ML17261A326

Forwards Comments on NRC 810727 Draft Evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation Sys. Two Oversize Drawings Encl.Aperture Cards Are Available in PDR

ML17261A326
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/30/1981
From:	Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17261A327	List: ML17261A326 ML17261A328 ML17261A329
References
TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8201060307
Download: ML17261A326 (146)

Text

REGULATOR> 'INFORHATIOt<<'ISTRIBUTION S -

TEN ('RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR;8201060307 DOC ~ DATE: 81/12/30 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50"240 Rober t Emmet Ginna Nu'clear Pl anti Unilt 1 i Rochester G 05000240 AUTH. NAt<E AUTHOR AFF IL I ATION HAIERi J E Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corp.

RECIP ~ NANE . RECIPIENT AFFILIATION CRUTCHFIELD,D, Operating Reactors Branch 5

SUBJECT:

Forwards comments on NRC:810727'.draf-t~ evaluati.on of SEP Topic -VI""4i,"Containment Isolation.Sys,,"'wo oversize drawings encl. Aperture cards are available in ~PDR ~

S. A~ &~iA4,c, <~+~

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A 35S COPIES IRECEIVED:LTR, g ENCL, SIZE:

TITLE: SEP Topi cs NOTES:1 copy;SEP 'Sects Ldr ~ 05000240

~ 9 ~%~ KC -3 >~M R CIPIENT <<COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAPE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAVE LVTR ENCL ACTION: ORB P5 BC 01 7 '7 INT<<ERNAL: IE 06 2 '2 NRR/DE/ADAGE 13 1 1 NRR/DE/HGEB 10 2 2 NRR/DL/ORAB 11 1 1 NRR/D PB 12 3 <<3 NRR/DSI/CSB 07 1 1 FILE 04 1 1 EXTERNAL: ACRS 14 10 10 LPDR 03 NRC PDR 02 1 1 NTIS 5 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIEB REQUIRED; 4TTR + ENCL

I 0

flail HEW lMl0 t suzzzzzrz zzizzrzrz saic issustrz ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN E. MAILER TKLKPHONC Vke Preadent AREA CODE Tld 546.2700 December 30', 1981 gFCF)VED JAN6 1982t 8 g g4fg 5glNNl ONQS Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation gage eamtN 8 8

ATTN: Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief

'JlOC Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Crutchfield:

Your letter dated July 27, 1981 forwarded the NRC draft -evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isola-tion System. RGE has reviewed the evaluation and pro-vides the comments found in Attachment A to this letter in response.

The RGE comments define the basis upon which the specific containment isolation provisions at the Ginna Plant are judged to be acceptable. The comments also address two specific issues pointed out, in your letter, the location of both isolation valves outside contain-ment and use of a check valve as an isolation valve outside containment. Our understanding is that these comments will be used as input to the integrated safety assessment for the Ginna Plant.

Very truly yours, n E. Maier 820i060307 05000244 Bii230 Fi, PDR ADOCK PDR

0 I L

1y 1

Cw.~

P'"

I' ~

Pj pl f.-r

'I g" lt 4 )

a

/~>

) N.~)> ~ ~

~~a~~~ ~

g g, g Shoo 0~7 ATTACHMENT A Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield's letter dated July 27, 1981 forwarded the.NRC Staff draft, evaluation report of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System. The draft evaluation compared our facility, as described in the FSAR, with the General Design Criteria of Appendix A to 10CFR Part 50. Our comments on the draft evaluation are presented below.

The specific criteria which were applied to the Ginna containment isolation system design are given in FSAR sections 1.3 and 5.2.

The FSAR criteria are based upon the proposed Atomic Industrial Forum versions of the criteria issued for comment by the Atomic Energy Commission on July 10, 1967. These criteria cover overall containment capability, containment leakage, materials, valving, and testing. The governing criterion was that the structure be designed to withstand the initial effects of gross equipment failures including reactor coolant pipe guillotine breaks and to retain for as long as reguired the functional capability of the containment to avoid undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The criteria which were applied to containment and containment isolation are numbers 10, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, and 57.

The current criteria give specific isolation arrangements which are now used to provide redundant isolation and protection of the public. The design used at Ginna also called for redundant, isolation but differs in specific applications from the current prescriptions.

No bases are given for the prescriptions of GDC 55, 56 or

57. For example, no basis is provided for the requirement that check valves not be used as isolation valves outside containment.

It is true that check valves will seal more tightly with a higher differential pressure across the seat. Thus, check valves should perhaps be the first of two isolation valves where the redundant barriers are both provided in the form of valves. This will assure the best seat seal. Valves outside the containment will function at least as well as those inside containment, where an adverse accident environment may exist. For valves inside containment to be effective in isolating the accident environment, the pipe between the valve and the containment wall must remain intact.

Valves outside containment are also effective only if the pipe between the containment wall and the valve remains intact. In either case, there is no mechanistic effect from a LOCA which would damage the pipe, however, piping outside the containment is inherently better protected from pipe whip, jet impingement, or

~yp J

I P p,

I 4$

high temperature or caustic environments which may exist following an accident.

Section III.4.2.2 of WASH 1400 gives failure rates of valves including motor operated valves, 'air operated valves and check valves. Check valves have the lowest failure rate and are approxi-mately one order of magnitude better than motor operated valves, and a factor of 3 better than air operated valves. The valves are periodically tested in the post accident configuration. Thus check valves along with other types of valves provide acceptable isolation outside containment.

The most likely cause of containment, leakage following an accident. is valve leakage caused by valves failing to close when actuated or* failing to seat. tightly. Passive, closed mechanical systems or pipes represent relatively insignificant leakage paths as demonstrated by periodic testing of containment isolation systems. No significant leaks, other than through valves, caps or flanges have been observed during containment, testing of fluid systems at Ginna. Therefore, location of isolation valves outside containment does not represent a significant increased risk of leakage. The valves may be less susceptible to leakage outside containment following a LOCA because they are accessible for repair.

The NRC draft SEP evaluation compared the FSAR configuration with current GDC confiqurations and judged them acceptable because they meet current configuration requirements, judged them acceptable on some other defined basis as permitted by the GDCs, or described changes to the configurations which would meet the prescriptions of the current GDCs.

The NRC draft evaluation referenced drawings from the FSAR for specific containment penetrations. Some of these drawings do not represent the current. plant,'configuration. Enclosed, is Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valves,. Amendment 42 to the Ginna license, which was submitted and approved in response to the NRC request for TMI Lessons Learned Technical Specifications. This table lists all the containment penetrations and isolation valves.

One change has been made to the plant since this table was submitted.

Penetration 318 (35 on the NRC list) for the dead weight tester as een ecommissioned and is now capped and tagged close to the containment wall both inside and outside containment. This table has been modified to include the normal, shutdown and post-accident.

valve positions for all manual and power operated valves.

Also enclosed with this attachment, are individual fluid penetration drawings. Most of them have been taken from our Periodic Test procedures series (PT 23). For ease of correlation, each of the drawings has been labeled with the number used in the NRC draft evaluation as well as the penetration number assigned at Ginna. Some of the penetrations do not have a corresponding PT drawing because Type C testing is not reguired of all penetrations.

In such cases, a piping flow drawing depicts the penetration configuration.

i J'

~ JJ 1 P ir 1 y J J

4. ~

J 1JJ P

'l

All of the containment penetrations are addressed individually below. These discussions provide a basis upon which the con-tainment isolation configurations have been judged acceptable by RGE. The NRC reference number is given in parentheses behind the plant penetration designation. System flow diagrams are also referenced for some penetrations. Most. of the, referenced flow diagrams were provided by an RGE letter dated September 22, 1981.

Drawings 33013-521 and 33013-530 are included with this letter.

The discussions below describe only the isolation provisions which we considered in our evaluation although most lines penetrating containment have additional manual valves which could be used to isolate the lines. These manual valves are shown on the referenced drawings.

All of the automatic air operated containment isolation valves described below fail in the closed position. A loss of either vital DC control power or instrument air will cause the valves to close. Motor operated valves fail "as is" upon loss of AC power. All of the motor operated valves are powered from motor control centers on diesel backed buses. A loss of offsite power will not cause the valves to remain open.

All automatic containment isolation valves except the purge valves have a maximum closure time of 60 seconds as shown on Technical Specification Table 3.6-1. The purge valves must close in 5 seconds or less. Most automatic valves will close substantially sooner than the required 60 seconds.

A containment. isolation signal to automatic valves is generated by redundant and independent sensors. Containment isolation signals are generated by manual actuation or automatic safety injection which results from two out of three containment high pressure, two out of three low pressurizer pressure, or two out of three low steam line pressure in either loop. Containment ventilation isolation is actuated by the same signals and by the it p~

following additional siqnals; manual safety injection, manual containment spray and ezther high air particulate or gas radioactivity.

f 1 t' *h' t ',

Penetration 29 (12), the fuel transfer tube, was judged '1 is sealed by a double gasketed resilient seal flange. It is to the containment personnel hatch and the equipment hatch because leak tested in accordance with the requirements for Type B testing of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50. A manual valve outside containment provides an additional closure feature for this penetration although it is not, required for containment isolation.

Penetration 100 (7) (33013-433), the charging line, was judge accep e y the NRC because it is a closed safety grade system having a post accident, function. While it it is desirable to have charging remain functional after an accident is not required to meet accident analysis assumptions and therefore does not have a required post accident function. The system is closed outside containment and the positive displacement charging pumps act as a barrier to limit the portion of the system which may be

.yp 1 l P f

1 f

p ll

/q

exposed to containment pressure containment if check valve 370B inside fails. The system operates at a pressure (2250 psi) significantly greater than the peak containment pr'essure so that pipe leaks will be easily detected during normal operation and scheduled surveillance. Therefore check valve 370B inside containment and the seismic category 1 closed system outside containment provide acceptable containment isolation even system flow need not be maintained to mitigate an accident.

if the Penetrations 101 and 113 (17) (33013-425 and 432), the two safety zngectzon pene rations, were judged acceptable. These lines are closed systems having a post, accident. function which are fluid filled and in operation following a safety injection signal to mitigate accidents. Penetration 110 (16), shown on the same flow and PT drawings, is or t e sa ety injection test line.

Isolation valve 879 is .locked closed and is outside containment.

