ML093020098

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Summary of Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company, Licensee for South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, to Discuss Experience with Implementation of Risk-Managed Technical Specification Pilot Amendment (Initiative 4b) and Other Initiatives
ML093020098
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 10/29/2009
From: Thadani M
Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:
Thadani, M C, NRR/DORL/LP4, 415-1476
References
Download: ML093020098 (35)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 October 29, 2009 LICENSEE STP Nuclear Operating Company FACILITY South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 SUB~IECT:

SUMMARY

OF SEPTEMBER 29,2009 MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, LICENSEE FOR SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2, REGARDING LICENSEE'S RISK-INFORMED PERFORMANCE-BASED PROGRAMS On September 29,2009, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and representatives of STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC), the licensee for South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2, at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the status, lessons learned, and get feedback for the following programs.

  • Risk Managed Technical Specifications
  • Exemption from special treatment requirements
  • Risk-informed safety sulture
  • Graded Quality Assurance
  • Proposed exemption from the work-hour requirements in 10 CFR Part 26 The licensee described the lessons learned from Risk Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) program, Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP), and Exemption from Special Treatment Requirements. The licensee also discussed the Risk-Informed Safety Culture at STP, Units 1 and 2, and how the alignment of the programs focuses attention to safety, and improves decision-making.

-2 The NRC staff expressed appreciation for the licensee's presentation. and the staff from the NRC Technical Specifications Branch, Probabilistic Risk Asse.ssment Licensing Branch, and Fire Protection Branch shared insights from the NRC's experience in risk-informed activities. A list of attendees is provided in Enclosure 1. The licensee's presentation viewgraphs are provided in Enclosure 2.

The meeting notice and agenda for this meeting are available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML092570390. There was one member of the public in attendance. No Public Meeting Feedback forms were submitted related to the meeting.

Ifthere are any questions or comments, please contact me by telephone at 301-415-1476 or by electronic mail at Mohan.Thadani@nrc.gov.

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Mohan C. Thadani, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees
2. Licensee presentation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

LIST OF ATrENDEES MEETING WITH STP NUCLEAR OPERATINQ COMPANY Tuesday. September 29. 2009 2:00 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

NAME AFFIIJATION Mohan Thadani NRC/NRRlDORLlLPL4 Michael Markley NRC/NRRlDORLlLPL4 Gerald Waig NRC/NRRlDIRS/lTSB Robert Elliott NRC/NRRlDIRS/ITSB Steven A. Laur NRC/NRRlDRA A. Wayne Harrison STPNOC Rick Granton STPNOC Jin Chung MNES Donnie Harrison NRC/NRRlDRA/APLA Andrew Howe NRC/NRRlDRA/APLA Michael Boggi NRC/NRRlDIRS/IHPB Daniel M. Frumkin NRC/NRRlDRAlAFPB Enclosure 1

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STPNOC Risk Informed, Performance Based Programs Where we've been.

Where might we go?

Rick Grantom - Manager, Risk Management Wayne Harrison - Manager, Licensing September 29, 2009 Enclosure 2

Desired Outcomes

  • Discuss with NRC the status, feedback, and lessons learned for the following risk informed programs

- Risk Managed Technical Specifications

  • Configuration Risk Management (48)

- Exemption from Special Treatment Requirements

  • Discuss with NRC potential future STP risk informed, performance based efforts

- Risk Informed, Performance Based Fire Protection

- Redefinition of Large Break LOCA 2

Risk-Informed Safety Culture

  • Management and Operations are aligned on use of risk management in station programs to focus on safety and improve decision-making processes
  • Programmatic risk management improves focus on safety

- Risk Index is a Tier 1 Performance Indicator (Le.,

tracks and monitors long term configuration risk trends)

- Real-time risk calculations are used for managing work (i.e., tracks and monitors short term risk trends) 3

Overview of STP RIPS Applications

  • Graded Quality Assurance and Exemption that piloted 10CFR50.69

- Improved safety focus

  • Risk-Managed Technical Specifications

- Significant safety improvement in industry & regulatory Tech Spec approaches by establishing Configuration Risk Management methods for maintaining focus on risk significant activities and test interval methodology

