IR 05000412/1986043

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Insp Rept 50-412/86-43 on 861201-19.Violations Noted: Surveillance Deficiency Repts Incomplete & Control Sheet Entries Omitted
ML20212F844
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 02/26/1987
From: Briggs L, Petrone C, Vankessel H, Denise Wallace
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212F784 List:
References
50-412-86-43, NUDOCS 8703050180
Download: ML20212F844 (15)


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p U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION I

Report No.-

50-412/86-43 Docket No.

50-412

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License No. CPPR-105 Category B

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Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 l

Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: December 1-19, 1986-Inspectors:

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M2Mf7 H. F. vanKesseV, Reactor Engineer, TPS, 08, DRS dfte'

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b-b o /24 / # 7 L. Briggs, Leak Reactor Engineer,TPS, OB, DRS dat'e

Y WW2'7 D. Wallace, Reptor Eng eer, 0?S, OB, DRS da'te O

Approved by: _ C. Petrorie 1ef, Test Program Section, DRS d4te

//o Inspection Summary:

Inspection on December 1-19, 1986.

(Inspection Number 50-412/86-43)

Areas Inspected: Routine Unannounced Inspection of the Preoperational Test Program, including the witnessing of preoperational tests as conducted during the Hot Functional Test, the review of activities in the QA Interface and the review of unresolved items identified by the inspector in previous inspections.

The 30 day latch test of Main Steam Isolation Valve A was witnessed at the temporary test facility at the site.

Inspection Results: Two licensee identified violations were noted.

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, a Notice of Violation is not being issued.

Note:

For acronyms not defined refer to NUREG 0544 " Handbook of Acronyms and Initialisms".

870305o180 870226 PDR ADOCK 05000412 G

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Details 1.

Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company (DLC)

R. Bernuier, Engineer, Phase - 2 (SWEC)

T. Bold, Field Engineer (SPC)

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.R.C. Callaway, Test Supervisor, Phase - 2 M.0. Breck, Test Engineer M. Covey, Test Engineer, B0P

    • N.J. Daugherty, Director Systems Test
  • J.J. Dusenberry, QA Supervisor L. Earl, Test Engineer, Phase - 2 M. Eicher, Superintendent-Sheet Metal (SPC)

S.C. Fenner, Director QC R.D. Flodstrom, Assistant Director TQC

    • J. Godleski, Senior Test Engineer

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A.J. Gusew, Balancing Technician HVAC'(SSM)

E. D. Haack, HVAC Senior Test Engineer N. Harlow, Test Director NSSS J.J. Healey, Senior Engineer (SWEC)

J.D. Johns, Supervisor QA Surveillance'

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  • J. Kasunic, Maintenance Director W.A. Kraycar, Test Engineer Phase - 2 M. R. Miller, Test Engineer Phase - 2 T.P. Noonan, Superintendent, Operations & Maintenance

'J.S. Patterson, Test Engineer, Phase - 2 D. Powers, Test Engineer HVAC L. M. Rabenau, Compliance Engineer M. Robinson,-Test Engineer Phase - 2

  • C.K. Schultz,-Principal Engineer P. Slifkin, Test Supervisor, Phase - 1

.J. Steinke, Test Engineer, Phase - 1

  1. R. J. Swiderski, Startup Manager R.G. Williams, Software Development Supervisor
  • Denotes those present during the interim exit meeting held on December 12, 1986.
  1. Denotes those present during the exit meeting held on December 19, 1987.

2.

Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-412/86-38-01, " Emergency Diesel Generator Concerns" Scope A number of concerns were identified during the review of Phase-1 test i

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. reports ? for-the - Emergency Diesel _ Generators. (A & B) as identified in.

Inspection. Report 412/86-40.

On - this ' inspection, the progress made ~' on -

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.these items of. concern by the licensee was reviewed.

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Otscussion-LWith regardc to the. fuel oil filters (item,b) W. W. Nugent and Company,

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Inc. ~ had submitted " Cartridge Assembly -Series 1555",- drawing 30-222, Rev.

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14, dated November-- 13, '1984. 1 Thi s - drawi ng, however, does _ not show.

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. sufficient detail to ascertain the design details of the spring plate with-

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respect to. the spring clip retainers.

