftPt
                                                                      ~al I   II tt lt lka u furplatu Renerutur
                                                                                                ~a I,l I"""

ll I

                                                                                                                                    "hac" I

I ca~le

                                                                                                                                                          ~-
                                                                                                                                                          ~

t lalhnf Itlartalp CF4ccgfofwuro pfuOC ulurtup crunu-crt'ttlp Turla(uo gelaeracur crllag tlaauyalgp)u fur Iterylcut OR, Ifatfwefa Outa-futcc:t lucan j ~ httog tctttt pictnC ucarfup

2. Laaug Of Yult.egu oat pucft htIO tg) ft)6 gy Puccqug le fate gut)qfu nf lutb uwerguuc:y cceaau furwefat ucauyqt fellla fctt tctcryicu httO ~

pofy t)tcot )0 uauqca)tt, gtgaal Seneru)oru to ucuff SF uyat<<h)Voice 2. Suufuluu4 falluru ot llutla ettaerRocacy dleuul tteuuru-tet I I,tl ln I OR I ~ Ilc a Furu cu hynclarotafze w f alla t 0 ca ~ heart PF fuf > 1)

                                                                                                                     ~I ltFOp      4  acus S ttG ttaau yollaseu fct           vulcu.

g fO ovar for

                                                                                                                                    ~I I

S I ~I wlnccraa

                                                                                                                                                            ~ CC Suufutued drop ln h and p pC luu vplcuacu cu lO vdc'ur
                                                                                                                     > 15 eatnuteu.

ht:TlOtt j. Caw pluto uuttuuu lleca:4 un l Catwplecu uuclcaaau l loca:4 Cuwplccu uutloue llutud PttU)Pht. PKtcc ctlKcKLl+ ou hLKRT CUKCKL1ST. on SlTE hkah KtÃRCgttCy gllKCKLf S7. QO Vl c>> I WC n lD

0 TABLE 3-1 (CONT'D) SKQJS 1'Ty SHSllGSNGILS GLISK PIlgSPAL. RyfIg h+Rf Slag ASIA L'IIS}tGkIIG) g eecsflty e)eff bee baeI1 cq))eg 4 uucurlty usurfency )ieu bueq A uecurlty easurgeucy bae A uucceec ful tel.cover of the by fby uacuflfy fufca 3q fpc- ca)led by the uacurlty fur<<e ag pfugreeec4 tu ttiu potnt that IiuIl&u fo uua pf aeIfg pf fbg )feSII plant lnclultug the Control gc lgpug )n )hu gafeSuqr4lu fabcuyer of qua ablaut fe kuun haa pccurfe4. llqtug belay. guqtfugepcy P)etI. pfopablc

         ~  Smb tlIfeSN Attucg tbfeag
         ,  Cfvl) g)efurbuncu PfoIacfeg <<rea ]ntfIIp]og Sqbufegu efleuyf lqturual g)etuilaucy

l. Vllel afpa )ntruu]ug pacurft/ force etff)g guppletu <<ctluua 1)arpg olI ). Cuuylate <<cfluu>> llute4 pn " Cueylutu ncttuuu lletu4 ou 1,. Cua ytetu act tuue lleted uu

       .'IIIPSIIAP Pyyg eqigcg.tSI,             IM.SR/ CIISGSf.fuI.                    S11R ARSA RIISRGXIIGZ    Cllru-      crIIRIAL vxssGRHGy cssGrl.isa LIST.

0 0

THOLE 3-1 (CONT'of jtPjlPAj ejlgtigjcjgg VjjNUQ. gyeNf Spg AggA ejtegCejjCf cp<egAI. eatggcettcy Lhkluc OAXg gal nor fjlctug)la blao occurfp4 py uqrtjujuaku uccuru aajljc4 Au eat'tbguaka. Occura abfcb jq4jcajacj on uaftbqqaga'fofcQ raglutcrlj >Cga: (0.5S) Ou $0+ fagjateru >SS) ou 40AA aetautc ounjtof )tate-(2-jj (poof gccfg uj paj alai c ocju! puant. Cctu j Paula r pu>>aj) un4 anuunclojpg ou PQ I Ikl le ute jluatf jcaatuu by SOAA ('gaatjcuf jf Nnt ICattOII jay ajlu Mant jlqf jjutfftc<<tfuu jly abu Muotjler lbaj eau) gbIjj a j>> Ip utfpgt. jlucrjcguu~ vvoy'l I Iag puruau of jjlu approacj~ uf

                                                                   )Iufrjcanu aljjjl uju4o cljl rlt j    gurqalu uf tjCu alaproaela Of a jlurrjcal~u ujtb al jlujo > 4uu jgn Ijpnjqi bnuju (120 wpb) )avatar      Pauju (}20      sq b) )uvuju llINt la l1I    Mua  j j I cat jon by llokA    +natl)ar        All) jurna4o uf fjktug    toujljry guacau) jj~af A         tuaua4o~            jg ju gffect.                     vrfar na na) l~lkYER .XUL'I. 50-year f'}up4 ur lola uater,                  fjou4, lou uatur, burrtcuuu          )'jou4; leal uuter, jaurrjcauu jcuf f 1cauu <<grgu       OR otllor obuofpal    aufgul    Cg utlaur nbnulaaul water  aurgu    QR utllur nbnofwoj Qatar hNIOtuaab       uuaer )uvo) cou41rlunq                         )uycj con4lttonu cuuua 'llu uaoau    juvo) cou41t juuu cauuu vjrccl ajrgjuago uyateu au bu a:.Icua:4c:4. uqujpucur ju       fujj

j. jtuaff jcqttuu by SOAA (Meat)lor guruau) jbaa ubuuacaal llojuf

                         )uvul cun4lt tuuu aru eapucte4 ur are occurtng, qr

2. tfjauil atacYnuo by <<tatjon jaaruolluaj abut alutur luyulu 4aa approucblug utorw 4lntuaga Isyataaa capgctty Acr tou l. j:uaapletu act toui 11otc;4 un pjuru actjuua 11usu4 j. Cuwpletu actluuo jjote4 t><<u~lusuab evnq csecgj.jsv. u<<Af.ejty CjjeCgj.jgZ ou Site ARSA 12tegceucy Clfgcgj. 1ST m EA tor

&C A A>

CClSCELlhHLUUS VVKCCTi CLaay U<~uSy4~. RyRCg ALHRT ClfTK 48+ QIHgCKHC) GRHglt4L y4CHCLHCT tVR'4CT ABHURHhL LI ) 4~i TQfP~R'k4 U~kL hTSSURR

                        ~lltD g~cu Ilk~4 c, O erv)uto
                                                        ~lh
                        $. gqLcuu)(oy Ciucgfcl uoql~or flulfcqCO) lsvu C)lvH fg ggp-coijlIAK       OR f

f. QlgUvvf'lof )vll CvupeFvgggy

                             )u LP4R.()iau 20        f'4)qy  f(ly occ Fsclq>>        c~p FeluFp,   ccc pluug )Hcolv Cpurpocoug)pg
                              )u J l cq f p pt uucuvl fgp)

F~puF4 fUFou. CURfhlllN*'@II ay cuu)oulcuCCug Cud)YCcJuvf fy lH ) URY ClopvpurCI Q off ullu $ 0 tivuplta) fuQ CFOOCweug of Iulllrluo ~

                             ~ploCO         guCloccu                                       l Clco    UljUSp)L gypped   CC]~ ggT
                                                                                         ~

l CO ~ Co C n CD

TABLE 3-.1 (COHTID) HISCEI. JQIECUS EVEttTS xvgtq')}t~g f. Al'tff ALEE f SiTg AREA EIIEKCE(C'f CEI}ERA}. EHEKCENCT UTtttg tA)NDI 'IDICS )I h f'14IIF,III!uFItutct! $ 0 fgc}CI}ES'} The Tychnlcu} II'pEUOF f Cyrttyf )< 'fha +ergeucy ceuturIA ay>> Iy Tfcttltlus} 5}ec}f)raf)R1 r~ A!ID~DR }IIIsf SIF>> Ruargcnc}C Au >>Itcnt result l<<g lu uccutit tun CREASED AMARS- acF I usted > AIIIIL of tha gucrgcucy Clauslftcutluu DR

     !IESS f!fIRFag)acts EI!c)}tty'srp Rcl)yafc4      I}ul)ftur)>>E Tcelaq ttfp          to f!cIIclul Eartgcncy ulth 3~  Ql !tlttttf I>> 'illa) I}utCI) IN'JRF       gof o}}!IIff}IEn 1}Ffll }Ipf}I!tayII
                                                                                                            ~       asti l}Aryan; Atttt,              fuafttcu< Su}Iutauthal Cur>> UuIaIga ahpqfua} cunlltfu!It! (4.E cxcuedfoS cuo}gouu ftlleS c!F
                                                                 ~
                                                                                                                ). A frees<<F}upary      j uhllc      a<<4     }Iutcutfal fur rale>>ca uf Itutffhcalluu lu II>>II>> cou-      large auuuntu of rahluacttvfty f flaary aystua }I}IIE Pfttc}I>>                                                       cut cling >>I1 pt<<lot>>I! l Rlstlg
                              $ f!I fu!!I!) C}IIF)tttt Ctltc}'4f}fttt}t lu    S  short }Icr}ul of tlacl such con4l tlun tor uthar l)Is!I       II>> I Ijrl}}   p<<rlIO>>ua.

l. lhtCA utth fatlutc uf ECCS.

2. loss ut Sec>><<dpry I!c>>t SII;k.

Suatu local stat lon hl ackuut It}th }us>> of Ucconllaly hast

                                                                                                                                                           >> III!I.

fut}uI'a ul cu<<tat twunt heat uvul >>yet>.as lu tha latrt'II gcs uf aII uccIIIunl rcuult-lnlt lI'I }usa uf coutsllwcltt ACT10t} Cu>>IIIcte actlunu }tsteI! on l. Coupler>> ectfuue Alutu4 l. Lu>>III<<tu acrhun>> lhut>>II l. Cu>>IIActe aetio<> }INCSW}. RVEI!T Cttfm.roy. pn )I.RRT Cltf+I.TST. un SITE AREA RttEKCftICT ou Cft!ERAL fttft(CEIICY CPECrr.1ST. CIIECELAVr. CA W rt Q) I C CT CD

4 ~ NOTIFICATION AND CO>iMJNICATION .This section describes the procedures and methods established ior initial notification and followup communications witshin Florida Power & Light Company, and from Florida Power & Light Company to the appropriate state, county, and federal response organizations. Section 4.6, Communications Equipment, describes the referenced systems in more detail. Figure 4-1 shows the initial notification flow. Table 4-1 presents the organizational titles and alternates for the primary, response organizations communicatxon links. 4.1 PPL Raerzency Response Orzanizatioa Th~ FPL 3nergency Coordinator, acting in accordance with plant. procedures, has the responsibility ior deciding wnen and how to'make the necessary notifications and communications, and for determining the content of the notification. However, actual contacts may be made by designated communications assistants. The use of the phrase "Emergency Coordinator" below is also deiined as "Emergency Coordinator or his designee", except ior those items described in Section 2.2.2.1 which cannot be delegated. R.i.i Initial Notification Florida Power & Light Company emergency procedures call for the following actions fox initial notification within the FPL organization.

1) Personnel detecting a potential significant off-normal event or condition should repor" it to the Nuclear Plant Supervisor by the fastest means available. This may mean face-to-face communication, the Plant Public Address system, the PAX system or the commercial (Bel*) telephone system. These systems provide adequate means of redundancy ior this initial notiiication.

The following information should be related to the extent possible: 4~1 S t. Lucie 8/1/81

ENEBGEI)CY COOitu INAIOlt STATE OF FliORIDA Dul'Y CALL Et)ERGEIICY CONTROL FPL DEPART)If)IF OF IIEAI.TII f SUPERVISOR OFI'ICLR OR OFVSZTE EI)EBGCIICY BslthUILITATIVE SflltV1C . I IIAD. DufY OFI ICElt OBGA W I'4ATIOII I I I I Sl'ATE OF FIDI<IDA BUREAU OP DISASTER I'BEI'Al EDNA I SYSTEN OPIIIATIOIIS I I I ADDITIOWAI. puarr sut Iettr I OMEB COOllultthTOI'C I I'lllNC 1'Xt't)SU)<E PA'flBthY EI E E3)uttf II:S L)tt:t<t:IWICY 'ftW4 OFI'ICE t)C 01SAS'fLR IAAI)l'l(S TEAN t)IWt>t.t i i~ I'IU:Vht()3)ttflss Et)S 1tffEIIIN H USWRC EIIEBGENCY TEA))S Ol'EBATIOWS CflttfER TELEPIIONE g H n UX.'AL SUPPI)Kf TIIESP AGEIICIES II1LL RECEIVE t)OTIPICATIOII L. FIRE/At)sulk))CE AS FOILS)ts t oP4

2. t)ED ICAL l. BUBEAU OF DIShsTER PIRPAItflttttCSS ALEldl'AOltPTI.Y UNUSUAL AND EVfltff TEL)'.I'IIONE VIA PltlNAIIY COtt)IUNICA'I'fOWS I'LOW SITE ABLA EMIRGCNCY I't)OIN fLY VIA AND CENbttAL LNL'BGEttCY Wh)IAS PIAtff AI.TEBtthTE COttNUIIICA'T1OWS FLAVit

2. COUtffY OFFICE OF DISASffllt I'ttt)PAI(EI)NESS IIII'I'1AI. tNN1FICATIOW FLOW UWUSUAI EVEttf VIA Ul)P PIIONI'TI.Y ALL'Kf, VIA TL'LL'PI)OWE SITE AREA EttLBGEt)CY PIO)IPTI Y VIA tlhlthS AND Gntt:BAI. EttEBCCIICY 3~ USWBC VIA EtlS MITWIti 1 WOUR OF DIZIAIIATIOtt Ol'N ENE!tGEI)CY

0 TABLE 4-1 CO~iNCATIOViS RESPOiVS IBILITIES The folloeing positions (eith apptogata otgani "ation titles) ate tesponsihie for manning communication links among the listed organizations:

1. FPL On-Site Emergency Response Organization Primary: Emergency Coordinator

1. Nuclear Plant Supervisor 2 ~ Nuclear Watch Eng'eer (gg. i t c c~i ~ U~ <

Alternate: 'esignated Communicator (from available plant operating and operating tecnical staff).

2. FPL Off-Site Emergency Response Organization Primary; Recovery Manager

l. Manager, Power Resources, Nuclear

2. Assistant Manager, Power Resources, Nuclear

3. iMnager, Power Resources, Nuclear Services

                                                             ~

Alternate: Designated Communicator (from available management or technical s taf f ) .

3. Florida Bureau of Disaster Preparedness Field Operations Center, Jupiter.

Pr lmary: Bureau Chief, BDP Alternat e: Communication Coordinator

1. Communicator, Central Florida Emergency Operations Center

2. Communicator, West Florida Emergency Operations Center 4-3 St. Lucie 8/1/81

4 0

TABLE 4-1 COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES CONTINUED

4. Florida Bureau of Diastex Preparedness State Emergency Operations Center, Tallahassee Primary: Assistant Bureau Chiez, BDP Alternate: Communications Coordinator (from available BDP staff)

5. St. Lucie County Emergency Operan.ons Center, Ft. Pierce Primary; St. Lucie County Disaster Preparedness Director Alternate: Communications Ofzicer (911 Supervisor)

6. Martxn County Emergency Operations Center, Stuart Primary: Martin County Diaster Preoaredness Director Alternate: Martin County Disaster Preparedness Depu y Director

7. Flox'ida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Radiological Health Services Field Monitoring Teams Primary. Supervisor, RHS Alternate: Public Health Physicist, (from available staff) 4-4 St. Lucie 8/)/81

Type of emergepcy (fire, pipe rupture, etc.). Location of emergency. Presence of injured personnel. Extent of damage to plant components. The Nuclear Plant Supervisor classizies the event and if it is an Unusual Event, Alert, Site .Area Emergency, or General Emergency, he activates this Emergency Plan and becomes the Emergency Coorainator. If necessary, the Emergency Coord'nator noties pl nt person"el o the emergency situation and any requi.red protective ctions oy the Plant Public Address system. If necessary, the Emergency Coordinator directs the evacuation of all visitors. and non-essential Florida Power 6 Light Company employees.

