IR 05000458/1987007

Insp Rept 50-458/87-07 on 870216-0315.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp findings,10CFR21 Repts,Ie Info Notice 87-008 & IE Bulletin 86-003

ML20205G456
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	03/25/1987
From:	Bennett W, Chamberlain D, Jaudon J, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205G392	List: IR 05000458/1987007 ML20205G387
References
50-458-87-07, 50-458-87-7, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, IEIN-87-008, IEIN-87-8, NUDOCS 8703310460
Download: ML20205G456 (13)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMtISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/87-07 Docket: 50-458 Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)

P. O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: February 16 through March 15, 1987 ,

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) Inspectors: ( 4% / 4 % 4 3 / b - ') 7 D. D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector Date Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch kt ,

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W. 8. Jones, Resident Inspectorv Date Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch

/Jft YSlU W. R. Bennett, Project Engineer, Projects Date Section A. Reactor Projects ranch Approved: P. Jaudor ,

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tief, P oject Section A

)Dale M~

en' tor P ojects Branch 8703310460 070325 PDR ADOCK 0500045G G PDR

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-2-Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 16 through March 15, 1987 (Report 50-458/87-07)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, 10 CFR Part 21 Reports, IE Notice 87-08, IE Bulletin 86-03, maintenance witnessing, safety system walkdown, surveillance test witnessing, operational safety verification, licensee staffing and in-office review of written reports of nonroutine events at power reactor facilitie Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were }

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DETAILS Persons Contacted W. J. Beck, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs

• J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Licensing

• J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group P. E. Freehill, Outage Manager A. O. Fredieu, Assistant Supervisor, Operations

• P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

• E. R. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing

• J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering

• G. K. Henry, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering

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K. C. Hodges, Supervisor, Quality Systems

• G. R. Kimmell, Supervisor, Operations QA

• R. J. King, Supervisor, Licensing A. D. Kowalczuk, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

• I. M. Malik, Supervi:or, Quality Systems J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer V. J. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services W. H. Odell, Manager, idministration

• E. R. Oswood, Senior Engineer, QA

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering

• R. R. Smith, Licensing Engineer

• J. E. Spivey, Engineer, QA

• R. B. Stafford, Director, Operations QA

• K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Projects D. Williamson, Supervisor, Operations The NRC senior resident inspector (SRI) and resident inspector (RI) also interviewed additional licensee personnel during the inspection perio * Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on March 18, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (458/8581-04): Monitor licensee's engineering evaluation of residual heat removal (RHR) system for installation of interlocks between suppression pool Suction Valves 1E12*MOVF004A(B)

and shutdown cooling Suction Valves 1E12*MOVF006A(B). The proposed interlock would prevent the F004 and F006 valves within the same division from being open at the same tira The licensee has completed the above evaluation and determined that the installation of interlocks between the F004A(B) and F006A(B)

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valves is feasible. This evaluation is documented in Modification Request (MR) 85-0783 and the associated unreviewed safety question determination (USQD). Installation of the valve interlocks is scheduled for the first refueling outage. The NRC inspectors will monitor the installation and testing of the above valve interlocks as part of their normal inspection progra This open itera is close b. (Closed)OpenItem(458/8602-03): Requirement for testing of )

temporary alteration The temporary alteration program has been replaced by liodification Request Procedures. These procedures require documentation of testing for modifications. The Facility Review Comittee has also closed its open item on temporary alteration This open item is close =

c. (Closed) Unresolved Item (458/8624-03): Ability of condensate pumps to inject water into the reactor vessel at 600 psi The licensee stated that the pressure range utilized originally for condensate pump injection (0-600 psig) was based on Emergency Procedure Guidelines which used the term "RPV Pressure Range for System Operation." The licensee has recalculated pressures at which pumps utilized will actually inject into the reactor vessel. The procedure revision has been written, incorporating these injection pressures, and will be incorporated upon completion of operator training on the revision This unresolved item is close (Closed) Violation (458/8608-02): Failure to schedule an audit early in the life of an activit The licensee's quality assurance (QA) systems organization performed an audit of the Facility Review Committee's (FRC) startup and test activities (SU&T)inMarch1986. The audit scope included FRC SULT activities and reviews conducted during the previous year. One deficiency was identified involving documentation of the required reviews of the initial startup test log. This deficiency has been corrected. An internal audit of the QA audit program (QAl-2.1,

" Audit Performance and Reporting") was conducted by QA systems to assess the program's adequacy and effectiveness. Two deficiencies were identified indicating weak programatic controls, one of which involved audit schedule / scope reviews. The licensee's actions taken to correct and prevent similar recurrence of problems included:

