IR 05000395/2013010

IR 05000395-13-010; August 5, 2013 - October 8, 2013, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1; Biennial Requalification Inspection

ML13305B068
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	11/01/2013
From:	Mark Franke Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Gatlin T South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
References
IR-13-010
Download: ML13305B068 (18)

Text

UNITED STATES vember 1, 2013

SUBJECT:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000395/2013010

Dear Mr. Gatlin:

On October 8, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1. On October 8, 2013, the NRC Inspectors discussed the results with Mr. A. Barbee and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented three findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

These findings did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark E. Franke, Chief Operations Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-395 License No: NPF-12

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000395/2013010 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No. 50-395 License No. NPF-12 Report No. 05000395/2013010 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Company Facility: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Location: P.O. Box 88 Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Dates: August 5, 2013 through October 8, 2013 Inspectors: Daniel Bacon, Operations Engineer Michael K. Meeks, Senior Operations Engineer Approved by: Mark E. Franke, Chief Operations Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000395/2013010; August 5, 2013 - October 8, 2013; Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

Unit 1; Biennial Requalification Inspection This report covers an announced biennial licensed operator requalification program and licensed operator performance inspection conducted by a team of two regional inspectors.

Three Green findings were identified. The significance of most inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated October 28, 2011. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process Rev. 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green: The inspectors identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to meet training program standards in the development of Job Performance Measures (JPM) for the licensed operator requalification annual operating tests. The inspectors identified that three JPMs, which were administered as part of the 2013 annual operating examination, incorrectly designated one or more steps as critical to successfully completing the assigned task. The inspectors further identified that one JPM, which was administered as part of the 2013 annual operating examination, did not meet level of difficulty standards for licensed operator requalification annual operating examinations.

Overall, four JPMs out of a total sample size of 15 (26 percent) were determined to be flawed. As part of their immediate corrective actions, the facility licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR-13-03186.

This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the performance deficiency adversely affected the quality of operating tests for licensed operators, such that during the administration of the annual operating examination, operators were potentially not correctly evaluated. This impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance to assess and maintain the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix I, the Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because less than 40 percent of the reviewed JPMs were found to be flawed. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. H.2(b) (Section 1R11.1)

Green: The inspectors identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to meet training program standards in the development of questions for the biennial licensed operator requalification written examination. The inspectors identified that 19 written exam question contained two or more non-credible distractors. The inspectors further identified that seven written exam questions contained no correct answers or more than one correct answer. Additionally, two written exam questions were direct look-ups.

Some written exam questions contained more than one type of error which would result in the determination of being a flawed question. Overall, 25 written examination questions out of a total sample size of 70 questions (35 percent) were determined to be flawed. As part of their immediate corrective actions, the facility licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR-13-03288.

This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the performance deficiency adversely affected the quality of written tests for licensed operators, such that during the administration of the biennial written examination, the knowledge level of licensed operators were potentially not fully assessed. This impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance to assess and maintain the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix I, the Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because less than 40 percent of the reviewed written examination questions were found to be flawed.

The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that, the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. H.2(b) (Section 1R11.2)

Green: The inspectors identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to meet training program standards in the administration of the annual operating test for the licensed operator requalification annual operating examination. The inspectors identified that the facility licensee evaluators failed to correctly detect examinee performance errors for two administered JPMs, which affected the facility licensee evaluators overall pass/fail determination. The inspectors further identified one uncorrected examination administration error during the performance of the simulator scenarios. Specifically, during the administration of one simulator scenario, an improper action taken by the simulator booth operator resulted in a malfunction not occurring as designed. As part of their immediate corrective actions, the facility licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR-13-03289 and CR-13-03186.

This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the performance deficiency adversely affected the operating tests for licensed operators, such that during the administration of the annual operating examinations, the performance of licensed operators was incorrectly assessed by the facility licensee. This impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance to assess and maintain the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix I, the Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of procedural compliance in the Work Practices component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to define or effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel follow procedures. H.4(b) (Section 1R11.3)

Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in preparation for this inspection. During the week of August 5, 2013, the inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the effectiveness of the facility licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines established in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. The inspectors also evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985, American National Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for use in Operator Training and Examination. The inspectors observed five crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included written examinations, Job Performance Measures (JPMs), simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, simulator modification request records, simulator performance test records, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watchstanding records, and medical records. The records were inspected using the criteria listed in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. Documents reviewed during the inspection are documented in the List of Documents Reviewed.

1.