2) To activate the FPL Off-site Emergency Organization, the Emergency Coordinator notif'es the Duty Call Supervisor by the most readily available communications system and provides basic information as described below and the status of his notizication of off-site authoritzes. In turn, the Duty Call Supervisor relays his information to the Emergency Control Officer (ECO), or to the Radiological Duty Officer (TOO) lf the EGO or hia alternates cannot be confided. The ECO (or RDO) notifies, appropriate off-site response personnel If necessary, notificat" on from the Emergency Coordinator by'elephone.

to the ECO (or RDO) can be accomplished via the Systems Operations Power Coordinator. The Duty Call Supervisor provides the folJ.owing information to the FCO to the extent possible: 0 Type of accident or incident. O ~~dQ u 4-5 St. Lucie 8/1/81

Assessment of the emergency condition (inclu'ding the cxass of emergency). Information on personnel injuries, and an estimate of personnel radiation exposures. Ofr-site support already called in and/or required. An estimate of the magnitude or a radioactive material release and tne area possibly affected. Actions already taken ox recommended with respect to the evacuation of various on-site areas. Wind speed and direction; wind direction range (degrees) over the previous hour. Assessment of potential radiation exposure to persons off-site and any protective act"ons fox offsite areas recommended. 4 .1.2 Communications In~tially, communications between the Emergency Coordinator (in the Control Room) and FPL's Off-site Emergency Organization are by telephone, , with radio as the backup. When the Inter'mergency Operations Facility is mobili ed, communications within the FPL Emexgency Organization ax'e accomplished primarily using commercial (Bell) phones. 4-6 St. Lucie 8/1/81

FoLlow up messages regarding the prognosis for worsening or terminating of the event as well as requests for onsite support by ozfsite organizations will be made periodically or as needed by the EC to the RH. Recommendat"ons for offsite protective measures to BDP may be included as part of follow-up messages. These measures are discussed in Table 5-3. State of Floxida notification and communications pxocedures are presented in Appendix A. 4.2.1 Bureau of Disaster Pxe aredness Xni tial Notification FPL's Emergency Coordinator will make intit'al notification within 15 minutes of declaring an emergency. Commercial telephone (NAWAS backup) will be used for notification of an Unusual Event or Alert. NAWAS (commercial telephone backup) will be used for notification of a Site Area or General Emergency. Phone numbers for 24-hour per day notification axe provided by procedure. Table 4-2 contains the required information to be communicated to BDP during the initial notixication. The listed information will be provided to the extent possible a the time of notification. 4-, 7 St. Lucie 8/1/81

TABLE 4-2 INFORMATION CONTAINED IN INITIAL NOTIPICATION TO BDP Name, address, telephone number oi caller.

2. Location oi incident (i.e. St. Lucie Plant)

3. Class of emergency

4. Date/t~e of incident.

Note: The, above information will be available at time of notification and must be given. The following information may not be availableor should be provided to the extent possible.) 7P. Estimated quantity oi radioactive material released or being released, and height of release. 8 jf. Chemical and physical form of released material. Prevailing weather (as applicable): a) Wind velocity b) Wind direction c) Atmospheric stability loP- Personnel status: a) Killed b) Injured (Hospitalized) c) Injured (Not hospitalized) s lt/. Escdnate or prodecred dose at sdta boundary IZ+. Estimate or projected dose range Ig g. Estimate of contamination l4 g. Recommended offsite protective measures 5 Qgg)~ (ft5,cy')'p bio~ og f'hc. cvcA+ I", T~d~'cafe, W4e.9m~ oc. nd a. fdic s4 P"'9 4"8 St. Lucie 8/</ai .

FIGURE 4-2 COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACES

                                                                 'USHRC EHS REGION   I I/BETHESDA CONTROL ROOM BUREAU OF HAWAS DISASTER TEL    PREPAREDNESS OPERATIONS INTERIM SUPPORT TSC CENTER ftARTIH 5 HAWAS    ST., LUCIE COVNTTES (LGR)  DISASTER PREP.

INTERIM EOF MEDICAL, FIRE (TEL) AMBULANCE SUPPORT INITIAL HOTIFICATIONS PER PLAN AND PROCEDURES 4-9 St. Lucre 8/1/81.

The initxal notification may be brief with certain information not available. Pollowup messages from the Emergency Coordinator to the Bureau of Disaster Preparedness (BDP) will include the required information as it becomes available. The Bureau of Disaster Preparedness has ost blished a proc d re to authenticate emergency notification from the St. Lucie Plant. Communications Th Emergency Coordinator will maintain periodic contact with the BDP 1 until control is effectively transferred to the county response organization at the St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center. Coordination communications are to be transmitted from the Control Room to the Emergency Operations Center by Local Government Radio. When the Znterim Emergency Operations Facility is mobilized, communiation between the Interim EOF and the St. Lucie County Disaster Preparedness Coordinator is by telephone with Local Government Radio maintained as the backup mode. 'ommunication 4.2.2 ~De arrnenr or Healrh and Rehabili arrive Rervioee Enitial Notification The Bureau of Disaster Preparedness (BDP) Duty Warning Officer is responsible for notifying the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) ~ Notification is made to the Public Health Physicist and the Administrator, Radiological Health Services. The Public Health Physicist verifies the existence or a radiological emergency'y contacting the Control Room via telephone, then contacts the St. Lucie County EOC to ascertain what, is any, protective actions have been initiated. If required,'he Public Health Physicist activates the 4R1obile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (44ERL) ~ Communications St. Lucie 8/1/81

The Public Health Physicist maintains contact with the Bureau oi Disaster Preparedness (BDP) via mobile r'adio as he travels to the FPL near-site Interim Emergency Operations Facility or to the White City Substation where the HERL is parked. Contact is maintained with the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (Mi RL) by the Bureau of Disaster Preparedness (BDP) 'via Local Government Radio while the HERL is in transit. On arrival, commercial phones are available also. The State Plan describes provisions for communication bellmen EOC's and offsite radiological monitoring teams. Attachment 3 to Annex D is a schematic diagram of communication for field assessment teams. 4.3 St ~ Lucie Count and Hartin Count Disaster Preparedness Coordinator Initial LVotification The County Disaster Preparedness Coordinators are initially not5;fied (within 1S minutes) simultaneously via the same iVAWAS communication used to notify the Bureau of Disaster Preparedness for Site Area and General Emergencies. i%WAS is monitored on a 24-hour basis by the St. Lucie and Ywrtin County Department of Public Safety. The Disaster Preparedness CoordinatorScan then be reached by. telephone ox by dispatching a patrol car. Also, the Duty Warning Officer at the Buxeau of Disaster Preparedness's Warning Point is responsible for confirming the, receipt of emergency notification by the County Disaster For an Alert, the notification will be made

                                                     't Preparedness Coordinators.

(within approximately 15 minutes) by telephone with NAWAS as backup. Phone numbers for 24-hour per day notification are provided by procedure. The State BDP notifies the County Disaster Preparedness Coordinators of an Unusual Event. Communication The County Disaster Preparedness Coordinators -proceed to the St. Lucie and 4-11 S t. Lucie 8/1/81

I Hartin County Emergency Operations Centers, respectively and use the communication channels available there. These include NAPAS,. Local Government Radio, teletype, police and fare networks and teLephone. 4.4 Federal Agencies Xnitial Notification The NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, HD is notified oz certain events by Emergency Notification System from the Control Room. The notifications ar= made in accordance with Federal Reglatxons and plant procedures. The Emergency Coordinator or his designee completes this contact within one hour of the classificat'on oz an emergency. Communications Communications with the iNRC may be handled by telephone from the ControL Room, the Xnterim TSC (if activated), the Xnterim Emergency Operations Facility (iz activated), or from FPL's General Offices by a designee oz the Emergency Contxol Officer. 4.4.2 , U.S. Coast Guard Assistance from the Coast Guard for on-site rescue, aid or evacuation of persons in danger, and the protection of property threatened by any type of disaster can be requested by telephone from the Emergency Coordinator his designee or the Recovery 4'fwnager or his designee to the Coast Guard Duty Ofxicer. 4a.f Nouiflcaciou of che Public bv che aaaca/~Couuc The Florida Radiological Emergency Plan for Nuclear Power Facilities (see Appendix A) defines the state and county procedures for notifying the public 4-12 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 in the event of an emergency. Section 5 describes further provisxons. 4.6 Communications E~uipment The various communications systems previously discussed are described in more detail below. Th~s Communications Network incorporates all telephones, the plant public address system, rixed and mobile radio systems, and radio "beepers" employed for rout,ne plant operation and other normal. Company business. Xn addition, the communication systems or State and County agencies and other organ.zations with which the Company has emergency assistance agreements will be used to implement emergency activities. The PA system, with speakers strategically located throughout the Protected Area, provides for the transmission of warning and instructions in event of an emergency. The system is in frequent use during normal plant operations, and consists of numerous separate amplifiers which operate from the plant 120 volt AC vital, instrument power system. Handsets are provided in the Plant Control Room, the Plant Office, and numerous other Locations within the'Protected Ar~a. The system incxudes one paging channel and five party Line channels. PAX Tele hone S stem Private Automated Exchange (PAX) telephones are Located strategically throughout the Protected Area. This system, which is used during normal plant operation, also provides an automatic plane-wide fire alarm and code call capability. Xt will continue to operate on battery power for at least two weeks in case oi power failure. There are numerous Bell Telephone System lines connected to the plant for normal dial telephone service. This system. represents the primary system for 4-13 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 rout.ne communicat'on.with'areas outside the plant. Additionally a full period lease circuit (hot line) connects the Plant Control Room directly to the, Eastern Division Load Dispatcher and to the System Operations Power Coordinator in .'fiami. Portable Radio Transceivers Various portable radio transceivers (walkie-talkies) are available to supplement the fixed communications equipment in the plant. These radios are light-weight battery operated units which may be easily carried by. personnel to any location on the plant site. Some of these portable radi'os are capable of communicating with an FH radio transceiver over a range or several miles. Pdlami Araa Zttar Drr-dta Dial ~Sstem Each of the several Company offices in the Mi.ami Area has its own switchboard and telephone exchange number., There is also a tie line system whereby znter-of ce direct dialing can be accomplished. Offices on this system include most of the Miami Area Florida Power 6 Light Company offices. Each switchboard also has an'ntra-ofrice direct dialing system. These systems are accessed from the Bell telephones. Radio~Pa ~in ~Sseem Telephones in the Miami Area inter-office dial system *re interconnected to the Radio Paging System. This system is capable of reaching beepers in Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, and Sarasota Countires. Beepers are regularly assigned to key personnel in the Off-Site Emergency Organization as shown on the Emergency Roster, and additional beepers'an be quickly assigned ii required in an emergency. Assigment of beepers is shown in the Emergency Rosters. A be per is also assigned to the Duty Call Supervisor which is utilized in the St. Lucie/slartin County, area. The Company radio system consists of fazed base FH radio equipment in the System Operations'Power Coordinator's office, trouble dispatcher offices, 4-)4 St. Lucie 8/1/81

service centers, and power plants, plus numerous mobile units in automobiles, , trucks, and mobile service 'vehicles. Zn the event of interruption of electric

.service to the base radio stations, emergency power can be supplied to this equipment.

An FM transceiver is located in the Control Room. This radio will provide back-up communications beamen the Plant and the System Operations Office. Th~ System Operations Office has direct telephone lines and either direct, patch, or indicrect radio contact with all the plants, radio-equipped vehicles and service centers in the Florida Power 6 Light Company system. The NAWAS is installed in the Control Room. This system uses commercial, protected telephone lines. The initial Site Area or General Emergency notification to the State Bureau oz Disaster Preparedness (BDP) and the county Disaster Preparedness Coordinators will be made via NAWAS unless NANAS is inoperable, in which case notification will be made by telephone. Local Government Radio (LGR) System The LGR System is installed in the Control Room. This system, which operates on frequencies alloca.ted in the State Bureau of Diaster Preparedness (BDP), should be used to maintain communications with the BDP, the State"Department of Health'nd Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory ('SEEL), and tne County Disaster Preparedness Coordinators'. An LGR system is also provided in the interim EOF. Sner~e~nc SocSSecacSon Satan (nNS) e The ENS is installed in tne Control Room with an extension in the interim EOF and interim TSC. This is a dedicated phone line with an automatic ringing system that is designed to facilitate notifications to the NRC. 4.7 ~Tesein 4-15 St. Lucie 8/1/81,

l As discussed in Section 7.1, Exercises and Drills, communication equipment and procedures will be tested periodically as part of the PPL program oi exercises, drills, and tests for maintaining emergency preparedness. 4-16 St. Lucie 8/1/81

I 5 ~ RESPONSE TO ACCIEENT CONDITIONS Table 3-l identif i~>5 a spectrum of off-normal events and classifies those events into four categories. The classification is based on Emergency Action Levels which are related to instrument readings, or observations, or a combination of these identified in the table. This section discusses the assessment of and r sponse to these events. 5.1 Accident Assessment Once an off-normal event has been detected and classified in accordance with the Emergency Action Levels, a process of continuing assessment will be initiated. System instrumentation and procedures which would be used as appropriate in the assessment process are described below. Specifications of 'instrumentation utilized for accident assessment are contained in procedures. Post Accident sampling capabilities are also described in procedures. The St. Lucie Plant is pxovided with systems for measuring radioactivity at potential exxluent release points and within the primary containment building. The principal release point is the plant vent. A monitoring I system is provided in this vent. ~+s system samples the Plant Stack exhaust which includes the Reactor Auxiliary Building, Containment Purge, Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust, and waste gas decay tanks. The decay tanks have a separate noble gas monitor which controls the release to the Plant Stack.

        ~
          'dditional effluent points are monitored similarly for noble gases..

These include fuel building stack exhaust (fuel pool and pump room), the ECCS (one for each of two independent ECCS exhaust ducts), and the steam dump/saxety valves. For particulates and iodine, all effluent release points will be monitored using gxab sampling and analysis. Silver zeolite cart idges will be used. S t. Luci e 8/1/81

In addition to these effluent monitors, the plant is provided with an area radiation monitoring system. This monitoring system employs detectors distributed throughout the plant and detector indicators are provided locally and in the Control Room. The area monitoring system provides early indication of a release of radioactivity within the plant. Under accident conditions, the containment atmosphere is. monitored for radioisotopic content by grab sampling. In addition, the containment is provided with radiation monitors. These monitors would provide an early indication o radioact'.""- '" the contai-"~nt, par ic' '-"ly as result of a loss of reactor coolant to the containment building. Chemical and radioisotopic analyses of the reactor coolant 's provided by grab sampling. Also, the plant has a system of Eire detectors with approoriate alarms in the Control Room to provide warning of a fire emergency. 5.1.2 On-Sita Sam li Resources The capability is available at the St. Lucie Plant to obtain grab samples of the, reactor containment atmosphere and the reactor coolant. To obtain grab samples of the containment atmosphere following an accident, a special removable gas sampling vessel is used in the existing containment sampling system. The removable vessel would be transported to the plant laboratory. At the laboratory, a portion of the gas would be drawn from the vessel, and the radioisotopic content determined by a multichannel analy"er. Plant procedures provide detailed inst~tions for sample acquisition, transportation, and analysis. 5-2 St. Lucie 8/1/81.