The test line inside containment and out to valve 879 is "in service" following initiation of safety injection and is pressurized by both of the SI pump trains. Pressurization of this line with SI fluid will prevent any of the containment atmosphere from actually reaching the isolation valve. There is no design basis event which would result in a rupture of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) and the SI test line outside containment.

The test line is pressurized on a monthly basis to approximately 1500 psi so that, flaws which might allow 60 psi containment atmosphere to escape would be detected and repaired. This arrange-ment and testing provides adequate assurance that. containment atmosphere will not leak through this penetration.

Penetration 102 (no NRC evaluation) (33013-433), the alter-nate c arguing 1.ne, is similar in function and arrangement to the charging line, penetration 100, which was judged acceptable by the NRC evalution. Both of these lines have two check valves inside the containment separating the charging lines from the reactor coolant system. One check valve in each line is inside the missile barrier and one check valve is outside the missile barrier. Each line also has an Air Operated Valve (AOV) inside containment but, outside the missile barrier so that LOCAs in the loop compartments will not effect these valves. The AOV in the charging line is normally open; the AOV in the alternate charging line is normally closed. Both fail closed on loss of instrument air which occurs with containment isolation. The closed charging system and positive displacement pumps provide another isolation barrier outside containment. Therefore this penetration has adequate containment isolation capability.

Penetration 103 (no NRC evaluation), the construction fire service water one zs no longer in use. A pipe cap inside containment and a locked close isolation valve outside containment form the penetration boundaries. This provides containment isolation equivalent to the current GDC requirements and is therefore acceptable.

P l

l I

Penetrations 105 and 109 (15) (33013-425 and 432), containment spray, xs a sa eguar s system which will be in operation following accidents when containment pressure is high. There are no events which could both cause a rupture of the reactor coolant system and at. the same time cause the containment spray line outside containment to be broken. These lines are pressurized by the containment spray pumps. This operation will prevent containment atmosphere from leaking from the containment. These penetrations are judged to be acceptable, similar to the safety injection lines.

Penetrations 106 and 110 (9) (33013-433), reactor coolant pump sea water zn e , are similar to the charging line of penetration 100. It should be noted that each of the RCP seal water inlet lines has two check valves inside containment, not one as shown on the FSAR drawing. These valves are shown on drawing 33013-433. One valve in each line (304A and 304B) is located outside the missile barrier near the containment wall.

The other valve in each line is inside the missile barrier.

Although not required by accident analyses it is desirable to maintain RCP seal injection flow following containment isolation to maintain the reactor coolant pumps operable in the normal mode. The charging and RCP seal injection system is a closed system outside containment and the positive displacement charging pumps act as a barrier to limit the portion of the system which may be exposed to containment. pressure if check valves 304A or 304B inside containment fail. The system operates at a pressure (2250 psi) significantly greater than the peak containment pressure so that pipe leaks will be easily detected during normal operation and scheduled surveillance. Therefore, check valves 304A and 304B inside containment and the seismic category 1 closed system outside containment provide acceptable containment isolation.

Penetration 107 (30) (33013-431), sump A discharge line, has two AOVs, ot ocated outside containment, which are tripped closed on an isolation signal. Current criteria would place one of these valves inside containment and the other outside. There is'no postulated event, however, which will both cause a LOCA and damage the normal sump line outside containment. The piping outside containment is periodically subjected to a leakage test during testing of the isolation valves. In addition, pumps are operating in the automatic mode and are not being if the operated manually by the operator, the pumps will be automatically tripped by a containment isolation signal. Following a LOCA the sump will be submerged and the isolation valves will not be exposed to a gas environment. Leakage through the valves will be smaller than that determined under gas testing conditions.

Therefore, the existing isolation provisions for this penetration are acceptable.

Penetration 108 (10) (33013-433), RCP seal water return and excess et own one is isolated from the closed chemical and volume control system outside containment by MOV 313 which receives a containment isolation signal. The single pipe penetration

P I

l P

t

'h *l i

( r e ~ 1

passes the combined flow from the excess letdown heat'exchanger, the RCP number 1 seal bypass lines and "the seal water return lines. The excess letdown line is normally not in service and is isolated from the seal water return line inside containment by HCV 123. This air operated valve, even if open, will fail closed soon after containment isolation because instrument air is auto-matically isolated and the pressure to hold HCV 123 open decays quickly. The RCP number 1 seal bypass lines are also isolated from the seal water return line by normally closed AOV 386 which also will fail closed after a containment isolation. The only remaining line which would not have redundant closed valves after an isolation signal is the small 3/4 inch seal water return line from each RCP. Normal flow through these lines is from the charging pumps. Should MOV 313 fail to close, the volume control tank can accept the seal flow (< 3 gpm) or prevent the release of accident pressure until manual valves 315A and 315C are closed.

Only one of these valves is open during operation so only one operator action is required in the event MOV 313 fails. Therefore adequate=-isolation capability exists with the current, design.

RHR Penetrations ill and 140 (6, 4) (33013-436), the RHR in and out znes, were gu ge acceptable in the draft evaluation.

Additional information concerning testing of the RHR valves was provided in an RGE letter from L. D. White, Jr. to Mr. Dennis R.

Ziemann, USNRC dated September 21, 1978.

Penetration 112 (8) (33013-433), letdown to the non-re-generative eat exc anger, was judged in the draft evaluation report to meet the current GDCs. There is a difference between the as-built plant and the FSAR diagram. The orifice isolation valves (AOVs 200A, 200B and 202) do not receive containment isolation, or T, signals but do fail closed on loss of instrument air when the instrument, air line is isolated. Further, AOV 427 upstream of the letdown orifices will be closed on low pressurizer level. This valve, however, is not outside the missile barrier and does not, qualify as a containment isolation valve. It also fails open on loss of air. AOV 371 and the closed chemical and volume control system outside containment provide adequate containment isolation capability even without the additional protection from the letdown orifice isolation valves.

Penetration 120 (no NRC evaluation) (A-202), nitrogen to accumu ators, as one air operated valve outside containment (AOV 846) which receives a containment .isolation signal and has a check valve (CV 8623) inside containment. This valve config-uration conforms to the current criteria and provides adequate isolation capability.

Penetration 120 (1) (33013-424), pressurizer relief tank gas analyzer one, xs 3 8 inch tubing isolated by air operated valve 539. This valve is automatically operated and is approximately 15 inches from the penetration. This location satisfies the guidance of Safety Guide 11 that the isolation valve be as close as practical to the containment. MV 546, a manual valve approxi-

J J

P C

I jf 4,

mately 8 inches from the containment, provides .redundant isolation capability should it be required. The leakage through MV 546 is periodically tested as is the leakage through AOV 539. The need for additional isolation capability will be evaluated during the integrated assessment.

Penetration 121 (2) (33013-424), nitrogen supply to pressurizer relic tan PRT , xs prote'cted by check valve 528 inside con-

~

tainment. and pressure control valve (PCV) 441 outside containment.

PCV 441 maintains the downstream pressure at a constant 0.5 psig.

If the PRT is ruptured and CV 528 fails and containment pressure is elevated above 0.5 psig, PCV 441 will be closed. Pressure outside the containment upstream of PCV 441 will be 100 psig toward the containment. preventing leakage. If the PRT is ruptured, CV 528 fails, and containment pressure is less than 0.5 psig PCV 441 may open in an attempt to raise the downstream piping pressure but 100 psig nitrogen flow toward the containment will prevent leakage. Manual valve 547 @ear the containment wall can be used in the long term to isolate the nitrogen supply line. Therefore, the isolation provisions for this penetration are acceptable in the current configuration.

Penetration 121 (3) (33013-424), reactor makeup water to PRT, xs protecte y check valve 529 inside containment and AOV 508 outside containment. The draft evaluation report noted only one apparent difference from current criteria; AOV 508 should close automatically. This valve does close automatically upon i receipt of a containment isolation signal. Therefore, this penetration is judged acceptable as presently configured.

Penetrations 121, 203 and 332 (no NRC evaluations), contain-ment pressure sensing transmitter lines, are small (3/8 inch) instrument sensing lines open to the containment. The pressure transmitters form the boundary of a closed system outside containment and are located close to the containment. penetration. These closed systems are small, passive systems not subject to damage as a result of a LOCA. The need to incorporate remote manual or excess flow check valves into these lines to bring them into compliance with current criteria will be evaluated during the integrated assessment.

g 1V*,' 'hM'gdI Penetration 123 (21) (33013-431), Reactor Coolant Drain Tank penetration 120, PRT to the gas analyzer. AOV 1789, receives an isolation signal and is less than 2 feet from the wall. MV 1655 is less than a foot from the wall and will provide redundant isolation capability should it, be required. MV 1655 is also periodically checked for leakage. The need for additional isolation capability will be evaluated during the integrated assessment'.

Penetration 124 (22 and 23) (33013-435), excess letdown heat exchanger aux'.ary coolant supply and return, was found acceptable in the NRC draft evaluation.

P P

I I

/1

Penetrations 124, 203 and 305 (no NRC evaluation), containment post acci ent air samp e ines, are small tubing penetrations which are closed during normal operation by at. least 2 boundaries.

Each line has,two manual valves located close to the containment wall. In addition, each line is fitted with a tubing cap. These lines are closed and would be opened only to take' sample following, an accident and then reclosed. This'alve arrangement and operatinq mode meets the intent of Safety Guide 11, Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor Containment. Therefore, these penetrations should be found acceptable in the current configuration.

Penetrations 125 and 126 (25) (33013-435), component cooling water rom t e reactor coo ant pumps, are protected by remote manual isolation valves MOV 759A and MOV 759B and by the closed auxiliary coolant system outside containment. It is desirable to maintain flow through these lines to facilitate operability of the reactor coolant pumps. Component cooling water cools the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier and protects the number one seal in the event the reactor coolant pumps are operating. The lines are not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are not connected directly to the containment atmosphere. This system arrangement. meets the requirements of GDC 57, the applicable design criterion. In addition, the closed system outside containment (operated at a normal pressure greater than containment accident pressure) provides further leak protection.

