ML15334A397

TS 5 3 2 Emergency LAR Pre-Submittal Meeting Presentation

ML15334A397
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	11/30/2015
From:	Lisa Regner Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:
Regner L, NRR/DORL/LPLIV-1
References
TAC MF7116
Download: ML15334A397 (29)

Text

STPNOC Planned License Amendment Request:

Technical Specification 5.3.2, Control Rod Assemblies STP

Participants:

Michael Murray, Regulatory Affairs Manager Roland Dunn, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis Manager Michael Berg, Design Engineering Manager Wendy Brost, Licensing Engineer STPNOC/NRC Pre-Submittal Meeting December 1, 2015

Objectives

• Provide a description of the Unit 1 D-6 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) issue

• Provide overview of planned implementation actions

• Provide overview of expected License Amendment Request (LAR) content

• Discuss planned submittal date and need date

• Answer NRC questions 2

Presentation Outline

• Overview of Proposed Change

• Background

• Plant Changes Required

• Impact on Safety Analyses

• Regulatory Evaluation

• Summary Conclusions

• Proposed Schedule

• Additional Questions and Recap 3

Problem Statement

• Control Rod D-6 could not be reliably withdrawn during startup testing 4

Overview of Proposed Change

• Requesting proposed amendment to allow Unit 1 to resume operation with 56 full-length control rod assemblies

• Proposed change to TS 5.3.2 (change bar on right):

5

Overview of Proposed Change

• There is no methodology change involved with this change to the TS

• The proposed change would last through the end of Unit 1 Cycle 20

• One cycle of operation

• TS requirement to contain 57 control rods will remain unchanged for Unit 2 6

Control Rod Configuration

• Rod D-6 is a Shutdown Bank rod normally positioned fully withdrawn at power

• 57 Total Control Rods

• 29 Control Bank Rods

• 28 Shutdown Bank Rods 7

Background -

CRDM Description 8

9 Background - Rod Holdout Lock Ring

• Deformation in D-6 Rod Holdout lock ring

• Initiated in 2012 during rod control sequencing while unlocking control rods

• Source of sequencing issue has been addressed with a design change

Background -

Condition of Control Rod D-6

• Control Rod D-6 is not functioning as expected

• D-6 unable to be moved using normal methods during troubleshooting

• CRDM for Rod D-6 has been visually inspected and compared to another CRDM

• Confirming that this issue is confined to the CRDM for Rod D-6 10

Extent of Condition

• Deformation on lockout ring is only seen on Unit 1 Rod D-6 CRDM

• Extent of condition - other 56 rods unaffected

• Visual inspection has been performed on other 56 CRDMs

• CRDM monitoring (coil traces) indicate other 56 CRDMs are operating reliably

• Plans for future monitoring

• On startup: CRDM testing, rod drop timing testing

• Periodic control rod exercise at power

• Continue to evaluate coil traces

• Unit 2 CRDMs have been monitored and indicate reliable operation 11

Background -

Pressure Boundary 12

• Components being removed are internal to the RCS pressure boundary

• Pressure boundary:

butt weld between CRDM latch housing and rod travel housing

D-6 CRDM Replacement

• In-situ CRDM replacement would be a first-of-a-kind activity in United States

• Butt weld instead of canopy seal weld

• Requires special tooling that does not currently exist

• Lengthy preparation required for building mockup, testing, developing/obtaining tools 13

Plant Changes Required

• Remove Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) and associated drive shaft at core location D-6

• Some plant changes to Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) and Rod Control systems are required

• Install guide tube flow restrictor and fuel assembly thimble plug to maintain core and vessel thermal hydraulic characteristics

• Revise Reload Safety Evaluation to include impact of control rod removal on nuclear design and safety analyses

• Revise affected procedures and design documents 14

Thermal Hydraulic, Seismic and Structural Impacts

• Insertion of guide tube flow restrictor and thimble plug device maintain flow characteristics equivalent to previous configuration

• Dynamic analysis (seismic and loss of coolant accident forces) of the CRDM that was performed using the reactor equipment system model remains valid after removal of the D-6 control rod drive shaft and RCCA