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Green finding associated with the quality of Job Performance Measures (JPMs) developed by the licensee for the licensed operator requalification annual operating examination.

Description:

Facility licensee procedure TQP-408.03B, Development and Validation of Licensed Operator Annual Requalification Examinations, section 5.2.5.E.2 states that JPMs shall be developed using the guidance in Attachment IX. TQP-408.03B IX, Job Performance Measure Quality Checklist, qualitative attribute 4.e.v specifies the identification of those steps that are considered critical. Furthermore, facility licensee procedure TQP-305, Development, Review, Approval and Revision of JPMs, section 5.1.5 states that when developing JPMs, the Critical Steps shall be properly identified. The inspectors determined that JPMs JPP-070, JPP-058 and JPP-005B, which were administered as part of the 2013 annual operating examination, did not meet these standards due to critical steps not being properly identified.

Facility licensee procedure TQP-305 Enclosure B, NUREG-1021 - Appendix C, Job Performance Measure Guidelines, section B.3 states that simple one-step JPMs or JPMs that only require directly looking up the correct answer are not appropriate. The inspectors determined that JPM JPSF-029, which was administered as part of the 2013 annual operating examination, did not meet this standard because it was a simple one-step JPM.

Analysis:

Contrary to V. C. Summer training procedures TQP-305 and TQP-408.03B, for three JPM guides used during the 2013 licensed operator requalification examination, the licensee failed to ensure correct identifications of critical steps. Contrary to V. C.

Summer training procedures TQP-305, for one JPM guide used during the 2013 licensed operator requalification examination, the licensee failed to ensure that the JPM contained an appropriate level of difficulty. The inspectors determined that the failure to meet examination standards represented a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the performance deficiency adversely affected the quality of operating tests for licensed operators. This impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance to assess and maintain the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems.

The significance determination was performed in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP). Question 6, in Appendix I, asked if the finding was related to annual requalification operating test quality. The answer to this question was YES because, in accordance with section 03.04 and Appendix C of IP 71111.11, greater than 20 percent of the JPMs initially sampled were flawed in that three out of ten JPMs (30 percent) incorrectly designated one or more steps as critical to successfully completing the assigned task. Specifically, the instructions block of the Requalification Job Performance Measure Review Worksheet in Appendix C of IP 71111.11 directs the inspectors to designate a JPM under review as flawed if

(1) the JPM lacks adequate performance standards and/or contains errors in designating critical steps, or

(2) if the JPMs level of difficulty is inappropriate, (i.e., simple one-step JPMs, or a JPM that tests solely for recall or memorization, or a JPM which requires directly looking up a single correct answer is likely LOD = 1 and too easy), along with other criteria. After reviewing five additional JPMs, an additional JPM was determined to be flawed due to an inappropriate level of difficulty (simple one-step JPM and LOD = 1).

Question 7 of Appendix I then asked if greater than 40 percent of the reviewed JPMs were flawed. The answer to this question was NO because the inspectors identified four flawed JPMs out of the 15 JPMs (26 percent) reviewed in detail. Consequently, this finding was characterized as having very low safety significance (Green).

The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. H.2(b)

Enforcement:

NRC regulations require that licensed operators pass an annual operating examination and a biennial written examination; however, the regulations do not specify the quality of examination material. Therefore, no violation of regulatory requirements occurred. Enforcement action does not apply because the performance deficiency did not involve a violation of a regulatory requirement. The facility licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR-13-03186). Because the finding does not involve a violation and is of very low safety significance, it is identified as FIN 050000395/2013010-01, Failure to Meet Training Program Standards on Job Performance Measures for the Annual Licensed Operator Requalification Operating Examination.

2.

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Green finding associated with the quality of written examination questions developed by the licensee for the licensed operator requalification biennial written examination.

Description:

Facility licensee procedure TQP-408.03B, Development and Validation of Licensed Operator Annual Requalification Examinations, section 5.2.3.B.1 states that all test items should be consistent with the psychometric attributes stated in NUREG-1021.

NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Appendix B, Written Examination Guidelines, section C.2.m states to avoid specific determiners that give clues as to the correct answer. Specific determiners include implausible distractors and an option that includes another option. TQP-408.03B section 5.2.3.B.4 states that Attachment V, Question Checklist, shall be completed for each new or modified question. TQP-408.03B Attachment V has checks to ensure that there is only one correct answer to the question, the question requires an appropriate use of references and whether or not the question is a direct look-up. TQP-408.03B section 5.2.3.B.6 states that Attachment VII, Examination Development Checklist, shall be used for development of each examination. TQP-408.03B Attachment VII states that the expected range and goal for direct lookups on an examination is none. The inspectors determined that SRO Exam 2 and SRO Exam 3, which were administered as part of the 2013 annual operating examination, did not meet these standards due to 19 written examination questions containing two or more implausible distractors and seven written exam questions that contained no correct answer or more than one correct answer due to options that include another option (subsets). Additionally, two written exam questions were direct look-ups.