The -licensee will obtain direct information on the flatness of this plate :at the 1first. opportunity - for filter ' inspection. The plate will be. measured for flatness and pictures will be taken'to show the. design details of the plate. At another nuclear plant, these spring plates were found to have-excessive warpage as a

result of a. number of relatively large spot welds for spring retainer-l clips. This warpage allows the fuel oil to bypass the filter cartridge.

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The lube oil contaminant found to be plated out on the lube oil strainers-(item C) will be' analyzed for chemical composition at the first opportun-ity in the maintenance schedule if it. is still' found to be present at that i

time. This contaminant.may not be the system preservative it was' thought L

to be when.first found on the strainers, but could be soot buildup result-

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ing from diesel. operation under certain combustion conditions.

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' Conclusion The licensee is still working to resolve the' above items. They will be reviewed during a future inspection.

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3.0 Hot Functior.al-Test Witnessing

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Summary

The Hot Functional Test consists of a number of primary system tests which

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are performed at different plateaux of RCS pressure and temperature as

achieved by Reactor-Coolant' Pump (RCP) operation. The Reactor Vessel does

not contain fuel. ' Radioactivity, therefore, does not present a problem.

The RCS was heated up in steps to 547F and was subsequently cooled down in

~ teps to ambient conditions.

The temperature plateaux used at Beaver s

Valley were:

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For-heatup 150F; 250F; 350F; 450F; 489F; 525F; 547F For cooldown: 525F; 350F; 400F; 300F; ambient Heatup was started on November 15, 1986, the cooldown was concluded on December 19, 1986. Many of the system tests were performed with the RCS

4 at normal operating pressure and temperature (2235 psig, 547 F).

Other

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system tests need RCS conditions at lower temperature. Still other tests

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need to be repeated for different RCS' temperatures. The testing during the heatup-sequence, testing at normal _-operating-temperature, and subsequent cooldown' were witnessed by Regional NRC inspectors from November 17-21, 1986, (Inspection Report 412/86-40) and from December

'l-19, 1986, (this report).

In preparation for the HFT _ test witnessing, the latest revisions of these test procedures were reviewed. Only those tests that experienced system -

or procedural' problems are discussed in this report.

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3.1 Test Witnessing Scope Testing witnessed by the inspectors included the following observations, r

including the crew's overall performance:

Approved procedure with latest vevision available and in use by test-

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personnel; A designated person in-charge and conducting the test;

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Minimum test personnel requirements met;

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Qualified personnel performing the test; Test precautions followed and prerequisites met;

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QA/QC notification and witness _ requirements met (QA engineer

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present);

Proper plant supporting systems in service;

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Special test and measuring equipment required by the test procedure,

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its calibration and use; Procedure is technically adequate for the test;

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Testing being performed as required by the test procedure;

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Test personnel actions were correct and timely during performance of

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the test; and Adequate communications established for test performance.

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3.2 Discussion 3.2.1 P0 2.24B.02 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Cold Start)

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~ Scope S

Steam was admitted to' the turbine which was coupled to the AFW Pump. The

- steam piping was cold.

The.' steam piping was observed to see.if ' water

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-hammer and consequent pipe displacement would develop.

  • LDiscussion

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E The-test :itself was a regular performance test for the turbine and the'

pump. The inspectors were observing critical parts of the steam piping in the turbine room and at e1.725 in the Cable Vault area..Two bangs were'

heard in the turbine room but no displacement of the piping, nor vibra-h tion, was noted. Some slight movement was observed on the steam piping in the Cable Vault area. The degree of this' piping displacement was uncer-tain. The cold ' start was. repeated on December 5,1986. The same piping in the Cable Vault area was observed again by the inspectors.

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' The inspector was able to verify that neither water hammer nor excessive.

pipe displacement occurred at the moment that steam was admitted to the pipe.

Three Stone and Webster engineers were also present.in the area-to observe and record ' vibration and displacement of the steam pipe. Accelerometers were being used to record the maximum displacement of the steam supply-piping at two locations.

The inspector verified that these units were

. calibrated and functional.

Maximum displacement of the piping during the admittance of steam was

recorded to be.25 inches in the vertical direction and.18 inches in the horizontal direction at locations expected to respond with the largest.

movement.

The inspector witnesced these readings and also noted that no water hammer was heard. The inspector determined that the displacements were well within the design capabilities of the system.

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Apart from the water hammer issue there was a problem with humidity in the turbine room on the part of the performance test at the lower steam

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pressure and temperature in --the cooldown phase of the HFT.