Penetrations 127 and 128 (24) (33013-435), component cooling water to RCP 1A an RCP 1B, are protected by check valves 750A and 750B inside containment and MOVs 749A and 749B outside con-tainment. The applicable GDC for these lines which are not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor'onnected directly to the containment atmosphere, is GDC 57. Only the remote manually operated MOVs 749A and 749B are required. In addition, the check valves inside containment and the closed system outside containment (operated at a normal pressure greater than containment accident pressure) provide further leakage protection. Therefore, the isolation capability which has been provided for this penetration exceeds that required by current criteria and the configuration should be found acceptable.

Penetration 129 (18 and 20) (33013-431), is the line for t

both e RCDT an PRT to the vent header and nitrogen supply to the RCDT. The vent header line contains two AOVs, 1787 and 1786 outside containment which both receive a containment isolation signal. The line outside containment is not subject to damage as a result of the LOCA and therefore both valves should be operable.

Both are subjected to periodic leak testing. The nitrogen supply line to the RCDT is similar to the nitrogen supply line to the PRT except that the check valve in the RCDT line is located outside containment. The nitrogen supply is normally closed because the vent header pressure is usually higher than the nitrogen control pressure ( 0.5 psig). If the RCDT is opened to containment atmosphere and the containment pressure is greater than 0.5 psig the line will remain closed. If the tank is open

l

f,t iI J' J ",

to containment atmosphere but the containment pressure is less than 0.5 psig the nitrogen control valve will maintain a flow of nitrogen toward the containment. Manual valve 1793 can be used in the long term to isolate the nitrogen line if necessary.

Therefore, the redundant isolation provisions on each of the lines at penetration 129 are adequate to prevent unacceptable leakage and are judged acceptable in the current configuration.

Penetrations 130 and 131 (39 and 40) (33013-435), reactor support coo ing ines in an out, are each provided with a single valve, MOV 813 and MOV 814, outside containment which receives a containment isolation signal. The reactor support cooler system is a closed passive system inside containment. and the component cooling water system is a closed system outside containment. The CCW system operates at a pressure higher than containment accident pressure. Thus, the closed CCW system and the automatic isolation valves provide redundant protection against leakage and meet the requirements of GDC 57, the applicable design criterion.

Penetration 132 (36) (33013-533), depressurization at power, was oun accept e with one automatic isolation valve inside containment (AOV 7970) and one automatic valve outside containment (AOV 7971).

Penetrations 141 and 142 (5) (33013-425 and 432), containment sump recircu ation ines, were found acceptable in the draft evaluation based on the guidance of SRP 6.2.4, item II.3. The valve arrangements for these penetrations are not the same as the diagram contained in the FSAR. One pair of valves is inside containment (MOVs 851A and B) and one pair of valves is outside containment (MOVs 850A and B), however, this arrangement is still acceptable based on SRP 6.2.4.

Penetration 143 (19) (33013-431), reactor coolant drain tank discharge, is iso a ed by series AOVs outside containment which are tripped closed on an isolation signal. Current criteria would place one of these valves inside containment. There is no postulated event, however, which will both cause a LOCA and damage the RCDT line outside containment. The piping outside containment is periodically subjected to a leakage test during testing of the isolation valves. Following a LOCA, the RCDT will be submerged and the isolation valves will not be subject to a gas environment.. Leakage through the valves during an accident will be smaller than that determined under gas testing conditions.

Therefore, the existing isolation provisions for this penetration are acceptable.

Penetrations 201 and 209 (41 and 42) (33013-529), service water to reactor compartment cooling units A and B, are provided with manual isolation valves outside containment on both the inlet and discharge piping of the coolers. The coolers'nd piping inside containment. form a closed system and are protected throughout. their length from missiles. Thus, the only deviation from the current criteria of GDC 57, the applicable criterion, is

P P

4 ft J

gl

<

ed with automatically operated valves, one inside containment and one outside containment. These penetrations were judged acceptable in the NRC draft evaluation. Penetrations 205, 206 to and 207 to (11) (33013-422), sample ones rom t e reactor coo ant system oops and the pressurizer, are 3/8 inch instrument lines which are provided with one automatic isolation valve outside containment. The lines also have an additional manual valve outside containment and an AOV inside the missile barrier in containment which will fail closed when the instrument air to containment is automatically isolated. The need for additional automatic isolation provisions will be evaluated during the integrated assessment. Penetrati'ons 206 bottom and 207 bottom (29) (33013-422), steam generator samp e xnes, were gu ge acceptable in the NRC draft evaluation. Penetrations 301 and 303 (44 and 45), auxiliary steam supply and con ensate return, serve the closed system heaters inside containment,. The entire system inside the containment is outside the missile barrier. Ther'efore, GDC 57 applies to these pene-trations. The manual valves outside containment (6151 and 6175) are locked closed during operation. This configuration meets the current criterion and is acceptable. 10- C R CI 4 Penetration 305 (14) (33013-533), containment air sample out, zs iso ate y AOV 1597 outside containment. This valve is close to the containment wall (approximately 2 feet) even though it is not the first valve after the wall. Manual valve 1596 is between the wall and AOV 1597 and can also serve to isolate this line should AOV 1597 fail to close when required. Both of these valves are leak tested along with the piping between the contain-ment and AOV 1597. The need for additional automatically actuated valves will be evaluated during the integrated assessment. pt. bl 'h 'd Penetration 305 (13) (33013-533), containment air sample 1 check t, valve jlgj 1599 inside containment d and ft 1 t b automatic AOV 1598 p outside containment. Penetration 307 (no NRC evaluation), fire service water, serves a one w xc was upgraded in 1980 to meet fire protection requirements. Isolation of this line is accomplished by check valve 9229 inside containment and automatic AOV 9227 outside containment. These isolation provisions conform to current criteria. We have noted, however, that in some scenarios fire may cause spurious closure of AOV 9227 while the line may be in use to suppress a fire inside containment. Because AOV 9227 is closed during operation and would be opened only in the event of fire, a containment isolation signal is unnecessary. It is desireable to remove the existing isolation signal from this valve. This will be addressed in separate correspondence. Penetrations 308, 311, 312, 315, 316, 319, 320, and '323 (31 and 32 33 13-529 , service water to an coo ers, are szmz ar to penetrations 201 and 209. The fan coolers are provided with manual isolation valves outside containment on both the inlet and discharge piping of the coolers. The coolers and piping inside containment form a closed system and are protected throughout, their length from missiles. Thus, the only deviation from the current criteria of GDC 57, the applicable criterion, is that the isolation valve is not .remotely operable. The service water system operates at, a pressure higher than the peak containment pressure so that any leakage from the cooling system will be into the containment, not from the containment. A radiation monitor is provided on the service water discharge from the containment to alert the operator to abnormalities. The isolation valves are located in the intermediate building only a short distance from the control room. Entrance to this area does not require pro-tective clothing or entry through a controlled area. The isolation provisions for these lines are acceptable for continued operation. The need for remote manual operators on the valves will be further evaluated during the integrated assessment. Penetrations 309 and 313 (47), leak test depressurization, were gu ge accepta e zn t e NRC draft evaluation based upon flanges inside containment and normally closed valves MOV 7444 and MOV 7445 outside containment. 11 P J'/ Penetration 310 bottom (34) (33013-521), service air, was noted zn t e NRC ra t eva uation as having an exception from the current criteria because of valve location. This penetration has isolation different. from that shown on the FSAR drawings. Check valve 7226 inside containment and manual valve 7141, which is locked closed during operation, provide isolation which is in accordance with current criteria. Penetration 310 to (33) (33013-521), instrument air, was judge accept e xn e NRC draft evaluation. There is no manual valve between the containment wall and AOV 5392 as shown in the FSAR drawing, however, the actual arrangement. is still in conformance with current criteria. Penetration 317 (46), leakage test-supply, was judged acceptable in the NRC ra t evaluation based upon a flange inside containment and normally closed MOV 7443 outside containment. Penetrations 321 and 322 (28) (33013-522), steam generator blowdown, was gu ge accept le and in accordance with GDC 57 in the NRC draft evaluation. Penetration 324 (43) (33013-530), demineralized water, has been mo z ze since plant startup and is not configured as shown in the FSAR. Isolate.on of this penetration is provided by check valve 8419 inside containment and automatic AOV 8418 outside containment. This arrangement provides acceptable isolation and is in conformance with current criteria. Penetration 332 (48), leak test instrumentation, was judged accep e zn t e NRC draft evaluation. The arrangement of this penetration is different from the FSAR figure. A tubing cap has replaced the valve inside the containment. This arrangement still conforms to current criteria and is acceptable. Penetrations 401 402, 403, 404 (26 and 27) (33013-534 and 33013- 44 , mazn steam an ee wa er, were judged to be acceptable and in conformance with GDC 57 in the NRC draft. evaluation. Penetrations 1000 and 2000 (no NRC evaluation), personnel hatch an equipment atc , are not within the scope of this evaluation and are not governed by GDC 54, 55, 56 or 57. However, these openings are designed with redundant closures which are closed during normal operation and which will prevent the escape of radioactive material. These penetrations are described in FSAR Section 5.1.2.7. These penetrations are similar to current design practices and provide acceptable isolation of the containment. ~~ l t 7 Manual and Power Operated Valve Normal, Shutdown and Post-Accident Position Assuming No Operator Action 0-Open, C-Closed

• - Open for specific purpose for short period only TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAINIIENT ISOLATION VALVES PRIMARY MAXIKH1 SECONDARY IQZIMUM PENT. ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) 29 Fuel transfer tube flange NA (1) NA 100 charging line to "B" loop CV 370B (2) NA 101 -

