IR 05000458/1987029

Insp Rept 50-458/87-29 on 871122-1231.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings,Status of Facility OL Conditions,Nrc Bulletin 87-002,10CFR21 Repts,Surveillance Test Observation,Maint Observation & Safety Sys Walkdown

ML20195J852
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	01/22/1988
From:	Chamberlain D, Holler E, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195J794	List: IR 05000458/1987029 IR 07100122/2012031 ML20195J790
References
50-458-87-29, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8801290031
Download: ML20195J852 (15)

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8 a APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/87-29 Docket: 50-458 Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)

P. O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Ittspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: November 22 through December 31, 1987 Inspectors: " b D. D. Chamberlain, Menior Resident Inspector

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Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects e >$ . , , .w \~ ?YN B. Jottes, Resident Inspector Date Project Section C, Divisich of Reactor Projects Approved: - '

I fgef97 E. J. Hofler, Chief, Project Section C Date Division of Reactor Projects hl2?OO31880122 o ADOCK 05000458 PDR

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Inspection' Summary Inspection Conducted November 22 through December 31, 1987 TEeport 50-458/87-29)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, status of facility operating license conditions, NRC Bulletin 87-02, 10 CFR Part 21 Reports, surveillance test observation, maintenance observation, safety system walkdown, and operational safety verificatio Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to follow procedure for control of locked valves, paragraph 9).

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• L. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training R. J. Backen, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance

^W. J. Beck, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

• J. E. Booker, Manager, Oversight

• J. L. Burton, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs

• J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear Licenting

• T. C. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance

• J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

• R. G. Easlick, Supervisor, Radwaste C. L. Fantacci, Jurmevisor, Radiological Engineering

• W. Frayer, Director, Projects

• E. Freehill, Outage Manager

• A. O. Fredieu, Supervisor, Operations J. D. Gore, Cajun Consultant

• P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

• E. R. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing

• J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering

• C. Hardy, Supervisor, Radiation Protection G. K. Henry, Superviser, Electrical Engineering

• K. C. Hodges, Supervisor, Chernistry L. G. Johnson, Site Representative, Cajun

• G. R. Kimmell, Director, Quality Services R. J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing A. D. Kowalczuk, Director, Oversight

• J. W. Leavines, Director, Field Engineering I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Systems J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer

• V. J. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services

• W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering R. R. Smith, Engineer, Nuclear Licensing

^A. Soni, Supervisor, Environmental Qualification and Specification R. B. Stafford, Director, Operations Quality Assurance

• K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management

• R. J. Vachon, Senior Compliance Analyst

• R. G. West, Supervisor, General Maintenance D. W. Williamson, Supervisor, Operations The NRC inspectors also intarviewed additional licensea personnel during the inspection perio ,

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• Denotes.those persons that attended the exit interview-conducted on January 6, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (458/8624-02): Transition from emergency operating procedures to abnormal operating procedure The licensee has revised the emergency operating procedures to a flow chart format. The' immediate _ actions previously performed in the abnormal operating procedures have been implemented into the emergency operating procedures flow charts. The applicable abnormal operating procedures and general operating procedures are referenced at the applicable blocks in the emergency operating procedures flow charts. The resident inspector observed licensed operators utilizing the emergency operating procedures flow charts during training exercises and no problems were identified with the transition from emergency operating procedures to abnormal operating procedure This open item is close (Closed) Violation (458/8640-01): Failure to follow a surveillance test procedur The licensee has incorporated the comment control forms for STP-209-0302, "RCIC Pump Operability and Flow Test," through Temporary Change Notice 86-1947. This temporary change notice separates the multiple actions' required by the step into separate steps. Revision 2 of this procedure incorporated the above temporary change notice. The resident inspectors have observed subsequent performances of the surveillance test procedure, with no further procedural or personnel communication problems identifie This violation is close (Closed) Open Item (458/8513-01): Standby diesel generator jacket water / service water system engineering analysi The licensee has issued Field Change Notice 5 to Modification Request 85-001. This field change notice redefines the work necessary to maintain the Division I and II diesel generator engine jacket water and lube oil temperature within the recommended standby ranges. The issuance of this field cnange notice completes the licensee's temperature evaluation and required work scope for the diesel generator jacket water and lube oil system This open item is close (Closed) Open Item (458/8551-06): Monitor the engineering evaluatior for a long term solution to the spurious trip problem with Rosemount trio unit ,

