ML17261A326
| ML17261A326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1981 |
| From: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17261A327 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8201060307 | |
| Download: ML17261A326 (146) | |
Text
REGULATOR> 'INFORHATIOt<<'ISTRIBUTION S
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ACCESSION NBR;8201060307 DOC ~ DATE: 81/12/30 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET FACIL:50"240 Rober t Emmet Ginna Nu'clear Pl anti Unilt 1 i Rochester G
05000240 AUTH.NAt<E AUTHOR AFF ILIATION HAIERiJ E
Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corp.
RECIP ~ NANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION CRUTCHFIELD,D, Operating Reactors Branch 5
SUBJECT:
Forwards comments on NRC:810727'.draf-t~ evaluati.on of SEP Topic -VI""4i,"Containment Isolation.Sys,,"'wo oversize drawings encl. Aperture cards are available in ~PDR ~
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~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN E. MAILER Vke Preadent TKLKPHONC AREA CODE Tld 546.2700 December 30',
1981 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.
5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
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Subject:
SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System R.E.
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Crutchfield:
Your letter dated July 27, 1981 forwarded the NRC draft -evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isola-tion System.
RGE has reviewed the evaluation and pro-vides the comments found in Attachment A to this letter in response.
The RGE comments define the basis upon which the specific containment isolation provisions at the Ginna Plant are judged to be acceptable.
The comments also address two specific issues pointed out, in your letter, the location of both isolation valves outside contain-ment and use of a check valve as an isolation valve outside containment.
Our understanding is that these comments will be used as input to the integrated safety assessment for the Ginna Plant.
Very truly yours, n E. Maier 820i060307 Bii230 PDR ADOCK 05000244 Fi, PDR
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gg, g Shoo 0~7 ATTACHMENT A Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield's letter dated July 27, 1981 forwarded the.NRC Staff draft, evaluation report of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System.
The draft evaluation compared our facility, as described in the FSAR, with the General Design Criteria of Appendix A to 10CFR Part 50.
Our comments on the draft evaluation are presented below.
The specific criteria which were applied to the Ginna containment isolation system design are given in FSAR sections 1.3 and 5.2.
The FSAR criteria are based upon the proposed Atomic Industrial Forum versions of the criteria issued for comment by the Atomic Energy Commission on July 10, 1967.
These criteria cover overall containment capability, containment
- leakage, materials,
- valving, and testing.
The governing criterion was that the structure be designed to withstand the initial effects of gross equipment failures including reactor coolant pipe guillotine breaks and to retain for as long as reguired the functional capability of the containment to avoid undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
The criteria which were applied to containment and containment isolation are numbers 10, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, and 57.
The current criteria give specific isolation arrangements which are now used to provide redundant isolation and protection of the public.
The design used at Ginna also called for redundant, isolation but differs in specific applications from the current prescriptions.
No bases are given for the prescriptions of GDC 55, 56 or 57.
For example, no basis is provided for the requirement that check valves not be used as isolation valves outside containment.
It is true that check valves will seal more tightly with a higher differential pressure across the seat.
- Thus, check valves should perhaps be the first of two isolation valves where the redundant barriers are both provided in the form of valves.
This will assure the best seat seal.
Valves outside the containment will function at least as well as those inside containment, where an adverse accident environment may exist.
For valves inside containment to be effective in isolating the accident environment, the pipe between the valve and the containment wall must remain intact.
Valves outside containment are also effective only if the pipe between the containment wall and the valve remains intact.
In either case, there is no mechanistic effect from a LOCA which would damage the pipe, however, piping outside the containment is inherently better protected from pipe whip, jet impingement, or
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high temperature or caustic environments which may exist following an accident.
Section III.4.2.2 of WASH 1400 gives failure rates of valves including motor operated valves, 'air operated valves and check valves.
Check valves have the lowest failure rate and are approxi-mately one order of magnitude better than motor operated valves, and a factor of 3 better than air operated valves.
The valves are periodically tested in the post accident configuration.
Thus check valves along with other types of valves provide acceptable isolation outside containment.
The most likely cause of containment, leakage following an accident. is valve leakage caused by valves failing to close when actuated or* failing to seat. tightly.
- Passive, closed mechanical systems or pipes represent relatively insignificant leakage paths as demonstrated by periodic testing of containment isolation systems.
No significant leaks, other than through valves, caps or flanges have been observed during containment, testing of fluid systems at Ginna.
Therefore, location of isolation valves outside containment does not represent a significant increased risk of leakage.
The valves may be less susceptible to leakage outside containment following a LOCA because they are accessible for repair.
The NRC draft SEP evaluation compared the FSAR configuration with current GDC confiqurations and judged them acceptable because they meet current configuration requirements, judged them acceptable on some other defined basis as permitted by the GDCs, or described changes to the configurations which would meet the prescriptions of the current GDCs.
The NRC draft evaluation referenced drawings from the FSAR for specific containment penetrations.
Some of these drawings do not represent the current. plant,'configuration.
Enclosed, is Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valves,. Amendment 42 to the Ginna
- license, which was submitted and approved in response to the NRC request for TMI Lessons Learned Technical Specifications.
This table lists all the containment penetrations and isolation valves.
One change has been made to the plant since this table was submitted.
Penetration 318 (35 on the NRC list) for the dead weight tester as een ecommissioned and is now capped and tagged close to the containment wall both inside and outside containment.
This table has been modified to include the normal, shutdown and post-accident.
valve positions for all manual and power operated valves.
Also enclosed with this attachment, are individual fluid penetration drawings.
Most of them have been taken from our Periodic Test procedures series (PT 23).
For ease of correlation, each of the drawings has been labeled with the number used in the NRC draft evaluation as well as the penetration number assigned at Ginna.
Some of the penetrations do not have a corresponding PT drawing because Type C testing is not reguired of all penetrations.
In such cases, a piping flow drawing depicts the penetration configuration.
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All of the containment penetrations are addressed individually below.
These discussions provide a basis upon which the con-tainment isolation configurations have been judged acceptable by RGE.
The NRC reference number is given in parentheses behind the plant penetration designation.
System flow diagrams are also referenced for some penetrations.
Most. of the, referenced flow diagrams were provided by an RGE letter dated September 22, 1981.
Drawings 33013-521 and 33013-530 are included with this letter.
The discussions below describe only the isolation provisions which we considered in our evaluation although most lines penetrating containment have additional manual valves which could be used to isolate the lines.
These manual valves are shown on the referenced drawings.
All of the automatic air operated containment isolation valves described below fail in the closed position.
A loss of either vital DC control power or instrument air will cause the valves to close.
Motor operated valves fail "as is" upon loss of AC power.
All of the motor operated valves are powered from motor control centers on diesel backed buses.
A loss of offsite power will not cause the valves to remain open.
All automatic containment isolation valves except the purge valves have a maximum closure time of 60 seconds as shown on Technical Specification Table 3.6-1.
The purge valves must close in 5 seconds or less.
Most automatic valves will close substantially sooner than the required 60 seconds.
A containment. isolation signal to automatic valves is generated by redundant and independent sensors.
Containment isolation signals are generated by manual actuation or automatic safety injection which results from two out of three containment high
- pressure, two out of three low pressurizer
- pressure, or two out of three low steam line pressure in either loop.
Containment ventilation isolation is actuated by the same signals and by the following additional siqnals; manual safety injection, manual containment spray and ezther high air particulate or gas radioactivity.
Penetration 29 (12), the fuel transfer tube, was judged p~
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'1 to the containment personnel hatch and the equipment hatch because it is sealed by a double gasketed resilient seal flange.
It is leak tested in accordance with the requirements for Type B testing of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50.
A manual valve outside containment provides an additional closure feature for this penetration although it is not, required for containment isolation.
Penetration 100 (7) (33013-433),
the charging line, was judge accep e
y the NRC because it is a closed safety grade system having a post accident, function.
While it is desirable to have charging remain functional after an accident it is not required to meet accident analysis assumptions and therefore does not have a required post accident function.
The system is closed outside containment and the positive displacement charging pumps act as a barrier to limit the portion of the system which may be
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exposed to containment pressure if check valve 370B inside containment fails.
The system operates at a pressure (2250 psi) significantly greater than the peak containment pr'essure so that pipe leaks will be easily detected during normal operation and scheduled surveillance.
Therefore check valve 370B inside containment and the seismic category 1 closed system outside containment provide acceptable containment isolation even if the system flow need not be maintained to mitigate an accident.
Penetrations 101 and 113 (17)
(33013-425 and 432), the two safety zngectzon pene rations, were judged acceptable.
These lines are closed systems having a post, accident. function which are fluid filled and in operation following a safety injection signal to mitigate accidents.
Penetration 110 (16),
shown on the same flow and PT drawings, is or t e sa ety injection test line.
Isolation valve 879 is.locked closed and is outside containment.
The test line inside containment and out to valve 879 is "in service" following initiation of safety injection and is pressurized by both of the SI pump trains.
Pressurization of this line with SI fluid will prevent any of the containment atmosphere from actually reaching the isolation valve.
There is no design basis event which would result in a rupture of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) and the SI test line outside containment.
The test line is pressurized on a monthly basis to approximately 1500 psi so that, flaws which might allow 60 psi containment atmosphere to escape would be detected and repaired.
This arrange-ment and testing provides adequate assurance that. containment atmosphere will not leak through this penetration.
Penetration 102 (no NRC evaluation)
(33013-433),
the alter-nate c arguing 1.ne, is similar in function and arrangement to the charging line, penetration 100, which was judged acceptable by the NRC evalution.
Both of these lines have two check valves inside the containment separating the charging lines from the reactor coolant system.
