ML20039B308
| ML20039B308 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1981 |
| From: | Livermore H, Reimann F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039B300 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-81-25, NUDOCS 8112220510 | |
| Download: ML20039B308 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000461/1981025
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-461/81-25
Docket No. 50-461
License No. CPPR-137
Licensee:
Illinois Power Company
500 South 27th Street
Decatur, IL 62525
Facility Name: Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL
Inspection Conducted:
getober1-November 9,1981
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Inspector:
H. H. Livermore
Il - I G- Yl
A C ~' vs ?
Approved By:
F. Re mann, Actin Chief
Projects Section 1 C
11-M-'N
Inspection Summary
Inspection on October 1 through November 9, 1981, (Report No. 50-461/81-25)
Areas Inspected: Routine, Resident Inspector's inspection of construction
activities including material laydown and storage areas, welding activities,
electrical equipment installation and protection, concrete pours, HVAC equip-
ment interaction analysis, and electrical cable pull activities. The inspec-
tion involved a total of 86 incpector hours onsite by one NRC inspector, in-
cluding 0 inspector hours during off-shifts.
Results: Of the areas inspected, two items of Noncompliance and four Open
Items were identified.
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8112220510 811209
PDH ADOCK 05000461
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
- W.
C. Gerstner, Executive Vice President
- J. O. McHood, Vice President, Project Manager
- R.
J. Canfield, Director-Construction
- A. J. Bodnick, Director-QA
- E.
E. Connon, Director-Compliance
- L. W. Dozier, Assistant Director-Construction
R. W. Folck, Station QA Engineer
- J.
S. Spencer, Director, Design Engineering NSED
- J.
Geier, Manager-General Engineering
- W.
L. Calhoun, Electrical Construction Supervisor
B. Spicer, QA Engineer
- M.
C. Hollon, Supervisor, Construction QA
G. N. Motsegood, Engineering
- R. Morgenstern, Station QA Engineer
- D. G. Tucker, Operations Compliance Supervisor
T. J. Estes, QA Engineer
- J. M. King, Assistant Director, Construction
- C.
E. Calhoun, Operations QA
- M. E. D' Haem, Supervisor Operations QA
- L.
V. Koch, Vice President
- M. D. Tindill, Engineer
- L. H. Dunn, Compliance
- T.
F. Plunkett, Plant Manager
Baldwin Associates
- J. W. Smart, QA Manager
- T.
Selva, Manager, Quality and Technical Services
- W.
J. Harrington, Project Manager & Vice President
- J.
E. Findley, Resident Engineer
- H.
R. Swift, Project Engineer
- L.
A. Gelbert, QC Manager
G. B. Browne, Manager, Subcontracts
B. Curby, Asst. Project Manager
- G. Chapman, Manager, Technical Services
- J.
C. Wilson, Assistant Manager, QC
- T. Yearick, Assistant Project Manager
- H.
J. Harris, Sr. QC Electrical
- D.
R. Murphy, Sr. Electrical Engineer
Other staff and personnel were contacted during the reporting period.
- Denotes those attending at least one of the exit meetings.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previousiv Identified Items
(Closed) Open Item (81-22-02), Authority for Stop-Work Action. The
Contractor has revised the Quality Control inspection manuals now specifying
the authority that rests with the individual inspector to stop work if any
condition encountered appears to be detrimental to the quality of safety-
related items. Revision to QCI 102 (1) and procedure TSI-V1-2 detail the
course of action to be taken by Quality Control and Welding Inspectors in
the advent of questionable qu' ?ity situations.
The inspector has discussed
the subject of stop-work authority with a number of inspectors, and feels
satisfied that on-line inspectors do have the authority and confidence to
stop work if necessary.
This item is considered closed.
3.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected
a.
Site Tours
At periodic intervals during the report period, tours of areas of the
site were performed. These tours were intended to assess the cleanli-
ness of the site; storage conditions of equipment and material being
used in site constructica;
the potential for fire or other hazards
which might have a deletcrious effect on personnel and equipment, and
to witness construction activities in progress.
No items of nonc*ompliance or deviation were identified.
b.
