IR 05000461/1987032
| ML20236B679 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1987 |
| From: | Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236B642 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-87-32, NUDOCS 8710260297 | |
| Download: ML20236B679 (24) | |
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J U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-461/87032(DRP)
Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62
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Licensee:
Illinois Power. Company 500 South 27th Street
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Decatur, IL 62525
'1 Facility Name:
Clinton Power Station I
i Inspection At:
Clinton Site, Clinton, Illinois i
i Inspection Conducted:
August 31 through October 14, 1987
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l Inspectors:
P. Hiland
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S. Ray I
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l Approved By:
R. C. Knop, Chief
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Projects Section 18 Date Inspection Summary
Inspection on August 31 through October 14, 1987 (Report No. 50-461/87032(DRP))
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident i
inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; TMI action plan
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requirements; licensee event report review and followup; operational safety I
verification; monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; training effectiveness; startup test witnessing; onsite followup of events at
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nperating reactors; fuel storage pool anti-siphon feature.; employee concerns; and management meeting.
Results:
Of the 12 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in ten areas.
One violation with six examples was identified.
One example was identified in the area of previous inspection finding (Paragraph 2.d) and the remaining five examples were identified in the area of event followup i
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One' unresolved item was identified l
in the area of operational safety verification (Paragraph 5.b).
All of these items are receiving. licensee' management attention.
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8710260297 871021 ADOCKOS00g1 PDR G
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted i
Illinois Power Company (IP)
- J. Brownell, Project Specialist, Licensing
- R. Campbell, Manager, QA
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- W..Connell, Manager, Nuclear-Station Engineering Department (NSED)
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- J. Cook, Assistant Manager, Clinton Power Station (CPS)
- E. Corrigan, Director Quality Engineering and Verification
- F. Edler, Supervisor. Maintenance and Technical Training, NTD
@M. Ehalt, Staff Engineer, Civil / Structural
- R. Freeman, Assistant Plant Manager,-Maintenance
- K. Graf, Director, Operations Monitoring Program i
- D. Hall, Vice President, Nuclear.-
- D. Hillyer, Director, Plant Radiation Protection
- D. Holesinger, Assistant Manager, Startup
@E. Kant, Director, Design Engineering
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@G. Lukach, Staff Engineer, Licensing Operations l
@J. Mansker, Project Engineer, Civil / Structural
- A. Mcdonald, Director, Nuclear Program Assessment
- J. Miller, Manager, Scheduling and Outage Management
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- J. Perry, Manager, Nuclear Program Coordination
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@D. Phares, Supervisor, Licensing Operations
@F. Spangenberg, Manager, L&S
- J. Weaver, Director, Licensing
- J. Wilson, Manager, CPS i
- R. Wyatt, Director, Nuclear Program Assessment j
Soyland/WIPC0
- J. Greenwood, Manager Power Supply Sargent & Lundy
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@A. Singh, Structural Design Director
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l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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- P. Hiland, Senior Resident Inspector, Clinton
- S. Ray, Resident Inspector, Clinton
- R. Knop, Chief, Section 18, Region III
- W. Forney, Chief, Projects Branch 1, Region III
- E. Greenman, Deputy Director Region III Projects.
@G..Bagchi, Chief, Structural and Geosciences Branch, NRR
@G. Giese-Koch, Geophysicist, Structural and Geosciences Branch, NRR
@J. Richardson, Assistant Director for Engineering, NRR
@L. Reiter, Section Leader, Structural and Geosciences Branch, NRR
@D. Muller, Director, Directorate III-2, NRR
@B. Siegel, Project Manager, NRR
@A. Wang, Project Manager, NRR
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@ Denotes those attending the special-meeting on the seismic event on September 20, 1987.
- Denotes those attending the management meeting on October 9, 1987.
- Denotes those attending the monthly exit meeting on October 14, 1987.
i The inspector also. contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.
2.
Previously Identified Items (92701) (92702)
a.
(Closed) Open; Item-(461/85005-32):.. Verify that procedures.to ensure independent verification of system lineups'are complete (TMI Item II.K.1.10 and I.C.6.1).
This item was previously reviewed as documented'in Inspection Reports-No. 50-461/85032, Paragraph.2.f; No. 50-461/86064, Paragraph-2.a; and
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No. 50-461/87002, Paragraph 2.d.
At the conclusion of those reviews,
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this item remained open, pending completion of the' licensee's review i
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process and revision, if. required, to applicable procedures.
During this report period,.the inspector reviewed the licensee's action on this item.
The licensee completed their review of operating procedures requiring independent verification.
As previously documented in Inspection Report No. 50-461/87002, the licensee established criteria for independent verification of system lineups in CPS No. 1401.01, " Conduct of Operations".
Using the established criteria, the licensee reviewed applicable procedures to assure the independent verification requirement was met or exceeded.
CPS No. 1401.01, Revision 12, dated June 24, 1987, contained j
i Appendix "A" that identified plant operating procedures that required independent verification.
Based on completion of the licensee's review to assure independent verification was required i
in accordance with established criteria and the inspections previously performed as documented in the inspection reports referenced.above, the inspector concluded that the licensee's actions to address this item were completed.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Open Item (461/86072-02):
General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 445, Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) Fuse Failure, dated July 26, 1986.
During a previous report period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's action in response to GE SIL-445.
At the' time of that review, the licensee had not completed their evaluation of two recommendations contained in SIL-445.
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Ouring this report period, the inspector. reviewed IP_-
Memorandum Y-206033, dated September 25, 1987, which documented the licensee's final disposition of recommendations made in SIL-445.
(1) The licensee's technical department completed a review of plant technical procedures and identified no technical impact.
(2) In response to'GE's recommendation to add a plant modification to
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monitor-the -24VDC power supply, the licensee initiated plant
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Modification NR006.
The modification was classified as'a " plant.
,1 betterment" and was scheduled for implementation during the second i
refueling outage.
Based on the review performed,. the inspector concluded that the j
licensee had adequately reviewed SIL-445 in accordance with their-
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Industry Feedback Program.
Appropriate actions.were scheduled for completion.
This item is closed.
(. Closed) Open Item (461/87011-05):
Administrative' Controls In c.
Place For Compliance With Technical Specification Action Statements.
During a' routine inspection of LCOs in effect, the inspector noted an inconsistent approach in the licensee's administrative practice with regard to temporary modifications and tagging for compliance with the Action Statement.
