IR 05000458/1987010

Insp Rept 50-458/87-10 on 870316-0430.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp findings,LERs,10CFR21 Repts,Safety Sys Walkdown & Operational Safety Verification

ML20213G798
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	05/07/1987
From:	Chamberlain D, Jaudon J, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20213G777	List: IR 05000458/1987010 ML20213G775
References
50-458-87-10, NUDOCS 8705180450
Download: ML20213G798 (11)

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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/87-10 Docket: 50-458 Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)

.P. 0. Box 220

_St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Facility Name: River. Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: March 16 through April 30, 1987 In5pectors:' ,

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D. D.VChamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector Date-

- Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch

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b 1 $w % T-(.- fr7 W.B. Jones,Residp~tInspector Date Project SectionA, Reactor Proje ts Branch

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Approved: _

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audon Chief. Projeht Secfion A

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Re tor P ojects Branch

s B705180450 870508'

PDR ADOCK 05000458 G PDR

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-2-Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted Itarch 16 through April 30, 1987 (Report 50-458/87-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), 10 CFR Part 21 Reports, maintenance witnessing, safety system walkdown, surveillance test witnessing and operational safety _ verificatio Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie >

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• D. L. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training W. J. Beck, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

• J. E. Booker,- Manager, Oversight

• J. L. Burton, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs'

• J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear Licensing .

• J. C. Deddens, Senior Vic'e President, River Bend Nuclear Group P. E. Freehill, Outage Manager A. O. Fredieu, Assistant Supervisor, Operations

• D. R. .Gipson, Director, Quality Services

• E. R. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering

• R. W. Helmick, Director, Projects

• L. G. Johnson, Site Representative, Cajun R. J. Kii.g, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering R. R Smith, Nuclear Licensing

. B. Stafford, Director, Operations QA

• K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management

• D. Williamson, Supervisor, Operations The NRC senior resident inspector (SRI) and resident inspector (RI) also interviewed additional licensee personnel during the inspection perio * Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on May 1, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (458/8604-02): Failure to schedule a supplemental audit and/or surveillance of the Temporary Alterations Program after deficiencies were identified with the progra The licensee perfonned a followup surveillance of the Temporary Alterations-Program during January 1986 and identified a problem concerning proper completion of temporary alterations logs and proper control of tagging and/or equipment status. The use of the temporary alterations program was suspended February 1,1986, and replaced by the Modification Request Progra _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Quality Assurance Instruction QAI-2.3 " Planning, Scheduling and Reporting QA Surveillance of Plant Activities," has been revised to include-provisions for tracking and rescheduling, as applicable, missed QA surveillances required ~by the yearly and/or monthly surveillance schedule. In addition QAI-2.3 now delineates the review of closed quality assurance finding reports (QAFRs) and associated surveillance reports for significant program discrepancies and trends. The licensee has also initiated a computerized tracking system' to ensure that scheduled and unscheduled surveillances are

. performed or' rescheduled as required. In the case when a surveillance is cancelled, the program provides a reference to the document which justifies the cancellation. The surveillance checklists are presently being updated to provide the quality assurance engineer with a master surveillance list which identifies each of the areas to be inspected, including those areas which require additional followu This violation is close (0 pen) Unresolved Item (458/8702-02): Testing and analysis for peak temperature effects on concrete structure and rubber boot material for shield building penetration This unresolved item resulted from review of an allegation (4-86-A-092) relating to potential temperature problems where high temperature lines penetrate the containment and shield building. The disposition of a nonconformance may have failed to fully address the potential temperature effect on the concrete structural integrit The licensee has subsequently performed additional analysis of the peak temperatures expected in the main ~ steam tunnel area penetrations and has also retrieved startup test data that was taken at some locations. The startup test data taken is below the implied 150 F limit for concrete, but the analysis results exceed that limit if the guard pipes are assumed to be fully insulated. If the guard pipes are assumed to be uninsulated, the analysis results are very close to the startup test results. The licensee plans to make a steam tunnel entry during the first weekend of May 1987, to determine the insulation configuration for the guard pipes and to attempt some confirmatory temperature measurements. This unresolved item will remain open pending further review of data and final analysis result . Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