Inspection of Material and Component Storage Areas
During'the span of the reporting period, the Resident inspector toured
the yard and power block storage areas several times each week. Mechan-
ical and Civil safety-related material was segregated, off the ground,
protected, and, in general, adequately stored. Minor problems with the
Containment pipe laydown area were flagged to Illinois Power QA for
action. Electrical equipment storage and maintenance is addressed in
item c.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
c.
Protection of Electrical Equipment and Class lE Cable
(1) During numerous sarveillance tours of the Auxiliary and Control
Buildings, the following was noted in regard to installed and
terminated electrical cabinets Division 1, 2, T. 3 NSPS Inverters
(3) and the Division 3 & 4 Battery Chargers (2):
(a) Construction hardware (including a paint can) piled on open-
top cabinets. Hardware included small items (nuts, etc.)
that could fall through open screen top of inverters.
(b) Vis-queen covers not properly and completely covering the
cabinets.
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(c) Construction equipment leaning on cabinets and associated
installed cable. Examples such as 2x4s, HVAC metal dampers,
ladders, etc.
(d)
Div. 3 Inverter cabinet door open. Heavy layer of dust and
dirt over all internal components. No covering over cabinet.
The inspector notes that these cabinets are installed in areas of
continuing construction activity, and that the examples are not
momentary, but had been observed in this condition for a period
of weeks. The inspector also notes that the problem is further
compounded by the fact that the Contractor had performed a periodic
surveillance of the subject equipment three days prior to the
inspector's finding and had signed off the cabinets SMIR cards
signifying acceptability of storage, maintenance, cleanliness and
protection. This indicates a serious fault in the system as to
recognition and corrective action of examples of improper protec-
tion of electrical equipment.
(2) The inspector also noted the following pertaining to protection
and storage of precut Class lE electrical cable in the Auxiliary
and Control Buildings, 781' and 702' levels:
(a) The absence of specific protected storage areas for coiled
cable.
(b) Areas used were in well-traveled walkways. Protective enclo-
sures were either missing or partially down.
(c) Class 1E coils were on the concrete floor or piled on the
wooden surface of cable reels. No Vis-queen protective
covers were under or over coils.
(d) Class lE (colored) cable was mixed in storage with black
unmarked nonsafety-related cable. The inspector notes that
black safety-related cable requires a red slash across the
sides of the cable reel, and unmarked reels of black cable
require segregated storage from Class lE.
Segregation was
not apparent.
This item (1 and 2) is considered to be in noncompliance with the require-
ments of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Protection of Electrical
Equipment, (50-461/81-25-01).
d.
Electrical Cable Identification and Inspection
Clinton Power Station installs full colored cables in Class lE elec-
trical systems (yellow, blue, green, and orange for Divisions 1, 2,
3, and 4, respectively.) Division Associated cables require striped
markings at specific intervals. Black cables with color code markings
may be used in exception cases.
While performing an electrical surveillance the inspector noted a black
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cable installed in a Division 3 tray along side of numerous green
Division 3 cables. The black cable (IRP03H) had no green division
markers anywhere'along its length. Further inspection revealed
that QC inspection had noted the color identification discrepancy on
Inspection Report 81-0221, and Discrepancy Report DR051. The QC
Inspection Checklists JV353 for prepull and pull sections, and JV447
for terminations, were correctly rejected. The inspector notes-that
the cable Pull Card was incorrectly signed off by QC and the Discrepancy
Report number was not noted in the' Pull Card remarks section as required
by procedure BAP 3.3.2, Rev. 8, paragraph 5.8.4.
Further investigation by the inspector revealed that twelve additional'
Class 1E cables had been pulled (installed) without the correct color
code markings, i.e. striped to indicate Division Associated. The
cables are identified 1AP20D, E, H, IAP21H, IAP22B, D, E, 1AP23B, D, G,
H and J.
The inspector notes that six of the cable Pull Cards were
incorrectly signed off by QC and a DR or NCR number had not been entered
in the. remarks section. The inspector also notes that the Inspection
Checklists JV353 for prepull and pull. sections, and JV447 for cable
terminations were incorrectly accepted by QC in 24 places. Procedure
BAP 3.3.4, Paragraph 5.8.4 requires QC to document results of cable pull
on Inspection Checklist Form JV353.