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I The inspector reviewed IP Memorandum RFS-87-092, dated March 30, 1987, which directed the use of CPS No. 1014.03, " Temporary Modifications,"
or CP5 No. 1014.01, " Safety Tagging Procedure" to control lifted leads or switch positions when complying with.~an LC0 Action Statement.
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addition, CPS'No. 1014.01, Revision 12, dated' June 24, 1987, provided i
specific instructions in Paragraph 2.1.3 for administrative controls -
to be used when complying with LC0' Action Statements.
Based on the j
above review, the inspector concluded that the' licensee had adequate administrative controls in place for the identified problem for complying with LC0 Action Statements.
This. item is closed.
d.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(461/87030-09J:
Technical Specification Violation - Failure to Perform Channel Functional Test.
This item referred to an event on August 28, 1987, in which
'i control rods were withdrawn in Operating Condition 1 without having performed a channel function test of the Rod Pattern Control system Rod Withdrawal Limiter High Power Setpoint within one hour prior to control rod movement unless performed within the previous'24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Specification Table 4.3.6-1 Item 1.b.
Note (c).
This item was left unresolved pending further investigation by the licensee to determine if.the technical specification requirement had been missed on previous startups.
As reported in Licensee Event Report (LER) 87-051-00, dated September 17, 1987, the licensee determined that the same event had occurred on August 17, 1987, and may also have. occurred on July 18, 1987.
Since exact times of rod motion were not recorded,~the plant may not have been in. noncompliance on July 18, 1987, but compliance could not be adequately documented.
The cause of these events was attributed to personnel error on the part of licensed operators due to inadequate awareness of the technical specification requirements ~ and the fact _that this surveillance requirement was not called out in'the plant' integrated.
operating procedures.
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Failure on at least two and possibly three occasions to perform the channel functional test of the Rod Pattern Control system Rod Withdrawal Limiter High Power Setpoint within one hour prior to control rod movement unless performed within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, as required by CPS Technical Specification Table 4.3.6-l' Item 1.b.
Note (c), is a violation (461/87032-01A).
e.
(0 pen) Violation (461/87031-04):
Between March and July 1987, numerous discrepancies, thought to be limited to only " housekeeping" items, were identified by the licensee.
The licensee failed to promptly correct conditions and/or failed to evaluate and document the discrepancies that had been identified.
The licensee responded to this violation via IP Letter U-601040, dated September 21, 1987, in~a timely manner.
The licensee's immediate corrective action was to perform an evaluation of the identified discrepancies.
This evaluation included a walkdown of all the identified discrepancies to identify potential safety concerns.
Of the 500 initial discrepancies, 18 required corrective action.
Condition Report (CR) 1-87-07-023 was initiated by the licensee to properly document and provide corrective action for the 18 discrepant items.
In addition, the licensee provided specific training to appropriate site personnel on the requirements to promptly report deficiencies in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspector noted that the licensee's immediate corrective action was well defined in that the review criteria and walkdown performed by the licensee evaluated each of the discrepancies initially identified.
Corrective actions were completed or in progress on the 18 deficient conditions which required repair.
However, during the repair activities additional discrepancies, initially thought to be acceptable conditions, were identified by the licensee.
The licensee stated that additional sample inspections would be performed on 86 of the 500 initial discrepancies.
The selection of the 86 discrepancies to be sample inspected was based on the initial significance level assigned by the licensee.
The licensee stated that a revised response would be issued upon completion of the sample inspection.
The inspector reviewed the training material used by the licensee to upgrade the awareness of site personnel on the requirements of the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspector's review of that training material and review of training records indicated that the licensee's corrective action to prevent recurrence of this violation was appropriate and complete.
This item will remain open pending receipt of the licensee's revised response and the inspector's
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review of the licensee's sample inspection.
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f.
(Closed) Violation (461/87031-12):
Licensee failed to comply with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.2 within the
time allotted by the Action Statement (seven days).
From June.23 j
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.to July 15, 1987, the plant was operated in.0perating Conditions 1, h.
2, and 3 with Control Room Ventilation System Train B (VC-B)
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Technical Specification 3.7.2 required restoration i
of an inoperable Control Room Ventilation System within seven days-
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or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD m^'
SHUTOOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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During'this report period, the licensee responded to this' violation in a timely. manner.
IP Letter U-601040,- dated September 21, 1987, detailed the licensee's corret.tive action to this violation and the
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corrective-action taken to prevent recurrence of the. violation.
The licensee's immediate corrective action.was to restore VC-B.to an operable status after discovery of the -inoperable conilition on July 14, 1987.
The licensee's investigation into'the root'cause of the VC-8 inoperability was provided in LER 87-038-00,. dated i
July 23, 1987, and is discussed below in Paragraph 4.b.
The licensee's corrective action.to prevent-recurrence of this..
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violation included verification of proper' rotation on safety-related fans, a review of maintenance activities involving-lifted leads for 30 days preceding the date the violation was. identified, and additional training was provided to technicians involved with'
lifted lead control.
The inspector verified, through review of training records,'that the training on proper controls of lifted leads,was provided to.
appropriate site personnel as stated in the response to this
violation.
In addition, the inspector attended a training session
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conducted by the Manager, Licensing and Safety where the root causes for this violation were discussed.
The inspector's observation _of training provided and review of records indicated the licensee's corrective action to prevent recurrence of this violation was completed.
This item is closed.
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(0 pen) Violation (461/87031-05):
Locking devices not installed
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on valves.
The licensee responded to this violation via IP Letter U-601040, dated September 21, 1987, in a timely manner.
As stated in that response, the licensee's immediate corrective action was to verify l
that all accessible valves requiring a locking device were locked.
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The licensee stated that all valves were verified to be in their i
correct position and required locking ' devices were verified to be installed or were installed.
The licensee's action to prevent recurrence of this violation was to install plastic signs on valves that require a locking device.
Observations by the inspector. indicated that this action was completed.
However, on September 23, 1987,. the inspector identified that.
a locking device was not installed on Valve 1SA046, one of the containment isolation test valves listed in Technical Specification Table 3.6.4-1.
This valve contained a tag which. stated " Locked
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Valve." Valve 1SA046'hadga lockwire hanging.from the valve body,-
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but it was not installedi 'The inspector brought this to the
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attention of plant. staff who inv'estigated.
On. September 24,
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Valve 1SA046 was not required to be. locked' based on their review of CPS No. 3414.01V001, Revision 5, " Plant Air Valve Lineup".
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staf * Stated that Valve 1SA046 was required only to be " closed", not
"lo Wd closed." They further stated that the valve was:left in this condition,.in accordance with the valve lineup, after a recent
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Local Leak Rate-Test on the'the penetration.