During this inspection period, the SRI reviewed LERs for compliance with requirements established in 10 CFR Part 50.73. Specifically, the LERs were reviewed for accuracy and clarity of the event description, the cause of each component and/or system failure or personnel error, the failure mode and effect each event had on plant operation, and operator actions that affected the course of the event. Completion of corrective actions

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for significant events was also verifie The following LERs were reviewed:

85-007 Installation of Unqualified Equipment 85-018 RHR Isolation 85-038 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation 86-016 RCIC Isolation on Main Steam Tunnel Differential Temperature 86-018 RCIC Isolation on Main Steam Tunnel Differential Temperature 86-040 Control Room Charcoal Filtration System Actuation 86-041 Reactor Scram Turbine Bearing High Vibration The above listed LERs are close No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . 10 CFR Part 21 Reports The SRI was provided copies of selected 10 CFR Part 21 Reports by NRC Region IV, which may be applicable to equipment or services supplied to River Bend. These reports were provided to the licensee, who verified that the reports either had been or were being evaluated for applicability at River Bend. Most of the reports had been evaluated, and actions completed by the licensee. Any reports that were not already entered into the licensee tracking system were immediately entered. A listing of reports provided to the licensee by date, manufacturer, and subject is provided below: /1/86 - Transamerica Delaval - Time delay relays could cause premature activation of diesel engine shutdown circuitr /7/86 - Brown Boveri - Battery ground detector relays may fail to detect a ground condition on the negative bu /4/86 - Foxboro Corporation - E-line and H-line instruments greater than 10 years old are susceptible to degradation and failur /20/85 - AIRC0 Incorporated - Weld electrodes with incomplete flux coatin /28/86 - Atwood and Morrell Company - Main steam isolation valves thrust bearings extending past rotating fac .

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6 /13/86 - Atwood and Morrell Company - Main steam isolation valves experienced failure of external closing spring /10/86 - Transamerica Delaval - Diesel generator lube oil sump tank could disintegrate and restrict oil flo /1/86 - Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America - Model C deluge and preaction valves and mercury check devices may not open during a fire, preventing the flow of wate . 12/19/86 - Limitorque Corporation - Lead wire insulation on DC motors susceptible to damage during installatio /13/85 - Limitorque Corporation - Failure of worm shaft gear on size 2 Limitorque actuato /10/86 - Limitorque Corporation - Design defect in Limitorque valve operators manufactured prior to 1975 may cause the motor to burn ou . 1/27/87 - General Electric - Agastat GP Series Relays may not properly seat in their sockets, /3/87 - Limitorque Corporation - Inadequate instructions to maintain torque switch balanc /2/87 - Stone and Webster Engineering Company - Inadequate design of electrical manhole cover /19/86 - Houghto - Number 620 lubricant causes degradation of aluminum in valve /23/87 - Sorrento Electronics - Insulation resistance of Rockbestos coaxial cable used in high range radiation monitor is too low for proper operation of the monitor, /9/86 - General Electric - Qualification of GE AMP butt splices in G.E. drywell penetrations failed during postulated loss of coolant accident because of excess leakag /16/86 - Valydine Engineering Sales Corporation - Corrected list of model number The resident inspectors will continue to provide copies of potentially applicable 10 CFR Part 21 Reports for licensee evaluation, and a followup of licensee action on selected 10 CFR Part 21 Reports will be conducted during future NRC inspections.

l No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

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7 Maintenance Witnes_ On April 21, 1987, the SRI witnessed preventive maintenance (PM)

activities performed on the Division I emergency diesel generator, which included cleaning the lube oil strainers and replacing the cartridges in the air start filter The diesel was removed from service, and appropriate clearance tags were hung prior to ma!ntenance performanc The mechanics were observed to be using required controls for tool and cleaning rag accountability during the cleaning of the lube oil straine Both of these PM tasks were completed in accordance with the PM task-

-instructions. It was noted by the SRI that the PM instructions for the lube oil strainer required that the head bolts be torqued in accordance with a general maintenance procedure (GMP-18). No torque value was provided on the PM instructions. The required torque from GMP-18 was determined to be 30 foot pounds and the bolts were torqued to this valu The mechanics stated that some PM instructions were being updated to L

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include data such as these torque values. The SRI discussed this with maintenance supervision, and they stated that PM instructions were being updated, but the diesel generator PM instruction updates had bien delayed while a total reevaluation of required PM tasks was being conducted. This reevaluation of PM tasks for the diesel generators will possibly allow some changes to PM requirement The SRI will monitor the reevaluation of PM requirements for the diesel generators during future inspections.