. Initiating a 100 percent review of all 1985 audit files to assure that no outstanding audit checklist items exis I

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. Revising QAI-2.1 to include necessary progrannatic controls in sufficient detail to assure consnitments and/or requirements are properly implemente . Conducting formal classroom training of QA engineers on revisions made to QAl- . Developing a master audit plan for each audit are . Maintaining condition reports, quality assurance findings reports, surveillance reports NRC reports, etc., for use in developing the audit scop The above corrective actions were completed by December 1986. The licensee is presently developing an audit matrix of Technical Specification (TS) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requirements for the audit program to be used at the beginning of each audit year to assure that all required audit areas are addressed in the audit schedul This violation is close . 10 CFR Part 21 Reports The SRI was provided copies of selected 10 CFR Part 21 Reports by NRC Region IV, which may be applicable to equipment or services supplied to River Bend. These reports were provided to the licensee, who verified that the reports either had been or were being evaluated for applicability at River Bend. Most of the reports had been evaluated and actions completed by the licensee. Any reports that were not already entered into the licensee tracking system were immediately entered. The licensee also provided the SRI with some additional reports that had been evaluated at River Bend. A listing of reports by date, manufacturer, and subject is provided below: /2/84 - Transamerica Delaval - fuel control levers on diesel engine not pinned, /17/85 - Transamerica Delaval - Diesel engine control panels for DSR and DSRV-16 diesels could overhea /18/84 - Bahnson Industrial Air Quality Division - Bahnson Company heating and ventilation equipment deficiencie /5/85 - Reliance Electric Company - EQ test anomalies of the Reliance class RH motor operated valve motor /30/86 - Brown Boveri - Circuit breaker wiring harness interferenc /17/85 - General Electric Company - Standby liquid control system test switches are not qualified for containment environmen _ _ _ _ _ __

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$ 6 /14/85 - Morrison Knudson Company, Inc. - Lube oil system modification results in pressure alarm failure on diesel engin /6/86 - Atwood & Morrill Co., Inc. - Potentially deficient closing springs on main steam isolation valve ' /8/84 - Topaz Electronics - Defect in the low voltage shutoff of Class 1E inverter /19/83 - Woolley, W. J. Company - Defect on inflatable door seals for personnel air locks.

! /13/84 - Brown Boveri - Possible misoperation of ITE-27N undervoltage relay , /6/85 - detts Spring Co., Inc./Transamerica Delaval - Diesel engine intake and exhaust valve springs could fai I

! /17/85 - Transamerica Delaval - Liner seat material was found to be

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deteriorating in lube oil check valves.

. /18/85 - Transamerica Delaval - Crankshaft oil plug failed on l diesel engin /12/85 - Transamerica Delaval - Bottom guide on the starting air

check valve disc had broken of /20/83 - Transamerica Delaval - Defect in the diesel engine jacket

water pump assembly.

l /5/85 - Phoenix Steel - Wall thickness problem with SA106 pip , /13/85 - Brown Boveri - Model 00-4 and OD-5 low voltage breakers with an incorrect short time delay band leve /1/85 - American Air Filter /Transamerica Delaval - Standby diesel generator intake silencer failur ! /9/84 - Transamerica Delaval - Potential problem with diesel engine overspeed governor and fuel transfer pump drive.

! /28/82 - Transamerica Delaval - Potential problem with diesel

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engine piston skirt castin /17/86 - Promatec - Potentially defective penetration / conduit fire

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seals.

' /14/86 - Telemecanique, Inc. - Defective latch cam assembly used on

, Gould unitized conibination starter ;

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The resident inspectors will continue to provide copies of potentially applicable 10 CFR Part 21 Reports for licensee evaluation, and a followup of licensee action on selected 10 CFR Part 21 Reports will be conducted during future NRC inspection No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Licensee Action on IE Notice 87-08 This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions related to selected NRC Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Information Notices. The results of the review are documented below:

IE Information Notice 87-08: Degraded motor leads in Limitorque DC motor operators.This IE Infomation Notice alerted recipients of potentially defective direct current (DC) motors installed in Limitorque motor operators. The motors in question were manufactured by H. K. Porter between December 1984 and December 1985. Specifically, the motors were fitted with Nomex-Kapton insulated leads, which are susceptible to insulation degradation and subsequent short circuit failure. Limitorque has evaluated this condition and determined that the failure mechanism may result from the insulation being physically stiff with subsequent damage occurring durirg field installation and setu The licensee has evaluated the Limitorque letter dated January 5,1987, and IE Information Notice 87-08 concerning the problem with the design of Limitorque DC motor lead wire insulation for applicability to River Bend Station. Two DC motors have been identified which were manufactured with Nomex-Kapton insulated leids. These motors are presently being stored in the warehouse as spares and have been placed on hold pending disposition and closure of Nonconformance Report 87-NR-005. The licensee also reviewed those motors which have been installed in the field, specifically those installed in the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system to