The inspector pointed
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out to the staff members that Valve ISA046 was a manual containment isolation valve that was required to be locked shut.
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The above observations and discussions indicated that the corrective actions to this violation were not adequate in that, even though Valve 1SA046 had a " locked valve" tag, the tag was' ignored when the valve lineup procedure did not call for the valve to be locked.
It also confirmed that rapid correctivt nction to Open Item 461/87030-02 discussed.below in Paragraph h. is necessary to ensure that valve lineup procedures for all locked valves call for_ the valves to be -
locked.
Violation 461/87031-05 will remain open pending further
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corrective actions to ensure that the plastic " locked valve" tags.
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are understood and adhered to by appropriate plant personnel.
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(0 pen) Open Item (461/87030-02):
Discrepancies Between Valve l
Lineups and P& ids in the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) system.
This item identified several manual containment isolation valves in the LPCS system which were required to be " locked closed" in
accordance with Technical Specification 4.6.1.1.b, but were listed
only as being " closed" in the applicable CPS No. 3000 series valve j
and instrument lineups.
The inspector investigated further into this matter, comparing the list of manual containment isolation
test connections, vents and drains listed in Technical Specification Table 3.6.4-1 against CPS No. 9061.0500C1, Revision 23, " Containment and Drywell Test Connection, Vent and Orain Valves - Monthly," and CPS No. 9061.050002, Revision 23, " Containment and Drywell Test j
Connection, Vent and Drain Valves - Quarterly." The list was also verified against the appropriate CPS No. 3000 series valve and instrument lineups.
Of the 135 test, vent and drain valves listed on Table 3.6.4-1, all were checked in their locked closed position in either CPS
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No. 9061.050001 or 9061.050002, but only 17 were listed as locked closed in the corresponding CPS No. 3000 series lineups.
One. valve, ICC266, was listed as open in CPS-3203.01V001, Revision 5, " Component Cooling Water Valve Lineup," and one valve, 1CM099, could not be found in a CPS No. 3000 series lineup.
The remaining 116 valves.
were all listed only as closed in the CPS No. 3000 series lineups.
The inspector expressed his concern to plant staff that the valves might.' e' left unlocked after maintenance or operations becaase the o
valve lineups did not contain-the requirement to lock the valv.es.
This same concern was expressed during the last inspection period
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when discussing this item with plant staff.
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As discussed above in Paragraph g., the inspector!'s review of thp licensee's corrective action to' Violation-461/87031-05 indicated a continuing problem with plant staff's understanding of required valve lineups which appeared to be compounded by the. inconsistency-between required surveillance valve lineupt and system valve:1ineups.
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'This item.will remain open pending revisioris of all necessary valve
lineup procedures to show'the: required locked positions of locked-valves.
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i One violation was identified.
Five additional examples of-this violation were identified and are discussed in Paragraph 10. below.
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3.
Evaluation of Applicarit Action with Regard to Three Mile Island (TMI)
Action Plan Requirements (25401)
.i The NRC Office: of Inspection and Enforcement issue.d Temporary Instruction.
(TI) 2514/0., Revision 2, dated December 15, 1980,to-supplement the Inspection and Enforcement Manual.
The TI provides TMI-related inspection requirements for operating license applicants during the phase between relicensing and licensing for full power operation. 'The TI was used as the basis for inspection of the following TMI items found in NUREG-0737,
" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."
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(Closed) TMI Item I.C.6.1 and II.K.1.10:
" Guidance on Procedures for j
Verifying C u rect Performance of Operating Activity" [I.C.6.1] and
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" Verify procedures ensure' independent verification of system lineups
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[II.K.1.10].
These items were identical to Open Item 461/85005-32.
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Since the open item has been closed (see Partgraph 2.'a.
above),
f these items are closed.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
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Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events At Power Reactor Facilities (92700)
For the LERs listed below, the. inspector performed an onsite-followup
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inspection of the LERs to determine whether response to the events l
were adequate and met regulatory requirements, license conditions, and
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commitments and to determine whether the li.censee had taken corrective actions as stated in the LERs.
a.
(Closed) LER No. 86-016-00 and No. 86016-01 (461/86016-LL):
Operator Error Resulting in Technical Specification Violation.
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LER No. 86-016-00 was previously reviewed as documented in l
Inspectinn Report No. 50-461/86072, Paragraph 6.b.(5).
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the time of that review, this LER remained open due to an error-l in referencing the wrong reporting requirements and an incomplete j
narrnive.
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A violation was identified in Inspection Report No. 50-461/86065 j
(461/86065-070) related to this event.
The inspector's review of a
the licensee's corrective action to that violation was documented
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in Inspection Report No. 50-462 /87007, Paragraph 2.f.
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licensee's corrective action to the violation was found to-i be effectively implemented and the violation was closeti.
During this report period, the inspector reviewed I.ER No. 86-016-01.
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The revised LER referenced the appropriate reporting requirements of
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In addition, a more complete narrative and additional information were provided in the revised LER.
The inspector reviewed training records which verified corrective
actions as stated in the LER were completed.
Although additional
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technical specification violations have occurred since the licensee j
completed corrective action to this LER, the inspector noted that none -
of the subsequent technical specification violations were identical to this event (i.e., a known LCO was in effect at the time of a. mode-
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change in violation of Technical Specification 3.0.4.).
Based on completion of the corrective action as stated in the revised LER, this item is closed.
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(Closed) LER No. 87-038-00 (461/87038-LL):
Violation of The Plant's Technical Specification Due to Personnel Error Resulting in a Miswired i
Control Room Ventilation Makeup Fan.
The inspector reviewed the LER report dated July 23, 1987.
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inspector found that the event was properly classified and reported l
in an accurate and timely manner.
Determination of the cause of the event and corrective actions were found to be correct and appropriate.
Corrective actions have been completed.
A violation was identified i
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in Inspection Report No. 50-461/87031 (461/87031-12) relating to this event.
Followup of the licensee's corrective actions to.this violation are discussed in Paragraph 2.f. of this, report.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707)
Inspections were routinely performed to ensure that the licensee ccnducts activities at the facility safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements.
The inspections focused on the implementation and overall effectiveness of licensee's control of operating activities,
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and the performance of licensed and nonlicensed operators and shift-j technical advisors.
The following items were' considered during these
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inspections.
J Adequacy of plant staffing and supervision.