Reactor 'coolant grab samples can also be, taken following an accident. Dedicated sample lines are installed which route a reactor coolant sample to an accessible, low background area. This special routing makes it unnecessary to enter the sample room which might be inaccessible after an accident. These sample lines are shielded to reduce radiation exposure. The coolant sample would be analyzed ior-boron and radioactivi"y. Detai's on sample acqu'sition, transportation, and analysis are described in plant procedures. Airborne concentrations ox radioiodine. are detected using portable samplers. Silver zeolite sample cartridges are stored onsite. To preclude interferences by noble gas adsorption, only silver zeolite cartridges will initially be used to sample critically manned areas (e.g., Control Room, Technical Support Center, other areas which require personnel to be present). During subsequent sampling, if charcoal filters are used for sample collection, experience has shown that noble gases adsorbed on the sample media can be effectively removed by purging with clean air or nitrogen for 15-30 minutes. Air samples will be collected using portable high volume air samplers in accordance with a plant procedure. Portable air samplers are located such that time required to obtain results is minimized for critically manned areas (e.g., Control'Room, Technical Suppor" Center). Collected samples wi11 be transported promptly to the remote lab, which will be established using portable equipment in a low background area outside the Radiation Controlled Area. Samples are to be analyzed by GeLi spectroscopy in accordance with approved procedures. 5.1.3 Meteorolo ical S stems Meteoroxogical data are required to make estimates of oif-site radiation exposure in the event of a release or gaseous radioactivity. Ywasurement of three meteorological parameters are required to make estimates of atmospheric dispersion, an essential part oi an orisite radiation exposure calculation. The parameters are wind speed, wind direction, and a measure of atmospheric stability. 5-3 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 MeteoroLogical data is collected at the St. Lucie plant site. The West Palm Beach National Weather Service Station serves as the backup. Table 5-1 summarizes the available data. Data which represents primary and backup sources are summarized on Table 5-2. The readouts from the site meteorological tower ax'e provided at 15-minute intervals and the data are directly available at the Control Room. 5.1.4 Source Term and Release Determination As discussed in Section 5.1.3. certain meteorological parameters are required ior the calculat'on oi off-site radiation exposure from airborne releases. Additional essential pieces of.iniormation are the rate of release and isotopic composition of the released radioactivity. If radioactivity wexe released from a monitored vent, then a direct measuxe of the release rate would be available. Monitored release points are discussed in Section 5.1.1. In the event of a loss of coolant accident, the containment radiation monitors would provide the f'rst indication of the inventory oi radioactivity in the containment. Additional information about the isotopic composition of the airborne radioactivity would be derived from isotopic analysis oi a containment atmosphere sample. St. Lucie 8/1/81

TABLE 5-1 SUSSRY OP AVAILABLE METEOROLOGICAL DATA Source Data ~Dfs la St. Lucie Wind Speed Digital (15 minutes averages 60-met ." ".ower (10m and 60m) every'15 minutes) and strip Wind Direction chart records (10m and 60m) Delta T (60m - 10m) West Palm Wind Speed Hone; via telephone Beach Wind Direction (Class A 'ilWS Cloud Cover Station) Ceiling Height 5-5 St. Luci e 8/1/81

TABLE 5-2 SOURCES OF aaETEOROLOGICAL DATA. He tao rological Priority Parameter Soux ce ~Backc Atmospheric Delta T (St. Luc'e Su"=ac Stability Tower) Obsexvations (Vest Palm Beacn i~viS) Mind Speed St. Lucie Vest Palm Tower Beach WiS Mind St. Lucia Vest Palm Direction Tower Beach %lS, 5<<6 St. Lucia 8/1/81

Procedures have been developed to assist the plant staff in estimating release rates and isotopic content for releases from the various plant vents. A containment release )' rate for use in off-site dose estimation is conservatively estimated as the design basis leak rate at the design pressure.

5. 1.5 Ex osure and Dose Rate Determination One of the uses of radiation monitors and meteorological instrumentation is the calculation of off-site radiation exposures. An estimate of doses is needed in the event ox a radiological emergency so that responsible agencies can use this information to plan protective action.

o4 akt A plant procedure provides the degails rninca-= og hqw initial +~ peggy par icular, current meteorological ~ckag data p py aM

          ~   ~        doge
                )) ) fa) est~ates~

ccA+L p Xn Post-1,OCA Radiation Nonitor readings are used in conjunction with, Chb tables for estimating doses under actual conditions. Dose calculations will be updated periodically during the course of the accident and the results will be provided to state and county authorities for their use ig evaluating the need for protective

        ~gb4 5 3 co)nba~ oAsiWdose, as+)'m< tvs Vu Gr A P, p,C, ~s.r action. Refined dose estimates would be prepared by the Chemistry Department representative who reports to the Interim Technical Support Center or the Enterim Emergency Operations Pacility.
                                                                     ~~      )+ 0 c. lung a wo~ caM, aiba,t'I'on can be utilized     if  assessment instrumentation is.not available (off-scale or inoperable)               and  field  sample analysis has not yet been completed, 5-7 St. Luci e 8/1/81

5.1.6 Ofi-site Monitorim Dosimetry The Plorida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services maintains a system of 39 TLD stations in the vicinity oi St. Lucia Plant. Stations are provided in each 22.5'ector ac the 1-mile (approximate), S~e (approximat'e), and 10-mile (approximate) radii. At the 10-mile radius, stations are located with special emphasis on che more densely populated area. Labaracorfes gad~Sam lan Laboratory facilitias are provided as discussed in Section 2.3.2. The plant's on-site radiological laboratory serves as the primary facility with backup provided by portable equipment. Analysis of oif-site environmental samples will be performed ac the state's Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory. This mobile lab can be in position near the site within three hours oi notification and serves as a central point for the receipt of all off-site field monitoring data and coordintaion of sample media. Pield Monitorins Stace-Annex F of the State Plan discusses the State role in accident assessment. It descibes agencies and their missions, specialized personnel, special equipment (a.g., helicopters), and other matters related to field monitoring within the plume exosure EPZ. The four Appendices of Annex G discuss in further detail che capability and resources for field monitoring. Field team compositions, transportation, communications, equipment and estimated deployment cimas. are included in the State Plan. County plans also address some of these topics. Transportation of field teams is discussed in Section VI of Annex P of the State Plan. Field team communications are described in Annex D oi the State Plan. Monitoring aquipmant is described in Section VIII oi Annex F, and in attachments to Annex F. Composition oi field teams is 5-8 St. Lucia 8/1/81

discussed in Annex G of the State Plan, as well as the procedures which appear as appendices to Annex G. Deployment times are discussed in Standard Operating Procedure Il of the State Plan. County plans also discuss accident assessment. For example, the St. Lucie County Plan (Attachment 2 to Annex P) indicates that the County Health Depar.~nt Director will cooperate with DHRS with respect to accident assesment procedures. Appendix G to Attachment 2 to Annex P indicates that the St. Lucie County Disaster Preparedness Office will be involved in assessment activities as well. Standard Operating Procedure IX, which is attached to Annex G of the State Plan, discusses the measurement of iodine in air, and the use of such measurements in assessment activities. This is also discussed in Appendix I to Annex K. Field Honitorin - Plant Dl ant procedures provide methods for act jvation oi emergency field monitoring teams. These procedures include techniques, measurements or airborne concentrations or radioiodine, direct radiation dose rates, transportation of teams, and communications. Assessment of data is also discussed. 5.2 Protective Response This section describes the protective actions on-site, and the data provided to assist the state and county in determining appropriate off-site, protective actions. 5.2.1 Protective Actions On-site On-site protective actions for a radiological emergency consist of evacuation of the affected area, (localized evacuation or site evacuation), monitoring of all personnel who were in the affected area, decontamination as required, and re-entry to determine the magnitude and extent of the problem when it is determined to be safe to do so. 5-9 St. Lucie 8/1/81

                                                )BCTECTIYE ACT>>3 PX~       . ME. C>>.. 3

. Table 5-3 FI RCESCY ".'S Yscs tpc!\ p(AA issc "-cl A 5 'IVN 5 I LO R!LES

                 ~

E "ERAL M'CY PCS ~ LOCA '

            !(O(ITOR REAOI'(C                                                    (CR)

Ct ? I R/hr LOSS OF C~iZic(E;Pi E (cR) S (CRI 5 (OM) Q()~CRI Y E (CR) E (CRI (Od) + 5 (RCQIRI)(C SEC v RS I Esa %TH) CFFS>>~ "OSES OIZ A CTssl)(. gQCM5(r

       ~1          0 OP!     '?C    4     t<<I ~

BROLE BOOY OR TEYROIO

  *O.S hut <   I   re4 I
                              '     re4                                       5 (CR)                 5 (W)

I

       ?Lre4 hut              ?5   re4 hut                                    E (CR)                 5 (CRI             5 (O'Wl
           <<5 rani              c  '5 re4 I

I

           ?Sre4              ?   Isre4 I

E (CR) L(mdI:.I:V. ev~e ) I I

                                                                    ~ ft~mg.. O    Ct  ABBREV!AT CBS R       Ho   protective actaon reco4eanded 5   - Sheitarinq reconoended E   - Evacuation recoseeended CM      Co<<nM(nd,    90'ector CR    -Coop(ere care!a a(ound pLant at speciriad distance 5-10                                                                St. Lucre 8/1/81

Individuals remaining or arriving onsite during an emergency will be provided respiratory pr'objection or protective clothing as prescribed by the Radiation Team Leader and plant procedures. Radioprotective drugs will only be used when prescribed by a physician, after ez osure. Control Room personnel are in an isolated environment and need protective equipment if they leave the Control room. An emergency kit with all necessary equipment is presen" ins'de the Control Room and 's-to be used for this purpose. In addition, if there is fire or smoke in the Control Room or if the Control Room axr becomes contaminated, Control Room personnel might have to don respiratory protective equipment in order to remain in the Control Room to handle the emergency. Decontamination If needed,Their @or personnel decontamination facilities vliLl be Boveneet are availaole in t~m locations,~according to the nature of the incident.

1) Hot Locker Room - Showers and sinks available for the decontamination of personnel with no (or minor) injuries. Located in the Aura.liary Building@ in bo44 +~ill.

2) Lawnwood Medical Center of Ft. Pierce - Decontamination shower and contaminated in)ury treatment room. For interim use to treat severely in)ured personnel. Located approximately 10 miles Horth~wst of the St. Lucie Plant.

3) REeZ Associates - Capability exists to provide medical attention to the contaminated injury, along with decontamination activities, with highly t ained and experienced nuclear medical personnel.

Located at Nt. Sinai Hospital, iMami Beach. 5-11 St. Lucie 8/1/8.1

4) Decontamination Facility - The Site Assembly Station has some capability for 'decontamination of vehicles and personnel. Plant procedures describe the available resources of the Site Assembly Station for decontamination of personnel; including types of decontamination agents and extra clothing. Decontamination of vehicles will be augmented through the use of water trucks; hosing down these vehicles. Radiation survey equipment and certain protective clothing items are readily available from the Site Assembly station. Additional decontamination facilities can be provided at the Jaycee Park.

Off-site Off-site areas are the responsibility of the respective County Disaster Preparedness Departments, the DHRS, and the Bureau of Disaster Preparedness of the State of Plorida. Control of radioactive contamination and public safety in off-site areas are responsibilities of these governmental agencies, and their criteria for implementing protective actions may 'oe found in the Plorida Radiological Emergency Plan for Nuclear Power Pacilities (see Appendix A), Decontamination of off-site areas will be performed under the direction of the DHRS. Standard Operating Procedure IV, an Attachment to Annex I of the State Plan, discusses evacuation time estates and their use in determining protective actions. The St. Lucie county Plan (Appendix I to Attachment 2 to Annex P) discusses evacuation time estimates. The Hartin County Plan (Appendix I to Attachment 3 to Annex P) a3.so discusses evacuation times. Recommendations for protective actions wil'3. be made. by the Emergency Coordinator in accordance with Table 5-3. St. Lucie 8/1/81

5.2.2 On-site Warni and Res ouse During an emergency, the relocation oi persons on-site may be required in order to prevent or 'minimize exposure to radiaoactive materials. Evacuation is the primary protective action anticipated for on-site personnel. An emergency evacuation is the orderly, rapid, and safe withdr"wal o" all personne'rom =..". area affected by an emergency condition. The plant public address system will be used to announce I evacuation orders. Announcement oi an emergency situation to all on-site individuals can be accomplished in less than 15 minutes. Depending on the nature of the emergency and h extent of the area affected, on-site 'evacuation have been classified as either a Local Evacuation or an Owner Controlled Area Evacuation. Local Evacuation Definition A local evacuation is the evacuation of personnel from a room, area, or building located within the Owner Controlled Area. Czktaria The evacuation of an affected local area will be initiated per routine HP procedures, when any of the following conditions occur:

1) Area Radiation Monitor Alarm.

2) Containment Evacuation Alarm.

3) Unevaluated direct radiac" on dose rate increase in excess oi 100 mrem/hour above normal levels.

4) Unexpected airborne radioactivity concentration in excess of 1 x 10 9 micro Ci/cc.

St. Lucie 8/1/81

5) Removable radioactive su ace'contamination in an unposted area in excess of 1000 dpm/100cm beta - gamma over an area 100 ft

6) Removable radioactive surface contamination in an unposted area in excess or 50. dpm/100cm2 alpha over an area 100 ft2.

I Personnel Actions When the containment evacuation alarm is activated or when the Emergency Coordinator makes notification over the public address system that a local evacuation has been declared, non-essential FPL personnel,. subcontractor personnel, and visitors in the area will go to the designated assembly area and remain there for personnel accountability and monitoring. Plant visitors are escorted at all times by a trained person who is accountable for them. They will also be informed by their escort during any emergency or what they are expected to do during the emergency. When a local evacuation is declared, the Security Guard Force working as the Security Team will assist in personnel accounting, and be prepared to brief the Emergency Coordinator. Precautions Every effort will be made to minimize personnel exposure to radiation. Personnel who have been in the area of an emergency should remain in a group, and should not mix with other personnel in the assembly area I until they have been monitored for possible contamination, unless they are injured. ln/ured personnel will be treated by the First Aid and H Decontamination Team. Provisions exist for off-site treatment of personnel, if required (see Section 2.5).