One check valve in each line is inside the missile barrier and one check valve is outside the missile barrier.
Each line also has an Air Operated Valve (AOV) inside containment but, outside the missile barrier so that LOCAs in the loop compartments will not effect these valves.
The AOV in the charging line is normally open; the AOV in the alternate charging line is normally closed.
Both fail closed on loss of instrument air which occurs with containment isolation.
The closed charging system and positive displacement pumps provide another isolation barrier outside containment.
Therefore this penetration has adequate containment isolation capability.
Penetration 103 (no NRC evaluation),
the construction fire service water one zs no longer in use.
A pipe cap inside containment and a locked close isolation valve outside containment form the penetration boundaries.
This provides containment isolation equivalent to the current GDC requirements and is therefore acceptable.
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Penetrations 105 and 109 (15)
(33013-425 and 432), containment
- spray, xs a sa eguar s system which will be in operation following accidents when containment pressure is high.
There are no events which could both cause a rupture of the reactor coolant system and at. the same time cause the containment spray line outside containment to be broken.
These lines are pressurized by the containment spray pumps.
This operation will prevent containment atmosphere from leaking from the containment.
These penetrations are judged to be acceptable, similar to the safety injection lines.
Penetrations 106 and 110 (9) (33013-433),
reactor coolant pump sea water zn e
, are similar to the charging line of penetration 100. It should be noted that each of the RCP seal water inlet lines has two check valves inside containment, not one as shown on the FSAR drawing.
These valves are shown on drawing 33013-433.
One valve in each line (304A and 304B) is located outside the missile barrier near the containment wall.
The other valve in each line is inside the missile barrier.
Although not required by accident analyses it is desirable to maintain RCP seal injection flow following containment isolation to maintain the reactor coolant pumps operable in the normal mode.
The charging and RCP seal injection system is a closed system outside containment and the positive displacement charging pumps act as a barrier to limit the portion of the system which may be exposed to containment. pressure if check valves 304A or 304B inside containment fail.
The system operates at a pressure (2250 psi) significantly greater than the peak containment pressure so that pipe leaks will be easily detected during normal operation and scheduled surveillance.
Therefore, check valves 304A and 304B inside containment and the seismic category 1 closed system outside containment provide acceptable containment isolation.
Penetration 107 (30) (33013-431),
sump A discharge line, has two AOVs, ot ocated outside containment, which are tripped closed on an isolation signal.
Current criteria would place one of these valves inside containment and the other outside.
There is'no postulated
- event, however, which will both cause a
LOCA and damage the normal sump line outside containment.
The piping outside containment is periodically subjected to a leakage test during testing of the isolation valves.
In addition, if the pumps are operating in the automatic mode and are not being operated manually by the operator, the pumps will be automatically tripped by a containment isolation signal.
Following a LOCA the sump will be submerged and the isolation valves will not be exposed to a gas environment.
Leakage through the valves will be smaller than that determined under gas testing conditions.
Therefore, the existing isolation provisions for this penetration are acceptable.
Penetration 108 (10) (33013-433),
RCP seal water return and excess et own one is isolated from the closed chemical and volume control system outside containment by MOV 313 which receives a containment isolation signal.
The single pipe penetration
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passes the combined flow from the excess letdown heat'exchanger, the RCP number 1 seal bypass lines and "the seal water return lines.
The excess letdown line is normally not in service and is isolated from the seal water return line inside containment by HCV 123.
This air operated valve, even if open, will fail closed soon after containment isolation because instrument air is auto-matically isolated and the pressure to hold HCV 123 open decays quickly.
The RCP number 1 seal bypass lines are also isolated from the seal water return line by normally closed AOV 386 which also will fail closed after a containment isolation.
The only remaining line which would not have redundant closed valves after an isolation signal is the small 3/4 inch seal water return line from each RCP.
Normal flow through these lines is from the charging pumps.
Should MOV 313 fail to close, the volume control tank can accept the seal flow (<
3 gpm) or prevent the release of accident pressure until manual valves 315A and 315C are closed.
Only one of these valves is open during operation so only one operator action is required in the event MOV 313 fails.
Therefore adequate=-isolation capability exists with the current, design.
Penetrations ill and 140 (6, 4) (33013-436),
- znes, were gu ge acceptable in the draft evaluation.
Additional information concerning testing of the RHR valves was provided in an RGE letter from L. D. White, Jr. to Mr. Dennis R.
- Ziemann, USNRC dated September 21, 1978.
Penetration 112 (8) (33013-433),
letdown to the non-re-generative eat exc anger, was judged in the draft evaluation report to meet the current GDCs.
There is a difference between the as-built plant and the FSAR diagram.
The orifice isolation valves (AOVs 200A, 200B and 202) do not receive containment isolation, or T, signals but do fail closed on loss of instrument air when the instrument, air line is isolated.
- Further, AOV 427 upstream of the letdown orifices will be closed on low pressurizer level.
This valve, however, is not outside the missile barrier and does not, qualify as a containment isolation valve. It also fails open on loss of air.
AOV 371 and the closed chemical and volume control system outside containment provide adequate containment isolation capability even without the additional protection from the letdown orifice isolation valves.
Penetration 120 (no NRC evaluation)
(A-202), nitrogen to accumu ators, as one air operated valve outside containment (AOV 846) which receives a containment.isolation signal and has a
check valve (CV 8623) inside containment.
This valve config-uration conforms to the current criteria and provides adequate isolation capability.
Penetration 120 (1) (33013-424),
pressurizer relief tank gas analyzer
- one, xs 3
8 inch tubing isolated by air operated valve 539.
This valve is automatically operated and is approximately 15 inches from the penetration.
This location satisfies the guidance of Safety Guide 11 that the isolation valve be as close as practical to the containment.
MV 546, a manual valve approxi-
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i mately 8 inches from the containment, provides.redundant isolation capability should it be required.
The leakage through MV 546 is periodically tested as is the leakage through AOV 539.
The need for additional isolation capability will be evaluated during the integrated assessment.
~ Penetration 121 (2) (33013-424),
nitrogen supply to pressurizer relic tan PRT
, xs prote'cted by check valve 528 inside con-tainment.
and pressure control valve (PCV) 441 outside containment.
PCV 441 maintains the downstream pressure at a constant 0.5 psig.
If the PRT is ruptured and CV 528 fails and containment pressure is elevated above 0.5 psig, PCV 441 will be closed.
Pressure outside the containment upstream of PCV 441 will be 100 psig toward the containment. preventing leakage.
If the PRT is ruptured, CV 528 fails, and containment pressure is less than 0.5 psig PCV 441 may open in an attempt to raise the downstream piping pressure but 100 psig nitrogen flow toward the containment will prevent leakage.
Manual valve 547 @ear the containment wall can be used in the long term to isolate the nitrogen supply line.
Therefore, the isolation provisions for this penetration are acceptable in the current configuration.
Penetration 121 (3) (33013-424),
reactor makeup water to
- PRT, xs protecte y check valve 529 inside containment and AOV 508 outside containment.
The draft evaluation report noted only one apparent difference from current criteria; AOV 508 should close automatically.
This valve does close automatically upon receipt of a containment isolation signal.
Therefore, this penetration is judged acceptable as presently configured.
- 121, 203 and 332 (no NRC evaluations),
contain-ment pressure sensing transmitter lines, are small (3/8 inch) instrument sensing lines open to the containment.
The pressure transmitters form the boundary of a closed system outside containment and are located close to the containment. penetration.
These closed systems are small, passive systems not subject to damage as a result of a LOCA.
The need to incorporate remote manual or excess flow check valves into these lines to bring them into compliance with current criteria will be evaluated during the integrated assessment.
Penetration 123 (21) (33013-431),
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- 120, PRT to the gas analyzer.
AOV 1789, receives an isolation signal and is less than 2 feet from the wall.
MV 1655 is less than a foot from the wall and will provide redundant isolation capability should it, be required.
MV 1655 is also periodically checked for leakage.
The need for additional isolation capability will be evaluated during the integrated assessment'.
Penetration 124 (22 and 23) (33013-435),
excess letdown heat exchanger aux'.ary coolant supply and return, was found acceptable in the NRC draft evaluation.
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- 124, 203 and 305 (no NRC evaluation),
containment post acci ent air samp e
- ines, are small tubing penetrations which are closed during normal operation by at. least 2 boundaries.
Each line has,two manual valves located close to the containment wall.
In addition, each line is fitted with a tubing cap.
These lines are closed and would be opened only to take' sample following, an accident and then reclosed.
This'alve arrangement and operatinq mode meets the intent of Safety Guide 11, Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor Containment.
Therefore, these penetrations should be found acceptable in the current configuration.
Penetrations 125 and 126 (25) (33013-435),
component cooling water rom t e reactor coo ant pumps, are protected by remote manual isolation valves MOV 759A and MOV 759B and by the closed auxiliary coolant system outside containment.
It is desirable to maintain flow through these lines to facilitate operability of the reactor coolant pumps.
Component cooling water cools the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier and protects the number one seal in the event the reactor coolant pumps are operating.
The lines are not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are not connected directly to the containment atmosphere.
This system arrangement.
meets the requirements of GDC 57, the applicable design criterion.
In addition, the closed system outside containment (operated at a normal pressure greater than containment accident pressure) provides further leak protection.
Penetrations 127 and 128 (24) (33013-435),
component cooling water to RCP 1A an RCP 1B, are protected by check valves 750A and 750B inside containment and MOVs 749A and 749B outside con-tainment.
The applicable GDC for these lines which are not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor'onnected directly to the containment atmosphere, is GDC 57.
Only the remote manually operated MOVs 749A and 749B are required.
In addition, the check valves inside containment and the closed system outside containment (operated at a normal pressure greater than containment accident pressure) provide further leakage protection.
