IR 05000458/1987027

Insp Rept 50-458/87-27 on 871001-31.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings, 10CFR21 Repts,Surveillance Test & Maint Observation,Safety Sys Walkdown & Operational Safety Verification

ML20236Q464
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	11/16/1987
From:	Chamberlain D, William Jones, Madsen G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236Q443	List: IR 05000458/1987027 ML20236Q441 ML20236Q459
References
50-458-87-27, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8711200063
Download: ML20236Q464 (12)

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! APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/87-27 Docket: '5'0-458 i

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Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)

'P. O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

i Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: October 1 through October 31, 1987 Inspectors: * ,  !~ ~

D. D. 0%amberlain," Senior Resident Inspector Date Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects

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~ ff~hh W. B. Jones, Resident Inspector " Date

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Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects Approved: g WC tw- // -/4 - 9 7 G. L. Madsen, (Acting) Chief, Project Section C Date l Division of Reactor Projects

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2 l is L Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 1-31, 1987 (Report 50-458/87-27)

Areas Inspect'ed: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on !

-previous. inspection: findings, licensee event report review,'10 CFR Part 21 ]

reports,' surveillance test observation, maintenance observation, safety system walkdown, operational safety verification,'and preparations for refueling, . l

.Results: Within the areas inspected, two violations were identified (failure I to obtain required procedure approval and failure to initiate a hot work permit for a grinding activity, paragraph 6). .

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i DETAILS ,

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l Persons Contacted -

• D.:L. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training l W. J. Beck, Supervisor,' Reactor Engineering i J. E. Booker, Manager, Oversight l

• E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs  ;

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• J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear ]

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Licensing 1

• T. C. Crouse,_ Manager, Quality Assurance (QA)

• J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend

. Nuclear Group

• D. R. Derbonne,' Assistant Plant. Manager, Maintenance

• R. W. Frayer, Director,' Projects -

P. E. Freehill, Outage Manager l .A. 0. Fredieu,~ Assistant Supervisor, Operations- .

l~ *J. D. Gore, Cajun Consultant  !

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'*P. D.LGraham, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

• E. R. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing q

• J.' R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering <

K. C. Hodges, Supervisor,' Chemistry L. G. Johnson, Site Representative, Cajun

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• G. R.:Kimmell, Supervisor, Operations (QA)

• J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing .

• A. D. Kowalczuk, Director, Oversight

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J.-H. HcQuirter, Licensing Engineer V. J. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services

• W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration ,

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager l l

• M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering i R. R. Smith, Engineer, Nuclear Licensing I

• R. B. Stafford, Director, Operations (QA)

• K E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management R. G. West, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls D. W. Williamson, Supervisor, Operations

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• R. J. Vachon, Senior Compliance Analyst The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during the inspection perio * Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on November 4, 1987. The NRC resident inspector, W. B. Jones and an NRC Project Manager, W. A. Paulson also attended the exit intervie ;

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j Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a '. '(Closed) Open Item-(458/8519-03): Review of the Nuclear Utility Parts Associates (NuPA) procurement program and the GSU/NuPA~

interfac Gulf States Utilities (GSU) had been under contract with NuPA'.for spare part procurement and warehousing functions. This' contract was canceled on September 30, 1987, and GSU now has responsibility for spare part procurement,. receipt inspection,.and warehousing functions under their own quality assurance progra '

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Since the GSU/NuPA interface no longer exists, this open item is !

close (Closed) Violation (458/8620-01): Failure to follow administrative procedures for issuance of temporary change notices (TCNs).

This' violation involved the failure to use a previously revised TCH page of a procedure to issue a new TCN to the same pag The specific procedure identified in the violation has been corrected and personnel have been instructed on administrative procedure requirements for issuance of TCNs. . Administrative Procedure ADM-003, I

" Development, Control and Use of Procedures", has been revised to clarify procedural * instructions in this area. No other problems with administrative control of TCNs has been identified by resident inspections since completion of.this corrective actio This violation is close (Closed) Open Item (458/8633-01): : Timeliness of Licensee Event Report (LER)-submittals to the NR This open item involved a problem with intermittent late submittal of LERs by the licensee in 1986. The SRI reviewed the reporting history for 1987 and a positive history of timely reporting was noted, with several reports issued earl !

