IR 05000461/1990014
| ML20043F665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1990 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043F660 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-90-14-EC, NUDOCS 9006150192 | |
| Download: ML20043F665 (35) | |
Text
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s U.S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Report No. 50-461/90014(DRS)
Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62 Licensee:
1111nois Power Company 500 south 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525 Facility Name:
Clinton Power Station Meeting At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL 61727 Meeting Conducted:
June 5, 1990 Type of Meeting:
Enforcement Conference Dates of Previous Inspection: March 14 through May 14, 1990 Approved By:
.dVJdAu h ~--
6)D)90 M. A. Ring, Chief Date '
Engineering Branch Meeting Sunmary Meeting on June 5, 1990 (Report No. 50-461/90014(DRS)).
Matters Discussed:
Apparent violations of Technical 5;'ecifications for f ailure = to ensure operability of the Service Water-System, Control Room Ventilation System, and Divisions 1 and 11 Diesel Generators, and apparent
. violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, for inadequate corrective actions, tesi.
-controls, and design controls.
Information pertinent to the-causes, safety significance, and corrective actions to prevent recurrence were discussed.
Disposition of the apparent violations will be presented in subsequent communications.
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92 900611 Q.
CK 03000461
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DETAILS
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Enforcement Conference Attendees lilinois Power Company (IP)
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LJ. S. Perry, Vice President J. G.' Cook, Manager, Clinton Power Station
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~J. A._ Miller, Manager, Nuclear Station Engineering Department (NSED)_
F. A.-'Spangenberg, Manager, Licensing and Safety-
R. E. Wyatt',- Manager, Quality Assurance (QA)-
,
P. D. Yocum, Director,~ Plant Operations u
T.. R. Chitester, Director,. Design and Analysis R. T. Kerestes,- Director, Engiin.sring Projects-K.:S.LMoore, Director, Plant Technical R. F Phares, Director, Licensing A. L. Ruwe,- Diractor, Systems and Reliability. Engineering
- K. A. Baker, Supervisor,1&E -Interf ace LP. P.=Bhat, Supervu ce, Mechanical Design F. C. Elder, Projects Manager,_ Heat Exchanger -
- T S. Arnold, Project. Engineer, Licensing Operations
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M. J. Holli_nden, Project Test Engineer-
- l-C._W. Corley, Nuclear Equipment Operator LJ. Cunningham,' Nuclear Equipment Operator-Sargent and Lundy (S&L)
a 1._A. Garza, Mechanical Project Engineer
.
Newmand-and-Holtzinger W
E. Baer, Attorney-
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- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
y C. J._Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator... Rill
'H; J.' Miller, Director, Division'of; Reactor Safety, Rill M. A.' Ring, Chief, Engineering Branch, DRS'
R. D. Lanksbury. Chief, Section 3B, Division of Reactor Projects P.;G. Brochman, Senior Resident inspector
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S. P. Ray, Resident Inspector
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m J.LF. Schapker, Reactor Inspector j
M. P.'Huber, Reactor Inspector q
i 2.
Enforcement Conference As a result of apparent violations of NRC requirements, an Enforcement
>
Conference was held at the Clinton Power Station on June 5,1990. The i
nreliminary findings which were the bases for these apparent. violations of j
NRC requirements were documented in NRC Inspection Reports No.
!
50-461/90005(DRS) and No. 50-461/90012(DRP) and were transmitted to the l
licensee by letters dated May 31, 1990, and June 5, 1990, respectively, f
The attendees of this conference are denoted in Paragraph 1 of this report.
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The purposes'of the conference were:
(1) to discussjthe' apparent violations,-
the: significance, cause,~and the' licensee's= corrective actions; (2) to
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determine whether there were any_ mitigating circumstances;.and (3).to-
'obtain.other information which would help determine the appropriate =
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enforcement action.
The NRC-representatives identified the apparent violations and,those
,
~ deficiencies contributing to the apparent violations. These are detailed in the N90 Region 111 Enforcement Conference Presentation. included as.
Enclos'ure 2_to this report.
The information presented by_the Illinois' Power Company is included as
. Enclosures 3 and 4 p
Lv 3.