- Control room professionalism including procedure adherence,
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operator attentiveness and response to alarms, events, and-off normal conditions.
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Operability of selected safetyn elated systems' including
attendant alarms, instrumentation, and controls.
Maintenance of quality records'and reports.
- The inspections included direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel,
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independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation (LCO), and review of facility procedures, s. cords, and reports.
a.
Material Control in Containment j
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During the report period, routine' tours by the inspector indicated that material control conditions in the containment were inadequate.
Large loose pieces of plastic sheets, stepoff pads, anti-contamination clothing, and polyethylene bags were often left near the suppression
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pool for extended periods.
These items could fall into the suppression pool and clog ECCS pump suction strainers during an accident.
In addition, unused tools and equipment which.could become missile hazards were routinely left in all areas of containment.
Also some i
scaffolding, which appeared to be intended for permanent use, was
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installed without analyzing the modification for potential safety concerns in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
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There appeared to be several contributing causes for these j
unsatisfactory conditions.
The licensee had no policy for i
material control in containment and there was a general lack of knowledge of the potential effects of unanalyzed materials on the consequences of an accident in containment.
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As a result of these concerns, the Plant Manager directed the institution of written containment material control procedures.
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The unanalyzed scaffolding was removed and, late in the inspection i
period, most of the loose and unnecessary material was removed.
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condition of containment with regards to loose material was brought'
to acceptable standards.
The licensee'.s completion and successful implementation of material control procedures is considered an Open Item (461/87032-02).
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Unlocked Valves in the Standby Liquid Control System g
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On September 21, 1987, while conducting a routine inspection of the
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containment building, the inspector noted that Valves 1C41-F314A and i
1C41-F3148 in the Standby Liquid Centrol (SLC) system were not locked.
l In addition, the inspector noted that the pipe caps downstream of the l
valves were not welded.
The valves were isolations for temporary l
differential pressure gauges which were installed'for preoperational-
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and initial startup testing, but which were removed for normal ' plant'
operations.
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Drawing P&IO.M05-1077,' Revision R,' Field' Note 1, stated'that t'he lines should be capped and welded when the gauges were removed.
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The inspector noted that the gauges were removed but the caps-
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were not welded.
-1 Technical Specification 4.1.5.b.3 required that each valve in:
the flow path.of the_SLC system that is not locked, sealed, or,
otherwise secured in position be verified to be in its correct'
position at least once per 31 days.
CPS Ho. 9015.03, Revision 20,
"$LC Squib Valve Continuity and Flow Path Verification," only l
checked Valves-1C41-F001 A and B.
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The inspector discussed this item with plant staff on September 22,.
1987, The inspector also expressed-a concern that the same situation may exist in other. systems where temporary gauges have been removed.'
j On' September 23, 1987, the inspector was informed that plant.
l management did not consider that branch line isolation. valves in the SLC system to be 'lin the flow pat.h" and thus the valves were
'i not required to be locked or periodically checked in accordance I
with technical' specification'ns.
The inspector disagreed with'this l
interpretation.and requested clarification from the Technical Specifications Branch.
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This item is considered unresolved pending the inspector's receipt of the Technical Specifications interpretation (461/87032-03).
One open and one unresolved item were identified.
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'1 6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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Selected portions of the plant maintenance activities on safety-related
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systems and components were observed or reviewed to ascertain that the j
activities were performed in accordance with approved, procedures, j
regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and that the performance
of the activities conformed to the Technical Specifications.-
The inspection included activities associated with preventive or corrective
'l maintenance of electrical, instrumentation and control, mechanical-equipment, and systems.
The following items were considered during these inspections:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed'from service; approvals were obtainnd'
prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;-' functional testing and/or calibration was performed prior to returning the components or systems to service; parts and materials that were used were properly certified; and maintenance of appropriate fire prevention, radiological, and j
housekeeping conditio.
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i The inspector observed / reviewed the following work' activities:
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Maintenance Work Request No.
' Activity.
'PCIIAM003 (PM)
Loop Calibration on Division I ADS backup j
air bottle pressure transmitter, q
i MWR-C08054.
Repair / Rework of Penetrations, j
l No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
An inspection of' inservice and testing activities was performed to-l ascertain that'the activities were accomplished in accoroance with applicable regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in i
conformance with regulatory requirements.
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Items which were considered during' the inspection included whether l
adequate procedures were used to perform the testing, test instrumentation
.i was calibrated, test results conformed with Technical' Specifications and
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procedural requirements, and that tests were performed withi, the. required
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time limits.
The inspector determined that the' test results were ' reviewed.
j by someone other than the personnel. involved with the performance of the j
test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed
and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector observed / reviewed the following. activities.
>j Surveillance / Test
Procedure No.
Activity
.l CPS No. 9431.60,- Revision 31 Average Power Range Monitor i
(including PDR-87-1484)
Gain. Adjustment and Setpoint Verification CPS No. 9080.02, Revision 27 Diesel Generator 1C Operability -
Manual CPS No. 9432.18, Revision 22 RWCU Ventilation Differential Temperature Channel Functional /
Calibration'.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Training and Qualification Effectiveness (41400 and 41701)-
The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and nonlicensed personnel were reviewed by the inspector during the witnessing of
the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance,~and j
operational activities and during the review of the licensee's-response i
to events which occurred during the month cf September.1987.- Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed.
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During~.this report period, the inspectors.. directlyfobserved _ training on severa1' occasions.. They attended a' training session given' by: management-on the lessons' learned from LER.87"038-00 as discussed in Paragraph 2.f.
above.
They'also observed a: simulator training session in which the crew =
-u practiced the' actions they-would take during Startup Test; Procedure (STP)~-
25 B-6', "MSIV -' Full Reactor Isolation.".: In addition, the' inspectors
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attended training sessions ~on.the revised-Radiation; Work Permit progrsm'.
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No violations or deviations were' identified.
9.
Sta_rtup Test Witnessing and Observation'(72302).
During the' report period, the inspector witnessed the' performance of Startup Test Procedure (STP)-25-B-6,L"MSIV:- Full'--Reactor Isolation "'
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I The inspector determined by. direct observation that licensee. operating
and test personne1'were knowledgeable in their : individual roles and responsibilities.
Adequate. communications were established and' maintained n
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throughout the test.
Prior to, during,:and subsequent to.'the subject; test:
the inspector verified the following:
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Crew requirements were.being met as defined in p1dnt procedures,.
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and staffing satisfied requirements of Technical Specifications?
regarding licensed operators.