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This. spurious trip problem potentially occurs on adjacent trip units when a card is removed for~ testing or maintenance. Spurious trips occur in single channels only and single safety channels.do'not cause any plant trips,_ equipment trips, or safety actuations. Also, once-a trip unit is , initially calibrated and tested it is not frequently '

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removed. The licensee has instituted administrative controls to >

provide tschnician and cperator awareness of the potential for

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spurious trips and alarms during testing and-maintenanc Engineering has _ determined that the administrative controls are adequate and-no long term solution is require This open item.is close . Status of Facility Operating License Conditions Facility Operating License NPF-47-for the River Bend Station was. issued on November 20, 1985,' authorizing operation at reactor power levels not in excess of 2894 megawatts thermal (100 percent rated power). Attachment 1-to this license contains items to be completed to the satisfaction of NRC Region IV' prior to achieving certain operational conditions. ~ Attachment 5 to this license contains an item to be completed to the satisfaction of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and, as requested, verified complete by NRC Region I The following status is provided for the Attachment 1 license conditions: (Closed) License Condition'3.a: Complete a load test which meets all the Occupational Safety and Health Administration requirements for load handling capability on all remaining cranes and hoists _not previously tested prior to startup following the first refueling ;

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outag The licensee has completed load testing of all cranes'and hoists with the exception of 15 monorails. 'For each of the monorails not tested, the rigging has been removed and the applicable mark number stenciled on the monorail along with "Not Load Tested Do Not Use." The licensee has revised general maintenance procedure GMP-0014, "Control of Load Lifting Equipment," to prohibit the use of monorails that are identified as not having been load tested. The licensee has determined that 4 of the above monorails cannot be tested because of obstructions and the remaining eleven monorails are not needed for plant operation or maintenance activities. In the event that a monorail is required for a future activity, the monorail must be tested and certified in accordance with GMP-001 This license condition is close (Closed) License Condition 4.a: Replace the control valves on the heating, ventilation and air conditioning chillers as delineated in 10 CFR 50.55(e) report identified as DR-134 prior to startup following the first refueling outag . .

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The licensee has completed the work required by this license condition. A discussion of the work performed is provided in paragraph 7 of this repor This license condition is close The following status is provided for the Attachment 5 license condition:

(Closed) License Condition 2.c.14: Complete the eleven remaining Human Engineering Discrepancies identified during the control room design revie The following Human Engineering Discrepancies were verified complete:

o HED-105 Replace spare annunciator windows with smoked plexiglas; o HED-126 - Group battery room annunciators together; o HE0-242 - Rearrange drywell and containment equipment drain sump annunciators; o HED-529 - Group annunciatorc with related controls; o HED-643 - Group annunciators with related controls; o HED-702 - Increase rate of annunciator blink for alarms that clear; and o HED-803 - Purchase procedure racks that do not block operator vision of control panel This license condition is close . Licensee Action on NRC Bulletin 87-02 This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions relative to NRC Compliante Bulletin No. 87-02, "Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance With Applicable Material Specifications." The purpose of this bulletin is to request that the licensee: (1) review their receipt inspection requirements and internal controls for fasteners, and (2)

independently determine, through testing, whether fasteners in store at the facility meet required mechanical and chemical specification requirement The resident inspector accompanied the licensee during the selection of fasteners ta be tested. Twenty bolts and twenty nuts were selected from the following ASTM materials to be tested at the independent laboratcry:

SA 193 SA 307 A 194 A 325 A 449 SA 194 SA 325 A 307 A 563 A 574

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The licensee reviewed the current inventory list and determined that the following materials identified as "of interest" in the bulletin, are not in stock in the warehouse:

o A 193 Grade B16 o SAE J 429 Grades 5 and 8 o A 325 Types 2 and 3 o A 354 Grades BB and dC o A 490 o A 320 LTM The results of the chemical and mechanical tests are due back from the laboratory in early January. All of the information requested by the bulletin will then be submitted to the NRC. The resident inspector will review the license receipt inspection program as described in the bulletin response with the licensee's procedures during a subsequent inspectio No violations or deviations were idantified in this area of the inspectio . 10 CFR Part 21 Reports The resident inspectors were provided copies of selected 10 CFR Fact 21 reports by NRC Region IV, which may be applicable to equipment or services supplied to River Bend. These reports were provided to the licensee, who verified that the reports either had been or were being evaluated for applicability at River Ben Any reports that were not already entered into the licensee tracking system were immediately entered. A listing of reports by date, manufacturer, and subject is provided below:

o September 29, 1987 - Basler Electric - Inadequate insulation between windings on saturable core transforme o October 16, 1987 - Westinghouse Electric Corporation - Potential for spring retainer deformation on W-2 cell switches, o October 19, 1987 - Eastern Te:: ting and Inspection, Incorporated - Quality assurance control inadequacies identified for non-destruction examination documentation, o October 23,1987 - Exo-Sensor, :ncorporated - Design deficiency may I cause loss of calibration gas for containment hydrogen analyzer I

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system o November 12, 1987 - General Electric Company - HFA Relays found with i latch engagement clearances less than the recommended minimum, a

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The resident inspectors will continue to provide copies of potentially applicable 10 CFR Part 21 reports for licensee evaluation, and a. followup of licensee action on selected 10 CFR Part 21 reports will be conducted during future NRC inspection No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Surveillance Test Observation During this inspection period, the resident inspectors observed the performance of Surveillance Test Procedures STP-309-0602, "Division II 18 month ECCS Test," STP-057-3603, "Drywell Bypass Leakage Rate Test,"

STP-050-3601, "Shutdown Margin Demonstration," and reviewed the test results for STP-309-0601, "Division I 18-month ECCS Test."

o STP-309-0602: This Surveillance Test Procedure was performed from November 24 through 26, 1987, to verify operability of the Division II diesel generator and the associated emergency core cooling systems. The test included a simulated loss of offsite power in concurrence with a loss of coolant accident. The diesel generator was observed to start and obtain rated voltage and frequency within the required time and carry the auto connected loads. The remaining loads sequenced on within the designated time blocks, with the exception of standby gas treatment fan 1GTS*FN1B. The associated timer was found to be defective and was subsequently repaired and retested satisfactoril A 24-hour endurance run was also performed with the diesel generator loaded to between 3030 and 3130 kw by paralleling the diesel generator with the electrical grid.

1 During the performance of the endurance run, the diesel generator experienced a transient which caused _the generator to load shed and then immediately restore the loads. This occurred twice over a ,

15-second period. The resulting load swings caused the diesel -

generator to exceed the qualified 3130 kw load. The licensee evaluated the effect the load transients had on the crankshaft torsional fatigue margin, and determined that no appreciable fatigue usage occurred for the number of stress cycles above 3130 kw. The 24-hour run was restarted following the load transient and completed t;.thout further inciden The licensee speculates that a transient ts the bus caused by an offsite perturbation, resulted in the diesel generator load transients. The electrical droop setting has been adjusted to dampen out the diesel generator response to offsite electrical transients when the diesel generator is parallel to the grid. The droop setting does not affect the diesel generator response in the event of a loss of offsite powe o STP-057-3603: This surveillance test procedure was performed on i December 8,1987, to verify that leakage from the drywell, which bypasses the suppression pool, is less than or equal to that allowed by the River Bend Station Technical Specifications sections 4.6. and 4.6.2.1.d. This test was also used to verify operability of the

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y 9 drywell pressure instrumentation by directly monitorir.g drywall  ;

pressure through control room indications and alarms. The resident inspector verified through review of the surveillance. test procedure