I -No violations or deviations were identified during this inspectio . Surveillance Test Witness During this inspection period, the RI observed the performance of surveillance test procedures STP-051-4248, "ECCS REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE LOW SRV ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION MONTHLY CHFUNCT, 18 MONTH CHCAL, 18 MONTH LSFT (821-N068B, 821-N6688, B21-N6698, B21-N6708, B21-N6178, 821-N6188, B21-N697B, 821-N6988)," and STP-309-0201,' " DIESEL GENERATOR DIVISION I OPERABILITY TEST". The following observations were made for the above surveillances:

. STP-051-4248 - This surveillance test procedure (STP) was performed on March 24, 1987, to meet the 31-day channel functional test requirement for the ECCS reactor vessel pressure low SRV actuation instrumentation. The RI verified that tha licensee personnel l conducted the test in accordance with the procedure and followed the applicable administrative procedures during the test. The required jumpers were properly installed and recorded in the jumper control log book. During restoration of the system following successful completion of the STP, master trip unit B21-N668F tripped when the transmation was adjusted to zero milliamps and the transmation removed as required by the procedure. After restoring the master trip unit to normal, Condition Report 87-0341 was initiated to describe the condition and request an engineering evaluatio The

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trip of this master trip unit did not cause any operational problems l

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because appropriate bypasses were installed to prevent logic initiatio . STP-309-0201'- This surveillance was performed on March 21, 1987, to meet the 184-day Division I diesel generator operability test. This system is required to be operational when the plant is in operational conditions 1, 2, or 3. The diesel was observed to obtain rated speed and frequency within the required 10 seconds. The diesel generator was then gradually loaded to between 3000 kw and 3100 kw and operated in this condition for greater than 60 minutes as required by the procedu re. During the operation of the diesel, the " Lube Tank Low Level" alarm annunciated. The nuclear control operator (NCO)

properly observed the lube oil level to be within operable limits throughout the remainder of the diesel run. The licensee suspected that a lube oil level sensor failed causing the alarm. This condition was verified, and corrective actions take Following completion of the STP, the diesel was declared operable and restored to the normal system line u No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Safety System Walkdown this inspection period, the RI walked down the low pressure core During(LPCS)

spray system, which is required by Technical Specification 3.5.1 to be operable during operational conditions 1, 2, and 3. The RI observed that:

. All valves were properly aligned and locked as required by Station Operating Procedure 50P-0032, " Low Pressure Core Spray," (Manual Isolation Valve 1E21*F007 was observed to be locked open during the last drywell closeout performed)

. The Division I keep fill system was operating as required

. No abnormal control room instrumentation readings or alarms were present

. No leakage from major components was present

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. The LPCS upper and lower bearing oil reservoirs were properly filled; and

. Accessible hangers and supports were intact No problems were noted which would have affected LPCS system operabilit No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

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9 Operational Safety Verification The resident inspectors observed operational activities throughout the inspection period and closely monitored operational events. Control room activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled and efficien Proper control room staffing was maintained, and access to the control room operational areas was controlled. Operators were questioned regarding lit annunciators, and they understood why the annunciators were lit in all cases. Selected shift turnover meetings were observed, and information concerning plant status was being covered in these meeting A walkdown of the low pressure core spray system was conducted and the results are documented in paragraph 7 of this report. Plant tours were conducted, and while general plant cleanliness was good, the area around-the standby cooling towers was left cluttered following work activitie This area was cleaned up following discussions with licensee management by the SRI. During the plant tours general radiation protection and security activities were observed and no problems were note During routine control room observation, the SRI noted that certain statements had been added to instrumentation and control surveillance test procedures for shift supervisor signature. An example is as follows:

"Due to valving errors, hydraulic perturbation, multiple wires on single terminals, instrument, P. C. board removal / insertion an unanticipated ESF/RPS actuation is expected during the performance of this procedure."