Conclusion o
With: respect to the apparent violation regarding.the Service' Water System, m
l it was. concluded that further review by NRC was necessary to_ assess.the-
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adequacy-of the. licensee's analysis of-the safety significance.
IP 'would
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provide the-details with regard to the conservatisms assumed in the analysis to NRC:and discuss-the analysis if necessary.
sThe evaluation and 'isposition of~the apparent violations will be presented d
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--in subsequent communications.
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AS FOUtID FLQls FOR DIVIS10 tis 1,- II, Ato til C0tP0tlBITS OF THE SERVICE-
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TEN SX COMP 0tBRS,:SEVal lil DIVIS10t11 AtB TilEE ltl DIVIS10tl 11, AS-F00UD
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FLQ1S DID'IDT EET Tile EERGBICY SIM D381 liEAT LOAD EQUIREEIRS Ut0ER
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- TECittlCAL SPECIFICAT10tl 3/li,7.1?E0 VIRES THAT "THE SIMDa#1 SERVICE-WATER (SX)' LOOP (S) SliALL BE OPERABLE DURillG TIES 111181 ITS ASSOCIATED I
LSYSTEM(S) OR COMPQERS ARE EQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE.".APPLICABilllY-ALL MODES AfD MIEN HAtIDillG 1RRADIATED FUEL,,,
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lillTIAL LICalSillG DUE T0 lilADEQUATE FLGl TliROUGH SEVERAL SX HEAT EXCilAtlGERS,
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AERICAtl-AIR FILTER (AAFT HEAT EXQlAtlGERS IllSTALLED 110THE C0tRROL R004
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.-VBRILATIQF SYSTEM WITH LESS DIAN DESIGN EQUIRED FLOIS,
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t TllE LICENSEE DISCOVERED LOl FLOWS TliROUGil Tile DIVIS10ll I SX PaiP ROOM.
- COOLER Q1 JAllUARY 24, 1990, CORRECTIVE ACT10t1 TO RESTORE FLOWS TOLDESIGl REQUIPBENTS WAS NOT TAlal UllTIL FEBRUARY 15,1990,
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TIEIR ASSOCIATED SillHDalti SERVICE WATER PIPIllG SYSTEMS-IN OR ABOUT 1985 T01
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X2VRE DIAT TE EQUIR&BR FOR DE IllSTALLATI0tl 0F BELLOG TIE-RODS
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-SUBSEQUBIT T0-' REPAIR OF THERMAL EXPAtlS10t1 BELLOS, RESULTIllGLIN DIVISIONS
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ILLIN0IS POWER COMPANY CLINTON POWER STATION
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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ON SX FLOW, l
DIESEL BELLOWS TIE RODS, AND DIESEL HEAT l
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SHU100WN: SERVICE WATER- (SX) FLOW
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DIESEL GENERATOR BELLOWS - TIE RODS
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DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER. VALVE
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POSITIONING FOR EACH TOPIC, THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WILL BE-ADDRESSED:-
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NATURE OF ISSUE AND HOW IDENTIFIED B.
APPARENT VIOLATIONS AND IP POSITION ON EACH C.
CAUSES 0.
CORRECTIVE ACTION E.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE F.
IP POSITION ON ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT SPECIFIC NRC QUESTIONS RESPONDED TO UNDER
' APPROPRIATE TOPIC (SEE ALSO ATTACHED SUMMARY l HANDOUT)
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II. SHUTDOWN SERVICE WATER- (SX)
FLOW A.
CHRONOLOGY /NATb'RE OF ISSUE
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1/24/90 - LOW FLOW YO AN AMERICAN AIR FILTER SX ROOM COOLER (DIV. I)
2/15/90 - LOW FLOW CONDITION REPORTED TO SHIFT
'
SUPERVISOR AND 00CUMENTED?
2/24/90 -- A SECOND AMERICAd AIR FILTER SX: ROOM.