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-package that valves and leads that were manipulated and lifted as required by the procedure received an independent verification.for both the surveillance required lineup and restoration. The resident inspector observed the collection of data during the tast. Based on this data, the licensee calculated that the total leakage area'was 0.015 square feet which met the acceptance criteria of less than or equal to 0.1 square fee o STP-050-3601: This surveillance test procedure was performed on December 20, 1967, to verify the shutdown margin, as defined in the River Bend Station Technical Specification 3.1.1, is equal to-or greater than 0.38 percent delta K/K with the highest worth rod analytically determined. The shutdown margin was determined immediately after achieving criticality following the first refueling outag The license calculated the shutdown margin to be 2.89 percent delta K/K with the highest worth rod withdrawn from the cor o STP-309-0601: This surveillance test procedure was performed during the previous inspection period and the observations made during the test are reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/87-28. The licensee has resolved each of the deficiencies identified during the performance'of the surveillance test procedure and verified that all the River Bend Station Technical Specification acceptance criteria have been me All' licensee required reviews have been performed and the test results accepte No violations or deviations were identified in this are.. of the inspectio . Maintenance Observation During this inspection period, the resident inspectors observed maintenance activities for the replacement of control valves on the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning control building chiller The valves were replaced under maintenance work orders MWO-117403, 117404,

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117405, and 117406 for valves SWP*PVY-32A, B, C, and 0 respectivel These NW0s implemented the work requirements of Modification Request 86-1133. Tne design scope of the modification request is to improve the reliability of the control building chillers by regulating the flow of service water to the chillers during system initiation when service water temperatures are low. The resident inspectors verified through observation and/or review of the records that:

o The activities did not violate limiting condition for operation; o the required administration approvals and tagouts were obtained before initiating work; e

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o the procedures used were adequate to control the work; o- the equipment was tested before being returned to service; o quality control inspection witness and hold points were observed:by maintenance personnel; o the reactor operators were trained on the changes implemented by the modification request prior to reactor startup; and o red line~ changes were made to applicable control room drawings to-reflect the as-built configuratio No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Safety System Walkdow During this inspection period, the NRC resident inspectors performed a

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walkdown of the high pressure core spray system with the plant in'

operational condition 1. The high pressure core spray system is required to be operable during operational conditions 1, 2, and 3. The resident inspectors observed thet:

o' All valves were properly aligned and locked;

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o the keep fill system was operating as required; o no abnormal control room instrumentation readings or alarms were present; o no leakage from major components was present; o the upper and lower' motor bearing oil reservoirs were properly filled; and o accessible hangers and supports were intac No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Operational Safety Verification The resident inspectors continued to monitor control room activities and conduct during the refueling outage and monitored startup activities at the end of the inspection period. This first refueling outage began on September 14, 1987, and the outage was completed on December 26, 1987, when at 5:02 a.m., CST, the main generator output breaker was closed onto the grid. Control room activities and conduct were generally observed to

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be well controlled. Proper control room staffing was maintained and

". access to the control room operational areas was controlled. Selected shift turnover meetings were observed and it was found that information

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concerning plant status was being covered in each of these meeting Plant tours were conducted and the licensee was effective in cleaning plant areas as the outage was completed. The resident inspectors toured the drywell prior to plant startu The safety-related valves in the drywell that are inaccessible during plant operation were verified to be in the correct position. This included valves for low pressure core ,

spray, high pressure core spray and low precsure coolant injection '

systems. A walkdown of the high pressure core spray system was also conducted and the results are documented in paragraph 8 of this repor General radiation protection practices were observed and no problems were noted. Personnel exiting the radiation control area were observed and radiation monitors were being properly utilized to check for contaminatio The resident inspectors observed security activities in the central alarm station, secondary alarm station and in the plant. It was noted that alarms were being responded to as required. Plant perimeter walkdowns were conducted and no problems were noted. Personnel entry and exit from the protected area were observed, and no problems were note The resident inspectors also reviewed the status of plant modifications completed during this outage, reviewed the maintenance work order backlog and reviewed licensee actions on operational events and potential problems. The results of reviews of selected items are described below: Plant Hodification Status During this first refueling outage, the licensee implemented over 200 plant modifications. These modifications included minor items such as relocating annunciator windows and major items such as installation of the alternate rod insertion system and the bypass / inoperable status alarm system. In addition to the training required by the modification package, the licensee operations staff conducted special operator training on-shift for selected plant modification No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio Maintenance Work Order Backlog i