This open item is close . ' Licensee Event Reports (LERs)  !

During this inspection period, the SRI reviewed LERs for compliance with !

requirements established in 10 CFR Part 50.73. Specifically, the LERs were reviewed for accuracy and clarity of the event description, the cause of each component and/or system failure or personnel error, the failure j mode and effect each event had on plant operation, and operator actions that affected the course of the event. Completion of corrective actions ;

for significant events was also verified. The following LERs were

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reviewed: i Sti-008 Unqualified Wiring Discovered in Limitorque Operators i ,

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L862014L 'Inadvertentistart of. Division I Diesel: Generator 86-0215 ' Transformer Fault Results'.in High' Pressure _ Core Spray Injection ' '

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86-059 STP,Not Performed at High Point Vents

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..86-060 1HVK Inadequate Design Revief ~

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'86-062: ' Automatic, Initiation of SGTS Due to a Radiation Monitor y -Spik '86-065~ Failure to^ Adequately Perform MSIV Ldak Rate Test

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87-002- Manual! Reactor Scram Due.to High Unidentified Drywell ,

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!87-006' Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection' for: Class.1E Power j Cables-

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g'87-010 RWCU Isolation on High Heat Exchanger Room .Temperattire

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i 87-014- Main Steam' Isolation Valve Isolation Due to a Failed 1 F-Millimetar j 87-016 Spurious Auto' Start of Standby Gas Treatment and; Annulus

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Mixing Systems <

The above-listed.LERs are' close No violations or deviations were-

- ' identified:in this area of inspectio . 10 CFR Part 21 Reports \

h The' resident-inspectors were provided copies of.. selected 10.-CFR Part 21 -'

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Reports by NRC Region'IV, which may )e applicable to equipment or services supplied to River Bend Station. 'These reports were provided to the 11icensee, who verified that the reports either had:been or were being evaluated for applicability.to' River. Bend. -Any repo'rts that were not

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already entered into the licensee tracking system were immediately 1 entered. A listing of. reports by date, manufacturer, and subject is= j provided below:

o May 28, 1987_- IMO Delaval, Inc. - Potential defect in standby diesel l

' generator' air pressure' regulator supplying control air to engine

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control pane '

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, ;o- :*May 30, 1987.- General Electric - Loose and/or missing bolts in

' hydraulic control. unit support frame of control; rod drive. syste o -*June 5, 1987.- Wolfe and Swichard (Wallace - Murray Co.) - Inner w bearing race missing on diesel generato'r air start moto ,

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- . August 5,1987 - IMO Delaval, Inc. - . Potential"vitiration problem in tube and water jacket causing cracks in standby diesel. generator-

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' lubricating support member weld ,

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o August'7,1987.- IM0 Delaval, In ' Defect in air distribution

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' system of standby diesel-generator.>

' * Denotes those Part 21 Reports which had not been identified in the-  ;

1icensee's tracking progra .The, resident inspectors will continue to provide copies of'potentially applicable 10 CFR Part 21 Reports for licensee evaluation'and a followup i ofclicensee action on selected 10 CFR/Part 21 Reports will be conducted 1 lduring future NRC inspection l

' No violations'or deviations were identified in this area of the

~ inspectio . Surveillance' Observation During this; inspection period, the resident inspectors observed the performance of Survie11ance Test Procedures (STP) STP-500-4201, " Control Rod Scram Accumulator Instrumentation'18 Month CHFUNCT AND 18 Month CHCAL," and STP-309-0603, " Division III 18 Month ECCS Test," and reviewed-

" Chemical Radiochemical Technical Specifications Surveillance,". Chemistry Surveillance Procedure'(CSP) CSP-0100-A1, Attachment A - Standby LiquidL Control Tank Surveillanc The results of the observations and review is documented below:

, STP-500-4201 - This STP was performed, in part, on October 24, 1987,  ;

to meet the 18-month channel functional test of control rod scram j accumulator. leak detectors and 18-month channel calibration of the j accumulator pressure detectors. The resident inspectors observed the i performance of this STP on accumulator IC11*ACTD001/3609 and j IC11*ACTD001/3605. Communications were maintained between control  !

room personnel and the instrumentation and control technician  ;

performing the surveillance at the accumulators. During the i performance of this STP, the licensee found the pressure switch for i IC11*ACTD001/3605 to be less than the allowed TS value. The switch

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trip value was subsequently reestablished above the TS minimum value ,

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of 1520 psig in accordance with the. surveillance procedu !