Therefore, the isolation capability which has been provided for this penetration exceeds that required by current criteria and the configuration should be found acceptable.
Penetration 129 (18 and 20)
(33013-431), is the line for both t e RCDT an PRT to the vent header and nitrogen supply to the RCDT.
The vent header line contains two AOVs, 1787 and 1786 outside containment which both receive a containment isolation signal.
The line outside containment is not subject to damage as a result of the LOCA and therefore both valves should be operable.
Both are subjected to periodic leak testing.
The nitrogen supply line to the RCDT is similar to the nitrogen supply line to the PRT except that the check valve in the RCDT line is located outside containment.
The nitrogen supply is normally closed because the vent header pressure is usually higher than the nitrogen control pressure
( 0.5 psig). If the RCDT is opened to containment atmosphere and the containment pressure is greater than 0.5 psig the line will remain closed.
If the tank is open
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to containment atmosphere but the containment pressure is less than 0.5 psig the nitrogen control valve will maintain a flow of nitrogen toward the containment.
Manual valve 1793 can be used in the long term to isolate the nitrogen line if necessary.
Therefore, the redundant isolation provisions on each of the lines at penetration 129 are adequate to prevent unacceptable leakage and are judged acceptable in the current configuration.
Penetrations 130 and 131 (39 and 40) (33013-435),
reactor support coo ing ines in an out, are each provided with a single
containment isolation signal.
The reactor support cooler system is a closed passive system inside containment.
and the component cooling water system is a closed system outside containment.
The CCW system operates at a pressure higher than containment accident pressure.
Thus, the closed CCW system and the automatic isolation valves provide redundant protection against leakage and meet the requirements of GDC 57, the applicable design criterion.
Penetration 132 (36) (33013-533),
depressurization at power, was oun accept e with one automatic isolation valve inside containment (AOV 7970) and one automatic valve outside containment (AOV 7971).
Penetrations 141 and 142 (5)
(33013-425 and 432), containment sump recircu ation
- ines, were found acceptable in the draft evaluation based on the guidance of SRP 6.2.4, item II.3.
The valve arrangements for these penetrations are not the same as the diagram contained in the FSAR.
One pair of valves is inside containment (MOVs 851A and B) and one pair of valves is outside containment (MOVs 850A and B), however, this arrangement is still acceptable based on SRP 6.2.4.
Penetration 143 (19) (33013-431),
reactor coolant drain tank discharge, is iso a ed by series AOVs outside containment which are tripped closed on an isolation signal.
Current criteria would place one of these valves inside containment.
There is no postulated
- event, however, which will both cause a
LOCA and damage the RCDT line outside containment.
The piping outside containment is periodically subjected to a leakage test during testing of the isolation valves.
Following a LOCA, the RCDT will be submerged and the isolation valves will not be subject to a gas environment..
Leakage through the valves during an accident will be smaller than that determined under gas testing conditions.
Therefore, the existing isolation provisions for this penetration are acceptable.
Penetrations 201 and 209 (41 and 42) (33013-529),
service water to reactor compartment cooling units A and B, are provided with manual isolation valves outside containment on both the inlet and discharge piping of the coolers.
The coolers'nd piping inside containment.
form a closed system and are protected throughout. their length from missiles.
Thus, the only deviation from the current criteria of GDC 57, the applicable criterion, is
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ed with automatically operated
- valves, one inside containment and one outside containment.
These penetrations were judged acceptable in the NRC draft evaluation. Penetrations
- 205, 206 to and 207 to (11) (33013-422),
sample ones rom t e reactor coo ant system oops and the pressurizer, are 3/8 inch instrument lines which are provided with one automatic isolation valve outside containment. The lines also have an additional manual valve outside containment and an AOV inside the missile barrier in containment which will fail closed when the instrument air to containment is automatically isolated. The need for additional automatic isolation provisions will be evaluated during the integrated assessment. Penetrati'ons 206 bottom and 207 bottom (29) (33013-422), steam generator samp e
- xnes, were gu ge acceptable in the NRC draft evaluation.
Penetrations 301 and 303 (44 and 45), auxiliary steam supply and con ensate
- return, serve the closed system heaters inside containment,.
The entire system inside the containment is outside the missile barrier. Ther'efore, GDC 57 applies to these pene-trations. The manual valves outside containment (6151 and 6175) are locked closed during operation. This configuration meets the current criterion and is acceptable. 10- C CI R 4 Penetration 305 (14) (33013-533), containment air sample
- out, zs iso ate y AOV 1597 outside containment.
This valve is close to the containment wall (approximately 2 feet) even though it is not the first valve after the wall. Manual valve 1596 is between the wall and AOV 1597 and can also serve to isolate this line should AOV 1597 fail to close when required. Both of these valves are leak tested along with the piping between the contain-ment and AOV 1597. The need for additional automatically actuated valves will be evaluated during the integrated assessment. Penetration 305 (13) (33013-533), containment air sample 1 t, jlgj pt. bl 'h d ft 1 t b'd p check valve 1599 inside containment and automatic AOV 1598 outside containment. Penetration 307 (no NRC evaluation), fire service water, serves a one w xc was upgraded in 1980 to meet fire protection requirements. Isolation of this line is accomplished by check valve 9229 inside containment and automatic AOV 9227 outside containment. These isolation provisions conform to current criteria. We have noted, however, that in some scenarios fire may cause spurious closure of AOV 9227 while the line may be in use to suppress a fire inside containment. Because AOV 9227 is closed during operation and would be opened only in the event of
- fire, a containment isolation signal is unnecessary.
It is desireable to remove the existing isolation signal from this valve. This will be addressed in separate correspondence. Penetrations
- 308, 311,
- 312, 315,
- 316, 319,
- 320, and '323 (31 and 32 33 13-529
, service water to an coo ers, are szmz ar to penetrations 201 and 209. The fan coolers are provided with manual isolation valves outside containment on both the inlet and discharge piping of the coolers. The coolers and piping inside containment form a closed system and are protected throughout, their length from missiles.
- Thus, the only deviation from the current criteria of GDC 57, the applicable criterion, is that the isolation valve is not.remotely operable.
The service water system operates at, a pressure higher than the peak containment pressure so that any leakage from the cooling system will be into the containment, not from the containment. A radiation monitor is provided on the service water discharge from the containment to alert the operator to abnormalities. The isolation valves are located in the intermediate building only a short distance from the control room. Entrance to this area does not require pro-tective clothing or entry through a controlled area. The isolation provisions for these lines are acceptable for continued operation. The need for remote manual operators on the valves will be further evaluated during the integrated assessment. Penetrations 309 and 313 (47), leak test depressurization, were gu ge accepta e zn t e NRC draft evaluation based upon flanges inside containment and normally closed valves MOV 7444 and MOV 7445 outside containment. 11 P J'/ Penetration 310 bottom (34) (33013-521), service air, was noted zn t e NRC ra t eva uation as having an exception from the current criteria because of valve location. This penetration has isolation different. from that shown on the FSAR drawings. Check valve 7226 inside containment and manual valve 7141, which is locked closed during operation, provide isolation which is in accordance with current criteria. Penetration 310 to (33) (33013-521), instrument air, was judge accept e xn e NRC draft evaluation. There is no manual valve between the containment wall and AOV 5392 as shown in the FSAR drawing,
- however, the actual arrangement. is still in conformance with current criteria.
Penetration 317 (46), leakage test-supply, was judged acceptable in the NRC ra t evaluation based upon a flange inside containment and normally closed MOV 7443 outside containment. Penetrations 321 and 322 (28) (33013-522), steam generator
- blowdown, was gu ge accept le and in accordance with GDC 57 in the NRC draft evaluation.
Penetration 324 (43) (33013-530), demineralized water, has been mo z ze since plant startup and is not configured as shown in the FSAR. Isolate.on of this penetration is provided by check valve 8419 inside containment and automatic AOV 8418 outside containment. This arrangement provides acceptable isolation and is in conformance with current criteria. Penetration 332 (48), leak test instrumentation, was judged accep e zn t e NRC draft evaluation. The arrangement of this penetration is different from the FSAR figure. A tubing cap has replaced the valve inside the containment. This arrangement still conforms to current criteria and is acceptable. Penetrations 401
- 402, 403, 404 (26 and 27)
(33013-534 and 33013-44 , mazn steam an ee wa er, were judged to be acceptable and in conformance with GDC 57 in the NRC draft. evaluation. Penetrations 1000 and 2000 (no NRC evaluation), personnel hatch an equipment atc , are not within the scope of this evaluation and are not governed by GDC 54, 55, 56 or 57.
- However, these openings are designed with redundant closures which are closed during normal operation and which will prevent the escape of radioactive material.
These penetrations are described in FSAR Section 5.1.2.7. These penetrations are similar to current design practices and provide acceptable isolation of the containment. ~ ~ l t 7 Manual and Power Operated Valve Normal, Shutdown and Post-Accident Position Assuming No Operator Action 0-Open, C-Closed
- - Open for specific purpose for short period only TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAINIIENT ISOLATION VALVES PENT.
NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION PRIMARY ISOLATION BOUNDARY MAXIKH1 SECONDARY ISOLATION ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY IQZIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) 29 Fuel transfer tube 100 charging line to "B" loop 101 - SI Pump 1B discharge I 102 103 I 105 106 Alternate charging to "A" cold leg Construction Fire Service Water Containment Spray Pump lA "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal water inlet 107 Sump A discharge to Waste Holdup Tank 108 RCP seal water out.and excess letdown to VCT flange CV 370B CV 889B CV 870B CV 383B welded flange CV 862A CV 304A AOV 1728 OOC MOV 313 OOC NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 60 (1) (2) (5) (5) (2) MV 5129 CCC (3) (2) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA AOV 1723 OOC 60 (4) NA 109 Containment Spray Pump 1B 110 "B" RCP seal water inlet 110 SI test line 111 RHR to "B" cold leg 112 letdown to Non-regen. Heat exchanger 113 SI Pump 1A discharge CV 889A CV 870A NA NA CV 862B NA CV 304B NA MV 879 *CC NA MOV 720(20) COC NA AOV 371 OOC 60 (3} (2) (5) (6) MV 204A 000 MV 820 C*C (14)(17) (5) (5) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA r>> r d PENT. No. 120 120 121 121 121 121 123 124 I 124 125 126 127 128 129 IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION Nitrogen to Accumulators -Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) to Gas Analyzer (GA) Nitrogen to PRT Reactor Hakeup water to PRT Cont. Press. transmitter PT-945 (10) Cont. Press. transmitter PT-946 (10) Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) to GA Excess letdown supply and return to heat exchanger Post Accident air sample "C" fan C Component Cooling'Hater (CCM) from 1B RCP CCH from 1A RCP CCW to lA RCP CCH to 1B RCP RCDT & PRT to Vent Header PRIHARY ISOLATION BOUNDARY AOV 846 **C AOV 539 **C CV 528 CV 529 PT 945 PT 946 AOV 1789 *+C AOV 745 OOC CV 743 HV 1569 CC* HV 1572 CC* HOV 759B 000 HOV 759A 000 CV 750A CV 750B AOV 1787 OOC CV 1713 NA NA NA NA 60 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA HV 547(8) OOO AOV 508 **C HV 1819A 000 MV 1819B 000 MV 1655(7)OOO (>>) (11) MV 1571 CC* MV 1574 CC* (12) (12) HOV 749A 000 MOV 749B 000 AOV 1786 OOC MAXIMUM SECONDARY ISOLATION ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY 60 CV 8623 60 HV 546(7) OOO MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) NA NA NA 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 60 60 130 131 132 140 141 142 143 CCH to reactor support cooling CCW to reactor support cooling Depressurization at power RHR pump suction from "A" Hot leg RHR-Il pump suction from Sump B RHR-02 pump suction from Sump B RCDT pump suction HOV 813 OOC MOV 814 OOC AOV 7970
- CC HOV 701(20)
COC HOV 850A(13) CCO HOV 850B(13) CCO AOV 1721 OOC 60 60 60 NA NA NA 60 (19) NA (19) NA AOV 7971
- CC 60 (6)
NA MOV 851A(13) CCO NA MOV 851B(13) CCO NA AOV 1003A **C 60 AOV 1003B **C 60 e~ ~ P E> g I l 8 C a PENT. NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION 201 Reactor Compart. cooling Unit A & B 203 Contain. Press. transmitter PT-947 &.948 202 "B" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot & main) PT 947 PT 948 NA NA PRIMARY ERXIHUM ISOLATION ISOLATION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) HV 4757(16) 000 NA MV 4636(16) 000 NA MV 1076B CCC NA HV 1084B CCC NA SECONDARY ISOLATION BOUNDARY (11) (11) SOV IV-3B CCC SOU IV-5B CCC MV 1819C 000 MV 1819D OOO MAZIHUM'SOLATION TIME *(SEC) NA NA NA Normally Closed NA Normally Closed NA NA 203 Post accident air sample to "B" fan 204 205 206 206 207 207 209 210 Purge Supply Duct Hot leg loop sample Przr. liquid space sample "A" S/G sample Przr. Steam space sample "B" S/G sample Reactor Compart. cooling Units A & B. Oxygen makeup to A & B recombiners 300 Purge Exhaust Duct 301 Aux. steam supply to containment 303 Aux. steam condensate return 304 "A" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot and main) 305 Radiation Monitors R-ll, R-12 & R-10A Auto Inlet Isol. 305 R-ll, R-12 6 R-10A Outlet 305 Post Accident air sample (containment) MV 1563 CCC MV 1566 CCC AOV 5870
- OC AOV 966C **C AOV 966B **C AOV 5735 **C AOV 966A **C AOV 5736 **C MV 4758(16) 000 MV 4635(16) 000 MV 1080A CCC AOV 5878 *OC MV 6151 COC MV 6175 COC MV 1084A CCC MV 1076A CCC AOV 1597 OOC CV.1599 MV,1554 CCC HV 1557 CCC HV 1560 CCC NA NA 60 60 60 60 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 NA NA NA NA MV 1565 CCC NA MV 1568 CCC NA AOV 5869 *OC 5
MV 956D(14) 000 NA HV 956E(14) 000 NA MV 5733(7) 000 NA MV 956F 000 NA MV 5734(7) 000 NA (11) NA (11) NA SOV IV-2A CCC NA Normally SOV IV-2B CCC NA Normally AOV 5879
- OC 5
MV 6165(15) COC NA HV 6152(15) COC NA SOV IV-5A CCC NA Normally SOV IV-3A CCC NA Normally MV 1596 000 NA AOV 1598 OOC 60 MV 1556 CCC NA HV 1559 CCC NA MV 1562 CCC NA Closed Closed Closed Closed P Sg>> 4k PENT. No. 307 308 IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION Fire Service Water (18) Service Water to "A" fan cooler 309 leakage test depressurization 310 Service Air to Contain. PRIMARY MAXIMUM ISOLATION ISOLATION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) CV 9227 NA HV 4627(16) 000 NA flange NA CV 7226'A SECONDARY ISOLATION BOUNDARY AOV 9229 CCC (ll) HOV 7445 CCC HV7141 C*C MAXIMUH ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) 60 NA NA Normally Closed NA 310 Instrument Air to Contain. 311 Service Water from "B" fan cooler 312 Service Water to "D" fan cooler 313 315 316 cn 317 318 319 leakage test depressurization Service Water from "C" fan cooler Service Water to "B" fan cooler leakage test supply Dead weight tester Service Water from "A" fan cooler 332 Leakage test instrumentation lines 401 Main steam from A S/G 402 Hain steam from B S/G 320 Service water to "C" fan cooler 321 A S/G Blowdown 322 B S/G Blowdown 323 Service Water from "D" fan cool'er 324 Demineralized water to Containment 332 Cont. Press. Trans. PT-944, 949 & 950 CV 5393 MV 4630(16) 000 MV 4642(16) 000 flange MV 4643(16) 000 HV 4628(16) 000 flange tubing cap HV 4629(16) 000 MV 4641(16) OOO AOV 5738 OOC AOV 5737 OOC MV 4644(16) 000 CV 8419 PT 944 PT 949 PT 950 Cap Cap Cap NAA* NA** NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA AOV 5392 OOC (>>) (11) HOV 7444 CCC (11) (11) MOV 7443 CCC Capped (>>) (11) HV 5701(7) OOO mr 57O2(7) ooo (>>) AOV 8418 COC HV 1819G 000 MV 1819F 000 HV 1819E 000 MV 7448 CCC HV 7452 CCC MV 7456 CCC NA NA 60 NA NA NA Normally Closed NA NA NA Normally Closed NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ~ p P J PENT. NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION PRIMARY ISOLATION BOUNDARY MAXIMUM SECONDARY ISOLATION ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) 403 Feedwater line to A S/6 404 Feedwater line to B S/6 1000 Personnel Hatch 2000 Equipment Hatch NA NA NA** NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
- The maximum isolation time does not include diesel start time.
- The MSIVs and feedvater isolation valves are not considered to be containment isolation valves.
The containment boundary is the steam generator secondary side and tubes. MV - Manual Valve MOV - Motor Operated Valve AOV - Air Operated Valve CV - Check Valve SOV - Solenoid Operated Valve NOTES The end of the fuel transfer tube inside containment is closed by a double-gasketed blind flange, to prevent leakage of spent fuel pit water into the containment during plant operation. This flange also serves as protection against leakage from the containment, following a loss of coolant accident. The space between these gaskets can'also be pressurized by the penetra-tion test, system. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-3) Incoming lines connected to closed systems outside containment are provided with at least one check valve or normally closed isolation valve located inside containment. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg 5.2.2-2) The Containment Spray System is a closed system outside con-tainment provided with a single containment isolation valve (FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-8). The single remotely controlled, motor operated containment isolation valve is normally open. The seal water return line is not directly connected to the Reactor Coolant System. A second automatic isolation barrier is provided by the closed system consisting of the volume control tank and connecting plp3.ng ~ The Safety Injection system is a closed system outside con-tainment provided with a single containment isolation valve (FSAR Tabl'e 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-9). Connections of the test line with other lines inside containment are all missile protected and upstream of check valves connecting to the RCS. The SI system is in operation following a LOCA and pressurized to a pressure higher than that in containment. The RHR system is a closed system outside containment provided with one normally closed, missile protected containment iso-lation valve inside containment. In addition, a second normally closed valve is provided inside the missile barrier (FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-2, see also ANSI-N271-1976). Normally operating outgoing lines not connected to the Reactor Coolant System and not protected against missiles throughout their length inside containment are provided with at least one automatically operated trip valve or one remotely operated stop valve located outside containment. Manual isolation valves in series with the trip or remote operated valves are also provided outside the containment (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-1a). See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-1. Incoming lines connected to open systems outside the contain-ment are provided with a check valve located inside containment, and a remote operated valve or check valve and remote operated valve located outside containment. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-2) 18 >> I It (1o) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) The 'pressure transmitter provides a boundary. Normally operating incoming and outgoing lines which are connected to closed systems inside containment and protected against missiles throughout their length, are provided with -at least one manual isolation valve outside containment (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-2). The single remotely controlled containment isolation valve is normally open and motor, operated. The cooling water return line is not directly connected to the reactor coolant syst: em and, should remain open while the coolant pump is running. A second automatic isolation barrier is provided by the component cooling water loop, a closed system. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-la) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-2. Sump lines are in operation and filled with fluid following an accident. Containment leakage testing is not required. The valves are subjected to RHR system hydrostatic test. Normally operating outgoing lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System are provided with at, least one automatically operated trip valve and one manual isolation valve in series located outside the containment. In addition to the isolation
- valves, each line connected to the Reactor Coolant System is provided with a remote operated root valve located near its connection to the Reactor Coolant System.
(FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-1) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-17. The Service Water system operates at a pressure higher than the containment accident pressure and is missile protected inside containment. Therefore, these valves are used for flow control only and need not be leak tested. A manual valve outside containment in series with an automatic valve is provided for normally operating outgoing RCS lines (FSAR pg. 5.2.2-1). Installation of this penetration and valving is scheduled for 1981. (19) (2O) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-16. Containment leakage testing is not required per L. D. White, Jr. letter to Dennis L. Ziemann, USNRC dated September 21, 1978. I / +n J PT-23.8:3 PT-23 ~ 8 REACTOR COOLAVZ SYSTEMS CHARGING LQK PENETRATION No. 100 HCV 142 ~ ~ 370A 9308 PIV 370B 2230 384C Conn. Bl Conn. B2 Rotometer Serial r9 Rot er 'Flow Indication Air Temperature (t) PIV 370B cc/min. 0>>r. (Rotometer Indication cc/min.) X (460 + ) Q cc/min. at 0 psig and 70 530 o 460 +,t ( cc/minat0osi &70F ) / 60 i &70F 0 cc min. at 60 psig & 70 F 5.08 PTV Leakage Max. Leakage is 200.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 r. o cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. CALVEXTZ) BY: DATE:. R & T REVIEW: DATE ~ PENETRATIONS //101, 81 OTTOM) AND 8113 I CV I AUX I I I I Conn. Bl L.O. 78m 878C 87 2A 872B 885A 113 i I PIV I I 870A I M 87lA I I I I I 8 871B I stoa L.O. 88 8 L.O. 28@ IV 889A Con B2 2849 Conn. B3 2810 891 91B 891 1A L. 0. 18 2 B 820 90A 1815A 815 if' .O. 820 L.O <<) I 8781 101I I 110 I Qs I 885B ~ goal L.C. 88B 'P '/ PIV 879 g/0p' 2818 ~ o~ 889B 84 883 Z 882 1B TEST LINE BEHIND RWST 890B I 4O ~ ~ b C ~ 4 L'X ZD FLU:0 ALTERNATE CHARGING LINE PEKTRATION NO. '302 2218 9305 9306 PIV '383 B f l. 2227 323 Conn. Bl Conn. B i 50TOMETER SERE P: <OTOMETER PLOW INDICATION: KIR ~~EKkTURE j',t):
- Rotometer
. Indication cc/min) (cc/min at 0 osi and 70 P) 0 5.08 ?IV LEAKAGE: PUT 3833 cc/min. X 530 4 ~ cc/min at 0 psig and 70 P 0 460 + . cc/min at 60 psig and 70 P 'I cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 P ,.<<AX. LEAKAGE IS 170.33 cc/min 9 60 psig and 70 P ~~CS: ll CALCULATED BY: DATE' ~ ~ ~ S PT-23.49:3 CONSTRUCTION FIRE SERVICE RATER PENETRATION NO. 103 IN ) (pipe cap) PEV C f35130 5129A 85129 (welded cap) Conn. Bl Rotameter Serial PRELACY Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t ) cc/min. OF cc/min. Q 0 psig and i% F (Rotameter Flow):C 530 460 + t 1/2 cc/m'n. 3 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 3 0 osis and 70 F)
- 5. 08 PIV Leakage
~wz. Leakage is R~RRKS: 10.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig. and 70 F cc/min. 8 60 psig. and 70 Calculatec bv: R 6 s. Re view o Date: Date e ~r "A" CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADER PT-'23.18A:4 PENETRATION NO. 105 I I I I I I 1Q15 I I I I I I I I 2857 868K 2856 Coal. Bl TZS'7 LZua 8 6' PEV 86>4 8693. Pg~ 5 g)D ><~ c.RP ~2822) 860B g (guGr from. C. S. Pum L> Rotameter Serial
Conn 31 860C 860D from C.'S. Puznp 1B R ameter Serial 4 PIV 862B Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. F cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X/ 530 i 460+ t.'c/min. (I 60 psig and 70'F ~ (cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F 5.08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage REMARKS: cc/min. (~ 60 psig. and 70'F '00 cc/min. (I 60 psig. and 70'F 1 CALCULATED BY: DATE: R 6 T REVIEW: DATE: ~~ ~ ~ l Cl "B" RCP SEAL WATER LINE PENETRATION NO ~ 110 PT-23.9B:4 I' I I QR( M77 goig 303 C 9301 304B 9302 Conn. Bl ConM2 300 B t 2224 r f 300 f 277 A 275 Rotameter Serial fk PIV-304B Rotameter Flow Indication cc/min.
- Air Temperature
'F t (Rocamacer Zndicac ion cc/min) x 530 l/2 ~ cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F ~ 0 460 + c cc/min. 9 0 psig & 70'F ~ cc/min at 60 psig & 70'F 5.08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage REMARKS: cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F 200.00 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ~, i Cl- ~ ~ s q o PT-23.7 LETDOWN FROM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PENETRATION NO. 112 PT-23.7:4 Conn. Bl to PRT 133 200A 703 200 2202 202 I 22 I I I iQB PIV 371 2231 369 Conn. B2 821 204 ~Recirc. Pump I I I I I S.W. Hx NRHx Room RWST ROTAMETER SERIAL 8 OTAMETER FLOW INDICATION AIR TEMPERATURE Primary cc/min OF (Rotameter Indication cc/min) x 530 1/2 cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F 0 460 + t (cc/min at 0 si & 70 F).. 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min at 60 psig & 70 F cc/min 8 60 psig & 70 F Max Leakage RVfARKS: 58.07 cc/min 8 60 psig & 70 F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIE<: DATE'ATE' pp k ~ J Cll ".-23'.46 Nitro en to Accumulators Penetration No. 120 PT-23.46:3 Conn. Bl 94 834 B to Accumula l I I @25 I I N'2'f 86'23 I tors I %2 I I I 8627 IV'46 8626 8621~~ VENT 2831 8>8$' A Conn. B2 Rotameter Serial /$ PIV-846 Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. 530 cc/min. I 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) 460 + t cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig. and 704F MAX Leakage 29.04 cc/min. g 60 psig. and 70OF REEQUIP CALCULATE& BY: RGT REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ~ ~ ~ PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK GAS ANALYZER LINE PENETRATION NO. 120 PT-23. 1: 3 t I I I Ql from P.R.T. ~ 546 I I I I l I 493 Conn. Bl PIV 539 VENT HERE 492 to G.A. Rotometer Serial 8 PIV 539 F 'OMETER FLOW INDICATION cc/min AIR TEMPERATURE (t) (rotometer indication cc/min) X 530 1/2 ~ cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F 0 460 + t (cc/min at 0 si + 70 F) = cc/min at 60 psig + 70 F
- 5. 08 PIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig + 70 F.
Max. Pig leakage is 10.89 cc/min 0 60 psig + 70 P. RESQKS: CULATED BY: DATE' & T REVIEW: DATE: P NITROGEN SUPPLY TO PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK PENETRATION NO. 121 PT-23 ':3 to PRT 496 PIV 528 495 I I IN I I I I I I I I I I I OR 547 494 441 1662 from 100 psig N2 Conn. Bl Conn. B2 Rotometer Serial f/ Rotometer Flow Indication Air Temperature (t) PIV 528 cc/min F tometer Indication cc/min) X 530 = cc/min at 0 460 + t c/min at 0 si + 70 F = cc/min at 60 psig + 70 F. 5.08 psig and 70 F. PIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig + 70 F. Max. Leakage is 45.00 cc/mia g 60 psig + 70 F. 0 Calculated By: R & T Review: Date: Date: Remarks: ~ k A PT-23.3:4 MAKEUP WATER TO PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK PENETRATION NO. 121 / $907 Conn. Bl 568 PIV 529 576 567 IN i I I I I I I I 0') I I I I I I 498 I I I Conn. B2 497 SIV 508 tometer Serial No. No. Rotometer Flow Indication PRIMARY cc/min SECONDARY cc/min. Air Temperature (t) (Rotometer Indication (cc/min at 0 si and
- 5. 08 PIV Leakage F
cc/min) X 530 4 cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F; 460 + 70 F) cc/min at 60 psig and 70 F cc/min 8 60 psig and 70 F F Max. Leakage is 175.0 cc/min g 60 psig and 70 F 0 SIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage is 67.11 cc/min g 60 psig and 70 F 0 REMARKS lculated By: Date: R 6 T Review: Date: J ~ J COHEIR Zi'JT PWSSUW SENSING TBAiVMI~B PHKTMtZOtt HO. 121 PT-23.17A:4 Conn; Bl (open pipe) I I I I I I I 1819A 18193 PT-9-"5 'T-946 0 (S~. Bldg.) Rotameter Serial PRIMARY Rotameter Flow ir Temperature(t) cc/min. F / >>0 cc/min. 6 0 paig and 70'F = (itotametet Flow) X $460 + t/ cc/min. (8 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 P'ZV Leakage Max Leakage REMARKS: 10.89 cc/min. (~ 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CM CULAT:"D BY: DATi: R&T RZVZEW: DATi: (i R. C.D.T. GAS AHALYZER MZGZHATiON NO. 123 (BOTTOM) QT I I I I I I I Vent Here I from , BCDT 1717 I I I I I I I I I 1655 PIV 1789 1709F Conn. Hl 1022E Rotameter Serial 8 meter Flow PIV 1789 cc/min Air Temperature (t) F cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) X ( <60 ) 0 530 0 ~ o cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F =.. (cc/min. (I 0 six and 70 F) 5.08 PXV Leakage
- x. Leakage is 10.89 REPAS:
cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F. 0 cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F. 0 CALCULATED BY: R 6 T REVIiV: DATE: DATE: I ~ ~ ~ ~ AM~L:M~ COOL='lT SYS ~ ~= XCcSS L- 'DON KX (S~+- PWcTRAT.ION NO. 124 CC Supply to CV
- fOV 817 C Pumps 815A tuz.