The resident inspectors reviewed the status of maintenance work order l backlog with licensee personnel at the end of the refueling outag The licensee has established a goal to maintain the available-to-work maintenance work order backlog below 850. The status at the end of the outage was 653 maintenance work orders available to work. This is well below the established goal. The status of open preventive maintenance tasks was 900, which is above the licensee goal of 70 The preventive maintenance backlog has been reviewed by the licensee and no safety-related equipment qualifications are affected. The licensee will concentrate on reducing the preventive maintenance

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backlo Theresident'inspbctorswillcontinuetomonitor maintenance work backlog during future inspection ~

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio Emergency Diesel Generator Winding

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This area of inspection was conducted to provide continuing followup on the previously identified problem with an emergency diesel generator rotor pole winding. This problem was identified by the licensee on October 27, 1987. It involved a problem with one roto pole on the Division II diesel generator where the outer winding wrap had delaminated and bowed out toward the stator. This was found during a scheduled refueling outage inspection of the generator. The licensee completed the repair of the Division II generator and conducted electrical tests and video tape magnified visual inspections on both emergency diesel' generators. These tests were

, conducted before and after the 18-month surveillance test runs. The Division II generator was operated approximately 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> between the tests. No unsatisfactory conditions were noted during these test The licensee will use the data obtained from these tests as base line data. The licensee plans to perform the visual inspection on both generators every six months.or after 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> of_ operation. The electrical tests will be repeated each refueling outage. ~The results of future tests will be compared with the baseline data to determine further corrective action requirements. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions during future testin No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio Misaligned Instrument Root Valve This area of inspection was conducted to monitor licensee corrective actions for the previously identified drywell pressure sensing line i valve misalignment. The licensee completed its planned reverification of all safety system valve lineups (approximately 12000 valves) during this refueling outage. No other misaligned t valves were identified. The licensee also sealed 37 valves open for instruments which normally indicate zero. The management review and the quality assurance review of system lineups was also complete This completes the immediate corrective actions for this proble Lifted Electrical Lead / Jumper Program This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions on l several condition reports identifying potential problems with the t

lifted lead program. All of these conditions were identified during the refueling outag The licensee's investigation revealed that none of the identified conditions resulted in the inoperability of

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required safety systems. Most of the problems were administrative control problems. As a. result of these problems the plant manager {

requested a quality assurance surveillance of the maintenance lifted lead program. Additional administrative problems were identified by the surveillances. Corrective actions for the identified problems has resulted in an overall strengthening of the administrative control of the maintenance lifted lead program. Quality assurance also inspected all safety-related electrical panels for unidentified !

electrical leads or jumpers. No problems were found during these I inspections on safety-related equipment. Procedure GMP-004E, !

"Circuit Testing and Lifted Leads and Jumpers" has been revised to l require maintenance foremen to verify issue and removal of tags as well as accounting fer lost tags. Other additional controls included placing responsibility on inaintenance foremen to review logs monthly and to sign various controlling documents after proceduralized verifications. The resident inspectors will monitor the effectiveness of these additional controls during future inspection . Service Water System Corrosion This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions on the service water system piping and heat exchanger corrosion proble This. problem was identified by the licensee during visual inspections of heat exchangers for the corbicula control program. Certain

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auxiliary building unit coolers were found partially plugged because 1 of the corrosion products. One unit cooler had to be chemically l cleaned to reduce the tube blockage. The licensee has performed an

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engineering evaluation of the unit coolers for worst case heat I removal degradation. Although some degradation was noted, all coolers I were determined to be acceptable for operation to the second

! refueling outage. The licensee is instituting additional torrosion l inhibitor controls. Also, a monitoring program has been established l to detect any further degradation of the heat exchangers.