- Operational flexibility

- Fewer challenges to LCO ACTION times 4

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SFCP Outline

  • Background
  • Independent Decisionmaking Panel
  • Identification of candidate STI changes
  • Approved STI changes
  • Resources
  • Lessons
  • SFCP evaluations after PRA updates 7

SFCP Background

  • Submitted License Amendment Request (LAR) to implement TSTF-425 on 10/23/07
  • NEI 04-1 0 Rev.1 process followed - onIy exception is Independent Oecisionmaking Panel (lOP) - STP uses Graded Quality Assurance program lOP instead of Maintenance Rule Expert Panel
  • NRC issued STP SER on 10/31/08 8

Completed STI Changes Phased Curr Prop'd KICK* INPUTS STRIDE Parameter Impl. IWG EP Impl.

Freq Freq OFF DUE Status Likely?

SG Water Level Lo-Lo ACOT, TT/FI Q R Yes 01/20 03/04 03/19 07101 Complete Hi-Hi ACOT Loss of Voltage, Degraded Voltage Q 01/28 SA No 03/04 03/19 04/02 Complete TADOTS WR Containment Water Level R R2 No 01119 02/05 02/18 02126 04/02 Complete Calibration AFW Monthly Op. Test and Channel Q M No 01/19 02/25 04/01 04116 05/15 Complete checks motor-driven pumps only PZR Level ACOT Q R Yes 02/09 04/16 04/29 05/14 06114 Working PZR Press ACOT Q R Yes 02/09 06/11 06/24 07/23 08/23 Working Containment Press ACOT Q R Yes 02/09 06/11 06/24 07/23 08/23 Working SSDG Fuel Oil Tank Cleaning 10 yr 20 yr No 04/21 06/30 07108 08/20 09/20 Main Steam Press ACOTs Q R Yes 05/12 07/15 08/05 08/20 09/20 RCS Flow ACOT Q R Yes 05/12 07/31 08/19 09/17 11117*

RWST Level ACOT Q R Yes 06/16 08/15 09/02 09/17 11117*

9

STP SFCP Lessons Learned

  • Two IWG meetings are required to review each STRIDE

- First meeting identifies comments that require resolution

- Second meeting resolves comments and finalizes recommendations

  • Reactor and ESF instrumentation STI changes Engineering resources needed to evaluate drift impact on Tech Spec allowable value and Setpoint Methodology
  • PRA maintains an aggregate "analysis" model to evaluate previous and current STI changes. Will need to be re-created after each PRA model update.

10

STP SFCP Lessons Learned

- Previous STI changes require re-evaluation after PRA model update if PRA quantitative analysis performed

- Will be significant work load, i.e., re-perform previous STI change PRA analyses with updated PRA model part of RI-application update process after model revIsion

- Assessing aggregate effects can/should be accommodated with Risk Index approach 11

Risk Managed Technical Specifications

- RITS Initiative 48 STP Units 1 & 2

RMTS Outline

  • Background

RMTS at STP

  • Approved by NRC on 7/13/07
k. Configuration Risk Management Program (CR~fP)

AprograIIl to calculate risk-infomlcd cOTnpleLion time in accordance with NEI 06-09,

~'Rlsk-t\1anaged Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Rev. (r. The CR~P may be used for calculat.ing a risk-informed completion time only in Mode 1and Mode 2. In accordance with NEI 06-09, the completion time determined using the CRMP shall not be morc than 30 davs.

14

Example RMTS LeO Action 3.7.14 At least three independent Essential Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY; MODES 1,2,3, and 4, ACTION~

a. With only two Essential Chilled Water System loops OPERABLE, within 7 days restore at least three loops to OPERABLE status or apply the requirements of the CRMP, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the foJlowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b. With two or more Essential Chilled Water System loopsinoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status or apply the requirements of the CRMP, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN with;n the foUowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

15

STP RMTS Experience

  • Used for planned 1E 120VAC instrument inverter maintenance, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> TS front stop.

NRC performed inspection activity and QA performed RMTS audit.