                                               ~ 'gc 5-14 S t. Luci e 8/1/81

Evacuation ~m lementation The Emergency Coordinator'ill announce the local evacuation over the public address system, identifying the area af" ected, the assembly point, and other instructions as required. All personnel in the evacuated area wili stop work, turn off potentially hazardous equipment-and leave the area. All personnel in the evacuated area should xeoort to the assembly area for ~onitoring and accountability. T¹ "=-er ncy Coordinator will activate Emergency Teams, as required. The Emergency Coordinator, and department supervisors and foremen <<avlug personnel working'n the evacuated area, will verify that all personnel are 'accounted'for. The Emergency Coordinator will initiate a search "or personnel who have not been accounted xor. Owner Controlled Area Evacuation (Inc3.udes Protected Area) Definition An Owner Contx'oiled Area Evacuation is the orderly withdrawal of al3. personnel from the Owner Controlled Area, including the Protected Area, except pex'sonnel required to place the plant in a safe condition and Emergency, Teams which will report to the OSC for assignment. The Emergency Coordinator will sound the plant evacuation alarm and then provide further inxormation by the public address system. Criteria The Owner Controlled Area will be evacuated in the event ox a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Personnel Actions When an evacuation has been dec3.axed, the Security Team will take action according to established procedures to verify that an order3.y, safe withdrawal of all non-essential personne3. takes place. The members of the Security Team have been assigned specific areas or the Owner St. Lucie 8/1/81

Controlled Area, outside the Protected Area, for which they are x'esponsible for personnel notification and accountability. The assembly area for evacuated personnel xrom the Protected Area is the Site Assembly Station located on Highway AlA near the north entrance to the plant property. For non-FP&I. personne3. and FP&L personnel from outside the Protected Area, the assembly area is the Jaycee Public Park on Highway AlA, located approximately 7 1/2 miles north of the plant on the road to Ft. Pierce. All personnel will be requested to remain at the assembly area until instructed otherwise. Figure 5-1 shows the evacuation ro'utes for personnel. Responsibilities The Emergency Coordinator advises the Security Team Leader of an Owner Control3.ed Area evacuation via the evacuation alarm or the public address system. Information needed by the Security Guard Force to pxoperly fulfill their xesponsibilities during the evacuation is provided to the Security Team Leader by the Emergency Coordinator. Significant responsibilities during the evacuation include directing the evacuation movements and personnel accountability. Evacuation Pre aredness All visitors will have adequate transportation avai3.able on-site to evacuate all members of their respective groups. It is the responsibility of the Security Guard Foxce to ensure that this transportation requirement is met. Escorts accompanying visitors wi13. assure that transportat"on is available at all times while the visitors are on-sita. Security Guards ox Escorts wQ.l maintain control of groups or individuals to whi'ch they are assigned to enable all members oz the groups to be located, notified, and evacuated in the event oi a Site Area Emergency or General Emex'gency. 5-16 St. Lucie 8/1/81

When the Emergency Coordinatox determines that an evacuat'on of an'Owner Controlled Area is necessary, he will order an Owner Controlled Area Evacuation using the public address system and tne evacuation alarm. Upon hearing the evacuation order or the evacuation alarm, all non-essential personnel will evacuate to, the appropriate assembly area. Emergency Teams vill report to the Administration Building for assignment. The Emergency Coordinator o>> his designee vill notify the Security Team Leader that an Owner Controlled Area evacuation ls ordered and will advise him of all pertinent inxoxmation axfecting the evacuation, including priorities and/or speciaL conditions which exist to enable the ev'acuation to be conducted in a saxe manner. The Security. Team Leader will immediately initiate the evacuation procedures including:

1) Notification of a11 security patrols and tour guides ox the evacuation,

2) Notification of all non-Company groups working in or using portions of the p Owners Controlled Area,

3) Xnitiate*t sweeps of recreation areas and assist in persona'el accountability, and

4) Establish the assembly areas and account for all persons.

Personnel Accountabilit , Trans rtation, and Exit Routes The maximum population within the Owner Controlled Area .'s approximately 0 ge 4g . This consists ox 850 workers who may be present at shift change during an outage at the .' orle uniV- ' ~~4~~~00= St. Lucie 5-17 8/1/81

0 Upon declarat'on of an emergency evacuation, the Security Guard Force will assist in personnel accountability in accordance with Emergency Procedures. R When an evacuation is declared, all non-essential personnel in the affected area will stop working, leave the affected area and assemble by departments in the designated assembly area. Figure 5-1 shows the evacuation route and assembly areas (for the site). The Emergency Coordinator will initiate a search for any personnel not accounted for. The security force on duty at any time is adequate to handle the evacuation of personnel in the Owner Controlled Area. The estimated reaction time (time measured from the time of the accident until the initiation of evacuation - including "hosted" groups) should not mc " 30 '" t s. At "'t ox und " adv rse weather conditions, reaction time should be shortened since fewer persons are on site. Actual evacuation drills have shown that personnel evacuation can be accomplished within 30 minutes following declaration oi an evacuation. Procedures used by the Security Guard Force define which evacuation route{s) will be used by the various groups in the Owner Controlled Area. 5.2.3 Ofx-Site Area Protective Heasures An Off-Site Area Evacuation is the orderly withdrawal of all persons from the portion of the public areas surxounding the plane which have been axfected by the emergency. The cx'iteria for the initiation of the evacuation are determined by the Department oi Health and Rehabilitative Services as specified in the Florida Radiological Emergency Plan for Nuclear Facilities. Annex P of the State Plan describes evacuation measures and provides maps indicating designated evacuation routes. 5-18 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 The St. Lucie and Hartin County Disaster Preparedness Coordinators and the State Bureau of Disaster Pr paredness will be responsible for the d'rection and implementation oi the necessary protective actions as specified in ehe Florida Radiological Fmergency Plan for Nuclear Power Facilities, including notification and coordination wich other seate and local assistance agencies. It will be the respoasibility of the St. Lucia and Hartin County Disaster Preparedness agencies to notify the general public ii an evacuation is warranted. The Emergency Coordinator will recommend offsite evacuation based upon the criteria discussed in Table 5-3. The State plan describes the bases for ehe choice oi recommended aceions from the plume exposure pathway EPZ during emergency conditions. The emergency classi ication system used by che State includes certain protective actions which are automatically triggered upon the occurrence of designated emergency classifications.- These are discssed in Section V.B. oi Annex G to the State Plan. Other protective action decisioas are made on the basis of iaformaeioa which becomes available as a result of accident assessment. Standard Operating Procedure I (Ateachmene to Annex G) also discusses ehe process by which seaee officials collect information and make recommendations. Standard Operating. Procedure II (also attached to Annex G) also discusses assessment actions which would form a basis for recommendatioas. The State aad County plans point out d that EPA Protective Aceion Guies will be an important basis for proeeceive action recommendations. 5.2.4 Public Marais and Information Annex P, to the State Plan, provides information on warning oi the public. Ateachmencs 2 and 3 eo Aanex P discuss warning procedures in Sc. Lucie and Martin Counties. Prompt noe'ficacion systems are discussed therein. FPL has committed to purchase and inscall an alert (siren) system. 5-19 St. Lucie 8/1/81

FIGURE 5-1 SITE EVACUATION ROUTES

                                                'J. C. PARK g',g,ucl                             OFF-SITE g4V&yy                                                     W ptmP4                             ASSEMBLY AREA Jul4 W I yk        Alit.

( N C si.~c 8',

                                          ~44
                                              ~
                  , QOj AT LAMTIC OCEAN SITE BuuaiDARY STATION OFF-SITE ASSEMBLY AREA pv
                                                            '4 vvcctlxM 6ey QclcrH Avv          ST. LUCIE gwy                PLANT 7                                                        h erral
                                                                      .s~o   Q wi V(4 Po47 vip'P L u'c./ E                                    hl +orle/                    Q 7o7 5-20                           3 9fsEA
                                                                             ~    Se. L..~,

8/1/81

Notification to the populat*on and arrangements with public communications media are described in the State Plan. Annex E to the State Plan provides the guidance for keeping the public informed about the potential hazards, emergency response, and protective measures that can be taken to minimize or avoid public health effects. Annex E also provides procedures for the timely and accurate collection, coordination, and dissemination to the public of such information. Xn an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or R. ral Emergency, a press section in the State Emergency Operations Center will be the state's primary source for release oi public information. An official spokesperson -'or the State, the Emergency Information Of=icer (EIO), will estab&.sh press sections in the State EOC and the EOF. Through these press sections, the EIO will establish contact with wire services, newspapers, radio, 'and television. Information releases will be coordinated with Federal and local agencies. Annex E of the State Plan also provides for releases to be used for media. These are consistent with FPL's classification scheme. These are examples of specific prior arrangements that have been made to,use public communiation media for issuing emergency instructions to the public. Appendix E to Attacment 2 of Annex P discusses annual orientation of the media. Append z C of Attachment 3 to Annex P indicates TV and radio stations which would be used. 5.2.5 ~Po ulation Ex osure Estimates Population exposure estimates are discussed in the State plan. Standard Operating Procedure XI (attachment to Annex G) discusses the projected dose calculation process. Standard Operating Procedure III (attachment to Annex I) discusses assessment and monitoring in the ingestion pathway EPZ As indicated in Annex K of the State Plan (Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post Accident Operations), Standard Operating Procedure II is used to determine dose rates. SOP VII alsod.)ScuSSP5 ds~ mi'~a.ki~. c"44'c+a,e 5-21 St. Lucie 8/1/81

IIV1 5.2.6 S ecial Heeds of che Population Appendix'I'of Attachment 2 to Annex P contains a discussion of evacuation of special needs populations. 5.2.7 ~PD ulae1on Dkstrkbue'<on The State Plan contains maps showing population distribution, and it describes the means for notifying transient and res'dent populacion. Population maps and tables are included in the St. Lucie County olans (Attachment 2 to Annex P of the State, Plan). Population maps also are included in Attachment 9 co Annex P. 5.3 Radiological >mposure Control 5.3.1 On-Site Radiation Protection Pro ram An ob) ective of emergency xesponse is to minimize radiation exposure to individuals both on-site and off-site. Situations may arise,,however, when observance of this goal is inconsistent with personnel or plant, safety. Xn anticipation of such needs, guidelines have been established for emergency conditions. The guidelines on which .the emergency radiation protection program is based are seated below,.

1) Efforts should be made to limit radiation exposures to the quarterly exposure limits established for routine operations.

Shorter stay times and 'portable shielding should be used, when possible, to minimize personnel exposures. I

2) %cere exposures to personnel are to exceed those permitted by 10CFR20, the following guidelines will be mec:

5-22 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 f

a) This exposure must be explicitly authorized in advance by

  . the Emergency Coordinator or one of his recognized superiors.

b)'ny volunteer authorized (by the EC) to receive greater than regulatory exposure limits should be a healthy male older than 45 years. No women of childbearing age will be selected to per orm these emergency ac 'ons. c) Whole body exposure limits have been established as follows: Under emergency conditions not requiring action to prevent serious injury or a catastrophic incident, personnel exposure should not exceed 5 Rem. A planned emergency whole body dose to prevent destruction oz equipment which could result in serious injury or to assess a potentially critical situation should not exceed 12 Rem. Mhen immediate action is necesary to prevent serious injury, dose to the whole body should not exceed 25 Rem. Events in this category include removal or incapacitated personnel from high radiation areas, providing emergency medical treatment including first aid and decontamination of individuals. For lifesaving actions, an individuals may receive a whole body dose of 75 Rem. Because oi the health risks associated with the dose limit, liiesaving missions should be undertaken by volunters who have an understanding oi the health risks and preierentially by those whose normal duties have trained them for such missions. 5-23 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 d) Frequent checking of radiacioa survey instruments and self reading dosimeters is required during emergency operaeions. e) Whenever ie is likely that an area has the pocential for airborne radioactivity greater than limics specified ia plane Health Physics procedures, appropriate respiratory . protection will be prescribed. 5.3,2 Dose Records All emergency response personnel under the auehority of FPL who will potentially be exposed to radiaeion in the course ox their ducies will be monitored by the plant radiation exposure monitoring program. Personnel in this category will be issued the appropriate personnel dosimetry devices. FPL Power Resources - Nuclear Services procedures provide for coaduceing the personnel dosimetry progxam. The Company has the capability of determining personnel radiatioa exposures on a 24 hour per day basis. Dose records for all individuals exposed to ionizing radiaeion ae FPL' facilities are maintained. 5.3.3 Contamination Control and Decoacaminatioa Procedures A personnel decontamination washroom and shower room'ith chemical decontamfnation agents is provided on the ground floor ox the Aux"liary Building., Except in cas~s or serious in)ury, accepted decoacaminacxoa practices w'ill be employed on-site. Life endangering injuries such as extensive burns, serious wounds, or fractures shall receive prompt attention in preference eo decontamination. Personnel with injuries involviag radiaeion or radioactive contamination will be handled by RZEF ae the designaced facilities ae Hount Sinai Hospital, or ae the Lawnwood Hedical Ceaeer. Plant Health Physics procdures provides the criteria 5-24 S t. Lucie 8/1/81

for decontamination of unin)urad personnel, Any item of equipment, once having been taken inside a controlled area, requires a survey for possible contamination prior to its removal from the controlled area. Equipment can only be released from a controlled area if the levels of contamination are within the limits of the clean area as prescribed by procedu a. Equipment regularly required within a contxolled area will be maintained within the controlled area. Due to the rigid radiological controls, it is not considered likely that contaminated equipment will inadvertently be taken off-site. Should contaminated aquimant be discovered, it will be stored and either decontaminated or disposed of in accordance with plant procedures. Areas within the plant or items suspected of contamination will be checked before normal use is pexmitted. Laboratory analysis oi swipes will be undertaken and an aria or item will be declared suitable for noxmal use ix contamination levels are less tnan 1,000 dpm/100cm

     .Food    or emergency workers will be brought in fxom off-site,          if necessary. The plant drinking water is obtained xrom the Ft. Pierce water supply. Zt is unlikely that ingest"on of contam'nated xood or water will occur.

Frequent surveys of habitable areas utilized for emergency response 4 (i.e. Control Room and TSC) will be performed to assure these areas remain uncontaminated. 5.3.4 Radioactive Wastes Radioactive wa'stas (resins, trash, etc.) accumulated during an emergency,, will be handled by normal plant procedures. Any special cix'cumstances

   . will be handled on a case-by-case basis.

t~ 5.4 Recovery and Re>>entry Once the hazard potential has passed, steps must be taken to recover 5-25 St. Lucia 8/1/81

from the incident. All actions should be preplanned in order to l'mit exposures. Access to the area will be controlled and personnel exposures will be documented. The Recovery Manager has the responsibility for determining and declaring "when an emergency situation is stable and has entered the recovery phase. He will evaluate the status or the emergency by observing monitoring instrumentation and reviewing all current and pertinent data available from emergency response and/or mon'oring teams. The recovery phase will begin only when the fo1lowing emergency situation-is under control and the following guidelines are met: Radiation Levels in all in-plant areas are stable or decreasing with time.

2) Releases of radioactive materials to the environment from the plant are under control or have ceased.

3) Any fire, flooding, or similar emergency conditions are controlled or have ceased.

4) The reactor is in a stable condition.

At the time of declaring that an emergency has entered the recovery phase, the Recovery Reneger will be responsible for informing all applicable agencies (e.g., federal, state, and local agenc's) that the emergency has shifted to a recovery phase. Recovery actions that plan for or may result in radioactive release will be evaluated by the Recovery Manager and his staff as far in advance of the event as is possible. Such events and data pertaining to the release will be r-ported to the appropriate off-site emergency response organisation and agencies. I Re-entry into an af"ected area may be required before entering the recovery phase. Re-entry into an evacuated area will be made by the Emergency Teams when required for one or more of the following reasons: 5-26 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 To ascertain that all pex'sonnel who 'were in the affected area have been evacuated, or to search for unaccounted personnel.

2) To assist in evacuating in]ured or incapacitated personnel "rom the affected area.

3) To perform operations which may mitigate the effect of the emergency ox'azardous condition.

4) To determine the nature and extent of the emergency and/or radiological conditions.

5) To establish definite personnel exclusion area boundaries.