1 The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions for this proble Reactor Shutdowns l

During this inspection period, the licensee initiated a manual l reactor shutdown as required by River Bend Station Technical L Specifications and received an automatic reactor scram during the j subsequent reactor startup. These reactor shutdowns are described t below:

l o Manual Reactor Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications:

Ouring a reactor startup on December 19, 1987, with the reactor subcritical and at atmospheric pressure, the licensee inserted a manual reactor shutdow This shutdown was required, by River Bend Station Technical Specification paragraph 3.1.3.3.a. when more than one control rod accumulator fault occurred and no

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control rod drive pumps were operating. The control rod drive

_ pumps had tripped approximately two minutes prior to receiving the accumulator low pressure alarms because of a loss of suction pressure. The licensee determined that the flow path from the condensate storage tank to the control rod drive pumps had been inadvertently isolated earlier that morning when ,the suction-path to the control rod drive pumps,was transferred from the condensate storage tank to the condensate syste A subsequent valve packing leak in the long cycle cleanup line and a failed pressure tap line on the short cycle cleanup line required that the condensate system be secured. This resulted in isolating the only remaining control rod drive pump suction path. When the control rod drive pumps tripped on low suction pressure, the accumulators lost their source of charging water and gradually lost pressure until the low pressure alarms annunciate The ieactor was then manually scrammed to ensure

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there was sufficient pressure in the accumulators to drive the control rods fully into the cor The licensee reviewed station operating procedure 50P-002,

"Control Rod Drive Hydraulics," which the nuclear equipment operator utilized when changing the suction sources. It was discovered that under the heading for transferring suction sources, the procedure allowed for unlocking and closing the condensate storage tank supply valve (1C11-VF123). This valve was unlocked and closed by the nuclear equipment operator

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without the cognizance of control room personnel. The licensee's operations support procedure OSP-0014, "Control of Locked Yalves and Devices," establishes the controls for normally locked valves. This procedure requires that when it is necessary to_ change the position of a locked valve or device, the authorized individual will make appropriate entries in the Locked Valves / Devices Manipulation Log and obtain a locked valve key from the shift supervisor or control operating foreman. The re'sponsible nuclear equipment operator did not follow the above procedure when IC11-VF123 was unlocked and closed. Instead, the nuclear equipment operator utilized the general access key provided for use under the direction of either the shift supervisor or control operating foreman. This failure to follow !

the operations support procedure is a potential violatio [

(458/8729-01) The licensee's corrective actions taken include:

(1) revising 50P-002 to clarify the steps in transferring control rod drive pump suction paths, (2) reviewing all other station operating procedures identified in the startup procedure to ensure clarification of other steps was not needed, (3)

retraining the operating crews on 0$P-0014, and (4) reiterating through a memo from the Assistant Plant Manager - Operations, the responsibilities of the nuclear equipment operators and the ,

control room personnel for ensuring that each task is carried

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o Reactor Scram Caused by Spike on Neutron Instrument: During a i reactor startup on December 20, 1987, with the unit critical and i at approximately 50 psig, the reactor scrtsmed when a spike on

.an intermediate range neutron monitor was received with a half scram present on the other division. . The licensee had placed one vessel water level-instrument in the trip. condition because the instrument had drifted outside the licensee's allowe toleranceLband in the nonconservative direction. The observed-drift appears to be because of an air bubble in the reference

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leg which is compressed as reactor pressure is increased. The licensee was backfilling the reference leg when the scram occurred. The licensee has reviewed the' event and is planning tighter controls as to when half scrams may be input ouring reactor startups or if the reactor should be manually shutdow Final closure of this event will be documented by the resident inspectors during routine Licensee Event Report revie . Exit' Interview An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the resider.t inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspectio .

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