EYom he" CV users I g u <sr M Q'J &Is I I ~&9 A. I AOV 906 res I pzv IQ 2727 I COLL% B3 742C 2776 J CONNi Bl Excess letdo~-.. to sumD Ins-de C.V. I I f 743 l 742A. ( 22 2728 I CONN B2 OUTSIDE CV I A7m 619o 2723 MOV 813 To othe" CV use"s t ~ ~ s PT-23.5OC: P COi~ITAIRKR~IT POST ACCID gd'x AIR SQIPTZ Abfi. BLDG. PEIZTHATXON HO. IH Conn.+ I Bl to C Fan I I I I I I Bottom B3 4 Common Return I I I I 1 L-C-PIV 1569 L.C. PIV 1572 1570 Conn. B2 1573 Conn. B4 L.C. 1571 L.C. 1574 TEST l'Il (TOP LINE) Rotameter Serial I PIV 1569 Rotameter Plow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. op cc/min. 0 0 psig and 70 P (Rocamacac Plow) 3 ( ) 4 0 530 460 + t cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 P (cc/min. (I 0 osi and 70 r) o 0 5.08 PIV Leakage Max. Leakage is RRw-aging: cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 P. 29.04 cc/min. (I 60 psig and ?0 P. CALCUI %TED BY: DATE: R & T REVIE)v.'ATE: ~~~ k PT 23.29 AUXILIARYCOOLANT SYSTEM FROi4f "B" REACTOR COOLANT PUiifP PENETRATION NO. 125 754 B 756B fromm "8'CP IN 765A I I I I I I I l25 Vi PIV 759B TE-612 762B to Cont. Sump 758B 2731 Conn. Bl Rotameter Serial (l Ro ta me te r F low Air Temperature (t) PIV 759B cc/min. OF 0 cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F = cc/min. 9 60 psig and" 70 F = (Rotameter Flow ) X ~60 + t (cc/min. 8 0 osiR and 70 F ) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max. Leakage is cc/min. 9 60 psig. and -70oF and 70 F REMARKS: C Calculated by: Date:. RE~ Review: .. ate: PT-23 ~ 25: 3 PT 23.28 AUXILIARYCOOLANT SYSTEM FROM "A" REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 754A 756A PENETRATION NO. 126 765 D I I I I I I I 0 from "A" RC2 757A to Cont. Sump 765 C 758k. I I I I I I'I I I PIV 759A 2729 Conn. Bl Qo 762A Rotameter Serial. 8 Rotameter Fl.ow Air Temperature (t) PIV 759A cc/min. OF cc/min. 8 0 psig and-70 F = (Rotameter Flow ) X 0 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 8 0 osia and 70 F ) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage is cc/min. 8 60 psig. and 70oF 0 116. 14 cc/min. 6 60 ps ig. and 70 F REMARKS: Calculated'y: R:.;& T'eview: Date: Date: ~~ > ~ ~ V ~ PT-23.26:4 PT 23.26 AUXILIARYCOOLANT SYSTEM TO "A" REACTOR COOLANT PUMP PENETRATION NO. 127 rm I I I I I I I I to other C. C. users m C.V. 752A 753A 761F PIV 750A 750C Conn. Bl 749A 2761 I I I I I I I Conn. B2 I 2730 Conn. B3 from C. C. Pump Rotameter Serial /I Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) PIV 750A cc/min. F cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) X 530 1/2 460 + t cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max. Leakage REMA1KS: cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F 230.0 cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F CALCULATED BY:. R&T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ~r J ~ PT-23;27:4 PT 23 ~ 27 AUXILIARYCOOLANT SYSTEM TO "B" REACTOR COOLANT PUMP'ENETRATION NO. 128 rm I I I I I I I to other C. C. users in C.V. 752B 753B 75lE ,'g4 750D Conn. Bl Pr.V 750B I I I I I I I I 274l 749B Conn. B2 M from C. C. Pump 2732 Conn. B3 Rotameter Serial // Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) PIV 750B cc/min. F cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage ~ cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage 230.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F EKHAEKS: CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW: DATE DATE J P R.C.D.T. GAS HEADER PENETRATION NO. 129 I I lo cad<~ 8 PTV 1787 SIV 1786 167> 167 o to Vent Header Conna 32 1716A 167 6A. Qs 1015 Conn. B1 1793 2rv 1713 1014 '08 (brcak cub~~8 ccnn. here for vent) to H2 Supply Rotometer Serial 0 Rotometer Flow Air mperature (t) PIV 1787 cc/min. SIV 1786 cc/min. F PIV 1713 cc/min. F CC I 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotometer Flow) Z ( 460 + t ) 0 530 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70oF = (cc/min. I 0 si 5.08 and 70oF) PIV Leakage cc/min. I 60 psig and 70 F, AOV 1787. Max. Leakage is 29.04 cc/min. I 60 psig and 70 F, AOV 1787. SIV Ieakage Max. Leakage PIV Ieakage Max. Leakage is REMARKS'c/min. I 60 psig and 70 F, AOV 1786. 29.04 cc/min. I 60 psig and 70 F, AOV 1786. cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F, Check Valve 1713. 58.00 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F, Check Valve 1713. C4LC'uLATED BY: R 6 T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ~ g t ~ r \\ REACTOR SUPPORT COOLING ( I'N 8c OUT ) PE¹TRATIOKS, PT 23 ~ .6 FO ~ 130 Ee ZO ~ 13K: TO ~ C PUMPS I Conn. B6 I I I I I Q4o gyp 8 SZ5'A BIGK POI>K VEHTS 27% 2733 MOV 823 I Conn. B5 I I I I I I I MOV 82,7 I corn I B3 I I I COHK OUTSIDE C.V. 2725/ 2726 REACTOR SUPPORT COOLERS INSIDE C.V. g 2723 COHÃ E2. 2724 I I corer 32 I I I I I OUTSIDE C V. ON RETUHK VALVES 759 s 759 3 745 TQ SUPPORT VALV 74.9 A 74.9 3 >Q.ZUAL VAL7r. 742 ~ ~ + 4 PT 23.34 DEPRESSUHIZk'ION AT POMER PEhrTMTIOH NO. 132 PIV 7970 IN I I I I I I 2214 SIV 7971 to Auz. Bld~. Charcoal Palter Conn. Bl tameter Serial fj 1 Rotameter Flow Air Temperatore (t) PIV 7970 cc/min. F SIV 7971 cc/min. F cc/min. 6 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) X ( 460 + t ) '530 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 6 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max. Leakage is cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F. 174.21 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F. SIV Leakage Hax. Leakage is cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F. 174.21 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F. CALCULATED BY: R 8 T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ac~ \\" 4 ~r ~ ~ ~ R. C. 0. T. 9 "SC:"'='?.G: vV'~~ )ITI l'lf << ~ f PT-23.22:4 ffBff $ BY MOV'-851's I I I f=o.. C c Igl Ilg I I 'we '2 I'r 4 51V 003 'A" 8431 8432 Conn B2 PIU 1721 l7QOG Conn. Bl pi+ 100 ~ to RCD: p"".p~ Rotameter Serial 8 Rotaraeter Flow Air Temperature (t) PIV-1721 cc/rain. SIV-1003A B cc/min. cc/min. 6 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) X( 530 i460 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage. cc/min. I 60 psig 6 700F MAX Leakage is 116.14 cc/min. 9 60 psig 8 70 F REMARKS SIV 1003A Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig 8 70 F MAX I,eakage is 87.11 cc/min. 9 60 psig 6 70~F REMARKS: REACTOR COttPART ttT COOLItIG 'NITENETRATIONS 201 TOP AÃ) 209 BOTTO'ti 4625 4626 PI 2231 4775A 4589 SIV 4757 4775 PI 2232 4590 I I I In C.V. I I 4794U I I I I I I ( PIV 201T 3 209B azacTOR I I COiIPARTia1E~(TI COOLER I 1A I I I I I I I D I 4759 SIV 4758 4638A 4624 Rotameter Serial // "-Located in 1D Recirc. Fan Plenum SECONDARY 4757 SECONDARY 4758 Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. OF cc/min. oF cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Plow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV RCC "A" Hx SIV Leakage 4757 SIV Leakage 4758 REMARKS: cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70oF COMPLETED BY: DATE COMPLETED: SHIFT FOREMAN: RESULTS AND TEST REVIEW: DATE ~ < e J 1 t,~ REACTOR COiMPARTMEViP COOLING UNIT "B" PEViETRATZOViS 209 TOP AND 201 BOTTOM PT-23.38:4 4625 PX 2140. 4512 PIV I I Zn C.V. I I I I J 041 I 209T I I I 2141 l I I I I ,F2 201B 4588 4658 4624 ea 4626 4637A SIV 4635 4637 I I REACTOR I I COMPARTMEVi'I I COOLER I 1B I I I I I I 4776 SIV 4636 4776A Rotameter Serial 8 tameter Flow Temperature (t) SECONDARY 4635 cc/min, oF SECONDARY 4636 cc/min. oF cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV RCC "B" HX SIV Leakage 4635 SIV Leakage 4636 REMARKS: cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70~F cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70~F cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F COHPLETED BY: DATE COMPLETED: SHIFT FOREMAN: RESULTS AND TEST REVIEW: DATE ~ ~ t ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ PT-23..51B:4 "B" HYDROGEN RECOMBINER PILOT AND MAIN c PENETRATION NO. 202 2ft 3/4" 8427 8428 CONN B-3 IN I I I/ I I I ) I I L.C. 1076B PIV L.C. 1075B CONN. Bl S SIV IV3B TO H2 RECOMBINER PILOT BURNER I TO H2 RECOMBINER 8425 8426 CONN B-4 I l I I I 1084B PIV SIV IV5B 1083B CONN. B2 MAIN BURNER h w w ear Pz-23.ps: 4 ~~~~ P~SSUEK SENSING THANSMITTEPg 'PT 47 4 PEHEZRATI01J N0. 