SI Pump 1B discharge CV 889B NA (5) NA CV 870B NA (5) NA I 102 Alternate charging to "A" cold leg CV 383B NA (2) NA 103 Construction Fire Service Water welded flange NA MV 5129 CCC NA I 105 Containment Spray Pump lA CV 862A NA (3) NA 106 "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal water CV 304A NA (2) NA inlet 107 Sump A discharge to Waste Holdup Tank AOV 1728 OOC 60 AOV 1723 OOC 60 108 RCP seal water out .and excess letdown MOV 313 OOC 60 (4) NA to VCT 109 Containment Spray Pump 1B CV 862B NA (3} NA 110 "B" RCP seal water inlet CV 304B NA (2) NA 110 SI test line MV 879 *CC NA (5) NA 111 RHR to "B" cold leg MOV 720(20) COC NA (6) NA 112 letdown to Non-regen. Heat exchanger AOV 371 OOC 60 MV 204A 000 NA MV 820 C*C (14)(17) 113 SI Pump 1A discharge CV 889A NA (5) NA CV 870A NA (5) NA r>> r d PRIHARY MAXIMUM SECONDARY MAXIMUM PENT. ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION No. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) 120 Nitrogen to Accumulators AOV 846 **C 60 CV 8623 NA 120 -Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) to Gas AOV 539 **C 60 HV 546(7) OOO NA Analyzer (GA) 121 Nitrogen to PRT CV 528 NA HV 547(8) OOO NA 121 Reactor Hakeup water to PRT CV 529 NA AOV 508 **C 60 121 Cont. Press. transmitter PT-945 (10) PT 945 NA HV 1819A 000 NA 121 Cont. Press. transmitter PT-946 (10) PT 946 NA MV 1819B 000 NA 123 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) to GA AOV 1789 *+C 60 MV 1655(7)OOO NA 124 Excess letdown supply and return AOV 745 OOC 60 (>>) NA to heat exchanger CV 743 NA (11) NA I 124 Post Accident air sample "C" fan HV 1569 CC* NA MV 1571 CC* NA C HV 1572 CC* NA MV 1574 CC* NA 125 Component Cooling'Hater (CCM) from 1B RCP HOV 759B 000 (12) NA 126 CCH from 1A RCP HOV 759A 000 NA (12) NA 127 CCW to lA RCP CV 750A NA HOV 749A 000 60 128 CCH to 1B RCP CV 750B NA MOV 749B 000 60 129 RCDT & PRT to Vent Header AOV 1787 OOC AOV 1786 OOC 60 CV 1713 NA 130 CCH to reactor support cooling HOV 813 OOC 60 (19) NA 131 CCW to reactor support cooling MOV 814 OOC 60 (19) NA 132 Depressurization at power AOV 7970 *CC 60 AOV 7971 *CC 60 140 RHR pump suction from "A" Hot leg HOV 701(20) COC NA (6) NA 141 RHR-Il pump suction from Sump B HOV 850A(13) CCO NA MOV 851A(13) CCO NA 142 RHR-02 pump suction from Sump B HOV 850B(13) CCO NA MOV 851B(13) CCO NA 143 RCDT pump suction AOV 1721 OOC 60 AOV 1003A **C 60 AOV 1003B **C 60 e~ ~ P g I E> 8 l C a PRIMARY ERXIHUM SECONDARY MAZIHUM'SOLATION PENT. ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) 201 Reactor Compart. cooling Unit A & B HV 4757(16) 000 NA (11) NA MV 4636(16) 000 NA (11) NA 202 "B" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot & main) MV 1076B CCC NA SOV IV-3B CCC NA Normally Closed HV 1084B CCC NA SOU IV-5B CCC NA Normally Closed 203 Contain. Press. transmitter PT-947 &.948 PT 947 NA MV 1819C 000 NA PT 948 NA MV 1819D OOO NA 203 Post accident air sample to "B" fan MV 1563 CCC NA MV 1565 CCC NA MV 1566 CCC NA MV 1568 CCC NA 204 Purge Supply Duct AOV 5870 *OC AOV 5869 *OC 5 205 Hot leg loop sample AOV 966C **C 60 MV 956D(14) 000 NA 206 Przr. liquid space sample AOV 966B **C 60 HV 956E(14) 000 NA 206 "A" S/G sample AOV 5735 **C 60 MV 5733(7) 000 NA 207 Przr. Steam space sample AOV 966A **C 60 MV 956F 000 NA 207 "B" S/G sample AOV 5736 **C 60 MV 5734(7) 000 NA 209 Reactor Compart. cooling Units A & B. MV 4758(16) 000 NA (11) NA MV 4635(16) 000 NA (11) NA 210 Oxygen makeup to A &B recombiners MV 1080A CCC NA SOV IV-2A CCC NA Normally Closed SOV IV-2B CCC NA Normally Closed 300 Purge Exhaust Duct AOV 5878 *OC AOV 5879 *OC 5 301 Aux. steam supply to containment MV 6151 COC NA MV 6165(15) COC NA 303 Aux. steam condensate return MV 6175 COC NA HV 6152(15) COC NA 304 "A" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot and main) MV 1084A CCC NA SOV IV-5A CCC NA Normally Closed MV 1076A CCC NA SOV IV-3A CCC NA Normally Closed 305 Radiation Monitors R-ll, R-12 & R-10A Auto AOV 1597 OOC 60 MV 1596 000 NA Inlet Isol. 305 R-ll, R-12 6 R-10A Outlet CV .1599 NA AOV 1598 OOC 60 305 Post Accident air sample (containment) MV,1554 CCC NA MV 1556 CCC NA HV 1557 CCC NA HV 1559 CCC NA HV 1560 CCC NA MV 1562 CCC NA P Sg>> 4k PRIMARY MAXIMUM SECONDARY MAXIMUH PENT. ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION No. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) 307 Fire Service Water (18) CV 9227 NA AOV 9229 CCC 60 308 Service Water to "A" fan cooler HV 4627(16) 000 NA (ll) NA 309 leakage test depressurization flange 7445 NA Normally Closed 310 Service Air to Contain. CV 7226'A NA HOV HV7141 C*C CCC NA 310 Instrument Air to Contain. CV 5393 AOV 5392 OOC 60 311 Service Water from "B" fan cooler MV 4630(16) 000 NA (>>) NA 312 Service Water to "D" fan cooler MV 4642(16) 000 NA (11) NA 313 leakage test depressurization flange NA HOV 7444 CCC NA Normally Closed 315 Service Water from "C" fan cooler MV 4643(16) 000 NA (11) NA 316 Service Water to "B" fan cooler HV 4628(16) 000 NA (11) NA cn 317 leakage test supply flange NA MOV 7443 CCC NA Normally Closed 318 Dead weight tester tubing cap NA Capped NA 319 Service Water from "A" fan cooler HV 4629(16) 000 NA (>>) NA 320 Service water to "C" fan cooler MV 4641(16) OOO NA (11) NA 321 A S/G Blowdown AOV 5738 OOC 60 HV 5701(7) OOO NA 322 B S/G Blowdown AOV 5737 OOC 60 mr 57O2(7) ooo NA 323 Service Water from "D" fan cool'er MV 4644(16) 000 NA (>>) NA 324 Demineralized water to Containment CV 8419 NA AOV 8418 COC 60 332 Cont. Press. Trans. PT-944, 949 & 950 PT 944 NA HV 1819G 000 NA PT 949 NA MV 1819F 000 NA PT 950 NA HV 1819E 000 NA 332 Leakage test instrumentation lines Cap NA MV 7448 CCC NA Cap NA HV 7452 CCC NA Cap NA MV 7456 CCC NA 401 Main steam from A S/G NAA* NA NA NA 402 Hain steam from B S/G NA** NA NA NA ~p P J PRIMARY MAXIMUM SECONDARY MAXIMUM PENT. ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) 403 Feedwater line to A S/6 NA NA 404 Feedwater line to B S/6 NA** NA NA 1000 Personnel Hatch NA NA NA NA 2000 Equipment Hatch NA NA NA NA

• The maximum isolation time does not include diesel start time.

• • The MSIVs and feedvater isolation valves are not considered to be containment isolation valves. The containment boundary is the steam generator secondary side and tubes.

MV - Manual Valve MOV - Motor Operated Valve AOV - Air Operated Valve CV - Check Valve SOV - Solenoid Operated Valve NOTES The end of the fuel transfer tube inside containment is closed by a double-gasketed blind flange, to prevent leakage of spent fuel pit water into the containment during plant operation. This flange also serves as protection against leakage from the containment, following a loss of coolant accident. The space between these gaskets can'also be pressurized by the penetra-tion test, system. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-3) Incoming lines connected to closed systems outside containment are provided with at least one check valve or normally closed isolation valve located inside containment. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg 5.2.2-2) The Containment Spray System is a closed system outside con-tainment provided with a single containment isolation valve (FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-8). The single remotely controlled, motor operated containment isolation valve is normally open. The seal water return line is not directly connected to the Reactor Coolant System. A second automatic isolation barrier is provided by the closed system consisting of the volume control tank and connecting plp3.ng ~ The Safety Injection system is a closed system outside con-tainment provided with a single containment isolation valve (FSAR Tabl'e 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-9). Connections of the test line with other lines inside containment are all missile protected and upstream of check valves connecting to the RCS. The SI system is in operation following a LOCA and pressurized to a pressure higher than that in containment. The RHR system is a closed system outside containment provided with one normally closed, missile protected containment iso-lation valve inside containment. In addition, a second normally closed valve is provided inside the missile barrier (FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-2, see also ANSI-N271-1976). Normally operating outgoing lines not connected to the Reactor Coolant System and not protected against missiles throughout their length inside containment are provided with at least one automatically operated trip valve or one remotely operated stop valve located outside containment. Manual isolation valves in series with the trip or remote operated valves are also provided outside the containment (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-1a). See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-1. Incoming lines connected to open systems outside the contain-ment are provided with a check valve located inside containment, and a remote operated valve or check valve and remote operated valve located outside containment. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-2) 18 >> I It (1o) The 'pressure transmitter provides a boundary. (11) Normally operating incoming and outgoing lines which are connected to closed systems inside containment and protected against missiles throughout their length, are provided with -at least one manual isolation valve outside containment (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-2). (12) The single remotely controlled containment isolation valve is normally open and motor, operated. The cooling water return line is not directly connected to the reactor coolant syst: em and, should remain open while the coolant pump is running. A second automatic isolation barrier is provided by the component cooling water loop, a closed system. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-la) (13) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-2. Sump lines are in operation and filled with fluid following an accident. Containment leakage testing is not required. The valves are subjected to RHR system hydrostatic test. (14) Normally operating outgoing lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System are provided with at, least one automatically operated trip valve and one manual isolation valve in series located outside the containment. In addition to the isolation valves, each line connected to the Reactor Coolant System is provided with a remote operated root valve located near its connection to the Reactor Coolant System. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-1) (15) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-17. (16) The Service Water system operates at a pressure higher than the containment accident pressure and is missile protected inside containment. Therefore, these valves are used for flow control only and need not be leak tested. (17) A manual valve outside containment in series with an automatic valve is provided for normally operating outgoing RCS lines (FSAR pg. 5.2.2-1). (18) Installation of this penetration and valving is scheduled for 1981. (19) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-16. (2O) Containment leakage testing is not required per L. D. White, Jr. letter to Dennis L. Ziemann, USNRC dated September 21, 1978. I / +n J PT-23.8:3 PT-23 ~ 8 REACTOR COOLAVZ SYSTEMS CHARGING LQK PENETRATION No. 100 HCV 142 ~ ~ 370A PIV 370B 9308 2230 384C Conn. Bl Conn. B2 Rotometer Serial r9 PIV 370B Rot er 'Flow Indication cc/min. 0>>r. Air Temperature (t) 530 o "." (Rotometer Indication cc/min.) X (460 460 ++,t ) Q cc/min. at 0 psig and 70 0 ( cc/minat0osi &70F ) cc /min. at 60 psig i &70F & 70 F 5.08 o PTV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 r. Max. Leakage is 200.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. CALVE XTZ) BY: DATE:. R & T REVIEW: DATE ~ PENETRATIONS //101, 81 OTTOM) AND 8113 I CV AUX I I I I Conn. Bl L.O. I 885A 78m 891 820 L.O. 28@ 1A 113 i 88 8 IV 90A I < PIV 889A I I 870A I Con B2 87 2A I L. 0 . M 87lA 2849 91B 18 2 B I I I 1815A 815 I 872B 8 871B Conn. B3 .O. if' I 878C stoa 2810 891 820 L.O. L.O 1B <<) 101I 885B goal ~ 88B 890B I 'P '/ 889B I 8781 110 I L.C. TEST LINE Qs 84 PIV BEHIND RWST I I 879 g/0p' 883 4O 2818 ~ Z 882 ~~ o~ b C ~ 4 L'X ZD FLU:0 ALTERNATE CHARGING LINE PEKTRATION NO. '302 2218 9305 PIV f 323 '383 B

