IR 05000461/1987034

Safety Insp Rept 50-461/87-34 on 870921-23.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Actions Taken to Implement Generic Ltr 84-11 & Followup on Part 21 Rept

ML20235Q212
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	10/02/1987
From:	Danielson D, Schapker J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Q185	List: IR 05000461/1987034 ML20235Q183
References
50-461-87-34, GL-84-11, NUDOCS 8710070528
Download: ML20235Q212 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-461/87034(DRS)

Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62 l

Licensee: Illinois Power Company '

l 500 South 27th Street j Decatur, IL 62525 J

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Facility Name: .Clinton Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, Illinois Inspection Condycte September 21-23, 1987 g Inspector:

h/ chapker /0/2/87 l Date w,w 0,/2.hy

Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief

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Materials and Processes Date i Section l

Inspection Summary Inspection on September 21-23, 1_987 [ Report No. 50-461/87034(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of licensee actions taken to implement Generic Letter 84-11 (Temporary Instruction 2515/89)

(25589), and follow-up on a Part 21 report (92716).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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8710070528 871002 PDR ADOCK 05000461 G PDR

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a DETAILS T s j

, Persons Contacted

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l \ Illinois Power Company (IP) ' 1 l )

l *D. P. Hall, Vice President 'i

• J. D. Weaver, Director, Licensing

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• R. E. Campbell, Manager, Quality Assurance

• G. W. Bell, Director, Material Management

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• E. W. Kant, Director, NSED

• R. D. Freeman, Manager, NSED J. B. Comiskey, Project Engineer, NSED

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C. L. Nash, Supervising Engir:eer, Chemical Programs L. A. Brienig, Supervisor, Chemical Programs

• D. W. Wilson, Supervisor, Licensing

• E. Wyatt, Director, Nuclear Training

• J. A. Miller, Manager, Scheduling, Outage Management t *J. S. Perri, Manager, Nuclear Program. Coordinator j l *F. A. Spangenberg III, Manager, Licensing and Safety l *J. W. Wilson, Manager, EPS

• J. Greenwood, Manager, Power Supply i l

NuclearRegulatory_Commissich(NRCl P. L. Hiland, Senior Resident Inspector

• S. P. Ray, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those perscnnel attending the exit meeting on September 23, 1987. l (Open TI 2515/89) Inspection of BWR Stainless Steel Piping in Accordance with Generic Letter 84-11 l

{0 pen) Generic Letter (GL) 84-11 (461/84011-HH): Inspection of Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Stainless Steel Pipin The objective of this inspection is to assess the actions of the licensee ' I based on the initial suggestions contained in GL 84-11 and related correspondence concerning specific licensee commitment The licensee took corrective measures of mitigating the susceptibility to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of stainless steel piping in the reactor coolant pressure boundary by replacing the Reactor j Recirculation System (RR) riser piping with low carbon stainless steel '

piping (T316); the remainder of the IGSCC susceptible piping was corrosion resistant cladded (CRC) and solution heat treated to mitigate susceptibility to IGSCC.

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The NRC inspector rer"fested to,revietthe licebsee's response to GL 84-11 1 and subsequent correspondence r regarding positions' taken to the recommended actions in the referencud document." Rd licensee could not, provide the NRC inspector with a documejit which replied to GL S4-1 l After further investigation by 'the licensee, it was determined that the licensee had not replied to GL 84-11. Sinc (th

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l i to GL 84-11, the NRC inspector was not ableyerify to' qcommitments licensee hadtonot thereplied same. Powever, the NRC inspector made the fol' lowing observations of ,

TI.2515/S9 inspection requirements: l

/ ; Inspection Program The licensee's inservice inspection (ISI) program is committed to .

ASME Section XI, 1980 Edition, 1981 Winter Addenda. No augmented l inspection in excess of ASME requirements is currently planne The NRC inspector also observed preservice iupection (PSI) records of ultrasonic examinations (UT) of the RR system. This review disclosed that PSI was performei,to the current (at that date)' state ,

of the art UT for detection of IGSCC.' No relevant indications were i I

disclosed. In addition, the licens 4 , at the request of the NRC-demonstrated that a special UT of recirculation piping with corrosion resistant cladding was adequate to identify IGSCC type indications. This demonstration was observed by a cognizant RIII  :

NRC inspector and is documented in NRC Inspection Report  !

No. 50-461/8502 NUREG-0313, Revision 2, Paragraph 5.3.2.1, Inspection Schedule for Category A Weldments states: " Category A welds should be inspected according to a schedule similar to that called for in Section XI of the Code. Specifically, resistant bimetallic welds and terminal ends should be inspected every ten year interval. In addition, a  !

representative sample of 25*4 of other welds ihould be excmined every ten year interval." Category A Weldments ars defined in Paragraph 5.3.1.1, as those (weldmsots) with no known cracks, that have a low probability of incurring IGSCC 'Olems, because they are made entirely of IGSCC resistant rraterials or have been solutica heat treated after welding. CRC is considered to be IGSCC resistan Since the licensee had perfcrmed the necessary upgrading of the RR system piping, the piping presently meets the requirements for Category A Weldments as defined in NUREG-0313, Revision 2, and therefore, would not require an au0mented inspection program in excess of Code requirements.