20'onn. Bl (open pipe I I I I I I I I I PT-947 PT-948 1819C 1819D (ControDed Tnt. Bldg. ) Rotameter Serial ik PRIMARY ameter Flow Axr Temperature(t) cc/min. 'F I'0 cc/mia. 0 0 paig aad 70'F = (Rotameter Flow) X/60 + t cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PXV Leakage Max Leakage REMARKS: 10.89 cc/min. (I 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. (I 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: R&TREVIEW'ATE 'ATE' f~ ~ ~ J 0 PT-23.50B:3 CONTAI&IENT POST ACCIDENT AIR SA".PLE (CONTROLLED INT. BLDG.) PENETRATION NO. 203 I I I Conn. B3 Bottorn C or.".znon Return I I I I sVQ I I I I I I L.C. PIV 1563 L.C. PIV 1566 1564 Conn. B2 1567 Conn. L.CD 1565 L.C. 1568 TEST i"1 (TOP LINE) Rotameter Serial PIV 1563 Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. OF cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F 0 cc/min. 9 60 ps'g and 70 F = 0 (Rotameter Flow) X, 530 - 460 + t i (cc/min. 8 0 osie anc 70 F) 0 5.08 PIV Leakage Miax. Leaicage is
- 29. 04 cc/min 8 60 psig
& 70 F 0 cc/min 9 60 psig & 70 F Calculated By: R & T Review: Date: Date: y ~l PT-23.3S:4 PT-~. 35 PURGE SUPPLY XN I I PXV 5870 8074A SXV 5869 8074 AIR SUPPLY Conn. Bl P Pf sig sig Tf V =, 103 Ft3 F F Time Time f QTime-Hr Hr Hr 2.7 ( si + 14.7 sia) F= 460 lb/ft V - 103 ft ( 3 1 P2-2.7 ( W 103 ft ( 3 2 lb/ft ) si + 14.7 sia) F 460 lb/ft ) lb. lb lb/ft PN= ( ) ( Hr) lb/hr cc 471.6 ( min lb/hr) lb/ft ) cc/min leakage TE: Use smallest density calculated (lb/ft ) in cc/min calculation. 3 CALCULATED BY: REVlEKD BY: DATE: DATE: PT-23.12C:3 R.C.S, SAMPLE LOOP B PENETRATION No. 205 IN C.V. 955 I 1 I I I Ioil I I I I I I t I I 956D Conn. Bl PIV 966C I IN Sample Room I I I I I I I I 956B I 999C I I I I Rotameter Serial 8 PIV-AOV 966C SIV-V 956B otameter Flow Air Temperature(t) cc/min. 'F cc/min. 530 cc/min. 0 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Flow) x(460 + t/ cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage SIV Leakage Max Leakage 110.89 10.89 cc/min. (< 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. (t 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ~ p I 1 'i PRESSURIZER LIQUID SPACE SAMPLE PENETRATION NO. 206 (Top) PT-23. 12B: 3 I IN C.-V. I I I I I I 953 L. 956 956H Conn. Bl PIV 966B IN Sample Room I I I I I I I I I 956A I 999D I J Rotameter Serial t Rotameter Flow Air Temperature(t) PIV-AOV 966B cc/min. 'F SIV-V 956A cc/min. 'F f 530 ') Yo2r cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Flow) x4460 + ti'c/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70'F)
- 5. 08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage SIV Leakage Max Leakage 110.89 10.89 cc/min.
6 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: "A" STEAM GENERATOR SAMPLE PENETRATION NO. 206 (Bottom) PT-23.13A:3 N CV I I I I I I I I I I I ~ Conn. Bl (Tubing Fitting) 5749 ) IN Sample Room I I I I I I I I I PIV I 5735 "Tubing Fithing 992 for Vent" I I I I Blowdown ( Line Rotameter Serial /I PIV 5735 otameter Flow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. F cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Plow) x 530 460 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F ~ (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage 110.89 REMARKS: cc/~in. 8 60 psig & 70 F cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ~ ~ + 1 PT-23.12A:3 PRESSURIZER STEAM SPACE SAMPLE PENETRATION NO. 207 (TOP) IN C.V. l ~ I I j I I 011 951 956F 956G PIV 966A IN Samp 1e Room I I I I = I I I I 956C I 999E Conn. B1 I V Ro t arne ter Serial lP Rotameter Flow Air Temperature(t) PIV-AOV 966A cc/min. SIV-V 956C cc/min. 'F f 530 )'/~ cc/min. g 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Flow) x(460 + tJ cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'7 = (cc/min. (~ 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage SIV Leakage Max Leakage 110.89 10.89 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 6 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ~ ~ ~ "B" STEAM GENERATOR SAMPLE PENETRATION NO. 207 (Bottom) 4 IN CV I I I I I j's I I I I I I I 5734 5753 Conn. Bl PIV 5736 5754 I I I l I from S.G. I Blowdown Line I .I 992 t IN Sample Room I I I I Tubing Fitting I for Vent I Rotameter Serial 8 Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) PIV 5736 cc/min. F cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) x ( 530 $ 460+ t cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F Max Leakage 110.89 cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: R&T R~IEV: ~ ~ J I PT-23.51C:3 "A" AND "B" HYDROGEN RECOMBINER O'MAGEN KAKEfJP PENETRATION NO. 210 IN CONN. B-1 CONN. B-2 8424 1079 (NORTH SIDE) S S TO "A" RECONBINER 8423 TO C.V. RECIRC. SYSTEf L. C.. I 1080A I PIV I I I 1V-2A SIV 1V-2B SIV 1V-1A 1V-1B TO "B RECONBINER (SOUTH SIDE) ROTchMETER SERIAL i'3 ROTA.fETER PLOW AIR T~ERATURE (t) PIV 1080A cc/min OF SIV IV2A, IV2B cc/min QF cc/min (f 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) Z ( 0 530 ) 460 + t cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F ~ (cc/min (f 0 osiu and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage i~fax. Leakage is SIV Leakage Max. Leakage is SIV Leakage 'fax. Leakage is REMARKS: cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. 58.07 cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. 58.07 cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. 58.07 cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. CALCULATED BY: R & T REVIEW: DATE: DATE' ~ gt P PT-23. 36:4 PT-23.36 PURGE EXHAUST PENETRKTI'ON NO. '300 I IN I I Os 8050 AIR SUPPLY PIV 5878 SIV 5879 8052 Conn. Bl 8049' Pi P a f sig Sig Ti .s" f V 103 ft3 op Time Time f Qx~e Hr Hr Hr 2.7 ( W ~ 103 ft ( 3 1 p z - z.v W2 ~ 103 ft ( 3 ~W - ( t cc ~ 471 6 ( min ) ( Hr) lb/ft ) lb/hr) lb/ft ) si + 14. 7 sia) P + 460 lb/ft ) 3 si + 14.7 sia) P + 460 lb/ft lb lb/ft lb lb/hr cc/min leakage OTE: Use smallest calculated density (lb/ft ) in cc/min. calculation. 3 CALCULATED BY'EVIF~ BY: DATE: . DATE: ~ t I' Cl PT"23.40:4 AUXILIARYSTEAM SUPPLY AND CONDENSATE RETURN PENETRATION NO. 301 6 303 PEN 301 95 I I 6151 I I I 79 75 ) EN 303 I 4 I IL 7949 Conn. Bl 6165 B3 Strainer Space Heaters 6175 I. I 7950 Conn. B2 TEST gl: Rotameter Serial 0 PIV MANUAL VALVE 6151 Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. I 60 psig and 70~F cc/min. I 60 psig and 70 F cc/min. oF 530 (Rotameter Flow) X 460 + t (cc/min. 6 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage MAX Leakage 58.07 REMARKS: cc/min. 9 60 psig 6 70 F cc/min. 6 60 psig S 70 F CALCULATED BY: RS(T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: ~ ~ t p, CS ~ ~ ~ PT-Z3.51A:4 "A" HYDROGEN RECOMBINER (PILOT AND MAIN PENETRATION NO. 304 2" 8433 IN L.CD 084A PIV SIV TO H RECOMBINER MAIN BURNER 8434 Conn. B-3 1083A CONN. Bl 3/4lt 8435 8436 L.C. 1076A PIV SIV IV3A TO H2 RECOMBINER PILOT BURNER Conn. B-4 1075A CONN. B2 y ~ ~ ~ ~ PT-23.15:3 PENETRATION NO. 305 (BOTTOM) CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE OUT. ( 'onn. Bl (open pipe) IN ( t I I tlg 59 I 1597 1594 to Air Sampler Iodine Monitor 1595 1593 Rotameter Serial 8 PIV-AOV 1597 SIV-V 1596 Air Temperature(t) cc/min. cc/min. 'F P 530 cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F ~ (Rotameter Flow) x(460 + t/ cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage SIV Leakage Max Leakage 29.04 29.04 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: J J CONTAINMENT AIR SA%'LE INLET PT-23.14:3 PENETRATION NO. 305 (To ) Conn. Bl IN I I l Test Conn. (open pipe) 1" Pipe Plug to 3/8 Swedgelock Fitting PIV 1599 1580 SI 1598 Conn. B2 Rotameter Serial // PIV 1599 SIV AOV 1598 Rotameter Flow r Temperature(t) cc/min. F cc/min F 530 cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) x 460 + t cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage SIV Leakage Max Leakage 58.0 29.04 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70 F cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW'ATE'ATE' PT-23.50A:4 CONTAIVii!ENT POST ACCIDENT AIR SfQPLE CLEAN INT. BLDG. ) PENETRATION NO. 305 I 1 I I I I Cow Jl TOD to D Pan L.C. PIV ~554 L.C. 1555 Conn. n2 L.C. 1556 L.CD ConM3 I Corn 55 I I I I I I I I I l 3~,Iiddle to A. Pan Bottom Common Return PIV 1557 L.C. PIV 1560 ~ 558 1559 Conn'4 L~ C ~ 1562 Conn. TEST Pil (TOP LINK) Rotameter Serial !2 Rotameter Flow PIV 1554 cc/min. OF Air Temperature (t) / cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter 'Flow)- x 530 460+ t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 osis and 70 F)