Analysis:

Contrary to V. C. Summer training procedure TQP-408.03B, for two SRO written examinations used during the 2013 licensed operator requalification examination, the licensee failed to ensure that the written examination questions were properly developed. The inspectors determined these deficiencies represented a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency adversely affected the quality of operating tests for licensed operators. This impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance to assess and maintain the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems.

The significance determination was performed in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP). Question 4, in Appendix I, asked if the finding was related to biennial written exam quality. The answer to this question was YES because, in accordance with section 03.03 and Appendix B of IP 71111.11, greater than 20 percent of the written examination questions initially sampled from SRO Exam 3 were determined to be flawed in that twelve out of thirty-five questions (34 percent) met one or more of the standards for being designated as a flawed question.

Specifically, the instructions block of the Requalification Written Examination Review Worksheet in Appendix C of IP 71111.11 directs the inspectors to designate a question under review as flawed if

(1) two or more distractors are not credible, or

(2) if the question is a direct look-up, or

(3) if the question has no correct answer or more than one correct answer, or

(4) if the stem or answer choices contain cues as to the correct answer (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc.), along with other criteria.

After reviewing an additional written examination (SRO Exam 2), an additional thirteen questions were determined to be flawed due to meeting one or more of the standards for being designated as a flawed question. Question 5 of Appendix I then asked if greater than 40 percent of the reviewed written examination questions were flawed. The answer to this question was NO because the inspectors identified a total of twenty-five flawed written examination questions out of the seventy questions (35 percent) reviewed in detail. Consequently, this finding was characterized as having very low safety significance (Green).

The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. H.2(b)

Enforcement:

NRC regulations require that licensed operators pass an annual operating examination and a biennial written examination; however, the regulations do not specify the quality of examination material. Therefore, no violation of regulatory requirements occurred. Enforcement action does not apply because the performance deficiency did not involve a violation of a regulatory requirement. The facility licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR-13-03288). Because the finding does not involve a violation and is of very low safety significance, it is identified as FIN 05000395/2013010-02, Failure to Meet Training Program Standards for the Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Written Examination.

3.

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Green finding associated with the licensees administration of the operating examination for the licensed operator requalification annual operating examination.

Description:

Facility licensee procedure TQP-305, Development, Review, Approval and Revision of JPMs, Enclosure B, NUREG-1021 - Appendix C, Job Performance Measure Guidelines, Section B.3 states the following requirement: The JPM must clearly identify the task standard (i.e., the predetermined qualitative and/or quantitative outcome) against which task performance will be measured. Every procedural step that the examinee must perform correctly (i.e., accurately, in the proper sequence, and at the proper time) in order to accomplish the task standard shall be identified as a critical step and shall have an associated performance standard.

The task standard for JPM JPS-024, which was administered as part of the 2013 annual operating examination, was: S/G levels restored to between 60-65 percent with the reactor at power. The use of applicable Human Performance Tools (3-way communications, self-checking, peer checking, phonetic alphabet, etc.) and industrial safety practices meets expectations.

Facility licensee procedure TQP-408A, Scheduling and Administration of Licensed Operator Annual Requalification Examinations and Post-Examination Activities, section 5.3.2.E states: It is possible for a student to fail a JPM even if all critical steps are graded SAT. A failure will result if the examinee takes actions or omissions that include but are not limited to, the following: 1. Would cause reduced generation capability of the plant.

The inspectors determined that the standards listed above were not met because the licensee evaluators gave two individuals a satisfactory grade on JPM JPS-024 when the stated task standard was not met. None of the four individuals that performed this JPM were able to control S/G levels and a reactor trip resulted in all cases. For one individual who had received an unsatisfactory grade on a different JPM, this resulted in an improper overall pass/fail determination for the JPM portion of the annual operating examination. When the licensee was informed of the inspectors observations on the grading of JPM JPS-024, an evaluation was performed and the licensee determined that the simulator response for the JPM was not as intended when the JPM was validated.

An alternate JPM was administered to only the licensed operators that were initially graded as satisfactory on JPM JPS-024.