COOLER DETERMINED TO HAVE LOW FLOW 3/05/90 - REVIEW OF PREOPERATIONAL TEST FOR~SX SHOWS L
FLOWS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPEC 3/06/90 - ISSUE FORMALLY REPORTED TO NRC 3/13/90 - REBALANCING OF SX BEGINS L
i 4/03/90 - TWO AMERICAN AIR FILTER CONTROL ROOM
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VENTILATION (VC) RouM COOLER UNITS l
FOUND TO HAVE LOW FLOW-4/03/90 - REBALANCING OF-ALL DIVISIONS-0F SX.AND VC L
COMPLETED L
4/06/90 - REVIEW OF SELECTED PREOPERATIONAL TEST
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PACKAGES COMPLETED l
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SX FLOW
B.
APPARENT VIOLATIONS /IP POSITION ON EACH 1.
TEST CONTROL. - APP. B, CRITERION XI ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (+/- 10%)
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PRESSURE DROP DATA (AMERICAN AIR FILTER)
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MEASUREMENT METHODS _
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POST' INSTALLATION TESTING OF FLOW ORIFICES-
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IP AGREES WITH VIOLATION
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2.
OPERABILITY OF SX SYSTEM - TECH SPEC 3.7.1'.1 AND
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CPS USAR ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT SYSTEM AS-FOUND
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WOULD HAVE. PERFORMED ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION
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L IP AGREES THAT AS-FOUND FLOWS DID NOT' MEET:
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USAR 3.
OPERABILITY OF CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGERS - TECH. SPEC 3/4.7.2 ANALYSIS-SHOWS THAT HEAT EXCHANGERS WOULD
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HAVE PERFORMED THEIR INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION 4.
TIMEI.INESS OF CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR SX FLOW -
APP. B, CRITERION-XVI
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SX FLOW C.
CAUSES OF LOW FLOW PRESSURE DROP DATA FROM AMERICAN AIR FILTER
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TEST CRITERIA / METHODOLOGY
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D.
CORRECTIVE' ACTION ESTABLISHED ACCEPTABLE DESIGN-FLOWS FOR ALL SX.
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AND VC HEAT EXCHANGERS HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS
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REBALANCED ALL PORTIONS OF SX AND VC SYSTEM
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' INSPECTED HEAT EXCHANGERS - NO SIGNIFICANT
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FOULING REVIEWED OTHER PREOPERATIONAL TEST
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PACKAGES NO-ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOUND ON SAFETY
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RELATED SYSTEMS BRIEFED APPROPRIATE TECH STAFF PERSONNEL-
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ON~ ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO TESTING DISCREPANCIES UPGRADING HEAT EXCHANGER PERFORMANCE
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MONITORING PROGRAM OPEN AND INSPECT REMAINING HEAT EXCHANGERS
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REPLACE DIVISION I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER ORIFICE
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CHEMICAL TREATMENT OF SX
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SX-FLOW E
SIGNIFICANCE A.--
SX FLOW - NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT SCOPE METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS OF
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ANALYSIS-s.
VC HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW - NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT SCOPE, METHODOLOGY AND.RESULTS OF:
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ANALYSIS c.
ISSUE ~ LIMITED TO SX AND CHILLED WATER PORTION OF VC
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F.
IP POSITION ON ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT 1.
NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT 2.
PROBLEM IDENTIFIED BY IP-
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3.
ONCE INITIATED, CORRECTIVE ACTION-WASLVIGOROUS AND THOROUGH
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ISSUE DOES NOT EXTEND-TO OTHER SAFETY SYSTEMS L
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ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT-NOT WARRANTED
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III. DIESEL GENERATOR BELLOWS'
g A.
CHRONOLOGY / NATURE OF' ISSUE
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'5/4/90~-
LACK 0F TIE RODS ON BELLOWS IDENTIFIED DURING DESIGN REVIEW 0F BELLOWS 5/7/90 -
BELLOWS LENGTHS-MEASURED AND TRANSMITTED L
TO VENDOR; VEND 0R EVALUATES BELLOWS AS ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT TIE RODS
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5/8/90 -
PIPE SUPPORT DAMAGE DISCOVERED AND STRESS ANALYSIS OF PIPING AND SUPPORTS INITIATED s
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5/8/90 -
DIVISION I AND II DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE AND PLANT SHUT DOWN
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L 5/11/90 - REPLACED ONE BELLOWS ASSEMBLY AND
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INSTALLED TIE RODS ON REMAINING SEVEN:
INSPECTED,. ADJUSTED AND REPAIRED PIPE SUPPORTS 5/11/90 - COMPLETED OPERABILITY ANALYSIS 5/12/90 - DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED OPERABLE-6/01/90 - ANALYSIS COMPLETED SHOWING THAT THERMAL, HYDRAULIC AND SEISMIC STRESSES ARE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT L
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DIESEL GENERATOR BELLOWS B.