The relative humidity in the room during' this test was 100% in the entire room.

The allowable relative humidity is 86%.

The licensee has noted this test deficiency and plans to take corrective action.

This may take the form of removing the instruments with the Equipment Qualification problem from the turbine room.

This item will be tracked under Unresolved Item 412/86-43-01. The turbine (Terry) performed well during the cold start and also during the other

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tests. An overspeed trip, however, could not be accomplished with the as written preoperational test procedure.

A test deficiency was initiated

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requesting --the ' phase II. test data be accepted by the JTG for the overspeed

' trip testing.

Findings-It is concluded from the observations that the steam supply-system of. the

- turbine' driver of - the AFW Pump can~ handle a live steam. admission (saturated csteam)1to cold piping without excessive pipe displacement and twater hammer.

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- The relative-humidity problem, experienced during the test at lower RCS~

temperature-and' pressure, will-be tracked under Unresolved Item to 412/86-43-1 3.2.2 P0. 2.04.02, " Emergency Shutdown-Panel (ESP) and Alternate Shutdown

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Panel (ASP)

Scope

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Both panels were tested to demonstrate their capability to cool down.the plant using only the panel instruments and local controls after transfer.

of the controls from the main control board.

In the first' phase of the ~

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cooldown, the steam generators were used as the heat sink by opening the Atmospheric Relief Valves; in the second phase the RHR Heat Exchanger _ was put into service.

~ Discussion-In both-cases, for the ESP and ASP, the objectives of the tests were achieved.

In the case of the ASP, however, a procedural problem was experienced in putting the RHR Heat Exchanger into service. The ASP does not have controls for the bypass valve of the RHR heat exchanger bypass.

When reactor coolant.was first admitted to the heat exchanger, loud bangs (water hammer) were heard which originated from the component cooling water piping.-

The procedure was changed to eliminate this problem. The test was repeated successfully the next day.

The inspector asked for a report on the possible damage incurred as a result of the experienced water hammer.

This will be tracked under Unresolved Item 412/86-43-02.

The termination of the first ASP test was precipitated by excessive vibration on the_ RHR pump (11 mils in one direction on motor housing).

The retest did not experience excessive RHR Pump vibration.

It was also noted that the human engineering deficiencies, which were corrected on the main control board (MCB) still existed on the ESP and ASP. These-deficiencies included:

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Absence of (red) pointers on some instruments used during the test,C

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2.I ' Missing labe1 Eon-HVAC' switch addition on the ASP.

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No instrument " islanding" on ESP and ASP.-as was done on the MCB.

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.No permanent instrument 11dentification. tags The above four items will be followed under Unresolved-Item 412/86-43-03 ~

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No-violations were-identified.

~3.2.3 P0-2.06.05 Reactor Coolant Loop Isolation Valve Test Scope:

The ' initial performance of this test,. conducted on' 'B'.

loop,.was terminated approximately 11 minutes after the 'B' reactor coolant pump was started,'due to' high vibration.

The proportion of the te'st witnessed-consisted of stroke. timing of the reactor coolant hot loop isolation zvalves ~and the 8 inch minimum flow valve. The' cold loop-isolation valve is then stroked shut and timed. - At that point, the cold' leg isolation Tvalve cannot be opened without ' defeating an interlock. or. satisfying the interlock condition.

To satisfy the' interlock, the hot leg isolation valve and the eight inch minimum flow valve are. opened and the - reactor '

coolant pump is started.

This lineup allows coolant flow through the 8 -

r inch recirculation line and about 175 to 200 gallons per minute -(GPM)

through a' 2 inch cold -leg isolation valve bypass line. When flow through the 2 inch line reaches 200 GPM, a timer is automatically 1 started which-will allow the-cold leg isolation valve to start opening in 107 minutes if

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flow remains above 200 GPM.

If flow decreases' below 200 GPM, the timer-reinitiates valve opening from zero time.

~ Discussion

..The 'B' loop was originally selected to be tested first because its reac-tor coolant pump (RCP) had the lowest vibration. At eleven minutes, the

'B" RCP ~ vibration had increased from about 6 mils to 17 to 20 mils, at which time the pump was stopped. To open the cold leg isolation valve, the--interlock was defeated by the licensee.

The inspector witnessed a similar test on.the

'C' loop. Although vibration did not steady out above

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15 mils on the

'C' loop, swings to 20 mils were observed.