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determine their applicability to the Limitorque letter and the IE Information Notice. The review revealed that the installed DC motors were manufactured prior to the December 1984 through December 1985 time fram This IE Infomation Notice is close . Licensee Action on IE Bulletin 86-03 The NRC issued IE Bulletin 86-03 (IEB 86-03), " Potential failure of multiple ECCS pumps due to single failure of air-operated valve minimum flow recirculation line." It was discovered at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant that a single failure of the air operated isolation valve, on the low pressure emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps minimum flow recirculation lines could disable more than one emergency core cooling system (ECCS) trai _- -

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The licensee evaluated the single failure vulnerability of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) as part of their review of IE Bulletin 86-01,

" Minimum flow logic problems that could disable RHR pumps." The licensee has determined that the single failure vulnerability problem described in IEB 86-03 does not exist at River Bend Station. This response to IEB 86-03 was provided to the NRC within the required 30 days from receipt of this Bulleti This IE Bulletin is close . Maintenance Witness On February 20, 1987, the RI witnessed corrective maintenance activities for the RCIC high steam line flow isolation instrument, IE31*N690A. During the performance of STP-207-4236, "RCIC Isolation - RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Monthly CHFUNCT; 18 Month CHCAL; 18 I!onth LSFT (E31-N083A, E31-N683A, E31-N690A)," on February 17, 1987, the slave trip unit, 1E31*N690A, failed to respond as expected when the input stable current was reduced. This resulted in a trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the allowable values' column of TS table 3.3.2.2. With the above instrument inoperable, the licensee isolated the RCIC system steam supply line and declared RCIC inoperable within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> required by T The licensee conducted the above maintenance activity in accordance with approved Prompt Maintenance Work Order (PitWO) 55524. The RI noted that the appropriate limiting conditions of operation (LCOs) and lifted lead / jumper control forms were initiated as required. During the performance of the maintenance activity, a OC inspector was present to-observe the work and the restoration of the system to operable statu STP-207-4236 was performed as part of the maintenance job plan to assist the technicians in trouble shooting the problem; however, no problem with the IE31*N690A isolation instrument was observed. Isolation Trip Unit IE31*N690A was then declared operable based on the successful completion of STP-207-4236. Although no specific cause for the surveillance test failure on February 17, 1987, was identified, electrical connections were tightened during the maintenance activity and the licensee postulates that a loose connection may have caused the original failur No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

i Safety System Walkdown During this inspection period, the SRI and RI walked down the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system which is required by TS 3.5.1 to be operable during operational conditions 1, 2, and 3. The NRC inspectors observed that:

Station All valves were properly aligned and locked as required by(Manual

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Operating Procedure 50P-0030. "High Pressure Core Spray,"

l Isolation Valve 1E22*VF036 was observed by the RI to be locked open during the last drywell closecut performed).

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. No abnormal control room instrumentation readings or alanns were presen ?

., No leakage from major components was presen C The HPCS pump upper and lower bearing oil reservoirs were properly fille .

. Accessible hangers aira supports were intac 'P ' . The HPCS keep fill system was operating as require No problems were noted which would have affpcted HPCS system operabilit No violations or &:viations were identified in' this area of inspectio ( Surveillance Test; Witness

'During this inspection period, the RI observed the perfonnance of STP-205-3301, "LPCS Valve Operability and Pump Flow Test," on March 5, 1987. This surveillance test was performed to demonstrate operability of the low pressure core spray (LPCS) system following preventive maintenence' activities. The results of the surveillance test revealed that the'LPCS pump operability was within the limits established by TS 4.5.1.b.1 and 4.5.2.1 and that valve operability and isolation times were within the limits of TS 4.6.4.1 and 4.6.4.3 with the plant in

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operational condition 1. - No problems were identified during the review of

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the completed STP packag In addition the RI reviewed the data packages for several STPs performed between February 20, 1987 and February 23, 1987. The following STP data

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packages were reviewed:

. STP-505-4508, "RPS/ Control Rod Block APRM Weekly CHFUNCT, Weekly CHCAL (C51*K605H) and 18 Month LSFT."