APPARENT VIOLATION AND IP POSITION BELLOWS NOT INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DRAWING
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~CAUSES
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CONSTRUCTION / INSTALLATION
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INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS
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DIESEL GENERATOR BELLOWS D'.
CORRECTIVE ACTION PERFORMED STRESS-ANALYSIS USING WORST CASE LOADS AND-
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l DETERMINED STRESSES IN PIPE WERE.LESS THAN ACTUAL MATERIAL YIELD STRENGTH PERFORMED STRESS ANALYSIS ON PIPE SUPPORTS AND J
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ASSOCIATED SUPPORT STRUCTURES; YIELD-STRENGTHS NOT l
EXCEEDED
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- DETERMINED THAT HEAT EXCHANGER N0ZZLE AND ANCHOR LOADS WERE WITHIN DESIGN ALLOWABLES
- 0BTAINED VENDOR ANALYSIS OF EXTENDED. BELLOWS
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(WITHOUT TIE RODS); STRESSES FOUND ACCEPTABLE ADJUSTED PIPE SUPPORTS ~TO DESIGN CONDITIONS
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' INSPECTED STRUCTURAL ~ COMPONENTS AND FOUND NO~
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SIGNIFICANT DISCREPANCIES
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REPLACED DAMAGED SUPPORT ON DIVISION I SX PIPING
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REPLACED LEAKING BELLOWS ~WITH BELLOWS.HAVING TIE
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RODS.AND-INSTALLED TIE RODS ON THE OTHER SEVEN L
BELLOWS WALKED DOWN SX PIPING AFTER ALL REPAIRS AND SYSTEM
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PRESSURIZED VERIFIED TIE RODS INSTALLED AS REQUIRED ON OTHER'
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TWO SAFETY-RELATED BELLOWS INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR BELLOWS WILL BE
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REVISED TO CLEARLY INDICATE. TIE R0D REQUIREMENTS (10)
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DIESEL GENERATOR BELLOWS E.
SIGNIFICANCE
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ASSESSMENT OF PIPING, SUPPORTS AND ASSOCIATED-
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STRUCTURES-FOR THERNAL', HYDRAULIC AND SEISMIC LOADS
INDICATES THAT BELLOWS CONDITION WAS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT THIS ISSUE DOES NOT EXTEND TO OTHER SAFETY RELATED
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F.'IP POSITION ON ESCALATED-ENFORCEMENT NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT
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IP IDENTIFIED'THIS ISSUE
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PROMPT, THOROUGH CORRECTIVE ACTION
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CONSTRUCTION GRIGINS
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DOES NOT EXTEND-T0 OTHER SAFETY RELATED
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ENFORCEMENT ACTION NOT WARRANTED
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IV. DIESEL-GENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE.
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POSITIONING A.
CHRONOLOGY / NATURE OF ISSUE
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3/12-3/22 INTERIM FLOW BALANCE ON DIV I l
3/18 DIV I DRAINED FOR MODIFICATIONS 3/19 CAUTION TAGS (INTERIM) HUNG ON DIV I AND III 3/22 FINAL FLOW BALANCING OF DIV I.SX-3/27-4/3 FLOW BALANCES AND MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED ON DIV II-4/7 CAUTION TAGS (INTERIM) HUNG ON DIV II'
5/9-5/11 DG HX ISOLATED FROM SX; DIV I AND II DG BELLOWS REPAIRED 5/11 RESTORED SX USING CAUTION TAG (INTERIM)
POSITIONS
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5/14 PLANI kNihWhU MUDE 2 (FROM MODE 4)
5/15 DURING WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE DIV I DG
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TRIPPED ON HIGH TEMPERATURE:
DECLARED DIV I DG INOPERABLE; TOOK TECH SPEC ACTION INVESTIGATION REVEALED IMPROPERLY
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POSITIONED SX VALVES ON DIVISION I AND II DGs.