• Drive shaft does not provide stiffening function - free motion 15

Impact on Safety Analyses

• Rod D-6 is a Shutdown Bank RCCA

• Accidents where at-power core power distribution is a key factor are not affected

• Evaluated Rod D-6 removal impacts

• Available shutdown margin including highest reactive stuck rod

• Boron worth when all RCCAs are inserted

• Rod worth of adjacent RCCAs when all RCCAs are inserted

• Trip reactivity as a function of time

• Most positive Moderator Density Coefficient (MDC) 16

Impact on Safety Analyses -

Available Shutdown Margin

• TS 3.1.1.1 requires shutdown margin to be within the limits of the COLR

• TS shutdown margin limits are not affected

• UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analyses remain bounding

• Actual shutdown margin reduced from 2.43% to 2.18% for Modes 1 and 2 at End of Life (EOL)

• 1.3% limit for Modes 1 and 2 currently specified in COLR Section 2.3.1 is met 17

Impact on Shutdown Margin (EOL Values Below) 18

Impact on Safety Analyses -

Boron Worth

• Potential impact to the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) malfunction resulting in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) boron dilution in Modes 3, 4, and 5

• Rod removal impacts boron worth for the all-rods inserted condition

• Analysis conservatively determines a boron worth with all rods out, therefore there is no impact with D-6 removed from the core 19

Impact on Safety Analyses -

Rod Worth of Adjacent Rods

• Removal of Rod D-6 slightly increases the rod worth of the adjacent control rods with all RCCAs inserted

• Potential impact to results of uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal from a subcritical or low power startup conditions and spectrum of rod ejection accidents

• Change in rod worth is considered and is bounded by the current analysis 20

Impact on Safety Analyses -

Trip Reactivity

• Removal of Rod D-6 reduces the trip reactivity as a function of rod insertion position

• The revised trip reactivity insertion vs. position remains greater than values required by the UFSAR Chapter 15 analysis

• There is no adverse impact to analyses for events where a reactor trip occurs 21

Impact on Safety Analyses -

Moderator Density Coefficient (MDC)

• The most positive MDC is conservatively calculated assuming all rods in the core

• Updated MDC without rod D-6 remains bounded by the limiting value assumed in the Chapter 15 safety analysis 22

Impact to UFSAR Chapter 15 Accident Analyses

• Postulated accidents dependent on core power distributions while at power are not impacted

• Effects on available shutdown margin, rod worth of the adjacent control rods, boron worth, trip reactivity as a function of time, and most positive MDC are bounded

• Therefore, the removal of RCCA D-6 does not adversely impact the results presented in Chapter 15 23

Regulatory Evaluation

• Requesting proposed amendment to allow Unit 1 to resume operation with 56 fuel assemblies for Unit 1 Cycle 20

• No other changes to STP TS required

• Applicable General Design Criteria have been reviewed and are satisfied

• These items will be discussed in the proposed LAR 24

Overview of Proposed Change

• Proposed change to TS 5.3.2 (change bar on right):

25

Summary Conclusions

• Appropriate safety margins maintained with 56 rods

• One fuel cycle change (Unit 1 Cycle 20)

• Why is this TS change needed?

• As previously discussed, first of a kind change in the United States for CRDM replacement requiring a pressure boundary weld

• Significant planning and remote tooling development is required to ensure no unforeseen impact to RCS pressure boundary and associated components 26

Summary Conclusions

• TS change does not involve a methodology change

• Instrumentation setpoints and trip settings will not be affected

• No new operator actions are proposed

• Installation of flow restrictor and thimble plug -

negligible impact on thermal hydraulics

• Input will be provided for No Significant Hazards Consideration determination 27

Proposed Schedule

• Submit LAR to NRC December 4, 2015

• Approval of the proposed amendment is requested by December 11, 2015 to support Unit 1 entry into Mode 5 and resume operation

• Planned implementation of LAR actions within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

• Change will remain in effect for the duration of Unit 1 Cycle 20 28

Additional Questions and Action Recap 29