In only three cases was the cable
color identification correctly rejected by QC on the checklist, 'and in
only two of these cases does Inspect 4.on Report 81-0062 correctly list
Nonconformance Report (NCR)S370 rel.'.ing to four cables.
The' inspector
further notes that NCR 5376 was written later to include the. remaining.
eight subject cables, but the NCR is not referenced on any of the pre-
ceding paperwork (Pull Cards, Inspection Reports, or. Inspection Check
Sheets).
In summation, there were numerous examples of failure to follow inspec-
tion procedures relating to cable acceptance on Pull Cards, Inspection.
Check Sheets,.and Inspection Reports. Furthermore, the aforementioned
examples seem to indicate the_ failure of at least two QC inspectors to
recognize cable segregation codes and/or recognize the correct course
of inspection reporting and corrective action.
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This item is considered to be in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix
.B, Criterion V, Failure to Follow Procedures (50-461/81-25-02),
e.
Cable Rework After Installation in Trays
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The inspector has a concern over the continuing practice of proceeding
to pull cables that are not properly identified as to color coding.
The thirteen cables listed in item d vere pulled on or about September 11,
and as of November 4, physica] corrective action (rework) had not been
performed. As corrective action is delayed it becomes more likely that
the improperly color coded cables will be covered over by other cables
making rework more difficult and identification of improper cables more
difficult. This, in turn, perpetuates'the possibility of more-damage
to the subject cable as well as others in the tray. This situation
very possibly could affect the quality aspects of corrective action
decisions by management. Prompt corrective action is a necessity.
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BAP 3.3.2 appears to be inadequate in that electrical engineering
does not provide a specific system for timely corrective action
of identified problems. The present suspense system is by DR or
NCR disposition, or by exception list at turnover time. As evidenced
by the thirteea cable examples in item d, the systems of suspense
are tco general and too far down the line of system progression
to provide the necessary timely action.
The inspector recognizes that due to supply problems, etc., sub-
stitute cables will be used in ever-increasing numbers. With this
in mind, and examples previously noted, it appears that an improved
suspense or tickler system for cable rework is necessary.
This is Open Item 50-461/81-25-03.
f.
Scaffolding on Electrical Cable Trays
It is a common electrical construction practice at Clinton to use
electrical cable trays and their hangers as supports for wooden
plank scaffolding. The inspector is concerned that this practice
will result in damage to cable trays and hangers which are important
to safety, especially in the Auxiliary and Control Buildings. The
inspector notes the following:
(1) Maximum permissible decking loads should be available in the
form of engineering requirements. These should be translated
into construction installation instructions.
(2) There are no requirements for Quality Control Inspections of
cable tray and hangers after scaffolding removal.
(3) There are no procedure instructions or checklists as to what
areas of the tray or hanger are to be inspected and to what
criteria.
(4) There is no formal system with QC and Construction to insure
prompt notification of scaffolding removal to insure timely
inspection.
The inspector notes that as of the end of this reporting period, the
licensee has initiated action on this item, identifying load require-
ments and initiating an inspection system. As noted above, further
action is yet necessary. This is Open Item 50-461/81-25-04.
g.
Electrical Cable Installation
During the reporting period, the inspector observed work including
installation, handling, and protection of electrical cables.
Specif-
ically, work associated with Class 1E electrical cables listed as
follows was observed: Cables 1HG05F, ICC07C, IRI23E, IRI23F, IVX05B,
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IFC08C, IIS13C, ISX21C. The cable was hand pulled through tray in
the Auxiliary and Control Buildings, 781' level.
It was observed
that: pull cards were in use, cables were identified, Quality
Control inspections were performed and Quality Control personnel
witnessed the pull.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
h.