Re-entry wi11 take place only under the authority of the Emergency Cooxdinator or the Recovery Manager. The leaders of the Radiation Team and/or the Pire Team are responsible for evaluating the existing emergency conditions and informing the Emergency Coordinator or the Recovery imager of the advisability of re-entry. For emergencies inside the RCA the Radiation Team Leader wilx supervise the init'al entry of the Emergency Teams and all subsequent entries until radiation areas have been properxy marked. Nore detailed guidance for re-entry teams is contained in plant procedures. 5-27 St. Lucia 8/1/81

II 6 e PUBLXC INFORifATXOH 6.1 Pre arator Public Information Pro ram 6.1.1 ~Pur ose s The purpose'of the preparatory public information program is. to inform the public of how they will be notified and what their act" ons should be in a radiological emergency. 6.1e2 ~Program Execution The State, of.Plorida Bureau of Disaster Preparedness and the St. Lucie County and Hartin County Disaster Preparedness Agencies have the responsibility for conducting the public information program. "."lorida Power 6 Light Company will provide support for the program by supplying information requested by those agencies. Annex E of the State Plan discusses the preparatory public information program. Section IXI.A. of Annex A describes periodic dissemination. Section IV indicates that the educational program will be conducted on an annual basis. Section IV also indicates that permanent and transient population will be provided with an opportunity to become aware of the information. Section XV.B i'ndicates that the program wilL contain information on radiation, respiratory protection, sheltering, evacuation procedures, warning and notification systems, and who to contact for additional information. 6.2 Plorlda Power 6 L~ibt C~oa an~hner~enc Public Znioraaccon Prograa Thzs section delineates the organizatxon, public information network, and facilities that would be made available as required in an emergency. i e'-1 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 6.2. 1 Or~aniza cion The members of the emergency public information organization (see Figux'e 6-1) aad their respective responsibilities are as iollows: Emae~enc Lixormeton Fang er (iH) The EDf will be a designated corporate oificer or senior manager experienced in media relations, having knowledge ox nuclear plant operations. He will be responsible for coordinaeing dissemination oi informatioa to the public via ehe news media. Insofar as praceical, he will work with the LLLC, staee, and local news media represeneatives to effect joint releases and public appearances. He will work with other company ofxicials to develop formal statements and responses. All press releases, other than routine '"updating" of data coming from the Emergency Operations Facility, should originate with or be cleared by the EIM. He will assure that exchange of information among designated spokespersons is accomplished ia a timely manner, when possible. This timely exchaage oi information will aid in responding to xumors that mighe arise out of an'emergency. Nuclear, Information Staf f A stafi of public y~ informaezoa and technical persoanel will be assigned as needed to the Emergency News Center. Their responsibilities will be to:

1) Provide techaical briefings eo the press.

2) Inform company employees through a newsletter, bulletin k board staeemenes, or other in-place networks.

3) Inform the industry, so other companies boch in the United States and overseas can deal with questions as they arise from their local media.

St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 1

FIGURE 6-1 PUBLIC INFORMATION INTERFACES E)MERGEiNCY CONTROL OFFICER EMERGENCY INFORMATION

                           .MANAGER OFFICIAL            POKESiMAN)
                                ~

STAFF STATE-COUNTY iMRC NE'AS PUBLIC PUBLIC 'MEDIA RELAT I ONS RELATrONS St. Lucie 8/1/81

4) . Prepare background material for features, historical context, r

profiles, etc.

5) . Handle the photogxaphic needs of the company.

6) Record and transcribe a13. press conferences and other ox'iicial proceedings for the beneiit of company management, official agencies and che news media.

7) Accredit and escort members oi tne pxess.

8) Provide its own stenographic and typing services for news releases, peto'aptions, reports, txanscripts, ecc.

9) Provide reference services for maintaining files of releases and photos, obtaining newspapers, monitoring wire services and'news bxoadcasts, logging all clippings.

The staff of che Florida Power 6 Light Company Corporace Communications Department may be augmented by personnel fxom other uti3.ities, consultants, or universities. 6.2.2 Emergenc News Center (ENC) The St. Lucie Plant near-site Emergency News Center (ENC) will be located with the Interim EOF. The Emergency Information nager will report to che G.O. Mi Emergency Center or interim EOF, a designated ENC supervisor and his staff will man the ENC when I the EEM deems it appropria'te. If a laxger zacility becomes necessary or ii radiological conditions preclude the use of che near-site location, che Jensen Beach Holiday Inn will be used. This faci3.ity is on Hutchinson Island south or che Jensen Beach Causeway approximately 7 miles SSE of the Plant on A1A. St. Lucie 8/1/81

6 ~ 2 ~ 3 Hews Media Provisions Florida Power 6 Light Company will conduct an annual program to acquaint the news media with the emergency plans, information concerning nuclear power and points of contact for release of public informataon in an emergency. In the event of an" emergency, representatives of the news media will be provided space in the Emergency Hews Center for work and interview purposes. St. Lucie, 8/1/81

0 7 ~ Nh.lÃZAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 7.1 Exercises and Drills 7.1.1 Definitions An exercise is an event that tests the integrated capability ol a major portion of the basic elements 'existing within the FPL emergency response organization. An exercise includes mobilization of state and local governmental personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to an accident scenario. A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is often a component of an exercise. A drill should be evaluated by the supervisory personnel conducting the drill. 7.1.2 Purpose Periodic exercises and drills will be conducted in order to test the state of emergency preparedness of participating personnel, organizations, and agencies. Each exercise or drill will be conducted to:

1) Ensure that participants are familiar with their respective duties and responsibilities.

2) Verify the adequacy of the Emergency Plan and emergency procedures.

3) Test the communication network and systems.

4) Check the availability of emergency supplies and equipment.

5) Verify the operability of emergency equipment.

St. Lucia 8/1/81

The results of the exercises will form the basis for prescribing action to eliminate identified deficiencies. 7.1.3 ~Plannin The Florida Power & Light Company Power Resources Emergency Planning Supervisor will be responsible for the planning, scheduling, and coorainating of major emergency dr&is or exercises involving offsite agencies. The Health Physics Supervisor will have the same responsibil'ty for all onsite emergency drills. A. sample format for drill and exercise scenarios appears as Table 7-1. All exercises and drills involving the plant are subject to the approval of the Plant Manager. ning When an exercise is to be conducted, the Emergency Plan Supervisor will:

1) Schedule a date for the exercise in coordination with the Health Physics Supervisor and the primary State and county emergency response agencies.

2) Request that the Health Physics Supervisor assign personnel to assist the Emergency Plan Supervisor in preparing a scenario.

3) Coordinate all FPL efforts with other participating personnel, organizations, and agencies.-

4) Obtain the approval of the Plant Manager.

5) Offer federal, state, and local officials the opportunity to observe the exercise.

6) Discuss and evaluate the exercise with observers and principal participants.

St. Lucie 8/1/81

I TABLE 7-1 EXcQPLE SCE~iO PORMAT 1.0 Basic objective(s) of drill or exercise. 2.0 Logistics 2.1 Date(s) 2.2 Time period

2. 3 Locatioa( s) 2.4 Participating organizations 3.0 The simulated events 4.0 Time schedule of real and simulaced events 5.0 narrative summary describing the conduct of the exerises or drills 5.1 Simulaced casualties 5.2 Offsite firezighcing assistance 5.3 Rescue of persoaael 5,4 Radiological monitoring deployment 5.5 Public information activities (Noce: 5.1 through 5.5 are examples of subjects that mignt be discussed in Section 5.0 of the scenario) 6.0 Duties of observers 6.1 Specific observer assigamenc by area 6.2 immaterial provided to observers (i.e. check lists) 6.3 Pre-drill meeting A. Date B Time C Location 7.0 Cri.tique/Evaluation 7.1 Dace

   /.2    Time 7.3    Location 7.4    Suggested  Participants 7-3                          St. Lucie 8/1/81

0

7) Ensure that for all identified deficiencies, corrective measures are recommended.

8) Prepare and retain documentation for recordkeeping.

When an exercise or a ma]or drill is to be conducted, the Health Physics Supervisor will assure that the follow'~ is accomplished: s

1) basign personnel to prepare a scenario.

ging

2) Coordinate through the Emergency Plan Supervisor all activities which involve off-site personnel, organizations, or agencies 3). Schedule a date for this activity in coordination with 'the n'ng Emergency Pla~Supervisor and assign observers

4) Obtain the approval of the Plant Manager.

5) Review evaluations of the exercise or drill with the observers and the. Pacility Review Group.

6) Ensure that deficiencies which are identified are addressed with corrective measures.

n grlg

     ,7)     pre'pare and schmdc doccmencacdon      co che Emergency   plangcpervdsor for recordkeeping.

These exercises and drills will simulate emergency conditions and may be scheduled such that t ~ or more drills are conducted simultaneously. Ql Ar3 The Emergency PlaySupervisor will normally notify the off-site

      'emergency    response organizations and agencies      at least   30 days   in advance of the scheduled date oi an exerc'e.

7~4 St. Lucie 8/1/81

0 7.1'.4 Conduct of Exercise, Drills and Tests 7 ~ 1.4.1 Exercises (Integrated Drills) A major radiological emergency response exercise will be conducted at least once every twelve (12) months (plus or minus three months) to demonstrate 'the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. This exercise will be conducted as a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Any exercise that will provide for coordination with and participation of off-site emergency response personnel, organizations, and agencies including those of federal, state, and local governments should escalate to a General Emergency. The emergency scenario will be varied from year to year such that all major elements of the Plan are tested within a 5-year period. Provisions will be made to start at least one exercise between 6:00 PN and midnight, and at least one exercise between midnight and 6:00 AH every six years. Me. ec~rio shiv>4 be c4a.ngpA +m% year W year. This emergency resoonse exercise will be critiqued by Elorida Power & Light Company observers/evaluators and other observers, as appropriate, from federal, state, and local agencies. 7.1.4.2 Radiolo ical Fonitorin Drill A radiological monitoring drill will be conducted at least once every twelve (12) months (plus or minus three months). These drills will include collection and analysis o'f sample media (e.g., water, air). The Health Physics Department will conduct health physics drills semi-annually and one of the semi-annual drills may be incorporated into the radiological monitoring drill. As indicated in Section III of Annex L of the State Plan, off-site radiological monitoring dril's will be conducted annually, and these drills will involve the collection of all sample media (e.g., water, grass, soil and air). 7-5 St. Lucie 8/1/81

7.1.4.3 Medical Emergency Drill A medical emergency drill involving a simulated contaminated individual, with provisions for activation of the plant First Aid and Personnel Decontamination Team and participation by local support services (i.e. ambulance and off-site medical treatment facility), will be conducted at least once every twelve (12) months (plus or minus three months) ~ 7.1,4.4 , Fire Emergenc Drill Fire drills are conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications to test the ooerational readiness (personnel, equipment and procedures) to control and extinguish a fire at site. The drills also serve to evaluate and document the response of on-site personnel and participating of-site agencies to varying fire situations. The communication links and notification procedures are tested at least semi-annually during fire emergency drills. A, postdrill critique is held after each fire drill is cnmpleterl to identify possible areas for improvement in equipment and/or V procedures.

7. 1.4.5 Communications Tests Communications with state and local governments within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Plan Zone (EPZ) will be tasted monthly.

Communications with the state and local emergency response o'rganizations within the ingestion pathway EPZ and federal response organizations will be tested at least quarterly. On an annual basis communications to the state EOC and St. Lucie EOC will be tasted. This last test may be performed as part of the annual exercise. As indicated in Annex L of the State Plan, the State conducts communications drills at least annually. Aq 7-6 St. Lucie 8/1/81

The Field Operations Center is one of the facilities which is involved in all exercises. Annex F indicates the equipment tested in these exercises. Annex F indicates the equipment tested in these exercises. As indicated in Section VI of Annex L, "communicat" ons between the nuclear facility, state and local emergency operation centers and field assessment teams will be tested (annually)..." 7.1.5 Evaluation During drills and exercises, observers will make on-the-spot corrections to actions taken by drill part'cipants that might affect the planned outcome (objective) oi the drill. P.nor errors'n procedures or techniques will be noted and discussed during the post-drill evaluation. Following an exercise, the Emergency Plan Supervisor, plant management, FPL observers, and principal particioants in the exercise will meet to discuss and evaluate the exercise. The evaluation should be based on the ability of participants. to follow emergency procedures, the adequacy oi emergency procedures, and the adequacy of emergency equipment and supplies. Plant management will be responsible for any necessary changes in the Plant Emergency Procedures and for recommending changes in the Emergency Plan to the Emergency-Plan Supervisor. Recommended changes in the Emergency Plan will be submitted to the Emergency Plan Supervisor. 7.2.1 ~Ob ectives The primary ob)ectives or emergency response training are as follows: 7-7 St. Lucie 8/1/81

Vg

1) Familiarize appropriate 'nd'v'dua's .Ath th Eme gency Plan and rela'ted implementing procedures.

2) Instruct'ndividuals in their specific duties to ensure exfective

    'and   expeditious action during an emergeacy.

3) Periodical3.y present significant changes in the scope or content of the Emergency Plan.

4) Provide'refresher training to easure that personnel are familiar with their duties and responsibilities.

5) Provide the various emergency organization groups with the required training that vill ensure an integrated and pxompt response to an emergency situation.

7.2.2 Training of On-Site Emergenc Or anization Personnel Training programs have been established for personnel working at the plant site. The programs include initial indoctrination and subsequent retrainxng. The training program fox'embers of the on-site emergency orgaaization will inc3.ude pxactical drills in which each individual demonstrates an ability to pex'form assigned emergency functioas. PJa 0 The St. Lucie<Training Supervisor is responsible for the conduct aad documentation or initial tx'aining and periodic retraiaing programs xor on-sita FPL emergency organization personnel, except Emergency Teams. Emergency Team Leaders are responsible for training team members and reporting the conduct or such training to the Training Supervisor. I Each new employee permanently assigned to work at the St. Lucie Plant shall be given initial orientation training, in the Emergency P3.an and Procedures. For employees not assigned specific responsibility or authox'ity under the Emergency Plan or Procedures, such training shall, 7-8 St Lucid 8/1/83.

I' at a minimum, provide information describing the action to be taken by an individual discovering an emergency condition, the location of assembly areas, the identification of emergency alarms, and the action to be taken on hearing those alarms. Initial training and annual retraining programs will be provided in the following categories. 7.2.2.1 Emer enc Coordinator a) interpretation or plant and field data and how it relates to emergencies and their classification (l.e. emergency action level determination per Chapter 3). b) Prompt and erfective notification methods, including the types oi communication systems. c) Method of activating the Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Organization. The methods used for estimating radiation doses~cL I eu~~cn~'I~> p&si Pc p~o+ccglva ~cgsvAS,, 7 '.2.2 Other Operational Assistance a) Emergency Plan familiarization. b) Emergency imp3.ementing procedures familiarization. c) Communications.and recordkeeping methods. d) Accident assessment and corrective action. e) Specific emergency team training. 7-9 St. Lucie 8/1/81

7.2.2.3 Technical Su ort Center On-Sire Staff a) Emergency Plan familiarization. b) Emergency implementing procedures familiarization. c) Communications and recordkeeping methods. I d) Training for the various technical engineers that make up the TSC staff with emphasis on accident assessment and corrective action. 7.2.3.4 Shift Technical Advisor a) Emergency Plan familiarization. b) Emergency implementing procedures familiarization. c) Technical Specifications (in-depth understanding) ~ d) Specialized training in power plant and reactor specific core operating characteristics (normal and abnormal). e) .Familiarization with other related Plant programs, plans, and procedures with emphasis on accident assessment techniques.

1) Emer enc Team Leaders The Emergency Teams are identified and described in Chapter 2. The Emergency Team Leaders and their alternates conduct applicable training sessions annually. The training sessions are focused on the duties and responsibiities of the specific team.