The proper version of the' test procedure was in use and was beingi.
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followed. -All referenced procedures had been' reviewed and approved.
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Each of the. prerequisites had been satisfied.
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Changes or revisions to the test procedure were properly
reviewed and approved.
Data sheet entries were.. legible and recorded in permanent' ink'.
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Review of the test results will be conducted during'a future inspection.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
0nsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702)
a.
General The inspector performed onsite' followup activities-for events-which occurred during the inspection' period. : Followup' inspection included cae or more of the following:
reviews offoperating logs, -
procedur.es,-condition reports; direct.' observation of licensee l actions; l
and interviews of. licensee. personnel.
For each event', the inspector.
I reviewed one or more.of the.following:-
theisequence!of actions; the:
functioning ~ of. safety systems required.by plant' conditions;f: licensee:
actionsito verify consistency with' plant procedures and license conditions;'and attempted to verify'the natu'reLof the event; y
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Additionally,:in'some cases, the inspector verifisd that licensee-investigation had identified root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel errors and were taking or had taken appropriate
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corrective actions.
Details of the events and licensee corrective e
actions noted during the inspector's followup'are provided in Paragraph b. below, b.
Details (1) Potential Missed Surveillance [ ENS No. N/A]
I I
On August 13, 1087, the licensee discovered that documentation l
on file in Startup Test GTP-31 did not provide for Visual i
Verification of the VC system.Recirc. Filter Housing to fan j
flexible. connection to satisfy Technical-Specification 4.7.'2.
Subparagraph h.
A critique,was held on August 14, 1987, with j
the inspector in attendance.
At the critique it was determined
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that a second startup test,.XTP-00-12 had satisfied the l
requirement for a visual verification, thus no' Technical
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Specification violation occurred.
It was also determined that'
l the existing Surveillance Procedure CPS No. 9866.04, Revision 22, l
"VC Negative Pressure Ductwork Leak Test," contained incorrect
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instructions which would have led to visual verification of the wrong flexible connection.
-l The inspector reviewed the licensee's report of critique TEC-87-8-01 to evaluate the corrective action.
The inspector determined.that CPS Temporary Change Form 87-1323 instituted-
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a Procedure Deviation for Revision-(PDR) on August 14, 1987.
I This POR to CPS No. 9866.04 incorporated the changes necessary to ensure that the correct. flexible connection would be inspected.
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The inspector further determined that CPS No. 1011.07F001,
" Initial Surveillance Test Requirement Analysis," was approved on August 27, 1987, which accepted the resultsLof XTP-00-12 to
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meet the visual verification requirements of Technical Specification 4.7.2.h.
CPS Condition Report 1-87-08-055 was d
written on August 14, 1987, to track the corrective' action on
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this event.
The condition report was closed.out on September 15, i
1987, with a Technical Specification Change Request submitted to the Licensing Department under Commitment Tracking Number CCT
No. 046624 to clarify which flexible connection was to be j
inspected.
j The inspector found the-critique of the incident _and corrective action implemented to be adequate and timely.
This inadequacy.
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of the CPS No. 1011.07 evaluation of a startup test' appeared to
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be an isolated instance of personnel error in. misinterpreting i
an unclearly worded technical specification.
(2) ESF Actuation [ ENS No. 09851]
l On September C, 1987, with the plant in Mode 1 at.' normal
- perating temperature and pressure and 64% Reactor Power, the l
Reactor Core Isolation Coeling (RCIC) steam inboard isolation
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valve automatically isolated.
The lsolation^ occurred duringj trou_bleshooting to isolate erratic Division 2:RCIC steam flow.
indication that was causin Control:
and -Instrumentation (C&I) g. spurious high flow spikes..
technicians were throttling the transmitter' isolation valves'.as a 'possible solution, when the indication increased and the three second delay for'the'
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RCIC inboard isolation function and RCIC turbine trip signal:
timed out. The' turbine was in standby and not. running-I Operations implemented the automatic; isolation procedure-for RCIC and declared RCIC inoperable.:.The'cause of the
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event was attributed to' personnel ~not recognizing the' potential H
i for actuation prior to manipulating the' instrument isolation valves.. C&I Technicians and Operations' supervision have been trained on the requirement to. include potential. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations in the impact matrix of the.
work document.
Additional corrective actions-included instructing the Assistant Shift Supervisors to inform the Shift Supervisor (SS) of possible ESF.actuations and to obtain.SS concurrence prior to proceeding..
Engineering is preparing a procedure to provide written action =
plans for activities such as troubleshooting. This-procedure.
is scheduled to be issued by October 30, 1987. -The. licensee described this event in LER 87-052-00 dated September 24,'1987'.
(3) Local Fire Department-Response [ ENS No. 09854]
At about 10:40 p.m.-.on September.2, 1987, theilicens_ee requested the Clinton Fire Department to respond-to the Clinton Power.
Station when a 12 KV ring bus'was~ observed arching.. Licensee maintenance. personnel opened the.affected disconnect and is~ lated o
the portion of the bus that-had.. failed.
Remaining. portions of the 12 KV ring bus were reenergized<at about 11:30 p.m.'
No fire occurred.
No plant systems were affected. "At the time of
occurrence, the reactor plant was operating' at about 52% power.
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(4) Thermal Overload Protection Not Bypassed [ ENS No.JN/A]
j On September 12,1987, at.5:45 a.m.. an operator noted that test preparation switch for Valve 1FP079 was in the " test". position.
The switch was immediately. returned to,the " normal" position.
The purpose of the switch was to insert. thermal' overload'
protection in the Motor Operated-' Valve'during testing.. Under normal conditions.the thermal overload protection must be a
bypassed in accordance with Technical Specification'3.8.4.2.
An investigation determined that the switch was placed in !' test"'
at about 9:00 p.m. on September-11,'1987,. as part of Surveillance Procedure CPS No. 9061.03, " Containment /Drywell Isolation Valve =
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Three Month Operability.". The-procedure called for restoring the valve to:" normal" but that step was missed-The-abnormal
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switch position caused a~ Main: Control Room ' annunciator to _be:
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CPS.No. 1401.01, " Conduct.of Operations,". required that l
each oncoming Control-Room' Operator'(CRO) perform an annunciator f
check and understand the' reason for each lit' annunciator.
A j
proper review of the annunciators by the' oncoming CR0 at1 midnight
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on September 11,'1987, would.have discovered the mispositioning;
before the-8-hour time limit of Technical Specification 3.8.4.2.
had expired.~ Technical Specification 3.8.4.2 required that, if.
j the thermal overload protection was not bypassed continuously,
within eight hours, the affected valve must be declared
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inoperable'and the appropriate ACTION: statement for.the.
j affected system must be followed.