< STP-309-0603 - This STP was performed from October 25-27, 1987, to verify that the Division III diesel generator (D/G) and the l

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(ass'ocistedhighpressurecorespray(HPCS)systemmet'hefollowing t 18-monthLsurve111ance requirements:

.' Functional' test of the HPCS' system (block ~ valve closed to l prevent injection into the reactor vessel); j o; Proper operation of the Division III'D/G following a simulated

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Lloss of offsite power in' conjunction with.an emergency core cooling system (ECCS)-actuation. test signal; o Total ' connected loads to the Divis' ion III D/G do not exceed 2600 kw and that the auto load sequence timers are operable; o: -Division.III D/G capable of synchronizing with and transferring its load to the.offsite power source;

.o DivisionIIID/G'capableofrejectingaloadgreaterthanor

. equal to.1995 kw'while maintaining.less than or equal to 994 RPM; o Division-III D/G operating in the test mode, returns to' standby

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operation on an ECCS actuation signal; o Division III D/G operates through a 24-hour run consisting of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 2750 kw and 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> 2500 kw;-and o Division III D/G is capable of rejecting a load of 2500 to 2600 kw without tripping and..the' generator voltage does not exceed 5400 volt ,

During the performance of the tests, no conditions were identified which would have prevented the HPCS system from meeting.the TS

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acceptance criteri The test results have received the proper review and were determined to be acceptable with comment . CSP-0100-Al - The RI reviewed the chemistry surveillance test results for the standby liquid control (SLC) tank to verify that the sodium pentaborate solution volume / concentration requirements were being maintained in the acceptable operating region as illustrated in TS Figure 3.1.5-2. The sample test results for September 11 and October 12, 1987, were reviewed and verified to be within the acceptable operating regio No violations-or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Maintenance Observation The resident inspectors observed work performance and reviewed the work

~ document packages for motor operated valve signature testing to meet NRC Bulletin 85-J3 requirements (MWO-104007), the Division I emergency diesel

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rework of the overspeed trip actuation (MWO-110677) and main steam isolation valve (1821*A0VF0220) local leak rate test repair (MWO-R105964).

The following observations were made for each of the above maintenance activities: 5 l MWO-104007 - This generic work order was issued to test certain motor operated valves (MOVs) in accordance with commitments to NRC j Bulletin 85-03. This is to be achieved using Impell Corporation

"0ATIS" signature test equipment under both static and hydro conditions. This test data will be used to evaluate valve performance and operability under design delta pressure condition The SRI observed testing of valve E51*MOVF077 performed in accordance with Station Operating Procedure No. TP-87-29, "RCIC dignature Testing." No problems with test data collection were noted, but a

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subsequent review of the test procedure revealed that the test procedure had not been approved by the Plant Manager or one of the Assistant Plant Managers, prior to implementation, as required by Section 6.5.2.1 of River Bend TSs. The licensee stopped work per this procedure and'obtained the required approval prior to testing of-any other valves. This failure to obtain procedure approvals as required by TS was identified by the SRI as a potential violation -

(458/8727-01). MWO-110677 - This maintenance work order was initiated to install a modification on the Division I emergency diesel generator overspeed trip actuatio The modification was recommended'by the manufacturer to reduce the time required from sensing the overspeed condition to actual trip actuation to less than 1.5 seconds. This was accomplished by installing an additional pressure regulator and larger tubing to feed the overspeed trip actuation device. The installation of this modification was successful in reducing the overall response time for an overspeed trip. No problems were noted with the conduct of this maintenance activit MWO-R105964 - This work order was issued to allow for the disassembly of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) 1B21*A0VF022C located inside the drywell. On October 24, 1987, at approximately 2 a.m. (CDT), the RI observed work activities on the MSIV which involved grinding of a bolt stud to facilitate removal of the valve disc. This repair work was required to complete local leak-rate testing activities. Each of the individuals involved in this activity had signed in on the appropriate Radiation Work Permit (RWP) and was utilizing the required respiratory protection equipment. It was noted, however, that fire suppression equipment had not been located in the vicinity of the work. Discussions with one of the individuals involved in the work revealed that a fire watch had not been established for control of the generated ignition sources. Fire Protection Procedure (FPP)-0060, " Hot Work Permit," requires that a Hot Work Permit be initiated whenevor an ignition source is to be used in any area of the plant not designated as a Hot Work Area. The Hot Work Permit establishes the fire protection controls associated with the