Communications and coordination with other Emergency Teams are emphasized. 7-10 St Lucia

                                                                              ~

8/1/81

I

2) PPL Radiological '.foni tori Teams a) Use of air sampling equipment.

b) Performance of radiation/contamination surveys. c) Deteanination of air activity levels. d) Determination of radiation levels. e) Emergency Plan familiarization. f) Recordkeeping methods. g) In-depth knowledge of personnel and field monitoring/analyzing techniques. h) Responsibilities of the Emergency Radiation Team. a) Emergency Plan familiarization. b) Personnel accountability procedures. c) Site ingress and egress control procedures. d) Deployment of Security Personnel,

4) First Aid/Decontamination Team a) Emergency Plan familiarization.

b) Emergency implementing procedures familiarization. 7-11 St. Lucie 8/1/81

c) Description, storage location, and,application of suppliers and equipment. d) Sequential steps for the assessment of contamination levels and treatment of personnel in]ury. e) 'Allowable radiation exposures and advisable radiological environments. f) Personnel decontamination procedures. g) Procedures for the evacuation of contaminated persons to oxf-site medical facilities. h) 4 +earn members will satisfactorily complete the American National Red Cross %ziti-Hedia First Aid Course and wD1 requalify every three years. 7.2.3 Trainin of FPL Off-Site Emex enc Organization Personnel II

                              ~i'm/

The FPL Emergency Plan Supervisor is responsible for the conduct and documentation oi initial training and annual retraining for FPL Off-site Emergency Organization personnel. 7.2.3.L Recove Mingler, Emer enc Control Officer a) Prompt and effective notification methods, including the types of communication systems. b) Method of activating the Florida Power 6 Light Company Emergency Organization. c) The methods used for estimating radiation doses. d) Emergency Plan familiarization. e) Emergency Plan implementing procedures familiarization. 7-12 St. Lucie 8/1/81

f) Familiarization with the Interim Emergency Operations Facility, the Interim and Technical Support Canter. 7.2.3.2 Emer enc Information Ywna er, Governnental Azfairs Hang er, Emer enc Securit Manager, Emer enc Technical

                   ~Haaa  ar a)    Emergency Plan       fand.li.arization b)    Emergency Plan implementing procedures            familiarization

7. 2.4 Traini of Non-FFL Off-site Emer enc Response Personnel Offsite agencies who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency will be offered briefings annually.

These briefings will discuss basics concepts in radiation protection, plant operations and security, and emegency classizication and response. The following groups will be offered these sessions: a) Fire and rescue b) Police c) Local disaster preparedness officials d) medical support 7.2.4.1 Police and Fire Fi htir Su port As indicated in Section V oz Annex N to the State Flan, police and fire fighting personnel will recieve tzaining and retaining. Annex M descr-'bes the details of training.

                'I 7.2.4.2       Local Disaster Preparedness        Of icials As  described in Annex 8 of the State Plan, disaster preparedness personnel will receive training and retraining.

7-13 St. Lucie 8/1/81

, 7.3 Plannin Effort Development 7.3.1 Review Procedure The Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures wild. be under continuing review by the Florida Power 6 Light Company Emergency ning Plant Supervisor. Notification U.sts and rosters will be updated quarterly. .The Fmergency Plan and letters of support will be reviewed annually. Required changes to the Plan or updated Letters wil3. be II incorporated as required. Substantia3. changes affecting emergency response are identified; these changes will be made as needed. U during this annual review of the Plan and Letters, no changes are needed, this, will'be documented. Procedures are subject to continuing review and are changed as necessary. The Facility Review Group will conduct periodic reviews of Emergency Plan Imp3.ementing Procedures, in accordance with Technical Specifications and update the procedures as necessary to incorporate the results or exercises and drills and to account tor other site-related changes. Recommended changes to the Emergency Plan will be submitted, ning in writing,. to the Emergency Play Supervisor. 'hanges in the Emergency Plan that are approved by the Vice President- Power Resources will be

   ~ incorporated into the Emergency Plan under the direction of the Emergency     Play Supervisor.
                     ,~

Document tulders (e.g., FPL, state, local, and ederal agencies, etc.) will receive revisions to the Emergency ning Plan and Emergency Procedures as they are issued. The Emergency Play Supervisor is responsible for coordinating the periodic reviews of the Fmergency Plan. In addition, qinQ the Emergency Plan Supervisor, will ensure that elements of the I' emergency organisation (e.g., FPL, state, federal, loca3., etc.) are informed of amendments and revisions to the Fmergency Plan and Emergency Procedures. During the annual review of the Emergency Plan, letters of support and agreements will be reviewed and determined if they 'need to be updated. 7-14 St. Lucie 8/1/81

S I

7.3.2 Review of Cha es b On-Sita Personnel Emergency Team Leaders s will inform their team members of relevant f changes in the Emergency Plan and Fmergency Procedures. a 7.3.3 Review of Cha es b 'Off"Site Personnel

          \

Periodic correspondence and/or meetings will be held to inform off-site FPL emergency support personnel of changes in the Emergency Plans and Emergency Procedures. Audits

                         '.3.4 An  independent audit of emergency preparedness will be performed by the FPL Quality Assurance Department at least annually.               Audits will verify compliance with federal regulations and Technical Specifications provisions.

ning Plant management, the Emergency Plan Supervisor, and the iianager, Power Resources-Nuclear will evaluate 'the audit findings and recommend corrective actions to the Vice President-Power Resources. 7.3.5 Document Distribution The Quality Control Supervisor is responsible for distribution oi the Emergency plan Co on-sire personnei. The gmergency piag Supervisor is responsible for Emergency Plan distributions to orf-site agencies and organizations. Appendix A, (Florida Radiological Emergency Plan For Nuclear Facilit" es) wi3.l on3.y be distributed to the interim TSC, interim EOF, P3.ant Document Control Center, and Emergency Plan Supervisor. Revisions to the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will be distributed in accordance with plant procedures. 7"15 St. Lucie 8/1/81

The Fmergency Plan Tmplementing Procedures provide suf"icient information to assure a thorough understanding oi the various emergency

   'response duties and responsibilities.         Appendi:c J contains a listing of the pertinent Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

7.3.6 Emer enc'lanner Traini Host training of FPL emergency planners is through on-the-5ob training. Other training is received through seminars, meetings, and discussions with other industry groups. 7.4 Emer enc E ui ment Haintenance All designated emergency equipment that is maintained in the Control Room, interim TSC, interim EOF, and site assembly station will be inventoried, operationally checked, and inspected at least once each calendar quarter and following each use. 4 g g lp 7-16 St. Lucie 8/1/81

P, I APPENDIX A FLORIDA'S RADIOLOGICAL ENERGENCY PLAV FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES St. Lucre 8/1/81

APPENDS A FLORIDA.' RADIOLOGICAL EiiERGENCY PLAN FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES The Florida Radiological'Emergency Plan for Nuclear Power Facilities is maintained on file in the following locations: Plo~f

1. t St. Lucie See: Document Contxol Center

2. Interim Technical Support Center

3. Interim Emergency Operations Facility g jng

4. Emergency Plan Supervisor (at General Office)

A-1 St. Lucie 8/1/81

APPENDIX B RESERVED St. Lucre 8/1/81

0 APPEÃ)IX C FLORXDA HXGHl<AY PATROL St. Lucie 8/1/81

                       ~ ~   ~

I >HC SI'<>5 SI.J../ Vl.J-

      ~   >~IVII' PElIBItmEIIt Gf                                                         COL. J. EI.ORICE 8EACH, OINCCzon OIVISIOH Or rLONIO>> HIOHH*v n>>TNOL
    <<>>            >>                                                                                   JOHN O. CALVIN, OINCC TON OIVI5IGN Or Ho Ion vtHICI 5$

COO Ho 5 I~ SAFETY'IH'rl!II'NY AID MOTOR YEHll:LES CLAT H. KEITH, oIntc Ton olvI5ION or onIvtn I.IctN5ts HCIL KIRKMAH BUILDING TALLAIIASSEE 32301 CHESTER f. 8LAKESIORE 5 Ceo zl'It

  '              olntc  Ton HILLIA55 R, KAIJfRAN. OIntczon OIVISIOH or AOHINISTNA'TIVCSCNVICCS June 9, 1981 Mr. S. A. Kingsberry Florida Power and Light                  Company'.

0. Box 529100 Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Mr. Kingsberry:

In response to oux telephone convexsation this date, this is to advise that Florida Highway Patrol General Order 25 pextaining Procedures Applicable to Acci-dents Involving Radioactive Materials And/Or Nuclear Devices, dated September 1, 1977 is in effect at this time and has not been revi'sed.< This order would apply in cases of accident or emergency at Florida Power and Light's nuclear power plants at Turkey Point and St. Lucie. Sincerely, J. E. Beach, Colonel Director Florida Highway Patxol JEB:bb 0

APPENDIX D SUPPORT LETTER .BETWEEN FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AND THE ST. LUCIE COUNTY - FT. PIERCE FIRE DISTRICT S t. Lucia 8/1/81

( June 9, 1981 Florida Power Ec Light Company P. 0. Eox 529100 Miami, Flor'da 33152 ATTN: S. A. K'~sbury

Dear Kh. D.ngsbury:

The St. Lucie County-Fort Pierce Fire Department provides fire protection, emergency r.scue and ambulance service to all areas of St. Lucie County, including the Florida Power and. Ligh Plant on South Hutchinson island. 1n case of fire or accident at the Power Plant, this Department will immediately respond and render whatever emergency rescue or ambulance service that might become necessary. Sincerely, Russell E. Rogers Fire Chief RER/f

APPENDIX =E SUPPORT LETTERS BETWEEN FLORIDA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPAiVZ AND U.S ~ COAST GUARD St. Lucre 8/1/81

DEPARTMENT OF TRA)ASPORTATION Address repsy ro: UiXlTED STATES COAST GUARD COMMAiVOSA (Or) Seventh Crssst Cuerd Oistrict "'1 S.W. 1st Avenue n%0 Mierni, Fle. 33130 Phones (305) 350" 5638 3000 Ser: 241 12 June 1981 Mr. S. A. KINGSBURY Florida Power and Light Co. P. 0. Box 529100 Mi'ami, FL 3,3152-

Dear Sir:

You requested'a brief statement updating the Coast Guard's probable response to typical emergency that might occur at the Turkey Point, plant a or the St. Lucie plant. 'his updated statement reflects no substantial change from our previous statements. The following statement extracted from the. Department of Transportation's Regional Emergency Transportation Natural Disaster P3;an prov'-des a broad, summation of Coas" Guard responsibility:

        "In a natural disaster, or whenever life, limb, or property is in danger or deemed to be in danger in the immediate future, under'uthority of Section 88 and 1414, Title 14 U.S.governmental             Code, the U. S. Coast   Guard   will     provide  to  any person      or authority any assistance that constitutes the rescue, aid or evacuation of persons in danger, and the protection of property threatened by any type of disas er. Among other things, this includes the transportation of personnel and. materials, to assist a disaster stricken area, the assistance to other officials involved in 'of     the. emergency situtation, and. the search for and rescue              persons or vessels lost at sea during an emergency situation."

The following additional information may be of assistance: The nearest Coast Guard facility to your St. Lucie plant site is the Fort Pierce Station. At least one small rescue this craft and crew are on immediate stand-by status atavailable station at all times, and two of these craft are on weekends. Providing that they are not otherwise engaged,, their normal response time to the vicinity of the St. also

                                                 'ort                        Lucie, plant is between      30 and     45  minutes.           Pierce      is able to communicate with radio equipped vessels in the area.

3000 Ser: 241 12 June 1981 A normal response time for helicopters based at. Opa Locka and St. Petersburg, Flor'da, to the area in the vicinity of your St. Lucie plant would be approximatley 75 minutes. The nearest Coast Guard facility to your Turkey Point plant si'te would be the Ni'ami Beach Base. Providing that their rescue craft are not otherwise engaged their normal response time to the vicinity of the Turkey Point plant is approximately 2 hours. A normal response time of helicopters based at Opa Locka, FL to the area in the vicinity of the Turkey Point plant would be approximately 25 minutes. Should you desire specific details of other Coast Guard. forces in these areas that might be available to assist you, please contact CDR H. A. NPi/HOFF, (ph. 350-5638/561.1). The presence of Coast Guard, forces do not ho'wever automatically guarantee their availability at any particular time. Coast Guard response to any. given emergency must be based on the operational priorities existing at that particular time. Your interest in including the Coast Guard in your erne gency planning for th'ese plants is appreciated. Si ALLE>i Captain, U. S. Coast Guard Chief, Operations Division By direction of the District Commander Copy: Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater, FL Coast Gaurd Air Station lKami,. FL Coast Guard Base Miami Beach, FL Coast Guard Station Fort Pierce, FL Coast. Guard Group .'miami, FL

APPENDIX F SUPPORT LETTER BETWEEN V.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (REACTS) AND FLORIDA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY St. Lucia 8/1/81

4 if 6 Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations P.O. Box E Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 June 2S, 1981

  . S. A. Kirgsbury Radiolcgical Bnmgency Plan Acministrator Florida Pcwer and Light Ccmpany Post Office Box 5291GO Miami, Florida 33252

Dear Nr.'irqsbury:

RADIATICi'1 M~~%C'Z ASSES'~H TBAZTB'.G SITE (BEARS) In response to ycur recuest of June 9, 198, we are plem& to ir; form ycu that the DOE BRACES facilitv and team ccntirue to be available to provice backup capability ard assistarce to t.".e:"orida Power and Eight Canpany in the event of a radioxogxcal ac'icenc or energency. The ~CTS facility is operated by the Oak Ridge base iated Universities (CRU) for the U'.S. Depar rent oz Rergy (DOE). Dr. Kar3. F. Fubner is the Director of ~CZS. The ACTS facility and team are part of a continuing DOE program ard +he availability over a lcng period of time is dependent on continuing federal appropriaticns. The BEKCZS provides very mode n facilities for handling rad ation accident patients. The ACTS staff, in c njuncticn with tr:e Oak-Ridge Hcspital of the United Methcdist Church Disaster Team and staff, is prepared to treat radiaticn victim cuicklv and cpm~ tently and to provide advice and,assistarce when radiation ac"idents acct cutside the Oak Ridge area. Following initial one gency treat-ment in ~~, the patient(s) can be transrerred to lccal hospitals in ac=ardance with usual acmissicn prccedur s for c nventicnal medical ard surgical follcmp, if necessary. Since radiaticn acc'dents are infr~ent, the ~~ staff is involved cn a daily basis in trainirg programs and radiaticn enure st dies utilizinq the acility to assure its cons"ant readiress. F~~ is also a source of information on the epidemiolcgica3. aspects of human exposure to radiaticn.

Nr. S, A. Eingsburv . 7u'.e 25, 1981 ccmruterized data bank of h and medical exgosur s has

                               ~

bern radiat'cn eff~m fran acciden~~ estral'shed and serves as a basis for epicemiological studies as w~~ as oroviding timely data to those involved in handling rad'aticn accidents. >o fe or retainer is recui"ed for t.".e provisicn of backup services by ~~~ ~ however I should jQu des/re to

                                                      'e util ~ e a~/den pan+ing and   t"e recover tnt   c= "~ t'es and services those costs which could resonab of HC5 we would erat to y be related to  h=-.dl'.";". such an incident including all charges bi>>ed to CCE or OBAU by hcspitals orivate chvsicians. Ycu are fre to inform the i1uclear Regulatory            'nd Ccrmissicn that ~CZS is available as a succcrt facility to ycur cn-going orcgram., We do ask that ycu        info'll     n .~rs of ycur staz" with the mechanisLs and agorcpriateness cf se k'ng B~CZS assistance.