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'b. Competence'of UT Examiners The licensee's ISI program requires personnel performing ultrasonic 1 examinations of piping susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion ~l l cracking (IGSCC) to be certified to standards with the ability. to l detect IGSCC (Clinton FSAR Section 5.2.4.12). No ISI has been i i performed to date as the licensee just recently received it's 'l operating licens '

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The licensee's PSI of piping susceptible to IGSCC was performed by personnel certified to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

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standards for detection of IGSC The licensee has not addressed the use of SNT-TC-IA, NDT Level 1, UT examiners in performance of examinations of piping susceptible to IGSCC. This item will be addressed by the licensee in their j reply to GL 84-11 and will be reviewed by the NRC inspector during 1 subsequent inspection ]

c. Leak Detection and Leakage Limits The licensee's technical specifications require reactor coolant system leakage be limited to: i

(1) No Pressure Boundary Leakage d (2) 5 gpm Unidentified Leakage  !

(3) 25 gpm Identified Leakage (averaged over any 24-hour period)

(4) 0.5 gpm leakage per nominal inch of valve size up to a maximum of 5 y ".7 any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve'specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1, at rated reactor pressur ;

Action required: )

(1) With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (2) With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the I limits in (2) and/or (3), above, reduce the leakage rate to i within the limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the 1 frilowing 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> I

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(3) With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least two other closed manual or j deactivated automatic valves, or be in at least HOT.SHUTOOWN '

within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Surveillance requirements:

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l The reactor coolant system leakage shall be demonstrated to be.within each of the above limits by: .

I (1) Monitoring the drywell atmospheric particulate and gaseous i radioactivity at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,

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(2) Monitoring the drywell floor and equipment drain sump level and I sump flow rate at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, I (3) Monitoring the drywell air coolers condensate flow rate at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and (4) Monitoring the reactor vessel head flange leak detection system I at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, d. Leakage Detection j The licensee's technical specifications require that the following l reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:  ;

(1) The drywell atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system,

(2) The drywell sump flow monitoring system, and (3) Either the drywell atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system or the drywell air coolers condensate flow rate monitoring syste Action:

With only two of the above required leakage detection detection systems OPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided  ;

grab samples of the drywell atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at

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least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required gaseous and/or particulate radioactive monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ - . _ _

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Surveillance Requirements i

The reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

(1) Drywell atmosphere particulate and gaseous monitoring systems-performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 month ,

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(2) Drywell sump flow monitoring system performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION TEST at least once per 18 month (3) Drywell air cooler condensate flow rate monitoring system performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 month I (4) Flow testing the drywell floor drain sump inlet piping for l blockage at least once every 18 months during shutdow The licensee has committed to reply to GL 84-11 by early November. The NRC inspector informed the licensee that this is an open item pending receipt 1 and review of the response to GL 84-11 (0 pen Item No. 461/87034-01).

I No violations or deviations were identifie ]

3. Licensee Action on Part 21 Report (0 pen) 10 CFR, Part 21 Item (461/86006-PP): Two motor-operated valves j failed during preoperational testing of the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). Valve No. 1E22-F010 experienced a sheared stem and valve No. 1E22-F011 experienced a separation of the stem from the disc. The

original valve stems supplied by the manufacturer had high hardness j valves with resultant high residual stress, typical of 410 stainless stee The licensee's corrective action included hardness testing of all 166 safety-related valves with type 410 stainless steel stems or check valve ;

pins. Fifteen valves were found to have stems or pins with a hardness '

in excess of the General Electric recommendation. General Electric (GE)

performed a safety evaluation which demonstrated that a common mode 3 failure of the valves in question would not impact safe shutdown and l accident response function Since type 410 material cracking requires a combination of high hardness and high applied stress, GE has concluded that it is acceptable to leave the fifteen type 410 items in service until the first refueling outag ;

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Due to the low stress levels involved with normal valve operations along with the. licensee's program to assure that no improper back seating of the valves will occur (i.e., causing high tensile stress), the NRC inspector found the GE conclusions to be acceptable. This item will remain open pending verification of replacement of the stems or pins for the following valves:

Valve N (1) 1E22-F001 (6)' 1E22-F015 (11) 1E12-F041C (2) 1E22-F004 (7) 1E51-F010 (12) 1E51-F066 (3) 1E22-F010 (8) 1G33-F040 (13)'1821-F032B (4) 1E22-F011 (9) 1SX-105A (14) 1E12-F0508 (5) 1E22-F012 (10) 1E21-F006 (15) 1821-F032A No violations or deviations were identifie . Open Items

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Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which will involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in_ Paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on September 23, 1987. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.

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