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l Upon discovering the mispositioned switch at 5:45 a.m. on
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September 12,'1987, the Shift Supervisor'(SS) realized that~
the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> time limit had expired but did not consider the
- i event reportable because declar.ing IFP079 inoperable would'
have allowed an additional four hours before action had to.
be taken to isolate the penetration.
Since the switch was r
returned to the " normal" position'before the additional four-hours would haveLexpired, the SS initially determined.that _
Technical Specifications had not been violated.
Upon reviewing the SS logs on the morning of September 12, 1987,. the. inspector l
pointed out that exceeding the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> time limit of Technical-l Specification 3.8.4.2 without declaring the affected system-j inoperable was in itself a violation of Technical. Specifications.
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The inspector noted that one of the contributing. factors to this event was the difficult time the CR0s had.-in reviewing the causes of all the annunciators on the Main Control Boards.
due to the large number of nuisance,~out-of-service, and normally i
lit annunciators.
This condition has been discussed with plant-
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management by the inspector'and Region III management on several
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occasions.
Although plant staff is presently pursuing correction j
of out-of-service annunciators and proceeding toward the
" blackboard" concept, these actions should continue to be more actively pursued.
The licensee reported this event in LER 87-053-00 dated October'1, 1987.
Failure to declare the associated penetration inoperable within
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eight hours of thermal overload protection not being continuously
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bypassed on Valve'1FP079 is a violation of Technical Specification 3.8.4,2 (461/87032-01B).-
(5) Filter and Cartridge Not Changed Out on Radiation Monitor
[ ENS No N/A]
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On September 16, 1987, the licensee discover'ed that the filter and cartridge sample changeout on' radioactive gaseous effluent:
monitor PR001 had not been accomplished for a period.of 13 days.
CPS Technical Specification Table 4.11.2-1c required that the.
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i sample media be changed and' analyzed weekly.
The cause'of this il event'was attributed to failure on the part of Chemistry l-
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Department' personnel to properly. identify, ' document, and track the requirement.
.A critique of:the event was held a
on' September 17,.1987, in which the causes were determined acd
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corrective actions assigned.
The licensee reported this ever.t
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in LER 87-054-00 dated October 6,.1987.
Failure'to change and analyze the sample media'of PR001 each seven days is a violation of Technica1' Specification 4.11.2-Ic (461/87032-010).
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'(6) Sleeping Ar'eas Found In Plant [ ENS No. N/A]
On September 17, 1987, the licensee identified.an area'in the-control building ventilation room 1that was apparently being j
used as-a sleeping area.
The area in question was on top of j
the control building ventilation intake lductwork.
On,
j September 19, at about 8:30 a.m. the licensee's investigator found a laborer employed by the site maintenance contractor, Stone and Webster,-(S&W), in the area above the ventilation equipment.
Although the laborer was_not found sleeping, his
.i explanation for being in.the area was poor.
In addition,.the j
licensee's investigator detected the smell of alcohol on the
breath of the S&W laborer.
The laborer was immediately escorted
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offsite and' agreed to take a blood-alcohol test at a-local-hospital.
The results of the blood-alcohol test were received by the licensee on September 21, and indicated 0.103L The S&W 1aborer was immediately terminated in accordance with the
licensee's fitness for duty program.
On September 23, 1987, the Plant Manager provided.a memo toall j
employees informing them that' sleeping areas had been found and i
reminding them that sleeping or other inattention to duty would-
- j result in disciplinary action.
On September 28,~1987, employees j
I of the security contractor found what' appeared to be' additional sleeping areas in the Radwaste Building.
On September 29, 1987, j
the resident inspector found additional sleeping areas on top of.
filter housings in the Control and Diesel Generator Building.
j There was no evidence that these areas had been recently used
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and they n.ay have been left over from construction periods.
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During the Maiagement Meeting on October.9. 1987, the licensee i
informed the hRC that they had conducted extensive searches of
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all areas of the plant to remove rest areas and had instituted
a program to periodically sweep the plant to' ensure no new rest
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areas existed.
j (7) Reactor Scram [ ENS No. 10078]
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s On September 21, 1987, the licensee experienced a reactor scram from 98% power on high reactor vessel level'(Level 8)
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While in Startup Test Condition Six, the' licensee was performing a feedwater control ~ system response test.
With one turbine driven feed pump in manual and the other in auto, a 20% step-increase in flow was inserted.into theLfeed pump that was in manual to test the response of the automatic control system of-the other feed pump.
A few seconds after inserting the step-
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change, the standby condensate (CD) and condensate booster (CB)
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pumps automatically' started on a low net positive suction head-(NPSH) signal at the feed pump suctions.
The combination of
step increase in feed and increased flow from the condensate l
system' caused reactor vessel water level to increase rapidly.
The operators attempted to control the feed rate but'after about 25l seconds,-the reactor tripped on high level.
All
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systems responded as expected after the scram, l
i A critique of the event was held later the same day with the g
inspector in attendance.
The licensee believed that one of
the three NPSH sensing circuits was out of calibration and that actual NPSH never reached the setpoint for starting the standby
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CD and CB pumps.
The licensee found that calibration.of~the NPSH circuits was difficult due to the fact that the~ normal output of the circuits reads off scale high under normal-operating conditions'and there was no easy way to determine the outputs from the circuits in the " black box" type NPSH computer devices.
Compensatory actions were taken to prevent the standby'CD and CB pumps from starting during the feedwater tests and the plant was restarted on September 22, 1987.
The. inspector witnessed the reactor startup.
Feedwater testing was later completed without incident but work was continuing to colve the problems in the NPSH circuits.
(8) Radioactive Iodine in Sewage Plant [ ENS No. N/A]
On September 21, 1987, during routine weekly testing at the licensee's station sewage treatment plant, trace amounts of radioactive Iodine-131 were detected in the waste system.
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Since the analysis indicated no other isotopes,-the Iodine-131 was thought to come from excretions of body wastes of a person
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I who was undergoing medical treatment using the isotope.
The Plant Manager immediately sent a memo to all employees asking that anyone undergoing this type of treatment notify Radiation Protection.
When no-one identified themselves and no one j
alarmed the exit portal radiation monitors it was assumed the
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Iodine-131 must be coming.from offsite.