  • "Almost" used for instrument inverter failure and emergent ECW pump maintenance.
  • Used to replace Train A and Train C class 1E batteries in Units 1 & 2 - 5 day work window planned. 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> TS front stop. No risk threshold Issues 16

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Lessons Learned

  • Early involvement from Operations and Work Control
  • Draft requirements document with multiple review cycles BEFORE beginning software development
  • Present RMTS concepts in multiple Licensed Operator Requal cycles

- "multiple clocks" (e.g., front stop, RMAT, RICT ICDP or ILERP, back stop)

- scenario development

- software demos 18

STP RMTS Pre-Implementation Lessons

  • Important to train on new concepts like "PRA Functional", RMAT, and RICT.

Operations, Work Control, Management, Engineering.

  • Formed RMTS working group and met weekly to develop program, procedures, and policies.

19

STP RMTS Implementation Lessons

  • Dose mitigation functions of Control Room HVAC need to be addressed as separate action statements for CRMP purposes.
  • Thorough pre-job review involving all stakeholders is important to error-free application

- STP prepared a procedure specifically for battery replacement 20

STP RMTS Conclusion RMTS has improved the quality of the station's working environment by providing an approved process for addressing Tech Spec equipment issues while also reducing administrative and regulatory burden for both STP and NRC

-Questions ?

21

Exemption from Special Treatment Requirements Lessons Learned

  • Change management and cultural change issue
  • Categorization supports risk informing station processes (corrective action, PREP, Self-Assessments, Audits, etc.) and associated performance indicators (Risk Index, Equipment Reliability clock resets) .
  • Significantly

. supports and reinforces safety culture Issues

- heightens awareness and improves communication of concerns and issues related to risk significant SSCs

  • Approximately 2 Working Group meetings and 1 Expert Panel meeting to categorize system functions and components for each system on average (-200 man hrs/system)
  • Can be used in Fatigue Rule to establish scope of equipment for which the rule will apply 25

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RMTS Phase 2 ??

  • Based on the good results for the current RMTS program, STP can foresee another phase of systems being incorporated into the CRMP scope for RMTS

- Systems like FW Iso Vlvs, ESFAS

  • Based on the good results of the RITS 58, STP can foresee another phase of surveillances being incorporated into the SFCP

- Additional I&C systems 27

RISK-INFORMED FIRE PROTECTION

  • A significant amount of regulatory uncertainty remains with the transition process and industry resources are limited.
  • Many facilities (including STP) can effectively resolve non-compliances with their Fire Protection Program Licensing Basis in a more efficient manner using alternative methods.
  • STP's approach on previous RIPB applications has been to meet RG 1.200 for PRA technical adequacy

- Need to be able to reference use of RG.1200 for Fire PRA technical adequacy 28

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FIRE LARs

  • STP identified 3 fire areas where the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis does not fully meet Appendix R, III.G.2 requirements

- One amendment approved

- Two remaining amendments under staff review and a request for additional information has been received.

31

Nuclear Safety Culture

  • STP participating in Industry Pilot Initiative to develop a process for assessing a facility's nuclear safety culture on a real-time basis.
  • STP is doing this because this is the right-thing to-do.
  • An Industry desired-outcome is to demonstrate that this process is an effective method to assess nuclear safety culture and that the NRC will revise the ROP to not include a need to identify Substantive Cross-cutting Issues.

32

Nuclear Safety Culture

  • Concept is that the Facility has numerous data points to access nuclear safety culture compared to the limited number of data points provided by NRC identified cross cutting aspects.
  • Nuclear Safety Culture will be assessed against the INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture.
  • Pilots will start in November and conclude in the April May 2010 time frame. The NRC has been requested to observe.

33

Hurricane Exemption

  • Exemption request for not meeting certain work hour requirements during tropical storm or hurricane conditions submitted to the staff on September 21, 2009.
  • The STP exemption is a lead-plant request for affected facilities in the industry.
  • STP participated in NRC meetings to resolve this issue.
  • Ultimate resolution is expected to be Part 26 rulemaking so that the exemption will not be required.

34

Meetina Notice: ML092570390 , Meetma S urnmary: ML093020098 OFFICE DORULPL4/PM DORULPL4/LA DORULPL4/BC DORULPL4/PM NAME MThadani JBurkhardt MMarkley MThadani DATE 10/29/09 10/29/09 10/29/09 10/29/09