l. 2227 9306 Conn. Bl Conn. B i

50TOMETER SERE P: PUT 3833 <OTOMETER PLOW INDICATION: cc/min. KIR ~~EKkTURE j', t): 0

Rotometer . Indication cc/min) X . 530 4 ~ cc/min at 0 psig and 70 P 460 +

0 (cc/min at 0 osi and 70 P) . cc/min at 60 psig and 70 P 5.08 'I ?IV LEAKAGE: cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 P ,.<<AX. LEAKAGE IS 170.33 cc/min 9 60 psig and 70 P ~~CS: ll CALCULATED BY: DATE' ~~ ~ S PT-23.49:3 CONSTRUCTION FIRE SERVICE RATER PENETRATION NO. 103 IN ) (pipe cap) (welded cap) PEV C f35130 85129 5129A Conn. Bl Rotameter Serial PRELACY Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF cc/min. Q 0 psig and i% F (Rotameter Flow):C 530 1/2 460 + t cc/m'n. 3 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 3 0 osis and 70 F)

5. 08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig. and 70 F

~wz. Leakage is 10.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig. and 70 ": R~RRKS: Calculatec bv: Date: R 6 s. Re view o Date e ~r PT-'23.18A:4 "A" CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADER PENETRATION NO. 105 I I TZS'7 LZua I I I 8 6' g)D ><~ I c.RP 1Q15 from. C. S. I 868K PEV Pum L> I 86>4 I I 8693. Pg~ 5 ~2822) 860B I I 2856 I I 2857 g (guGr Coal. Bl Rotameter Serial <P PIV 862A R ameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature(t) 'F 530 I/2 cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X 460 + t cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70'F ~ (cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. (I 60 psig 6 70'F Max Leakage 100.00 cc/min. (I 60 psig 6 70'F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: R&T REVIEW: DATE: tg \ 0~ "a" RCP S~u. Va.~ Lr.r~ PT-23. 9A:4 ~ ) ~ P ~%TRACTION NO. 106 I I 303A I Qq 303C 30 PIV 304A 300A 9304 2225 I 277A t CONN. Bl l CONN. B2 275 300B I Rotameter Seria'ot te Fleer Indication cclmin. Air Temneratur e o P t (Rotameter Ind'cat"on cc/min) x ( 530 Q 460 + t (cc/m n at 0 osis 6 70 7) , . o 5.08 cc/min at 60 psig & 70:- PUT Leakage cc/min 9 60 psig 6 70 c ~~a Leakage is 200.0 cc/min 9 50 psig 6 70 7 4+~ ~ CAlCVUW 3Y: DA.T:-: RST REVT~~: DA:= r PT-23.23:3 PENETRATION NO. l07 ZT ) I I l I I I 1760: 1759 t ,go to %'as-'e 1758 1757 Eolcup 8429 PTV Tank 1728 1723 8430 [ 1072 I Svz"a < Conn. Corm. Sl B2 I Rotameter Serial 8 PIV 1728 SIV 1723 I Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F F 530 cc/min 9 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) X ( + t )'60 cc/min 9 60 psig and 70 .F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. Cd 60 psig 8 70 F. Max Leakage is cc/min. I 60 psig 6 70 F. REMARKS: 'c/min. SIV Leakage Max. Leakage is cc/min. 8 5 60 60 psig psig 8 70 F 6 70 F REilARKS CALCULATED BY: DATE: R 6 T REVIEW: DATE: p~ C 0 PT-23.11:4 R.C.P. SEAL WATER RETURN & EXCESS LETDOWN Penetration No. 108 I Conn. Bl to I I 2215 I IIAII 314 I 320A I IIBII 2213 I 320B 386 I 117 316A ~118 'Qo I PIV 315C I 313 I 2212 2229 I 315A 385B 362B J 3118 I I Conn. B2 from I "B" RCP 385A 362A Excess I "A" RCP Letdown Hx. PIV 313 Rotometer Flow Indication cc/min. Air Temperature F = t 530 0 (Rotometer Indication cc/min) X ( 460+ 460 t ) = cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F 0 (cc/min. at 0 si & 70 F) cc /min att 60' ps g & 70 F 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F. Max. Leakage is 87.11 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. ~fARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: R & T REVIEW: DATE: 0 ~ ~ \ "3" COMAS dT SPRAY HEADER PT-23 . 18B: 4 P~~M~ CTZ01I '.IO. 109 ( ~ &RACc i TZS L&Z P8~ 3 I ~ $'30 864B wjL.p~ > I 860C its from C.'S. I Puznp 1B 868B PEV I 862B I I 86eB ~ fA4 860D I I l PI 2858 933B Conn 31 2859 R ameter Serial 4 PIV 862B Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X/ 530 i 460+ t.'c/min. (I 60 psig and 70'F ~ (cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. (~ 60 psig. and 70'F '00 Max Leakage cc/min. (I 60 psig. and 70'F 1 REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: R 6 T REVIEW: DATE: ~~ ~ ~ l Cl "B" RCP SEAL WATER LINE PT-23.9B:4 PENETRATION NO ~ 110 M77 I' I I goig QR( 303 C 9301 304B 300 B t 2224 r 277 A 9302 f ConM2 275 Conn. Bl 300 f Rotameter Serial fk PIV-304B Rotameter Flow Indication cc/min.

Air Temperature 'F t (Rocamacer Zndicac ion cc/min) x 530 l/2 ~ cc/min at 0

~ psig 0 and 70 F 460 + c cc/min. 9 0 psig & 70'F ~ cc/min at 60 psig & 70'F 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 200.00 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: R&T REVIEW: DATE: ~, i Cl- ~ ~ PT-23.7:4 s q o PT-23.7 LETDOWN FROM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PENETRATION NO. 112 Conn. Bl to PRT 133 NRHx Room I RWST I 703 I 821 ~Recirc. 200A Pump iQB I PIV I 200 371 I I S.W. 2231 369 I Hx 204 202 I 22 Conn. B2 2202 ROTAMETER SERIAL 8 Primary OTAMETER FLOW INDICATION cc/min OF AIR TEMPERATURE 0 (Rotameter Indication cc/min) x 530 1/2 cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F 460 + t (cc/min at 0 si & 70 F) .. cc/min at 60 psig & 70 F 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig & 70 F Max Leakage 58.07 cc/min 8 60 psig & 70 F RVfARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE'ATE' R&T REVIE<: pp k ~ J Cll ".-23'.46 Nitro en to Accumulators PT-23.46:3 Penetration No. 120 l 8621 Conn. Bl 94 I I 8627 ~~ VENT @25 I 8626 A I N'2'f 86'23 834 B 8>8$ ' . I IV'46 to Accumula tors I %2 I 2831 I I Conn. B2 Rotameter Serial /$ PIV-846 Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) 530 cc/min. I0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) 460 + t cc/min. 8 60 REEQUIP psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig. and 704F MAX Leakage 29.04 cc/min. g 60 psig. and 70OF CALCULATE& BY: DATE: RGT REVIEW: DATE: PT-23. 1: 3 ~ ~ ~ PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK GAS ANALYZER LINE PENETRATION NO. 120 t VENT HERE I I I Ql from P.R.T. to G.A. ~ . 546 PIV 492 I 539 I I 493 I l I Conn. Bl Rotometer Serial 8 PIV 539 'OMETER FLOW INDICATION cc/min AIR TEMPERATURE (t) F 0 (rotometer indication cc/min) X 530 1/2 ~ cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F 460 + t (cc/min at 0 si + 70 F) = cc/min at 60 psig + 70 F

5. 08 PIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig + 70 F.