. STP-207-5505,"MSL 150L-MSL Area Temperature High (TURB Bldg) Monthly CHFUNCT, (ILDS-ESIB, ES2B, ES3B and ES4B)."

. STP-057-3705, " Primary Containment Air Lock Seal Leakage Rate Test."

. STP-207-4241, "RCIC ISOL, RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temperature High (E31-N6028)."

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. STP-207-4204, "RCIC System Isolation, RCIC Equipment Room Arabient Temperature High."

. STP-207-5507, "MSL ISOL-MSL Area Temperature High (TURD BLDG) Monthly CHFUNCT, (ILDS-ESID, ES20, ES3D ar.d ES40)."

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. STP-051-4215, " Isolation Actuation /MSLI-Main Steam Line Pressure-Low Monthly CHFUNCT, 18 Month CHCAL, and 18 Month LSFT (821-N076B; B21-N676B)."

. STP-207-4215 "RWCU High Differential Flow Monthly CHFUNCT,18 Month-CHCAL, 18 Month LSFT LE31-N075A, E31-N076A, E31-N077A and Differential Flow Timer Monthly CHFUNCT (E31-R615A)." '

. STP-207-4237, "RCIC Isolation, RCIC Steam Line Flow, High Monthly CHFUNCT, 18 Month CHCAL and 18 Month LSFT (E31-N083B, E31-N683B, E31-N6908)."

In each case, the STP had been properly completed and received the required operations department review as indicated by the shift supervisor / control operating foreman signature at the end of the STP. The RI noted that when an "as-found" setpoint was outside the allowable band, the "as-left" setpoint was adjusted to be within the allowable settin No cases were noted where the setpoint had exceeded the TS setpoin No violations 'or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Operational Safety Verification The resident inspectors observed operational activities throughout the inspection period and closely monitored operational events. Control room activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled and efficien Proper control room staffing was maintaired and access to the control room operational areas was controlled. Operators were questioned regarding lit annunciators, and they understood why the annunciators were lit in all cases. Selected sM*t turnover meetings were observed and information concerning plant statu, das being covered in these meetings. A walkdown of the HPCS system was conducted and the results are documented in paragraph 7 of this report. Plant tours were conducted and overall plant cleanliness was good. During these plant tours general radiation protection and security activities were observed and no problems were note The usident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational events and potential problems and participated in the yearly licensee conducted emergency exercise. The results of selected items are documented below: Emergency Exercise: The resident inspectors participated in the licensee conducted emergency exercise on February 25, 1987. This exercise included local, state, and federal participation. The NRC participation included four personnel on site and activation of the NRC Region IV emergency response facility. An NRC inspection team was also on site to evaluate the licensee's emergency response capability. The evaluation results will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/87-06. While participating in the exercise, the resident inspectors monitored the licensee actions to control and

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mitigate the consequences of the simulated emergency. Licensee e actions were deemed to be controlled and proper to control and mitigate the simulated emergenc Inadvertent Activation of Emergency Sirens: At 5:12 a.m. CST on

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February 26, 1987, all eight emergency sirens in East Baton Rouge (EBR)

Parish were inadvertently activated. The SRI was notified of the problem upon arrival at the site that morning. The licensee had made announcements on local television and radio that the alarms had been falsely activated. The licensee initiated an inanediate investigation to determine the cause of the false activation and to detemine any corrective actions needed. The cause of the inadvertent activation was a result of the emergency exercise the previous day. During the

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exercise the EBR sirens were apparently initialized improperly by

holding the EXECUTE AND ALL CALL buttons down instead of momentarily depressing and releasing them. This caused the control unit to go through a complete cycle and then into the next cycle to INITIALIZ The control unit was subsequently turned off without anyone

recognizing that the sirens were ARMED for activation. .The silent i siren computer software used in the exercise was then replaced with the normal software. The computer performs a daily automatic interrogation of the sirens beginning at 5

00 a.m. each morning. When the interrogation process reached the EBR sirens that morning, the computer read the ALL CALL status and activated the alarms for approXimately three to five minute As a result of this event, the licensee has provided additional instruction to on site personnel and provided additional procedural controls for reactivation of the siren computer. Additional training will also be provided for offsite personnel to prevent inadvertent

, siren activation. In addition, onsite and offsite procedures have been developed which describe the required actions if any future

inadvertent activations occur. These actions include broadcasting a

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message on the local radio stations stating that the sirens have sounded in error. (Allegations 4-87-A-014,4-87-A-015,and4-87-A-016) Licensee Identified Lifted Lead: The licensee initiated Condition