In addition, bypass flow did not stay above 200 GPM and the timer was noted by the

[i inspector to be chattering as flow oscillated around the 200 GPM value.

i The inspector also noted that to satisfy the interlock to allow the hot leg isolation valve to be opened, the cold leg isolation valve had to be further closed by hand to satisfy the fully closed interlock.

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Itcensee noted that similar action had been required on the

'B'

loop.

Deficiencies were appropriately initiated by the licensee to address each item.

On December 18, 1986, the licensee had all RCP's rebalanced by a l

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Westinghouse representative.

All pumps indicated about 6 to 7 mils on

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installed instruments prior to balancing and about 5 to 6 mils afterward.

The licensee also initiated a procedure change to allow the timer to pickup at 125 GPM. Since the 107 minutes at 200 GPM is the time and flow determined by analysis to be necessary to ensure complete Boron mixing and temperature equalization before opening the cold leg isolation valve, additional evaluation will be performed to determine new time and flow requirements for complete mixing.

Results of the licensee's evaluation of test results and resolution of identified deficiences will be reviewed during a subsequent routine inspection.

3.2.4 P0. 2.11A.02 Safety Injection Check Valve Test Scope Several portions of P0 2.11A.02 tests of Safety Injection System (SIS)

Check Valves were observed.

The tests conducted, which checked for through leakage from the reactor coolant system, were conducted in accordance with procedural requirements.

Numerous deficiencies were generated by the test engineer identifying excessive check valve leakage.

During the leak test of 2 SIS-134, loop 23 cold leg injection, the inspector and the test engineer identified what seemed to be a drawing or procedure error.

It first appeared that the wrong line to check valve 2 SIS-134 had been pressurized.

Further review of the controlled copy of diagram AA N0 10800-0M-211-4-1C indicated that the correct valve (2 SIS-134) had been tested.

Licensee evaluation of test results and deficiency resolution will be followed by the inspectors during a future routine inspection.

3.2.5 P0. 2.06.12, System Vibration and Thermal Expansion Scope Piping locations which were identified by the inspector, earlier in the HFT program, to have moved out of the expected (and calculated) band of displacement margins, were tracked by the inspector through the different HFT temperature plateaux on the computer printouts in the Westinghouse trailer.

The inspector also checked to see that pipe displacement instruments were installed in critical locations on the steam supply line of the AFW Pump turbine driver (Terry) for use during the cold start of the Terry turbine.

Discussion The inspector checked to see if the pipe locations with displacements outside of the allowable displacement margins, as identified in Inspection Report 412/86-40 (5 inputs), would, at the h.gher temperature plateaux,

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draw back within said margins.

All 5 inputs were cleared eventually either by the computer output or by re-calculation.

The displacement instruments installed on the steam supply piping for the Terry turbine were used in test PO 2.248.02 (cold start). The results are reported above under paragraph 3.2.1 Findings No violations were observed.

4.

Independent Inspection Effort 4.1 Temperature Measurements in Containment during Hot Functional Test TIFFT)

Scope Independent temperature measurements were made by the inspectors in containment to determine the effectiveness of the HVAC systems in keeping the air temperatures below the maximum temperature specified for equipment subject to the Equipment Qualification requirements for category I equipment.

Discussion The temperature readings were made with a calibrated hand held pyrometer.

Readings were taken by contacting the metal housing of safety related instruments and by measuring the air temperature in the vicinity of the same instruments. Readings were made during the heat up phase, at the 450 F plateau of the RCS. The results of this survey are shown in Attachment C.

These results show temperatures well below the 90F max. valid for most instruments which must meet Equipment Qualification requirements. These good results are largely due to superior RCS equipment and piping insulation even though some piping only had temporary insulation.

At that point of the HFT schedule, the balancing tests for the HVAC outlets were far from complete.

Additional temperature readings, taken at different containment elevations during the period of the 547F temperature plateau of the HFT, generally showed temperatures approximately 5*F below the corresponding Attachment C value. At that time, the balancing of the HVAC outlets, although incomplete, had made significant progress.

Temperature readings were taken also during the initial coupled run of the Terry Turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump in the pump room.

These readings are shown in Attachment C (70.5F).

The relative humidity in the pump room was close to 100% at one location.