DIV II DG DECLARED
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INOPERABLE;.TOOK TECH SPEC ACTION SX VALVES REPOSITIONED; DIV II DG'
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DECLARED OPERABLE DETERMINED THAT INCORRECT POSITION
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OF VALVES WAS A RESULT OF USE OF
DIFFERENT REFERENCES FOR NUMBER-OF
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TURNS
'l 5/16 DIV I DG DECLARED OPERABLE
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DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE-POSITIONING-B.
APPARENT VIOLATIONS AND IP POSITION CHANGING MODE WITH DIESELS INOPERABLE -
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TECH SPEC 3.0.4-C.
CAUSES INSTRUCTIONS FOR POSITIONING DIESEL GENERATOR:
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BUTTERFLY THROTTLE VALVES COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OPERATORS / TECH. STAFF
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POST MAINTENANCE TESTING
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DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE POSITIONING D.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
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VALVES PROPERLY POSITIONED 2)
PLANT PROCEDURES NOW PROVIDE CONSISTENT INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO POSITION VALVES,-AND.
OPERATIONS STANDING ORDER (OS0) NOW REQUIRES FLOW TESTS TO VERIFY CORRECT POSITIONING 0F THROTTLE VALVES 3)-
AS A LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION, IP WILL ELIMINATE BUTTERFLY VALVES AS THROTTLING MECHANISM FOR DG SX FLOW
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4)
SIMILAR VALVES CHECKED FOR CORRECT POSITION 5)
NEW CAUTION TAGS ISSUED FOR DIESELLGENERATOR
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THROTTLE VALVES UNTIL PROCEDURE-REVISED 6)
TRAINING FOR OPERATORS ON NEW STANDING ORDER
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PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO REFLECT. FINAL POSITIONS
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DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE-l POSITIONING
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E SIGNIFICANCE OPERABILITY IMPAIRED FOR 44 HOURS
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OPERATOR MAY BE ABLE TO RESPOND AND CORRECT
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DIV III (HPCS) AVAILABLE
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FREQUENT TESTING --PROBLEM WOULD HAVE BEEN DETECTED I
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RAPIDLY (WITHIN 7 DAYS) IN ANY. CASE
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F.
IP POSITION ON ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT 1.
PROBLEM IDENTIFIED BY IP 2.
PROMPT, THOROUGH CORRECTIVE; ACTION
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OPCRADILITY IMPAIRED FOR SHORT TIME
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ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT NOT WARRANTED (15)
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IP Response NRC Questions for
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6/5/90 Enroremmant Conferangs
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j NRC Ouestion 1.
Discuss heat removal capabilities of the shutdown service water ($X)
components and control room ventilation (VC) system and components as found, with less than design flow.
.
H Resuonti A safety analysis was performed by sargent & Lundy (s&L) to assess the operability of the heat exchangers in the SX and VC systems under the low flow conditions. This analysis demonstrated that the heat exchangcrs would have provided sufficient heat removal capacity so that systems, structures and components served by the heat exchangers would have performed t. heir intended safety functions.
See Shutdown Service Watar Safety Significance Report, S&L project Nos. 8648 $3 and 8648 54, dated May 31, 1990.
ERC Ouestion 2.
Addsens inadequate corrective action taken by test engineera upon
'
discov6ry the low flows within the SX system on January 24, 1990,
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including why no licensee action was taken until February 15, 1990, and the problem was not reported to the NRC until March 6, 1990, 1P Reapsnia The low flows recorded on the SX system on January 24 were not recognized (by the test engineers) to be an operability concern but rather as a need to clean the heat exchanger.
Contributing factors to this perception vera:
The differential pressure (dp) indication recorded during the
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testing was consistent with the value provided by the vendor (American Air Filtar).