Max. Pig leakage is 10.89 cc/min 0 60 psig + 70 P. RESQKS: CULATED BY: DATE' & T REVIEW: DATE: P PT-23 ':3 NITROGEN SUPPLY TO PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK PENETRATION NO. 121 I I IN I I I I OR from 100 psig to N2 I PRT PIV I 547 441 1662 528 I I I 496 495 I 494 I Conn. Bl Conn. B2 Rotometer Serial f/ PIV 528 Rotometer Flow Indication cc/min Air Temperature (t) F tometer Indication cc/min) X 530 = cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F. 460 + t c/min at 0 si + 70 F = cc/min at 60 psig + 70 F. 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig + 70 F. 0 Max. Leakage is 45.00 cc/mia g 60 psig + 70 F. Calculated By: Date: R & T Review: Date: Remarks: ~ k A PT-23.3:4 MAKEUP WATER TO PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK PENETRATION NO. 121 / i IN I I I I I 497 I I 0') I $ 907 PIV SIV I 529 I 508 I I 568 567 I 498 I I Conn. I Bl 576 Conn. B2 tometer Serial No. No. PRIMARY SECONDARY . Rotometer Flow Indication cc/min cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F F (Rotometer Indication cc/min) X 530 4 cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F; 460 + (cc/min at 0 si and 70 F) cc/min at 60 psig and 70 F

5. 08 PIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig and 70 F 0

Max. Leakage is 175.0 cc/min g 60 psig and 70 F SIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig and 70 F 0 Max. Leakage is 67.11 cc/min g 60 psig and 70 F REMARKS lculated By: Date: R 6 T Review: Date: J ~ J COHEIR Zi'JT PWSSUW SENSING TBAiVMI~B PT-23.17A:4 PHKTMt ZOtt HO. 121 PT-9-"5 'T-946 I I I 0 I 1819A 18193 I I Conn; Bl I (open pipe) (S~. Bldg.) Rotameter Serial PRIMARY Rotameter Flow cc/min. ir Temperature(t) F / >>0+ cc/min. 6 0 paig and 70'F = (itotametet Flow) X $460 t/ cc/min. (8 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 P'ZV Leakage cc/min. (~ 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 10.89 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F REMARKS: CM CULAT:"D BY: DATi: R&T RZVZEW: DATi: (i < R. C.D.T. GAS AHALYZER MZGZHATiON NO. 123 (BOTTOM) QT I I I I I I I Vent Here I from , BCDT I 1717 1655 PIV 1022E I I 1789 I I 1709F I I I Conn. Hl I Rotameter Serial 8 PIV 1789 meter Flow cc/min Air Temperature (t) F 0 530 cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) X ( <60 ) 0 ~ o cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F =.. (cc/min. (I 0 six and 70 F) 5.08 0 PXV Leakage cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F. 0

x. Leakage is 10.89 cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F.

REPAS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: R 6 T REVIiV: DATE: I ~ ~ AM~L:M~ COOL='lT SYS ~ ~= XCcSS L- 'DON KX (S~+- ~ ~ PWcTRAT.ION NO. 124 CC Supply to CV

fOV 817 I

A7m I C Pumps f l 743 742A. 22 619o ( I g u <sr M Q'J 2723 742C 2776 2728 &Is J I I CONNi CONN MOV Bl B2 813 I ~&9 A. OUTSIDE CV Excess letdo~-.. I I AOV To othe" 906 res I to sumD CV use"s Ins-de C.V. pzv IQ 815A 2727 I COLL% B3 tuz. EYom he" CV users t s PT-23.5OC: P ~ ~ COi~ITAIRKR~IT POST ACCID gd'x AIR SQIPTZ Abfi. BLDG. PEIZTHATXON HO. IH I L-C- L.C. Conn.+ Bl to C Fan PIV I 1569 1570 1571 I I I I Conn. B2 I Bottom L.C. L.C. B3 4 Common Return PIV I 1572 1573 1574 I I I 1 Conn. B4 TEST l'Il (TOP LINE) Rotameter Serial I PIV 1569 Rotameter Plow cc/min. op Air Temperature (t) 0 530 4 cc/min. 0 0 psig and 70 P (Rocamacac Plow) 3 ( ) 460 + t o 0 cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 P (cc/min. (I 0 osi and 70 r) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 P. is 29.04 cc/min. (I 60 psig and ?0 P. Max. Leakage RRw-aging: CALCUI %TED BY: DATE: R & T REVIE)v.'ATE: ~ ~~ k PT 23.29 AUXILIARY COOLANT SYSTEM FROi4f "B" REACTOR COOLANT PUiifP PENETRATION NO. 125 754 B IN I I 765A I 756B I I I I TE-612 fromm l25 . Vi "8'CP PIV 759B 762B to Cont. 2731 Sump 758B Conn. Bl Rotameter Serial (l PIV 759B Ro ta me te r F low cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 0 F = (Rotameter Flow ) X ~60 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and" 70 F = (cc/min. 8 0 osiR and 70 F ) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig. and -70oF Max. Leakage is and 70 F REMARKS: Calculated by: Date:. C RE~ Review: .. ate: PT-23 ~ 25: 3 PT 23.28 AUXILIARY COOLANT SYSTEM FROM "A" REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 754A PENETRATION NO. 126 765 D I I I I I 756A I I 0 from "A" 765 C RC2 I PIV Qo 757A I 759A 762A I to Cont. I 2729 Sump 758k. I I 'I Conn. Bl I I Rotameter Serial. 8 PIV 759A Rotameter Fl.ow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF cc/min. 8 0 psig and-70 F = (Rotameter Flow ) X 0 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 8 0 osia and 70 F ) 5.08 cc/min. 8 60 psig. and 70oF PIV Leakage 0 Max Leakage is 116. 14 cc/min. 6 60 ps ig. and 70 F REMARKS: Calculated'y: Date: R:.;& T'eview: Date: ~ ~ ~ ~ V ~ PT-23.26:4 PT 23.26 AUXILIARY COOLANT SYSTEM TO "A" REACTOR COOLANT PUMP PENETRATION NO. 127 rm I I I I to other C. C. users I m C.V. I I I from C. C. Pump 752A PIV I 750A I 749A I 2761 2730 753A 750C I I I Conn. Bl I Conn. B2 Conn. B3 I 761F Rotameter Serial /I PIV 750A Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) X 530 1/2 460 + t cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage 230.0 cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70 F REMA1KS: CALCULATED BY:. DATE: R&T REVIEW: DATE: ~ r J ~ PT-23;27:4 PT 23 ~ 27 AUXILIARY COOLANT SYSTEM TO "B" REACTOR COOLANT PUMP'ENETRATION NO. 128 rm I I I I to other C. C. users I in C.V. I I ,'g4 M from C. C. 752B Pr.V Pump 750B I 749B I 753B 750D I 274l 2732 I I Conn. Bl I I Conn. B2 Conn. B3 75lE I Rotameter Serial // PIV 750B Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage ~ cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage 230.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F EKHAEKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE R&T REVIEW: DATE J P R.C.D.T. GAS HEADER PENETRATION NO. 129 I I to Vent lo cad<~ PTV 1787 SIV 1786 167> Header 8 167 o Conna 32 1716A Qs 1015 167 6A. to H2 '08 Supply Conn. B1 1793 2rv 1014 1713 (brcak cub~~8 ccnn. here for vent) Rotometer Serial 0 PIV 1787 SIV 1786 PIV 1713 Rotometer Flow cc/min. cc/min. cc/min. Air mperature (t) F F CC I0 psig and 0 70 F = (Rotometer Flow) Z ( 460530+ t ) cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70oF = (cc/min. I 5.08 0 si and 70oF) PIV Leakage cc/min. I 60 psig and 70 F, AOV 1787. Max. Leakage is 29.04 cc/min. I 60 psig and 70 F, AOV 1787. SIV Ieakage I 60 psig and 70 F, AOV 1786. Max. Leakage 29.04 cc/min. I 60 psig and 70 F, AOV 1786. REMARKS'c/min. PIV Ieakage cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F, Check Valve 1713. Max. Leakage is 58.00 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F, Check Valve 1713. C4LC'uLATED BY: DATE: R 6 T REVIEW: DATE: ~g t ~ r PT 23 ~ .6 \ REACTOR SUPPORT COOLING ( I'N 8c OUT ) PE¹TRATIOKS, FO ~ 130 Ee ZO ~ 13K: TO BIGK POI>K VEHTS ~C PUMPS  ! I I Conn. B6 Conn. B5 I I 27% 2733 I I I MOV I 82,7 I I I MOV I 823 gyp 8 I I SZ5'A Q4o REACTOR SUPPORT COOLERS 2726 2724 g 2723 2725/ I I corer COHÃ I COHK corn I 32 E2. B3 I I OUTSIDE C.V. I INSIDE C.V. I OUTSIDE C V. I I I I SUPPORT ON RETUHK VALVES TQ VALV 759 s 74.9 A 759 3 74.9 3 745 >Q.ZUAL VAL7r. 742 ~~ + 4 PT 23.34 DEPRESSUHIZk'ION AT POMER PEhrTMTIOH NO. 132 IN I I I I I I to Auz. Bld~. Charcoal Palter PIV SIV 7970 7971 2214 Conn. Bl tameter Serial fj PIV 7970 SIV 7971 1 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperatore (t) F F '530 cc/min. 6 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) X ( 460 + t ) cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 6 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F. Max. Leakage is 174.21 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F. SIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F. Hax. Leakage is 174.21 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F. CALCULATED BY: DATE: R 8 T REVIEW: DATE: ac~ ~ ~ ~ \" ~ r 4 PT-23.22:4 R. C. 0. T. 9 "SC:"'='?.G: vV '~~ )ITI l'lf << ~ f I I ffBff $ I f=o .. Ilg 'w e I I 'A" BY MOV'-851's C c I'r '2 4 51V Igl 003 to RCD: p"".p~ 8431 PIU 1721 8432 pi+ l7QOG 100 ~ Conn B2 Conn. Bl Rotameter Serial 8 PIV-1721 SIV-1003A B Rotaraeter Flow cc/rain. cc/min. Air Temperature (t) cc/min. 6 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) X( 530 i460 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage. cc/min. I 60 psig 6 700F MAX Leakage is 116.14 cc/min. 9 60 psig 8 70 F REMARKS SIV 1003A Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig 8 70 F MAX I,eakage is 87.11 cc/min. 9 60 psig 6 70~F REMARKS: REACTOR COttPART ttT COOL ItIG 'NITENETRATIONS 201 TOP AÃ) 209 BOTTO'ti I PI I In C.V. I PI 2231 I 2232 I 4794U I I I I 4589 I 4590 4759 I 4625 ( PIV 4624 201T 3 209B SIV SIV 4626 azacTOR 4757 I 4758 COiIPARTia1E~(TI I COOLER 4775A 4775 4638A I 1A I I I I I I I D I Rotameter Serial // "-Located in 1D Recirc. Fan Plenum SECONDARY 4757 SECONDARY 4758 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF oF cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Plow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 9 0 si . and 70 F) 5.08 PIV RCC "A" Hx cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F SIV Leakage 4757 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F SIV Leakage 4758 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70oF REMARKS: COMPLETED BY: DATE COMPLETED: SHIFT FOREMAN: RESULTS AND TEST REVIEW: DATE ~ e J 1 t, ~ PT-23.38:4 REACTOR COiMPARTMEViP COOLING UNIT "B" PEViETRATZOViS 209 TOP AND 201 BOTTOM I I PX I Zn C.V. I I 2140. I 2141 I l I I I I 4512 I 4588 4658 4625 J I 041 I PIV ,F2 4624 4626 SIV 209T I I 201B SIV ea 4635 REACTOR I 4636 I COMPARTMEVi'I 4637A 4637 4776 4776A I COOLER I 1B I I I I I I Rotameter Serial 8 SECONDARY 4635 SECONDARY 4636 tameter Flow cc/min, cc/min. Temperature (t) oF oF cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si . and 70 F) 5.08 PIV RCC "B" HX cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70~F SIV Leakage 4635 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70~F SIV Leakage 4636 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F REMARKS: COHPLETED BY: DATE COMPLETED: SHIFT FOREMAN: RESULTS AND TEST REVIEW: DATE ~~ t ~ ~ 0 ~~ PT-23..51B:4 "B" HYDROGEN RECOMBINER PILOT AND MAIN PENETRATION NO. 202 c IN 3/4" L.C. S TO H2 RECOMBINER 8427 I 1076B SIV PILOT BURNER PIV I IV3B 8428 I/ I 1075B I CONN B-3 I CONN. Bl ) I I 2ft I L.C. TO H2 RECOMBINER 8425 1084B SIV MAIN BURNER I PIV IV5B l 8426 1083B I CONN B-4 I CONN. B2 I h ear w w Pz-23.ps: 4 ~~~~ P~SSUEK SENSING THANSMITTEPg 'PT 47 4 PEHEZRATI01J N0. I I PT-947 PT-948 I I 20'onn. I I 1819C 1819D I I Bl I (open pipe (ControDed Tnt. Bldg. ) Rotameter Serial ik PRIMARY ameter Flow cc/min. 'F Axr Temperature(t) (Rotameter Flow) I'0 t X/60 + cc/mia. 0 0 paig aad 70'F = and 70'F = (cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F) cc/min. (I 60 psig 5.08 cc/min. (I 60 psig & 70'F PXV Leakage cc/min. (I 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 10.89 REMARKS: R&T REVIEW'ATE CALCULATED BY: 'ATE' f ~ ~ ~ J 0 PT-23.50B:3 CONTAI&IENT POST ACCIDENT AIR SA".PLE (CONTROLLED INT. BLDG.) PENETRATION NO. 203 I I I L.C. L.CD sVQ PIV I 1563 1564 1565 I I I Conn. B2 I Conn. I L.C. L.C. B ottorn B3 C or.".znon Return PIV I 1566 1567 1568 I I I Conn. TEST i"1 (TOP LINE) Rotameter Serial PIV 1563 Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF 0 530 cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) X, - 460 + t i 0 0 cc/min. 9 60 ps'g and 70 F = (cc/min. 8 0 osie anc 70 F) 5.08 0 PIV Leakage cc/min 8 60 psig & 70 F Miax. Leaicage is 29. 04 cc/min 9 60 psig & 70 F Calculated By: Date: R & T Review: Date: y ~l PT-23.3S:4 PT-~. 35 PURGE SUPPLY XN I I PXV SXV 5870 5869 AIR SUPPLY 8074 8074A Conn. Bl P sig F Time Hr sig Time Hr P f T f F f V =, 103 Ft 3 QTime- Hr 2.7 ( si + 14.7 sia) lb/ft F= 460 V 1 - 103 ft3 ( lb/ft ) lb. P2- 2.7 ( si + 14.7 sia) lb/ft F 460 W 2 103 ft3 ( lb/ft ) lb PN= ( ) ( lb/hr Hr) cc 471.6 ( lb/hr) cc/min leakage min lb/ft ) TE: Use smallest density calculated (lb/ft3 ) in cc/min calculation. CALCULATED BY: DATE: REVlEKD BY: DATE: PT-23.12C:3 R.C.S, SAMPLE LOOP B PENETRATION No. 205 I IN C.V. IN Sample Room I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I oil I I I 955 956D PIV 956B I 966C I I I 999C I I I t I I I Conn. Bl I Rotameter Serial 8 PIV-AOV 966C SIV-V 956B otameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature(t) 'F 530 cc/min. 0 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Flow) x(460 + t/ cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. (< 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 110.89 cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70'F SIV Leakage cc/min. (t 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 10.89 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: DATE: R&T REVIEW: DATE: ~ p 1 I 'i PT-23. 12B: 3 PRESSURIZER LIQUID SPACE SAMPLE PENETRATION NO. 206 (Top) I IN C.-V. IN Sample Room I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 953 956 PIV 956A I 966B I 956H 999D I J Conn. Bl L. Rotameter Serial t PIV-AOV 966B SIV-V 956A Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature(t) 'F 'F cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70'F = f (Rotameter Flow) x4460 530 + ') Yo2r and 70'F = (cc/min. 70'F) ti'c/min. 9 60 psig 8 0 psig and