This deficiency was picked up by the test enginee n R. ;

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Temperature measurements were also.taken near safety related

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instruments _in the vicinity of.the Atmospheric Relief Valves (steam

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pumps).~ < These temperatures are shown in Attachment C (81-82F) and

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were taken during the HFT period of the 547F plateau.

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'None of-the temperature readings taken indicated a potential challenge of _ the equipment' qualification requirements of the safety

related instruments located in the locations identified in Attachment-C..

4.2 Status of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's)

Scope i

The 30 'dayc latch test for the operator of MSIV-A was conducted on.

~ December 18, 1986,'9:15 a.m.

The inspector witnessed this test and the instantaneous-retests.

Discussion The sequential results of these tests were as follows:

Push Force-lbs.

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30 day latch test 180 2.

Instantaneous Retest 120 *

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relief valve problem on hydraulic system.

All of the-latch test results obtained to date had been plotted on log-log paper (force vs dwell time). A straight line distribution of test points emerged on this plot of force versus dwell time. - The new point for the 30 days latch test appeared to fall in line.

It has been decided to replace the solenoid tower of the valve actuatorx with two air. cylinders which are actuated via solenoid valves.

The push force developed by the air cylinders will be approxiximately 400 lbs., well in' excess of the maximum push force anticipated in accordance with the latch test results.

Conclusions The licensee now feels that the dwell time related push force problem has been resolved.

The erratic data on the push force I-

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requirements prevalent prior to the reinforcement of the pivot door, have disappeared.

This leaves the problem of the scratching of the balls experienced during ball rotation. The balls have been cleaned in the factory and are waiting for re-installation.

4.3 Independent Measurements During the preoperational test witnessing, discussed in paragraph 3 of this report, the inspector independently timed valve stroke times and verified SIS check valve leak rates.

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QA/QC Interface Scope

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The participation of the Duquesne Light QA surveillance group in the preoperational test program was evaluated by the inspector.

Samples of the surveillances performed on the most recently performed preoperational tests, including phase 1 and phase 2 tests, were obtained for the review and are shown in Attachment B.

Discussion Of the surveillances reviewed, there were four Surveillance Deficiency-Reports (SDRs).

The more significant deficiencies of the four SDRs are SOR #2 of POT 39C-86 and SDR#1 of POT 32A-86.

In the latter case, Test Deficiency Report #3 was not shown in the test log at shift change.

Further investigation revealed that testing had continued without the test Deficiency Form having the required OSOS concurrence to continue the Test without corrective action.

These omissions violate the requirements of SUM 8.2.1, Rev.1, paragraphs VI.B.4.b and VI B.8. a and b respectively.

For SDR #2 of POT 39C-86, an entry on the " Testing and Plant Performance Administrative Control Sheet" was incomplete.

The description of "Li f ted upper hite lead on TB108, Term 11 in RK* AUX-REL-A to de-energize relay LY E0 BX, dated October 6,1986, had a

" time on" of 2020 but no initials of the test personnel who made the entry.

Subsequent field verification revealed that the white lead had been relanded on TB108, Term 11 without the required " time off" and

" verification" entries being made on the Control Sheet.

These omissions do not meet the requirements of SUM chapters 3.4.14, Rev. 3, paragraph VI.H.3 and 8.2.1, Rev.

1, paragraph VI.B.S.

These discrepancies are repetitous of the referenced SUM requirements as documented in (SDR) #2 of POT-21-86, SDR #1 of POT--24A-86, and SOR #1 of SOV-36-8.

The above items are considered licensee identified violations of NRC requirements.

A Notice of Violation is not being issued in accordance with 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Paragraph V.A. Notice of Violation.

No Startup Management responses to SDRs, as identified in previous inspection reports, were received during this inspection period.

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' Findings The QA discovered departures from the requirements of the Startup Manual were noted by the inspector. He will follow startup management's response to these QA findings 6.

Unresolved' Items Unresobed items are matters about which more information is required in order to determine whether they are acceptable, an item of noncompliance, or a de'liation.

New unresolved items in this report are identified in paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.

7.

Exit Interview At the conclusion of the site inspection, on December 19, 1986, an exit interview was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives (denoted in Section 1).

The findings were identified and previous I

inspection items were discussed.

j At no time during this inspection was written -material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

Based on the NRC Region I review of ~ this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during this inspection, it was determined that this report does not contain informa-tion subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.