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ignition source. This failure to initiate th'e required Hot Work Permit for the above ignition-sources resulting from the grinding operation was. identified by the RI as a potential violation

.(458/8727-02). Safety System Walkdown On October 20, 1987, the resident inspectors performed a walkdown of the standby liquid control (SLC) system. This system is required by TSs.to be operable with the reactor in' mode 5 (refueling) and a control blade

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. withdrawn. During the system walkdown, it was' observed that:

o System valves were properly aligned; o no abnormal control room instrumentation or alarms were present; o no leakage from major components was present; and-o accessible hangers and supports were intac In addition, the resident inspectors reviewed the latest performance of Chemistry Surviellance Procedure (CMP)-0100-Al for determining by chemical analysis that the available weight of sodium pentaborate in the SLC tank was greater than or equal to 4246 pounds and the percent weight concentraU on of sodium pentaborate in solution is within the limits established by Technical Specifications. The results of.the CMP verified that the concentration of sodium pentaborate is within the TS limits. A further discussion of this CMP review is provided in Section 5 of this repor No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio i Operational Safety Verification i

The resident inspectors continue to monitor control room activities and f conduct during the refueling outage. Control room activities and conduct j were generally observed to be well controlled. Proper control room j staffing was maintained, and access to the control room operational areas was controlled. Operators were questioned regarding lit annunciators, and they understood why the annunciators were lit in all cases. Selected shift turnover meetings were observed, and it was found that information concerning plant status was being covered in each of these meetings. A walkdown of the standby liquid control system was conducted, and the results are documented in paragraph 7 of this report. Plant tours were conducted, including a tour of the drywell, and while overall plant cleanliness was good, several areas were noted which will require extensive cleaning prior to restart.following the outage. These areas included the containment and drywell. Plant cleanup will be monitored by the resident inspectors as the outage is complete .

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During the tour of the drywell, radiological protection activities for safety relief valve replacement and main steam isolation valve stud removal were observed. In each case, the required radiological controls '

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.. General radiation practices were also observed for the remaining radiation control areas. One problem was noted with packaging of potentially contaminated material exiting a contaminated area. Personnel were observed bagging tools and other equipment in a red plastic bag at the contaminated area exit of the steam jet air ejector room in the turbine building. Radiation protection procedures established a preferred method of packaging material exiting a contaminated area to be yellow plastic )-

bags. This was discussed with radiation protection management and this area will be monitored during future inspections to access the adequacy of procedural. controls and training to assure that preferred methods are being implemented. Personnel exiting the radiation control area (RCA)

were observed and radiation monitors were being properly utilized to check for contaminatio The resident inspectors observed security activities in the central alarm -

station, recondary alarm station and in the plant and it was noted that alarms were being responded to as required. Plant perimeter walkdowns were conducted, and no problems were noted. Personnel entry'and exit from -

the protected area were observed, and no problems were note The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational events and potential problems. The results of reviews of selected items are described below:

Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) Removal: ~ During the previous

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o inspection period, the licensee experienced a problem with the LPRM removal machin During this inspection period, the licensee was able to recover the first LPRM and the machine was removed for repairs. The licensee determined that the most likely cause of the e initial failure in the automatic mode was high friction between the LPRM cable and dry tub A new cutter was installed on the machine and it was successfully tested in the automatic and manual mode. The licensee also installed a camera under the reactor vessel so that cutter operation could be monitored during the next attempt to remove a LPR During the next attempt on October 7, 1987, the machine again stopped in the automatic mode after 80-100 inches of LPRM cable had been removed. The machine then failed after one cut in the manual mode. The failure in the manual mode was found to be a mechanical fault in the cutter linkage. The cutter drive used in the first LPRM removal attempt was then installed and the second LPRM was removed in the manual mod The remaining three LPRMs were then removed and all five have since been replaced. No other LPRM replacements are planned for this outage. The operation of the LPRM cutter machine will be fully evaluated prior to the next refueling outage or prior to any planned usage, o Emergency Diesel Generator Output Breaker: On October 21, 1987, during surveillance testing of the Division II emergency diesel generator, the output breaker failed to close. A second attempt was also unsuccessful. An operator was then dispatched to the breaker and the breaker was successfully closed after manipulation of the