This can hest be facilitat< by direct contact winch the B~VS Director, Dr. Earl P. B.bner, Oak Ridge Asscciare9 Universities, Post Office Box 117, Oak Ricge, T~~esse 37830 or telephone (615) 576-3098. Ne trust this information is adecuate for your needs. Sincerely, William R. Bibb, Direr ER-13: BEB Research Divisicn cc: C. C. K,ush~mugh, OBAU K. P. Hubner, OBAU C. N. Edirgtcn, BT-30, EQ; Bccm P-208, GLH W. P. Snyder, CC-10, OB3 J. N. Range, N-4, OBO l

APPENDIX G MXSCELLANEOUS LETTERS OF SUPPORT St ~ Lucre 8/i/8i

IP,g IICgy UNITED STATES ~

 +

y 0 A, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 JUll2 '3 I981 Fl ori da Power and Li ght Company ATTN: A. 0. Schmidt Vice President P. 0. Hox 529100 Miami, FL 33152

   -Gentlemen:

This responds to your letter of. June 9, 1981, requesting updated information concerning the NRC's role in the event of a nuclear power reactor incident. A current statement with regard to the IVRC's role is presented in NUREG-0728, "Report to Congress:. HRC Incident Response Plan", September -1980. The most pertinent portion of that docuIrent is paraphrased below: When the licensee notifies NRC of an incident, the initial IVRC response is to ascertain the status of the plant and monitor licensee activities. The purpose of this monitoring role is to assure that the public and the environment are fully protected. If and when the NRC determines that there is a potential threat to the public or the environmenz, it wi ll begin to monitor more intensively to develop an NRC assessment of the problems. Tne NRC will of er specific advice to the licensee to help solve or limit the consequences of the problem, but the licensee .has the immediate and primary cont:nuing responsibility for limiting the conse-quences of an .accident at ine nucIear power reactor. While in this advisory role, the NRC must also be prepared to issue formal orders if the licensee should fai 1 to take whatever actions the NRC deems necessary to orotect the public. In'he logical extreme, the NRC must be preoared to assume management control of a plant to whatever degree deficiencies in licensee management make it necessary. Management control is a very unlikely possibility, and good coordination of licensee and IVRC activi-ties'during an emergency will lower the possibi lity st~ 11 more. In addition, depending upon the situation, the NRC (and other organizations) will measure offsite radiological effects and will develop projections of onsite and offsite effects for the use of other Federal, State, and local agencies. Should you have further questions, please contact this office. Sincerely,

                                                           . Phi    i g tohr, Acting Oirector r  Oivisioa and oT Emergency Preparedness Operational Support cc:      C. H.    !/ethy, Plant Manager

8. J. Escue, Plant Nanager J ~ g ~b eJI,! al

                                                                                                ~  ~

C. L. i4ORVELL ~ SAINT LUCIE COUNTY

            ~ I  ) ~       Member Florida Sherii'I's Association Post OffIce 8ov 45S, Fort Pierce, Florida 330M
          /                Telephone: Office (305) KI-7320. Residence 46I-3+}6 June 5, 1981 Mr. Sam    Kingsbury Florida     Pot-er and   Light 'Company 9250 West       Flagler Str'eet Miami,    Florida'3174

Dear Mr. Kingsbuxy:

The St. Lucie County Sheriff's Depa t-m'ent, together with the Emergency Prepardness Director for St. Lucie County, have establhed an emergency evacuation plan in cooper'ation with the Florida Power and Light Company. The Sherifr"'s Depaxtment enjoys a very ood"-re A~~ ] a +4@~ ¹~ <<4w4 ~'4 Q1

                  ....'>.....a              '4 iv e~
                                     . florida     T7 and Light Company and we are continually upgrading our emer'gency plans and procedures.

Xn the event of an emergency, the Shexiff's Department will provide any help we are able to give for the safe evacuati,on and protection of the citizens of St.. Lucie County. Sincerely, cc C. L. NORVELL Sheriff CLN: ewc

n l MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF'5 DEPARTMENT JAMES D. HOLT. seen>rs P. 0. 8ox 07 'll.'b~4>8 Stuart, Florida '33494 A;uA 305-203-{300 Jun ,5, 1931 Mr. S am A. Kin gs bury Florida Power Fr Light P.O. Bor 529100 Miami, Florida 55152 ~

Dear Mr. Kingsbury:

Please be advised that the Martin County Sherif""'s Department will assist the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Department as required in the event of any emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant on Hutchinson Tg 't ~~A Sincerely, AMES D. HOLT'HERIFF

   )ART IN COUNTY- SHERIFF '            DEPT.

JDH/nh

l ~ ore'z POST OFFICE BOX 1480 OfftC0 Of City MRIIRger FORT PIERCE, fLORIDA 33450 June 8, 1981 Mr. Sam A. Kingsbury Florida Power h Light Company P. O..Box 529100 Miami, Florida 33152 Re: Use of Jaycee Park During Emergency

Dear Mr. Kingsbury:

Per our conversation this date, this letter will serve to update your request for use of the Jaycee Park on South Beach for emergency parking in event of an emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. It is understood that Flor'ida Power k. Light Company will repair or pay for the repair of any damage to the grass or park facilities re-sulting from the emergency use,of the park. Sincerely yours, Patricia B. Hilburn CITY MANAGER PBH/tc cc: Chief of Police City Engineer/Director of Public Vlorks

APPEi%)IX H SUPPORT LETTER AND EMERGENCY iKDICAL PLAN BETNEEN FLORIDA POVER & LIGHT COMPANX AND REEF ASSOCIATES, INC (MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CEitT R) St Lucre

                                                 ~

8/1/81

RADIATION EHERGENCY MEDICAL PLAN i~fOUNT SufAI HOSPITAL OF GREATER i~fDQiI 4300 ALTON ROAD, NIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA RADIATION EMERGENCY EVALUATION FACILITY MAY 1978

RADIATION FHERGRfCY MEDICAL PLAN I. INTRODUCTION A. REEF Associates, Inc. (REEF), a group of physicians, basic scientists and technologists at the Division of Nuclear Medicine, Mount Sinai Hospital, Miami Beach, <<- has entered into an Agreement with the Florida Power and Light Company (FPL). Under, the terms of the'Agreement, REEF will provide for im-mediate availability of fully equipped primary medical facilities for the Turkey Point Plant, primary faci1ities for the St. Lucie Plant, and fully equipped Regional facilities (a nationally recognized hospital substantially the same as the Radiation Emeroenc>> Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) facilities of the Oak Ridge Associated Universities, equipped and staffed to provide definitive medical care for serious cases of radiation

      ,,exposure)   with an ade'quate staff of physicians, nurses           and  tech-nical personnel sk"lied in       the. diagnosis and treatment of radiation injury and personnel contamination. At the request of FPL, these fac'ilities shall be made available to FPL employees and members of the general public in case of actual, alleged, or suspected radiation exposure or contamination resulting from             a  radiation incident occurring at the       FPL   Turkey Point and/or St. Lucie Plants.

B. REEF, within the Division of Nuclear Medicine, Mount Sinai Hospital, has developed a Radiation Emergency Evaluation

                                      '        (1978)

Facility to carry out the terms of its Agreement with FPL, and eo coordinaee ehe efforts of the multiple medical disciplines within the Houne Sinai Hospieal which ax'e committed eo support ehe radiation emergency medical treatmene effort of REEF. II. RESPONSIBILITIES A. REEF Associates Inc. (REEF) REEF is responsible for ehe ezecueion,of the terms of ies agree-ment with FPL. The primary facilities and personnel 'related to this agreemene are locaeed at the 'Aoune Sinai Hospital, ~Kami Beach, F1oxida (Fig. 3). The interim facilieies for the Turkey Point Plant are located ae Bapeise Hospital, &900 North Kendall nrive v4~~ F'forida ~ The interim facilieies for the St. Lucie Plant are locaeed at ehe Lawnwood Medical Center, 1700 South 23rd Streee, Fore Piex'ce, Florida" REEF wi13."

1. Provide plans, procedures, and training programs for the reception, diagnosis, and treatmene of personnel with injuries in-volving radiation exposure and/or xadioaceive contamination, or the inhalation or ingestion of radionuclides. Update such plans, procedures and programs as necessary to include the latest developments in the seate of the are and/or changes in REEF personnel and facilities which affect this Plan.

Revisions will be sent to FPL for review and accepeance. (1978)

2. Designate the physical facilities and equipment'o be used

     , for  initial emergency    care and subsequent     definitive     care and treatment    of personnel with radiation injuries.

3. Designate physicians, basic science'ersonnel, and medi-cal support personnel and alternates "for special REE'F emergency teams to hand'e radiation emergency oatients.

4. .Train as required,'the designated e ergency team personnel and others involved in the care and treatment of radiation injuries.. Training will include familiarization with the medical emergency aspects of nuclear power facility operation, hospital reception and admission procedures, initial emer-gency care, definitive care and treatment, fundamentals of nuclear radiation dosimetry, and radiation biology.

5. Provide training for selected FPL employees in the special aspects of first-aid related to serious radiation exposure, and to injury accompanied by radiation exposure and/or radioactive contamination, including the evacuation of casualties to off-site medical facilities.

6. Ensure that key medical team personnel are familiar with the first-aid and personnel decontamination capabilities of FPL at the Turkey Point and St. Lucie Plants, and at the Lawnwood Medical Canter.

7., Plan C and implement periodic emergency practice drills "3- (1978)

and exercises to ensure the orompt and effective emergency care,. tr'eatment and evaluation of radiation injuries; semi-annually conduct drills in coordination with the emergency drills scheduled by the Plant iMnagers of the FPL Turkey Point and St. Lucie Plants.

8. Establish an effective. system of communications to imple-ment the radiation emergency medical plan in coordination with PPL Emergency Plans for the Turkey Point and St.

Lucie Plants. See Pigure 1, Organizational Responsibility. B. Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami The Mount Sinai Hospital will:

1. Provide REEF with the ohysical facilities and the necessary equipment for the medical and hospital care of persons with in$ uries involving radiation exposure and/or radioactive contamination.

2. Provide the consultative medical support and services of all departments and facilities within the Yuunt Sinai Hospital which may be required to cope with a wide spectrum of medical emergencies.

(l978)

IXX. HOSPITAL FACILITIES AND E UIPMENT The facilities available to REEF are located at Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, 4300 Alton Road, Miami Beach. The patient re-ceiving area is on the first floor of the Nuclear Medicine Building, adjacent to the Cyclotron Vault. 't is equipped -for patient decon-tamination and the performance of emergency medical procedures for life saving purposes. Other equipment available in this area includes whole body gamma radiation scanners and portable radiation survey meters.

                                                                                          'I Additional   emergency medical treatment        facilities available     include the Mount Sinai Hospital Emergency         Rooms and an   Intensive   Care  Unit.

The Intensive.,Care Unit is available for the treatment of decontaminated radiation accident casualties or persons who have received only ex-ternal radiation exposures. IV. MEDICAL AND TECHNICAL STAFF The Division of Nuclear Medicine, within which REEF operates, is staffed by six physicians engaged in the practice of nuclear medicine. The'basic science staff consists of five scientists skilled in the dis-ciplines of nuclear physics, radiochemistry, computer science and health physics. - Low level whole body counting, whole body scanning 5 (1978)

and radiobioassay facilities will be provided on request. Data processing facilities for spectrum stripping are available. The qualifications of the key personnel are given in Appendix 1, Biographical Description of Principal REEF Personnel. In addition, the full capabilities of Mount Sinai Medical Center are at the disposal of REEF. V. OTHER SUPPORTING PERSONNEL The nurses, nurses aides, nuclear medical technologists and orderlies are personnel whose normal job includes the handling of patients who have received radionuclides for diagnostic purposes. VI. SUPPORT AGREVfENTS A. Mount'inai Hospital By "letter, Mount Sinai Hospital pledges the full cooperation of all its departments and facilities in support of REEF Associates, Inc. in event'f a radiation emergency (Appendix 2). B. Ba tist Hos ital Baptist Hospital, 8900 North Kendall Drive, Miami, i~ the interim facility for the Turkey Point Plant, under a separate agreement with FPL. C. Lawnwood Medical Center Lawnwood Medical Center, 1700 South 23rd St., Fort Pierce, Florida, is the interim facility for the St. Lucie Plant, under a separate agreement with FPL. (1978'

D. REAC/TS By letter, REAC/TS, of the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU).agrees to provide back-up support for REEF Associates, Inc. for the definitive care and treatment of seriously irradiated persons (Appendix 2). VII. TRAINING Division of Nuclear Medicine and REEF All personnel assigned to REEF radiation emergency medical teams, and other associated medical support functions receive a thorough orienta-tion on radiation emergency plans and procedures. Emergency medical team personnel are trained, in the handling and treatment of irradiated and/or ingured and contaminated persons, and other radiation emergency operations. Training material is updated as required to include new, information and techniques; the frequency of scheduled training courses and refresher courses are such that fully trained emergency teams are maintained at all times. All personnel are familiar with the Emergency Medical Plan of REEF Associates, Inc. and Florida Power and Light Company; All personnel also participate in the semi-annual emergency F drills held in collaboration with Florida Power and Light Company. VIII. DRILLS Radiation emergency practice drills will be conducted as required to ensure the proficiency of the REEF emergency organisation and to (1978)'

verify arrangements with other groups for medical support. Semi-

                                 \

annually, drills will be conducted in coordination with radiation emexgency drills scheduled by the Plant Managers of the FPL Turkey Point and St. Lucie Plants. IX. COMMUNICATIONS A. Telephone and radio communications are provided on a 24<<hour pex'ay basis between the FPL nuclear plants and the FPL Off-Site Emergency Organization, Miami. The telephone switchboard supervisor at Mount Sinai Hospital is instructed to establish an emergency communication. link between any incoming calls from the FPL nuclear plants and FPL Off-Site Emergency Organization and the REEF President or his designated alternate. A single contact will serve to mobilize full emergency medical response. The REEF President will be responsible for the notification and assembly of the required emexgency medical support personnel. See Figure 2, Communications for Emergency Medical Response. B. In the event the REEF President is not in the hospital when noti-fication of a radiation emergency is received at the hospital switchboard, pxovisions have been made to notify him by tele-phone or "beeper" as listed in the REEF Emergency Roster. (1978)

X. TRANSPORTATION OP PERSONNEL WITH INJURIES INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE CONT&GNATION A. An ambulance or other acceptable vehicle will normally be used to transport in)ured persons from the Turkey Point or St. Lucie Plants, or from the Lawnwood Medical Center, Ft. Pierce, to the REEP facility. If required, patients could also be transferred from the Baptist Hospital, Miami. Air transportation by heli-copter from Turkey Point will be considered under unusual conditions,, as provided for. in an agreement between FPL and . the Homestead Air Porce Base. B.. Transportation of persons who are both injured and contaminated will require special precautions and equipment to prevent or minimize the spread of radioactive material and/or radiation exposure of the vehicle operator and medical attendants. Pre-cautions may include the use of plastic sheeting for contamina-tion control, shadow shields to control the exposure of attending personnel, and respiratory protection for both the injured person and others involved. (19 78) ~

XI. ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL TEAMS The REEF President has the primary responsibility for the develop-

    'ent   of plans, procedures     and  treatment methods for handling medical emergencies    involving personnel radiation e~osure and/or radioactive contamination. Figure 1,   REEF  Associates,         Inc. Organizational Responsibility,    shows  the structure of the emergency medical response teams and   their alternates.