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ATTACHMENT A 50-412/86-43, Beaver Valley-2 Test Witnessing Proc. No.

Title Rev. No.

Approval Date P0-2.01A.01 Reactor Trip Switchgear and

5-30-86 CRDM Generator Power Supply Test P0-2.06.07 Pressurizer Pressure and

5-28-86 Level Control Test P0-2.06.12 System Vibration and

11-14-86 Thermal Expansion Testing During HFT P0-2.24B.01 Motor Driven Auxiliary

7-31-86 Feedwater Pumps and Controls P0-2.248.02 Turbine Driven Auxiliary

10-24-85 Pump Test P0-2.06.08 Integrated Hot Functional

10-10-86 Test SM-TAB-1 Proc. for the Adjusting and

11-24-86 Balancing of Ventilation, Filtration and Air Condition-ing Systems (Schneider)

P0-2.06.05 Reactor Coolant Loop Isola-

12-08-85 tion Valve Test, Loop "C" P0-2.11A.02 Safety Injection Check Valve

11-28-86 Test Section D.

P0-2.018.01 Full Length Rod Control

8-28-86 System Checkout P0-2.04.02 Emergency Shutdown Panel and

7-30-86 Alternate Shutdown Panel Test P0-2.10.01 Residual Heat Removal Test

12-31-85

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ATTICHMENT B

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To 50-412/86-43 Review of QA Surveillance Deficiency Reports (SDRs)

Sury. No.

Date (DDR-No).

Description 8 DR Test Proc. No.

Reviewed POT 39C-86

. Incomplete Test Performance P0.2.06.07 12-2-86 (SDR-2)

Admin. Control Sheet POT 32A-86 Test Deficieng Report (TDR)

P0.2.21A.01 11-24-86,

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not logged in and without OSOS Concurrence POT 39C-86 RCS temperature drifted P02.06.07 12-2-86 (SDR-1)

below required 542 Fin Step VCI with a TDR

POT 58C-86 No approved procedure at the 12-15-86 (SDR-1)

location of test activity..

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a ATTACHMENT C To 50-412/86-43 December 4, 1986 (Data Date)

Building Temperatures During Hot Functional Test Ambient Contact Loc. or Temp.- F Temp.- F Bldg.

Elevation Azimuth *

Instrument No.

of Instr. of Instr.

Cont.

697 180 2CHS-FT-1558 77.7 80.4 Cont 697 222 2 SIS-LT-926 75.0 75.0 Cont.

697 270 2DGS-PT-107A 72.7 72.4 Cont.

697 343 2 SIS-LT-920 71.3 72.6 Cont.

697

2CHS-PT-134 72.7 72.6 Cont 721

2RCS-FT-416 74.0 73.8 Cont 721 348 2RCS-PT-403 74.0 74.8 Cont.

721 RCP-C 2CCP-FT-106C 76.9 75.7 Cont.

721

2 SIS-FI-973 77.7 77.7 Cont.

721 130 2RCS-PEP-455A 80.6 80.2 Cont.

721 180 2 SIS-FI-976 79.4 79.0 Cont.

721 285 2RCS-FI-4008 73.3 72.4 Cont.

721

2RCS-LT-102 80.1 82.3

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Cont.

735 2HVR-PDS-202A-2 76.7 76.9 Cont.

735 RCP-A 2NSS-LT-101 70.6 70.6 Cont.

735 RCP-C 2RMR-RL-204 74.0 74.2 Cont.

735 2FWS-LT-475 75.8 76.7 Cont.

735 PRZR Bay 2LMS-TE-100-8 80.0 80.9 Cont.

735 RCP-B 2RCS-PT-456 83.8 83.8 Cont.

735 108 2RCS-LT-462 83.2 83.4 Cont.

735 RCP-B 2FWS-LT-485 79.6 80.2 75.0 Cont.

772

2FWS-LT-476 84.3 83.6 Cont.

772 130 2RCS-PT-455 85.4 86.2 Cont.

772 194 2 MSS-FT-485 83.6 83.6 Cont.

772 2 MSS-FT-484 83.4 83.4 Cont.

772 Near Rx cavity open floor N/A 82.2 Cont.

772 322 2FWS-LT-476 82.3 82.6 ESF AFW Pump Room 2 FWE-TCH22 70.5 70.7 MSIV Room 2 MSS-HYV-101C 81.6 82.0