,
The flow motors used had been showing spurious " alarms" that made
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the measurements questionable; because of this, the shif t supervisor was not immediately notified, j
The reason for the test was not
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tomeasureflowratogbutto obtain a value of HYDRAULIC RESISTANCE ((R) psid gpm ) to provide j
/
a baseline for measuring heat exchenger cicaning effectiveness as requested in Generic Letter 89 13.
<
Upon reviewing the tent results oa February 15, 1990 the Supervisor - Testing recognized that operability of th heat exchartgers was potentially affected by the low flow.
He notified the Shift Supervisor, and initiated a corrective action document.
A copy of this condition report van provided to the NRC.
Upon evaluation, NSED on March 6, 1990 determined that the as found low flow condition was outside the plant desi n basis.
The Shift Supervicor notified
the NRC on March 6, '1990.
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NRC Ouest10n
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3.
SX preoperational test program deficiencies and the reviews performed on other system preoperational test results.
Include the testing related i
to RHR orifice modification.
I IP RennonsA A number of discrepancies were identified in the preoperational testing of the SX system.
These included: (1) a +/- 104 acceptance criterin lackin6 appropriate engineering justification; (2). pressure drop data eupplied for heat exchangers manufactured by American Air Filter; (3) the failure to account for pressure drops associated with the differences between heat exchanger coil end points and the location of measuring devices on system piping; and (4) insufficient testing of the effects of newly installed flow orifices on the SX system.
Because of these discrepancies, Ip and S6L performed reviews of other preoperational test packages to determino whether similar discrepancies existed in test packages for other systems in which flow balancing of liquid or gas flows is required. The reviews encompasted preoperational test packages prepared by the same author or in the same time frame as the SX package (it was determined that only the SX package had been prepared by this author). The reviews included evaluation of the acceptance criteria, test methodology, flow calculations and other aspects of those packages.
The reviews confirmed that the test program problems on safety related systems were limitad to the SX system and to American Air Filtur heat
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exchangers on the VC system.
NRC Ouestion
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4.
Address corrective actions planned for the next refueling outage for I
the SX system, including future surveillances, inspections, and other preventive measures to control fouling from MIC. nilt, etc.
IP Mescontg The remainirt heat exchangers will be opened and inspected to determine thef.r performance beseline.
The upgraded heat exchanger performance monitoring program wil; address evaluation of heat exchangers for fouling from MIC, sitt, Chemical treatment of the SX system for MIC is being pursuod.
etc.
NRC Ouestjon 5.
Describe and discurs the iepact of a design seismic event on shutdown service water piping and supporta due to the increased stress from the thermal expansion bellows which were not restricted by retaining bolts.
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KAB7:TSA1 (2)
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II_111ponse
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The results of an S&L assessment of the thernal, hydraulic, and seismio loads indicates that piping stresses were in some cases in excess of code allowable limits but would not have exceeded the yield strength of the pipin5 Similar
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resulta vore obtained during reviews of strasses on pipe supports and a6sociated structural components, as well as the bellows themselves.
Accordingly, the lack of wie rods woul; not have caused these items to fail to perform their intended safety functions and is therefore not se.fety significant.
See Letter from J. W. Blattnsr. S&L, to J. A. Miller, IP, dated June 1, 1990.
NRC Ouention 6.
Desertbe the operation of the emergency diesel generator under accident condu. ions without cooling vatar and provide a basis for your description.
II_Eespontg The diesel generator vendor, Morrison Knudsen, has indicated based upon previous experience that the diesel generator (DC) would run for approximately 4 1/2 minutes at full load befora the high water jacket tenterature alarm (208') annunciated.
Another 11/2 minutes would clapse before the cooling
,
water began to boil off (231'). Following this, there would be approximately 23 minutes before cooling water in the jacket would have boiled off.
The time at which the diesci engine vou'Id cease to function is not certain, but is estimated to be approximately 5 10 minutes after the high temperature alcrm.
If the diesel generator were not at full load, this period could be expected to be longer.
During this time, operators might be able to take action to restore cooling flow.
(In accordance with procedures when a DG trouble alarm is received in the Main Control Room an operator is dispatched to the DG room to investigate and remedy, if possible, the cause of the alarm.)
NEC Ouestion 7.