- 5. OS PIV Leakage
~!ax. Leakage RE'f QKS cc/min. Q 60 psig and 70 F 29.04 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIE!4: DATE: DATE: FIRE SERVICE WATER PENETRATION 307 IN PT-23 ~52:4 TO CONTAINMENT 923l HOSE REELS PIV 9229 9230 I I I I I 9228i SIV 9227 9225 9226
- CONN, B2 CONN ~
B3
- CONN, Bl Rotameter Serial 0
Rotameter Flow Air Temperature '(t) PIV"9229 cc/min. 'F SIAV-9227 cc/min. 'F 530 /min. 9 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Flow) x 460 +t) PIV Leakage I Max. Leakage 230 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F. REMARKS: cc/min. Q 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. (~ 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F. SIV Leakage cc/min. (t 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage 116.14 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: R 6 T REVIEW: DATE'ATE: v PT-23. 44 LEAKAGE TEST/DEPRESSURZZATZON ~orms B1 PIV (blind Range) I I I I I I I Conn. B2 147 I I I I I I I PENETRATION NO. 309 SIV 7445 ~ Conn'3 (blind Qange on Int.'ldg. rooi) Rotameter Serial 8 Rotameter Flow P Air Temperature (t) PIV BLIND FLANGE cc/min. F SIV 7445 cc/min. F cc/min. 6 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max. Leakage REHARKS: 10.00 cc/min. Cd 60 psig and 70 F cc/min 8 60 psig and 70 F 0 SIV Leakage Max. Leakage is 174.21 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 oF cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F 0 Calculated by: R 6 T Review: Date: Date: ~ )P PT 23'3 SERVICE AZH PKKTEKTZOH HO. 310 (BOTTOM) PT-23.33:4 PIV 7227 7226 7228 Conn. Bl To User Outlet Valves I I I I I I ~+>< gc.+~,ccrc I / I I I I 34 7222 I I I I I I ~ 7141 7221 Conn. B2 Conn. B3 to House 714P S eFv1ce 3 1x Rotameter Serial fP PIV-V-7226 SIV-V-7141 eter Plow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. 'F cc/min. 'F cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70 F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X 530 0 1/2 ~60 + e cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70'F ~ (cc/min. i~ 0 psig and 70'F 5.08 PIV Leakage Max. Leakage is SIV Leakage Max Leakage 58.07 cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70'F. 116.0 cc/min. (> 60 psig and 70'F. ~ cc/min. (I 60 psig & 70'F. cc/min. (I 60 psig & 70'F. CALCULATED BY: DATE: R & T REVIEW: DATE: PZ-"3.>2 32lSTKiKZ ATZ iZETMZGIT PIO. 310 (KP) PT-23-32 4 I ZT I I I I o Serg C. V-5394 Conn. Bl 5395 j'IU >393 I I I 5395', Conn. B2 I SIV5392'ROif control 5397 4.ir Sup. Rotameter Serial /$ Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) PIV"5393 cc/min. SIV-5392 cc/min. OF 530 cc/min. I 0 psig and 70~F = (Rotameter Flow) X 460 + t cc/min. 9 60 'psig and 70 F =.(cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage 'AX Leakage is SIV Leakage MAX Leakage is REMARKS: cc/min. 9 60 psig. and 70 F 116.0 cc/min. 9 60 psig. and 70 F cc/min. 9 60 psig..and .70 F 58.07 cc/min. I 60 psig. and 70 F CALCULATED BY: RGT REVIEW: DATE: DATE: 4 ~1 LEAKAGE ~T - DEPHESSURZKAQLOH PT-23.42:3 HZLTRATZOM il'O. 313 ~ OQzlo rzv (br d a ge) I I I I I I Conn. B2i(44'I ~ Col!Z1 ~ (Blind Qange on Int. Bldg. rooi) Rotameter Serial // Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) PIV BLIND FLANGE cc/min. oF SIV 7444 cc/min. oF ( 530 $ /2 cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70OF = (Rotameter Flow) K 460 + t.j cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV I,eakage Max. I,eakage RE>IARKS: cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70~F 10.00 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F SIV Leakge Max. Leakage REMARKS: cc/min. g 60 psig 8 70 F 174.21 cc/min. 9 60 psig 8 70 F CALCULATED BY DATE RGT REVIEW DATE i ~l LE'AGKZ TEST - SUPPLY HEADER PE~@ RATION NO. 317 I I I I I Conn. B2 Conn. Bl. rlV (blind flange) I I I I I I SIV 7443 7441~ 7442 ~sr Rotameter Serial ff Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) PIV-BLANK FLANGE cc/min. OF SIV 7443 cc/min. ,OF cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) X ( 0 530 ) 460 + t cc/min. 8 60 psig and. 70 F (cc/min. (t 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage Max. Leakage is REMARKS: 10.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. SIV Leakage'ax. Leakage is 174.21 REMARKS: cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. 0 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. CALCULATED BY: R & T REVIEW: DATE: DATE: 4l "A" STZA~ GENERATOR. BLOTCH)OI'TN PBZTHATZON HO. 321 from I I I I I I I 5701 9752 PIV 5738 D 5765 9516A 95163 to Blovrdovrn Tank to Blowdown Conn. Sl {tubing fitting) 5751 to Sample System Rotameter Serial 8 tameter Flow PIV S738 cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70 F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 0 60 psig and 70 F ~ cc/min. 6 0 si and'70 F) S.08 PIV Leakage Max. Leakage 408.07 1U2fARKS: cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 P C 4':QLATED BY: RGT REVISIT: DATE: DATE: "B" STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN PENETRATION NO. 322 I I I I ~ 28 from lgl I I l l l l l l 5702 5756 PIV 5737 5755 Q onn. 331 (till)i?lgfitting) Drain Valve 5766 o Slowdown T RXLK 9516G to Blowdc 9517A to Sazrple Systezn Rotameter Serial 8 PIV 5737 tameter Flow Air Temperature (t) cc/min. OF cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F ~ cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 1/2 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage is 408.07 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW: DATE DATE DEMINERALIZED WATER PEG;TRATION NO. 324 To Outlet Valves in Containment 8422 PIV 8419. 8421 Conn. B2 IN I I I I 04' I SIV I '8418 I 8420 I I I Conn. B3
- 5021, 5023 Conn.
Bl Rotameter Serial /3 Rotameter Flow Air Temperature (t) P IV-8419 cc/min. OF SIV-8418 cc/min. OF ( 530 cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) x $460 + t .cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage 'Max. Leakage RQfARKS: 116.00 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. SIV Leakage 'Max. Leakage is +a.
- 58. 07 cc/min.
8 60 psig and 70 F. cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. CALCULATE BY: R & T'EVIEW: DATE: DATE: em CONTAINMENT PRESSURE SENSING TRANSMITTERS PT-949 & PT-950 PT"23 '7C:4 PENETRATION NO. 332 1819G Qa~o .1819:" P 9-"9 I 3 1819'onn. Bl (open pipe) (Clean Int. Slag. ) Rotameter Serial 8 (-",:!) otameter Flov Air Temperature(t) PRIMARY cc/min. 'F 530 cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flo~) X(460 + tj cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'.F = (cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F)
- 5. 08 PIV Leakage Max Leakage REHARKS:
10.89 cc/min. 8 "60 psig & 70'F cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY'&T REVIEW: DATE'ATE: l PT-23.45:4 ~PT-23.45 LEAKAGE TEST/INSTRUMENTATION PENETRATION NO. 332 PIV I 45A i Q4 8439 7e48 45C 5B PIV 045A l~ 45B ~~4 8438 7452 Conn. Bl 45B 45C 045A IN C.V. PIV !j3 I 45C I 48 Conn. B2 CL~~f WiT. BLDG. 8437 7456 - l'EST $/45A Rotameter Serial 8 Rotameter Flow Air Temperature PIV /Pl Conn. B3 cc/min. F I'c/min. 6 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) x 530 460 + t cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV I,eakage Max. Leakage 10.89 cc/min. 6 60 psig. and 70 F 0 cc/min. 6 60 psig. and 70 F