Concrete Installation
The inspector observed a concrete pour of a floor slab in the Diesel
Generator Room and a pour in the Containment Bioshield Wall in
accordance with the requirements of travelers 1679 and 1680. 'The
following conditions were noted:
the travelers were complete and
signed off by all parties prior to the concrete pour; concrete test
results were within specification limits; roving surveillance by
Quality Control was adequate and satisfactory; placement areas were
clean of debris, rebar tie fastenings were secure; placement crew
numbers were satisfactory, concrete delivery and placement were
satisfactory, consolidation techniques were satisfactory; Quality
Control concrete pour, placement and drawing checklists were complete
and signed.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
i.
Containment Liner
During a routine surveillance of the Containment 0 , 755 foot level,
the inspector noted (by sound) numerous potential hollow areas behind
the containment steel-lined wall. The area was in close proximity to
main steam and feedwater piping exits through the containment liner.
Numerous hollow sounding areas were noted by tapping with a hammer on
the steel liner. The concrete-backed liner normally produces a solid
sound. The areas in question were identified to the Licensee Quality
Assurance personnel. The inspector's concern is whether the areas in
question:
(1) have been previously identified.
(2) are possible voids in the coc. crete or local separation of the
liner and the concrete.
The licensee has been requested to address these concerns and to also
identify engineering criteria for acceptable liner and concrete
separation. This is Open Item 50-461/81-25-05.
j.
Containment HVAC Installations
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) ducting and hangers
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are installed around the steel liner wall inside containment. The
ducting is at the approximate 828' level installed around the peri-
meter ot the containment, and then traveling up the side wall ending
at the apex of the containment dome. The inspector points out that
the ducting and hanger installation is directly over the fuel pool
and part of the fuel transfer tube area. The HVAC dncting and hangers
are classified as seismic nonsafety-related, therefore, did not receive
any QC weld inspection (except at liner interface). The Licensee is
requested to demonstrate that the subject material installed under the
nonsafety work program will not disintegrate and fall during a Seismic
Event, therefore, causing possible damage to the fuel transfer tube or
the fuel in the storage pool. This is Open Item 50-461/81-25-06.
k.
Welding Electrode
The inspector was contacted by a contractor welder with a concern of
the adequacy of a particular brand and size of Shielded Metal Arc
electrode (weld rod). The welder felt that the rod was causing weld
spatter, flux flaking, and resulting in poor quality fillet welds on
electrical hanger steel. The welder stated that he did not desire
confidentiality. The contractor's Technical Services Weld Engineers
performed a controlled test of the subject electrode, with no adverse
results. An additional test was performed using the welder's machine,
his electrode, and his participation.
Results indicated that the
erratic welds and spatter were due to a faulty weld machine. Actual
amperages at the electrode were 50% higher than those read at the weld
machine setting. The resulting high amperage caused weld spatter and
a poor weld. The weld machine was replaced and the testing was repeated
with good results. The subject welder used the replacement machine,
produced an acceptable weld, and stated he was satisfied that the pre-
vious faulty machine was the problem--not the electrode. The contractor
performed additional corrective action, checking weld machines in other
areas of similar complaints. The inspector has no further concerns in
this area.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
1.
Program Control
At periodic intervals the inspector reviewed all Nonconformance Reports
(NCRs), selected audit findings, construction procedure revisions,
Quality Control instruction revisions, and plant problems identified by
the Licensee and Contractor (BA) . The inspector attended the weekly
schedule meetings, startup/ turnover meetings, and the monthly pre-owners
meeting.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
4.
Items of Special
erest
The NRC Human Factors Branch personnel were on site for the period of
a.
November 3 through 5,1981, performing a design review of the Control
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Room for the power plant licensing process.
b.
The NRC, Illinois Power, the State of Illinois, and the Prairie Alliance
held an informal meeting on November 6, 1981, with the intent to stream-
line or consolidate a selected number of licensing contentions. Two con-
tentions were deleted and a number of others rewritten.
5.
Exit Meetings
The Resident Inspector attended five exit meetings conducted by Region III
inspectors:
K. Baker and M. Holzmer; K. Ward; R. Gardner and R. Lee; C. Erb;
and H. Wescott on October 1, 21, 23, 29, and November 5.
The Resident Inspector
met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) on
October 2, 16, 23 and November 9, 1981. The inspector summarized the scope
and findings of the inspections performed.
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