Present an action plan to prevent the recurrence of similar problems considering the small margin for error in establishing the correct of throttic valve position.
11_EAsponse IP has issued Operations Standing Order (OS0).073, " Positioning of Throttle Valves." The OSO catablishes guidelines and consistency in the manner of positioning throttle valves.
The reference point for number of turns is that position where flow is indicated or observed.
The OSO also requires flow to be tested for compliance with design criteria following any repositioning of throttle valves. A CPS Procedure (No. 3211.01) specifies the precise valve position to be attained for the SX throttle valves. As a long term actiot,, IP will also climinato butterfly valves as a throttling mechanism for DC Sy flow.
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NEC Ouestion
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8.
Describe the nochanism that allowed the throttle valves to be positioned in other than the correct flow balance position.
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IP Ramongtg
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The technique used to position the butterfly valves during FO 3 balance (number of turns open after flow scerts) was not used when restoring their
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position after the work on the diesel generator bellows was performed.
Instead, the valves were set by counting the number of turns from the " fully" shut position (where the handwheel can be turned no further), this variation i
in references used during positioning of the valves resulted in the diesel generator SX throttle valves being positioned less open than specified on the caution tags.
EEC_ Question i
9.
Justify the use of buttorfly salves to perform throttling functions considering the tendency of the valves to reposition, such as the incident on May 24, 1990.
IP_ Response
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IP has analyrod the events on May 24, 1990, and has determined that the butterfly valves did not reposition and are not subject to repositioning due to flow and pressure conditions experienced in SX piping. !!owever, Ip recognizes that other types of valves a'e superior for throttling purposes.
r As a long term corrective action IP will eliminate the use of butterfly valves for throttling SX flow to the diesel generators.
In the interim, 0S0 073 and CPS Procedure No. 3211.01 will ensure that valves are positioned consistently.
Additionally, the OSO requires that flow be measured across repositioned and restored throttle valves to ensure that design flows have been achieved.
>
FRC_ovostien 10.
Justify the use of caution tage to align safety related systems such as SX for normal operation in lieu of processing a proceduro chani (temporary, permanent, etc.),
Include any differences in the review and control process between caution tags and procedures in your discussion.
IP_ Response Safety tags, whether caution or danger, can be used in lieu of, and taka precedence over approved valve lineups, Tags are generally uand to. control valve position for a short period of time. The diesel generator heat exchanger SX vaivas were caution taggad to control valve pooittons during flow balancing of the SX system.
When flow balar.cing was completed the appropriato valve lineup procedure should have been expeditiously revised to reflect the required final position.
That procedure (CPS No. 3211.01) has now been revised to incorporate correct valve positions.
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KAB7:TSA1 (4)
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Tagout sheets are normally prepared by operations personnel, approved by the
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Shift / Assistant Shift Supervisor, and implamented and verified by Operations s
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personnel.
Procedure revisions undergo a formal review process including at a minimum.
.;j the originator, an independent technical review, an interface review, and ot.her reviews as appropriate.
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USE TESTED FLOWS CAPACITY > REQUIRED TO FIND HX CAPACITY g O'
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y CALCULATE CALCULATE CALCULATE WOULD HAVE SHUTDOWN ACCIDENT DRAWDOWN PERFORMED ITS TEMPERATURES TEMPERATURES TIME SAFETY FUNCTION r
WORST CASE RECALCULATE TEMPERATURE OFFSITE - & MCR
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DOSES WITHIN 10CFR UMITS U
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION &
EVALUATE STRUCTURES
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V WOULD HAVE PERFORMED ITS SAFETY FUNCTION
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NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT
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iHERMAL HYDRAULIC & DYNAMIC- ( OBE' & SSE ) LOADS
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COMPARE COMPARE COMPARE COMPARE
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PPE STRESS HANGERS TO
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STRUCTURES
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NOZZLE LOADS
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TO CODE CODE & VENDOR
& STEEL TO TO SEISM!C
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ALLOWABLE LOAD SHEETS CODE ALLOWABLE DESIGN (CODE) J
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UNSAT SAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT SAT SAT l
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TO CODE TO YELD TO YlELD YIELD
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WALKDOWN i
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