ML17264A909

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Special Rept:On 970503,declared Fire Barrier Component (Fire Door) Inoperable.Caused by Maint Activities That Unintentionally Blocked Open Fire Door F-30.Stopped Activities Approx 1 Hr Later & Closed Fire Door F-30
ML17264A909
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/03/1997
From: Mecredy R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: Vissing G
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9706110112
Download: ML17264A909 (4)


Text

CATEGORY REGULAT INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO YSTEM (RIDS)

I A ACCESSION NBR:9706110112 DOC.DATE: 97/06/03 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET "N-FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G

05000244 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MEt"REDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas 6 Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISSINGgG ~ ST

SUBJECT:

Special rept:on 970503,declared fire barrier component (fire door) inoperable. Caused by maint activities that inintentionally blocked open Fire Door F-30.Stopped activities hr later

& closed Fire Door F-30.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

05000244 G

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNA.

'EOD FILM C g~

NR DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB

'RR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.

NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL rr RECXPXENT ID CODE/NAME VISSXNGiG.

AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB LITCO BRYCEgJ H

NOAC QUEENERgDS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 0

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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATIONS CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)

ON EXTENSION 415-2083 r

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 24 ENCL

AND ROCHFSlER GASANDELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 8P EASTAVENUE, ROCHESlER, MY 14849-0001 AREA CODE 716 54'6-2700 ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor operations June 3, 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn:

Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Thirty (30) Day Special Report Inoperable Fire Barrier Component, Due to Fire Door Blocked Open R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

Fire Door F-30, which provides part of the overall fire barrier for Diesel Generator (DG) Room A, was blocked open without an assigned fire watch. This resulted in the fire barrier component (fire door) being considered inoperable.

The Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Section TR 3.7.5, Required Action B.1, requires a Special Report outlining the cause of fire-barrier penetration seal inoperability and plans for restoring to operable status.

This thirty (30) day Special Report is being submitted to satisfy that requirement.

Maintenance activities involving painting of the floor in DG Room A were started at approximately 0700 EDST on May 3, 1997.

This activity included intentionally blocking open Fire Door F-30.

Blocking open'the fire door resulted, in that portion of the overall fire barrier being considered inoperable, and a designated worker in the area acted as the fire watch. Work activities were stopped about an hour later, and Fire Door F-30 was closed.

Some time later, an individual noted the drying paint in DG Room A, and blocked open Fire Door F-30, presumably to assist the drying process.

With the fire door blocked open, those opening the security door to enter DG'Room A would be aware of the drying paint.

(The security door is approximately one foot ahead of door F-30.) The fire door was blocked open without ensuring that an hourly fire watch inspection would be performed, which is contrary to the requirements of TRM Section 3.7.5.

Subsequent inspections of DG Room A were performed by Security and Operations personnel.

Those personnel were unaware that no hourly fire watch inspection was being performed, and took no action to correct the situation.

9706iiOii2 97060S PDR ADQCK 05000244 S

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Page 2 At approximately 2000 EDST on May 4, 1997, the Operations Shift Supervisor, performing a plant tour, identified that having Fire Door F-30 blocked open required compensatory actions to comply with TRM Section 3.7.5, Required Action A.1.

He confirmed that no hourly fire watch inspection was being intentionally performed.

The fire door was immediately unblocked

" and closed, restoring the overall fire barrier to operable status.

ACTION Report 97-0674 was initiated to identify the condition to management and to initiate measures to prevent recurrence.

During this period, DG Room A was never completely vulnerable to the effects of a fire. While the fire door was blocked open, the fire detection and suppression system for DG Room A was

operable, as were those for the adjoining areas: DG Room B and Turbine Building Basement.

Hourly fire watch inspection ofthe affected fire zone would have satisfied TRM Required Action A.l. Although no hourly fire watch inspection was intentionally being performed, Operations and Security personnel (who are trained as fire watches) made numerous entries into DG Room A during the period the door was blocked open.

Additionally, the overall fire barrier is protected by a high energy line break (HELB) "superwall" (which is located approximately a foot away from the fire barrier wall and contains the security door). This "superwall" remained operable during the period that Fire Door F-30 was blocked open.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Mecredy XC:

Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 1482)

PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.

20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

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