There were two uncorrected administration errors observed during the performance of a simulator scenario and the scenario was not conducted as planned. Simulator scenario LOR-SA-056R was not administered as specified in the simulator exercise guide.

Specifically, the booth operator inadvertently deleted a malfunction that would have prevented the B Reactor Trip Breaker from opening when a reactor trip occurred.

Additionally, the simulator exercise guide executive summary stated that the B Diesel Generator would fail to start when XSW-1DB Feeder Breaker tripped on the Safety Injection signal. Although the evaluators briefed that this event would occur as stated in the executive summary, there was no malfunction listed in the booth operator summary that would prevent the B Diesel Generator from starting.

Additionally, scenario LOR-SA-084R was not run as planned. The executive summary stated that a loss of the 1DB safeguards bus would result in a total loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) and that the crew should refer to AOP 118.1, Total Loss of Component Cooling Water, and trip the reactor within ten minutes. However, the Station Blackout immediately occurred and the reactor automatically tripped. This prevented evaluation of the loss of 1DB event as was intended. Also, concerns about the indications that the simulator was providing prompted the lead evaluator to stop the scenario early in order to potentially prevent negative training from being provided to the operating crew. This prevented complete evaluation of one of the critical tasks for the scenario.

Analysis:

Contrary to V. C. Summer training procedure TQP-305 and 408A, for two JPMs given during the 2013 licensed operator requalification examination, the licensee failed to assign a failing grade when the task standard was not met and operator actions caused reduced generation capability of the plant. Contrary to the V. C. Summer simulator exercise guide for LOR-SA-056R, all events were not conducted as planned due to the inadvertent deletion of a malfunction. The inspectors determined these deficiencies represented a performance deficiency. Specifically, the performance deficiency adversely affected the operating tests for licensed operators, such that during the administration of the annual operating examinations, the performance of licensed operators was incorrectly assessed by the facility licensee. This impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance to assess and maintain the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems.

The significance determination was performed in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP). Question 9, in Appendix I, asked if the finding was related to licensee administration of an annual requalification operating test.

The answer to this question was YES because, in accordance with section 03.05 and Appendix D of IP 71111.11, there were examinee performance errors during JPMs that were not detected by facility evaluators and the inspectors did not agree with all of the pass/fail determinations for JPMs that were observed. Additionally, there was one uncorrected administration error observed during the performance of a simulator scenario and the scenario was not conducted as planned. Consequently, this finding was characterized as having very low safety significance (Green).

The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of procedural compliance in the Work Practices component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to define or effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel follow procedures.

H.4(b)

Enforcement:

Enforcement action does not apply because the performance deficiency did not involve a violation of a regulatory requirement. The facility licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR-13-03186 and CR-13-03289). Because the finding does not involve a violation and is of very low safety significance, it is identified as FIN 05000395/2013010-03, Failure to Meet Training Program Standards for Administration of the Annual Licensed Operator Requalification Operating Examination.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 8, 2013, a teleconference was held with Mr. A. Barbee and other members of the licensees staff to discuss the results of this inspection. The team verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

G. Lippard, General Manager of Nuclear Operations

A. Barbee, Director of Nuclear Training

R. Justice, Operations Manager

B. Thompson, Manager of Nuclear Licensing

M. Mosley, Nuclear Training Manager

M. Coleman, Manager of Health Physics and Safety

S. Zarandi, General Manager of Nuclear Support Services

R. Garner, Operations Training Supervisor

E. Warden, Requalification Training Supervisor

F. Lucas, Operations Supervisor

G. McEntyre, Training Supervisor

J. Garza, Nuclear Licensing Supervisor

M. Moore, Nuclear Licensing Supervisor

J. Lawter, Simulator Supervisor

T. Bowers, Medical Coordinator

T. Stewart, Engineer Associate

L. Ainsworth, Training Instructor

D. Wokurka, Training Instructor

M. Youmans, Simulator Training

S. Poteet, Training Support Supervisor

NRC personnel

E. Coffman, Resident Inspector

J. Viera, Operations Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened and Closed

05000395/2013010-01 FIN Failure to Meet Training Program Standards on Job Performance Measures for the Annual Licensed Operator Requalification Operating Examination (Section 1R11.1)

05000395/2013010-02 FIN Failure to Meet Training Program Standards for the Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Written Examination (Section 1R11.2)

05000395/2013010-03 FIN Failure to Meet Training Program Standards for Administration of the Annual Licensed Operator Requalification Operating Examination (Section 1R11.3)