The SRI was concerned that this might be misinterpreted as a basis for not evaluating an ESF actuation for reportability. This was discussed with licensee management, and they stated that the intent was to notify operations personnel that the potential existed for an ESF actuation during test performance and not to preclude evaluation of any ESF actuation for reportabilit In order to prevent misinterpretations, the plant manager issued a memorandum to all operations personnel stating that all ESF actuations were to be documented on a condition report so that a reportability evaluation would occur. Licensee management also stated

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that a similar statement would be added to the surveillance test procedures at the next revision. The SRI will monitor licensee actions in this are The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational events and potential problems. The results of reviews of selected items

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are described below; Inoperable Fire Barriers Found During Surveillance Testing: On February 23, 1987, the licensee issued a condition report to document deficient conditions found during the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure STP-000-3602, " Fire Barrier Visual Inspection". Fire watch patrols were established as required by River Bend Technical Specifications. During subsequent repairs to correct the deficiencies, a licensee quality control (QC) inspector noted that several items did not appear to be installed in strict accordance with the installation specification. These 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, fire wrap assemblies were installed and inspected under a

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vendor quality assurance program that required a 100 percent inspection by the vendor. As a result of the deficiencies identified, the licensee QC organization has performed a 100 percent reinspection of the Appendix R fire wrap assemblies. The deficiencies identified are being evaluated by the licensee engineering organization for needed repairs. The licensee will begin training of additional fire barrier repair personnel on May 4, 198 All needed repairs have already been completed inside containmen The schedule for completion of all repairs has not been developed ye Fire watch patrols are being maintained in all plant areas with fire barrier deficiencies. The SRI will continue to monitor licensee actions to correct the identified fire barrier deficiencie b. Potential Deficiency in the Environmental Qualification of Equipment:

This issue was discussed in paragraph 9.e of NRC Inspection Report 50-458/87-07 and related to certain electrical equipment affected by an error discovered in the high energy line break analysis of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system steam line. The licensee provided status for this issue indicates that all required equipment is qualified with the exception of four motor control centers supplied by Telemecanique. Certain thermal sensitive protective devices are being tested by the vendor, and results are expected to qualify the motor control centers by June 19, 1987. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions in this are c. Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection for Class 1E Cables: On April 1, 1987, the licensee determined that certain electrical cables at the standby cooling towers were not fully protected from the potential effects of severe environmental conditions such as tornadoes and tornado generated missile These cables supply power to five of ten cooling fans for each division of standby service water. At 2:00 p.m. (CST) on April 1, 1987, the licensee entered the required Technical Specification action statements for inoperable ultimate heat sink fans and initiated an around the clock effort to install missile shields for the affected cables. The required installation of the missile shields were completed within the time frames allowed by the Technical Specification action statements. The licensee also conducted walkdowns of other safety-related structures for this problem and no other occurrences involving safe shutdown equipment were identified. This problem involves a deviation from FSAR requirements, but since the licensee identified the problem and took prompt and extensive corrective action no NRC Deviation will be cited, d. Process Computer Thermal Power Calculation: On April 13, 1987, the licensee discovered, during routine minor power adjustments, that the process computer thermal power indication was not responding as expected. Operations personnel on shift immediately reduced power and initiated an investigation of the problem. Subsequent investigations by the licensee revealed that a software change c__-

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' implemented earlier in the day had inadvertently affected the temperature compensation of feedwater flow ~which is an element of the thermal power calculation. The software change had been received from General Electric, and it was intended to only affect rate of change parameters on balance of plant indications only. The software change was immediately removed by the license The licensee performed calculations from available data during the time the software change was in place and worst case calculations indicated that thermal power had slightly exceeded 100. percent power for a period of about four hour The peak power was calculated to be 101.1 percent. The precautionary reduction in power brought the 24-hour average below the licensee limit of 2894 megawatts thermal to 2885 megawatts thermal. The licensee contacted General Electric, and it was determined that an error had been made in the software chang General Electric indicated to the licensee that only one other plant was affected by the software change, and they had previously corrected the error. The other affected plant was the Leibstadt facility in Switzerland. The licensee is continuing the investigation of any programmatic corrective actions needed for this type of problem. The SRI will continue to monitor licensee actions in this are No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Exit and Inspection Interview An exit interview was conducted on May 1,1987, with licensee representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.

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