5. 08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 6 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 110.89 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F SIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 10.89 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: DATE:

R&T REVIEW: DATE: PT-23.13A:3 "A" STEAM GENERATOR SAMPLE PENETRATION NO. 206 (Bottom) N CV ) IN Sample Room I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I PIV "Tubing Fi thing 992 5735 I for Vent" I I 5749 I I I I I I Conn. Bl Blowdown ~ (Tubing Fitting) Line ( Rotameter Serial /I PIV 5735 otameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Plow) x 530 460 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F ~ (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/~in. 8 60 psig & 70 F Max Leakage 110.89 cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: R&T REVIEW: DATE: ~ + ~ 1 PT-23.12A:3 PRESSURIZER STEAM SPACE SAMPLE PENETRATION NO. 207 (TOP) IN C.V. l ~ I IN Samp 1 e Room I I I I j I I = I I I 011 I I 951 956F PIV 956C 966A I 956G 999E I Conn. B1 V t Ro arne t er Serial lP PIV-AOV 966A SIV-V 956C Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature(t) 'F cc/min. g 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Flow) x(460 + f 530 tJ )'/~ cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'7 = (cc/min. (~ 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 110.89 cc/min. 6 60 psig & 70'F SIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 10.89 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: DATE: R&T REVIEW: DATE: ~ ~~ "B" STEAM GENERATOR SAMPLE PENETRATION NO. 207 (Bottom) 4 IN CV t IN Sample Room I I I I I I I I I j I 's Tubing Fitting for Vent I I 5734 PIV I 992 I 5736 I 5753 I l I I I from S.G. I I Blowdown I 5754 Conn. Bl Line I I .I Rotameter Serial 8 PIV 5736 Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) x ( 530 $ 460+ t cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F Max Leakage 110.89 cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: R&T R~IEV: ~ ~ J I PT-23.51C:3 "A" AND "B" HYDROGEN RECOMBINER O'MAGEN KAKEfJP PENETRATION NO. 210 IN CONN. B-1 CONN. B-2 1079 (NORTH SIDE) S S TO "A" RECONBINER 8424 1V-2A 1V-1A SIV L. C.. 8423 I 1080A TO C.V. I PIV TO "B RECONBINER RECIRC. SYSTEf I I 1V-2B 1V-1B I SIV (SOUTH SIDE) ROTchMETER SERIAL i'3 PIV 1080A SIV IV2A, IV2B ROTA.fETER PLOW cc/min cc/min AIR T~ERATURE (t) OF QF cc/min 0 530 (f 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) Z ( ) 460 + t cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F ~ (cc/min (f 0 osiu and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. i~fax. Leakage is 58.07 cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. SIV Leakage cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. Max. Leakage is 58.07 cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. SIV Leakage cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. 'fax. Leakage is 58.07 cc/min (f 60 psig and 70 F. REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: R & T REVIEW: DATE' ~ gt P PT-23. 36:4 PT-23.36 PURGE EXHAUST PENETRKTI'ON NO. '300 IN I AIR I 8050 SUPPLY I Os PIV SIV 5878 5879 Conn. Bl 8052 8049' P i sig T i op Time Hr a Sig .s" Time Hr P f f f V 103 ft3 Qx~e Hr 2.7 ( si + 14. 7 sia) lb/ft P + 460 W 1 ~ 103 ft3 ( lb/ft3 ) lb p z - z.v si + 14.7 sia) lb/ft P + 460 W2 ~ 103 ft3 ( lb/ft ) lb ~W - ( ) ( lb/hr t Hr) cc ~ 471 6 ( lb/hr) cc/min leakage min lb/ft ) OTE: Use smallest calculated density (lb/ft3 ) in cc/min. calculation. CALCULATED DATE: BY'EVIF~ BY: . DATE: ~ t I' Cl PT"23.40:4 AUXILIARY STEAM SUPPLY AND CONDENSATE RETURN PENETRATION NO. 301 6 303 PEN 301 I I 6165 6151 7949 I I Conn. Bl I I 79 75 EN 303 95 4 I) IL B3 6175 7950 Strainer Space Heaters I. I Conn. B2 TEST gl: Rotameter Serial 0 PIV MANUAL VALVE 6151 Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) oF 530 cc/min. I 60 psig and 70~F (Rotameter Flow) X 460 + t cc/min. I 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 6 0 5.08 si and 70 F) PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig 6 70 F MAX Leakage 58.07 cc/min. 6 60 psig S 70 F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: RS(T REVIEW: DATE: ~ ~ t p, > CS ~ ~ ~ PT-Z3.51A:4 "A" HYDROGEN RECOMBINER (PILOT AND MAIN PENETRATION NO. 304 IN 2" L.CD TO H RECOMBINER 8433 084A SIV MAIN BURNER PIV 8434 Conn. B-3 1083A CONN. Bl 3/4lt L.C. TO H2 RECOMBINER 8435 1076A SIV PILOT BURNER PIV IV3A 8436 1075A Conn. B-4 CONN. B2 y ~~ ~ ~ PT-23.15:3 PENETRATION NO. 305 (BOTTOM) CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE OUT. ( IN ( t I I 'onn. t Bl lg to Air Sampler & (open pipe) 59 I 1594 Iodine Monitor 1597 1595 1593 Rotameter Serial 8 PIV-AOV 1597 SIV-V 1596 cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature(t) 'F P 530 cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F ~ (Rotameter Flow) x(460 + t/ cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 29.04 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F SIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 29.04 cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70'F CALCULATED BY: DATE: R&T REVIEW: DATE: J J PT-23.14:3 CONTAINMENT AIR SA%'LE INLET PENETRATION NO. 305 (To ) IN I I l Conn. Bl (open pipe) PIV SI 1599 1598 Test 1" Pipe Plug to Conn. 3/8 Swedgelock Fitting 1580 Conn. B2 Rotameter Serial // PIV 1599 SIV AOV 1598 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min r Temperature(t) F F 530 cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) x 460 + t cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig & 70 F Max Leakage 58.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F SIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F Max Leakage 29.04 cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70 F CALCULATED BY: R&T REVIEW'ATE'ATE' PT-23.50A:4 CONTAIVii!ENT POST ACCIDENT AIR SfQPLE CLEAN INT. BLDG. ) PENETRATION NO. 305 I 1 L.C. L.C. I TOD I to D Pan I PIV ~554 1555 1556 I Cow Jl L.C. Conn. n2 L.CD 3~,Iiddle ConM3 I to A. Pan PIV Corn 55 1557 I ~ 558 1559 I I L.C. Conn'4 L ~ C ~ I Bottom I Common I Return PIV I 1560 1562 I I Conn. l TEST Pil (TOP LINK) Rotameter Serial !2 PIV 1554 Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF / cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter 'Flow)- x 530 460+ t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 osis and 70 F)