Additional testing.
identified the source as being from waste hauled to the site
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from the holding tanks at the Clinton Lake Marina.
Waste water i
from the marina was being hauled to the site for treatment on a
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temporary basis while work was in progress'on installing a new i
waste treatment plant'at the marina, j
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(9) Required Four Hour Grab Sample-of-Offgas System Hydrogen Missed-
[ ENS No. N/A]
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On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 p.m., the. licensee
discovered that they had failed to obtain the. required Hydrogen
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(H2) grab sample on the Main Condenser Offgas System.
The grab sample was required to be taken within four, hours of both trains
of H2 samplers becoming inoperable.
Both trains were inoperable l
between approximately 3:43 p.m. and 9:35 p.m. on September 23, 1987.
The cause of the event was attributed to personnel. error on the part of the Shift Supervisors who failed to identify the i
grab sample requirement in a timely manner.
Two Shift Supervisors j
knew the status of the-Offgas system but did not review.the
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Technical Specification requirements due to more pressing operational concerns.
A critique of the event was held on September.24,.1987, in which the root causes were determined
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and corrective actions were assigned.
The licensee reported l
this event in LER 87-056-00 dated October 8, 1987.
Failure to obtain a H2 grab sample within four hours of both trains of Main Condenser Offgas H2 sampling becoming inoperable is a violation of Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.12-1 Item 3.a. ACTION 124 (461/87032-01D).
l (10) Missed Surveillance [ ENS No. N/A]
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On September 29, 1987, the licensee discovered that they-j had failed to perform a recurrent surveillance requirement to i
verify offsite power breaker alignment each eight. hours while I
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the Division 2 Diesel Generator was out of service for scheduled maintenance.
The Diesel Generator had been removed from service i
earlier the same day and the eight hour surveillance had been l
performed twice that day by previous shifts.
The Line Assistant-I Shift Supervisor (LASS), a Senior Reactor Operator, was aware.of the requirement to perform the surveillance, but became
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preoccupied with supervising the startup testing evolutions
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and overlooked it.
The Shift Supervisor (SS), a Senior Reactor Operator, had not received a turnover on the requirement and was not aware of it until he discovered.it while researching the Technical Specifications on a related matter.
The circumstances of this missed surveillance were very-similar to the missed H2 grab sample discussed above in Paragraph (9)
and similar-to other problems in identifying-and tracking short term ACTION and surveillance requirements discussed in previous inspection reports..As part of the corrective action, a large status board showing all upcoming short term ACTION and surveillance requirements for a three day period was.placed
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in the SS's office and the Main Control Room.
Permanent corrective actions were stil.1 being evaluated.
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Failure' to perform an offsite' power breaker alignment
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verification each eight hours with.one diesel. generator out of service ~is a violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 ACTION b (461/87032-01E).
(11) Failure to Perform Local Leak Rate Test [ ENS No'. N/A]
On September 30, 1987, the licensee determined that the Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) on the containment 737' elevation airlock-i door ~ seals had.not been' performed within the last 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> I
as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.a.1.
-The LLRT had been satisfactorily (
performed on September 25, 1987, and the airlock 'had been used q
for multiple entries since that time.
On September 28, 1987,
shortly before the LLRT was due, the. airlock was declared
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inoperable due to a broken outer door latch.-
The door was broken in such a way that it could not be closed.
The inner H
door was then locked shut in accordance with Technical
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Specification 3.6.1.3. ACTION a.1.
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ll The technical staff engineer responsible for conducting the q
LLRT and the Assistant Shift Supervisor (Senior Reactor Operator)
discussed the situation and concluded that the LLRT was not d
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required on an inoperable air lock.
Later review by plant staff
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determined that the LLRT should have been done on the operable inner door.
Had the Assistant Shift Supervisor brought the question of performing the LLRT to the attention of the Shift Supervisor or higher management staff, the problem with missing che surveillance might have been avoided.
Failure to perform a LLRT on the ' containment airlock door seal each 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during periods of use is a violation of Technical j
Specification 4.6.1.3.a.1 (461/87032-01F).
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,(12) ESF Actuation - RCIC Isolation [ ENS No. 10192].
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On October 2, 1987, tue licensee experienced an unexpected ESF actuation when Reactor Core Isolation Cooling.(RCIC)
l isolated.
The cause for the unexpected isolation was due to a wiring error during the installation of a temporary modification.
In order to troubleshoot a continuing problem with a RCIC steam flow transmitter, the licensee was installing-
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a temporary cable in.accordance with their temp.. mod. program.
'q Upon installation of the temporary cable, the RCIC inboard a
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isolation valve (E51-F063) went closed.
Subsequent investigation
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by the licensee' determined that the temporary cable was
imp'operly made up causing a direct short when: installed.
j The licensee removed the temporary modification and returned l
'the RCIC system to a standby status.
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(13) Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Non Safety DC Distribut' ion Bus
[ ENS No. 10193]
On October 2, 1987, the licensee experienced an unexpected reactor trip caused by loss of a non safety 125V DC distribution
bus.
At the time of event occurrence, the reactor plant was l
operating at about 91% power.
During restoration of the j
IF battery to service, a non-licensed operator inadvertently
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deenergized the 1F 125V distribution bus.
At the_ time'the 1F bus was deenergized, reactor water level feedwater control
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was selected to the "B" controller.
The B controller receives j
DC power from the 125V 1F distribution bus.
That resulted in
a downscale level signal causing the feedwater controller to j
compensate by increasing feedwater flow.
About 15 seconds later the reactor reached'its high level trip setpoint of
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+52" causing a reactor trip, main turbine trip, feedpump
turbine trip, and.the end of cycle.recirc pump trip.. The B Reactor Recirc Punip 58 breaker did not initially open because of the loss of control power which was supplied from the 1F DC
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bus.
This caused the recirc pumps to turn off.instead of shifting to slow speed on the RPT signal.
In addition, several i
non safety loads (circ water Pump B, No. 1 cir comprecsor, and
WO chillers) were tripped and had to be manually restarted.
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The-' loss of the non safety loads was caused by failure of the l
6.9 KV Bus 1B and the 4160V Bus 18 to transfer to the reserve J
aux. transformer (RAT) when the main turbine tripped. -This was j
.due to the loss uf control power supplied from the IF DC bus.
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Upon restoration of the 125V DC distribution Bus IF (about one minute after reactor trip), the non safety. loads were restored.
The licensee completed their investigation into this event and-i returned the plant to operation on October 3, 1987.