XII. RADIATION EMERGENCY OPERATIONS A; Notification of Radiation Emer enc'he REEF President 'will receive notification of a radiation emergency at the Turkey Point or St. Lucie Plants through established communication channels (See Fig. 2). Based on information received relative to personnel injury, radiation exposure and/or contamination, the REEF President will provide any requested emergency medical advice to the Turkey Point or St. Lucie Plant Emergency Coordinators relative to first-aid, preliminary personnel decontamination, and evacuation priorities; he will determine whether or not the full capability of REEF will be mobilized.

                                      -LO-            (l9 78)

B. Activation of Emer~enc Medical Teams The REEF President or his alternate will ensure that all appro-priate members are activated and that the required preparation

         .for receipt of the casualties is complete prior to their arrival from the Turkey Point or St. Lucie Plants, or from Lawnwood Medical Center or other     facility. Emergency equipment and supplies and theixocation are      shown   in Table   1 and   Figure 5.

C. Under very unusual conditions a REEF medical team may be re-quired to go to the Turkey Point Plant, the St. Lucie Plant, or to Lawnwood Medical Center or to Baptist Hospital, if requested by the medical directors of the xadiation emergency teams at either of these institutions. XIII. CASUALTY ADMITTING PROCEDURE Figure 3, Site Plan, Mount Sinai Hospital, shows the street approach to the patient receiving area, and the helicopter landing area. Figure 4, Emergency Medical Evaluation and Decontamination Chart, depicts the procedures detailed in 4, a through f, below.

1. Radiation emergency casualties will be transported to REEF by the most expeditious form of transportation available. Normally this will be an ambulance (under unusual circumstances, helicopter transportation may be used).

(1978)

0

2. The transporting'vehicle will be met at the emergency facility entrance by health physics and nuclear medicine'ersonnel, and a rapid evaluation of casualty contamina-

             "tion will be     made.

3. The transporting vehicle, its.driver, and attending person-nel will be chec'ked for contamination and appropriate measures taken to decontaminate personnel and isolate vehicles as required. Contaminated vehicles wiU. be placed within a roped-off area and will be posted with appropriate

           ~

signso 4."'asualties will be categorized and handled as follows: ~ ,, " , ...a., Nonviable contaminated: This casualty will be immediately transferred to Room A, Figure 5.

b. Nonviable noncontaminated: This casualty will. be trans-ferred to the Mount Sinai Medical Center morgue.

c. Ambulatory low-level contamination: This casualty will'e evaluated in the decontamination and treatment area, Room C, Figure 5, where he will receive further decontamina-tion and the necessary medical care and will subsequently be transferred to the hospital for continued medical care or discharge.

d. Nonambulatory low>>level contamination: This casualty will be transferred to the decontamination and treatment area, Room C, Figure 5, where he will receive further

                                        -12>>      (1978)

0 0

the records will be retained for future references. C. The personnel monitoring equipment of REEF members will-be read and the results recorded; the records will be retained for future reference. XV. CONTAHXNATED PASTE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL Appropriately marked plastic lined containers will be provided for contaminated items such as clothing, equipment, paper, plastic

    ,sheeting,. rope and liquid waste...The containers      will be periodically monitored to ensure against the build-,up of radiation to hazardous levels or to levels which would interfere with the proper operation of radiation detection     and  diagnostic instrumentation. Filled containers  will be   sealed,   marked, and stored  in an appropriately isolated  and  protected area in accord with applicable State regulations.

FPL will be requested to dispose of the waste. XVE. RECORDS AND REPORTS The medical records of all persons examined at the request of FPL in relation to the )ob preplacement examination requirements of the NRC, e or in relation to actual, suspected, or alleged incidents involving possible exposure to radiation or radionuclide contamination will be (1978)

0 retained indefinitely at the facilities of the Division of Nuclear Medicine.'opies of these records will be made available to FPL, and to other physicians involved in the treatment of FPL employees under this plan. Will. RELEASES OF INFORMATION CONCERNING RADIATION ACCIDENTS

1. The release of information or announcements of any kind to radio,

          ~

television, newspapers or other news media will be made only by or in coordination with the FPL Emergency Information Officer or

        --'-hYsdesignated:.representative.'       '='-   .    '    '"':: "--'     i"' .'-'!-'~" ~'~"- ~

2. At the, request of the REEF director or of Mount Sinai Hospital, FPL will assist by dispatching a representative to,the Hospital to talk to media representatives or to assist hospital Administra-tion in this activity. FPL will also provide an update of relevant information as it becomes available.

3. In the event anyone, not referred to Mount Sinai by FPL, alleges a radiological exposure related to the FPL'Turkey Point Plant, the FPL System Operations Power Coordinator should be notified immediately.

4. The FPL System Oper tions Po~er Coordinator mill alert the appropriate FPL Duty Officers who will, assist by obtaining factual information and making it available as indicated in 2.

above'15-(1978)

0 0 e

5, The following sample statement can be made pending the receipt of verified factual information "An individual was admitted to Mount Sinai for observation and testing. While this is an established precautionary procedure, we realize it may attract unusual attention. Therefore, an update will be released as soon as information becomes available. Florida Power & Light Company may be contacted for-further comment." (1978)

0 C FIGURE l 1 qJ ~ REEF Associates, Inc. ORGANIZATIONALRESPONSIBILITY Emergency planning Future Planning Albe r t S. Gils on,: C.'ontinuing D. Education Preplacement Medical Evaluation Alt.: Wm. M. Smoakg M.D. Liaison vrith O.R.A. U. Radiation Physicist Medical Emergency and Decontamination Administrator Receivin Team Back-U Emergency Radiation H alth Medical Team I Medical Team 2 Mount Sinai Hospital-Accident Reconstruction Total Body Counting Physician -.Phys i cia n Dosimetry Basic Rad, Scientist 'Basic Rad. Scientist Consultative Service Ra diobioa s sa y Rad. Technologist .:Rad. Technologist RHAC/TS (ORAU) Instrument Calibration Ba ck-U Medical Team 3-Physician Basic R ad. Scientist Rad. Tech'nolo ist

FIGURE 2 COHfUHICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR TURKEY POINT PLANT ST. LUCIE PLANT FPL MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL SYSTEM OPERATIONS SWITCHBOARD POWER COORDINATOR REEF PRESIDENT A. J. GILSON, M.D. ALT: W. M. SMOAK$ M.D. RADIATION P11YSICS ADMINISTRATIVE REEF PERSONNEL DIRECTOR DIRECTOR ASSEMBLE ALL REEF PERSONNEL ALL CONSULTATIVE PERSONNEL

                                             +IMMI-EIADE VuNIOR N URGED COLLEgE PAR.kI NQ HKLICOPT'ER I ECHOING PARKING 0
                               /

tD

                                 /

REEI. NUCLEAR MEDICINE ENTRANC'E /y CEhlTER 0'I/IERGCMCY CO

ROOM A REEF AREA NOVi AMIABLE CASUALTIES RADIOCHEMISTRY CYCLOTRON ROOM B VAULT REEF AREA STORAGE YCLOTRON WORK STORAGE ROOM RO'OM C AIR REEF AREA LOCK I I VXABLE I CONTAMINATED I CASUALTIES TOILE CONTROL ROOM TARGET ASSEMBLY AXR ROOM LOCK CHANGE AREA REEF (NUCLEAR MEDICX.tE ENTRANCE) STORAGE OFF XCE OFFICE OFFXCE AREA LEVA

                                                                   .UP Location  o j Radiation  Survey Lguipment (1978)

TABLE I The following equipment is furnished to REEF Associates, Inc., Mount Sinai Hospital, for use in support of Florida Power and Light Company, Turkey Point Plant and St. Lucie Plant Emergency Plans: ITEM ASSIGNED QUANTITY QUANTITY PRESENT PROTECTIVE CLOTHING Coveralls, medium 10 each 10 each Coveralls, large 10 each 10 each Cloth gloves 2 dozen 2 dozen Rubber gloves 20 pair 20 pair Cloth shoe covers 10 each 10 each Rubber rain shoes 10 pair 10 pair Cloth caps 10 each 10 each Cloth hoods 5.each ~ S each ." INSTRlH~i TATION BetaWamma, G.M. count rate meter PRMW, 0-500 Kc/m 1 each 1 each Count rate meter with alpha range PRM-4, 0-500 Kc/m 1 each 1 each Ionization chamber, high range RO>>l, 0-500 R/hr 1 each 1 each Ionization chamber, high range RO-l, 0-500 R/hr 1 each 1 each Self reading dosimeters 0-200 mR 5 each 5 each Self reading dosimeters 0-10 R 5 each 5 each Dosimeter. charger 1 each 1 each (19 78)

APPENDIX I BIOGRAPHY OP PRINCIPAL REEP Associates, Inc. PERSONNEL (1978)

REEF Associates, Inc. KEY PERSONNEL Dr. Albert J. Gilson is President of REEF Associates, Inc. Dr. Gilson

                                       'I is Director of   the Division of Nuclear Medicine, Mount Sinai Hospital and a Professor of Radiology at the University of Miami.            He /'s is a member of the  Ad Hoc Radiological Health Advisory Council to the Department of

, Health and Rehabilitative Services of the State of: Florida. Dr. William M. Smoak is Associate'irector of the Division of Nuclear Medicine of Mount Sinai Hospital. He is a radiologist and is a past President of the Southeastern Chapter of the Society of Nuclear Medicine. He is a Professor of Radiology at the University of Miami-Dr. Peter J. Kenny is a radiation physicist and is Radiation Safety Officer for the Cyclotron'acility at Mount Sinai'Hospital.. He i's an Associate Professor of Radiology at the University of Miami. Dr. Ronald D. Finn is a radiochemist and an Assistant Research Professor of Radiology at the University of Miand.. Dr. James A. Campbell is a radiochemist and an Assistant Research Professor . of Radiology at the University of Miami. (1978)

APPELLDXX II SUPPORT AGREEKaaTS (1978)

i

                                                                                       . p   ""..';i)

January 22, 1975 QE~i ~wX~ Albert J. Gilson, M.D. MQU'AT SiNA) Director MKDlCAl0=i lTZH Radiation Emergency Evaluation Facility (REEP) 105 Z~ida Parkway Gables Estates Coral Gables, Plor'a 33133 Dea- Dr. Gilson: At your reauest, Z am pleased to inform you that the ifount Sinai Cyclotron Facility is available to patients being treated under tne Radiation Emergency Evaluation Facility (REEF) Program. After it is'determined that patients are free of radiation contamination and in no way consti ute a radiation hazard, then all of the facilities of'n the Yount Sinai Medical Center will be available to you the care of these patients. feel that this facility is ideally suited for the type of patient treatment being pursued by REEF. As 1 am sure you are aware, this area was originally designed as a radiation controlled facility with extra-thick concrete walls, special air handling equipment and built-in radiation detection in-s trumentation. Xt is our understanding that all patients that are referred to Mount Sinai through the REEP Program will be under the direct care of. the professional staff of BEEP. Blount Sinai will in turn bill BEEP for all hospital charges at current prevailing rates. t<e are very pleased to be associated with this important. conmunity endeavor. Wishing you great success..... Sincerely,

    / (,o. PJi.i!"( C   ~
           >,J        )

Alvin Goldberg Executive. Direc" or sailOUili SIHAl ill:DlCALC. HT:-2 OF GRZ~T:-3 i'i]lA>1} 4300 Alton Aoad. Nbml brooch, Florldo 33140 Tol. 53 3011 (1978)

0

  ~~V ALOp~

1 UNITED STATES ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION OAK RIDGE OPFRATIONS P.O. BOX E AREA CODE 616 OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE 37830 TELEPHONE 483-8611 VS% July 15, 1976 Dr. Peter J. Kenny Radiation Physicist REEF Associates, Inc. P.O. Box 40-3022 Miami Beach,, Florida 33140

Dear Or . Kenny:

REACTS ASSISTAI'ICE TO REEF This letter is in response to your letter of July .1, 1976, requesting. the backup capabilities of,the ERDA'EACTS facility for the Radiation Emergency Evaluation Facility (REEF). You indicate that your services will be extended to the Florida Power and Light Company. ERDA, by my letter of June 25, 1976, to Mr. S. A. Kingsbury of FPL (copy enclosed),. has authorized the inclusion of the REACTS facility as a backup facility for FPL. Any services required by FPL in the event of an emergency will be handled under the t rms outlined in that letter. Sincerely, oseph A. Lenhard, Director ORR:CRF Research and Technical Support Division

Enclosure:

Ltr dtd 6-25-76 JAL to SAK cc w/o encl: M. W. H. Meyzen, BER-Hg C. C. Lushbaugh, ORAU C. A. Keller,.OR C. M. Hill, OR M. H. Travis, OR ~111TIQy (1978)

'PP8.1O16

0 APPENDIX I AGREEMENT BETWEEN FLORIDA POWER.& LIGHT COMPANY AND RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATES INC. (LAWNWOOD MEDICAL CENTER) St. Lucre 8/1/81

LAWNWOOD ~ MEDICAL JA: s Wee Pg P-.r)> CENTER INC. qadi)~- s ~ 4 ' s ~~. ~~~iig~~>>: ra.~ t inq cq; Post Office Box 188, Farl Pierco, Ftorida 33454 Toiophono (305) 461-4GOO Zune 5, 1981 Mr. E. A. Adomat, Executive Vice President Florida Power and L'ight Company Post Office Box 013100 Miami, Florida 33101

Dear Mr. Adomat:

This letter is intended to confirm Lawnwood Medical Center's participation in the Radiation Emergency Plan for the Florida Power and Light Company's St. Lucie Plant.. The Hoard of Trustees are unanimous in their support of the Emergency Plan and the cooperative training program and the further development of plans to meet the needs of Florida Power and Light. il Lawnwood Medical Center stands ready to provide facilities and personnel to care for accident victims who might arrive from the St. Lucie Plant. Sincerely, Hasi L. King, Administrator cc: Doctor Berg, Chief of Staff Mr. S. A. Kingsbury

APPENDIX J LISTING OP EMERGENCY PLi'iN IHPLEMENTING PROCEDURES St. Lucre 8/1/81

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEME'iiTING PRCCEDURES NIM!ER PROCEDURE TITLE 3100021 E DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 3100022 E CLASSIFICATXON OF EiiERGENCIES AND CRXTERIA FOR EVACUATION 3100023 E EMERGENCY ROSTER 3100024 E NATURAL EMERGENCXES 3100025 E FIRE LKRGENCIES 3100026 E EVACUATION AND PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABXLITY 3100027 E RE-ENTRY 3100029 E DUTIES OF AN XNDXVXDUAL WHO DISCOVERS AN EMERGENCY CONDITION 3100032 E ON-SXTE SUPPORT CENTERS 3100033 E LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT DOSE CALCULATIONS, 3100034 E MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS-RADXOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN TRAIiNING 3100035 E OFFSITE RADXOLOGICAL MONITORING AND DOSE ASSESSMENT 3100050 E EMERGENCY PROCEDURE-DRXLLS AND ALARM TEST St. Lucre 8/1/81

OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION PROCEDURES 1101 Duties of the Emergency Control Officer 1102 Duties of the Recovery Manager 1103 Duties of the Emergency Information Manager 1104 Duties of the Emergency Security Manager 1105 Duties of the Emergency Technical Manager 1106 Duties of the Govexnmental Affai'rs Managex'uties 1107 of the Emergency Plan Supervisor 1201 Activation and Use of the Interim Emergency News Centex 1202 Activation and Use of the Interim Emergency Operations Facility 1301 Emergency Roster - Offsite Organization J-2 St. Lucie 8/1/81

Compliance with Reg. Guide 1.76 With regards to Design Basis Tornado, Florida Power & Light.will comply with Reg. 'Gu'ide 1'.76. This commitment will be reflected in a'future amendment to the St. Luc'ie 82 FSAR.

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