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b breaker racking mechanis The' breaker was then removed and' replaced'

b withra spare breaker so that the breaker could be examined. 'The spare-breaker was operated several times with-no problems-encountered. : Subsequent investigation by the licensee, revealed that the Division II. surveillance test had been performed successfully on

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September. 12,~1987,.'with proper operation of the. output breaker. A Lreview:of. work documents.and clearances revealed no evidence of any

' work' performed on or manipulation of this breaker since that tim .

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The breaker was extensively examined and the only problem found.was

'that.a pin.(solid drive-pin) holding the racking nut and racking screw together had worked-loose. The pin'hadLnot fallen all the wa "

n out.. This loose pin could cause the breaking racking mechanism to ,

bind and cause difficulty with racking the breaker in or ou i However, the-licensee conducted field testing of the breaker and they were'not able to recreate a situation where the breaker would function one time and then fail on a subsequent-attempt. If-the t breaker:was not. fully racked in due to' binding the breaker latch l mechanism would cause:a manual trip of the breaker to be latched i The-breaker would' attempt _.to close then trip free. This appears to

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be,the condition that existed on'0ctober 21, 1987. The licensee has~

contacted the vendor (Brown Boveri) and the breaker racking mechanism Lis be.i.ng returned for analysis. The licensee. is continuing their

. review' of. this event for corrective action such as training or additional. procedural controls. Also, a modification request (MR 87-0753) has been initiated to evaluate installation of a h . latch check switch on these types of breakers to give an alarm or indication when the breaker is not properly positioned for operatio 'The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions for

,this proble o Emergency Diesel Ge'nerator. Winding: During the planned refueling outage inspection of the Division II emergency diesel generator, on October 27, 1987, a problem was identified with the generators rotor windings on the number 14 pole. The windings had separated from the shaft pole washer and bowed out toward the stator. Individual wires in the winding had delaminated and overlapped. The epoxy resin had apparently pulled away from the pole washer, revealing as unpainted surface on the washer, which may indicate that this condition occurred after man'ufacturing. This condition was not found on any other poles of the Division II generator and it was not found during a similar inspection of the Division I generator. The licensee and authorized vendor representatives (IM0 Delaval and Parsons Pebbles -

' Electric Products) conducted an inspection of the damaged pole and a

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decision was made to rewind the pole. The licensee was informed that this problem was similar to a problem that occurred at Palo Verd They have contacted the licensee at Palo Verde to obtain the details of that problem. The generator pole has been removed and sent to Eastern Electric in Charlotte,' North Carolina, for repai A failure

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L analysis of-the damaged pole will'also be conducte Initial L: -indications are that the pole was fully functional electricall The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions for this proble . Preparation for Refueling

The resident inspectors monitored the licensee implementation of controls for refueling operations during this inspection period. This included

' assuring that the licensee implemented controls for such things as shutdown margin determinations, reactivity monitoring, radiation monitoring, water level control, decay heat removal and containment

' integrity. Technical Specification requirements were observed to be implemented for these activities during control room observations. ' Site management involvement was evident in refueling activities during control room observation and attendance at outage meetings. The resident inspectors also observed fuel handling activities throughout the inspection period including control rod shuffle, control rod friction testing and video core mappin Procedures for integrated control rod shuffling and control rod friction testing were also reviewed. The

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licensee completed loading of fuel in the reactor on October 20, 198 During final video core mapping of the fuel, one bundle was found rotated

.180 degrees. This bundle was removed and rotated to the correct positio No other problems were noted during final core verificatio No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Exit and Inspection Interview

.An exit interview was conducted on November 4, 1987, with the licensee representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspectio ..

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