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The cause of the event was attributed to the non-licensed operator's failure-to close the feed breaker from the IF battery bus to the IF 125VDC distribution panel.
The operator-l had closed the breaker from the IF battery to the battery bus
but was not aware of the existence of the panel feed breaker.
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Contributing to the' event was the fact that the panel feed l
breaker was not labeled nor did the procedure being used i
clearly identify the panel feed breaker or its location, a
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Conclusions il Several licensee identified violations of plant technical
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specifications occurred during this report period.
In addition, the licensee reported additional violations that were identified while following up an event which occurred during the previous inspection period.
Although the significance of each of these events taken alone was minor, they indicated a generic weakness
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on the part of the licensee to' identify and track short periodicity surveillance and ACTION requirements.
These violations generally.
appeared to be the result of poor communications, inattentiveness-.to.
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detail, failure to followup,.and decisions.made by' individuals without consulting ~with supervisors.
The six events discussed above in-Paragraph 2.d. and Paragraphs 10.b.(4),(5),(9),(10), and (11) are l)
a'vi01ation (461/87032-01),
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One violation with five examples _was identified.
An additional example I
of this violation was identified in Paragraph 2.d.
f 11.
Inspection of Fuel Storage Pools Anti-Siphon Devices - Regional Request (92701)
In response. to Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual.0ccurrence PNO-IV-87-48, an inspection of the. anti-siphon features.of the' fuel
storage pools was conducted.
As described in PN0<IV-87-48, another licensee partially drained their upper fuel pool wnen a siphon path
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was established to the condensate storage tank.
Discussions with the i
inspector at the site involved determined that the siphon path was due to a plug being inadvertently left in the anti-siphon air hole on a-pipe from the upper fuel pool.
c l
The inspector reviewed the drawings of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup l
(FC) system, interviewed the system engineer, reviewed the appropriate
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FSAR sections, reviewed plant procedures, and conducted a field walkdown of the system.
The inspector investigated all piping which penetrated
below the normal water levels in the containment fuel-storage area,
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i containment transfer pool, spent fuel storaae pool, fuel transfer pool, and cask storage pool.
The inspector notea that all' piping in those areas contained anti-siphon devices consisting of a short 1/2 inch diameter open ended pipe located near the surface of-the pools.
None of the anti-aiphon pipes seemed to contain any plugs, nor were 'there any plart procedures which called for plugging the pipes.
The system j
ongineer stated that there were no hydrostatic, preoperational or startup i
'
tests that called fnr plugging the pipes.
Because of a 90 degree elbow i
in each of the anti-siphon pipes, the open end of the pipes faced downward q
and could not be directly observed but as a result'of the inspection, no reason to suspect that plugs were installed could be found.
Accidental
draining of a fuel storage pool in a manner described in PNO-IV-87-48 did not appear to be a possibility at Clinton Power Station.
No violation or deviation was identified.
12.
Special/ Management Meetings (30702)
a.
On September 10, 1987, a special meeting was held at Bethesda,
)
Maryland between F. Spangenberg (Manager, Licensing and Safety)
and others of Illinois Power Company to discuss the effects of the i
June 10, 1987, seismic event.
Key personnel attending the meeting are identified by (@) in Paragrapn 1. of this report.
The licensee discussed the chronology of the event, the status of the plant's seismic monitoring instruments, the analysis of the outputs of the seismic monitoring instruments, results.of walkdowns in the plant after the event, and the decisions leading to the licensee's conclusion that the event did not adversely affect the plant and did not warrant a unit shutdown.
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Most of the discussions between the NRC and the licensee centered
J around two topics.
One was the reliability.and operational status of the seismic monitoring instruments'.
The other was the fact that,
.although plant walkdowns indicated that there was no adverse effects from the event, all four of the passive seismic instruments available to analyze the event indicated that the Operational Basis Earthquake (0BE) was exceeded in at least some~high frequencies.
The NRC was-concerned that the licensee made the decision that much of the passive
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seismic data was not due to the event and the event had not exceeded the.08E without clearly hforming the NRC of the data that was available.
The staff was continuing to evaluate the-licensee'.s special
')
report on the June 10, 1987, seismic event.
Following receipt of additional information requested from the licensee at the September 10, 1987, meeting, Region III management will determine any additional actions.
b.
On October 9, 1987, NRC management met with IP management at the
Clinton Power Station to discuss the status of the facility, the l
licensee's Monthly Performance Monitoring Management Report and actions being taken to enhance the licensee's performance in several areas.
Key personnel attending the meeting are identified by (#)-
in Paragraph 1. of this report.
The licensee discussed the status of their power ascension test program and their plans for a maintenance outage at the completio,i of the program.
In addition, the licensee discussed recent Licensee Event Reports noting the apparent shift in type of events from Engineered Safety Feature actuations to Technical Specifications Violations.. Preliminary plans for improved performance in this
area were discussed.
The licensee also discussed their plans for-j reducing out-of-service annunciators, instruments, and recorders; i
the status of their Radiological Improvement Plan; the results of I
housekeeping surveys for personnel rest areas; and administrative procedures for conducting 10 CFR 50.59 safety reviews.
NRC (Region III) management acknowledged the licensee's status and plans.
The meeting concluded with a tentative agreement to meet again in November at the Clinton Power Station with a similar agenda.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Employee Concerns (99014)
The inspector reviewed concerns expressed by site personnel from time to time throughout the inspection period.
Those concerns related to regulated activities were documented by the inspector and submitted to Region III.
One concern was transmitted to the. regional office during this report period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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14.
Management Changes j
During the report period, the licensee:announcedLthe Manager, Nuclear Planning and Support,'Mr; W. Connell' accepted a position as Vice President
with Illinois Power responsible for fossil power production' effective
,
November 1, 1987.
The' licensee also. announced that Mr. J. G. Cook l
(Assistant Plant Manager) will assume the' position of Manager, Nuclear Planning and. Support.and Mr. D. L. Holesinger.(Assistant Manager, Startup)
will assume the position of Assistant Plant Manager effective October 15,
'
1987.
15.
.0 pen Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the: licensee, which.
will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which will' involve some
.
action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both..One open item' dis ~ closed'
during the ir.spection was discussed in Paragraph 5.
16.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required:
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items,. violations, or
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deviations.
One unresolved item disclosed during this inspection was
.l discussed in Paragraph 5.
17.
Exit Meetings (30703)
,
a The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
)
throughout the inspection and at~the conclusion of the inspection on j
October 14, 1987.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of j
the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection
findings.
]
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any-l documents / processes as proprietary.
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