, Report (CR) 87-0219 on February 13, 1987, to document and correct a I, lifted electrical lead found during conduct of maintenance. The lifted lead was found inside the 4160 volt alternate supply breaker i

to the Division 11 emergency switchgear, and it was not tagged in i accordance with the maintenance or plant modification program. The lifted lead served a control room alam, which would alert the operator of a trouble condition with or loss of control power to the i breaker. Indicating lights on the breaker control switch would have

! still alerted the operator to a loss of control power. The alternate supply breaker provides a tource of power to the emergency bus, if the normal power source is lost. In addition, the emergency diesel generators provide the safety-related power source, if both normal and alternate power are lost. Manual operator action is required to close in the alternate power source. The identified lifted lead did

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not affect the proper functioning of the breaker. The Division I emergency bus alternate supply breaker was checked and no similar problem was identified. The licensee has reviewed past maintenance work orders and startup temporary modifications, and no documentation of the lifted lead has been found. The lifted lead has been reterminated and the alarm function has been tested by the license The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee corrective actions for closure of this identified conditio d. Licensee Identified Temporary Test Cables: The licensee initiated CR 87-0218 on February 20, 1987, to document and correct two temporary cables connected at the RCIC system local control panel. These cables were connected to the emergency response information system (ERIS) and were being used during testing. These cables were not tagged as modifications in accordance with approved procedures. The licensee immediately removed the cables from the local RCIC panel. The cables would have had no direct impact on RCIC operability as terminated, but they could have caused a physical divisional separation concer The licensee's investigation is continuing, but they found documented

, evidence that the cables had been removed on June 9, 1986, by l

Temporary Alteration 85-ERI-015. No documentation has been located to indicate how or when the cables were reinstalled. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee action for closure of this identified condition, e. Potential Deficiency in the Environmental Qualification of Equipment:

The SRI was notified on March 6,1987, of a potential problem with

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the environmental qualification of certain equipment in the auxiliary

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building. The licensee had been notified by Stone and Webster (S&W)

that high energy line break (HELB) analysis had failed to account for three break locations on two short segments (2-foot and 3-foot) of RHR system steam condensing mode lines located upstream of normally closed Valves 1E12*MOVF052A and F0528. The original HELB analysis had assumed that these valves were located in the main steam tunnel instead of their actual locations just inside the auxiliary buildin Additional analysis by S&W revealed that the peak area temperatures from the revised HELB analysis exceeds the documented qualification envelope for certain equipment. The licensee stated that similar equipment has been qualified at other locations for the higher temperature level A subsequent conference call was conducted with the licensee, NRC Region IV, and Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) representatives to I discuss this issue. The licensee stated that they were cont 1nuing their evaluation of this problem and that they would provide a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) for NRC review. The JC0 was completed on March 13, 1987. It listed several factors to justify continued operation of River Bend. These factors included low piping stress levels, low probability of line break occurrence, automatic leak detection isolation capability, increased visual inspection of the piping, good potential for qualification of the equipment to the

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, higher temperatures, etc. The licensee plans to complete their efforts to document qualification of the equipment by April 3,198 '

The resident inspectors will monitor licensee actions in this are :-

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Licensee Staffing The NRC inspector interviewed personnel from the QA and engineering 4 departments concerning personnel staffin ] The QA department has 7 vacancies to be filled utilizing GSU personne i l These vacancies are being temporarily filled by S&W personnel. Recruiting ,

is underway to staff these vacancies, and two offers are outstanding. The

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final staffing goal is 60 GSU personnel in the QA departmen j The engineering department has 20 vacancies to be filled utilizing GSU >

i personnel . These vacancies are also being filled temporarily by S&W personnel. A recruiting effort is underway to staff these vacancies, and this effort has recently been increased. The final staffing goal is approximately 100 engineers in the departmen Both departments stated that they had no problem obtaining requisitions to hire personnel to fill vacancies. Each department has lost 3 or 4 people in the last several month No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio ;

1 In-Office Review of Written Reports of Non-Routine Events at Power Reactor [

q Facilities

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The purpose of this portion of the inspection was to ascertain whether i corrective actions discussed in the licensee event reports appeared to be appropriate, and whether information reported satisfied reporting requirements.

$ The NRC inspector reviewed LERs 86-53 through 86-69 and 87-01 through

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87-03. All reporting requirements were found to have been met, and all

reports were adequate to assess the events reported. Corrective actions i' specified in the reports appeared to be adequate to identify the root causes and to correct these cause No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Exit and Inspection Interview

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An exit interview was conducted on March 18, 1987, with licensee representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspectio ,

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