5. OS PIV Leakage cc/min. Q 60 psig and 70 F

~!ax. Leakage 29.04 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F RE'f QKS CALCULATED BY: DATE: R&T REVIE!4: DATE: FIRE SERVICE WATER PENETRATION 307 IN PT-23 ~ 52:4 TO CONTAINMENT 923l PIV I SIV 9225 HOSE REELS 9229 I 9227 I I I 9230 9228i 9226 CONN, CONN ~ CONN, B2 B3 Bl Rotameter Serial 0 PIV"9229 SIAV-9227 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature '(t) 'F 'F 530 /min. 9 0 psig and 70'F = (Rotameter Flow) x 460 +t) cc/min. Q 60 psig and 70'F = (cc/min. (~ 0 psig and 70'F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F. I Max. Leakage 230 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F. REMARKS: SIV Leakage cc/min. (t 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage 116.14 cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE'ATE: R 6 T REVIEW: v PT-23. 44 LEAKAGE TEST/DEPRESSURZZATZON PENETRATION NO. 309 I I I I I I I Conn. B2 147 ~orms ~ Conn'3 B1 PIV I SIV (blind Qange on (blind Range) 7445 Int.'ldg. rooi) I I I I I I Rotameter Serial 8 PIV BLIND FLANGE SIV 7445 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. P Air Temperature (t) F F cc/min. 6 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. Cd 60 psig and 70 F 0 Max. Leakage 10.00 cc/min 8 60 psig and 70 F REHARKS: oF SIV Leakage cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 0 Max. Leakage is 174.21 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F Calculated by: Date: R 6 T Review: Date: ~ )P PT-23.33:4 PT 23 '3 SERVICE AZH PKKTEKTZOH HO. 310 (BOTTOM) I To User Outlet I Valves I I I Conn. B3 I ~+>< I gc.+~,ccrc I / I I PIV ' to House 7227 7226 I 34 7222 ~ 7141 714P S eFv1ce 3 1x I I 7228 I 7221 I I Conn. Bl I Conn. B2 Rotameter Serial fP PIV-V-7226 SIV-V-7141 eter Plow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature (t) 'F 'F 0 70 F ~ (Rotameter Flow) 1/2 cc/min. (I 0 psig and X 530 ~60 + e cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70'F ~ (cc/min. i~ 0 psig and 70'F 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. (I 60 psig and 70'F. Max. Leakage is 116.0 cc/min. (> 60 psig and 70'F. SIV Leakage ~ cc/min. (I 60 psig & 70'F. Max Leakage 58.07 cc/min. (I 60 psig & 70'F. CALCULATED BY: DATE: R & T REVIEW: DATE: PZ-"3.>2 32lSTKiKZ ATZ iZETMZGIT PIO. 310 (KP) PT-23-32 4 I ZT I I I I o Serg C. V- 5394 j'IU >393 I I I 5392'ROif SIV 5397 control 4.ir Sup. 5395 5395', Conn. Bl Conn. B2 I Rotameter Serial /$ PIV"5393 SIV-5392 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF 530 cc/min. I 0 psig and 70~F = (Rotameter Flow) X 460 + t cc/min. 9 60 'psig and 70 F = .(cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig. and 70 F Leakage 'AX is 116.0 cc/min. 9 60 psig. and 70 F SIV Leakage cc/min. 9 60 psig..and .70 F MAX Leakage is 58.07 cc/min. I 60 psig. and 70 F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE: RGT REVIEW: DATE: 4 ~1 PT-23.42:3 LEAKAGE ~T - DEPHESSURZKAQLOH i(44'I HZLTRATZOM il'O. 313 I I I I I I Conn. B2 ~ OQzlo (br d a rzv ge) ~ Col!Z1 ~ (Blind Qange on Int. Bldg. rooi) Rotameter Serial // PIV BLIND FLANGE SIV 7444 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature (t) oF oF cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70OF = (Rotameter Flow) K 460 + ( 530 $ /2 t.j cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV I,eakage cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70~F Max. I,eakage 10.00 cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F RE>IARKS: SIV Leakge cc/min. g 60 psig 8 70 F Max. Leakage 174.21 cc/min. 9 60 psig 8 70 F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY DATE RGT REVIEW DATE i ~l LE'AGKZ TEST - SUPPLY HEADER PE~@ RATION NO. 317 I I I I I Conn. B2 7441 ~ Conn. Bl . rlV SIV (blind flange) 7443 I I ~sr 7442 I I I I Rotameter Serial ff PIV-BLANK FLANGE SIV 7443 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF ,OF 0 530 cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) X ( ) 460 + t cc/min. 8 60 psig and. 70 F (cc/min. (t 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. Max. Leakage is 10.0 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. REMARKS: REMARKS: 0 SIV Leakage'ax. cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. Leakage is 174.21 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. CALCULATED BY: DATE: R & T REVIEW: DATE: 4l "A" STZA~ GENERATOR. BLOTCH)OI'TN PBZTHATZON HO. 321 I I I D I I I I 5765 from to Blovrdovrn 5701 PIV 9516A Tank 5738 to Blowdown 9752 95163 Conn. Sl {tubing fitting) to Sample System 5751 Rotameter Serial 8 PIV S738 tameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) F cc/min. (I 0 psig and 70 F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X 530 460 + t cc/min. 0 60 psig and 70 F ~ cc/min. 6 0 si and'70 F) S.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage 408.07 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 P 1U2fARKS: C 4':QLATED BY: DATE: RGT REVISIT: DATE: "B" STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN PENETRATION NO. 322 Drain Valve I 5766 I I I 28 Slowdown from ~ o l gl I T RXLK I 5702 PIV 9516G l 5737 to Blowdc 5756 9517A l l Q onn. 331 (till)i?lg fitting) l to Sazrple l Systezn l 5755 Rotameter Serial 8 PIV 5737 tameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F ~ (Rotameter Flow) X 530 1/2 460 + t cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70 F ~ cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F Max. Leakage is 408.07 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F REMARKS: CALCULATED BY: DATE R&T REVIEW: DATE DEMINERALIZED WATER PEG;TRATION NO. 324 IN I I I I To Outlet Valves 04' in Containment I 8422 PIV SIV 5021, 8419. '8418 I I 8421 8420 5023 I I I Conn. Conn. Conn. B2 B3 Bl Rotameter Serial /3 P IV- 8419 SIV- 8418 Rotameter Flow cc/min. cc/min. Air Temperature (t) OF OF ( 530 cc/min. 8 0 psig and 70 F (Rotameter Flow) x $ 460 + t .cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F (cc/min. 8 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. 'Max. Leakage 116.00 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. RQfARKS: SIV Leakage cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. 'Max. Leakage is 58. 07 cc/min. 8 60 psig and 70 F. +a. CALCULATE BY: DATE: R & T'EVIEW: DATE: em CONTAINMENT PRESSURE SENSING TRANSMITTERS PT-949 & PT-950 PT"23 '7C:4 PENETRATION NO. 332 Qa~o P 9-"9 I 3 1819G .1819:" 1819'onn. Bl (open pipe) (Clean Int. Slag. ) Rotameter Serial 8 PRIMARY (-",:!) otameter Flov cc/min. Air Temperature(t) 'F 530 cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70 F = (Rotameter Flo~) X(460 + tj cc/min. 9 60 psig and 70'.F = (cc/min. 9 0 psig and 70'F)

5. 08 PIV Leakage cc/min. 8 "60 psig & 70'F Max Leakage 10.89 cc/min. 8 60 psig & 70'F REHARKS:

CALCULATED BY'&T DATE'ATE: REVIEW: l PT-23.45:4 ~ PT-23.45 LEAKAGE TEST/INSTRUMENTATION PENETRATION NO. 332 I 45A i Q4 PIV 8439 7e48 45C 5B 45B l~ ~~4 Conn. Bl 45B 45C PIV 045A 8438 045A 7452 Conn. B2 IN C.V. I 48 CL~~f WiT. BLDG. 45C I PIV !j3 8437 7456 Conn. B3 - l'EST $/45A Rotameter Serial 8 PIV /Pl Rotameter Flow cc/min. Air Temperature F 6 0 psig and 70 F =I'c/min. (Rotameter Flow) x 530 460 + t cc/min. 6 60 psig and 70 F = (cc/min. 9 0 si and 70 F) 5.08 0 PIV I,eakage cc/min. 6 60 psig. and 70 F Max. Leakage 10.89 cc/min. 6 60 psig. and 70 F